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BIOGRAPHIES

OF

ANCIENT AND MODERN

CELEBRATED FREETHINKERS.

REPRINTED FROM AN ENGLISH WORK, ENTITLED

"HALF-HOURS WITH THE FREETHINKERS."

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EDITORS' PREFACE.

In these pages, appearing under the title of "Half-Hours with the Freethinkers," are collected in a readable form an abstract of the lives and doctrines of some of those who have stood foremost in the ranks of Freethought in all countries and in all ages; and we trust that our efforts to place in the hands of the poorest of our party a knowledge of works and workers—some of which and whom would otherwise be out of their reach—will be received by all in a favorable light. We shall, in the course of our publication, have to deal with many writers whose opinions widely differ from our own, and it shall be our care to deal with them *justly*, and in all cases to allow them to utter in their own words their essential thinkings.

We lay no claim to originality in the mode of treatment—we will endeavor to cull the choicest flowers from the garden, and if others can make a brighter or better boquet, we shall be glad to have their assistance. We have only one object in view, and that is, the presenting of free and manly thoughts to our readers, hoping to induce like thinking in them, and trusting that noble work may follow noble thoughts. The Freethinkers we intend treating of have also been Free Workers, endeavoring to raise men's minds from superstition and bigotry, and place before them a knowledge of the real.

We have been the more inclined to issue the "Half-Hours with the Freethinkers" in consequence, not only of the difficulty which many have in obtaining the works of the Old Freethinkers, but also as an effective answer to some remarks which have lately appeared in certain religious publications, implying a dearth of thought and thinkers beyond the pale of the Church. We wish all men to know that great minds and good men *have* sought truth apart from faith for many ages, and that it is because few were prepared to receive them, and many united to *crush* them, their works are so difficult of access to the general mass at the present day.

BIOGRAPHY

OF

THOMAS HOBBES.

This distinguished Freethinker was born on the 5th of April, 1588, at Malmesbury; hence his cognomen of "the philosopher of Malmesbury." In connection with his birth, we are told that his mother, being a loyal Protestant, was so terrified at the rumored approach of the Spanish Armada, that the birth of her son was hastened in consequence. The subsequent timidity of Hobbes is therefore easily accounted for. The foundation of his education was laid in the grammar school of his native town, where most probably his father (being a clergyman) would officiate as tutor. At the age of fifteen he was sent to Oxford. Five years of assiduous study made him proficient as a tutor; this, combined with his amiability and profound views of society, gained him the respect of the Earl of Devonshire, and he was appointed tutor to the Earl's son, Lord Cavendish. From 1610 to 1628, he was constantly in the society of this nobleman, in the capacity of secretary. In the interval of this time he travelled in France, Germany, and Italy; cultivating in each capital the society of the leading statesmen and philosophers. Lord Herbert, of Cherbury, the first great English Deist, and Ben Jonson, the dramatist, were each his boon companions. In the year 1628, Hobbes again made the tour of the Continent for three years with another pupil, and became acquainted at Pisa with Galileo. In 1631 he was entrusted with the education

of another youth of the Devonshire family, and for near five years remained at Paris with his pupil.

Hobbes returned to England in 1636. The troublous politics of this age, with its strong party prejudices, made England the reverse of a pleasant retirement, for either Hobbes or his patrons; so, perceiving the outbreak of the Revolution, he emigrated to Paris. There in the enjoyment of the company of Gassendi and Descartes, with the *elite* of Parisian genius, he was for awhile contented and happy. Here he engaged in a series of mathematical quarrels, which were prolonged throughout the whole of his life, on the quadrature of the circle. Seven years after, he was appointed mathematical tutor to the Prince of Wales, afterwards Charles II. In 1642, Hobbes published the first of his principal works, "De Cive, or Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society." It was written to curb the spirit of anarchy, then so rampant in England, by exposing the inevitable results which must of necessity spring from the want of a coherent government amongst a people disunited and uneducated. The principles inculcated in this work were reproduced in the year 1651, in the "Leviathan, or the Matter, Form, and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil;" this, along with a "Treatise on Human Nature," and a small work on "The Body Politic," form the groundwork of the "selfish schools" of moral philosophy. As soon as they were published, they were attacked by the clergy of every country in Europe. They were interdicted by the Pontiffs of the Roman and Greek Church, along with the Protestants scattered over Europe, and the Episcopal authorities of England. Indeed, to such an extent did this persecution rise, that even the royalist exiles received warning that there was no chance for their ostracism being removed, unless "the unclean thing (Hobbes) was put away from their midst." The young prince, intimidated by those ebullitions of vengeance against his tutor, was obliged to withdraw his protection from him, and the old man, then near seventy years of age,

was compelled to escape from Paris by night, pursued by his enemies, who, according to Lord Clarendon, tracked his footsteps from France. Fortunately for Hobbes, he took refuge with his old protectors, the Devonshire family, who were too powerful to be wantonly insulted. While residing at Chatsworth, he would no doubt acutely feel the loss of Descartes, the Cardinal de Richelieu, and Gassendi; in the place of those men he entered into a warm friendship with Cowley, the poet, Selden, Harvey, the discoverer of the circulation of the blood, Charles Blount, and the witty Sir Thomas Brown.

In 1654, he published a "Letter upon Liberty and Necessity;" this brief tractate is unsurpassed in Freethought literature for its clear, concise, subtle, and demonstrative proofs of the self-determining power of the will, and the truth of philosophical necessity. All subsequent writers on this question have largely availed themselves of Hobbes's arguments, particularly the pamphleteers of Socialism. It is a fact no less true than strange, that Communism is derived from the system of Hobbes, which has always been classed along with that of Machiavelli, as an apology for despotism. The grand peculiarity of Hobbes is his method. Instead of taking speculation and reasoning upon theories, he carried out the inductive system of Bacon in its entirety, reasoning from separate generic facts, instead of analogically. By this means he narrowed the compass of knowledge, and made everything demonstrative that was capable of proof. Belief was consequently placed upon its proper basis, and a rigid analysis separated the boundaries of Knowing and Being. Hobbes looked at the great end of existence and embodied it in a double axiom. 1st. The desire for self-preservation. 2nd. To render ourselves happy. From those duplex principles which are inherent in all animals, a modern politician has perpetrated a platitude which represents in a sentence the end and aim of all legislation, "the greatest happiness for the greatest number." This is the *ultimatum* of Hobbes's philo-

sophy. Its method of accomplishment was by treating society as one large family, with the educated and skilled as governors, having under their care the training of the nation. All acting from one impulse (self-preservation,) and by the conjoint experience of all, deriving the greatest amount of happiness from this activity. Hobbes opposed the Revolution, because it degenerated into a faction; and supported Charles Stuart because there were more elements of cohesion within his own party, than amongst his enemies. It was here where the cry of despotism arose; the "Roundheads" seeing they could not detach the ablest men from the King's party, denounced their literary opponents as "lovers of Belial, and of tyranny." This was their most effective answer to the "Leviathan." In after years, when the Episcopal party no longer stood in need of the services of Hobbes, they heaped upon him the stigma of heresy, until his *ci-devant* friends and enemies were united in the condemnation of the man they most feared. Mr. Owen, in his scheme of Socialism, took his leading idea on non-responsibility from Hobbes's explanation of necessity, and the freedom of the will. The old divines had inculcated a doctrine to the effect that the "will" was a separate entity of the human mind, which swayed the whole disposition, and was of itself essentially corrupt. Ample testimony from the Bible substantiated this position. But in the method of Hobbes, he lays down the facts that we can have no knowledge without experience, and no experience without sensation. The mind therefore is composed of classified sensations, united together by the law of an association of ideas. This law was first discovered by Hobbes, who makes the human will to consist in the strongest motive which sways the balance on any side. This is the simplest explanation which can be given on a subject more mystified than any other in theology.

A long controversy betwixt Bishop Bramhall, of Londonderry, followed the publication of Hobbes's views on Liberty and Necessity. Charles II. on his restora-

tion, bestowed an annual pension of £100 on Hobbes, but this did not prevent the parliament, in 1666, censuring the "De Cive" and "Leviathan," besides his other works. Hobbes also translated the Greek historian, Thucydides, Homer's Odyssey, and the Illiad. The last years of his life were spent in composing "Behemoth; or, a History of the Civil Wars from 1640 to 1660," which was finished in the year he died, but not published until after his death. At the close of the year 1679, he was taken seriously ill. At the urgent request of some Christians, they were permitted to intrude their opinions upon his dying bed, telling him gravely that his illness would end in death, and unless he repented, he would go straight to hell. Hobbes calmly replied, "I shall be glad then to find a hole to creep out of the world." For seventy years he had been a persecuted man, but during that time his enemies had paid him that tribute of respect which genius always extorts from society. He was a man who was hated and dreaded. He had reached the age of ninety-two when he died. His words were pregnant with meaning; and he never used an unnecessary sentence. A collection of moral apothegms might be gathered from his table-talk. When asked why he did not read every new book which appeared, he said, "If I had read as much as other men, I should have been as ignorant." His habits were simple; he rose early in the morning, took a long walk through the grounds of Chatsworth, and cultivated healthful recreation. The after part of the day was devoted to study and composition. Like Sir Walter Raleigh, he was a devoted admirer of the "fragrant herb." Charles II.'s constant witticism, styled Hobbes as "a bear against whom the Church played their young dogs, in order to exercise them."

If there had been a few more similar "bears," the priestly "dogs" would long since have been exterminated, for none of them escaped unhurt from their encounters with the "grizly" of Malmesbury, except it was in the mathematical disputes with Dr. Wallis.

He was naturally of a timid disposition: this was the result of the accident which caused his premature birth, and being besides of a reserved character, he was ill-fitted to meet the physical rebuffs of the world. It is said that he was so afraid of his personal safety, that he objected to be left alone in an empty house; this charge is to some extent true, but we must look to the mitigating circumstances of the case. He was a feeble man, turned the age of three-score and ten, with all the clergy of England hounding on their dupes to murder an old philosopher because he had exposed their dogmas. It was but a few years before, that Protestants and Papists had complimented each other's religion by burning those who were the weakest, and long after Hobbes's death, Protestants murdered, ruined, disgraced, and placed in the pillory Dissenters and Catholics alike, and Thomas Hobbes had positive proof that it was the intention of the Church of England to *burn him alive*, on the stake, a martyr for his opinions. This, then, is a sufficient justification for Hobbes feeling afraid, and instead of it being thrown as a taunt at this illustrious Freethinker, it is a standing stigma on those who would re-enact the tragedy of persecution, if public opinion would allow it.

Sir James Mackintosh says:* "The style of Hobbes is the very perfection of didactic language. Short, clear, precise, pithy, his language never has more than one meaning, which never requires a second thought to find. By the help of his exact method, it takes so firm a hold on the mind, that it will not allow attention to slacken. His little tract on human nature has scarcely an ambiguous or a needless word. He has so great a power of always choosing the most significant term, that he never is reduced to the poor expedient of using many in its stead. He had so thoroughly studied the genius of the language, and knew so well how to steer between pedantry and vulgarity, that

* Second Dissertation: Encyclopædia Brit., p. 318.

two centuries have not superannuated probably more than a dozen of his words."

Lord Clarendon describes the personal character of Hobbes as "one for whom he always had a great esteem as a man, who besides his eminent parts of learning and knowledge, hath been always looked upon as a man of probity, and a life free from scandal."

We now proceed to make a selection of quotations from the works of this writer, commencing with those on the "Necessity of the Will," in reply to Bishop Bramhall.

"The question is not whether a man be a free agent —that is to say, whether he can write, or forbear, speak, or be silent, according to his will; but whether the will to write, and the will to forbear, come upon him according to his will, or according to anything else in his own power. I acknowledge this liberty, that I can *do*, if I *will*, but to say, I can *will* if I *will*, I take to be an absurd speech." Further replying to Bramhall's argument, that we do not learn the "idea of the freedom of the will" from our tutors, but we know it intuitively, Hobbes says, "It is true very few have learned from tutors that a man is not free to will; nor do they find it much in books. That they find in books that which the poets chaunt in the theatres, and the shepherds on the mountains, that which the pastors teach in the churches, and the doctors in the universities; and that which the common people in the markets, and all the people do assent unto, is the same that I assent unto; namely, that a man hath freedom to do if he will; but whether he hath freedom to will, is a question which it seems neither the Bishop nor they ever thought of.....A wooden top that is lashed by the boys, and runs about, sometimes to one wall, sometimes to another, sometimes spinning, sometimes hitting men on the shins, if it were sensible of its own motion, would think it proceeded from its own will, unless it felt what lashed it. And is a man any wiser when he runs to one place for a benifice, to another for a bargain, and troubles the world

with writing errors, and requiring answers, because he thinks he does it without other cause than his own will, and seeth not what are the lashings which cause that will?"

Hobbes casually mentions the subject of "praise or dispraise," in reference to the will; those who are old enough will remember this was one of the most frequent subjects of discussion amongst the earlier Socialists. "These depend not at all in the necessity of the action praised or dispraised. For what is it else to praise, but to say *a thing is good*? Good, I say, for me, or for somebody else, or for the State and Commonwealth. And what is it to say an action is good, but to say it is as I would wish, or as another would have it, or according to the will of the State—that is to say, according to the law? Does my lord think that no action could please me, or the commonwealth, that should proceed from necessity? Things may be therefore necessary, and yet praiseworthy, as also necessary, and yet dispraised, and neither of them both in vain; because praise and dispraise, and likewise reward and punishment, do, by example, make and conform the will to good or evil. It was a very great praise, in my opinion, that Vellerius Paterculus gives Cato, where he says that he was good by nature, '*et quia aliter esse non potuit.*'—'And because he could not do otherwise.'" This able treatise was reprinted, and extensively read about twenty years ago; but, like many other of our standard works, it is at present out of print.

The "Leviathan" is still readable, a bold masculine book. It treats everything in a cool, analytic style. The knife of the Socialist is sheathed in vain; no rhapsody can overturn its impassioned teachings. Rhetoric is not needed to embellish the truths he has to portray, for the wild flowers of genius but too frequently hide the yawning chasms in the garden of logic. It is not to be expected that this book will be read now with the interest with which it was perused two centuries ago; then every statement was impugned,

every argument denied, and the very tone of the book called forth an interference from parliament to stop the progress of its heresies. Now the case is widely different, and the general tenor of the treatise is the rule in which are illustrated alike the works of the philosophers and the dreams of the sophists (priests.) We give part of the introduction. "Nature (the art whereby God hath made and governs the world) is, by the art of man, as in many other things, so in this also, imitated, that it can make an artificial animal. For seeing life is but a motion of limbs, the beginning whereof is in some principal part within; why may we not say, that all automata (engines that move themselves by springs and wheels, as doth a watch) have an artificial life? For what is the heart but a spring; and the nerves but so many strings; and the joints but so many wheels, giving motion to the whole body, such as was intended by the Artificer? Art goes yet further, imitating that rational and most excellent work of nature, man. For by art is created that great leviathan, called a Commonwealth, or State, which is but an artificial man though of greater stature and strength than the natural, for whose protection and defence it was intended, and the sovereignty of which is an artificial soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body. To describe the nature of this artificial man, I will consider

"1st. The *matter* thereof, and the *artificer*, both which is man.

"2nd. *How*, and by what *covenants* it is made; what are the *rights* and *just* power or authority of a sovereign; and what it is that *preserveth* and dissolveth it.

"3rd. What is a Christian Commonwealth.

"Lastly, what is the kingdom of darkness.

"The first chapter treats of 'Senses.' Concerning the thoughts of man, I will consider them first singly, and afterwards in train, or dependence upon one another. Singly, they are every one a representation, or appearance, of some quality or accident of a body without us, which is commonly called an object. Which

object worketh on the eyes, ears, and other parts of a man's body, and by diversity of working, produceth diversity of appearances. The original of them all is that which we call sense, for there is no conception in a man's mind, which hath not at first totally or by parts been begotten upon the organs of sense; the rest are derived from that original."

Speaking of "Imagination," Hobbes says, "That when a thing lies still, unless somewhat else stir it, it will lie still forever, is a truth no one doubts of. But that when a thing is in motion, it will eternally be in motion, unless somewhat else stay it, though the reason be the same—namely, that nothing can change itself—is not so easily assented to. For men measure not only other men, but all other things, by themselves; and because they find themselves subject after motion to pain and lassitude, think everything else grows weary of motion, and seeks repose of its own accord—little considering whether it be not some other motion, wherein that desire of rest they find in themselves consisteth.....When a body is once in motion, it moveth (unless something else hinder it) eternally, and whatsoever hindereth it, cannot in an instant, but in time, and by degrees, quite extinguish it; and as we see in the water, though the wind cease, the waves give not over rolling for a long time after; so also it happeneth in that motion which is made in the internal parts of man, then, when he sees, dreams, etc. For after the object is removed, or the eye shut, we still retain an image of the thing seen, though more obscure than when we see it.....The decay of sense in men waking, is not the decay of the motion made in sense, but an obscuring of it, in such manner as the light of the sun obscureth the light of the stars; which stars do no less exercise their virtue, by which they are visible in the day, than in the night. But because amongst many strokes which our eyes, ears, and other organs receive from external bodies, the predominant only is sensible; therefore the light of the sun being only predominant, we are not affected with the

actions of the stars.....This decaying sense, when we would express the thing itself (I mean fancy itself), we call imagination, as I said before, but when we would express the Decay, and signify the sense is fading, old, and past, it is called Memory ; so that imagination and memory are but one thing, which, for divers considerations, hath divers names."*

Such is the commencement of this celebrated book ; it is based upon materialism; every argument must stand this test upon Hobbes's principles, and characteristically are they elaborated. Hobbes ("De Cive") says of the immortality of the soul, "It is a belief grounded upon other men's sayings, that they knew it supernaturally; or that they knew those who knew them, that knew others, that knew it supernaturally." A sparkling sneer, and perhaps the truest answer to so universal an error. Dugald Stewart, in his analysis of the works of Hobbes, says, † "The fundamental doctrines inculcated in the political works of Hobbes, are contained in the following propositions :—All men are by nature equal, and, prior to government, they had all an equal right to enjoy the good things of this world. Man, too, is by nature, a solitary and purely selfish animal; the social union being entirely an interested league, suggested by prudential views of personal advantage. The necessary consequence is, that a state of nature must be a state of perpetual warfare, in which no individual has any other means of safety than his own strength or ingenuity ; and in which there is no room for regular industry, because no secure enjoyment of its fruits. In confirmation of this view of the origin of society, Hobbes appeals to facts falling daily within the cycle of our experience. "Does not a man (he asks) when taking a journey, arm himself, and seek to go well accompanied? When going to sleep, does he not lock his doors?" Nay, even in his own house, does he not lock his chests? Does he not

* Leviathan. Ed. 1651.

† Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Science, p. 41.

there accuse mankind by his action, as I do by my words?" For the sake of peace and security, it is necessary that each individual should surrender a part of his natural right, and be contented with such a share of liberty as he is willing to allow to others; or, to use Hobbes's own language, "every man must divest himself of the right he has to all things by nature; the right of all men to all things, being in effect no better than if no man had a right to anything." In consequence of this transference of natural rights to an individual, or to a body of individuals, the multitude become one person, under the name of a State, or Republic, by which person the common will and power are exercised for the common defence. The ruling power cannot be withdrawn from those to whom it has been committed; nor can they be punished for misgovernment. The interpretation of the laws is to be sought, not from the comments of philosophers, but from the authority of the ruler; otherwise society would every moment be in danger of resolving itself into the discordant elements of which it was at first composed.—The will of the magistrate, therefore, is to be regarded as the ultimate standard of right and wrong, and his voice to be listened to by every citizen as the voice of conscience."

Such are the words of one of Hobbes's most powerful opponents. Dr. Warburton says, "The philosopher of Malmesbury was the terror of the last age, as Tindal and Collins are of this. The press sweats with controversy; and every young churchman militant would try his arms in thundering on Hobbes's steel cap." This is a modest acknowledgment of the power of Hobbes, from the most turbulent divine of the eighteenth century.

Victor Comyin gives the following as his view of the philosophy of Hobbes:—"There is no other certain evidence than that of the senses. The evidence of the senses attests only the existence of bodies; then there is no existence save that of bodies, and philosophy is only the science of bodies.

"There are two sorts of bodies: 1st, Natural bodies, which are the theatre of a multitude of regular phenomena, because they take place by virtue of fixed laws, as the bodies with which physics are occupied; 2nd, Moral and political bodies, societies which constantly change and are subject to variable laws.

"Hobbes's system of physics is that of Democritus, the atomistic and corpuscular of the Ionic school.

"His metaphysics are its corollary; all the phenomena which pass in the consciousness have their source in the organization, of which the consciousness in itself is simply a result. All the ideas come from the senses. To think, is to calculate; and intelligence is nothing else than an arithmetic. As we do not calculate without signs, we do not think without words; the truth of the thought is in the relation of the words among themselves, and metaphysics are reduced to a perfect language. Hobbes is completely a nominalist. With Hobbes there are no other than contingent ideas; the finite alone can be conceived; the infinite is only a negation of the finite; beyond that it is a mere word invented to honor a being whom faith alone can reach. The idea of good and evil has no other foundation than agreeable or disagreeable sensations; to agreeable or disagreeable sensation it is impossible to apply any other law than escape from the one and search after the other; hence the morality of Hobbes, which is the foundation of his politics. Man is capable of enjoying and of suffering; his only law is to suffer as little, and enjoy as much, as possible. Since such is his only law, he has all the rights that this law confers upon him; he may do anything for his preservation and his happiness; he has the right to sacrifice everything to himself. Behold, then, men upon this earth, where the objects of desire are not superabundant, all possessing equal rights to whatever may be agreeable or useful to them, by virtue of the same capacity for enjoyment and suffering. This is a state of nature, which is nothing less than a state of war, the anarchy of the passions, a combat in which every man is arrayed

against his neighbor. But this state being opposed to the happiness of the majority of individuals who share it, utility, the offspring of egotism itself, demands its exchange for another, to wit, the social state. The social state is the institution of a public power, stronger than all individuals, capable of making peace succeed war, and imposing on all the accomplishment of whatever it shall have judged to be useful, that is, just."

Before we dismiss the father of Freethought from our notice, there remains a tribute of respect to be paid to one whom it is our duty to associate with the author of the "Leviathan," and who has but just passed away—one man amongst the British aristocracy, with the disposition of a tribune of the people, coupled with thoughts at once elevated and free, and a position which rendered him of essential service to struggling opinion. This man saw the greatness, the profound depth, the attic style, and the immense importance of the works of Hobbes, along with their systematic depreciation by those whose duty it should be to explain them, especially at a time when those works were not reprinted, and the public were obliged to glean their character from the refutations (so called) by mangled quotations, and a distorted meaning. Impelled by this thought, and anxious to protect the memory of a philosopher, his devoted disciple, at a cost of £10,000, translated the Latin, and edited the English works of Hobbes, in a manner worthy alike of the genius of the author, and the discernment of his editor. For this kindness, a seat in Parliament was lost by the organization of the clergy in Cornwall. The name of this man was Sir William Molesworth. Let Freethinkers cherish the memory of their benefactor.

We now take our leave of Thomas Hobbes. He had not the chivalry of Herbert; the vivacity of Raleigh; the cumulative power of Bacon; or the winning policy of Locke. If his physical deformities prevented him from being as daring as Vane, he was as bold in thought and expression as either Descartes, or his young friend Blount. He gave birth to the brilliant constellation of

genius in the time of Queen Anne. He did not live to see his system extensively promulgated; but his principles moulded the character of the men who formed the revolution of 1688, equally as much as Hume established the Scotch and German schools of philosophy; and Voltaire laid the train by which the French Revolution was proclaimed. Peace to his memory! It was a stormy struggle during his life; its frowns cannot hurt him now. Could we believe in the idea of a future life, we should invoke his blessings on our cause. That cause which for near two hundred years has successfully struggled into birth, to youth, and maturity. Striking down in its onward course superstitions which hath grown with centuries, and where it does not exterminate them, it supplies a purer atmosphere, and extracts the upas-sting which has laid low so many, and which must yet be finally exterminated. The day is rapidly dawning when our only deities will be the works of genius, and our only prayer the remembrance of our most illustrious chiefs.

A. C.

BIOGRAPHY

OF

LORD BOLINGBROKE.

Henry St. John, Lord Bolingbroke, was born in his family seat at Battersea, on the 1st of October, 1672, and died there on November 15th, 1751, in his 79th year. He was educated by a clergyman in an unnatural manner, and speedily developed himself accordingly. When he left Oxford, he was one of the handsomest men of the day—his majestic figure, refined address, dazzling wit, and classic eloquence, made him irresistibly the "first gentleman in Europe." Until his twenty-fourth year, he was renowned more for the graces of his person, and the fascination of his wild exploits, rather than possessing a due regard to his rank and abilities. His conduct, however, was completely changed when he became a Member of Parliament. The hopes of his friends were resuscitated when they discovered the aptitude for business—the ready eloquence, and the sound reasoning of the once wild St. John. He soon became the hardest worker and the leader of the House of Commons. The expectations of the nation rose high when night after night he spoke with the vivacity of a poet, and the profundity of a veteran statesman on public affairs. In 1704, he received the seals as Secretary-of-War, and was mainly instrumental in gaining Marlborough's victories, by the activity with which he supplied the English General with munitions of war. On the ascendency of the Whigs, St. John re-

signed his office, and retired into privacy for two years, when the Whig administration was destroyed, and St. John re-appeared as Secretary for Foreign Affairs. His greatest work now was the negotiation of the treaty of Utrecht. This treaty was signed by St. John (then Lord Bolingbroke,) he being sent to Paris as the British Plenipotentiary, and was hailed by the Parisians as a guardian angel. To such an extent was this feeling manifested, that when he visited the theatres every one *rose* to welcome him. So long as Queen Anne lived, Bolingbroke's influence was paramount, but associated with him was the Earl of Oxford, in opposition to the Whig party, and serious differences had arisen between the rivals. Oxford was dismissed four days before the Queen's death, and Bolingbroke officiated in his place, until Oxford's vacancy was filled, which all expected would be given to himself. A stormy debate in the Privy Council so agitated the Queen, that it shortened her life, and the Council recommended the Earl of Shrewsbury as Premier, and with him the Whigs.

With the accession of George, came the impeachment of Bolingbroke by the victorious Whigs. Knowing that it was their intention to sacrifice him to party revenge, and that his accusers would likewise act as his judges, he wisely withdrew himself to France. The Pretender held a mimic court at Avignon, and a debating society at Lorraine, entitled a Parliament. He offered Bolingbroke the office of Secretary of State, which was accepted by him; and it was only at this time that the emanations of the exiled Stuart's cabinet possessed either a solidity of aim, or a definite purpose. If Louis XIV. had lived longer, he might have assisted the Pretender, but with his death expired the hopes of that ill-fated dynasty. Bolingbroke strove to husband the means which the Chevalier's friends had collected, but the advice of the Duke of Ormond was listened to in preference to Bolingbroke's. The results which Bolingbroke foretold—proceeding rashly, and failing ignominously—both occurred. The insur-

rection broke out, and failed—no other end could have been anticipated. Intrigues were fast coiling themselves around the secretary; he was openly blamed for the reverses in Scotland—but he was alike careless of their wrath or its issue. One morning Ormond waited upon him with two slips of paper from the Pretender, informing him that his services were no longer required. After his dismissal he was impeached by the lackeys of the Pretender under seven heads, which were widely distributed throughout Europe. There is this anomaly in the life of Bolingbroke, witnessed in no other Englishman: In one year he was the most powerful man in England — Secretary of State — an exile—and then in the same year he occupied a similar office to one who aimed at the English throne, and was impeached by both parties.

For several years he occupied himself in France with philosophical pursuits—until the year 1723 — when he received a pardon, which allowed him to return to England, but still his sequestered estates were not returned, and this apology for a pardon was negotiated by a bribe of £11,000 to the German Duchess of Kendal—one of the king's mistresses.

Alexander Pope was Bolingbroke's constant correspondent. Pope had won the applause of England by his poems, and was then considered the arbiter of genius. Voltaire occupied a similar position in France. Since Pope first laid the copy of his greatest epic at the feet of Bolingbroke, and begged of him to correct its errors, he had gradually won himself that renown which prosperity has endorsed. But what a unity in divergence did those philosophers present! The calm moralism of Pope, his sweet and polished rhyme, contrasted with the fiery wit and hissing sarcasm of the Frenchman, more trenchant than Pope's, yet wanting his sparkling epigrams. The keen discernment of both these men saw in Bolingbroke a master, and they ranked by his side as twin apostles of a new and living faith. It was the penetration of true greatness which discerned in the English peer that sublimity of intel-

lect they possessed themselves, without the egotism of an imbecile rival. Bolingbroke had cherished the ethics of one, and restrained the rancor of the other — and both men yielded to him whose system they worshipped; and this trinity of Deists affords the noblest example which can be evoked to prove the Harmony of Reason amidst the most varied accomplishments. Although Pope's name occurs but seldom in the history of Freethought—while that of Bolingbroke is emblazoned in all its glory, and Voltaire is enshrined as its only Deity—yet we must not forget that what is now known as the only collection of St. John's works (the edition in five volumes by Mallet,) were written for the instruction of Pope—sent to him in letters—discussed and agreed to by him—so that the great essayist is as much implicated in them as the author of the Dictionary. It is said, "In his society these two illustrious men felt and acknowledged a superior genius; and if he had no claim to excellence in poetry—the art in which they were so pre-eminent—he surpassed them both in the philosophy they so much admired."

For ten years after this period, he devoted himself to various political writings, which were widely circulated; but we must waive the pleasure at present of analyzing those, and confine our attention to the alliance between Pope and Bolingbroke, in the new school of philosophy.

Bolingbroke's principal friends were Pope, Swift, Mallet, Wyndam, and Atterbury. The first three were most in his confidence in regard to religion: and although Pope was educated a Roman Catholic, and occasionally conformed to that hierarchy (and like Voltaire, for peace, died in it,) yet the philosophical letters which passed between Pope and St. John, fully established him as a consistent Deist—an honor to which Swift also attained, although being a dignitary of the Church: but if doubts arise on the subject, they can easily be dispelled. General Grimouard, in his "Essai sur Bolingbroke," says that "he was intimate with

the widow of Mallet, the poet, who was a lady of much talent and learning, and had lived upon terms of friendship with Bolingbroke, Swift, Pope, and many other distinguished characters of the day, who frequently met at her house." The General adds, that the lady has been frequently heard to declare, that these men were all equally deistical in their sentiments (que c'etait une societe de purs deistes;) that Swift from his clerical character was a little more reserved than the others, but he was evidently of the same sentiments at bottom.

There is a remarkable passage in one of Pope's letters to Swift, which seems rather corroborative of the General's. He is inviting Swift to come and visit him. "The day is come," he says, "which I have often wished, but never thought to see, when every mortal I esteem is of the same sentiments in politics and religion." Dr. Warton remarks upon this paragraph "At this time therefore (1733) he (Pope) and Bolingbroke were of the same sentiment in religion as well as politics;"* and Pope writing to Swift is proof sufficient that Bolingbroke, Swift, and himself, were united in opinions. Wherever Swift's name is known, it is associated with his spleen on account of his not being elevated to the Episcopal Bench, when he was promised a vacancy, which was reserved for him; but Queen Anne absolutely refused to confer such a dignity upon the author of "Gulliver's Travels"—that profound satire upon society and religion; and this occurring at a time when his energetic services were so much needed in defence of the government he so assisted by pamphleteering, satire, and wholesale lampoons. Mr. Cooke says, "The Earl of Nottingham, in the debate upon the Dissenters' Bill, chiefly founded his objection to the provision that the Bishops should have the only power of licensing tutors, upon the likelihood there was that a man who was in a fair way for becoming a Bishop, was hardly suspected of being a

* Cook's Life of Bolingbroke, 2nd vol., p. 97.

Christian." This pointed allusion to Swift passed without comment or reply in a public assembly, composed in a great measure of his private friends and associates. This seems to intimate that the opinion of his contemporaries was not very strong in favor of Swift's religious principles." This may suffice to prove the unanimity of sentiment existing among this brilliant coterie—one a political Churchman—another the greatest poet of his age—the third, the most accomplished statesman of his country. Although they were united in religious conviction, it would have been certain ruin to any of the confederates if the extent of their thoughts had reached the public ear. The Dean wrote for the present—the poet for his age—and the peer for the immediate benefit of his friends, and a record for the future. But they were all agreed that some code of ethics should be promulgated, which should embody the positive speculations of Bolingbroke, with the easy grace of Pope—the elaborate research of the philosopher with the rhetoric of the poet. Swift coalesced in this idea, but was, to a certain extent, ignorant of its subsequent history. It was not thought prudent to trust Mallet and others with the secret. For this purpose the "Essay of Man" was designed on the principles elaborated by Bolingbroke in his private letters to Pope. It was Bolingbroke who drew up the scheme, mapped out the arguments, and sketched the similes—it was Pope who embellished its beauties, and turned it into rhyme. Doctor Warton, the editor of Pope, also proves this:—"Lord Bathurst told the Doctor that he had read the whole of the 'Essay on Man' in *the handwriting of Bolingbroke*, and drawn up in a series of propositions which Pope was to amplify, versify, and to illustrate." If further proofs are required, that Bolingbroke was not only a co-partner but coadjutor with Pope, it is found in the opening of the poem, where the poet uses the plural in speaking of Bolingbroke—

"Awake, my St. John, leave all meaner things
To low ambition, and the pride of kings.
* * * * *

Laugh when we must, be candid when you can,
And vindicate the ways of God to man."

This is sufficient to prove the partnership in the poem, and from the generally acknowledged fact of his connection, we have no hesitation in declaring that this poem is the grand epic of Deism, and is as much the offspring of Bolingbroke, as his own ideas when enunciated by others. There is not a single argument in the Essay but what is much more elaborated in the works of Bolingbroke, while every positive argument is reduced to a few poetic maxims in the Essay. We may as well look here for Bolingbroke's creed, rather than amongst his prose works. There is, however, this difference, that in the Essay there is laid down an ethical scheme of positivism—*i. e.*, of everything in morals which can be duly tested and nothing more: while in the prose writings of Bolingbroke, the negative side of theology is discussed with an amount of erudition which has never been surpassed by any of the great leaders of Freethought. The first proposition of the Essay is based on a postulate, upon which the whole reasoning is built. Overthrow this substratum, and the philosophy of the Essay is overturned—admit it, and its truth is evident; it is—

"What can we reason but from what we know?"

This is equivalent to saying that we can only reason concerning man as a finite part of an infinite existence, and we can only predicate respecting what comes under the *category of positive knowledge;* we are therefore disabled from speculating in any theories which have for a basis opposition to the collected experience of mankind. This was a position laid down by Bolingbroke to escape all the historical arguments which some men deduce from alleged miraculous agency in the past, or problematical prophecy in the future. It likewise shows the untenable nature of all analogy, which presumes to trace an hypothetical first cause, or personal intelligence, to account for a supposed

origin of primeval existence, by which nature was caused, or forms of being first evolved. Although it may be deemed inconsistent with the philosophy of Bolingbroke to admit a God in the same argument as the above, we must not forget that in all speculative reasoning there must be an assumption of some kind, which ought to be demonstrated by proof, or a suitable equivalent in the form of universal consent. Yet in the case of the God of the Essay, we look in vain for the attributes with which Theists love to clothe THEIR God, and we can but perceive inexorable necessity in the shape of rigid and unswerving laws, collected in one focus by Pope, and dignified with the name of God; so that the difference betwixt a Deist of the old, and an Atheist of the modern school, is one of mere WORDS—they both commence with an assumption, the Atheist only defining his terms more strictly, the subject-matter in both instances being the same. The only difference being, the one deceives himself with a meaningless word, the other is speechless on what he cannot comprehend. The Essay shows a scheme of universal gradation, composed of a series of links, which are one entwined within the other—every rock being placed in its necessitated position—every plant amidst its growth bearing an exoteric similitude to itself—every animal, from the lowest quadruped to the highest race of man, occupying a range of climate adapted to its requirements. The Essay here is scientifically correct, and agrees with the ablest writers on necessity. A German philosopher, renowned alike for rigid analysis and transcendent abilities as a successful theorist, observes, "When I contemplate all things as a whole, I perceive one *nature*, one *force:* when I regard them as individuals, many forces which develop themselves according to their inward laws, and pass through all the forms of which they are capable, and all the objects in nature are but those forces under certain limitations. Every manifestation of every individual power of nature is determined partly by itself, partly by its own preceding manifestations, and partly

by the manifestations of all other powers of nature with which it is connected; but it is connected with all, for nature is one connected whole. Its manifestations are, therefore, strictly necessary, and it is absolutely impossible to be other than as it is. In every moment of her duration nature is one connected whole, in every moment must every individual be what IT IS, because all others are what they are, and a single grain of sand could not be moved from its place, without, however imperceptibly to us, changing something throughout all parts of the immeasurable whole. Every moment of duration is determined by all past moments, and will determine all future movements, and even the position of a grain of sand cannot be conceived other than it is, without supposing other changes to an indefinite extent. Let us imagine that grain of sand to be lying some few feet further inland than it actually does; then must the storm-wind that drove it in from the sea-shore have been stronger than it actually was; then must the preceding state of the atmosphere, by which this wind was occasioned, and its degree of strength being determined, have been different from what it actually was, and the preceding changes which gave rise to this particular weather, and so on. We must suppose a different temperature from that which really existed—a different constitution of bodies which influenced that temperature. How can we know that in such a state of weather we have been supposing, in order to carry this grain of sand a few yards further, some ancestors of yours might not have perished from hunger, cold, or heat, long before the birth of that son from whom you are descended, and thus you might never have been at all, and all that you have done, and all that you ever hope to do, must have been hindered, in order that a grain of sand might lie in a different place."* The whole of the first book is devoted to the necessitated condition of man in relation to the universe. In one portion there is a succession of beau-

* Fichte's "Destination of Man," pp. 8, 9.

tiful similes, portraying the blissful state we are in, instead of being gifted with finer sensibilities, or a prescience, which would be a curse.

Pope, although an ardent disciple of Bolingbroke, did not entirely forsake the prejudices of childhood; he still indulged in a bare HOPE of a future life, which his master, with more consistency, suppressed. So that when the poet rhymed the propositions of St. John, he pointed them with "hope" in an eternal future; for that speculation which was still *probability* in his day, is now nearly-silenced by modern science. But we must not confound the ideas of futurity, which some of the Deists expressed, with those of Christianity. They were as different as the dreams of Christ and Plato were dissimilar. Pope "hoped" for a future life of intellectual enjoyment devoid of evil, but the heaven of the gospel is equally as necessary to be counterbalanced by a hell, as the existence of a God requires the balancing support of a devil. We therefore can sympathise with the description of a heaven, the poor Indian looked for:—

"Some safer world in depths of woods embraced,
Some happier island in the watery waste;
Where slaves once more their native land behold,
Nor fiends torment, nor *Christians thirst for gold.*
To be—contents his natural desires,
He asks no angels' wings, no seraphs' fires,
But thinks, admitted to that equal sky,
His faithful dog should bear him company."

Pope durst not emphatically deny the future-life theory, so he attacked it by elaborating a physical instead of a spiritual heaven. So heterodox a notion of the Indian's future sports, is not to be found in theology, especially as he pictures the Indian's sports with his dog. Here was a double blow aimed at Christianity by evolving a "positive" idea of future pleasures, and the promulgation of sentiments anti-Christian.—Again he attacks them for unwarrantable speculation in theology, when he says—

"In pride, in reasoning pride our error lies."

This is a corollary to the first proposition, "What can we reason but from what we know?" The only predicate we can draw from this is, the undoubted fact we have no right to profess to hold opinions of that, upon which we cannot have any positive proof. The last line of the first book has been generally thought open to attack. It relates to necessity—"Whatever is, is right"—and is not to be viewed in relation to society as at present constituted, but to the physical universe.

The second book deals with man in relation to himself as an individual; the third as a member of society, and the last in respect to happiness. Throughout the whole Essay the distinctions arising from nature and instinct are defined and defended with vigor and acuteness. Both are proved to be equally great in degree, in spite of the hints constantly thrown out in reference to "God-like Reason *versus* Blind Instinct." We confess our inability to discern the vaunted superiority of the powers of reason over those of its blinder sister. We see in the one matchless wisdom—profound decision—unfailing resource—a happy contentment as unfeigned as it is natural. On the other hand, we see temerity allied with cowardice—a man seeking wisdom on a watery plank, when every footmark may serve him for a funeral effigy; political duplicity arising from his confined generalization of facts; a desire to do right, but checked by accident and cunning—everywhere uneasy—always fatal. If the Christians' fables were true, we might say that Adam and Eve were originally in possession of Instinct and Reason, and fell by listening to the promptings of volition, instead of the unswerving powers of the brutes, and for a hereditary punishment was cursed with a superabundance of reason. For with all our intellectual prerogatives, we have yet failed to arrive at a definite course of action which should influence our conduct. The Essay, speaking of Government by Christianity, says:—

"Force first made conquest, and that conquest law,
Till superstition taught the tyrant awe.
* * * * *
She taught the weak to bend, the proud to pray,
To power unseen, and mightier far than they:
She, from the rending earth and bursting skies,
Saw Gods descend and fiends infernal rise.
Here *fixed* the dreadful, there the blessed abodes,
Here *made her* devils, and weak HOPE HER GODS.
Gods partial, changeful, passionate, *unjust*,
Whose *attributes* were *rage*, *revenge*, or *lust*.
Such as the souls of cowards might conceive,
And formed like tyrants; tyrants would BELIEVE.
Zeal then, not charity, became the guide,
And HELL was *built* IN *spite*, and HEAVEN IN PRIDE."

And again—

"For modes of faith let graceless zealots fight,
His can't be wrong whose life is in the right."

The Essay concludes with an invocation to Bolingbroke—whom Pope styles, "my guide, philosopher, and friend." Such is the conclusion of the most remarkable ethical poem in any language. It is the Iliad of English Deism. Not a single allusion to Christ—a future state of existence given only as a faint probability—the whole artificial state of society satirized—prayer ridiculed, and government of every kind denounced which does not bring happiness to the people. The first principle laid down is the corner-stone of materialism—"What can we reason but from what we know?"—which is stated, explained, and defended with an axiomatic brevity rarely equalled, never surpassed—with a number of illustrations comprising the *chef d'œuvre* of poetic grace, and synthical melody combined with arguments as cogent as the examples are perfect.

It stands alone in its impregnability—a pile of literary architecture like the "Novum Organan" of Bacon, the "Principia" of Newton, or the Essay of Locke. The facades of its noble colonnades are seen extending their wings through the whole sweep of history, con-

stituting a pantheon of morals, where every nation sends its devotees to admire and worship.

Let us now turn to the philosophical works of Bolingbroke. By the will of Bolingbroke he devised this portion of his manuscripts to David Mallet, the poet, for publication. The noble Lord's choice is open to censure here. He knew the character of Mallet, and could expect little justice from him who should have been his biographer. The MSS. were all prepared for the press long before Bolingbroke died. In this original state, they were addressed to Pope. When published they appeared as "Letters or Essays addressed to Alexander Pope, Esq." The political friends of St. John wished their suppression, fearing that they would injure his reputation by being anti-Christian. A large bribe was offered by Lord Cornbur if Mallet would destroy the works. He, no doubt, thinking more money could be made by their publication, issued them to the world in 1754, but without giving a biography or notes to the books, his work being simply correcting the errors of the press. True, there existed no stipulation that he should write the Life of Bolingbroke, but no one can doubt that such was the intention of the statesman, when he bequeathed to him property which realized £10,000 in value. Every one knows the huge witticism of Dr. Johnson, who accused Bolingbroke of cowardice, under the simile of loading a blunderbuss, and then leaving a Scotchman half-a-crown to fire it when he was out of the way. When those posthumous works appeared, the grand jury of Westminster presented them to the judicial authorities as subversive of religion, morality, and government. They were burnt by the common hangman.

With difficulty we give a quotation from Bolingbroke's ideas of a Future Life. In vol. IV., p. 348, he says, "I do not say, that to believe in a future state is to believe in a vulgar error; but this I say, it cannot be demonstrated by reason: it is not in the nature of it capable of demonstration, and no one ever returned that irremediable way to give us an assurance of the fact."

Again, he speaks personally in reference to himself, Pope, and Wollaston, whom he had been opposing :—

"He alone is happy, and he is truly so, who can say, Welcome life whatever it brings! welcome death whatever it is! If the former, we change our state. * * * * * That you, or I, or even Wollaston himself, should return to the earth from whence we came, to the dirt under our feet, or be mingled with the ashes of those herbs and plants from which we drew nutrition whilst we lived, does not seem any indignity offered to our nature, since it is common to all the animal kind: and he who complains of it as such, does not seem to have been set, by his reasoning faculties, so far above them in life, as to deserve not to be levelled with them at death. We were like them before our birth, that is nothing. So we shall be on this hypothesis, like them too after our death, that is nothing. What hardship is done us? Unless it be a hardship, that we are not immortal because we wish to be so, and flatter ourselves with that expectation.

"If this hypothesis were true, which I am far from assuming, I should have no reason to complain, though having tasted existence, I might abhor non-entity. Since, then, the first cannot be demonstrated by reason, nor the second be reconciled to my inward sentiment, let me take refuge in resignation at the last, as in every other act of my life: let others be solicitous about their future state, and frighten or flatter themselves as prejudice, imaginative bad health—nay, a lowering day, or a clear sunshine shall inspire them to do: let the tranquillity of my mind rest on this immovable rock, that my future, as well as my present state, are ordered by an Almighty Creator, and that they are equally foolish, and presumptuous, who make imaginary excursions into futurity, and who complain of the present."

Lord Bolingbroke died in the year 1751, after a long and painful illness, occasioned by the ignorance of a quack. While lying on his death-bed he composed a discourse, entitled "Considerations on the State of the

Nation." He died in peace—in the knowledge of the truth of the principles he had advocated, and with that calm serenity of mind, which no one can more fully experience than the honest Freethinker. He was buried in the church at Battersea. He was a man of the highest rank of genius, far from being immaculate in his youth, brave, sincere, a true friend, possessed of rich learning, a clear and sparkling style, a great wit, and the most powerful Freethinker of his age.

A. C.

BIOGRAPHY

OF

CONDORCET.

In the history of the French Revolution, we read of a multitude of sections, each ruled by a man, and each man representing a philosophy. Not that each man was the contriver of a system, but the effervescence of one. As true as Robespierre was the advocate of Rousseau, as Marat was the Wilkes of Paris, as Danton was the Paine, and Mirabeau the expediency-politician of reflex England, so true is it that Condorcet was the type of the philosophic Girondists, the offspring of Voltaire. The two great schools of metaphysics fought out the battle on the theatre of the Constituent Assembly, in a spirit as bitterly uncompromising as when under different phraseological terms, they met in the arguments of the School-men, or further in the womb of history, on the forum of Athens. It is a fact no less true than singular, that after each mental excitement amongst the *savans*, whether in ancient or in modern times, after the literary shock has passed away, the people are innoculated with the strife, and, destitute of the moderation of their leaders, fight for that doctrine which they conceive oppresses their rights. The French Revolution was one of those struggles. It gave rise to epoch-men. Not men who originated a doctrine, but those who attempted to carry it out. Condorcet was one of those men. He was the successor of Voltaire in the Encyclopædic warfare. The philosopher amongst the orators. Destitute of the amazing versa-

tility of the sage of Ferney, he imbibed the prophet's antipathy to superstition, and after a brilliant career, fell in the wild onslaught of passion. The Revolution was the arena on which was fought the battle involving the question whether Europe was to be ruled for a century by Christianity or Infidelity. The irresolution of Robespierre lost to us the victory of the first passage of arms, equally as decisive as Lafayette in 1830, and Lamartine in 1848, being Liberals, lost in each case the social Republic by their vacillating policy. The true Freethinkers of that age were the Girondists. With their heroic death, the last barrier to despotism disappeared; the Consulate became the only logical path for gilded chains and empire. With the ostracism of the Republicans by Napoleon the Little, a parallel is completed between the two eras of French history.

The family name of Condorcet was Caritat. His father was a scion of an aristocratic family, and an officer in the army. The son who gave honor to the family, was born in the year 1743, at Ribemont, in Picardy. His father dying early, left his son to be educated with his wife, under the guardianship of his brother, the Bishop of Lisieux, a celebrated Jesuit. The mother of Condorcet was extremely superstitious, and in one of her fanatic ecstacies, offered up her son at the shrine of the Virgin Mary. How this act was performed we cannot relate; but it is a notorious fact that until his twelfth year, the embryo philosopher was clothed in female attire, and had young ladies for companions, which, M. Arago says, "accounts for many peculiarities in the *physique* and the *morale* of his manhood." The abstinence from all rude, boyish sports, checked the proper muscular development of his limbs; the head and trunk were on a large scale, but the legs were so meagre that they seemed unfit to carry what was above them; and, in fact, he never could partake in any strong exercises, or undergo the bodily fatigues to which healthy men willingly expose themselves. On the other hand, he had imbibed the

tenderness of a delicate damsel, retaining to the last a deep horror for afflicting pain on the inferior animals.

In 1775, he entered the Jesuit Academy at Rheims. Three years afterwards, he was transferred to the College of Navarre, in Paris, and soon made himself the most distinguished scholar there. His friends wished him to enter the priesthood, not knowing that even in his seventeenth year he had embraced the Deism of the age.

At the age of nineteen he left college, and immediately published a series of mathematical works, which established his fame. Shortly after this, the Academy of Sciences chose Condorcet for their assistant secretary. In the year 1770 he accompanied D'Alembert in a tour through Italy, making a call for some weeks at Ferney, where he was delighted with the company of Voltaire, and was duly recognised as one of the Encyclopædists; and, on his return to Paris, became the literary agent of his great leader.

A Quarterly Reviewer, writing on Voltaire and Condorcet, says of the former, "When he himself, in these latter days, was resolved to issue anything that he knew and felt to be pregnant with combustion, he never dreamt of Paris—he had agents enough in other quarters; and the anonymous or pseudonymous mischief was printed at London, Amsterdam, or Hamburgh, from a fifth or sixth copy in the handwriting of some Dutch or English clerk—thence, by cautious steps, smuggled into France—and then, disavowed and denounced by himself, and, for him, by his numberless agents, with an intrepid assurance which, down to the last, confounded and baffled all official inquisitors, until, in each separate case, the scent had got cold. Therefore, he sympathized not at all with any of these, his subalterns, when they, in their own proper matters, allowed themselves a less guarded style of movement."

On one occasion, Condorcet's imprudence extorts a whole series of passionate remonstrants from him and his probable confidants—but the burden is always the same—"Tolerate the whispers of age! How often

shall I have to tell you all that no one but a fool will publish such things unless he has 200,000 bayonets at his back? Each Encyclopædist was apt to forget that, though he corresponded familiarly with Frederick, he was not a King of Prussia; and, by-and-by, not one of them more frequently made this mistake than Condorcet—for that gentleman's saint-like tranquillity of demeanor, though it might indicate a naturally languid pulse, covered copious elements of vital passion. The slow wheel could not resist the long attrition of controversy; and when it once blazed, the flame was all the fiercer for its unseen nursing. 'You mistake Condorcet,' said D'Alembert, 'he is a volcano covered with snow.'"

When Turgot became Minister of Marine, he gave Condorcet a post as Inspector of Canals; from this he was subsequently promoted to the Inspector of the Mint. When Turgot was replaced by Necker, Condorcet resigned his office.

In 1782 he was elected one of the forty of the Academy of Sciences, beating the Astronomer, Bailly, by *one* vote. In the next year, D'Alembert, his faithful friend, died, leaving him the whole of his wealth; his uncle, the bishop, likewise died in the same year, from whom he would receive a fresh accession of property. Shortly after this time, Condorcet married Madame de Grouchy—also celebrated as a lady of great beauty, good fortune, and an educated Atheist. The marriage was a happy one. The only offspring was a girl, who married General Arthur O'Connor, uncle to the late Feargus O'Connor, an Irish refugee who was connected with Emmett's rebellion.

During the excitement of the American War of Independence, Condorcet took an active part in urging the French Government to bestow assistance in arms and money, upon the United States; after the war was concluded, he corresponded with Thomas Paine, who gradually converted him to the extreme Republican views the "illustrious needleman" himself possessed, which, in this case, rapidly led to the *denouement* of

1791, when he was elected a member of the Legislative Assembly by the department of Paris. In the next year he was raised to the rank of President by a majority of near one hundred votes. While in the Assembly, he brought forward and supported the economical doctrines of Adam Smith, proposed the abolition of indirect taxation, and levying a national revenue upon derivable wealth in amount according to the individual, passing over all who gained a livelihood by manual labor. He made a motion for the public burning of all documents relating to nobility — himself being a Marquis. He took a conspicuous place in the trial of the king; he voted him guilty, but refused to vote for his death, as the punishment of death was against his principles. The speech he made on this occasion is fully equal to that of Paine's on the same occasion.

When the divergence took place between the Jacobins and Girondists, Condorcet strove to unite them; but every day brought fresh troubles, and the position of the Seneca of the Revolution was too prominent to escape the opposition of the more violent faction.

Robespierre triumphed; and in his success could be traced the doom of his enemies. An intercepted letter was the means of Condorcet's impeachment. Deprived of the support of Isnard, Brissot, and Vergniaud, the Jacobins proscribed without difficulty the hero whose writings had mainly assisted in producing the Revolution. His friends provided means for his escape. They applied to a lodging-house keeper, a Madame Vernet, if she would conceal him for a time; she asked was he a virtuous man—yes, replied his friend, he is the——stay, you say he is a good man, I do not wish to pry into his secrets or his name. Once safe in this asylum, he was unvisited by either wife or friends; morever, such was the hurry of his flight, that he was without money, and nearly without books.

While in this forced confinement, he wrote the "Esquisse d'un Tableau Historique des Progres de l'Esprit Humain," and several other fragmentary essays. In

this work he lays down a scheme of society similar to the "New Moral World," of Robert Owen. Opposing the idea of a God, he shows the dominion of science in education, political economy, chemistry, and applies mathematical principles to a series of moral problems. Along with the progress of man he combined the progress of arts—estimating the sanatory arrangements of our time, he prophecied on the gradual extension of longevity, amongst the human race; and with it, enjoyments increased by better discipline in gustatorial duties. He has similar views on the softer sex to M. Proudhomme (his immediate disciple,) and, in the close of the work, Condorcet announced the possibility of an universal language, which is daily becoming more assimilated to modern ideas.

The guillotine had not been idle during the few weeks of Condorcet's retreat. Fancying that (if discovered) he might be the means of injuring his benefactress, he resolved to escape from the house of Madame Vernet. Previous to doing this, he made his will. M. Arago, describing this epoch in his closing days, says :—

"When he at last paused, and the feverish excitement of authorship was at an end, our colleague rested all his thoughts anew on the danger incurred by his hostess. He resolved then (I employ his own words) to quit the retreat which the boundless devotion of his tutelar angel had transformed into a paradise. He so little deceived himself as to the probable consequences of the step he meditated—the chances of safety after his evasion appeared so feeble—that before he put his plan into execution he made his last dispositions. In the pages then written, I behold everywhere the lively reflection of an elevated mind, a feeling heart, and a beautiful soul. I will venture to say, that there exists in no language anything better thought, more tender, more touching, more sweetly expressed, than the 'Avis d'un Proscrit a sa Fill.' Those lines, so limpid, so full of unaffected delicacy, were written on that very day when he was about to encounter volun-

tarily an immense danger. The presentiment of a violent end almost inevitably did not disturb him—his hand traced those terrible words, *Ma mort, ma mort pro chaine!* with a firmness which the Stoics of antiquity might have envied. Sensibility, on the contrary, obtained the mastery when the illustrious proscribed was drawn into the anticipation that Madame de Condorcet also might be involved in the bloody catastrophe that threatened him. *Should my daughter be destined to lose all*—this is the most explicit allusion that the husband can insert in his last writing."

"The Testament is short. It was written on the fly-leaf of a 'History of Spain.' In it Condorcet directs that his daughter, in case of his wife's death, shall be brought up by Madame Vernet, whom she is to call her second mother, and who is to see her so educated as to have means of independent support either from painting or engraving. 'Should it be necessary for my child to quit France, she may count on protection in England from my Lord Stanhope and my Lord Daer. In America, reliance may be placed on Jefferson and Bache, the grandson of Franklin. She is, therefore, to make the English language her first study.'"

Such was the last epistle ever written by Condorcet. Notwithstanding the precautions taken by his friends, he escaped into the streets—from thence having appealed in vain to friends for assistance, he visited some quarries. Here he remained from the 5th to the evening of the 7th of April, 1794. Hunger drove him to the village of Clamart, when he applied at an hostelry for refreshment. He described himself as a carpenter out of employment, and ordered an omelet. This was an age of suspicion, and the landlord of the house soon discovered that the wanderer's hands were white and undisfigured with labor, while his conversation bore no resemblance to that of a common artificer. The good dame of the house inquired how many eggs he would have in his dish. Twelve, was the answer. Twelve eggs for a joiner's supper! This was heresy against the equality of man. They de-

manded his passport—he had not got one—the only appearance of anything of the sort was a scrap of paper, scrawled over with Latin epigrams. This was conclusive evidence to the village Dogberries that he was a traitor and an aristocrat. The authorities signed the warrant for his removal to Paris. Ironed to two officers they started on the march. The first evening they arrived at Bourg-la-Reine, where they deposited their prisoner in the gaol of that town. In the morning the gaoler found him a corpse. He had taken a poison of great force, which he habitually carried in a ring. Thus ended the life of the great Encyclopædist—a man great by his many virtues—who reflected honor on France by his science, his literary triumphs, and his moral heroism. He had not the towering energy of Marat, nor the gushing eloquence of Danton, neither had he the superstitious devotion to abstract ideas which characterized the whole course of Robespierre's life. The oratory of Danton, like that of Marat, only excited the people to dissatisfaction; they struck down effete institutions, but they were not the men to inaugurate a new society. It is seldom we find the pioneers of civilization the best mechanics. They strike down the forest—they turn the undergrowth—they throw a log over the stream, but they seldom rear factories, or invent tubular bridges.

Amongst the whole of the heroes of the French Revolution, we must admire the Girondists, as being the most daring, and, at the same time, the most constructive of all who met either in the Constituent Assembly or the Convention. The Jacobin faction dealt simply with politics through the abstract notions of Rousseau: but of what use are "human rights" if we have to begin *de novo* to put into operation?—rather let us unite the conservative educationalism of Socialism with the wild democracy of ignorance. Politics never can be successful unless married to Socialism.

It was not long after Condorcet's death, before the Committee of Public Instruction undertook the charge of publishing the whole of his works. For this they

have been censured on many grounds. We consider that it was one of the few good things accomplished by that Committee. There is nothing in the works of this writer which have a distinctive peculiarity to us; few great writers who direct opinion at the time they write, appear to posterity in the same light as they did to a public inflamed by passion, and trembling under reiterated wrongs. When we look at the works of D'Holbach, we find a standard treatise, which is a land-mark to the present day; but at the time the "System of Nature" was written, it had not one tithe the popularity which it now enjoys; it did not produce an effect superior to a new sarcasm of Voltaire, or an epigram of Diderot. Condorcet was rather the co-laborer and *literateur* of the party, than the prophet of the new school. Voltaire was the Christ, and Condorcet the St. Paul of the new faith. In political economy, the doctrines of the English and Scotch schools were elaborated to their fullest extent. Retrenchment in pensions and salaries, diminution of armies, equal taxation, the resumption by the State of all the Church lands, the development of the agricultural and mechanical resources, the abolition of the monopolies, total free trade, local government, and national education; such were the doctrines for which Turgot fought, and Condorcet popularized. If they had been taken in time, France would have escaped a revolution, and Europe would have been ruled by peace and freedom. It may be asked, who brought about the advocacy of those doctrines, for they were not known before the middle of the eighteenth century? They were introduced as a novelty, and defended as a paradox. France had been exhausted by wars, annoyed by *ennui*, brilliant above all by her genius, she was struck with lassitude for her licentious crimes. There was an occasion for a new school. Without it, France, like Carthage, would have bled to death on the hecatomb of her own lust. Her leading men cast their eyes to England; it was then the most progressive nation in existence. The leading men of that country were in-

timate with the rulers of the French; the books of each land were read with avidity by their neighbors; a difference was observable between the two; but how that difference was to be reconciled was past the skill of the wisest to unravel. England had liberal institutions, and a people with part of the substance, and many of the forms, of Liberalism, along with a degree of education which kept them in comparative ignorance, yet did not offer any obstacles to raising themselves in the social sphere. Before France could compete with England, she had to rid herself of the feudal system, and obtain a Magna Charta. She was above four centuries behind-hand here. She had to win her spurs through revolutions, like those of Cromwell's and that of 1688, and the still greater ones of Parliament. The Freethinkers of England prepared the Whig revolution of William, by advocating the only scheme which was at the time practicable, for of the two—the Protestant and the Catholic religion—the former is far more conducive to the liberties of a people than the latter, and at the time, and we may also say, nearer the present, the people were not prepared for any organic change. This being the case, it is not to be wondered at that the French Revolution was a failure as a constructive effort; it was a success as a grand outbreak of power; showing politicians where (in the future) to rely for success. The men who undertook to bring about this Revolution are not to be censured for its non-success. They wished to copy English institutions, and adapt them to those of the French; for this purpose, the Continental League was formed, each member of which pledged himself to uproot, as far as lay in his power, the Catholic Church in France. A secret name was given to it—L'Infame —and an organized attack was speedily commenced. The men at the head of the movement, besides Voltaire and Frederick, were D'Alembert, Diderot, Grim, St. Lambert, Condillac, Helvetius, Jordan, Lalande, Montesquieu, and a host of others of less note. Condorcet, being secretary of the Academy, corresponded

with, and directed the movements of all, in the absence of his chief. Every new book was criticised—refutations were published to the leading theological works of the age; but by far the most effective progress was made by the means of poems, essays, romances, epigrams, and scientific papers. The songs of France at this era were written by the philosophers; and this spirit was diffused among the people. In a country so volatile and excitable as the French, it is difficult to estimate too highly the power of a ballad warfare. The morality of Abbots and Nuns were sung in strains as rhapsodical, and couplets as voluptuous as the vagaries of the Songs of Solomon.

Much discretion was required, that no separate species of warfare should be overdone, lest a nausea of sentiment should revert upon the authors, and thus lead to a reaction more sanguinary than the force of the philosophers could control. In all those cases Condorcet was the prime mover and the agent concerned. He communicated with Voltaire on every new theory, and advised him when and how to strike, and when to *rest*. In all those matters Condorcet was obeyed. There was a smaller section of the more serious philosophers who sympathized with, yet did not labor simultaneously for the common cause—those men, the extreme Atheists—clever but cautious—men who risked nothing—Mirabeau and D'Holbach were the types of this class. It is well known that both Frederick, Voltaire, and Condorcet opposed those sections, as likely to be aiming at too much for the time.

When it was considered prudent to take a more decided step, the Encyclopædia was formed. Condorcet had a principal part in this work, which shook priestcraft on its throne; it spread consternation wherever it appeared, and was one of the main causes of the great outbreak. No one can sufficiently praise a work of such magnitude; nor can any one predicate when its effects will cease.

In the "Life of Condorcet," by Arago, there is a curious extract copied from a collection of anecdotes,

said to oe compiled from his note-books, and dignified with the title of "Memoires de Condorcet." It relates to a conversation between the Abbe Galiana and Diderot, in which it is said Condorcet acquiesced. The subject is the fair sex :—

Diderot.—How do you define woman?

Galiana.—An animal naturally feeble and sick.

Diderot.—Feeble? Has she not as much courage as man?

Galiana.—Do you know what courage is? It is the effect of terror. You let your leg be cut off, because you are afraid of dying. Wise people are never courageous—they are prudent—that is to say, poltroons.

Diderot.—Why call you woman naturally sick?

Galiana.—Like all animals, she is sick until she attains her perfect growth. Then she has a peculiar symptom which takes up the fifth part of her time. Then come breeding and nursing, two long and troublesome complaints. In short, they have only intervals of health, until they turn a certain corner, and then *elles ne sont plus de malades peut-etre—elles ne sont que des reilles.*

Diderot.—Observe her at a ball, no vigor, then, M. l'Abbe?

Galiana.—Stop the fiddles! put out the lights! she will scarcely crawl to her coach.

Diderot.—See her in love.

Galiana.—It is painful to see anybody in a fever.

Diderot.—M. l'Abbe, have you no faith in education?

Galiana.—Not so much as in instinct. A woman is habitually ill. She is affectionate, engaging, irritable, capricious, easily offended, easily appeased, a trifle amuses her. The imagination is always in play. Fear, hope, joy, despair, and disgust, follow each other more rapidly, are manifested more strongly, effaced more quickly, than with us. They like a plentiful repose, at intervals company; anything for excitement. Ask the doctor if it is not the same with his patients. But ask yourself, do we not all treat them as we do sick

people, lavish attention, soothe, flatter, caress, and get tired of them?

Condorcet, in a letter, remarking on the above conversation, says :—"I do not insist upon it as probable that woman will ever be Euler or Voltaire; but I am satisfied that she may one day be Pascal or Rousseau." This very qualification, we consider, is sufficient to absolve Condorcet from the charge of being a "woman hater." His opponents, when driven from every other source, have fallen back on this, and alleged that he viewed the sexes as unequal, and that the stronger had a right to lord it over the weaker. But which is the weaker? Euler and Voltaire were masculine men. A woman to be masculine, in the true sense of the word, is an anomaly, to be witnessed with pain. She is not in a normal condition. She is a monster. Women should live in society fully educated and developed in their physical frame, and then they would be more feminine in proportion as they approach the character of Mary Wollstonecraft. They have no right to domineer as tyrants, and then fall into the most abject of slaves. In each of the characters of Pascal and Rousseau, was an excess of sensibility, which overbalanced their other qualities, and rendered their otherwise great talents wayward, and, to a certain extent, fruitless. The peculiarity of man is physical power, and intellectual force; that of woman is an acute sensibility. Condorcet, then, was justified in expressing the opinions he avowed upon the subject.

In a paper, in the year 1766, read before the "Academy," on "Ought Popular Errors to be Eradicated?" Condorcet says, "If the people are often tempted to commit crimes in order that they may obtain the necessaries of life, it is the fault of the laws; and, as bad laws are the product of errors, it would be more simple to abolish those errors than to add others for the correction of their natural effects. Error, no doubt, may do some good; it may prevent some crimes, but it will occasion mischiefs greater than these. By put-

ting nonsense into the heads of the people, you make them stupid; and from stupidity to ferocity there is but a step. Consider—if the motives you suggest for being just make but a slight impression on the mind, that will not direct the conduct—if the impressions be lively, they will produce enthusiasm, and enthusiasm for error. Now, the ignorant enthusiast is no longer a man; he is the most terrible of wild beasts. In fact, the number of criminals among the men with prejudices (Christians) is in greater proportion to the total number of our population, than the number of criminals in the class above prejudices (Freethinkers) is to the total of that class. I am not ignorant that, in the actual state of Europe, the people are not, perhaps, at all prepared for a true doctrine of morals; but this degraded obtuseness is the work of social institutions and of superstitions. Men are not born blockheads; they become such. By speaking reason to the people, even in the little time they give to the cultivation of their intellect, we might easily teach them the little that it is necessary for them to know. Even the idea of the respect that they should have for the property of the rich, is only difficult to be insinuated among them—first, because they look on riches as a sort of usurpation, of theft perpetrated upon them, and unhappily this opinion is in great part true—secondly, because their excessive poverty makes them always consider themselves in the case of absolute necessity—a case in which even very severe moralists have been of their mind—thirdly, because they are as much despised and maltreated for being poor, as they would be after they had lowered themselves by larcenies. It is merely, therefore, because institutions are bad, that the people are so commonly a little thievish upon principle."

We should have much liked to have given some extended quotations from the works of Condorcet; but, owing to their general character, we cannot extract any philosophic formula which would be generally interesting. His "Lettres d'un Theologien" are well

deserving of a reprint; they created an astounding sensation when they appeared, being taken for the work of Voltaire—the light, easy, graceful style, with deeply concealed irony, the crushing retort and the fiery sarcasm. They made even priests laugh by their Attic wit and incongruous similes. But it was in the "Academy" where Condorcet's influence was supreme. He immortalized the heroes as they fell, and pushed the cause on by his professional duties. He was always awake to the call of duty, and nobly did he work his battery. He is now in the last grand sleep of man—the flowers of poesy are woven in amarynth wreaths over his tomb. A. C.

BIOGRAPHY

OF

SPINOZA.

Baruch Spinoza, or Espinoza, better known under the name of Benedict Spinoza (as rendered by himself in the Latin language,) was born at Amsterdam, in Holland, on the 24th of November, 1632. There is some uncertainty as to this date, as there are several dates fixed by different authors, both for his birth and death, but we have adopted the biography given by Dr. C. H. Bruder, in the preface to his edition of Spinoza's works. His parents were Jews of the middle, or, perhaps, somewhat humbler class. His father was originally a Spanish merchant, who, to escape persecution, had emigrated to Holland. Although the life of our great philosopher is one full of interesting incidents, and deserves to be treated fully, we have but room to give a very brief sketch, referring our readers, who may wish to learn more of Spinoza's life, to Lewes's "Biographical History of Philosophy," *Westminster Review*, No. 77, and "Encyclopædia Brittannica," p. 144. His doctrines we will let speak for themselves in his own words, trusting thereby to give the reader an opportunity of knowing who and what Spinoza really was. One man shrinks with horror from him as an Atheist. Voltaire says, that he was an Atheist, and taught Atheism. Another calls him "a God-intoxicated man." We present him a mighty thinker, a master mind, a noble, fearless utterer of free and noble thoughts, a hard-working, honest, in-

dependent man; as one who, two centuries ago, gave forth to the world a series of thinkings which have crushed, with resistless force, the theological shell, in the centre of which the priests hide the kernel "truth."

Spinoza appears in his boyhood to have been an apt scholar, and to have rapidly mastered the tasks set him by his teachers. Full of rabbinical lore he won the admiration of the Rabbi Moses Mortira, but the pupil rose higher than his master, and attempted to solve problems which the learned rabbis were content to reverence as mysteries not capable of solution. First they remonstrated, then threatened; still Spinoza persevered in his studies, and in making known the result to those around him. He was threatened with excommunication, and withdrew himself from the synagogue. One more effort was made by the rabbis, who offered Spinoza a pension of about £100 a-year if he would attend the synagogue more frequently, and consent to be silent with regard to his philosophical thinkings. This offer he indignantly refused. Reason failing, threats proving futile, and gold being treated with scorn, one was found sufficiently fanatic to try a further experiment, which resulted in an attempt on Spinoza's life; the knife, however, luckily missed its aim, and our hero escaped. At last, in the year 1660, Spinoza, being then twenty-eight years of age, was solemnly excommunicated from the synagogue. His friends and relations shut their doors against him. An outcast from the home of his youth, he gained a humble livelihood by polishing glasses for microscopes, telescopes, etc., at which he was very expert. While thus acquiring, by his own handiwork, the means of subsistence, he was studying hard, devoting every possible hour to philosophical research. Spinoza became master of the Dutch, Hebrew, German, Spanish, Portuguese, and Latin languages, the latter of which he acquired in the house of one Francis Van den Ende, from whom it is more than probable he received as much instruction in Atheism as in

Latin. Spinoza only appears to have once fallen in love, and this was with Van den Ende's daughter, who was herself a good linguist, and who gave Spinoza instruction in Latin. She, however, although willing to be his instructress and companion in a philological path, declined to accept his love, and thus Spinoza was left to philosophy alone. After his excommunication he retired to Rhynsburg, near the City of Leyden, in Holland, and there studied the works of Descartes. Three years afterwards he published an abridgment of the "Meditations" of the great father of philosophy, which created a profound sensation. In an appendix to this abridgment were contained the germs of those thinkings in which the pupil outdid the master, and the student progressed beyond the philosopher. In the month of June, 1664, Spinoza removed to Woorburg, a small village near the Hague, where he was visited by persons from different parts, attracted by his fame as a philosopher; and at last, after many solicitations he came to the Hague, and resided there altogether. In 1670 he published his "Tractatus Theologico-Politicus." This raised him a host of opponents; many writers rushed eager for the fray, to tilt with the poor Dutch Jew. His book was officially condemned and forbidden, and a host of refutations (?) were circulated against it. In spite of the condemnation it has outlived the refutations.

Spinoza died on the 21st or 22nd of February, 1677, in his forty-fifth year, and was buried on the 25th of February at the Hague. He was frugal in his habits, subsisting independently on the earnings of his own hands. Honorable in all things, he refused to accept the chair of Professor of Philosophy, offered to him by the Elector, and this because he did not wish to be circumscribed in his thinking, or in the freedom of utterance of his thoughts. He also refused a pension offered to him by Louis XIV., saying that he had no intention of dedicating anything to that monarch. The following is a list of Spinoza's works:—"Principiorum Philosophiæ Renati Descartes;" "Tractatus

Theologico-Politicus;" "Ethica;" "Tractatus Politicus;" "De Emandatione Intellectus;" "Epistolæ;" "Grammaticus Hebraeæ," etc. There are also several spurious works ascribed to Spinoza. The "Tractatus Politicus" has been translated into English by William Maccall, who seems fully to appreciate the greatness of the philosopher, although he will not admit the usefulness of Spinoza's logic. Maccall does not see the utility of that very logic which compelled him to admit Spinoza's truth. We are not aware of any other translation of Spinoza's works except that of a small portion of his "Ethica," by Lewes. This work, which was originally published in 1677, commenced with eight definitions, which, together with the following axioms and propositions, were reprinted from the *Westminster Review* in the *Library of Reason*:—

DEFINITIONS.

I. By cause of itself I understand that, the essence of which involves existence; or that, the nature of which can only be considered as existent.

II. A thing finite is that which can be limited (*terminari potest*) by another thing of the same nature—*ergo*, body is said to be finite because it can always be conceived as larger. So thought is limited by other thoughts. But body does not limit thought, nor thought limit body.

III. By substance I understand that which is in itself, and is conceived *per se*—that is, the conception of which does not require the conception of anything else as antecedent to it.

IV. By attribute I understand that which the mind perceives as constituting the very essence of substance.

V. By modes I understand the accidents (*affectiones*) of substance; or that which is in something else, through which also it is conceived.

VI. By God I understand the being absolutely infinite; that is, the substance consisting of infinite at-

tributes, each of which expresses an infinite and eternal essence.

Explication. I say absolutely infinite, but not in *suo genere;* for to whatever is infinite, but not in *suo genere*, we can deny infinite attributes; but that which is absolutely infinite, to its essence pertains everything which implies essence, and involves no negation.

VII. That thing is said to be free which exists by the sole necessity of its nature, and by itself alone is determined to action. But that is necessary, or rather constrained, which owes its existence to another, and acts according to certain and determinate causes.

VIII. By eternity I understand existence itself, in as far as it is conceived necessarily to follow from the sole definition of an eternal thing.

AXIOMS.

I. Everything which is, is in itself, or in some other thing.

II. That which cannot be conceived through another, *per aliud*, must be conceived, *per se.*

III. From a given determinate cause the effect necessarily follows, and *vice versa.* If no determinate cause be given, no effect can follow.

IV. The knowledge of an effect depends on the knowledge of the cause, and includes it.

V. Things that have nothing in common with each other cannot be understood by means of each other—that is, the conception of one, does not involve the conception of the other.

VI. A true idea must agree with its original in nature.

VII. Whatever can be clearly conceived as non-existent does not, in its essence, involve existence.

PROPOSITIONS.

I. Substance is prior in nature to its accidents.

Demonstration. Per definitions three and five.

II. Two substances, having different attributes, have nothing in common with each other.

Dem. This follows from def. three; for each substance must be conceived in itself and through itself; in other words, the conception of one does not involve the conception of the other.

III. Of things which have nothing in common, one cannot be the cause of the other.

Dem. If they have nothing in common, then (per axiom five) they cannot be conceived by means of each other; *ergo* (per axiom four,) one cannot be the cause of the other.—Q. E. D.

IV. Two or more distinct things are distinguished among themselves, either through the diversity of their attributes, or through that of their modes.

Dem. Everything which is, in itself, or in some other thing (per ax. one)—that is (per def. three and five,) there is nothing out of ourselves (*extra intellectum*, outside the intellect) but substance and its modes. There is nothing out of ourselves whereby things can be distinguished amongst one another, except substances, or (which is the same thing, per def. four) their attributes and modes.

V. It is impossible that there should be two or more substances of the same nature, or of the same attributes.

Dem. If there are many different substances they must be distinguished by the diversity of their attributes or of their modes (per prop. 4.) If only by the diversity of their attributes, it is thereby conceded that there is, nevertheless, only one substance of the same attribute; but if their diversity of modes, then, substance being prior in order of time to its modes, it must be considered independent of them—that is (per def. three and six,) cannot be conceived as distinguished from another—that is (per prop. four,) there cannot be many substances, but only one substance.—Q. E. D.

VI. One substance cannot be created by another substance.

Dem. There cannot be two substances with the same attributes (per prop. five)—that is (per prop.

two,) that have anything in common with each other; and, therefore (per prop. three,) one cannot be the cause of the other.

Corollary 1. Hence it follows that substance cannot be created by anything else. For there is nothing in nature except substance and its modes (per axiom one, and def. three and five.) Now, this substance, not being produced by another, is self-caused.

Corollary 2. This proposition is more easily to be demonstrated by the absurdity of its contradiction; for if substance can be produced by anything else, the conception of it would depend on the conception of the cause (per axiom four,) and hence (per def. three,) it would not be substance.

VII. It pertains to the nature of substance to exist.

Dem. Substance cannot be produced by anything else (per coroll. prop. six,) and is therefore the cause of itself—that is (per def. one,) its essence necessarily involves existence; or it pertains to the nature of substance to exist.—Q. E. D.

VIII. All substance is necessarily infinite.

Dem. There exists but one substance of the same attribute; and it must either exist as infinite or finite. But not finite, for (per def. two) as finite it must be limited by another substance of the same nature, and in that case there would be two substances of the same attributes, which (per prop. five) is absurd. Substance therefore is infinite.—Q. E. D.

"Scholium I.—I do not doubt but that to all who judge confusedly of things, and are not wont to inquire into first causes, it will be difficult to admit the demonstration of prop. 7, because they do not sufficiently distinguish between the modifications of substances, and substances themselves, and are ignorant of the manner in which things are produced. Hence it follows, that the commencement which they see natural things have, they attribute to substances; for he who knows not the true cause of things, confounds all things, and feigns that trees talk like men; that men are formed from stones as well as from seeds,

and that all forms can be changed into all other forms. So, also, those who confound the divine nature with the human, naturally attribute human affections to God, especially as they are ignorant of how these affections are produced in the mind. If men attended to the nature of substance, they would not, in the least, doubt proposition seven; nay, this proposition would be an axiom to all, and would be numbered among common notions. For by substance they would understand that which exists in itself, and is concerned through itself—*i. e.*, the knowledge of which does not require the knowledge of anything as antecedent to it. But by modification they would understand that which is in another thing, the conception of which is formed by the conception of the thing in which it is, or to which it belongs. We can have, therefore, correct ideas of non-existent modifications, because, although out of the understanding they have no reality, yet their essence is so comprehended in that of another, that they can be conceived through this other. The truth of substance (out of the understanding) lies nowhere but in itself, because it is conceived *per se*. If therefore any one says he has a clear idea of substance, and yet doubt whether such substance exist, this would be as much as to say that he has a true idea, and nevertheless doubts whether it be not false (as a little attention sufficiently manifests;) or if any man affirms substance to be created, he at the same time affirms that a true idea has become false, than which nothing can be more absurd. Hence it is necessarily confessed that the existence of substance, as well as its essence, is an eternal truth. And hence we must conclude that there is only one substance possessing the same attribute, which requires here a fuller development. I note therefore — 1. That the correct definition of a thing includes and expresses nothing but the nature of the thing defined. From which follows—2. That no definition includes or expresses a distinct number of individuals, because it expresses nothing but the nature of the thing defined; *ergo*, the definition of a tri-

angle expresses no more than the nature of a triangle, and not any fixed number of triangles. 3. There must necessarily be a distinct cause for the existence of every existing thing. 4. This cause, by reason of which anything exists, must either be contained in the nature and definition of the existing thing (viz., that it pertains to its nature to exist,) or else must be beyond it—must be something different from it.

"As therefore it pertains to the nature of substance to exist, so must its definition include a necessary existence, and consequently from its sole definition we must conclude its existence. But as from its definition, as already shown in notes two and three, it is not possible to conclude the existence of many substances —*ergo*, it necessarily follows that only one substance of the same nature can exist."

It will be necessary for the reader to remember that Spinoza commenced his philosophical studies at the same point with Descartes. Both recognized existence as the primal fact, self-evident and indisputable.

But while Descartes had, in some manner, fashioned a quality—God and God-created substance — Spinoza only found one substance, the definition of which included existence. By his fourth proposition ("of things which have nothing in common, one cannot be the cause of the other,") he destroyed the creation theory, because by that theory God is assumed to be a spirit having nothing in common with matter, yet acting on matter; and Lewes speaks of the fourth proposition in the following terms:—"This fallacy has been one of the most influential corruptors of philosophical speculation. For many years it was undisputed, and most metaphysicians still adhere to it. The assertion is that only like can act upon like; but although it is true that *like* produces (causes) *like*, it is also true that like produces *unlike;* thus fire produces *pain* when applied to our bodies; *explosion* when applied to gunpowder; *charcoal* when applied to wood; all these effects are unlike the cause."

We cannot help thinking that in this instance, the

usually thoughtful Lewes has either confused substance with its modes, or, for the sake of producing a temporary effect, has descended to mere sophism. Spinoza's proposition is, that *substances* having nothing in common, cannot act on one another. Lewes deals with several modes of the same substance as though they were different substances. Nay, more, to make his argument the more plausible, he entirely ignores in it that *noumenon* of which he speaks as underlying all phenomena, and uses each phenomenon as a separate existence. In each of the instances mentioned, however varied may be the modification, the essence is the same. They are merely examples of one portion of the whole acting upon another portion, and there is that in each mode which is common to the whole, and by means of which the action takes place.

Much has been said of Spinoza's "God" and "Divine Substance," and we must refer the reader to Definition Six, in which God is defined as being "infinite substance." Now, although we should be content to strike the word "God" out of our own tablet of philosophical nomenclature, as being a much misused, misrepresented, and entirely useless word, yet we must be very careful, when we find another man using the word, to get his precise definition, and not to use any other ourselves while in his company.

Spinoza, when asked "What name do you attach to infinite substance?" says, "God."—If he had said any other word we could not have quarrelled with him so long as he defined the word, and adhered strictly to the terms of his definition, although we might regret that he had not either coined a word for himself, or used one less maltreated by the mass. Spinoza said, "I can only take cognizance of one substance (of which I am part) having infinite attributes of extension and thought. I take cognizance of substance by its modes, and in my consciousness of existence. Every thing is a mode of the attribute of extension, every thought, wish, or feeling, a mode of the attribute of thought. I call this substance, with

infinite attributes, God." Spinoza, like all other thinkers, found himself overpowered by the illimitable vastness of the infinite when attempting to grasp it by his mental powers, but unlike other men he did not endeavor to relieve himself by separating himself from that infinite; but, knowing he was a part of the whole, not divisible from the remainder, he was content to aim at perfecting his knowledge of existence rather than at dogmatising upon an indefinable word, which, if it represented anything, professed to represent an incomprehensible existence far beyond his reach.

We ought not to wonder that in many parts of Spinoza's writings we find the word "God" treated in a less coherent manner than would be possible under the definition given in his "Ethics," and for these reasons:—Spinoza, from his cradle upwards, had been surrounded with books and traditions sanctified by the past, and impressed on his willing mind by his family, his tutors, and the heads of his church; a mind like his gathered all that was given, even more quickly than it was offered, still craving for more—"more light"—"more light"—and at last light came bursting on the young thinker like a lightning flash at dark midnight, revealing his mind in chains, which had been cast round him in his nursery, his school, his college, his synagogue. By a mighty effort he burst these chains, and walked forth a free man, despite the entreaties of his family, the reasonings of the rabbis, the knife of the fanatic, the curse of his church, and the edict of the state. But should it be a matter of surprise to us that some of the links of those broken chains should still hang on the young philosopher, and, seeming to be a part of himself, almost imperceptibly incline to old ways of thinking, and to old modes of utterance of those thoughts? Wonder not that a few links hang about him, but rather that he ever succeeded in breaking those chains at all. Spinoza, after his secession from his synagogue, became logically an Atheist; education and early impressions enlarged this into a less clearly-defined Pantheism;

but the logic comes to us naked, disrobed of all by which it might have been surrounded in Spinoza's mind. If that logic be correct, then all the theologies of the world are false. We have presented it to the reader to judge of for himself. Many men have written against it; of these some have misunderstood, some have misrepresented, some have failed, and few have left us a proof that they had endeavored to deal with Spinoza on his own ground. Maccall says, "In the glorious throng of heroic names, there are few nobler than Spinoza's. Apart altogether from the estimate we may form of his philosophy, there is something unspeakably interesting in the life and the character of the man. In his metaphysical system there are two things exceedingly distinct. There is, first, the immense and prodigious, but terrible mathematical skeleton, which his subtle intellect binds up and throws as calmly into space as we drop a pebble into the water, and whose bones, striking against the wreck of all that is sacred in belief, or bold in speculation, rattle a wild response to our wildest phantasies, and drive us almost to think in despair that thinking is madness; and there is, secondly, the divinest vision of the infinite, and the divinest incense which the intuition of the infinite ever yet poured forth at the altar of creation."

The "Treatise on Politics" is not Spinoza's greatest work; it is, in all respects, inferior to the "Ethics," and to the "Theologico-Political Treatise." But there are in politics certain eternal principles, and it is for setting forth and elucidating these that the Treatise of Spinoza is so valuable.

In the second chapter of that Treatise, after defining what he means by nature, etc., he, on the sixth section, proceeds as follows:—"But many believe that the ignorant disturb more than follow the order of nature, and conceive of men in nature as a state within the state. For they assert that the human mind has not been produced by any natural causes, but created immediately by God, and thereby rendered so

independent of other things as to have absolute power of determining itself, and of using reason aright. But experience teaches us more than enough, that it is no more in our power to have a sound mind than a sound body. Since, moreover, everything, as far as it is able, strives to conserve its being, we cannot doubt that if it were equally in our power to live according to the prescripts of reason, as to be led by blind desire, all would seek the guidance of reason and live wisely, which is not the case. For every one is the slave of the particular pleasure to which he is most attached. Nor do theologians remove the difficulty, when they assert that this inability is a vice, or a sin of human nature, which derives its origin from the fall of the first parent. For if it was in the power of the first man to stand rather than to fall, and if he was sound in faculty, and had perfect control over his own mind, how did it happen that he, the wise and prudent, fell? But they say he was deceived and tempted by the devil. But who was it that led astray and tempted the devil himself? Who, I ask, rendered this the most excellent of intelligent creatures so mad, that he wished to be greater than God? Could he render himself thus mad—he who had a sane mind, and strove as much as in him lay to conserve his being? How, moreover, could it happen that the first man in possession of his entire mental faculties, and master of his will, should be both open to temptation, and suffer himself to be robbed of his mind? For if he had the power of using his reason aright, he could not be deceived; for as far as in him lay, he necessarily sought to conserve his own being, and the sanity of his mind. But it is supposed he had this in his power, therefore he necessarily conserved his sane mind, neither could he be deceived. Which is evidently false from his history; and, consequently, it must be granted that it was not in the power of the first person to use reason aright, but that he, like us, was subject to passions."

Spinoza is scarcely likely to become a great favorite with the "Woman's Right's Convention." In his ninth

chapter of the same Treatise, he says, "If by nature women were equal to men, and excelled as much as they in strength of mind and in talent, truly amongst nations, so many and so different, some would be found where both sexes ruled equally, and others where the men were ruled by the women, and so educated as to be inferior to them in talent; but as this has never happened, we are justified in assuming that women, by nature, have not an equal right with men, but that they are necessarily obedient to men, and thus it can never happen that both sexes can equally rule, and still less that men be ruled by women."

Lewes, in his seventh chapter on Modern Philosophy, thus sums up Spinoza's teachings and their result. He says:—

"The doctrine of Spinoza was of great importance, if for nothing more than having brought about the first crisis in modern philosophy. His doctrine was so clearly stated, and so rigorously deduced from admitted premises, that he brought philosophy into this dilemma:—

"'Either my premises are correct; and we must admit that every clear and distinct idea is absolutely true; true not only subjectively, but objectively.

"'If so, my objection is true;

"'Or my premises are false; the voice of consciousness is not the voice of truth;

"'And if so, then is my system false, but all philosophy is impossible; since the only ground of certitude—our consciousness—is pronounced unstable, our only means of knowing the truth is pronounced fallacious.'"

"Spinozism or scepticism, choose between them, for you have no other choice.

"Mankind refused, however, to make a choice. If the principles which Descartes had established could have no other result than Spinozism, it was worth while inquiring whether those principles might not themselves be modified.

"The ground of discussion was shifted, psychology

took the place of ontology. It was Descartes's theory of knowledge which led to Spinozism; that theory must therefore be examined; that theory becomes the great subject of discussion. Before deciding upon the merits of any system which embraced the great questions of creation, the Deity, immortality, etc., men saw that it was necessary to decide upon the competency of the human mind to solve such problems. All knowledge must be obtained either through experience or independent of experience. Knowledge dependent on experience must necessarily be merely knowledge of *phenomena*. All are agreed that experience can only be experience of ourselves as modified by objects. All are agreed that to know things *per se*—*noumena*—we must know them through some other channel then experience. Have we or have we not that other channel? This is the problem."

"Thus, before we can dogmatize upon ontological subjects, we must settle this question—Can we transcend the sphere of our consciousness, and know things *per se*?"

"I."

BIOGRAPHY

OF

ANTHONY COLLINS.

Freethought, as developed in the Deistic struggles of the seventeenth century, had to battle for existence against the Puritanic reaction which took its second rise from the worn-out licentious age of the last of the Stuarts, and that of the no less dangerous (though concealed) libertinism of the Dutch king. A religious rancor also arose which, but for the influence of a new power, would have re-enacted the tragedy of religious persecution. But this rancor became somewhat modified, from the fact that the various parties now were unlike the old schismatics, who were each balanced at the opposite ends of the same pole—extreme Papacy on the one hand, and Fifth-monarchists on the other—when each oscillation from the Protestant centre deranged the balance of enthusiasm, and drove it to the farthest verge of fanaticism, until all religious parties were hurled into one chaos of disunion. Such were the frequent changes of the seventeenth century—but at its close the power of Deism had evolved a platform on which was to be fought the hostilities of creeds. Here, then, could not exist that commingling of sects, which were deducible in all their varied extravagance from the Bible. Theology had no longer to fight with itself, but with philosophy. Metaphysics became the Jehu of opinion, and sought to drive its chariot through the fables of the saints. The old doctrines had to be re-stated to meet new foes. For the

Papists, Nonconformists, and Brownists, were excluded to make way for the British Illuminati, who spread as much consternation through England as did the French Encyclopædists across Europe. The new field of action was only planned, for when Catholicism first opposed Protestantism, its leaders little thought what a Pandoric box it was opening—nor did the Divines of the latter sect ever doubt the finality of their own doctrines. They wished to replace one infallibility by another. And the same charge can be substantiated against Deism. When in this Augustan age the Free-thinking leaders, fresh from the trammels of Christism, first took the name of Moral Philosophers, they little knew they were paving the way for an Atheism they so much dreaded—a democracy more unbridled than their most constitutional wishes—a political economy to be tried for half a century, and then to be discarded —a revolutionary fervor which should plough up Europe, and then give place to a Communism, which the first founders of this national agitation would have gazed upon with amazement, and shrunk from with despair. Such is the progress of change. The rise of the Deistic movement may be defined in a sentence. It was the old struggle of speculative opinion shifting its battle-ground from theology to philosophy, prior to the one being discarded, and the other developed into positive science.

Amongst the most distinguished of these reformers, stands the name of Anthony Collins.

Who and what he was, we have little opportunity of knowing, save from the scattered notices of contemporaries; but sufficient is left on record to prove him one of the best of men, and the very Coryphæus of Deism. The twin questions of Necessity and Prophecy have been examined by him perhaps more ably than by any other liberal author. There are slight discrepancies in relation to the great events of his life. The Abbe Lodivicat says he was born June 21st, 1676, of a rich and noble family, at Heston, in Middlesex, and was appointed treasurer of the county; but another

account says "Hounslow," which we think was the more likely place. He was educated at Eton and Cambridge. He studied for the bar for sometime, but (being wealthy) ultimately renounced jurisprudence, while his youthful studies admirably fitted him for his subsequent magisterial duties. He was clever, honest, learned, and esteemed by all who knew his character. The elder D'Israeli says, "that he was a great lover of literature, and a man of fine genius, while his morals were immaculate, and his personal character independent."

The friendship of Locke alone is sufficient to stamp the character of Collins with honor, and he was one of the most valued friends of this great man. In a volume published by P. Des Maizeaux (a writer we shall have occasion to notice) in the year 1720, containing a collection of the posthumous works of Locke, there are several letters addressed to Collins which fully substantiate our opinion. Locke was then an old man, residing in the country, and Collins was a young man in London, who took a pleasure in executing the commissions of his illustrious friend. In one of them, dated October 29th, 1703, he says—"If I were now setting out in the world, I should think it my greatest happiness to have such a companion as you, who had a true relish of truth, would in earnest seek it with me, from whom I might receive it undisguised, and to whom I might communicate what I thought true, freely. Believe it my good friend, to love truth for truth's sake, is the principal part of human perfection in this world, and the seed-plot of all other virtue; and, if I mistake not, you have as much of it as ever I met with in anybody. What, then, is there wanting to make you equal to the best—a friend for any one to be proud of?"

During the following year the correspondence of Locke appears in a most interesting light—the affectionate inquiries, the kind advice, and the most grateful acknowledgments are made to Collins. On Sept. 11th, Locke writes:—"He that has anything to do

with you, must own that friendship is the natural product of your constitution, and your soul, a noble soil, is enriched with the two most valuable qualities of human nature—truth and friendship. What a treasure have I then in such a friend, with whom I can converse, and be enlightened about the highest speculations!" On the 1st of October he wrote Collins on his rapid decay, "But this, I believe, he will assure you, that my infirmities prevail so fast on me, that unless you make haste hither, I may lose the satisfaction of ever seeing again a man that I value in the first rank of those I leave behind me." This was written twenty-seven days before his death. Four days before his decease, he wrote a letter to be given to Collins after his death. This document is one of the most important in relation to the life of the great Freethinker—it irrefragably proves the falsity of everything that may be alleged against the character of Collins:—

"*Oates, August* 23, 1704.

For Anthony Collins, Esq.

Dear Sir—By my will, you will see that I had some kindness for * * * And I knew no better way to take care of him, than to put him, and what I designed for him, into your hands and management. The knowledge I have of your virtues of all kinds, secures the trust, which, by your permission, I have placed in you; and the peculiar esteem and love I have observed in the young man for you, will dispose him to be ruled and influenced by you, so of that I need say nothing. May you live long and happy, in the enjoyment of health, freedom, content, and all those blessings which Providence has bestowed on you, and your virtues entitle you to. I know you loved me living, and will preserve my memory now I am dead. * * * I leave my best wishes with you.

John Locke."

Such is the honorable connection which existed between Locke and Collins. Collins's first publication

was a tract, "Several of the London Cases Considered," in the year 1700. In 1707, he published an "Essay Concerning the Use of Reason on Propositions, the evidence whereof depends upon Human Testimony;" "in which," says Dr. Leland, "there are some good observations, mixed with others of a suspicious nature and tendency." It principally turned on the Trinitarian controversy then raging, and is of little interest now. In this year Collins united with Dodwell in the controversy carried on by Dr. Samuel Clarke. One of Clarke's biographers alludes to it thus: "Dr. Clarke's arguments in favor of the immateriality, and consequent immortality of the soul, called out, however, a far more formidable antagonist than Dodwell, in the person of Anthony Collins, an English gentleman of singular intellectual acuteness, but, unhappily, of Infidel principles. The controversy was continued through several short treatises. On the whole, though Clarke, in some instances, laid himself open to the keen and searching dialectics of his gifted antagonist, the victory certainly remained with the Divine." Of course it is only to be expected that such will be the opinion of an opponent—but it is further proof of Collins's ability and character. In 1703 appeared his celebrated "Discourses of Freethinking," which perhaps created the greatest sensation in the religious world (with the exception of the "Age of Reason") of any book published against Christianity. This book is as able a defence of the freedom of the expression of thought without penalty, as was ever published. It is divided into four sections. In the 1st, Freethinking is defined —in five arguments. In the 2nd, That it is our duty to think freely on those points of which men are denied the right to think freely: such as of the nature and attributes of God, the truth and authority of Scriptures, and of the meaning of Scriptures, in seven arguments and eleven instances. The third section is the consideration of six objections to Freethinking—from the whole of which he concludes (1) That Freethinkers must have more understanding, and that they must

necessarily be the most virtuous people. (2) That they have, in fact, been the most understanding and virtuous people in all ages. Here follows the names of a great number of men whom Collins classified as Freethinkers, and of whom we have no reason to be ashamed.

This book was answered by many divines, but none of them emerged from the contest with such Christian honors as the famous Dr. Bentley—considered England's greatest classical scholar. In the same year, the Dr. published his reply under the signature of "Phileleutheros Lipsiensis." The fame of Bentley was considered equal to Collins's; and it has always been represented that this reply completely crushed the Freethinker—nothing could be further from the truth. Bentley principally attacked the Greek quotations, and denounced Collins for his ignorance in not putting his (Bentley's) construction on every disputed word. For this reply, Bentley received the thanks of the University of Cambridge. In conection with this work, Collins is also charged with wilful deception —which has been reproduced in our own days by divines who perhaps never read a line of Collins. A French edition of the "Discourse" was translated under the personal inspection of Collins: and it is said that he altered the construction of several sentences to evade the charges brought against him by Bentley. Dr. Leland is particularly eloquent upon this; and the Rev. Mr. Lorimer, of Glasgow, triumphantly plagiarises the complaint of the men whose defects he can only imitate. There is another charge connected with Bentley and his friends, which it is desirous should be exposed. The elder D'Israeli says:—"Anthony Collins wrote several well-known works, without prefixing his name; but having pushed too far his curious and polemical points, he incurred the odium of a Freethinker—a term which then began to be in vogue, and which the French adopted by translating it, in their way—'a strong thinker,' or *esprit fort*. Whatever tendency to 'liberalise' the mind from the dog-

mas and creeds prevails in these works, the talents and learning of Collins were of the first class. His morals were immaculate, and his personal character independent; but the *odium theologicum* of those days combined every means to stab in the dark, till the taste became hereditary with some. I may mention a fact of this cruel bigotry which occurred within my own observation, on one of the most polished men of the age. The late Mr. Cumberland, in the romance entitled his 'Life,' gave this extraordinary fact. He said that Dr. Bentley, who so ably replied to Collins's 'Discourse,' when many years after he discovered him fallen into great distress, conceiving that by having ruined Collins's character as a writer for ever, he had been the occasion of his personal misery, he liberally contributed to his maintenance. In vain I mentioned to that elegant writer, who was not curious about facts, that this person could never have been ANTHONY Collins, who had always a plentiful fortune; and when it was suggested to him that this 'A. Collins' as he printed it, must have been ARTHUR Collins, the historic compiler, who was often in pecuniary difficulties, still he persisted in sending the lie down to posterity, without alteration, in his second edition, observing to a friend of mine, that 'the story, while it told well, might serve as a striking instance of his great relative's generosity; and that it should stand because it could do no harm to any but to ANTHONY Collins, whom he considered as little short of an Atheist.'" Such is a specimen of Christian honor and justice.

In 1715, appeared his "Philosophical Inquiry into Human Liberty." Dr. Clarke was again his opponent. The publication of this work marked an epoch in metaphysics. Dugald Stewart, in criticising the discussion on Moral Liberty between Clarke and Leibnitz, says, "But soon after this controversy was brought to a conclusion by the death of his antagonist, he (Clarke) had to renew the same argument, in reply to his countryman, Anthony Collins, who, following the footsteps of Hobbes, with logical talents not inferior to his mas-

ter (and with a weight of personal character in his favor to which his master had no pretensions,) gave to the cause which he so warmly espoused, a degree of credit amongst sober and inquiring politicians, which it had never before possessed in England." The following are the principal arguments of Collins in reference to Liberty and Necessity :—

First. Though I deny Liberty in a certain meaning of that word, yet I contend for Liberty, as it signifies *a power in man to do as he wills or pleases.*

Secondly. When I affirm *Necessity*, I contend only for *moral necessity;* meaning thereby that man, who is an intelligent and sensible being, is determined by his reason and senses; and I deny any man to be subject to such necessity as is in clocks, watches, and such other beings, which, for want of intelligence and sensation, are subject to an absolute, physical or mechanical necessity.

Thirdly, I have undertaken to show, that the notions I advance are so far from being inconsistent with, that they are the sole foundation of morality and laws, and of rewards and punishments in society, and that the notions I explode are subversive of them.

From the above premises, Collins sought to show that man is a necessary agent. (1) From our experience (through consciousness.) (2) From the impossibility of liberty. (3) From the consideration of the divine prescience. (4) From the nature and use of rewards and punishments. (5) From the nature of morality. Such were the principles on which the great question of Necessity has ever been advocated — from Hobbes to Collins, Jonathan Edwards to Mackintosh and Spencer. In the year 1704 Toland dedicated to him a new translation of Æsop's Fables. There are many anecdotes respecting Collins inserted in religious magazines, most of which are false, and all without proof. One of them, related in a most circumstantial manner, appears to be the favorite. It depicts Collins walking out in the country on a Sunday morning, when he meets a countryman returning from Church.

"Well, Hodge," says Collins, "so you have been enjoying the fresh breezes of nature, this fine morning."

The clown replied that "he had been worshipping nature's God," and proved it by repeating the substance of the Athanasian creed. Upon which Collins questions him as to the residence of his God: and for a reply is told that his God is so large, that he fills the universe; and so small that he dwells in HIS BREAST. This sublime fact, we are told, had more effect upon Collins's mind than all the books written against him by the clergy. When will sensible men reject such charlatanism?

The next great work of Collins was his "Discourse on the Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion," in two parts. The first containing some considerations on the quotations made from the Old in the New Testament, and particularly on the prophecies cited from the former, and said to be fulfilled in the latter. The second containing an examination of the scheme advanced by Mr. Whiston, in his essay towards restoring the true text of the Old Testament, and for vindicating the citations thence made in the New Testament, to which is prefixed an apology for free debate and liberty of writing. This book took the religious world by storm; it is even thought it struck more dismay amongst divines than his former essay on Freethinking. The book proceeds to show that Christianity is not proved by prophecy. That the Apostles relied on the predictions in the Old Testament, and their fulfilment in Jesus as the only sure proof of the truth of their religion; if, therefore, the prophecies are not thoroughly literal, and fulfilled distinctly, there can be no proof in Christianity. He then examines the principal prophecies, and dismisses them, as allegorical fables too vague to be of any credit. In less than two years no less than thirty-five books were published in reply to this work, written by the ablest and most influential theologians in England. In 1727 Collins published another large work, "The Scheme of Literal Prophecy Considered," in which he still further

defends his view principally against the sophistical reasoning of Whiston, and finally vanquished the whole of his opponents.

Perhaps no Freethinker, with the single exception of Hobbes, was so attacked during his life as Collins. Toland and Woolston were persecuted and driven into prison and poverty; but Collins, with his profusion of wealth, could oppose Christianity with applause—mingle in the gaiety of the Court—occupy a seat on the magisterial bench—be the welcome guest of the most liberal of the aristocracy, contemporary with others who even languished in prison for the propagation of similar sentiments. Since his day the clergy have grown wiser; THEN the most trivial pamphlet on the Deistic side created a consternation amongst the saints, and they strove who should be the first to answer it—indeed, it was considered a test of honor amongst the clergy to be eager in the exposure of Deism; but this style of warfare was discontinued after the lapse of a few years. The most discerning observers discovered that in proportion to the answers published against liberal works, the influence of the most powerful side decreased. Force, then, gradually interfered, and acts of Parliament were considered the only logical refutation of a philosophical heresy. The anomaly of our laws interfered again. Collins was RICH, and so must escape the fangs of the law. Thomas Woolston was POOR, so his vitals were pierced by laws which Collins escaped—yet both committed the same offence. In later times Gibbon traced the rise of Christianity, and about the same time Paine accomplished another portion of the same risk—and the Government which prosecuted the plebeian, flattered the patrician. But Collins's time was rapidly drawing nigh. On the 13th of December, 1729, he expired, aged fifty-three years; and to show the esteem in which his character was held, the following notice was inserted in the newspapers of the day—all hostile to his views, yet striving to make it appear that he was, after all, not so great an Infidel as his reputation honored him with :—"On

Saturday last, died at his house in Harley Square, Anthony Collins, Esq. He was a remarkably active, upright, and impartial magistrate, the tender husband, the kind parent, the good master, and the true friend. He was a great promoter of literature in all its branches; and an immoveable asserter of universal liberty in all civil and religious matters. Whatever his sentiments were on certain points, this is what he declared at the time of his death—viz., that he had always endeavored, to the best of his ability, to serve God, his king, and his country, so he was persuaded he was going to that place which God hath prepared for them that serve him, and presently afterwards he said, the Catholic religion is to serve God and man. He was an eminent example of temperance and sobriety, and one that had the true art of living. His worst enemies could never charge him with any vice or immorality."

With this character the Freethinkers have no right to be dissatisfied. The Abbe Lodivicat says, "His library was curious and valuable; always open to the learned, even to his opponents, whom he furnished with pleasure, both with books and arguments, which were employed in confuting him." Mr. D'Israeli says he has seen a catalogue of Collins's library, elaborately drawn up in his own handwriting, and it must have contained a splendid selection of books. This is proved by the correspondence with Locke, and the extensive number of quotations spread thoughout his published works.

By the death of Collins, and the defalcation of one who abused the name of a Deist, the cause of Freethought was impeded at the time when it most needed assistance. Collins had written a great number of tracts and larger works, intending them to be published after his death: one collection of eight octavo volumes of manuscript containing the attacks upon Christianity, by which he intended his name to be transmitted to posterity, were all arranged ready for publication as his posthumous works. To ensure their creditable appearance, and to reward a man whom he had

thought worthy of confidence, and one who professed to be a disciple of Collins, he bequeathed them to Des Maizeaux, then a popular author and editor. He had edited the correspondence of Locke and Collins, written the life of Bayle, and subsequently edited Toland. The idea of Collins was to give his work to Des Maizeaux for a recompense for the trouble of publishing them, while he would derive the whole profits of their sale, which no doubt would be very large. It appears that the widow of Collins was much younger than himself—in league with the Church of England; and was in rather a suspicious friendship with more than one clerical antagonist of her late husband. Des Maizeaux being worked upon conjointly by Mrs. Collins and a person named Tomlinson, was induced to accept a present of fifty guineas, and relinquished the possession of the manuscripts. It was not long, however, before his conscience accused him of the great wrong done to the memory of his benefactor, and to the Free-thinking cause. His regret was turned into the most profound compunction for his crime; and in this state of mind he wrote a long letter to one who had been a mutual friend to Collins and himself, acknowledging that he had done "a most wicked thing," saying—"I am convinced that I have acted contrary to the will and intention of my dear deceased friend; showed a disregard to the particular mark of esteem he gave me on that occasion; in short, that I have forfeited what is dearer to me than my own life—honor and reputation.....I send you the fifty guineas I received, which I do now look upon as the wages of iniquity, and I desire you to return them to Mrs. Collins, who, as I hope it of her justice, equity, and regard to Mr. Collins's intentions, will be pleased to cancel my paper."

This appeal (which proved that Des Maizeaux, if he was weak-minded, was not absolutely dishonest) had no effect on Mrs. Collins. The manuscripts were never returned. What their contents were, no one now can inform us. We are justified, however, in supposing

that as those eight volumes were the crowning efforts of a mind which in its youth was brilliant in no common degree, must have been even superior to those books which roused England from its dreamy lethargy, and brought about a revolution in controversy. Whether they touched upon miracles, or the external evidences, or the morals of Christism, is unknown. The curtain was drawn over the scene of demolition. Seven years after this time the controversy was reopened by Mrs. Collins, in the year 1737, on account of a report being current that Mrs. C. had permitted transcripts of those manuscripts to get abroad. The widow wrote some very sharp letters to Des Maizeaux, and he replied in a tone which speaks faithfully of the affection he still bore to Collins's memory. He concludes thus:—"Mr. Collins loved me and esteemed me for my integrity and sincerity, of which he had several proofs. How I have been drawn in to injure him, to forfeit the good opinion he had of me, and which, were he now alive, would deservedly expose me to his utmost contempt, is a grief which I shall carry to the grave. It would be a sort of comfort to me if those who have consented I should be drawn in, were in some measure sensible of the guilt towards so good, kind, generous a man."

Such is an epitome of the secret history of the MSS. of Anthony Collins. If we look at the fate of the MSS. of other Deists, we shall have good reasons for believing that some of the ablest writings, meant to give a posthumous reputation to their authors, have disappeared into the hands of either ignorant or designing persons. Five volumes, at least, of Toland's works, meant for publication, were, by his death, irretrievably lost. Blount's MSS. never appeared. Two volumes of Tindall's were seized by the Bishop of London, and destroyed. Woolston's MSS. met with no better fate. Chubb carefully prepared his works, and published them in his lifetime. Bolingbroke made Mallet his confidant, as Collins did by Des Maizeaux. The name of St. John produced £10,000 to Mallet;

but those works were left with the tacit acknowledgment that the Scotch poet should write a suitable life of the peer. The letter of Mallet to Lord Cornbury can only be compared to an invitation for a bid for the suppression of the "Philosophical Works" of St. John; and if this was not sufficient, we need only instance the apparent solicitation with which he stopped a well-known influential dignitary of the church on the day when the works were to appear, by pulling out his watch, and saying, "My Lord, Christianity will tremble at a quarter to twelve." We may be thankful to the pecuniary poverty of our opponents even for the possession of the first philosophy. Some of Hume's and Gibbon's works have not yet appeared. The MSS. of most of the minor Freethinkers disappeared with their authors. There is no doubt but what Robert Taylor left some valuable writings which cannot be recovered. Such is the feeble chance of great men's writings being published when they are no longer alive.

With regard to the literary claims of Collins. His works are logically composed and explicitly worded. He invariably commences by stating the groundwork of his opponent's theories, and from them deduces a great number of facts and axioms of a contrary character, and upon those builds his whole chain of argument. He is seldom witty—never uses the flowers of rhetoric, combining a most rigid analysis with a synthetic scheme, admitting but of one unswerving end. He was characteristically great in purpose. He avoided carrying forward his arguments beyond the basis of his facts. Whether in treating the tangled intricacies of necessity, or the theological quagmires of prophecy, he invariably explained without confusing, and refuted without involving other subjects than those legitimately belonging to the controversy. His style of writing was serious, plain, and without an undue levity, yet withal perfectly readable. Men studied Collins who shrunk from contact with the lion-hearted Woolston, whose brusque pen too often shocked those

it failed to convince. There was a timidity in many of the letters of Blount, and a craving wish to rely more on the witticisms of Brown, than was to be found in the free and manly spirit of our hero. To the general public, the abstruse speculations of the persecuted Toland were a barrier which his many classical allusions only heightened; and the musical syllables of Shaftesbury, with his style, at once so elevated, so pompous, and so quaint; or the political economic doctrines of Mandeville, all tended to exalt the name of Collins above those of his contemporaries and immediate successors; and posterity cannot fail to place his bust in that historic niche betwixt Hobbes—his master on one hand—and Bolingbroke, his successor, on the other. From the great St. John has descended in the true apostolical descent the mantle of Freethought upon Hume, Gibbon, Paine, Godwin, Carlile, Taylor, and Owen. And amongst this brilliant galaxy of genius, no name is more deserving of respect than that of Anthony Collins. A. C.

BIOGRAPHY

OF

DES CARTES.

Rene des Cartes Duperron, better known as Des Cartes, the father of modern philosophy, was born at La Haye, in Touraine, of Breton parents, near the close of the sixteenth century, at a time when Bacon was like the morning sun, rising to shed new rays of bright light over the then dark world of philosophy. The mother of Des Cartes died while he was but a few days old, and himself a sickly child, he began to take part in the battle of life with but little appearance of ever possessing the capability for action on the minds of his fellows, which he afterwards so fully exercised. Debarred, however, by his physical weakness from many boyish pursuits, he devoted himself to study in his earliest years, and during his youth gained the title of the young philosopher, from his eagerness to learn, and from his earnest endeavors by inquiry and experiment to solve every problem presented to his notice. He was educated in the Jesuits' College of La Fleche; and the monument erected to him at Stockholm informs us, "That having mastered all the learning of the schools, which proved short of his expectations, he betook himself to the army in Germany and Hungary, and there spent his vacant winter hours in comparing the mysteries and phenomena of nature with the laws of mathematics, daring to hope that the one might serve as a key to the other. Quitting, therefore, all other pursuits, he retired to a little village near Eg-

mont, in Holland, where spending twenty-five years in continual reading and meditation, he effected his design."

In his celebrated "Discourse on Method," he says, —"As soon as my age permitted me to leave my preceptors, I entirely gave up the study of letters; and, resolving to seek no other science than that which I could find in myself, or else in the great book of the world, I employed the remainder of my youth in travel —in seeing courts and camps—in frequenting people of diverse humors and conditions—in collecting various experiences; and, above all, in endeavoring to draw some profitable reflection from what I saw. For it seemed to me that I should meet with more truth in the reasonings which each man makes in his own affairs, and which, if wrong, would be speedily punished by failure, than in those reasonings which the philosopher makes in his study upon speculations which produce no effect, and which are of no consequence to him, except perhaps that he will be the more vain of them, the more remote they are from common sense, because he would then have been forced to employ more ingenuity and subtlety to render them plausible."

At the age of thirty-three Des Cartes retired from the world for a period of eight years, and his seclusion was so effectual during that time, that his place of residence was unknown to his friends. He there prepared the "Meditations," and "Discourse on Method," which have since caused so much pen-and-ink warfare amongst those who have aspired to be ranked as philosophical thinkers. He became European in fame; and, invited by Christina of Sweden, he visited her kingdom, but the rudeness of the climate proved too much for his delicate frame, and he died at Stockholm in the year 1650, from inflammation of the lungs, being fifty-four years of age at the time of his death.

Des Cartes was perhaps the most original thinker that France had up to that date produced; and, contemporary with Bacon, he exercised a powerful influence on the progress of thought in Europe; but although a

great thinker, he was not a brave man, and the fear of giving offence to the church and government, has certainly prevented him from making public some of his writings, and perhaps has toned down some of those thoughts which, when first uttered, took a higher flight, and struck full home to the truth itself.

The father and founder of the deductive method, Des Cartes still proudly reigns to the present day, although some of his conclusions have been over-turned, and others of his thinkings have been carried to conclusions which he never dared to dream of. He gave a strong aid to the tendency of advancing civilization, to separate philosophy from theology, thereby striking a blow, slow in its effect, and effectual in its destructive operation, on all priestcraft. In his dedication of the "Meditations," he says,—"I have always thought that the two questions of the existence of God, and the nature of the soul, were the chief of those which ought to be demonstrated rather by philosophy than by theology; for although it is sufficient for us, the faithful, to believe in God, and that the soul does not perish with the body, it does not seem possible ever to persuade the Infidels to any religion, unless we first prove to them these two things by natural reason."

Having relinquished faith, he found that he must choose an entirely new faith in which to march with reason; the old ways were so cumbered with priests and Bibles, that progression would have been impossible. This gave us his method. He wanted a starting point from which to reason, some indisputable fact upon which to found future thinkings.

"He has given us the detailed history of his doubts. He has told us how he found that he could, plausibly enough, doubt of everything except his own existence. He pushed his scepticism to the verge of self-annihilation. There he stopped: there in self, there in his consciousness, he found at last an irresistible fact, an irreversible certainty. Firm ground was discovered. He could doubt the existence of the external world, and treat it as a phantasm. He could doubt the ex-

istence of God, and treat the belief as a superstition. But of the existence of his own thinking, doubting mind, no sort of doubt was possible. He, the doubter, existed if nothing else existed. The existence that was revealed to him in his own consciousness, was the primary fact, the first indubitable certainty. Hence his famous *Cogito ergo Sum:* I think, therefore I am." (*Lewes's Bio. Hist. Phil.*)

Proceeding from the certainty of his existence, Des Cartes endeavors to find other equally certain facts, and for that purpose presents the following doctrine and rules for our guidance:—The basis of all certitude is consciousness, consciousness is the sole foundation of absolute certainty, whatever it distinctly proclaims must be true. The process is, therefore, rendered clear and simple: examine your consciousness—each distinct reply will be a fact.

He tells us further that all clear ideas are true—that whatever is clearly and distinctly conceived is true—and in these lie the vitality of his system, the cause of the truth or error of his thinkings.

The following are the rules he gave us for the detection and separation of true ideas from false, (*i. e.*, imperfect or complex):—

"1. Never to accept anything as true but what is evidently so; to admit nothing but what so clearly and distinctly presents itself as true, that there can be no reason to doubt it.

"2. To divide every question into as many separate parts as possible, that each part being more easily conceived, the whole may be more intelligible.

"3. To conduct the examination with order, beginning by that of objects the most simple, and therefore the easiest to be known, and ascending little by little up to knowledge of the most complex.

"4. To make such exact calculations, and such circumspections as to be confident that nothing essential has been omitted. Consciousness being the basis of all certitude, everything of which you are clearly and distinctly conscious must be true: everything which

you clearly and distinctly conceive, exists, if the idea of it involve existence."

In these four rules we have the essential part of one half of Des Cartes's system, the other, which is equally important, is the attempt to solve metaphysical problems by mathematical aid. To mathematics he had devoted much of his time. He it was who, at the age of twenty three, made the grand discovery of the applicability of algebra to geometry. While deeply engaged in mathematical studies and investigations, he came to the conclusion that mathematics were capable of a still further simplification, and of much more extended application. Impressed with the certainty of the conclusions arrived at by the aid of mathematical reasoning, he began to apply mathematics to metaphysics.

His ambition was to found a system which should be solid and convincing. Having searched for certitude, he had found *its basis* in consciousness; he next wanted a *method*, and hoped he had found it in mathematics. He tells us that "Those long chains of reasoning, all simple and easy, by which geometers used to arrive at their most difficult demonstrations, suggested to him that all things which came within human knowledge, must follow each other in a similar chain; and that provided we abstain from admitting anything as true which is not so, and that we always preserve in them the order necessary to deduce one from the other, there can be none so remote to which we cannot finally attain, nor so obscure but that we may discover them."

Acting out this, he dealt with metaphysics as we should with a problem from Euclid, and expected by rigorous reasoning to discover the truth. He, like Archimedes, had wished for a standing place from which to use the lever, that should overturn the world; but, having a sure standing place in the indubitable fact of his own existence, he did not possess sufficient courage to put forth the mighty power—it was left for

one who came after him to fairly attempt the overthrow of the world of error so long existent.

Cartesianism was sufficiently obnoxious to the divines to provoke their wrath; and yet, from some of its peculiarities, it has found many opponents amongst the philosophical party. The Cartesian philosophy is founded on two great principles, the one metaphysical, the other physical. The metaphysical is Des Cartes's foundation-stone—the "I think, therefore I am." This has been warmly attacked as not being logical. Des Cartes said his existence was a fact—a fact above and beyond all logic; lôgic could neither prove nor disprove it. The *Cogito ergo Sum* was not new itself, but it was the first stone of a new building—the first step in a new road: from this fact Des Cartes tried to reach another, and from that others.

The physical principle is that nothing exists but substance, which he makes of two kinds—the one a substance that thinks, the other a substance extended. Actual thought and actual extension are the essence of substance, so that the thinking substance cannot be without some actual thought, nor can anything be retrenched from the extension of a thing, without taking away so much of its actual substance.

In his physical speculations, Des Cartes has allowed his imagination to run very wild. His famous theory of vortices is an example of this. Assuming extension to be the essence of substance, he denied the possibility of a vacuum by that assumption; for if extension be the essence of substance, wherever extension is, there substance must be. This substance he assumes to have originally been divided into equal angular particles, each endowed with an equal degree of motion; several systems or collections of these particles he holds to have a motion about certain equi-distant points, or centres, and that the particles moving round these composed so many vortices. These angular particles, by their intestine motions, he supposes to become, as it were, ground into a spherical form;

the parts rubbed off are called matter of the first element, while the spherical globules he calls matter of the second element; and since there would be a large quantity of this element, he supposes it to be driven towards the centre of each vortex by the circular motion of the globules, and that there it forms a large spherical body such as the sun. This sun being thus formed, and moving about its own axis with the common matter of the vortex, would necessarily throw out some parts of its matter, through the vacuities of the globules of the second element constituting the vortex; and this especially at such places as are farthest from its poles; receiving, at the same time in, by these poles, as much as it loses in its equatorial parts. And, by these means, it would be able to carry round with it those globules that are nearest, with the greater velocity; and the remoter, with less. And, further: those globules which are nearest the centre of the sun, must be smallest; because, were they greater, or equal, they would, by reason of their velocity, have a greater centrifugal force, and recede from the centre. If it should happen that any of these sun-like bodies, in the centres of the several vortices, should be so incrusted and weakened, as to be carried about in the vortex of the true sun: if it were of less solidity, or had less motion than the globules towards the extremity of the solar vortex, it would descend towards the sun, till it met with globules of the same solidity, and susceptible of the same degree of motion with itself: and thus, being fixed there, it would be for ever after carried about by the motion of the vortex, without either approaching any nearer to, or receding from the sun, and so become a planet. Supposing, then, all this, we are next to imagine that our system was at first divided into several vortices, in the centre of each of which was a lucid spherical body; and that some of these being gradually incrustated, were swallowed up by others which were larger, and more powerful, till at last they were all destroyed and swallowed up by the biggest solar vortex, except some few

which were thrown off in right lines from one vortex to another, and so became comets. It should also be added, that in addition to the two elements mentioned above, those particles which may yet exist, and be only in the course of reduction to their globular form, and still retain their angular proportions, form a third element.

This theory has found many opponents; but in this state of our work we conceive our duty to be that of giving a simple narrative of the philosopher's ideas, rather than a history of the various criticisms upon those ideas, the more especially as our pages scarcely afford room for such a mode of treatment.

Having formed his method, Des Cartes proceeded to apply it. The basis of certitude being consciousness, he interrogated his consciousness, and found that he had an idea of a substance infinite, eternal, immutable, independent, omniscient, omnipotent. This he called an idea of God: he said, "I exist as a miserably imperfect finite being, subject to change—ignorant, incapable of creating anything—I find by my finitude that I am not the infinite; by my liability to change that I am not the immutable; by my ignorance that I am not the omniscient: in short, by my imperfection, that I am not the perfect. Yet an infinite, immutable, omniscient, and perfect being must exist, because infinity, immutability, omniscience, and perfection are applied as correlatives in my ideas of finitude, change, etc. God therefore exists: his existence is clearly proclaimed in my consciousness, and therefore ceases to be a matter of doubt any more than the fact of my own existence. The conception of an infinite being proved his real existence, for if there is not really such a being I must have made the conception; but if I could make it I can also unmake it, which evidently is not true; therefore there must be externally to myself, an archetype from which the conception was derived." * * * * * "All that we clearly and distinctly conceive as contained in anything is true of that thing."

"Now, we conceive clearly and distinctly that the existence of God is contained in the idea we have of him: *ergo*—God exists."—(*Lewes's Bio. Hist. Phil.*)

Des Cartes was of opinion that his demonstrations of the existence of God "equal or even surpass in certitude the demonstrations of geometry." In this opinion we must confess we cannot share. He has already told us that the basis of all certitude is consciousness—that whatever is clearly and distinctly conceived, must be true—that imperfect and complex conceptions are false ones. The first proposition, all must admit, is applicable to themselves. I conceive a fact clearly and distinctly, and, despite all resistance, am compelled to accept that fact; and if that fact be accepted beyond doubt, no higher degree of certainty can be attained, That two and two are four—that I exist—are facts which I never doubt. The *Cogito ergo Sum* is irresistible, because indubitable; but *Cogito ergo Deus est* is a sentence requiring much consideration, and upon the face of it is no syllogism, but, on the contrary, is illogical. If Des Cartes meant "*I*" am conscious that I am not the whole of existence, he would be indisputable; but if he meant that "*I*" can be conscious of an existence entirely distinct, apart from, and external to, that very consciousness, then his whole reasoning from that point appears fallacious.

We use the word "I" as given by Des Cartes. Mill, in his "System of Logic," says, "The ambiguity in this case is in the pronoun I, by which in one place is to be understood *my will:* in another *the laws of my nature.* If the conception, existing as it does in my mind, had no original without, the conclusion would unquestionably follow that '*I*' had made it—that is, that the laws of my nature had spontaneously evolved it; but that my *will* made it would not follow. Now, when Des Cartes afterwards adds that I cannot unmake the conception, he means that I cannot get rid of it by an act of my will, which is true; but is not the proposition required. That what some of the laws of my nature have produced, other laws, or those same laws

in other circumstances, might not subsequently efface, he would have found it difficult to establish."

Treating the existence of God as demonstrated from the *a priori* idea of perfection and infinity, and by the clearness of his idea of God's existence, Des Cartes then proceeds to deal with the distinction between body and soul. To prove this distinction was to him an easy matter. The fundamental and essential attribute of substance must be extension, because we can denude substance of every quality but that of extension; this we cannot touch without at the same time affecting the substance. The fundamental attribute of mind is thought; it is in the act of thinking that the consciousness of existence is revealed; to be without thought would be to be without consciousness.

Des Cartes has given us, among others, the axiom "That two substances are really distinct when their ideas are complete, and no way imply each other. The idea of extension is complete and distinct from the idea of thought, which latter is also clear and distinct by itself. It follows, therefore, that substance and mind are distinct in essence."

Des Cartes has, from the vagueness of some of his statements, subjected himself to the charge of asserting the existence of innate ideas, and the following quotations will speak for themselves on the subject:— "When I said that the idea of God is innate in us, I never meant more than this, that Nature has endowed us with a faculty by which we may know God; but I have never either said or thought that such ideas had an actual existence, or even that they were a species distinct from the faculty of thinking.....Although the idea of God is so imprinted on our minds, that every person has within him the faculty of knowing him, it does not follow that there may not have been various individuals who have passed through life without ever making this idea a distinct object of apprehension; and, in truth, they who think they have an idea of a plurality of Gods, have no idea of God whatever." This seems explicit as negativing the charge of holding the

doctrine of innate ideas; but in the *Edinburgh Review* several passages are given, amongst which is the following:—"By the word idea I understand all that can be in our thoughts; and I distinguish three sorts of ideas—adventitious, like the common idea of the sun, framed by the mind, such as that which astronomical reasoning gives of the sun; and innate, as the idea of God, mind, body, a triangle, and generally all those which represent true, immutable, and eternal essences." With regard to these rather opposite statements, Lewes says, "If Des Cartes, when pressed by objections, gave different explanations, we must only set it down to a want of a steady conception of the vital importance of innate ideas to his system. The fact remains that innate ideas form the necessary groundwork of the Cartesian doctrine.....The radical error of all ontological speculation lies in the assumption that we have ideas independent of experience; because experience can only tell us of ourselves or of phenomena; of noumena it can tell us nothing..... The fundamental question, then, of modern philosophy is this—Have we any ideas independent of experience?"

Des Cartes's disciples are of two classes, the "mathematical cultivators of physic," and the "deductive cultivators of philosophy." The first class of disciples are far in advance of their chief, and can only be considered as having received an impulse in a true direction. The second class unhesitatingly accepted his principles, and continued his thinking, although they developed his system in a different manner, and arrived at stronger conclusions than Des Cartes's courage would have supported. Some of the physical speculations of Des Cartes have been much ridiculed by subsequent writers; but many reasons may be urged, not only against that ridicule, but also against the more moderate censure which several able critics have dealt out against the intellectual character of Des Cartes. It should be remembered that the theories of all his predecessors were mere conjectural speculations respect-

ing the places and paths of celestial bodies, etc. Innumerable hypotheses had been formed and found useless; and we ought rather to look to what Des Cartes did accomplish under the many difficulties of his position, in respect to the then state of scientific knowledge, than to judge harshly of those speculations, which, though attended with no beneficial result to humanity at large, were doubtless well intended by their author. He was the first man who brought optical science under the command of mathematics, by the discovery of the law of refraction of the ordinary ray through diaphanous bodies; and probably there is scarcely a name on record, the bearer of which has given a greater impulse to mathematical and philosophical inquiry than Des Cartes. Although, as a mathematician, he published but little, yet in every subject which he has treated he has opened, not only a new field for investigation, but also a new road for the investigators to proceed by. His discovery of the simple application of the notation of indices to algebraical powers, has totally remodelled the whole science of algebra. His conception of expressing the fundamental property of curve lines and curve surfaces by equations between the co-ordinates has led to an almost total supersedence of the geometry of the ancients. Contemporary with Galileo, and with a knowledge of the persecution to which that father of physics was being subjected by the Church, we are tempted to express our surprise that Des Cartes did not extend the right hand of fellowship, help, and sympathy to his brother philosopher; but it is, nevertheless, the fact, that either jealous of the fame of Galileo (as some have alleged,) or from a fear of being involved in the same persecutions, Des Cartes abstained from visiting the astronomer, although travelling for some time near his place of abode in Italy. Lewes, in his "Life of Des Cartes," says, "Des Cartes was a great thinker; but having said this we have almost exhausted the praise we can bestow on him as a man. In disposition he was timid to servility. While promulgating the proofs of the ex-

istence of the Deity, he was in evident alarm lest the Church should see something objectionable in them. He had also written an astronomical treatise; but hearing of the fate of Galileo he refrained from publishing, and always used some chicanery in speaking of the world's movement. He was not a brave man; he was also not an affectionate one. There was in him a deficiency of all finer feelings. But he was even-tempered, and studious of not giving offence."

We are tempted, after a careful perusal of the life and writings of Des Cartes and his contemporaries, to be of opinion that he was a man who wished to be considered the chief thinker of his day, and who shunned and rejected the offers of friendship from other philosophers, lest they, by being associated with him, should jointly wear laurels which he was cultivating solely to form a crown for himself. Despite all, his brow still bears a crown, and his fame has a freshness that we might all be justly proud of, if appertaining to ourselves.

We trust that in these few pages we have succeeded in presenting Des Cartes, to such of our readers who were unacquainted with his writings, sufficiently well to enable them to appreciate him, and to induce them to search further; and at the same time we hope that those better acquainted with him will not blame as for the omission of much which they may consider more important than the matter which appears in this little tract. We have endeavored to picture Des Cartes as the founder of the deductive method, as having the foundation-stone of all his reasoning in his consciousness.

"I."

BIOGRAPHY

OF

M. DE VOLTAIRE.

François Marie Arouet, better known by the name of Voltaire, was born at Chatenay, on the 20th of February, 1694. By assuming the name of Voltaire, young Arouet followed the custom, at that time generally practiced by the rich citizens and younger sons, who, leaving the family name to the heir, assumed that of a fief, or perhaps of a country house. The father of M. de Voltaire was treasurer to the Chamber of Accounts, and his mother, Margaret d'Aumart, was of a noble family of Poitou. The fortune which the father enjoyed, enabled him to bestow a first-class education upon the young Arouet, who was sent to the Jesuits' College, where the sons of the nobility received their education. While at school, Voltaire began to write poetry, and gave signs of a remarkable genius. His tutors, Fathers Poree and Jay, from the boldness and independence of his mind, predicted that he would become the apostle of Deism in France. This prediction he fulfilled. "Voltaire was," says Lord Brougham, "through his whole life, a sincere believer in the existence and attributes of the Deity. He was a firm and decided, and an openly declared unbeliever in Christianity; but he was, without any hesitation or any intermission, a Theist." His open declaration of disbelief in the inspiration of the Bible, and his total rejection of the dogmas of Christianity, laid him open to the malignant attacks and misrepresentations of the priest-

hood and the bigots of Europe; and so strong were they, that his life was continually in danger. Lord Brougham, in his "Men of Letters of the Time of George III.," says:—"Voltaire's name is so intimately connected in the minds of all men with Infidelity, in the minds of most men with irreligion, and, in the minds of all who are not well-informed, *with these qualities alone*, that whoever undertakes to write his life and examine his claims to the vast reputation which all the hostile feelings excited by him against himself have never been able to destroy, or even materially to impair, has to labor under a great load of prejudice, and can hardly expect, by any detail of particulars, to obtain for his subject even common justice at the hands of the general reader."

Voltaire was born in a corrupt age, and in a capital where it was fashionable to be immoral. When he left College, he was introduced by his own godfather, the Abbe de Chateauneuf, to the notorious Ninon de l'Enclos, who, at her death, left him by will two thousand livres to purchase books. In estimating the character of Voltaire, a due consideration must be had for the period in which he lived, and of the nature of the society amidst which he was reared. He lived twenty years under the reign of Louis XIV., and during the whole of the reign of the infamous Louis XV., when kings, courtiers, and priests set the example of the grossest immorality. It was then, as Voltaire said, "that to make the smallest fortune, it was better to say four words to the mistress of a king, than to write a hundred volumes."

Voltaire's life, from his youth upwards, was a stormy one. After he left College, his father, finding him persist in writing poetry, and living at large, forbade him his house. He insisted upon his son binding himself to an attorney. But his restless disposition quite unfitted him for regular employment, and he soon quitted the profession. He early made the acquaintance of the most celebrated men of his time, but his genius, his wit, and his sarcasm, soon raised up numerous ene-

mies. At the age of twenty-two, he was accused of having written a satire upon Louis XIV., who was just dead, and was thrown into the Bastile. But he was not cast down. It was here that he sketched his poem of the "League," corrected his tragedy of "Œdipus," and wrote some merry verses on the misfortune of being a prisoner. The Regent, Duke of Orleans, being informed of his innocence, restored him to freedom, and granted him a recompense. "I thank your royal highness," said Voltaire, "for having provided me with food; but I hope you will not hereafter trouble yourself concerning my lodging."

Voltaire, with his activity of mind, and living to so great an age, must necessarily produce many works. They are voluminous, consisting of history, poetry, and philosophy. His dramatic pieces are numerous, many of which are considered second only to Shakspeare's. "Œdipus," "Zadig," "Ingenu," "Zaire," "Henriade," "Irene," "Tancred," "Mahomet," "Merope," "Saul," "Alzire," "Le Fanatisme," "Mariamne," "Gaston de Foix," "Enfant Prodigue," "Pucelle d'Orleans," an essay on "Fire," the "Elements," "History of Charles XII.," "Lectures on Man," "Letters on England," "Memoirs," "Voyage of Sacramentado," "Micromegas," "Maid of Orleans," "Brutus," "Adelaide," "Death of Cæsar," "Temple of Taste," "Essay on the Manners and Spirit of Nations," "An Examination of the Holy Scriptures," and the "Philosophical Dictionary," are works that emanated from the active brain of this wit, poet, satirist, and philosopher.

In 1722, while at Brussels, Voltaire met Jean Baptiste Rousseau, whose misfortunes he deplored, and whose poetic talents he esteemed. Voltaire read some of his poems to Rousseau, and he in return read to Voltaire his "Ode addressed to Posterity," which Voltaire, it is asserted, told him would never arrive at the place to which it was addressed. The two poets parted irreconcileable foes.

In 1725, Voltaire was again shut up in the Bastile, through attempting to revenge an insult inflicted upon

him by a courtier. At the end of six months he was released, but ordered to quit Paris. He sought refuge in England, in 1726. He was the guest in that country of a Mr. Falconer, of Wandsworth, whose hospitality he remembered with affection so long as life lasted. Voltaire was known to most of the wits and Freethinkers of that day in England. At this early age he was at war with Christianity. "His visit to England," says Lamartine, "gave assurance and gravity to his incredulity; for in France he had only known libertines—in England he knew philosophers." He went to visit Congreve, who had the affectation to tell him that he (Congreve) valued himself, not on his authorship, but as a man of the world. To which Voltaire administered a just rebuke by saying, "I should never have come so far to see a gentleman!"

Voltaire soon acquired an ample fortune, much of which was expended in aiding men of letters, and in encouraging such youth as he thought discovered the seeds of genius. The use he made of riches might prevail on envy itself to pardon him their acquirement. His pen and his purse were ever at the service of the oppressed. Calas, an infirm old man, living at Toulouse, was accused of having hung his son, to prevent his becoming a Catholic. The Catholic population became inflamed, and the young man was declared to be a martyr. The father was condemned to the torture and the wheel, and died protesting his innocence. The family of Calas was ruined and disgraced. Voltaire, assuring himself of the innocence of the old man, determined to obtain justice for the family. To this end he labored incessantly for three years. In all this time, he said, a smile did not escape him for which he did not reproach himself as for a crime. His efforts were successful. Nor was this the only cause in which he was engaged on the side of the weak and the wronged against the powerful and the persecuting. His whole life, though maligned as an Infidel and a scoffer, was one long act of benevolence. On learning that a young niece of Corneille languished in a condi-

tion unworthy of his name, Voltaire, in the most delicate manner, invited her to his house, and she there received an education suitable to the rank that her birth had marked for her in society. "It is the duty of a soldier," he said "to succor the niece of his general."

Voltaire lived for a time at the Court of Frederick the Great of Prussia, and for many years carried on a correspondence with that monarch. He quarrelled with the king, and left the court in a passion. An emissary was despatched to him to request an apology, who said he was to carry back to the king his answer *verbatim*. Voltaire told him that "the king might go to the devil!" On being asked if that was the message he meant to be delivered? "Yes," he answered, "and add to it that I told you that you might go there with him." In his "Memoirs," he has drawn a most amusing picture of his Prussian Majesty. He also says, "Priests never entered the palace; and, in a word, Frederick lived without religion, without a council, and without a court."

Wearied with his rambling and unsettled mode of living, Voltaire bought an estate at Ferney, in the Pays des Gex, where he spent the last twenty years of his life. He rebuilt the house, laid out gardens, kept a good table, and had crowds of visitors from all parts of Europe. Removed from whatever could excite momentary or personal passion, he yielded to his zeal for the destruction of prejudice, which was the most powerful and active of all the sensations he felt. This peaceful life, seldom disturbed except by the threats of persecution rather than persecution itself, was adorned by those acts of enlightened and bold benevolence, which, while they relieve the sufferings of certain individuals, are of any service to the whole human race. He was known to Europe as the "Sage of Ferney." After an absence of more than twenty-seven years, he re-visited Paris in the beginning of 1778. He had just finished his play of "Irene," and was anxious to see it performed. His visit was an ovation. He had out-

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lived all his enemies. After having been the object of unrelenting persecution by the priests and corrupt courtiers of France for a period of more than fifty years, he yet lived to see the day when "all that was most eminent in station or most distinguished in talents—all that most shone in society, or most ruled in court, seemed to bend before him." At this period he, for the first time, saw Benjamin Franklin. They embraced each other in the midst of public acclamations, and it was said to be Solon who embraced Sophocles.

Voltaire did not survive his triumph long. His unwearied activity induced him, at his great age, to commence a "Dictionary" upon a novel plan, which he prevailed upon the French Academy to take up. These labors brought on spitting of blood, followed by sleeplessness, to obviate which he took opium in considerable quantities. Condorcet says that the servant mistook one of the doses, which threw him into a state of lethargy, from which he never rallied. He lingered for some time, but at length expired on the 30th of May, 1778, in his eighty-fifth year.

It was the custom in those days, and prevails to a considerable extent even in our own time, for the religious world to fabricate "horrible death-beds" of all Freethinkers. Voltaire's last moments were distorted by his enemies after the approved fashion; and notwithstanding the most unqualified denial on the part of Dr. Burard and others, who were present at his death, there are many who believe these falsehoods at this moment. Voltaire died in peace, with the exception of the petty annoyances to which he was subjected by the priests. The philosophers, too, who wished that no public stigma should be cast upon him by the refusal of Christian burial, persuaded him to undergo confession and absolution. This, to oblige his friends, he submitted to; but when the cure one day drew him from his lethargy by shouting into his ear, "Do you believe the divinity of Jesus Christ?" Voltaire exclaimed, "In the name of God, Sir, speak to me no

more of that man, but let me die in peace!" This put to flight all doubts of the pious, and the certificate of burial was refused. But the prohibition of the Bishop of Troyes came too late. Voltaire was buried at the monastery of Scellieres, in Champagne, of which his nephew was abbot. Afterwards, during the first French Revolution, the body, at the request of the citizens, was removed to Paris, and buried in the Pantheon. Lamartine, in his "History of the Girondists," p. 149, speaking of the ceremony, says :—

"On the 11th of July, the departmental and municipal authorities went in state to the barrier of Charenton, to receive the mortal remains of Voltaire, which were placed on the ancient site of the Bastile, like a conqueror on his trophies; his coffin was exposed to public gaze, and a pedestal was formed for it of stones torn from the foundations of this ancient stronghold of tyranny; and thus Voltaire when dead triumphed over those stones which had triumphed over and confined him when living. On one of the blocks was the inscription, '*Receive on this spot, where despotism once fettered thee, the honors decreed to thee by thy country*'..... The coffin of Voltaire was deposited between those of Descartes and Mirabeau—the spot predestined for this intermediary genius between philosophy and policy, between the design and the execution."

The aim of Voltaire's life was the destruction of prejudice and the establishment of Reason. "Deists," said W. J. Fox in 1819, "have done much for toleration and religious liberty. It may be doubted if there be a country in Europe, where that cause has not been advanced by the writings of Voltaire." In the Preface and Conclusion to the "Examination of the Scriptures," Voltaire says :—

"The ambition of domineering over the mind, is one of the strongest passions. A theologian, a missionary, or a partisan of any description, is always for conquering like a prince, and there are many more sects than there are sovereigns in the world. To whose guidance

shall I submit my mind? Must I be a Christian, because I happened to be born in London, or in Madrid? Must I be a Mussulman, because I was born in Turkey? As it is myself alone that I ought to consult, the choice of a religion is my greatest interest. One man adores God by Mahomet, another by the Grand Lama, and another by the Pope. Weak and foolish men! adore God by your own reason.....I have learnt that a French Vicar, of the name of John Meslier, who died a short time since, prayed on his death-bed that God would forgive him for having taught Christianity. I have seen a Vicar in Dorsetshire relinquish a living of £200 a-year, and confess to his parishioners that his conscience would not permit him to preach the shocking absurdities of the Christians. But neither the will nor the testament of John Meslier, nor the declaration of this worthy Vicar, are what I consider decisive proofs. Uriel Acosta, a Jew, publicly renounced the Old Testament in Amsterdam; however, I pay no more attention to the Jew Acosta than to Parson Meslier. I will read the arguments on both sides of the trial, with careful attention, not suffering the lawyers to tamper with me; but will weigh, before God, the reasons of both parties, and decide according to my conscience. I commence by being my own instructor.....I conclude, that every sensible man, every honest man, ought to hold Christianity in abhorrence. 'The great name of Theist, which we can never sufficiently revere,' is the only name we ought to adopt. The only gospel we should read is the grand book of nature, written with God's own hand, and stamped with his own seal. The only religion we ought to profess is, 'to adore God, and act like honest men.' It would be as impossible for this simple and eternal religion to produce evil, as it would be impossible for Christian fanaticism not to produce it.....But what shall we substitute in its place? say you. What? A ferocious animal has sucked the blood of my relatives. I tell you to rid yourselves of this beast, and you ask me what you shall put in its place! Is it you that put this

question to me? Then you are a hundred times more odious than the Pagan Pontiffs, who permitted themselves to enjoy tranquillity among their ceremonies and sacrifices, who did not attempt to enslave the mind by dogmas, who never disputed the powers of the magistrates, and who introduced no discord among mankind. You have the face to ask what you must substitute in the place of your fables!"

As will be seen by his exclamation on his death-bed, Voltaire was no believer in the *divinity* of Christ. He disbelieved the Bible *in toto*. The accounts of the doings of the Jewish kings, as represented in the Old Testament, he has unsparingly ridiculed in the drama of "Saul." The quiet irony of the following will be easily appreciated:—

Divinity of Jesus.—The Socinians, who are regarded as blasphemers, do not recognize the divinity of Jesus Christ. They dare to pretend, with the philosophers of antiquity, with the Jews, the Mahometans, and most other nations, that the idea of a god-man is monstrous; that the distance from God to man is infinite; and that it is impossible for a perishable body to be infinite, immense, or eternal. They have the confidence to quote Eusebius, Bishop of Cæsarea, in their favor, who, in his "Ecclesiastical History," book i., chap. 9, declares that it is absurd to imagine the uncreated and unchangeable nature of Almighty God taking the form of a man. They cite the fathers of the church, Justin and Tertullian, who have said the same thing: Justin in his "Diologue with Triphonius;" and Tertullian, in his "Discourse against Praxeas." They quote St. Paul, who never calls Jesus Christ, God, and who calls him man very often. They carry their audacity so far as to affirm, that the Christians passed three entire ages in forming by degrees the apotheosis of Jesus; and that they only raised this astonishing edifice by the example of the Pagans, who had deified mortals. At first, according to them, Jesus was only regarded as a man inspired by God, and then as a creature more perfect than others. They gave him

some time after, a place above the angels, as St. Paul tells us. Every day added to his greatness. He in time became an emanation, proceeding from God. This was not enough; he was even born before time. At last he was God consubstantial with God. Crellius, Voquelsius, Natalis, Alexander, and Hornbeck, have supported all these blasphemies by arguments, which astonish the wise and mislead the weak. Above all, Faustus Socinus spread the seeds of this doctrine in Europe; and at the end of the sixteenth century, a new species of Christianity was established. There were already more than three hundred.—[Philosophical Dictionary, vol. i. p. 405.

Though a firm and consistent believer in the being of a God, Voltaire was no bigot. The calm reasoning of the following passage does honor to its author:—

Faith.—Divine faith, about which so much has been written, is evidently nothing more than incredulity brought under subjection; for we certainly have no other faculty than the understanding by which we can believe; and the objects of faith are not those of the understanding. We can believe only what appears to be true; and nothing can appear true but in one of the three following ways—by intuition or feeling, as I exist, I see the sun; or by an accumulation of probability amounting to certainty, as there is a city called Constantinople; or by positive demonstration, as triangles of the same base and height are equal. Faith, therefore, being nothing at all of this description, can no more be a belief, a persuasion, than it can be yellow or red. It can be nothing but the annihilation of reason, a silence of adoration at the contemplation of things absolutely incomprehensible. Thus, speaking philosophically, no person believes the Trinity; no person believes that the same body can be in a thousand places at once; and he who says, I believe these mysteries, will see, beyond the possibility of a doubt, if he reflects for a moment on what passes in his mind, that these words mean no more than, I respect thee, mysteries; I submit myself to those who announce

them. For they agree with me, that my reason, or their own reason, believe them not; but it is clear that if my *reason* is not persuaded, *I* am not persuaded. I and my reason cannot possibly be two different beings. It is an absolute contradiction that I should receive that as true which my understanding rejects as false. Faith, therefore, is nothing but submissive or deferential incredulity. But why should this submission be exercised when my understanding invincibly recoils? The reason, we well know, is, that my understanding has been persuaded that the mysteries of my faith are laid down by God himself. All, then, that I can do, as a reasonable being, is to be silent and adore. That is what divines call external faith; and this faith neither is, nor can be, anything more than respect for things incomprehensible, in consequence of the reliance I place on those who teach them. If God himself were to say to me, "Thought is of an olive colour;" "the square of a certain number is bitter;" I should certainly understand nothing at all from these words. I could not adopt them either as true or false. But I will repeat them, if he commands me to do it; and I will make others repeat them at the risk of my life. This is faith; it is nothing more than obedience. In order to obtain a foundation then for this obedience, it is merely necessary to examine the books which require it. Our understanding, therefore, should investigate the books of the Old and New Testament, just as it would Plutarch or Livy; and if it finds in them incontestable and decisive evidences—evidences obvious to all minds, and such as would be admitted by men of all nations—that God himself is their author, then it is our incumbent duty to subject our understanding to the yoke of faith.—[Ibid, p. 474.

Prayer.—We know of no religion without prayers; even the Jews had them, although there was no public form of prayer among them before the time when they sang their canticles in their synagogues, which did not take place until a late period. The people of all nations, whether actuated by desires or fears, have

invoked the assistance of the Divinity. Philosophers, however, more respectful to the Supreme Being, and rising more above human weakness, have been habituated to substitute, for prayer, resignation. This, in fact, is all that appears proper and suitable between creature and Creator. But philosophy is not adapted to the great mass of mankind; it soars too highly above the vulgar; it speaks a language they are unable to comprehend. To propose philosophy to them, would be just as weak as to propose the study of conic sections to peasants or fish-women. Among philosophers themselves, I know of no one besides Maximus Tyrius who has treated of this subject. The following is the substance of his ideas upon it:—The designs of God exist from all eternity. If the object prayed for be conformable to his immutable will, it must be perfectly useless to request of him the very thing which he has determined to do. If he is prayed to for the reverse of what he has determined to do, he is prayed to be weak, fickle, and inconstant; such a prayer implies that this is thought to be his character, and is nothing better than ridicule or mockery of him. You either request of him what is just and right, in which case he ought to do it, and it will be actually done without any solicitation, which in fact, shows distrust of his rectitude; or what you request is unjust, and then you insult him. You are either worthy or unworthy of the favour you implore; if worthy, he knows it better than you do yourself; if unworthy, you commit an additional crime in requesting that which you do not merit. In a word, we offer up prayers to God only because we have made him after our own image. We treat him like a pacha, or a sultan, who is capable of being exasperated and appeased. In short, all nations pray to God; the sage is resigned, and obeys him. Let us pray with the people, and let us be resigned to him with the sage. We have already spoken of the public prayer of many nations, and of those of the Jews.—That people have had one from time immemorial, which deserves all our attention, from its resemblance

to the prayer taught us by Jesus Christ himself. This Jewish prayer is called the Kadish, and begins with these words :—" Oh ! God ! let thy name be magnified and sanctified ; make thy kingdom to prevail ; let redemption flourish, and the Messiah come quickly ! " As this Kadish is recited in Chaldee, it has induced the belief, that it is as ancient as the captivity, and that it was at that period that the Jews began to hope for a Messiah, a Liberator, or Redeemer, whom they have since prayed for in the seasons of their calamities. —[Ibid, vol. ii., p. 350.

Voltaire's contempt for the Bible led him to use the language of " holy writ " in the coarsest jokes ; though, perhaps, with such material, the jokes could not well be otherwise than *coarse.* The following letter he addressed to M. Baillon, Intendant of Lyons, on account of a poor Jew taken up for uttering contraband goods. This kind of writing obtained for Voltaire the title of " scoffer : "—

" Blessings on the Old Testament, which gives me this opportunity of telling you, that amongst all those who adore the New, there is not one more devoted to your service than myself, a certain descendant of Jacob, a pedlar, as all these gentlemen are, whilst he is waiting for the Messiah, waits also for your protection, which at present he has the most need of. Some honest men, of the first trade of St. Matthew, who gather together the Jews and Christians at the gates of your city, have seized something in the breeches pocket of an Israelitish page, belonging to the poor circumcised, who has the honour to tender you this billet, with all proper submission and humility. I beg leave to join my Amen to his at a venture. I but just saw you at Paris as Moses saw the Deity, and should be very happy in seeing you face to face. If the word face can any ways be applied to me, preserve some remembrance of your old eternal humble servant, who loves you with that chaste and tender affection, which the religious Solomon had for his three hundred Shunamites."

Voltaire's prodigious wit and sarcasm were so exuberant, that he expended them upon all people and all subjects—even *himself*, when occasion admitted of it, In one of his letters, addressed to the Elector Palatine, Sept. 9, 1761, he gives this excuse for not attending at the court :—

"I should really make an excellent figure amidst the rejoicings of your electoral highness. It was only, I think, in the Egypt of antiquity that *skeletons* were admitted to a place in their festivals. To say the truth, my lord, it is all over with me. I laugh indeed sometimes; but am forced to acknowledge that pain is an evil. It is a comfort to me that your highness is well; but I am fitter for an extreme unction than a baptism. May the peace serve for an era to mark the prince's birth; and may his august father preserve his regard for, and accept the profound respects of his little Swiss, VOLTAIRE."

In politics, Voltaire was not very far advanced. He seems to have had no idea of a nation without a *king*. A monarch who should not commit any very flagrant acts of tyranny, was as much as he appeared to desire. He evidently did not foresee the great revolution that was so soon to burst forth in France, but that he mainly contributed by his writings to bring it about, there can be no doubt. His influence upon the men of his time, both in France and Europe, is ably depicted by such writers as Lamartine, Quinet, and Brougham. Voltaire's was the one great mind of his day, whose thoughts engrossed the attention of all men. He was great by his learning, his genius, and his benevolence —and this man was the champion of Reason, the enemy of superstition, and an "Infidel."

Quinet, in his lectures on the Romish Church, says :—

"I watch, for forty years, the reign of one man who is in himself the spiritual director, not of his country, but of his age. From the corner of his chamber, he governs the kingdom of spirits; intellects are every day regulated by his; one word written by his hand travers-

es Europe. Princes love, and kings fear him; they think they are not sure of their kingdom if he be not with them. Whole nations, on their side, adopt without discussion, and emulously repeat, every syllable that falls from his pen. Who exercises this incredible power, which had been nowhere seen since the middle ages? Is he another Gregory VII.? Is he a Pope?—No—Voltaire."

We conclude our sketch with the eloquent words of Lamartine, who describes, in a few sentences, the inestimable services rendered to Freethought and intellectual progression by the Sage of Ferney:—

"If we judge of men by what they have *done*, then Voltaire is incontestably the greatest writer of modern Europe. No one has caused, through the powerful influence of his genius alone, and the perseverance of his will, so great a commotion in the minds of men; his pen aroused a world, and has shaken a far mightier empire than that of Charlemagne, the European empire of a theocracy. His genius was not *force* but *light*. Heaven had destined him not to destroy but to illuminate, and wherever he trod, light followed him, for Reason (which is *light*) had destined him to be first her poet, then her apostle, and lastly her idol." J. W.

BIOGRAPHY

OF

JOHN TOLAND.

In the Augustan age of Freethought, no British writer achieved more renown, or performed greater services to Biblical criticism, than John Toland. His life would fill a volume, while his works would stock a library. True to his convictions, he spoke like a man, and died as a hero. His books are strewn with classical illustrations, and deal so with abstract (and to us) uninteresting arguments, that we shall simply give a brief sketch of the life of this extraordinary man. He gave his thoughts to the scholars at the same time that Woolston addressed the people; conjointly they revolutionized opinion in our favor.

Toland was born on November 30, 1670, at Londonderry, in Ireland. It is said his registered name was "James Junius," another account says "Julius Cæsar;" but we have been unable to find any authentic date for either supposition, and whatever his name was registered, we have indisputable evidence that he was always called John Toland. We have less proof as to his parentage; some writers allege that he was the natural son of a Catholic priest; while others contend that he was born of a family once affluent, but at the time of his birth in very reduced circumstances. Whether this was the case or the reverse, young Toland received a liberal education. He was early taught the classics, studied in the Glasgow College; and on leaving Glasgow he was presented with letters of credit

from the city magistrates, highly flattering to him as a man and a scholar. He received the diploma of A.M. at Edinburgh, the day previous to the Battle of the Boyne. He finished his studies at the University of Leyden.

The first work of importance which Toland published, was a "Life of John Milton, containing besides the History of his Works, several extraordinary Characters of Men and Books, Sects, Parties, and Opinions." This work being violently opposed, was speedily followed by "Amyntor," or a defence of Milton's life, containing—1. A general apology for all writings of that kind. 2. A catalogue of books, attributed in the primitive times to Jesus Christ, his apostles, and other eminent persons, with several important remarks relating to the canon of Scripture. 3. A complete history of the Book, entitled "Icon Basilike, proving Dr. Gauden, and not King Charles I., to be the author of it," etc. Those works established the fame of Toland, as well as formed the groundwork for persecution, which hunted him even on his death-bed. In the year 1699 Toland collected, edited, and published, from the original MSS., the whole of the works of James Harrington, prefixed by a memoir of this extraordinary theorist. In his preface he says that he composed this work "in his beloved retirement at Cannon, near Bansted, in Surrey." From this, along with other excerpts scattered through his works, we cannot but infer that at the outset of his career he possessed a moderate competence of worldly wealth and social position. He says his idea was "to transmit to posterity the worthy memory of James Harrington, a bright ornament to useful learning, a hearty lover of his native country, and a generous benefactor to the whole world; a person who obscured the false lustre of our modern politicians, and equalled (if not exceeded) all the ancient legislators." This to us is an interesting fact, for it shows the early unanimity which existed between the earlier reformers in politics and those of theology. The supervision of the "Oceana" by Toland, bears the

same inferential analogy, as if Mr. Holyoake were the biographer and publisher of the "New Moral World" and its author. In 1700, he published "Anglia Libera; or, the Limitation and Succession of the Crown of England, explained and Asserted," etc. This book is concluded by the following apothegm, assuring the people "that no king can ever be so good as one of their own making, as there is no title equal to their approbation, which is the only divine right of all magistracy, for the voice of the people is the voice of God." In 1702, Toland spent some time in Germany, publishing a series of Letters to a friend in Holland, entitled "Some Remarks on the King of Prussia's Country, on his Government, his Court, and his numerous Palaces." About this time appeared "The Art of Governing by Parties;" this was always a favorite subject of the old Freethinkers, and is still further elucidated by Bolingbroke.

In 1707 he published a large treatise in English and Latin, as "A Philippic Oration, to incite the English against the French," a work I have never seen. We now return to an earlier date, and shall trace the use of his theological works. The first of note (1696) was "Christianity not Mysterious"—showing that there is nothing in the gospel contrary to reason, nor above it; and that no Christian doctrine can be properly called a mystery. As soon as this book was issued from the press, it was attacked with unmanly virulence. One man (Peter Brown) who was more disgustingly opposed to Toland than the rest, was made a bishop; and by far the greatest majority amongst the Anglican clergy, who attacked him, were all rewarded by honors and preferment. The author was accused of making himself a new Heresiarch; that there was a tradition amongst the Irish that he was to be a second Cromwell, and that Toland himself boasted that before he was forty years old, he would be governor over a greater country than Cromwell; and that he would be the head over a new religion before he was thirty. One of his opponents publicly stigmatises him as saying that he

(Toland) himself designed to be as great an impostor as Mahomet, and more powerful than the Pope; while the Puritans denounced him as a disguised Jesuit, and the Papists as a rancorous Nonconformist. To complete the comedy, the Irish Parliament condemned his book to be publicly burnt, some ecclesiastics loudly murmuring that the author should be burned with it; others, more moderate, were anxious that Toland should burn it himself, while at last they came to an unanimous resolution to burn it in front of the threshhold of his door, so that when the author appeared, he would be obliged to step over the ashes of his own book, which was accordingly done amid the brutal cheers of an ignorant and infuriated populace.

As a proof of the high esteem in which Toland was held by the *few* able and liberal men of the day, we extract the following account from the correspondence of John Locke and Mr. Molyneux.* The latter gentleman, writing to the former, says:—"I am told the author of 'Christianity not Mysterious' is of this country, and that his name is Toland, but he is a stranger in these parts, I believe. If he belongs to this kingdom, he has been a good while out of it, or I have not heard of any such *remarkable* man amongst us." In another letter, the same writer says:—"In my last to you, there was a passage relating to the author of 'Christianity not Mysterious.' I did not then think he was so near me as within the bounds of this city; but I find since that he has come over hither, and have had the favor of a visit from him. I now understand that he was born in this country, but that he has been a great while abroad, and his education was for some time under the great Le Clerc. But that for which I can never honor him too much, is his acquaintance and friendship to you, and the respect which upon all occasions he expresses for you. I propose a great deal of satisfaction in his conversation. I take him to be a candid Freethinker, and a good scholar. But there is

* Locke's posthumous works. Edited by Die Maizeaus.

a violent sort of spirit which reigns here, which begins already to show itself against him, and I believe will increase daily, for I find the clergy alarmed to a mighty degree against him. And last Sunday he had his welcome to this city, by hearing himself harangued against out of the pulpit, by a prelate of this country."

Mr. Locke, in return, says :—"For the man I wish very well, and could give you, if it needed, proofs that I do so. And therefore I desire you to be kind to him; but I must leave it to your prudence in what way and how far. For it will be his fault alone, if he proves not a very valuable man, and have not you for his friend." To this, Mr. Molyneux writes to Mr. Locke —"I look upon Mr. Toland as a very ingenuous man, and I should be very glad of any opportunity of doing him service, to which I think myself indispensably bound by your recommendation." Soon after this, Mr. Molyneux describes the treatment Toland underwent in Ireland. In another letter to Locke—"He has had his opposers here, as you will find by a book which I have sent to you. The author (Peter Brown) is my acquaintance, but two things I shall never forgive in his book: the one is the foul language and opprobrious names he gives Mr. Toland; the other is upon several occasions, calling in the aid of the civil magistrate, and delivering up Mr. Toland to secular punishment. This, indeed, is a killing argument, but some will be apt to say, that where the strength of his reason failed him, then he flies to the strength of his sword; and this reminds me of a business that was very surprising to many, the presentment of some pernicious books and their authors by the grand jury of Middlesex. This is looked upon as a matter of dangerous consequence, to make our civil courts judges of religious doctrines; and no one knows upon a change of affairs whose turn it may be next to be condemned. But the example has been followed in this country, and Mr. Toland and his book have been presented here by a grand jury, not one of whom I am persuaded ever read one leaf in 'Christianity not Mysterious.'

Let the Sorbonne forever now be silent; a learned grand jury, directed by as learned a judge, does the business much better. The Dissenters here were the chief promoters of this matter, but, when I asked one of them 'What if a violent Church of England jury should present Mr. Baxter's books as pernicious, and condemn them to the flames by the common executioner,' he was sensible of the error, and said he wished it had never been done." Mr. Locke, in his reply, coincides with his friend, and says, "The Dissenters had best *consider;* but they are a sort of men which will always be the same." A remark which 150 years has not failed in its truthfulness. Mr. Molyneux concludes his remarks in reference to Toland, as follows: —"Mr. Toland is at length driven out of our kingdom; the poor gentleman at last wanted a meal's meat, and the universal outcry of the clergy ran so strong against him, that none durst admit him to their tables. The little stock of money which he had was soon exhausted, he fell to borrowing, and to complete his hardships, the Parliament fell on his book, voted it to be burnt by the common hangman, and ordered the author to be taken into custody by the Serjeant-at-Arms, and to be prosecuted by the Attorney General. Hereupon he is fled out of this kingdom, and none here knows where he has directed his course." From this correspondence we glean the following facts:—

1. That John Locke and Mr. Molyneux were favorable to Freethought.
2. That (on Locke's authority) Toland possessed abilities of no common order.
3. That Toland was unjustly persecuted, and he met with the sympathy of the Liberals.

Toland, having received a foretaste of his country's vengeance, retired for two years to Germany, where he was welcomed by the first scholars of the age. Hearing that the House of Convocation, in London, was about to denounce two of his works as heretical ("Christianity not Mysterious," and "Amyntor,") he

hastened to England, and published two letters to the Prolucutor, which were never laid before Convocation. He insisted that he should be heard in his own defence before sentence was passed on his works; but as usual this wish was denied him. A legal difficulty prevented the bishops from prosecuting the works, and Toland gave the world a full account in his "Vindicius Liberius." The "Letters to Serena," written in a bold, honest, unflinching manner, were the next performances of Toland. The first letter is on "The Origin and Force of Prejudices." It is founded on a reflection of Cicero, that all prejudices spring from moral, and not physical sources, and while all admit the power of the senses to be infallible, all strive to corrupt the judgment, by false metaphor and unjust premises. Toland traces the progress of superstition from the hands of a midwife to those of a priest, and shows how the nurse, parent, schoolmaster, professor, philosopher, and politician, all combine to warp the mind of man by fallacies from his progress in childhood, at school, at college, and in the world. How the child is blinded with an idea, and the man with a word. The second letter is "A History of the Soul's Immortality Among the Heathens." A lady had been reading Plato's "Phædo," and remarked as to how Cato could derive any consolation from the slippery and vague suppositions of that verbiant dialogue. Toland, therefore, for her edification, drew up a list of the specifications of the ancients on the subject, analysing (in its progress) the varying phases of the fables of the Elysian fields, the Charons, the Styx, etc., deriving them all from the ancient Egyptians. Toland thought the idea had arisen among the people, like our witches, ghosts, and fairy stories, and subsequently defended by the philosophers, who sought to rule their passions by finding arguments for their superstitions, and thus the rise of their exoteric and esoteric doctrines were the first foundations of the belief in the immortality of the soul. The third letter is on "The Origin of Idolatry," or, as it might rather be called, a history of the follies of

mankind. He traces the causes, the origin, and the science of superstition—its phenomena and its devotees, proving that all the sacrifices, prayers, and customs of idolatry are the same in all ages, they only differ in language and adaptability of climate, and that with the fall of judicial astrology, idolatry received its greatest blow, for while men thought that priests could control destiny, they feared them—but this idea destroyed, it removed the terror which so long had existed as an immediate object betwixt the man and this sacerdotal tyrant.

In letter fourth, addressed "To a Gentleman in Holland, showing Spinoza's System of Philosophy to be without any principle or foundation," and in the concluding article, Toland argues that "motion is essential to matter, in answer to some remarks by a noble friend on the above." In the fifteenth section of this argument, Toland thus rebuts the allegation that were motion indissolubly connected with matter, there must be extension without surface for motion or matter to exert their respective powers upon. It is often used as an argument, that if a vase was filled with any commodity to the utmost extent, where would be the space for motion? We know that in a kettle of water, if there is no outlet for the steam (which is the motion of the water,) the kettle will burst. Toland says, "'You own most bodies are in actual motion, which can be no argument that they have been always so, or that there are not others in actual repose.' I grant that such a consequence does not necessarily follow, though the thing may itself be true. But, however, it may not be amiss to consider how far this actual motion reaches, and is allowed, before we come to treat of rest. Though the matter of the universe be everywhere the same, yet according to its various modifications it is conceived to be divided into numberless particular systems, vortices or whirlpools of matter; and these again are subdivided into other systems greater or less, which depend on one another, as every one on the whole, in their centres, textures, frame, and co-

herence. Our sun is the centre of one of the larger systems, which contains a great many small ones within the sphere of its activity, as all the planets which move about it; and these are subdivided into lesser systems that depend on them, as his sattelites wait upon Jupiter, and the moon on the earth; the earth again is divided into the atmosphere, ground, water, and other principal parts; these again into the vegetable, animal, and mineral kingdoms. Now, as all these depend in a link on one another, so their matter is mutually resolved into each other, for earth, air, fire, and water are not only closely blended and united, but likewise interchangeable, transformed in a perpetual revolution: earth becoming water, water air, air ether, and so back again in mixtures without end or number. The animals we destroy contribute to preserve us, till we are destroyed to preserve other things, and become parts of grass, or plants, or water, or air, or something else that helps to make other animals, and they one another, or other men, and these again into stone, or wood, or metals, or minerals, or animals again, or become parts of all these and of a great many other things, animals, or vegetables, daily consuming and devouring each other—so true it is that everything lives by the destruction of another. All the parts of the universe are in this constant motion of destroying and begetting, of begetting and destroying, and the greater systems are acknowledged to have their ceaseless movements as well as the smallest particles, the very central globes of the vortices revolving on their own axis, and every particle in the vortex gravitating towards the centre. Our bodies, however we may flatter ourselves, do not differ from those of other creatures, but like them receive increase or diminution by nutrition or evacuation, by accretion, transpiration, and other ways, giving some parts of ours to other bodies, and receiving again of theirs, not altogether the same yesterday as to-day, nor to continue the same to-morrow, being alive in a perpetual flux like a river, and in the total dissolution of our system at death to be-

come parts of a thousand other things at once, our bodies partly mixing with the dust and the water of the earth, partly exhaled and evaporated into the air, flying to so many different places, mixing and incorporating with numerous things.

"No parts of matter are bound to any one figure or form, losing and changing their figures and forms continually, that is being in perpetual motion, clipt, or worn, or ground to pieces, or dissolved by other parts, acquiring their figures, and these theirs, and so on incessantly; earth, air, fire, and water, iron, wood, and marble, plants and animals, being rarefied, condensed, liquified, congealed, dissolved, coagulated, or any other way resolved into one another. The whole face of the earth exhibits those mutations every moment to our eyes, nothing continuing one hour numerically the same; and these changes being but several kinds of motion, are therefore the incontestable effects of universal action. But the changes in the parts make no change in the universe; for it is manifest that the continual alterations, successions, revolutions, and transmutations of matter, cause no accession or diminution therein, no more than any letter is added or lost in the alphabet by the endless combinations and transpositions thereof into so many different words and languages, for a thing no sooner quits one form than it puts on another, leaving as it were the theatre in a certain dress, and appearing again in a new one, which produces a perpetual youthfulness and vigor, without any decay or decrepitness of the world, as some have falsely imagined, contrary to reason and experience; the world, with all the parts and kinds thereof, continuing at all times in the same condition.

"* * * * * But the species still continue by propagation, notwithstanding the decay of the individuals, and the death of our bodies is but matter going to be dressed in some new form; the impressions may vary, but the wax continues still the same, and indeed death is in effect the very same thing with our birth; for as to die is only to cease to be what we

formerly were, so to be born is to begin to be something which we were not before. Considering the numberless successive generations that have inhabited this globe, returning at death into the common mass of the same, mixing with all the other parts thereof, and to this, the incessant river-like flowing and transpiration of matter every moment from the bodies of men while they live, as well as their daily nourishment, inspiration of air, and other additions of matter to their bulk; it seems probable that there is no particle of matter on the whole earth which has not been a part of man. Nor is this reasoning confined to our own species, but remains as true of every order of animals or plants, or any other beings, since they have been all resolved into one another by ceaseless revolutions, so that nothing is more certain than that every material Thing is all Things, and that all Things are but manifestations of one."

In his reply to Wotton, who attacks those "Letters to Serena," Toland says they were addressed "to a lady, the most accomplished then in the world." The name of the lady will probably remain forever a mystery.

In 1718, he published the celebrated work "Nazarenus, or Jewish, Gentile, and Mahometan Christianity," which caused an immense sensation at the time it appeared, and led to his "Mangonentes" (1720,) a work singularly profound and effective. In the same year he gave the world "Tetradymus," containing "Hodegus, or the Pillar of Cloud and Fire," that guided the Israelites in the Wilderness, *not miraculous*, but a thing equally practiced by other nations; and "Clidophorus, or of the Exoteric and Esoteric Philosophy;" and "Hypatia." There is a long preface to those books, "from under an elm in Bensbury (or Chebem's camp,) on the warren at the south end of Wimbledon Common (1720.") About this time "Pantheisticon" appeared, written as a caricature on Church Liturgies, which Archdeacon Hare denounced as "downright Atheism."

Along with the above, Toland wrote a multitude of small pamphlets; he translated the fables of Æsop, and published a poem, entitled "Clito," which caused much excitement at the time; and, as it represented Toland's ideal character, we reprinted it in the London Investigator. His earlier political works were esteemed so valuable in the defence of the Protestant succession, and advancing the interests of the Elector, subsequently King of England, that in one of his visits paid to that Court, he was presented by the Electress with miniature portraits of herself and family.

The following is a catalogue of the works of Toland, which have never yet been published, and the works in which they are mentioned :—

1. The History of Socrates (in the Life of Harrington.)
2. Systems of Divinity Exploded. An Epistolary Dissertation. (Christianity not Mysterious.)
3. The History of the Canon of the New Testament. (Nazarenus.)
4. Republica Mosaica. (Nazarenus.)
5. A Treatise Concerning Tradition. (Tetradymus.)

There were several other works, part of them written, which passed into the hands of Lord Molesworth (we believe,) part of which were published (the "History of the Druids" and also "Giordano Bruno;") but whether they exist at the present time or not, we are unable to say.

There is also great difficulty in deciding as to the manner of Toland's life; of this, however, we are certain, that he caused great opposition in his own day, and he was patronised by able man. He edited an edition of Lord Shaftesbury's Letters, and published a work of that noble Lord's surreptitiously; he mingled amongst the German Courts, and appeared on terms of equality with the *elite* of the philosophers and the aristocracy. The brief memoir prefaced to one of his works is an epistolary document addressed to a noble Lord. His acquaintance with Locke, Shaftesbury, Col-

lins, Molesworth, and Molyneux, must have proceeded from other causes than his genius, or why was Toland exalted when Mandeville, Chubb, and the brave Woolston are never so much as alluded to? We consider that there is a strong probability that he was wealthy—or at least possessed of a moderate competence. His abilities were of a curious order. He seemed to be one of a school which rose about his time to advocate Freethought, but shackled by a dogma. His collegiate education gave him an early liking for the dead languages, and he carried out the notion of the ancients, that the exoteric or esoteric methods were still in force. From a careful perusal of the works of the "Fathers," and the contemporary books of the heathens, he fancied that all the superstitions in the world differed but in degree—that religion was but the organic cause of superstition, the arguments made for it by the philosophers to propitiate the vulgar. This idea (in the main) was agreed to by Woolston, although his violent "Discourses," which were addressed to the unlearned, contained within them the germ of their intrinsic popularity. Yet even Woolston's works, notwithstanding their bluff exterior, had something more within them than what the people could appreciate, or even the present race of Freethinkers can always understand; for underneath that unrivalled vein of sarcasm, there was in every instance an esoteric view, which comprehended the meaning by which the earlier Christians understood the gospels, and rendered them on the same scale as the works of the ancients. The renowned William Whiston was another who interpreted Scripture in a similar manner. All those writers would have been Swedenborgians if there had been no Freethought, while Whiston would have been an Atheist had there been no representative of that school. We do not consider Toland, then, as an absolute Deist. At that time, the age was not so far progressed as to admit a Biblical scholar into the extreme advanced list; and when a man has spent the whole of his childhood in a secta-

rian family, and his youth and early manhood in a University, it is an impossibility to throw off at one struggle the whole of his past ideas; he may be unfettered in thought, and valiant in speech, still there is the encyclopædia of years hanging upon him as a drag to that extreme development which he wishes, but cannot bring his passions to follow. Not that we would by any means observe that Toland was comparatively behind his age, but that even in his more daring works he still had a vague idea of Scripture being partly inspired, although overlaid with a mass of ecclesiastical verbiage.

It also seems a mystery how the works of Woolston could be condemned, his person seized, while in the case of Toland we hear of nothing but his works being burnt. Why was Convocation so idle? Why make idle threats, and let their victim ramble at large? Was it because the one had powerful friends and the other had none? or was it that in the earlier portion of the career of Toland, the invisible hand of Bolingbroke stayed the grasp of persecution? Or was Shaftesbury's memory so esteemed, that his friend was untouched? Those particulars we cannot learn, but they will take rank with other parallel cases, as when the same government prosecuted Paine, and gave Gibbon a sinecure, or nearer our own times when a series of men were imprisoned for Atheism, and Sir William Molesworth published similar sentiments without hindrance.

In the "History of the Soul's Immortality," Toland thus gives the explanation respecting the exoteric and esoteric doctrines of Pythagoras:—"Pythagoras himself did not believe the transmigration which has made his name so famous to posterity; for in the internal or secret doctrine he meant no more than the eternal revolution of forms in matter, those ceaseless vicissitudes and alterations which turn everything into all things, and all things into anything; as vegetables and animals become part of us, we become part of them, and both become parts of a thousand other things in the universe, each turning into water, water into air, etc.,

and so back again in mixtures without end or number. But in the external or popular doctrine he imposed on the mob by an equivocal expression that they should become various kinds of beasts after death, thereby to deter them the more effectually from wickedness..... Though the poets embellished their pieces with the opinion of the soul's immortality, yet a great number of them utterly rejected it · for Seneca was not single in saying :—

> 'Naught's after death, and death itself is naught,
> Of a quick race, only the utmost goal ;
> Then may the saints lose all their hope of heaven,
> And sinners quit their racky fears of hell.'"

We now dismiss JOHN TOLAND from our view. He was one of the most honest, brave, truthful, and scholastic of the old Deists. His memory will be borne on the wings of centuries, and if ever a true millennium does arise, the name of this sterling Freethinker will occupy one of the brightest niches in its Pantheon of Worthies. A. C.

BIOGRAPHY

OF

COMPTE DE VOLNEY.

Constantine Francis Chassebœuf, de Volney, was born on February 3rd, 1757, at Craon, in Anjou. His father, a distinguished advocate, not wishing his son to bear the name of *Chassebœuf*, resolved that he should assume that of *Boisgirais*. With this name Constantine Francis was first known in the world, studying at the College of Ancenis and Angers. He afterwards commenced his Oriental travels, changing his name to Volney. At the age of seventeen, finding himself his own master, and possessed of £50 a-year, inherited from his mother, he went to Paris, in order to study the sciences, preferring the study of medicine and physiology, although giving great attention to history and the ancient languages. On inheriting a legacy of £240, he visted Egypt and Syria, starting on foot, a knapsack on his back, a gun on his shoulder, and his £240, in gold, concealed in a belt. When he arrived in Egypt, he shut himself up for eight months in a Coptic monastery, in order to learn Arabic; after which he commenced his travels through Egypt and Syria, returning to France after an absence of four years, and publishing his "Voyage en Egypte et en Syrie," which was acknowledged by the French army, on their conquering Egypt, to be the only book "that had never deceived them." The French Government named him Director of Commerce and Agriculture in Corsica, but being elected a deputy of the tiers-etat of the Sene-

chausse of Anjou, he resigned the government appointment, holding the maxim, that a national deputy ought not in any way to be a pensioner. He opposed all secret deliberations, and wished to admit the constituents and the citizens. He was made secretary on the 23rd of November, 1790, and in the debates which arose upon the power of the king to determine peace and war, Volney proposed and carried the resolution that "The French nation renounces from this moment the undertaking any war tending to increase their territory." In 1792, he accompanied Pozzo di Borgo to Corsica, in compliance with invitations from many influential inhabitants, who sought his information. In Corsica he became acquainted with Napoleon Buonaparte, who was then an artillery officer; and some years after, hearing that Buonaparte had obtained the command of the army of Italy, Volney exclaimed, "If circumstances favor him, we shall see the head of a Cæsar upon the shoulders of an Alexander." When Volney returned to Paris, he published an "Account of the State of Corsica." He was afterwards appointed Professor of History, attracting large audiences; but the Normal School being suppressed, he embarked for the United States of America, in 1795. He was received by Washington, who bestowed publicly on him marks of honor and friendship. In 1798, Volney returned to France, and gave up to his mother-in-law the property which he was entitled to from the death of his father, which had just occurred. During his absence, he had been chosen a member of the Institute. Buonaparte also, on Volney's return, tried to win his esteem and assistance, soliciting him as colleague in the consulship. But he refused the co-operation, as also the office of Minister of the Interior.

Seldom do men find so many inducements to "accept office" as was offered to Volney; and seldom do men appear who are disinterested enough to reject the inducements then held out to him. Although he refused to work *with* the ruling powers of that day, he never ceased to work *for* the *people!* He occupied

himself till the last year of his life in giving to the world that literature which will never be forgotten.

It would be impossible to notice all the works written by such an indefatigable thinker as the "*heretic*" of our sketch. We ought to mention, however, that subsequently to his being made Peer of France, by Louis XVIII.; and when there existed an intention of crowning Louis, Volney published "The History of Samuel, the inventor of Royal Coronations." This book represents Samuel as an impostor, Saul as the blind instrument of sacerdotal cunning, and David as an ambitious youth. In September, 1791, Volney presented to the Assembly "The Ruins, or Meditations on the Revolutions of Empires," a book which will immortalize him in the memory of Freethinkers. The originality of style, and the eloquence of expression, cannot fail to interest all who read it. We give the following extracts, from the above work, but as it contains so much that ought to be read, we must return to the subject in another number:—

"Legislators, friends of evidence and of truth!

"That the subject of which we treat should be involved in so many clouds, is by no means astonishing, since, beside the difficulties that are peculiar to it, thought itself has, till this moment, ever had shackles imposed upon it, and free inquiry, by the intolerance of every religious system, been interdicted. But now that thought is unrestrained, and may develope all its powers, we will expose in the face of day, and submit to the common judgment of assembled nations, such rational truths as unprejudiced minds have by long and laborious study discovered: and this, not with the design of imposing them as a creed, but from a desire of provoking new lights, and obtaining better information.

"Chiefs and instructors of the people! you are not ignorant of the profound obscurity in which the nature, origin, and history of the dogmas you teach are enveloped. Imposed by force and authority, inculcated by education, maintained by the influence of example,

they were perpetuated from age to age, and habit and inattention strengthened their empire. But if man, enlightened by experience and reflection, summon to the bar of mature examination the prejudices of his infancy, he presently discovers a multitude of incongruities and contradictions, which awaken his sagacity, and call forth the exertion of his reasoning powers.

"At first, remarking the various and opposite creeds into which nations are divided, we are led boldly to reject the infallibility claimed by each; and arming ourselves alternately with their reciprocal pretensions, to conceive that the senses and the understanding, emanating directly from God, are a law not less sacred, and a guide not less sure, than the indirect and contradictory codes of the prophets.

"If we proceed to examine the texture of the codes themselves, we shall observe that their pretended divine laws, that is to say, laws immutable and eternal, have risen from the complexion of times, of places, and of persons; that these codes issue one from another in a kind of genealogical order, mutually borrowing a common and similar fund of ideas, which every institutor modifies agreeably to his fancy.

"If we ascend to the source of those ideas, we shall find that it is lost in the night of time, in the infancy of nations, in the very origin of the world, to which they claim alliance: and there, immersed in the obscurity of chaos, and the fabulous empire of tradition, they are attended with so many prodigies as to be seemingly inaccessible to the human understanding. But this prodigious state of things gives birth to a ray of reasoning, that resolves the difficulty; for if the miracles held out in systems of religion have actually existed; if, for instance, metamorphoses, apparitions, and the conversations of one or more Gods, recorded in the sacred books of the Hindoos, the Hebrews, and the Parses, are indeed events in real history, it follows that nature in those times was perfectly unlike the nature that we are acquainted with now; that men of the present age are totally different from the men that

formerly existed; but, consequently, that we ought not to trouble our heads about them.

"On the contrary, if those miraculous facts have had no real existence in the physical order of things, they must be regarded solely as productions of the human intellect: and the nature of man, at this day, capable of making the most fantastic combinations, explains the phenomenon of those monsters in history. The only difficulty is to ascertain how and for what purpose the imagination invented them. If we examine with attention the subjects that are exhibited by them, if we analyze the ideas which they combine and associate, and weigh with accuracy all their concomitant circumstances, we shall find a solution perfectly conformable to the laws of nature. Those fabulous stories have a figurative sense different from their apparent one; they are founded on simple and physical facts; but these facts being ill-conceived and erroneously represented, have been disfigured and changed from their original nature by accidental causes dependent on the human mind, by the confusion of signs made use of in the representation of objects, by the equivocation of words, the defect of language, and the imperfection of writing. These Gods, for example, who act such singular parts in every system, are no other than the physical powers of nature, the elements, the winds, the meteors, the stars, all which have been personified by the necessary mechanism of language, and the manner in which objects are conceived by the understanding. Their life, their manners, their actions, are only the operation of the same powers, and the whole of their pretended history no more than a description of their various phenomena, traced by the first naturalist that observed them, but taken in a contrary sense by the vulgar, who did not understand it, or by succeeding generations, who forgot it. In a word, all the theological dogmas respecting the origin of the world, the nature of God, the revelation of his laws, the manifestation of his person, are but recitals of astronomical facts, figurative and emblematical nar-

ratives of the motion and influence of the heavenly bodies. The very idea itself of the divinity, which is at present so obscure, abstracted, and metaphysical, was in its origin merely a composite of the powers of the material universe, considered sometimes analytically, as they appear in their agents and their phenomena, and sometimes synthetically, as forming one whole, and exhibiting an harmonious revelation in all its parts. Thus the name of God has been bestowed sometimes upon the wind, upon fire, water, and the elements; sometimes upon the sun, the stars, the planets, and their influences; sometimes upon the universe at large, and the matter of which the world is composed; sometimes upon abstract and metaphysical properties, such as space, duration, motion, and intelligence; but in every instance, the idea of a Deity has not flowed from the miraculous revelation of an invisible world, but has been the natural result of human reflection, has followed the progress and undergone the changes of the successive improvement of intellect, and has had for its subject the visible universe and its different agents.

"It is then in vain that nations refer the origin of their religion to heavenly inspiration; it is in vain that they pretend to describe a supernatural state of things as first in order of events; the original barbarous state of mankind, attested by their own monuments, belies all their assertions. These assertions are still more victoriously refuted by considering this great principle, *that man receives no ideas but through the medium of his senses:* for from hence it appears that every system which ascribes human wisdom to any other source than experience and sensation, includes in it a *ysteron proteron*, and represents the last results of understanding as earliest in the order of time. If we examine the different religious systems which have been formed respecting the actions of the Gods, and the origin of the world, we shall discover at every turn an anticipation in the order of narrating things, which could only be suggested by subsequent reflection. Reason,

then, emboldened by these contradictions, hesitates not to reject whatever does not accord with the nature of things, and accepts nothing for historical truth that is not capable of being established by argument and ratiocination. Its ideas and suggestions are as follows :—

" Before any nation received from a neighbor nation dogmas already invented; before one generation inherited the ideas of another, none of these complicated systems had existence. The first men, the children of nature, whose consciousness was anterior to experience, and who brought no preconceived knowledge into the world with them, were born without any idea of those articles of faith which are the result of learned contention; of those religious rites which had relation to arts and practices not yet in existence; of those precepts which suppose the passions already developed; of those laws which have reference to a language and a social order hereafter to be produced; of that God, whose attributes are abstractions of the knowledge of nature, and the idea of whose conduct is suggested by the experience of a despotic government; in fine, of that soul and those spiritual existences which are said not to be the object of the senses, but which, however, we must forever have remained unacquainted with, if our senses had not introduced them to us. Previously to arriving at these notions, an immense catalogue of existing facts must have been observed. Man, originally savage, must have learned from repeated trials the use of his organs. Successive generations must have invented and refined upon the means of subsistence; and the understanding, at liberty to disengage itself from the wants of nature, must have risen to the complicated art of comparing ideas, digesting reasonings, and seizing upon abstract similitudes.

" It was not till after having surmounted those obstacles, and run a long career in the night of history, that man, reflecting on his state, began to perceive

his subjection to forces superior to his own and independent of his will. The sun gave him light and warmth; fire burned, thunder terrified, the winds buffeted, water overwhelmed him; all the various natural existences acted upon him in a manner not to be resisted. For a long time an automaton, he remained passive, without inquiring into the cause of this action; but the very moment he was desirous of accounting to himself for it, astonishment seized his mind; and passing from the surprise of a first thought to the reverie of curiosity, he formed a chain of reasoning.

"At first, considering only the action of the elements upon him, he inferred relatively to himself, an idea of weakness, of subjection, and relatively to them, an idea of power, of domination; and this idea was the primitive and fundamental type of all his conceptions of the divinity.

"The action of the natural existences, in the second place, excited in him sensations of pleasure or pain, of good or evil; by virtue of his organization, he conceived love or aversion for them, he desired or dreaded their presence: and fear or hope was the principle of every idea of religion.

"Afterwards, judging everything by comparison, and remarking in those beings a motion spontaneous like his own, he supposed there to be a will, an intelligence inherent in that motion, of a nature similar to what existed in himself; and hence, by way of inference, he started a fresh argument. Having experienced that certain modes of behavior towards his fellow-creatures wrought a change in their affections and governed their conduct, he applied those practices to the powerful beings of the universe. 'When my fellow-creature of superior strength," said he to himself, 'is disposed to injure me, I humble myself before him, and my prayer has the art of appeasing him. I will pray to the powerful beings that strike me. I will supplicate the faculties of the planets, the waters, and they will hear me. I will conjure them to avert the

calamities, and to grant me the blessings which are at their disposal. My tears will move, my offerings propitiate them, and I shall enjoy complete felicity.'

"And, simple in the infancy of his reason, man spoke to the sun and the moon; he animated with his understanding and his passions the great agents of nature; he thought by vain sounds and useless practices to change their inflexible laws. Fatal error! He desired that the water should ascend, the mountains be removed, the stone mount in the air; and substituting a fantastic to a real world, he constituted for himself beings of opinion, to the terror of his mind and the torment of his race.

"Thus the ideas of God and religion sprung, like all others, from physical objects, and were in the understanding of man, the products of his sensations, his wants, the circumstances of his life, and the progressive state of his knowledge.

"As these ideas had natural beings for their first models, it resulted from hence that the divinity was originally as various and manifold as the forms under which he seemed to act: each being was a power, a genius, and the first men found the universe crowded with innumerable Gods.

"In like manner the ideas of the divinity having had for motors the affections of the human heart, they underwent an order of division calculated from the sensations of pain and pleasure, of love and hatred: the powers of nature, the Gods, the genii, were classed into benign and maleficent, into good and evil ones: and this constitutes the universality of these two ideas in every system of religion.

"These ideas, analogous to the condition of their inventors, were for a long time confused and gross. Wandering in woods, beset with wants, destitute of resources, men in their savage state had no leisure to make comparisons and draw conclusions. Suffering more ills than they tasted enjoyments, their most habitual sentiment was fear, their theology terror, their worship was confined to certain modes of salutation, of

offerings which they presented to beings whom they supposed to be ferocious and greedy like themselves. In their state of equality and independence, no one took upon him the office of mediator with Gods as insubordinate and poor as himself. No one having any superfluity to dispose of, there existed no parasite under the name of priest, nor tribute under the name of victim, nor empire under the name of altar; their dogmas and morality, jumbled together, were only self-preservation; and their religion, an arbitrary idea without influence on the mutual relations existing between men, was but a vain homage paid to the visible powers of nature.

"Such was the first and necessary origin of every idea of the divinity."....

"In reality, when the vulgar heard others talk of a new heaven and another world, they gave a body to these fictions; they erected on it a solid stage and real scenes; and their notions of geography and astronomy served to strengthen, if they did not give rise to the delusion.

"On the one hand, the Phœnician navigators, those who passed the pillars of Hercules to fetch the pewter of Thule and the amber of the Baltic, related that at the extremity of the world, the boundaries of the ocean (the Mediterranean,) where the sun sets to the countries of Asia, there were Fortunate Islands, the abode of an everlasting spring; and at a farther distance, hyperborean regions, placed under the earth (relatively to the tropics,) where reigned an eternal night. From those stories, badly understood, and no doubt confusedly related, the imagination of the people composed the Elysian Fields, delightful spots in a world below, having their heaven, their sun, and their stars; and Tartarus, a place of darkness, humidity, mire, and chilling frost. Now, inasmuch as mankind, inquisitive about all that of which they are ignorant, and desirous of a protracted existence, had already exerted their faculties respecting what was to become of them after death; inasmuch, as they had early reasoned upon

that principle of life which animates the body, and which quits it without changing the form of the body, and had conceived to themselves airy substances, phantoms and shades, they loved to believe that they should resume in the subterranean world that life which it was so painful to lose; and this abode appeared commodious for the reception of those beloved objects which they could not prevail on themselves to renounce.

"On the other hand, the astrological and philosophical priests told such stories of their heavens as perfectly quadrated with these fictions. Having, in their metaphorical language, denominated the equinoxes and solstices the gates of heaven, or the entrance of the seasons, they explained the terrestrial phenomena by saying, that through the gate of horn (first the bull, afterwards the ram,) vivifying fires descended, which, in spring, gave life to vegetation, and aquatic spirits, which caused, at the solstice, the overflowing of the Nile: that through the gate of ivory (originally the bowman, or Sagittarius, then the balance,) and through that of Capricorn, or the urn, the emanations or influences of the heavens returned to their source and reascended to their origin; and the Milky Way which passed through the doors of the solstices, seemed to them to have been placed there on purpose to be their road and vehicle. The celestial scene farther presented, according to their Atlas, a river (the Nile, designated by the windings of the Hydra;) together with a barge (the vessel Argo,) and the dog Sirius, both bearing relation to that river, of which they foreboded the overflowing. These circumstances, added to the preceding ones, increased the probability of the fiction; and thus to arrive at Tartarus or Elysium, souls were obliged to cross the rivers Styx and Acheron, in the boat of Charon the ferryman, and to pass through the doors of horn and ivory, which were guarded by the mastiff Cerberus. At length a civil usage was joined to all these inventions, and gave them consistency.

"The inhabitants of Egypt having remarked that the putrefaction of dead bodies became in their burning

climate the source of pestilence and diseases, the custom was introduced in a great number of States, of burying the dead at a distance from the inhabited districts, in the desert which lies at the West. To arrive there it was necessary to cross the canals of the river in a boat, and to pay a toll to the ferryman, otherwise the body remaining unburied, would have been left a prey to wild beasts. This custom suggested to her civil and religious legislators, a powerful means of affecting the manners of her inhabitants, and addressing savage and uncultivated men with the motives of filial piety and reverence for the dead; they introduced, as a necessary condition, the undergoing that previous trial which should decide whether the deceased deserved to be admitted upon the footing of his family honors into the *black city*. Such an idea too well accorded with the rest of the business not to be incorporated with it; it accordingly entered for an article into religious creeds, and hell had its Minos and its Radamanthus, with the wand, the chair, the guards, and the urn, after the exact model of this civil transaction. The divinity then, for the first time, became a subject of moral and political consideration, a legislator, by so much the more formidable as, while his judgment was final and his decrees without appeal, he was unapproachable to his subjects. This mythological and fabulous creation, composed as it was of scattered and discordant parts, then became a source of future punishments and rewards, in which divine justice was supposed to correct the vices and errors of this transitory state. A spiritual and mystical system, such as I have mentioned, acquired so much the more credit as it applied itself to the mind by every argument suited to it. The oppressed looked thither for an indemnification, and entertained the consoling hope of vengeance; the oppressor expected by the costliness of his offerings to secure to himself impunity, and at the same time employed this principle to inspire the vulgar with timidity; kings and priests, the heads of the people, saw in it a new source of power, as they

reserved to themselves the privilege of awarding the favors or the censure of the great Judge of all, according to the opinion they should inculcate of the odiousness of crimes and the meritoriousness of virtue.

"Thus, then, an invisible and imaginary world entered into competition with that which was real. Such, O Persians! was the origin of your renovated earth, your city of resurrection, placed under the equator, and distinguished from all other cities by this singular attribute, that the bodies of its inhabitants cast no shade. Such, O Jews and Christians! disciples of the Persians, was the source of your New Jerusalem, your paradise and your heaven, modelled upon the astrological heaven of Hermes. Meanwhile, your hell, O ye Musselmans! a subterraneous pit surmounted by a bridge, your balance of souls and good works, your judgment pronounced by the angels Monkir and Nekir, derives its attributes from the mysterious ceremonies of the cave of Mithra; and your heaven is exactly coincident with that of Osiris, Ormuzd, and Brama."....

"It is evident, that it is not truth for which you contend; that it is not her cause you are jealous of maintaining, but the cause of your own passions and prejudices; that it is not the object as it really exists that you wish to verify, but the object as it appears to you; that it is not the evidence of the thing that you are anxious should prevail, but your personal opinion, your mode of seeing and judging. There is a power that you want to exercise, an interest that you want to maintain, a prerogative that you want to assume: in short, the whole is a struggle of vanity. And as every individual, when he compares himself with every other, finds himself to be his equal and fellow, he resists by a similar feeling of right; and from this right, which you all deny to each other, and from the inherent consciousness of your equality, spring your disputes, your combats, and your intolerance.

"Now the only way of restoring unanimity is by returning to nature, and taking the order of things which

she nas established for your director and guide, and this farther truth will then appear from your uniformity of sentiment.

"If we would arrive at uniformity of opinion, we must previously establish certainty, and verify the resemblance which our ideas have to their models. Now, this cannot be obtained, except so far as the objects of our inquiry can be referred to the testimony, and subjected to the examination of our senses. Whatever cannot be brought to this trial is beyond the limits of our understanding; we have neither rule to try it by, nor measure by which to institute a comparison, nor source of demonstration and knowledge concerning it.

"Whence it is obvious that, in order to live in peace and harmony, we must consent not to pronounce upon such objects, nor annex to them importance; we must draw a line of demarcation between such as can be verified and such as cannot, and separate, by an inviolable barrier, the world of fantastic beings from the world of realities: that is to say, all civil effect must be taken away from theological and religious opinions.

"This, O nations! is the end that a great people, freed from their fetters and prejudices, have proposed to themselves; this is the work in which, by their command, and under their immediate auspices, we were engaged, when your kings and your priests came to interrupt our labors.....Kings and priests! you may yet for awhile suspend the solemn publication of the laws of nature; but it is no longer in your power to annihilate or to subvert them."

We conclude with the following:—"Investigate the laws which nature, for our direction, has implanted in our breasts, and form from thence an authentic and immutable code. Nor let this code be calculated for one family, or one nation only, but for the whole without exception. Be the legislators of the human race, as ye are the interpreters of their common nature. Show us the line that separates the world of chimeras

from that of realities; and teach us, after so many religions of error and delusion, the religion of evidence and truth."

Our space prohibits further quotation in this number; but when we return to the subject, we shall notice chapter xxi., "Problem of Religious Contradictions," and also "The Law of Nature; or Principles of Morality." Few men wrote more on various topics than Volney; and few have been more respected while living, and esteemed when dead, by those whose respect and esteem it is always an honor to possess. At the age of fifty-three, after much travel and great study, Volney consoled his latter days by marrying his cousin—the hope of his youth—Mdlle. de Chassebœuf. A disorder of the bladder, contracted when traversing the Arabian deserts, caused his death at the age of sixty-three. He was buried in the cemetery of Pere Lachaise, when Laya, Director of the French Academy, pronounced a noble panegyric over his grave; and months after his death he was spoken highly of by some of the most illustrious men of France. Thus ended the days of one of the Freethinkers of the past whose works, despite all suppression, will never die.

J. W.

BIOGRAPHY

OF

CHARLES BLOUNT.

Look with me through the dark vista of 150 years of clouded history. Throw your mind across the bridge of time, for we are about to visit a tragic scene—a scene which might be depicted by a poet—so much of beauty, of truth, and of goodness, all blasted by the perjuries of the priest. Yonder, in the dim library of an ancestral mansion, embowered amid the woods of the south, close by the gurgling waters which beat an echo to the stormy breezes—those breezes which will never more fan his cheek—that water where he has often bathed his limbs will be his rippling monument. The shady moonlight of an August evening is gilding the rich pastures of Hertfordshire; the gorse bushes have not yet lost their beauty, the pheasants are playing in the woods—woods that so lately resounded with laughter—laughter ringing like a bell—the music of a merry heart. Withdraw those curtains which hide the heart-struck and the dead. Above you is the exquisite picture of Eleanora, gazing into the very bed at that form which lay shrouded in nothingness. You see the broad manly brow—even now the brown hair rises in graceful curls over that damp forehead. The lips are locked in an eternal smile, as if to mock the closed eyes and the recumbent form. Is it true that pictures of those we love are endowed with a clairvoyant power of gazing at those who have caressed them

in life? If it is, then on that August night the wife of Charles Blount was watching over his bier.

But who is that pale form, with dishevelled hair and weeping eyes, with an alabaster skin stained with the blue spots of grief? The rapid upheaving swells of that fair bosom tell of affection withered, not by remorse, but by superstition? See her how she nervously grasps that dead man's hand, how she imprints kisses on his lips! Her hair, which yesterday was glossy as the raven's, is now as bleached as the driven snow; to-day she utters her plaintive cries, to-morrow she hastens to join her lover in the tomb. This is a sad history. It should be written with the juice of hemlock, as a warning to Genius of impatient love.

While the fair girl watches by the couch of the suicide, while from the painted canvass Eleanora gleams on the living and the dead, while the clouds of night gather silently over that ancestral hall, around the drooping corn on the bold sloping park, and the clear blue river—all so quiet and gentle—let us gather up the events of the past, and learn the cause of a death so tragic, a grief so piercing.

In the year 1672, at the age of nineteen years, a young man (the son of a baronet) led to the altar the lovely daughter of Sir Timothy Tyrrel. Flowers strewed the path of the wedded pair, and for years their life was one scene of bliss. At last, struck down by disease, Charles Blount stood by the side of his dying wife—in his arms *his* Eleanora yielded her last sigh. He buried her by the willow-tree in the old churchyard. The lily blended with the white rose, and the myrtle overshadowed the grave. It was here where the widower rested in the evening—here where he taught his children the virtues of their dead mother. Sometimes he gazed at the azure skies, and strange fancies beguiled the mind of the mourner. When he saw the sun sink to the west, gilding the world with its glorious rays, he mused on the creeds of many lands. He fancied he saw a heaven and a God, and traced in the lines of light the patriarchal worshippers

of the world. He looked at the sun and its worshippers—those who sought the origin of purity by worshipping that which is the origin of all good. He looked at the fables of Greece, and found delight in the thought of Sappho uttering her diapason of joy in lyrics which told of love and beauty; at Egypt, where the priests, in their esoteric cunning, searched in vain for that which gives life, and motion, and joy; and then he glanced at the Christian heaven, but here all was dark—dark as the Plutonian caverns of Homer's hell. He wished to meet his Eleanora—not in Pagan dreams—not in Christian parables—but in the world of realities. He looked with eager eyes upon the world around him, in society, at Court, and in the homes of his country. But wherever he went, there was but one thought—one feeling. He wished a mother for his children—a mother like the sainted dead. There was but one who answered the ideal—like in features, in passion, and in beauty—to the lost Eleanora. Born of the same parents, loved by the same brother, educated by the same teachers, imbued with the same thoughts, she was the model of her dead sister; with a sisterly love for her brother, she was already both mother and aunt to her sister's children.

With deliberate thoughts, with convulsive passion, the love of Charles Blount passed the bounds of that of a brother; longing to make her his wife, he adored her with the passion he had lavished on the dead. It seemed as if the shade of Eleanora was perpetually prompting him to bestow all his affection on the young and beautiful Eliza. She caressed his children with the pride of an aunt, she traced the image of her sister in the laughing eyes of the merry babes—still she was not happy. How could she be happy? She loved him as a man—as a brother. She was a Christian—he an Infidel. She was bound by creeds—he by conduct. She was doing the duty she owed to the dead. He sought to do it by uniting himself to the living. Eliza was anxious to marry, but there existed something which, to her mind, was greater than human duties,

and it often outraged them. God and the Church demanded her first attention, and then her lover and his children. The Church, in cruel mockery of human rights, stepped between her judgment and her affections. It denied the power of a woman to occupy the married home of her deceased sister. She was willing to pledge her love to Charles Blount at the altar, but the priest mocked her prayers and denounced her affections. The occasion was too good to be lost. Episcopalism sought revenge on its opponent, and it triumphed. Eliza felt the force of Blount's arguments. She wandered with him through the green fields, but her sorrow was too great to pluck the wild roses. The luscious fruits of summer were passed untasted. A heart sick and in trouble, a mind wandering from her sister's grave to her children, and then at the anathema of the Church, made her a widowed maid. To overcome her scruples, her lover wrote a book (inviting the clergy to refute it,) defending the marriage with a deceased wife's sister. But ever as he spoke there was a film before her eyes. There was a gaunt priest, with canonical robes, stood before the gates of heaven. Before him and through him was the way to an eternal happiness, below him was a fiery hell; and he shouted with hoarse voice, *Incest, incest, incest!*— And ever as he shouted, he pointed with his finger of scorn at this Christian hell, and she conjured up in her mind the old stories of this priest, until she saw the livid flames rising up higher till they encircled her form, and then the priest screamed with fury, *Anathema maranatha, incest, incest!* And in terror she stood, with the big drops of sweat dripping from her brow, with her heart beating, with her mind distracted, but her affections unclouded.

This priest was the Church of England, and those fancies were driven into her imagination by her creed, her litanies, and her sermons. Eliza Tyrrel was miserable; she was placed between her love, her duty, and her religion. If she had been a woman of a strong mind, she would have torn her creed into shreds, she

would have dared the anathema of the priest—the ostracism of its dupes—and would have clung to the man she loved so truly, in defiance of that which was, at the best, but a faint possibility.

The arguments in that pamphlet of Blount's were conclusive, but she distrusted reason. The plainest dictates of common logic were referred to the promptings of the Devil. How could it be otherwise? Can the teachings of a lifetime be overthrown by the courtship of a few months? Eliza Tyrrel, true to Blount, loved him; true to her religion, she durst not marry him without the sanction of the Church. So Blount, as a last resolve, laid the matter before the Lord's Vicegerent at Canterbury, and many of the most learned divines of England; and from those ecclesiastical leeches there was a Shylock cry of *incest, incest, incest!* And those terrible words came greeting the ears of Charles Blount, making his home like a charnel-house, and they nearly sent his beautiful Eliza to a maniac's grave. Still she lingered on. Denied the power of a wife, she would not relinquish her duties as a mother to her sister's babes. There was a calm heroism here which few can imitate. The passions of Blount could not brook further insults. The last kick of bigotry against the broken-hearted Freethinker was given. He could no longer rise with the lark, and roam over the hills of his ancestral home. To him the birds, as they warbled, spoke of joys never to return. The broad river told him of the days when the little skiff floated on its waters with Eleanora; and even his friends only too bitterly reminded him of the tournaments of wit where Hobbes, Brown, and Gildon, jousted each other in the presence of his wife. His life was one scene of misery. He saw no chance of amendment. In a fit of despair, he loaded his pistol with due deliberation, placed it to his head, and shot himself. He lingered for sometime, and then died on the breast of Eliza.

This was a strange suicide. Blount's memory bears its weight of obloquy. It is hard to draw the line when and where a man has a right to take away his

life. Common sense tells us that so long as our families are dependent upon us, we have no right to end our lives; and if we have no dependents, no friends, then our country has a claim upon us. But, at the same time, the one sole end of existence is to be happy. If a man cannot find happiness in life, if there is a great coalition against him, he is justified in taking up arms against them; but, at the same time, it proves a greater amount of courage "to bear up against the ills of life" than to madly leave it, and thus weaken the force of those who wish to stem its injustice.

Charles Blount died, and with him expired much of the chivalry of Freethought. His friend, Charles Gildon, writing of him to a lady, says, "You know Astrea (Eliza,) and have an exact friendship with her. You can attest her beauty, wit, honor, virtue, good humor, and discretion. You have been acquainted with the charms of her conversation and conduct, and condemn her, only adhering to a national custom to the loss of so generous a friend, and so faithful a lover. But custom and obedience meeting the more easily, betrayed her virtue into a crime. I know my friend loved her to his last breath; and I know, therefore, that all who love his memory must, for her sake, love and value her, as being a lady of that merit, that engaged the reason of Philander (C. Blount) to so violent a passion for her."

The same writer says, "His father was Sir Henry Blount, the Socrates of the age, for his aversions to the reigning sophisms and hypocrisies, eminent in all capacities: the best husband, father, and master, extremely agreeably in conversation, and just in all his dealings. From such a father our hero derived himself; to such a master owed his generous education, unmixed with the nauseous methods and profane opinions of the schools. Nature gave him parts capable of the noblest sciences, and his industrious studies bore a proportion to his capacities. He was a generous and constant friend, an indulgent parent, and a kind master. His temper was open and free; his con-

versation pleasant; his reflections just and modest; his repartees close — not scurrilous; he had a great deal of wit, and no malice. His mind was large and noble —above the little designs of most men; an enemy to dissimulation, and never feared to own his thoughts. He was a true Englishman, and lover of the liberties of his country, and declared it in the worst of times. He was an enemy to nothing but error, and none were his enemies that knew him, but those who sacrificed more to mammon than reason."

This was the man who died, because a dominant priesthood insisted on a dogma which interfered with a purely Secular rite, which blasted two hearts in a vain attempt to perpetuate a system, which dashes its rude fingers, and tears out the heart of human felicity to sprinkle the altar of superstition with the gore of offended innocence. Charles Blount was a Deist; as such, he believed in a God, which he described in his account of a Deist's religion. Let us examine his thoughts, and see if they bear the interpretation which Christianity has always placed upon them. Blount gives the Deist's opinion of God. He says, "Whatever is adorable, amiable, and imitable by mankind, is in one Supreme, perfect Being." An Atheist cannot object to this. He speaks in the manner in which God is to be worshipped. He says, not by sacrifice, or by a Mediator, but by a steady adherence to all that is great and good and imitable in nature. This is the brief religious creed of Charles Blount. He never seeks to find out fabled attributes of Deity. He knows what is of value to mankind, and sedulously practices whatever is beneficial to society.

In his "Anima Mundi, or, History of the Opinions of the Heathens on the Immortality of the Soul," (p. 97,) Blount says:—

"The heathen philosophers were much divided concerning the soul's future state; some held it mortal, others immortal. Of those who held the mortality of the soul, the Epicureans were the chief sect, who, notwithstanding their doctrines, led virtuous lives."

Cardan had so great a value for their moral actions, that he appeared in justification of them. It appears (says he) "by the writings of Cicero, Diogenes, and Laertius, that the Epicureans did more religiously observe laws, piety, and fidelity among men than either the Stoics or the Platonists; and I suppose the cause thereof was, that a man is either good or evil by custom, but none confideth in those that do not possess sanctity of life. Wherefore they were compelled to use greater fidelity, thereby the better to justify their profession, from which reason it likewise proceeds, that at this day few do equal the fidelity of usurers, notwithstanding they are most base in the rest of their life. Also among the Jews, whilst the Pharisees, that confessed the resurrection and the immortality of the soul, frequently persecuted Christ, the Sadducees, who denied the resurrection, angels, and spirits, meddled not with him above once or twice, and that very gently. Thus, if you compare the lives of Pliny and Seneca (not their writings,) you shall find Pliny, with his mortality of the soul, did as far exceed Seneca in honesty of manners, as Seneca excels him in religious discourse. The Epicureans observed honesty above others, and in their conversation were usually found inoffensive and virtuous, and for that reason were often employed by the Romans when they could persuade them to accept of great employs, for their fault was not any want of ability or honesty, but their general desire of leading a private life of ease, and free from trouble, although inglorious. For when immortality is not owned, there can be no ambition of posthumous glory.

"The Epicureans, instead of those bloody scenes of gallantry (which tyrants applaud,) undertook to manage carefully the inheritance of orphans; bringing up, at their own charge, the children of their deceased friends, and were counted good men, unless it were in front of religious worship; for they constantly affirmed that there were no Gods, or, at least, such as concerned themselves with human affairs, according to the

poets. Neither doth the hope of immortality conduce to fortitude, as some vainly suggest, for Brutus was not more valiant than Cassius; and if we will confess the truth, the deeds of Brutus were more cruel than those of Cassius; for he used the Rhodians, who were his enemies, far more kindly than Brutus did those amicable cities which he governed. In a word, though they both had a hand in Cæsar's murder, yet Brutus was the only parricide. So that the Stoics, which believed a Providence, lived as if there were none; whereas the Epicureans, who denied it, lived as if there were.....The next sect to the Epicureans, in point of incredulity, concerning the soul, I conceive to be the Sceptics, who were by some esteemed, not only the modestest, but the most perspicuous of all sects. They neither affirmed nor denied anything, but doubted of all things. They thought all our knowledge seemed rather like truth, than to be really true, and that for such like reasons as these :—

"1. They denied any knowledge of the Divine Nature, because, they say, to know adequately is to comprehend, and to comprehend is to contain, and the thing contained must be less than that which contains it; to know inadequately is not to know.

"2. From the uncertainty of our senses, as, for instance, our eyes represent things at a distance to be less than they really are. A straight stick in the water appears crooked; the moon to be no bigger than a cheese; the sun greater at rising and setting than at noon. The shore seems to move, and the ship to stand still; square things to be round at a distance; an erect pillar to be less at the top. Neither (say they) do we know whether objects are really as our eyes represent them to us, for the same thing which seems white to us seems yellow to a jaundiced man, and red to a creature afflicted with red eyes; also, if a man rubs his eyes, the figure which he beholds seems long or narrow, and therefore it is not improbable that goats, cats, and other creatures, which have long pupils of the eye, may think those things long

which we call round, for as glasses represent the object variously, according to their shape, so it may be with our eyes. And so the sense of hearing deceives. Thus, the echo of a trumpet, sounded in a valley, makes the sound seem before us, when it is behind us. Besides, how can we think that an ear, which has a narrow passage, can receive the same sound with that which has a wide one? Or the ear, whose inside is full of hair, to hear the same with a smooth ear? Experience tells us that if we stop, or half stop, our ears, the sound cometh different as when the ears are open. Nor is the smelling, taste, or touch less subject to mistake; for the same scents please some, and displease others, and so in our tastes. To a rough and dry tongue that very thing seems bitter (as in an ague,) which to the most moist tongue seems otherwise, and so is it in other creatures. The like is true of the touch, for it were absurd to think that those creatures which are covered with shells, scales, or hairs, should have the same sense in touching with those that are smooth. Thus one and the same object is diversely judged of, according to the various qualities of the instruments of sense, which convinceth to the imagination; from all which the Sceptic concluded, that what these things are in their own nature, whether red, white, bitter, or sweet, he cannot tell; for, says he, why should I prefer my own conceit in affirming the nature of things to be thus, or thus, because it seemeth so to me—when other living creatures, perhaps, think it is otherwise? But the greatest fallacy is in the operation of our inward senses; for the fancy is sometimes persuaded that it hears and sees what it does not, and our reasoning is so weak, that in many disciplines scarce one demonstration is found, though this alone produces science. Wherefore it was Democritus's opinion that truth is hid in a well, that she may not be found by men. Now, although this doctrine be very inconsistent with Christianity, yet I could wish Adam had been of this persuasion, for then he would not have mortgaged his posterity for the purchase of a

twilight knowledge. Now, from these sinister observations it was that they esteemed all our sciences to be but conjectures, and our knowledge but opinion. Whereupon, doubting the sufficiency of human reason, they would not venture to affirm or deny anything of the soul's future state; but civilly and quietly gave way to the doctrines and ordinances under which they lived, without raising or espousing any new opinions."

Speaking of the "origin of the world," Gildon gives the following as a translation from Ocellus Lucanas:—"Again (says he,) as the frame of the world has been always, so it is necessary that its parts should likewise always have existed; by parts, I mean the heaven, earth, and that which lieth betwixt—viz., the sky; for not without these, but with these, and of these, the world consists. Also, if the parts exist, it is necessary that the things which are within them should also coexist; as with the heavens, the sun, moon, fixed stars, and planets; with the earth, animals, plants, minerals, gold, and silver; with the air, exhalations, winds, and alterations of weather, sometimes heat and sometimes cold, for with the world all those things do, and ever have existed, as parts thereof. Nor hath man had any original production from the earth, or elsewhere, as some believe, but have always been, as now he is, coexistent with the world, whereof he is a part. Now, corruptions and violent alterations are made according to the parts of the earth, by winds and waters imprisoned in the bowels thereof; but a universal corruption of the earth never hath been, nor ever shall be. Yet these alterations have given occasion for the invention of many lies and fables. And thus are we to understand them that derive the original of the Greek history from Inachus, the Argive; not that he really was the original, as some make him, but because a most memorable alteration did then happen, and some were so unskilful as to attribute it to Inachus.....But for the universe, and all the parts whereof it subsists, as it is at present, so it ever was, and ever shall be; one nature perpetually moving, and

another perpetually suffering, one always governing, and the other always being governed. The course which nature takes in governing the world, is by one contrary prevailing over another, as thus:—The moisture in the air prevaileth over the dryness of the fire; and the coldness of the water over the heat of the air, and the dryness of the earth over the moisture of the water; and so the moisture of the water over the dryness of the earth; and the heat in the air over the coldness of the water; and the dryness in the fire over the moisture of the air. And thus the alterations are made and produced, out of one another.....As nature cannot create by making something out of nothing, so neither can it annihilate, by turning something into nothing; whence it consequently follows, as there is no access, so there is no diminution in the universe, no more than in the alphabet, by the infinite combination and transposition of letters, or in the wax by the alteration of the seal stamped upon it. Now, as for the forms of natural bodies, no sooner doth any one abandon the matter he occupied, but another instantly steps into the place thereof; no sooner hath one acted his part and is retired, but another comes presently forth upon the stage, though it may be in a different shape, and so act a different part; so that no portion of the matter is, or at any time can be, altogether void and empty, but like Proteus, it burns itself into a thousand shapes, and is always supplied with one form or another, there being in nature nothing but circulation."

The following are the principal works of Blount:—"Anima Mundi; or, an Historical Narration of the Opinions of the Ancients concerning Man's Soul after this Life, according to Enlightened Nature;" published in 1679. Upwards of twenty answers were published to this work. In 1680 he published a translation, with notes, of the life of Apolloninis, of Tyana. This work was suppressed. During the same year, he gave the world "Great is Diana of the Ephesians; or, the Original of Idolatry." By able critics this is consider-

ed one of his ablest works. In 1683, "Religio Laici" appeared, which is published from a Latin work of Lord Herbert's. In 1688 he wrote "A Vindication of Learning, and of the Liberty of the Press." This tractate sparkles with wit and argument. But by far the most important work he was connected with, was published in the year he died, and mainly written by himself, "The Oracles of Reason," a favorite title with both American and English Freethinkers. It consists of sixteen sections; the most interesting being the first four, containing "A Vindication of Dr. Burnett's Archiologie." The seventh and eighth chapters (translated) of the same, of "Moses's Description of the Original State of Man," and Dr. Burnett's "Appendix of the Brahmin's Religion." We would quote from these sections of the "Oracles," but intend to form separate "Half-Hours," with sketches of Drs. Brown and Burnett; it will be more appropriate to use Blount's translation in describing those quaint, but highly instructive authors. In the general style of Blount's works, he is not seen to advantage; there is too much heaviness, enhanced by the perpetual Greek and Latin quotations; but as his works were intended for scholars, and the time in which they were written was essentially the most pedantic era of our literary history, we cannot expect that vivacity and clearness which other writers in a later age possessed. It was in his character as a man that Blount excelled—he was the leader of the chivalry of the period, as in the next age Woolston was his successor. At the Court he was the gayest of the gay, without the taint of immorality, in a period of the grossest licentiousness; he defended the honor of his friends, frequently at the expense of calumny and danger. In witty repartees he was equal to Rochester; while for abstruse learning he was superior to many of the most learned theologians. Daintily brave and skilfully alive to the requirements of friends and foes, he passed through life in the gilded barge of pleasure, and ended it sailing through a cloud where he foundered. But the darkness which enveloped his

history is now charged with that sympathetic power which draws the young to his grave, and compels the gloomiest to shed a tear over his unhappy fate.

At the close of August, in 1693, a few friends met near the grave of Blount, to join in their last respects to their lost friend. Foremost amongst them was Charles Gildon, who so soon repented of the part he had taken in the "Oracles of Reason," but never forgot the kindness he experienced from Blount. He lived long enough for Pope to be revenged on his apostacy, by inserting his name in his great satire. At the time we speak he was mournful and deeply grieved at the loss he had sustained; near him was Harvey Wilwood, whose bold demeanor and sorrowful countenance told of heart-struck grief, for of the few able to appreciate the genius of Blount, he was one of the earliest and most devoted in his friendship. Now we see the noble Lord, whom Blount always addressed as "the most ingenious Strephon;" along with him there is the pretty Anne Rogers, with Savage, and Major Arkwright; we look in vain for Eliza Tyrrel; they talk slowly over him that is no more; they recount to themselves the intellectual achievements, and the brilliant hours they have spent in the past; and while they speak so kindly, and think so deeply, they kneel on the hallowed spot, but not to pray; some of them pledge their enmity against Christian laws and Christian priests, and they executed it. During this time, the calm radiance of the lunar light shines on the church of Ridge, illumining those ghostly tablets of white marble, where the forefathers of Blount lie entombed. The baronial arms are emblazoned on the wall; heraldic pomp is keeping watch over the mouldering bones of the now-levelled great. Anne Rogers weeps wildly for Eliza and Eleanora. Those metaphysical disquisitions which have exalted woman to so high a nature, that devotion to æsthetics which woman should always cultivate, not as a household slave, but as one of equal rights with man, and his leader in everything which concerns taste, ele-

gance, and modesty; such gifts in no ordinary degree had Anne Rogers—and often in dialectic subtlety had she mastered her relative, who stood by her side, and given tokens of her admiration of Blount's philosophy and conduct. "Strephon" was passionately attached to his confidant and friend, and could not give so calm an expression to his loss. He wept wildly, for he had lost one who tempered his rebuke with a kind word, and pointed out that Epicurean path which leads to enjoyment without excess; to pleasure, without a reaction. It was a memorable meeting. While the remembrance of past deeds of love lighted up the eye and made the blood course faster through their veins, Anne Rogers detailed the following episode in his character:—Blount had visited the Court of King James, and had been singled out by that monarch for one of his savage fits of spleen. "I hear, Mr. Blount, you are very tenacious of the opinions of Sir Henry, your father, and you consider his conduct during the Rebellion as worthy of imitation. Is it so?" "Your Majesty," replies Blount, "has been correctly informed; I admire my father's conduct." "What!" says James, "in opposing his king?" Blount quickly answered, "A king, my liege, is the chief magistrate of the Commonwealth, and is so hereditarily while he obeys the laws of that Commonwealth, whose power he represents; but when he usurps the direction of that power, he is king no longer, and such was the case with your royal father." With a scowl of defiance on his face, King James left the Freethinker, and sought more congenial company; and as Anne Rogers told the story, each eye was dimmed with tears. The moon had risen high in the heavens ere the mourners prepared to depart—the first streaks of dawn broke through the Eastern sky, and revealed the grave watered with tears, where the most chivalrous Freethinker of his age reposed, in that sleep which knows of no awakening. "A. C."

BIOGRAPHY

OF

PERCY BYSSHE SHELLEY.

Percy Bysshe Shelley (the son and heir of a wealthy English baronet, Sir Timothy Shelley, of Castle Goring, in the county of Sussex) was born at Field Place, near Horsham, in that county, on the 4th of August, 1792. Ushered into the world in the midst of wealth and fashion, with all the advantages of family distinction, the future of Shelley's life appeared a bright one; but the sunshine of the morning only served to render the darkness which came over his noontide more dark, and to make poor Shelley still more susceptible of the hardships he had to encounter. First educated at Eton, his spirit there manifested itself by an unflinching opposition to the fagging system, and by revolt against the severe discipline of the school; in his "Revolt of Islam" Shelley has thus portrayed his feeling:—

"I do remember well the hour which burst
My spirit's sleep; a fresh May dawn it was
When I walked forth upon the glittering grass
And wept, I knew not why: until there rose
From the near school-room voices that, alas!
Were but one echo from a world of woes,
The harsh and grating strife of tyrants and of foes.

And then I clasped my hands and looked around,
And none was near to mock my streaming eyes,
Which poured their warm drops on the sunny ground;

So, without shame, I spake—'I will be wise,
And just, and free, and mild, if in me lies
Such power, for I grow weary to behold
The selfish, and the strong still tyrannize
Without reproach or check.'"

* * * * * *

And from that hour did I, with earnest thought,
Heap knowledge from forbidden mines of lore;
Yet nothing that my tyrants knew or taught
I cared to learn, but from that secret store
Wrought linked armour for my soul, before
It might walk forth to war among mankind."

From Eton, Shelley went to Oxford, and while there he, scarce at the age of eighteen, published a volume of political rhymes, entitled "Margaret Nicholson's Remains," the said Margaret being a woman who tried to assassinate George III. He also wrote a pamphlet in defence of Atheism. A copy of this pamphlet he caused to be sent to the head of each of the colleges in Oxford, with a challenge to discuss and answer.—The answer to this was the edict which expelled Shelley from Oxford, and at the same time placed a wide chasm between him and his family. This breach was still further widened in the following year by his marriage, at the age of nineteen, with a beautiful girl named Westbrook. Although Miss Westbrook was respectfully connected, Shelley's aristocratic family regarded this as a *mesalliance*, and withdrew his pecuniary allowance; and had it not been for the bride's father, who allowed the young couple £200 a year, they would have been reduced to actual poverty. This was an unfortunate marriage for both. After having two children, disagreements arose, and Shelley was separated from his wife. She (like all beautiful women) was soon attacked by the busy tongue of slander, and, unable to bear the world's taunts, committed suicide by throwing herself into a pond, just four years from the date of their marriage. Shelley, on this account, suf-

fered much misery and misrepresentation, and this misery was much increased by his family, who applied to the Court of Chancery, and obtained a decree, by which Shelley was deprived of the custody of his children, on the ground of his Atheism. The same spirit even now pervades the Shelley family, and scarce a copy of his poems can be found in the neighborhood of his birth-place. Shelley afterwards contracted a second marriage with the daughter of Godwin, the author of "Caleb Williams," and Mary Wollstonecroft (who died in giving birth to Shelley's wife), and for sometime the poet resided at Marlow, in Buckinghamshire, where he composed the "Revolt of Islam;" and it is a strong proof of the reality of Shelley's poetical pleadings for the oppressed amongst the human race, that he was indefatigable in his attentions to the poor cottagers of his neighborhood; and that he suffered severely from an attack of opthalmia, which was originated in one of his benevolent visits. Nearly the first of Shelley's poems was his "Queen Mab," in which (having in vain struggled to devote himself to metaphysics apart from poetry), he blended his metaphysical speculation with his poetical aspirations. The following quotations are taken from that poem, in which his wonderful command of language is well shown :—

"There's not one atom of yon earth
But once was living man;
Nor the minutest drop of rain,
That hangeth in its thinnest cloud,
But flowed in human veins;
And from the burning plains
Where Lybian monsters yell,
From the most gloomy glens
Of Greenland's sunless clime,
To where the golden fields
Of fertile England spread
Their harvest to the day,
Thou canst not find one spot
Whereon no city stood.

How strange is human pride!
I tell thee that those living things,
To whom the fragile blade of grass,
That springeth in the morn
And perishes ere noon,
Is an unbounded world;
I tell thee that those viewless beings,
Whose mansion is the smallest particle
Of the impassive atmosphere,
Think, feel, and live, like man:
That their affections and antipathies,
Like his, produce the laws
Ruling their mortal state;
And the minutest throb,
That through their frame diffuses
The slightest, faintest motion,
Is fixed and indispensable
As the majestic laws
That rule yon rolling orbs.

* * * * *

How bold the flight of passion's wandering wing,
How swift the step of reason's firmer tread,
How calm and sweet the victories of life,
How terrorless the triumph of the grave!
How powerless were the mightiest monarch's arm,
Vain his loud threat and impotent his frown!
How ludicrous the priest's dogmatic roar!
The weight of his exterminating curse,
How light! and his affected charity,
To suit the pressure of the changing times,
What palpable deceit!—but for thy aid,
Religion! but for thee, prolific fiend,
Who peoplest earth with demons, hell with men,
And heaven with slaves!
Thou taintest all thou look'st upon!—The stars,
Which on thy cradle beamed so brightly sweet,
Were gods to the distempered playfulness
Of thy untutored infancy: the trees,
The grass, the clouds, the mountains, and the sea,

All living things that walk, swim, creep, or fly,
Were gods: the sun had homage, and the moon
Her worshipper. Then thou becam'st a boy,
More daring in thy frenzies: every shape,
Monstrous or vast, or beautifully wild,
Which, from sensation's relics, fancy culls;
The spirits of the air, the shuddering ghost,
The genii of the elements, the powers
That give a shape to nature's varied works,
Had life and place in the corrupt belief
Of thy blind heart: yet still thy youthful hands
Were pure of human blood. Then manhood gave
Its strength and ardor to thy frenzied brain;
Thine eager gaze scanned the stupendous scene,
Whose wonders mocked the knowledge of thy pride.
Their everlasting and unchanging laws
Reproached thine ignorance. Awhile thou stood'st
Baffled and gloomy; then thou did'st sum up
The elements of all that thou did'st know;
The changing seasons, winter's leafless reign,
The budding of the heaven-breathing trees,
The eternal orbs that beautify the night,
The sunrise, and the setting of the moon,
Earthquakes and wars, and poisons and disease,
And all their causes, to an abstract point,
Converging, thou did'st bend, and called it GOD;
The self-sufficing, the omnipotent,
The merciful, and the avenging God!
Who, prototype of human misrule, sits
High in Heaven's realm, upon a golden throne,
Even like an earthly king: and whose dread work,
Hell gapes forever for the unhappy slaves
Of fate, whom he created in his sport,
To triumph in their torments when they fell!
Earth heard the name; earth trembled, as the smoke
Of his revenge ascended up to Heaven,
Blotting the constellations: and the cries
Of millions, butchered in sweet confidence
And unsuspecting peace, even when the bonds
Of safety were confirmed by wordy oaths,

Sworn in his dreadful name, rung through the land;
Whilst innocent babes writhed on thy stubborn spear,
And thou did'st laugh to hear the mother's shriek
Of maniac gladness, as the sacred steel
Felt cold in her torn entrails!

Religion! thou wert then in manhood's prime;
But age crept on: one God would not suffice
For senile puerility; thou fram'dst
A tale to suit thy dotage, and to glut
Thy misery-thirsting soul, that the mad fiend
Thy wickedness had pictured might afford
A plea for sating the unnatural thirst
For murder, rapine, violence, and crime,
That still consumed thy being, even when
Thou heard'st the step of fate:—that flames might light
Thy funeral scene, and the shrill horrent shrieks
Of parents dying on the pile that burned
To light their children to thy paths, the roar
Of the encircling flames, the exulting cries
Of thine apostles, loud commingling there,
Might sate thy hungry ear
Even on the bed of death!

But now contempt is mocking thy gray hairs;
Thou art descending to the darksome grave,
Unhonored and unpitied, but by those
Whose pride is passing by like thine, and sheds
Like thine, a glare that fades before the sun
Of truth, and shines but in the dreadful night
That long has lowered above the ruined world."

Speaking of the Atheist's martyrdom, in answer to the spirit of "Ianthe," Shelley makes his fairy say:—

"There is no God!
Nature confirms the faith his death-groan sealed.
Let heaven and earth, let man's revolving race,
His ceaseless generations, tell their tale;

Let every part depending on the chain
That links it to the whole, point to the hand
That grasps its term! Let every seed that falls
In silent eloquence unfold its store
Of argument. Infinity within,
Infinity without, belie creation;
The exterminable spirit it contains
Is nature's only God: but human pride
Is skilful to invent most serious names
To hide its ign rance.

The name of God
Has fenced about all crime with holiness,
Himself the creature of his worshippers,
Whose names and attributes and passions change,
Seeva, Buddh, Foh, Jehovah, God, or Lord,
Even with the human dupes who build his shrines.
Still serving o'er the war-polluted world
For desolation's watch-word; whether hosts
Stain his death-blushing chariot wheels, as on
Triumphantly they roll, whilst Brahmins raise
A sacred hymn to mingle with the groans;
Or countless partners of his powers divide
His tyranny to weakness: or the smoke
Of burning towns, the cries of female helplessness,
Unarmed old age, and youth, and infancy,
Horribly massacred, ascend to heaven
In honor of his name; or, last and worst,
Earth groans beneath religion's iron age,
And priests dare babble of a God of peace,
Even whilst their hands are red with guiltless blood,
Murdering the while, uprooting every germ
Of truth, exterminating, spoiling all,
Making the earth a slaughter-house."

"Ianthe's" spirit, however, asks still further, and the ghost of Ahasuerus having been summoned, the question is repeated, "Is there a God?"

"*Ahasuerus.*—Is there a God? ay, an Almighty God,
And vengeful as Almighty! Once his voice

Was heard on earth: earth shuddered at the sound,
The fiery-visaged firmament expressed
Abhorrence, and the grave of nature yawned
To swallow all the dauntless and the good
That dared to hurl defiance at his throne,
Girt as it was with power. None but slaves
Survived,—cold-blooded slaves, who did the work
Of tyrannous omnipotence: whose souls
No honest indignation ever urged
To elevated daring, to one deed
Which gross and sensual self did not pollute.
These slaves built temples for the omnipotent fiend,
Gorgeous and vast: the costly altars smoked
With human blood, and hideous pæans rung
Through all the long-drawn aisles. A murderer heard
His voice in Egypt, one whose gifts and arts
Had raised him to his eminence in power,
Accomplice of omnipotence in crime,
And confidant of the all-knowing one.

These were Jehovah's words:
"From an eternity of idleness
I, God, awoke: in seven days' toil made earth
From nothing; rested, and created man.
I placed him in a paradise, and there
Planted the tree of evil, so that he
Might eat and perish, and my soul procure
Wherewith to sate its malice, and to turn,
Even like a heartless conqueror of the earth,
All misery to my fame. The race of men,
Chosen to my honor, with impunity,
May sate the lusts I planted in their heart.
Here I command thee hence to lead them on,
Until, with hardened feet, their conquering troops
Wade on the promised soil through woman's blood,
And make my name be dreaded through the land.
Yet ever burning flame and ceaseless woe
Shall be the doom of their eternal souls,
With every soul on this ungrateful earth,
Virtuous or vicious, weak or strong,—even all

Shall perish, to fulfil the blind revenge
Which you, to men, call justice, of their God."

The murderer's brow
Quivered with horror.

God omnipotent!
Is there no mercy? must our punishment
Be endless? will long ages roll away,
And see no term? Oh! wherefore hast thou made
In mockery and wrath this evil earth?
Mercy becomes the powerful—be but just:
O God! repent and save.

"One way remains,
I will beget a son, and he shall bear
The sins of all the world: he shall arise
In an unnoticed corner of the earth,
And there shall die upon a cross, and purge
The universal crime; so that the few
On whom my grace descends, those who are marked
As vessels to the honor of their God,
May credit this strange sacrifice, and save
Their souls alive. Millions shall live and die
Who ne'er shall call upon their Saviour's name,
But, unredeemed, go to the gaping grave.
Thousands shall deem it an old woman's tale,
Such as the nurses frighten babes withal.
These in a gulph of anguish and of flame
Shall curse their reprobation endlessly.
Yet tenfold pangs shall force them to avow,
Even on their beds of torment, where they howl,
My honor, and the justice of their doom.
What then avail their virtuous deeds, their thoughts
Of purity, with radiant genius bright,
Or lit with human reason's earthly ray?
Many are called, but few I will elect.
Do thou my bidding, Moses!"

In his poem of "Rosalind and Helen," the poet indulges in the following prophecy, which he puts in the mouth of Helen:—

" Fear not the tyrants shall rule forever,
Or the priests of the bloody faith;
They stand on the brink of that mighty river,
Whose waves they have tainted with death.
It is fed from the depths of a thousand dells,
Around them it foams, and rages, and swells;
And their swords and their sceptres I floating see,
Like wrecks on the surge of eternity."

Beside the poems mentioned, Shelley wrote "The Cenci," "Alastor," "Prometheus Unbound," and many others, including a beautiful little ode to a "Skylark," and the well-known "Sensitive Plant."

Shelley was a true and noble man—no poet was ever warmed by a more genuine and unforced aspiration.—De Quincey says, "Shelley would, from his earliest manhood, have sacrificed all that he possessed for any comprehensive purpose of good for the race of man. He dismissed all insults and injuries from his memory. He was the sincerest and most truthful of human creatures. If he denounced marriage as a vicious institution, *that* was but another phase of the partial lunacy which affected him: for to no man were purity and fidelity more essential elements in the idea of real love." Again, De Quincey speaks of Shelley's "fearlessness, his gracious nature, his truth, his purity from all fleshliness of appetite, his freedom from vanity, his diffusive love and tenderness." This testimony is worth much, the more especially when we remember that it is from the pen of Thomas de Quincey, who, while truthfully acknowledging the man, hesitates not to use polished irony, rough wit, and covert sneering, when dealing with the man's uttered thinkings.

That Shelley understood the true mission of a poet, and the true nature of poetry, will appear from the following extract from one of his prose essays:—"Poetry," he says, "is the record of the best and happiest moments of the happiest and best minds. We are aware of evanescent visitations of thought and feeling, sometimes associated with place and person, some-

times regarding our own mind alone, and always arising unforeseen, and departing unbidden, but elevating and delightful beyond all expression. Poets are not only subject to these experiences, as spirits of the most refined organization, but they can color all they combine with the evanescent lines of this ethereal world; a word, a trait in the representation of a scene or passion will touch the enchanted cord, and reanimate in those who have ever experienced these emotions, the sleeping, the cold, the buried image of the past. Poetry thus makes immortal all that is best and most beautiful in the world; it arrests the vanishing apparitions which haunt the interlunations of life, and veiling them, or in language or in form, sends them forth among mankind, bearing sweet news of kindred joy to those with whom their sisters abide—abide, because there is no portal of expression from the caverns of the spirit which they inhabit into the universe of things."

Shelley's beautiful imagery and idealistic drapery is sometimes so accumulated in his poems, that it is difficult to follow him in his thinkings. In his verse he wishes to stand high as a philosophical reasoner, and this, together with his devotion to the cause, which even men of De Quincey's stamp call "Insolent Infidelity," has prevented Shelley from becoming so popular as he might have been.

Shelley lived a life of strife, passed his boyhood and youth in struggling to be free—misunderstood and misinterpreted: and when at last in his manhood happier circumstances were gathering around him, a blast of wind came, and the waves of the sea washed away one who was really and truly "a man and a poet."

On Monday, July 8th, 1822, being then in his 29th year, Shelley was returning from Leghorn to his home at Lerici, in a schooner-rigged boat of his own, with one friend and an English servant; when the boat had reached about four miles from the shore, the storm suddenly rose, and the wind suddenly shifted. From excessive smoothness, all at once the sea was foaming, and breaking, and getting up in a heavy swell. The

boat is supposed to have filled to leeward, and (carrying two tons of ballast) to have sunk instantaneously —all on board were drowned. The body of Shelley was washed on shore eight days afterwards, near Via Reggio, in an advanced state of decomposition, and was therefore burned on a funeral pyre, in the presence of Leigh Hunt, Lord Byron, Mr. Trelawney, and a Captain Shenley.

Thus died Shelley in the mid-day of life, and ere the warm sun of that mid-day could dispel the clouds that had gathered round the morning of his career. The following comparison made between the personal appearance of Shelley and of Byron, by Gilfillan, has been called by De Quincey "an eloquent parallel," and we therefore conclude the present number by quoting it:—"In the forehead and head of Byron there is more massive power and breadth: Shelley has a smooth, arched, spiritual expression; wrinkle there seems none on his brow; it is as if perpetual youth had there dropped its freshness. Byron's eye seems the focus of pride and lust: Shelley's is mild, pensive, fixed on you, but seeing you through the mist of his own idealism. Defiance curls on Byron's nostril, and sensuality steeps his full large lips. The lower features of Shelley's face are frail, feminine, flexible.—Byron's head is turned upwards as if having risen proudly above his contemporaries, he were daring to claim kindred, or demand a contest with a superior order of beings. Shelley's is half bent, in reverence and humility, before some vast vision seen by his own eye alone. Misery erect, and striving to cover its retreat under an aspect of contemptuous fury, is the permanent and pervading expression of Byron's countenance. Sorrow, softened and shaded away by hope and habit, lies like a 'holier day' of still moonshine upon that of Shelley. In the portrait of Byron, taken at the age of nineteen, you see the unnatural age of premature passion; his hair is young, his dress is youthful, but his face is old. In Shelley you see the eternal child, none the less that his hair is grey, and that sorrow seems half his immortality." "I."

BIOGRAPHY

OF

CLAUD ARIAN HELVETIUS.

If France, at the present day, has not reason to be proud of its "leading man," it has in former times produced those minds that shed lustre upon the country, and who, by their literature, add immortality to its renown. During the eighteenth century, when religious persecution and intolerance were rampant throughout Europe, France furnished men to check oppression and expose superstition, while others followed to lay the foundation of excellence and greatness in the examination and cultivation of its true source—the mind. Helvetius sought to direct men's attention to self-examination, and to show how many disputes might be avoided if each person understood *what* he was disputing about. "Helvetius on the Mind" is a work that ought to be read widely, and studied attentively, especially by "rising young men," as it is one of those *Secular* works too rarely found among our literature.

Claud Arian Helvetius was born in Paris in the year 1715. After his preparatory studies, he was sent to the College of Louis le Grand, having for his tutor the famous Poree, who bestowed additional attention upon Helvetius, perceiving in him great talent and genius. Early in life Helvetius formed the friendship of some of the leading minds of France, Montesquieu being his intimate friend. Voltaire, too, sought his

correspondence when at the age of twenty-three, calling him his "Young Apollo," and his "Son of Parnassus." The first literary attempts of Helvetius consisted of poetry—"Epistles on Happiness," which appeared as a posthumous production, with the "lavish commendations" of Voltaire. After ten years' thought and study Helvetius. in 1758, published a work entitled "De L'Esprit," which brought upon him a great amount of persecution. The Parliament of Paris condemned it, and Helvetius was removed from the office he held of "Maitre d'Hotel to the Queen." Voltaire remarks:—"It is a little extraordinary that they should have persecuted, disgraced, and harassed, a much respected philosopher of our days, the innocent, the good Helvetius, for having said that if men had been without hands they could not have built houses, or worked in tapestry. Apparently those who have condemned this proposition, have a secret for cutting stones and wood, and for sewing with the feet.....I have no doubt that they will soon condemn to the galleys the first who shall have the insolence to say, that a man cannot think without his head; for, some bachelor will tell him, the soul is a pure spirit, the head is nothing but matter: God can place the soul in the nails, as well as in the skull, therefore I proscribe you as impious." During the persecution raised against him, Helvetius visited England in 1764. In 1765 he visited Prussia, being well received by Frederick, in whose place he lodged. Voltaire strongly advised Helvetius to leave France in these words:—"In your place, I should not hesitate a moment to sell all that I have in France; there are some excellent estates in my neighborhood, and there you might cultivate in peace the arts you love." About this period Hume became acquainted with Helvetius, whom he styles, in writing to Dr. Robertson, "a very fine genius and worthy man." In 1765, Helvetius returned from Prussia, and retired to his estate at Vore. The sight of misery much affected him; and when relieving distress, he enjoined strict secrecy. Sometimes, when told he re-

lieved those undeserving his aid, he would say, "If I were a king I would correct them, but as I am only rich and they are poor, I do my duty in relieving them." An attack of gout in the head and stomach terminated his life in December, 1771, in the fifty-sixth year of his age.

In "De L'Esprit, or, Essays on the Mind," chap. I., Helvetius makes the following remarks on the "Mind considered in itself":—

"We hear every day disputes with regard to what ought to be called the Mind; each person delivers his thoughts, but annexes different ideas to the word; and thus the debate is continued, without understanding each other. In order, therefore, to enable us to give a just and precise idea of the word Mind, and its different acceptations, it is necessary first to consider the Mind in itself. We consider the Mind either as the effect of the faculty of thinking, and in this sense the Mind is no more than an assemblage of our thoughts; or, we consider it as the very faculty of thinking. But in order to understand what is meant by the Mind, in the latter acceptation, we ought previously to know the productive causes of our ideas. Man has two faculties; or, if I may be allowed the expression, two passive powers whose existence is generally and distinctly acknowledged. The one is the faculty of receiving the different impressions caused by external objects, and is called Physical Sensibility. The other is the faculty of preserving the impressions caused by those objects, called Memory; and Memory is nothing more than a continued, but weakened sensation.—Those faculties which I consider as the productive causes of our thoughts, and which we have in common with beasts, would produce but a very small number of ideas, if they were not assisted by certain external organizations. If Nature, instead of hands and flexible fingers, had terminated our wrist with the foot of a horse, mankind would doubtless have been totally destitute of art, habitation, and defence against other ani-

mals. Wholly employed in the care of procuring food, and avoiding the beasts of prey, they would have still continued wandering in the forests, like fugitive flocks. It is therefore evident that, according to this supposition, the police would never have been carried in any society to that degree of perfection, to which it is now arrived. There is not a nation now existing, but, with regard to the action of the mind, must not have continued very inferior to certain savage nations, who have not two hundred different ideas, nor two hundred words to express those ideas; and whose language must consequently be reduced, like that of animals, to five or six different sounds or cries, if we take from it the words bow, arrow, nets, etc., which suppose the use of hands. From whence I conclude, that, without a certain exterior organization, sensibility and memory in us would prove two sterile faculties. We ought to examine if these two faculties, by the assistance of this organization, have in reality produced all our thoughts. But, before we examine this subject, I may possibly be asked whether these two faculties are modifications of a spiritual or a material substance? This question, which has formerly been so often debated by philosophers, and by some persons revived in our time, does not necessarily fall within the limits of my work.—What I have to offer, with regard to the Mind, is equally conformable to either of these hypothesis. I shall therefore only observe that, if the church had not fixed our belief in respect to this particular, and we had been obliged by the light of reason alone to acquire a knowledge of the thinking principle, we must have granted, that neither opinion is capable of demonstration; and consequently that, by weighing the reasons on both sides, balancing the difficulties, and determining in favor of the greater number of probabilities, we should form only conditional judgments. It would be the fate of this problem, as it hath been of many others, to be resolvable only by the assistance of the calculation of probabilities."

Helvetius, on the question "whether genius ought to be considered as a natural gift, or as an effect of education," says:—

"I am going to examine in this discourse what the mind receives from nature and education; for which purpose it is necessary first, to determine what is here meant by the word Nature. This word may raise in our minds a confused idea of a being or a force that has endued us with all our senses: now the senses are the sources of all our ideas. Being deprived of our senses, we are deprived of all the ideas relative to them: a man born blind has for this reason no idea of colors; it is then evident that, in this signification, genius ought to be considered as a gift of nature. But, if the word be taken in a different acceptation, and we suppose that among the men well formed and endued with all their senses, without any perceivable defect of their organization, nature has made such a remarkable difference, and formed such an unequal distribution of the intellectual powers, that one shall be so organized as to be stupid, and the other be a man of genius, the question will become more delicate. I confess that, at first, we cannot consider the great inequality in the minds of men, without admitting that there is the same difference between them as between bodies, some of which are weak and delicate, while others are strong and robust. What can here occasion such variations from the uniform manner wherein nature operates? This reasoning, it is true, is founded only on analogy. It is like that of the astronomers, who conclude that the moon is inhabited, because it is composed of nearly the same matter as our earth.—How weak soever this reasoning may be, it must yet appear demonstrative; for, say they, to what cause can be attributed the great disproportion of intellects observable between people who appear to have had the same education? In order to reply to this objection, it is proper first to inquire, whether several men can, strictly speaking, have the same education; and

for this purpose to fix the idea included in the word Education. If by education we merely understand that received in the same places, and under the same masters; in this sense the education is the same with an infinite number of men. But, if we give to this word a more true and extensive signification, and in general comprehend everything that relates to our instruction; then I say, that nobody receives the same education; because each individual has, for his preceptors, if I may be allowed to say so, the form of government under which he lives, his friends, his mistresses, the people about him, whatever he reads, and in short chance; that is, an infinite number of events, with respect to which our ignorance will not permit us to perceive their causes, and the chain that connects them together. Now, this chance has a greater share in our education than is imagined. It is this places certain objects before us, and in consequence of this, occasions more happy ideas, and sometimes leads to the greatest discoveries. To give some examples: it was chance that conducted Galileo into the gardens of Florence, when the gardeners were working the pumps: it was that which inspired those gardeners, when, not being able to raise the water above the height of 32 feet, to ask him the cause, and by that question piqued the vanity of the philosopher, put in action by so casual a question, that obliged him to make this natural effect the subject of his thoughts, till, at last, by discovering the weight of the air, he found the solution of the problem. In the moment when the peaceful soul of Newton was employed by no business, and agitated by no passion, it was also chance that, drawing him under an apple tree, loosened some of the fruit from the branches, and gave that philosopher the first idea of his system on gravitation: it was really this incident that afterwards made him turn his thoughts to inquire whether the moon does not gravitate towards the earth with the same force as that with which bodies fall on its surface? It is then to chance that great geniuses are frequently

obliged for their most happy thoughts. How many great minds are confounded among the people of moderate capacities for want of a certain tranquillity of soul, the question of a gardener, or the fall of an apple!"

Of the "exclusive qualities of the Mind and Soul," Helvetius observes :—

"My view in the preceding chapters was to affix clear ideas to the several qualities of the mind, I propose in this to examine if there are talents that must necessarily exclude each other? This question, it is said, is determined by facts; no person is, at the same time, superior to all others in many different kinds of knowledge. Newton is not reckoned among the poets, nor Milton among the geometricians: the verses of Leibnitz are bad. There is not a man who, in a single art, as poetry, or painting, has succeeded in all the branches of it. Corneille and Racine have done nothing in comedy comparable to Moliere: Michael Angelo has not drawn the pictures of Albani, nor Albani painted those of Julius Romano. The genius of the greatest men appears then to be confined within very narrow limits. This is, doubtless, true: but I ask, what is the cause? Is it time, or is it wit, which men want to render themselves illustrious in the different arts and sciences? The progress of the human mind, it is said, ought to be the same in all the arts and sciences: the operations of the mind are reduced to the knowledge of the resemblances and differences that subsist between various objects. It is then by observation that we obtain, in all the different kinds of study, the new and general ideas on which our superiority depends. Every great physician, every great chemist, may then become a great geometrician, a great astronomer, a great politician, and the first, in short, in all the sciences This fact being stated, it will doubtless be concluded, that it is the short duration of human life that forces superior minds to limit themselves to one kind of study. It must, however, be confessed, that there are talents and qualities possessed only by

the exclusion of some others. Among mankind some are filled with the love of glory, and are not susceptible of any other of the passions: some may excel in natural philosophy, civil law, geometry, and, in short, in all the sciences that consist in the comparison of ideas. A fondness for any other study can only distract or precipitate them into errors. There are other men susceptible not only of the love of glory, but an infinite number of other passions: these may become celebrated in different kinds of study, where the success depends on being moved. Such is, for instance, the dramatic kind of writing: but, in order to paint the passions, we must, as I have already said, feel them very warmly: we are ignorant both of the language of the passions and of the sensations they excite in us, when we have not experienced them. Thus ignorance of this kind always produces mediocrity. If Fontenelle had been obliged to paint the characters of Rhadamistus, Brutus, or Catalme, that great man would certainly have fallen much below mediocrity.....Let a man, for instance, like M. de Fontenelle, contemplate, without severity, the wickedness of mankind; let him consider it, let him rise up against crimes without hating the criminals, and people will applaud his moderation; and yet, at the same instant, they will accuse him of being too lukewarm in friendship. They do not perceive, that the same absence of the passions, to which he owes the moderation they commend, must necessarily render him less sensible of the charms of friendship."

The "abuse of words" by different schools of philosophers is thus ably pointed out:—

"Descartes had before Locke observed that the Peripatetics, intrenching themselves behind the obscurity of words, were not unlike a blind man, who, in order to be a match for his clear-sighted antagonist, should draw him into a dark cavern. 'Now,' added he, 'if this man can introduce light into the cavern, and compel the Peripatetics to fix clear ideas to their words,

the victory is his own. In imitation of Descartes and Locke, I shall show that, both in metaphysics and morality, the abuse of words, and the ignorance of their true import, is a labyrinth in which the greatest geniuses have lost themselves; and, in order to set this particular in a clear light, instance, in some of those words which have given rise to the longest and sharpest disputes among philosophers: such, in metaphysics, are Matter, Space, and Infinite. It has at all times been alternately asserted that Matter felt, or did not feel, and given rise to disputes equally loud and vague. It was very late before it came into the disputants' heads to ask one another, what they were disputing about, and to annex a precise idea to the word Matter. Had they at first fixed the meaning of it, they would have perceived, if I may use the expression, that men were the creators of Matter; that Matter was not a being; that in nature there were only individuals to which the name of Body had been given; and that this word Matter could import no more than the collection of properties common to all bodies. The meaning of this word being determined, all that remained was to know, whether extent, solidity, and impenetrability, were the only properties common to all bodies; and whether the discovery of a power, such for instance as attraction, might not give rise to a conjecture that bodies had some properties hitherto unknown, such as that of sensation, which, though evident only in the organized members of animals, might yet be common to all individuals? The question being reduced to this, it would have appeared that if, strictly speaking, it is impossible to demonstrate that all bodies are absolutely insensible, no man, unless instructed by a particular revelation, can decide the question otherwise than by calculating and comparing the verisimilitude of this opinion with that of the contrary..... Instructed by the errors of great men who have gone before us, we should be sensible that our observations, however multiplied and concentrated, are scarcely sufficient to form one of those partial systems comprehend-

ed in the general system; and that it is from the depth of imagination that the several systems of the universe have hitherto been drawn; and, as our informations of remote countries are always imperfect, so the informations philosophers have of the system of the world are also defective. With a great genius and a multitude of combinations, the products of their labors will be only fictions till time and chance shall furnish them with a general fact, to which all others may be referred.

"What I have said of the word Matter, I say also of Space. Most of the philosophers have made a being of it; and the ignorance of the true sense of the word has occasioned long disputes. They would have been greatly shortened by annexing a clear idea to this word; for then the sages would have agreed that Space, considered in bodies, is what we call extension; that we owe the idea of a void, which partly composes the idea of Space, to the interval seen betwixt two lofty mountains; an interval which, being filled only by air, that is, by a body which at a certain distance makes no sensible impression on us, must have given us an idea of a vacuum; being nothing more than a power of representing to ourselves mountains separated from each other, and the intervening distances not being filled by other bodies. With regard to the idea of Infinite, comprehended also within the idea of Space, I say that we owe this idea of Infinite only to the power which a man standing on a plain has of continually extending its limits, the boundary of his imagination not being determinable: the absence of limits is therefore the only idea we can form of Infinite. Had philosophers, previously to their giving any opinion on this subject, determined the signification of the word Infinite, I am inclined to believe they would have adopted the above definition, and not spent their time in frivolous disputes. To the false philosophy of former ages, our gross ignorance of the true signification of words is principally owing; as the art of abusing them made up the greatest part of that

philosophy. This art, in which the whole science of the schools consisted, confounded all ideas; and the obscurity it threw on the expressions, generally diffused itself over all the sciences, especially morality."

The following remarks show Helvetius's notions of the "love of glory":—

"By the word Strong-Passion, I mean a passion the object of which is so necessary to our happiness, that without the possession of it life would be insupportable. This was Omar's idea of the passion, when he said, 'Whoever thou art, that lovest liberty, desirest to be wealthy without riches, powerful without subjects, a subject without a master, dare to condemn death: kings will then tremble before thee, whilst thou alone shalt fear no person.'.....It was the passion of honor and philosophic fanaticism alone that could induce Timicha, the Pythagorean, in the midst of torture, to bite off her tongue, that she might not expose herself to reveal the secrets of her sect. Cato, when a child, going with his tutor to Sylla's palace, at seeing the bloody heads of the proscribed, asked with impatience the name of the monster who had caused so many Roman citizens to be murdered. He was answered, it was Sylla: 'How,' says he, 'does Sylla murder thus, and is Sylla still alive?' 'Yes,' it was replied, 'the very name of Sylla disarms our citizens.' 'Oh! Rome,' cried Cato, 'deplorable is thy fate, since within the vast compass of thy walls not a man of virtue can be found, and the arm of a feeble child is the only one that will oppose itself against tyranny!' Then, turning towards his governor, 'Give me,' said he, 'your sword; I will conceal it under my robe, approach Sylla, and kill him. Cato lives, and Rome is again free.'.....If the generous pride, the passion of patriotism and glory, determine citizens to such heroic actions, with what resolution and intrepidity do not the passions inspire those who aim at distinction in the arts and sciences, and whom Cicero calls the peaceable heroes? It is from a desire of glory

that the astronomer is seen, on the icy summits of the Cordilleras, placing his instruments in the midst of snows and frost; which conducts the botanist to the brinks of precipices in quest of plants; which anciently carried the juvenile lovers of the sciences into Egypt, Ethiopia, and even into the Indies, for visiting the most celebrated philosophers, and acquiring from their conversation the principles of their doctrine. How strongly did this passion exert itself in Demosthenes, who, for perfecting his pronunciation, used every day to stand on the sea-shore, and with his mouth full of pebbles harangue the agitated waves! It was from the same desire of glory that the young Pythagoreans submitted to a silence of three years, in order to habituate themselves to recollection and meditation; it induced Democritus to shun the distractions of the world, and retire among the tombs, to meditate on those valuable truths, the discovery of which, as it is always very difficult, is also very little esteemed; in fine, it was this that prompted Heraclitus to cede to his younger brother the throne of Ephesus, to which he had the right of primogeniture, that he might give himself up entirely to philosophy; which made the Athletic improve his strength, by denying himself the pleasures of love; it was also from a desire of popular applause that certain ancient priests renounced the same pleasures, and often, as Boindin pleasantly observes of them, without any other recompense for their continence than the perpetual temptation it occasions.....'The cause,' says Cardinal Richelieu, 'why a timorous mind perceives an impossibility in the most simple projects, when to an elevated mind the most arduous seems easy, is, because, before the latter the mountains sink, and before the former mole-hills are metamorphosed into mountains.'"

The different motives that influence our conduct are thus stated:—

"A mother idolizes her son; 'I love him,' says she, 'for his own sake.' However, one might reply, you

take no care of his education, though you are in no doubt that a good one would contribute infinitely to his happiness; why, therefore, do not you consult some men of sense about him, and read some of the works written on this subject? 'Why, because,' says she, 'I think I know as much of this matter as those authors and their works.' But how did you get this confidence in your own understanding? Is it not the effect of your indifference? An ardent desire always inspires us with a salutary distrust of ourselves. If we have a suit at law of considerable consequence, we visit counsellors and attorneys, we consult a great number, and examine their advice. Are we attacked by any of those lingering diseases, which incessantly place around us the shades and horrors of death? We seek physicians, compare their opinions, read physical books, we ourselves become little physicians Such is the conduct prompted by a warm interest. With respect to the education of children, if you are not influenced in the same manner, it is because you do not love your son as well as yourself. 'But,' adds the mother, 'what then should be the motive of my tenderness?' Among fathers and mothers, I reply, some are influenced by the desire of perpetuating their name in their children; they properly love only their names; others are fond of command, and see in their children their slaves. The animal leaves its young when their weakness no longer keeps them in dependence; and paternal love becomes extinguished in almost all hearts, when children have, by their age or station, attained to independence. 'Then,' said the poet Saadi, 'the father sees nothing in them but greedy heirs,' and this is the cause, adds some poet, of the extraordinary love of the grandfather for his grandchildren; he considers them as the enemies of his enemies. There are, in short, fathers and mothers, who make their children their playthings and their pastime. The loss of this plaything would be insupportable to them; but would their affliction prove that they loved the child for itself? Everybody knows this passage in the life of M.

de Lauzun: he was in the Bastile; there, without books, without employment, a prey to lassitude and the horrors of a prison, he took it in his head to tame a spider. This was the only consolation he had left in his misfortune. The governor of the Bastile, from an inhumanity common to men accustomed to see the unhappy, crushed the spider. The prisoner felt the most cutting grief, and no mother could be affected by the death of a son with a more violent sorrow. Now whence is derived this conformity of sentiments for such different objects? It is because, in the loss of a child, or in the loss of the spider, people frequently weep for nothing but for the lassitude and want of employment into which they fall. If mothers appear in general more afflicted at the death of a child than fathers employed in business, or given up to the pursuit of ambition, it is not because the mother loves her child more tenderly, but because she suffers a loss more difficult to be supplied. The errors, in my opinion, are, in this respect, very frequent; people rarely cherish a child for its own sake. That paternal love of which so many men make a parade, and by which they believe themselves so warmly affected, is most frequently nothing more than an effect, either of a desire of perpetuating their names, or of pride of command.....Do you not know that Galileo was unworthily dragged to the prison of the Inquisition, for having maintained that the sun is placed in the centre, and does not move around the earth; that his system first offended the weak, and appeared directly contrary to that text of Scripture—'Sun, stand thou still?' However, able divines have since made Galileo's principles agree with those of religion. Who has told you, that a divine more happy or more enlightened than you, will not remove the contradiction, which you think you perceive between your religion, and the opinion you resolve to condemn? Who forces you by a precipitate censure to expose, if not religion, at least its ministers, to the hatred excited by persecution? Why, always borrowing the assistance of force and terror,

would you impose silence on men of genius, and deprive mankind of the useful knowledge they are capable of dispensing? You obey, you say, the dictates of religion. But it commands you to distrust yourselves, and to love your neighbor. If you do not act in conformity to these principles, you are then not actuated by the spirit of God. But you say, by whom then are we inspired? By laziness and pride. It is laziness, the enemy of thought, which makes you averse to those opinions, which you cannot, without study and some fatigue of attention, unite with the principles received in the schools; but which being proved to be philosophically true, cannot be theologically false. It is pride, which is ordinarily carried to a greater height in the bigot than in any other person, which makes him detest in the man of genius the benefactor of the human race, and which exasperates him against the truths discovered by humility. It is then this laziness and this pride, which, disguising themselves under the appearance of zeal, render them the persecutors of men of learning; and which in Italy, Spain, and Portugal, have forged chains, built gibbets, and held the torch to the piles of the Inquisition. Thus the same pride, which is so formidable in the devout fanatic, and which in all religions makes him persecute, in the name of the Most High, the men of genius, sometimes arms against them the men in power. After the example of those Pharisees, who treated as criminals the persons who did not adopt all their decisions, how many viziers treat, as enemies to the nation, those who do not blindly approve their conduct!" J. W.

BIOGRAPHY

OF

FRANCES W. D'ARUSMONT.

THE previous issues of this publication contain notices of the lives and writings of men of eminence in the world of Freethought. This number is devoted to a review of the career and works of a most talented and accomplished lady—a Freethinker and Republican. As a proof—if any proof were needed—that women, if adequately educated, are equally capable with men to become teachers and reformers, the works of the subject of present notice afford abundant evidence. The efforts now being made to procure an adjustment of the laws relating to women, whereby they will be protected in their property, and consequently improved in their social position, deserve the support of all classes. When females become independent, there will be less ignorance among women and more happiness among men.

FRANCES WRIGHT, afterwards Madame D'Arusmont, was a native of Dundee. She was born on the 6th of September, 1795. She came of a wealthy family, who had been extensive holders of city property from the year 1500. Her father was a man of considerable literary attainments, and to his active antiquarian researches and donations the British Museum is indebted for many rare and valuable coins and medals. He died young, as also his wife, leaving three children—two girls and a boy. Frances was then but two years

and a half old. At the wish of her grandfather, General Duncan Campbell, she was taken to England, and reared as a ward of Chancery, under the guardianship of a maternal aunt. She grew to be very tall in person, erect, and of a commanding figure; large eyes, and magnificent head, with a face somewhat masculine, but well formed, and decidedly handsome. Her brother was sent to India, at the age of fifteen, as a cadet in the East India Company's service, and was killed on the passage out in an encounter with a French vessel. Her sister passed her life with her, and died in Paris in 1831.

At an early age, Miss Wright gave evidence of great intellectual ability. The education she received was of a very superior kind. She diligently applied herself to the various branches of science, and to the study of ancient and modern letters and the arts, being impelled by a strong desire for knowledge. At the age of nineteen, she published her first work, "A Few Days in Athens." Her attention was early drawn to the sufferings of the lower classes, and on reflection she became convinced that some great vice lay at the foundation of the whole of human practice. She determined to endeavor to discover, and assist in removing it. She read Bocca's "History of the American Revolution," and resolved to visit that country, it appearing to her young imagination as the land of freedom and hope.—After having familiarised herself with the government and institutions of America, she sailed for New York 1818. She returned to England in 1820, and published a large volume, entitled "Views of Society and Manners in America." It was dedicated to Jeremy Bentham, and had a large sale. The work being translated into most of the continental languages, she became known to the prominent reformers of Europe.

In 1821, she made her first visit to Paris, and was there introduced to General Lafayette, who, having previously read her work on America, invited her to that city. A republican in all her views and hopes, she was highly appreciated by Lafayette and other

eminent supporters of the liberal party in France.— She remained in Paris until 1824, when she returned to the United States, and immediately undertook a project for the abolition of slavery upon a plan somewhat different from any that then engaged the attention of philanthropists. For this purpose she purchased two thousand acres of land at Chickasaw Bluffs, (now Memphis, Tennessee), intending to make a good farm rather than a cotton plantation. She then purchased several slave families, gave them their liberty, and removed them to the farm, residing there herself to direct their labor. Commencing this novel undertaking with all that enthusiasm for which she was remarkable, she continued the experiment some three years and a half, when her health gave way, and, suffering under severe sickness, she made a voyage to Europe for her recovery. During her absence, the farm got involved in difficulties by the influence of her enemies; and finally, the whole project falling through, the negroes were sent off to Hayti at her expense.— She gave much time and money to the carrying forward of this experiment; and though it was a failure, it strikingly exhibited her strong sympathy and benevolence for an oppressed and degraded class of beings. Returning from Europe, she went to New Harmony, (Indiana) to assume the proprietorship of a periodical (the Harmony Gazette), which had been published under the direction of Robert Dale Owen. In 1828, leaving Mr. Owen in charge of the paper, she began a lecturing tour through the Union; and probably no man, and certainly no *woman*, ever met with such furious opposition. Her views, as announced in her paper, had made her generally known, and, being somewhat new and radically "anti-theological," brought down upon her head the rancor of religious bigotry. As no church or hall would be opened for her, she lectured in theatres; and her ability and eloquence drew great audiences. On one occasion, while preparing to lecture in a theatre at Baltimore, she was threatened with the destruction of her life if she attempted to speak. She

calmly replied, that she thought she knew the American people, and for every riotous fanatic that might annoy her, a hundred good citizens would protect her, and she was not afraid to place herself in their hands. She judged rightly. She went to the theatre, which was crammed from pit to ceiling, and lectured to an admiring and enthusiastic audience. In other cities she was not always so fortunate; more or less rioting occurred, while the press, almost without exception, denounced her in the bitterest terms. Subsequently, her paper was removed to New York. Some years afterwards, she again made a lecturing tour, but this time she spoke on subjects of a political nature, and met with a better reception. In addition to lecturing, she conducted a political magazine, entitled the Manual of American Principles, and was also engaged with Mr. Kneeland in editing the Boston Investigator. She wrote a great deal, and upon many subjects. Among her many works is a tragedy called "Altorf," which was performed on the stage, the principal character being sustained by Mr. James Wallack. Her last work, of any considerable size, was entitled "England the Civiliser," published in London in 1847.

Madame D'Arusmont died suddenly in Cincinnati, on Tuesday, December 14, 1852, aged fifty-seven. She had been for sometime unwell, in consequence of a fall upon the ice the previous winter, which broke her thigh, and probably hastened her decease; but the immediate cause of her death was the rupture of a blood-vessel. She was aware of her situation, knew when she was dying, and met her last hour with perfect composure. A daughter, her only child, survives her.

In a small work entitled "Observations on Religion and Civilization," are given the following "Definitions of Theology and Religion: in the words and in the things signified. Origin and Nature of Theology:"—

"Theology from the Greek *theos*, *logos*, renders distinct the meaning of the subject it attempts to treat.—*Theos*, God, or Gods, unseen beings and unknown caus-

es. *Logos*, word, talk—or, if we like to employ yet more familiar and expressive terms, prattle or chatter. *Talk*, or *prattle*, *about unseen beings* or *unknown causes*. The idleness of the subject, and inutility—nay, absolute insanity of the occupation, sufficiently appears in the strict etymological meaning of the word employed to typify them. The danger, the mischief, the cruelly immoral, and, if I may be permitted to coin a word for the occasion, the *unhumanizing* tendencies both of the subject and the occupation, when and where these are (as they have for the most part ever been throughout the civilized world) absolutely protected by law and upheld by government, sufficiently appear also from the whole page of history. Religion, from the Latin *religo*, *religio*, renders with equal distinctness the things signified. *Religo*, to tie over again, to bind fast; *religio*, a binding together, a bond of union. The importance of the great reality, here so accurately shadowed out, appears sufficiently in the etymological signification of the word. Its utility will be evident if we read, with intelligence, the nature, the past history, the actual condition, and the future destiny of man. But now, taking these two things in the most strict etymological sense of the words which express them, it will readily be distinguished that the first is a necessary creation of the *human intellect* in a certain stage of inquiry; the second, a necessary creation of the *human soul* (by which I understand both our intellectual and moral faculties taken conjointly) in any and every state of human civilization. Theology argues, in its origin, the first awakening of human attention to the phenomena of nature, and the first crude efforts of human ingenuity to expound them. While man sees the sun and stars without observing either their diurnal or their annual revolutions; while he receives upon his frame the rain and the wind, and the varying elements, without observing either their effects upon himself or upon the field of nature around him, he is as the brute which suffers and enjoys without inquiring why it experiences light or darkness, pain or pleasure. When

first he puts, in awkward language, to himself or to his fellow, the question *why does such an effect follow such a cause?* he commences his existence, if not as a reasonable being, (a state at which he has not yet arrived) at least *as a being capable of reason.* The answer to this first inquiry of awakening intelligence is, of course, such as his own circumscribed observation supplies.—It is, in fine, in accordance with the explanation of the old nurse to the child, who, asking, when startled by a rolling peal of thunder—'what makes that noise?' was fully satisfied by the reply: 'my darling, it is God Almighty overhead moving his furniture.' Man awakening to thought, but still unfamiliar with the concatenation of natural phenomena, inevitably conceives of some huge being, or beings, bestriding the clouds and whirlwind, or wheeling the sun and the moon like chariots through the blue vault. And so again, fancy most naturally peoples the gloom of the night with demons, the woods and the waters with naiads and dryads, elves and fairies, the church-yard with ghosts, and the dark cave and the solitary cot with wizards, imps and old witches. Such, then, is theology in its origin; and, in all its stages, we find it varying in grossness according to the degree of ignorance of the human mind; and, refining into verbal subtleties and misty metaphysics in proportion as that mind exchanges, in its progress from darkness to light, the gloom of ignorance for the mass of terror."

The nature of belief in the unknowable, and the dire consequences arising from fanaticism, are ably depicted in the following passages, selected from Lecture IV., on "Religion:"—

"Admitting religion to be the most important of all subjects, its truths must be the most apparent; for we shall readily concede, both that a thing true, must be always of more or less importance—and that a thing essentially important, must always be indisputably true. Now, again, I conceive we shall be disposed to admit, that exactly in proportion to the indisputability

of a truth, is the proof it is capable of affording; and that, exactly in proportion to the proof afforded, is our admission of such truth and belief in it. If, then, religion be the most important subject of human inquiry, it must be that also which presents the most forcible, irrefragable, and indisputable truths to the inquirer.—It must be that on which the human mind can err the least, and where all minds must be the most agreed. If religion be at once a science, and the most true of all sciences, its truths must be as indisputable as those in any branch of the mathematics—as apparent to all the senses as those revealed by the chemist or observed by the naturalist, and as easily referred to the test of our approving or disapproving sensations, as those involved in the science of morals.....Is religion a science? Is it a branch of knowledge? Where are the *things known* upon which it rests? Where are the accumulated facts of which it is compounded? What are the human sensations to which it appeals? Knowledge is compounded of *things known*. It is an accumulation of facts gleaned by our senses, within the range of material existence, which is subject to their investigation.....Now let us see where, in the table of knowledge, we may class religion. Of what part or division of nature, or material existence, does it treat? What bodies, or what properties of tangible bodies, does it place in contact with our senses, and bring home to the perception of our faculties? It clearly appertains not to the table of human knowledge, for it treats not of objects discoverable within the field of human observation. 'No,' will you say? 'but its knowledge is superhuman, unearthly—its field is in heaven.' My friends, the knowledge which is not human, is of slippery foundation to us human creatures. Things *known*, constitute knowledge; and here is a science treating of things unseen, unfelt, uncomprehended! Such cannot be *knowledge*. What, then, is it? Probability? possibility? theory? hypothesis? tradition? written? spoken? by whom? when? where? Let its teachers—nay, let all earth reply! But what

confusion of tongues and voices now strike on the ear! From either Indies, from torrid Africa, from the frozen regions of either pole, from the vast plains of ancient Asia, from the fields and cities of European industry, from the palaces of European luxury, from the soft chambers of priestly ease, from the domes of hierarchal dominion, from the deep cell of the self-immolated monk, from the stony cave of the self-denying anchorite, from the cloud-capt towers, spires, and minarets of the crescent and the cross, arise shouts, and hosannas, and anathemas, in the commingled names of Brama, and Veeshnu, and Creeshna, and Juggernaut; heavenly kings, heavenly queens, triune deities, earth-born gods, heaven-born prophets, apotheosized monarchs, demon-enlightened philosophers, saints, angels, devils, ghosts, apparitions, and sorceries! But, worse than these sounds which but stun the ear and confound the intellect, what sights, oh! human kind! appal the heart! The rivers of earth run blood! Nation set against nation! Brother against brother! Man against the companion of his bosom! and that soft companion, maddened with the frenzy of insane remorse for imaginary crimes, fired with the rage of infatuated bigotry, or subdued to diseased helplessness and mental fatuity, renounces kindred, flies from social converse, and pines away a useless or mischievous existence in sighings and tremblings, spectral fears, uncharitable feelings, and bitter denunciations! Such are thy doings, oh! religion! Or, rather, such are thy doings, oh! man! While standing in a world so rich in sources of enjoyment, so stored with objects of real inquiry and attainable knowledge, yet shutting thine eyes, and, worse, thine heart, to the tangible things and sentient creatures around thee, and winging thy diseased imagination beyond the light of the sun which gladdens thy world, and contemplation of the objects which are here to expand thy mind and quicken the pulses of thy heart!.....I will pray ye to observe how much of our positive misery originates in our idle speculations in matters of faith, and in our blind, our fearful forgetful-

ness of facts—our cold, heartless, and, I will say, *insane* indifference to visible causes of tangible evil, and visible sources of tangible happiness. Look to the walks of life, I beseech ye—look into the public prints —look into your sectarian churches—look into the bosoms of families—look into your own bosoms, and those of your fellow beings, and see how many of our disputes and dissensions, public and private—how many of our unjust actions—how many of our harsh judgments—how many of our uncharitable feelings—spring out of our ignorant ambition to rend the veil which wraps from our human senses the knowledge of things unseen, and from our human faculties the conception of causes unknown? And oh! my fellow beings! do not these very words *unseen* and *unknown*, warn the enthusiast against the profanity of such inquiries, and proclaim to the philosopher their futility? Do they not teach us that religion is no subject for instruction, and no subject for discussion? Will they not convince us that as beyond the horizon of our observation we can know nothing, so within that horizon is the only safe ground for us to meet in public?.....Every day we see sects splitting, creeds new modelling, and men forsaking old opinions only to quarrel about their opposites. I see three Gods in one, says the Trinitarian, and excommunicates the Socinian, who sees a God-head in unity. I see a heaven but no hell, says the Universalist, and disowns fellowship with such as may distinguish less. 'I see a heaven and hell also, beyond the stars,' said lately the Orthodox friend, and expelled his shorter-sighted brethren from the sanctuary. I seek them both in the heart of man, said the more spiritual follower of Penn, and straightway builded him up another temple, in which to quarrel with his neighbor, who perhaps only employs other words to express the same ideas. For myself, pretending to no insight into these mysteries, possessing no means of intercourse with the inhabitants of other worlds, confessing my absolute incapacity to see either as far back as a first cause, or as far forward as a last one, I am content to

state to you, my fellow creatures, that all my studies, reading, reflection, and observation, have obtained for me no knowledge beyond the sphere of our planet, our earthly interests and our earthly duties; and that I more than doubt whether, should you expend all your time and all your treasure in the search, you will be able to acquire any better information respecting unseen worlds and future events than myself."

The philosophical romance, "A Few Days in Athens," though the first of Miss Wright's works, and written when she was very young, displays considerable power and eloquence. It is the most pleasing of all her writings. It is intended to portray the doctrines of Epicurus, and gives a picture of the Gargettian, in the "Gardens of the Academy," surrounded by his pupils, calculated to counteract many of the popular and erroneous notions entertained of that philosopher's teachings. The following dialogue between Epicurus and his favorite, Theon, will afford the readers of the "Half-Hours" an opportunity of judging how far Miss Wright has conveyed a truthful idea of Epicurus's ethical philosophy:—

"On leaving you, last night," said Theon, "I encountered Cleanthes. He came from the perusal of your writings, and brought charges against them which I was unprepared to answer."

"Let us hear them, my son; perhaps, until you shall have perused them yourself, we may assist your difficulty."

"First, that they deny the existence of the Gods."

"I see but one other assertion that could equal that in folly," said Epicurus.

"I knew it," exclaimed Theon, triumphantly; "I knew it was impossible. But where will not prejudice lead men, when even the upright Cleanthes is capable of slander?"

"He is utterly incapable of it," said the Master; "and the inaccuracy, in this case, I rather suspect to rest with you than with him. To *deny* the existence of

the Gods would indeed be presumption in a philosopher; a presumption equalled only by that of him who should *assert* their existence."

"How!" exclaimed the youth, with a countenance in which astonishment seemed to suspend every other expression.

"As I never saw the Gods, my son," calmly continued the Sage, "I cannot *assert* their existence; and, that I never saw them, is no reason for my *denying* it."

"But do we believe nothing except that of which we have ocular demonstration?"

"Nothing, at least, for which we have not the evidence of one or more of our senses; that is, when we believe on just grounds, which I grant, taking men collectively, is very seldom."

"But where would this spirit lead us? To impiety! —to Atheism!—to all, against which I felt confidence in defending the character and philosophy of Epicurus!"

"We will examine presently, my son, into the meaning of the terms you have employed. When you first entered the Garden your mind was unfit for the examination of the subject you have now started: it is no longer so; and we will therefore enter upon the inquiry, and pursue it in order."

"Forgive me if I express—if I acknowledge," said the youth, slightly recoiling from his instructor, "some reluctance to enter on the discussion of truths, whose very discussion would seem to argue a doubt, and"—

"And what then?"

"That very doubt were a crime."

"If the doubt of any truth shall constitute a crime, then the belief of the same truth should constitute a virtue."

"Perhaps a duty would rather express it?"

"When you charge the neglect of any duty as crime, or account its fulfilment a virtue, you suppose the existence of a power to neglect or fulfil; and it is the exercise of this power, in the one way or the other,

which constitutes the merit or demerit. Is it not so?"

"Certainly."

"Does the human mind possess the power to believe or disbelieve, at pleasure, any truths whatsoever?"

"I am not prepared to answer: but I think it does, since it possesses always the power of investigation."

"But, possibly, not the will to exercise the power. Take care lest I beat you with your own weapons. I thought this very investigation appeared to you a crime?"

"Your logic is too subtle," said the youth, "for my inexperience."

"Say, rather, my reasoning too close. Did I bear you down with sounding words and weighty authorities, and confound your understanding with hair-drawn distinctions, you would be right to retreat from the battery."

"I have nothing to object to the fairness of your deductions," said Theon. "But would not the doctrine be dangerous that should establish our inability to help our belief; and might we not stretch the principle, until we asserted our inability to help our actions?"

"We might, and with reason. But we will not now traverse the ethical *pons asinorum* of necessity—the most simple and evident of moral truths, and the most darkened, tortured, and belabored by moral teachers. You inquire if the doctrine we have essayed to establish, be not dangerous. I reply—not, if it be true.—Nothing is so dangerous as error—nothing so safe as truth. A dangerous truth would be a contradiction in terms, and an anomaly in things."

"But what is a truth?" said Theon.

"It is pertinently asked. A truth I consider to be an ascertained fact; which truth would be changed to an error, the moment the fact, on which it rested, was disproved."

"I see, then, no fixed basis for truth."

"It surely has the most fixed of all—the nature of things. And it is only an imperfect insight into that

nature which occasions all our erroneous conclusions, whether in physics or morals."

"But where, if we discard the Gods and their will, as engraven on our hearts, are our guides in the search after truth?"

"Our senses and our faculties as developed in and by the exercise of our senses, are the only guides with which I am acquainted. And I do not see why, even admitting a belief in the Gods, and in a superintending Providence, the senses should not be viewed as the guides provided by them, for our direction and instruction. But here is the evil attendant on an ungrounded belief, whatever be its nature. The moment we take one thing for granted, we take other things for granted; we are started in a wrong road, and it is seldom that we gain the right one, until we have trodden back our steps to the starting place. I know but of one thing that a philosopher should take for granted; and that only because he is forced to it by an irresistible impulse of his nature; and because, without doing so, neither truth nor falsehood could exist for him. He must take for granted the evidence of his senses; in other words, he must believe in the existence of things, as they exist to his senses. I *know* of no other existence, and can therefore *believe* in no other: although, reasoning from analogy, I may *imagine* other existences to be.—This, for instance, I do as respects the Gods. I see around me, in the world I inhabit, an infinite variety in the arrangement of matter—a multitude of sentient beings, possessing different kinds and varying grades of power and intelligence—from the worm that crawls in the dust, to the eagle that soars to the sun, and man who marks to the sun its course. It is possible, it is moreover probable, that, in the worlds which I see not—in the boundless infinitude and eternal duration of matter, beings may exist, of every countless variety, and varying grades of intelligence, inferior and superior to our own, until we descend to a minimum and rise to a maximum, to which the range of our observation affords no parallel, and of which our senses are inade-

quate to the conception. Thus far, my young friend, I believe in the Gods, or in what you will of existences removed from the sphere of my knowledge. That you should believe, with positiveness, in one unseen existence or another, appears to me no crime, although it may appear to me unreasonable; and so, my doubt of the same should appear to you no moral offence, although you might account it erroneous. I fear to fatigue your attention, and will, therefore, dismiss, for the present, these abstruse subjects."

"But we shall both be amply repaid for their discussion, if this truth remain with you—that an opinion, right or wrong, can never constitute a moral offence, nor be in itself a moral obligation. It may be mistaken; it may involve an absurdity, or a contradiction.—It is a truth; or it is an error: it can never be a crime or a virtue."—[Chapter xiv.

Miss Wright was a poetess, as well as a politician and writer on ethics. In her "Fourth of July" address, delivered in the New Harmony Hall, in 1828, in commemoration of the American Independence, is the following:—

"Is there a thought can fill the human mind
More pure, more vast, more generous, more refined
Than that which guides the enlightened patriot's toil?
Not he whose view is bounded by his soil—
Not he whose narrow heart can only shrine
The land, the people that he calleth mine—
Not he who, to set up that land on high,
Will make whole nations bleed, whole nations die—
Not he who, calling that land's rights his pride,
Trampleth the rights of all the earth beside.
No! He it is, the just, the generous soul,
Who owneth brotherhood with either pole,
Stretches from realm to realm his spacious mind,
And guards the weal of all the human kind—
Holds freedom's banner o'er the earth unfurl'd,
And stands the guardian patriot of a world!"

J. W.

BIOGRAPHY

OF

EPICURUS.

Epicurean.—One who holds the principles of Epicurus—Luxurious, contributing to luxury.

Epicurism.—The principles of Epicurus—Luxury, sensual enjoyment, gross pleasure.

THE words with which this page is headed may be found in the current and established dictionaries of the present day; and it shall be our task to show that never was slander more foul, calumny more base, or libel more cowardly, than when it associated the words luxury and sensuality with the memory of the Athenian Epicurus. The much-worn anecdote of the brief endorsed "The Defendant has no case, abuse the Plaintiff's Solicitor," will well apply here. The religionists had no case, the Epicurean Philosophy was impregnable as far as theological attacks were concerned, and the theologians have, therefore, constantly and vehemently abused its founder; so that, at last, children have caught the cry as though it were the enunciation of a fact, and have grown into men believing that Epicurus was a sort of discriminating hog, who wallowed in the filth which some have miscalled pleasure.

Epicurus was born in the early part of the year 344, B. C., the third year of the 109th Olympiad, at Gargettus, in the neighborhood of Athens. His father, Neocles, was of the Egean tribe. Some allege that Epi-

curus was born in the island of Samos; but, according to others, he was taken there when very young by his parents, who formed a portion of a colony of Athenian citizens, sent to colonize Samos after its subjugation by Pericles. The father and mother of Epicurus were in very humble circumstances; his father was a schoolmaster, and his mother, Chærestrata, acted as a kind of priestess, curing diseases, exorcising ghosts, and exercising other fabulous powers. Epicurus has been charged with sorcery, because he wrote several songs for his mother's solemn rites. Until eighteen, he remained at Samos and the neighboring isle of Teos; from whence he removed to Athens, where he resided until the death of Alexander, when, disturbances arising, he fled to Colophon. This place, Mitylene, and Lampsacus, formed the philosopher's residence until he was thirty-six years of age; at which time he founded a school in the neighborhood of Athens. He purchased a pleasant garden, where he taught his disciples until the time of his death.

We are told by Laertius, "That those disciples who were regularly admitted into the school of Epicurus, lived together, not in the manner of the Pythagoreans, who cast their possessions into a common stock; for this, in his opinion, implied mutual distrust rather than friendship; but upon such a footing of friendly attachment, that each individual cheerfully supplied the necessities of his brother."

The habits of the philosopher and his followers were temperate and exceedingly frugal, and formed a strong contrast to the luxurious, although refined, manners of the Athenians. At the entrance of the garden, the visitor of Epicurus found the following inscription:— "The hospitable keeper of this mansion, where you will find pleasure the highest good, will present you with barley cakes and water from the spring. These gardens will not provoke your appetite by artificial dainties, but satisfy it with natural supplies. Will you not, then, be well entertained?" And yet the owner of the garden, over the gate of which these words

were placed, has been called "a glutton" and "a stomach worshipper!"

From the age of thirty-six until his decease, he does not seem to have quitted Athens, except temporarily. When Demetrius besieged Athens, the Epicureans were driven into great difficulties for want of food; and it is said that Epicurus and his friends subsisted on a small quantity of beans which he possessed, and which he shared equally with them.

The better to prosecute his studies, Epicurus lived a life of celibacy. Temperate and continent himself, he taught his followers to be so likewise, both by example and precept. He died 273 B. C., in the seventy-third year of his age; and, at that time, his warmest opponents seem to have paid the highest compliments to his personal character; and, on reading his life, and the detailed accounts of his teachings, it seems difficult to imagine what has induced the calumny which has been heaped upon his memory.

We "cannot quote from his own works, in his own words, because, although he wrote very much, only a summary of his writings has come to us uninjured; but his doctrines have been so fully investigated and treated on, both by his opponents and his disciples, that there is no difficulty or doubt as to the principles inculcated in the school of Epicurus.

"The sum of his doctrine concerning philosophy, in general, is this:—Philosophy is the exercise of reason in the pursuit and attainment of a happy life; whence it follows, that those studies which conduce neither to the acquisition nor the enjoyment of happiness are to be dismissed as of no value. The end of all speculation ought to be, to enable men to judge with certainty what is to be chosen, and what to be avoided, to preserve themselves free from pain, and to secure health of body, and tranquillity of mind. True philosophy is so useful to every man, that the young should apply to it without delay, and the old should never be weary of the pursuit; for no man is either too young or too old to correct and improve his mind, and to study the art

of happiness. Happy are they who possess by nature a free and vigorous intellect, and who are born in a country where they can prosecute their inquiries without restraint: for it is philosophy alone which raises a man above vain fears and base passions, and gives him the perfect command of himself. As nothing ought to be dearer to a philosopher than truth, he should pursue it by the most direct means, devising no fictions himself, nor suffering himself to be imposed upon by the fictions of others, neither poets, orators, nor logicians, making no other use of the rules of rhetoric or grammar, than to enable him to speak or write with accuracy and perspicuity, and always preferring a plain and simple to an ornamented style. Whilst some doubt of everything, and others profess to acknowledge everything, a wise man will embrace such tenets, and only such as are built upon experience, or upon certain and indisputable axioms."

The following is a summary of his Moral Philosophy:—

"The end of living, or the ultimate good, which is to be sought for its own sake, according to the universal opinion of mankind, is happiness; yet men, for the most part, fail in the pursuit of this end, either because they do not form a right idea of the nature of happiness, or because they do not make use of proper means to attain it. Since it is every man's interest to be happy through the whole of life, it is the wisdom of every one to employ philosophy in the search of felicity without delay; and there cannot be a greater folly, than to be always beginning to live.

"The happiness which belongs to man, is that state in which he enjoys as many of the good things, and suffers as few of the evils incident to human nature as possible; passing his days in a smooth course of permanent tranquillity. A wise man, though deprived of sight or hearing, may experience happiness in the enjoyment of the good things which yet remain; and when suffering torture, or laboring under some painful disease, can mitigate the anguish by patience, and can

enjoy, in his afflictions, the consciousness of his own constancy. But it is impossible that perfect happiness can be possessed without the pleasure which attends freedom from pain, and the enjoyment of the good things of life. Pleasure is in its nature good, as pain is in its nature evil; the one is, therefore, to be pursued, and the other to be avoided, for its own sake.—Pleasure, or pain, is not only good, or evil, in itself, but the measure of what is good or evil, in every object of desire or aversion; for the ultimate reason why we pursue one thing, and avoid another, is because we expect pleasure from the former, and apprehend pain from the latter. If we sometimes decline a present pleasure, it is not because we are averse to pleasure itself, but because we conceive, that in the present instance, it will be necessarily connected with a greater pain. In like manner, if we sometimes voluntarily submit to a present pain, it is because we judge that it is necessarily connected with a greater pleasure.—Although all pleasure is essentially good, and all pain essentially evil, it doth not thence necessarily follow, that in every single instance the one ought to be pursued, and the other to be avoided; but reason is to be employed in distinguishing and comparing the nature and degrees of each, that the result may be a wise choice of that which shall appear to be, upon the whole, good. That pleasure is the first good, appears from the inclination which every animal, from its first birth, discovers to pursue pleasure, and avoid pain; and is confirmed by the universal experience of mankind, who are incited to action by no other principle than the desire of avoiding pain, or obtaining pleasure.

"There are two kinds of pleasure: one consisting in a state of rest, in which both body and mind are undisturbed by any kind of pain; the other arising from an agreeable agitation of the senses, producing a correspondent emotion in the soul. It is upon the former of these that the enjoyment of life chiefly depends. Happiness may therefore be said to consist in bodily ease, and mental tranquillity. When pleasure is asserted to

be the end of living, we are not then to understand that violent kind of delight or joy which arises from the gratification of the senses and passions, but merely that placid state of mind, which results from the absence of every cause of pain or uneasiness. Those pleasures, which arise from agitation, are not to be pursued as in themselves the end of living, but as means of arriving at that stable tranquillity, in which true happiness consists. It is the office of reason to confine the pursuit of pleasure within the limits of nature, in order to the attainment of that happy state, in which the body is free from every kind of pain, and the mind from all perturbation. This state must not, however, be conceived to be perfect in proportion as it is inactive and torpid, but in proportion as all the functions of life are quietly and pleasantly performed. A happy life neither resembles a rapid torrent, nor a standing pool, but is like a gentle stream, that glides smoothly and silently along.

"This happy state can only be obtained by a prudent care of the body, and a steady government of the mind. The diseases of the body are to be prevented by temperance, or cured by medicine, or rendered tolerable by patience. Against the diseases of the mind, philosophy provides sufficient antidotes. The instruments which it employs for this purpose are the virtues; the root of which, whence all the rest proceed, is prudence. This virtue comprehends the whole art of living discreetly, justly, and honorably, and is, in fact, the same thing with wisdom. It instructs men to free their understandings from the clouds of prejudice; to exercise temperance and fortitude in the government of themselves; and to practice justice towards others. Although pleasure, or happiness, which is the end of living, be superior to virtue, which is only the means, it is every one's interest to practice all the virtues; for in a happy life, pleasure can never be separated from virtue.

"A prudent man, in order to secure his tranquillity, will consult his natural disposition in the choice of his

plan of life. If, for example, he be persuaded that he should be happier in a state of marriage than in celibacy, he ought to marry; but if he be convinced that matrimony would be an impediment to his happiness, he ought to remain single. In like manner, such persons as are naturally active, enterprising, and ambitious, or such as by the condition of their birth are placed in the way of civil offices, should accommodate themselves to their nature and situation, by engaging in public affairs; while such as are, from natural temper, fond of leisure and retirement, or, from experience or observation, are convinced that a life of public business would be inconsistent with their happiness, are unquestionably at liberty, except where particular circumstances call them to the service of their country, to pass their lives in obscure repose.

"Temperance is that discreet regulation of the desires and passions, by which we are enabled to enjoy pleasures without suffering any consequent inconvenience. They who maintain such a constant self-command, as never to be enticed by the prospect of present indulgence, to do that which will be productive of evil, obtain the truest pleasure by declining pleasure. Since, of desires some are natural and necessary; others natural, but not necessary; and others neither natural nor necessary, but the offspring of false judgment; it must be the office of temperance to gratify the first class, as far as nature requires; to restrain the second within the bounds of moderation; and, as to the third, resolutely to oppose, and, if possible, entirely repress them.

"Sobriety, as opposed to inebriety and gluttony, is of admirable use in teaching men that nature is satisfied with a little, and enabling them to content themselves with simple and frugal fare. Such a manner of living is conducive to the preservation of health; renders a man alert and active in all the offices of life; affords him an exquisite relish of the occasional varieties of a plentiful board, and prepares him to meet every reverse of fortune without the fear of want.

"Continence is a branch of temperance, which prevents the diseases, infamy, remorse, and punishment, to which those are exposed, who indulge themselves in unlawful amours. Music and poetry, which are often employed as incentives to licentious pleasure, are to be cautiously and sparingly used.

"Gentleness, as opposed to an irrascible temper, greatly contributes to the tranquillity and happiness of life, by preserving the mind from perturbation, and arming it against the assaults of calumny and malice. A wise man, who puts himself under the government of reason, will be able to receive an injury with calmnese, and to treat the person who committed it with lenity; for he will rank injuries among the casual events of life, and will prudently reflect that he can no more stop the natural current of human passions, than he can curb the stormy winds. Refractory servants in a family should be chastised, and disorderly members of a state punished without wrath.

"Moderation, in the pursuit of honors or riches, is the only security against disappointment and vexation. A wise man, therefore, will prefer the simplicity of rustic life to the magnificence of courts. Future events a wise man will consider as uncertain, and will, therefore, neither suffer himself to be elated with confident expectation, nor to be depressed by doubt and despair; for both are equally destructive of tranquillity. It will contribute to the enjoyment of life, to consider death as the perfect termination of a happy life, which it becomes us to close like satisfied guests, neither regreting the past, nor anxious for the future.

"Fortitude, the virtue which enables us to endure pain, and to banish fear, is of great use in producing tranquillity. Philosophy instructs us to pay homage to the gods, not through hope or fear, but from veneration of their superior nature. It moreover enables us to conquer the fear of death, by teaching us that it is no proper object of terror; since, whilst we are, death is not, and when death arrives, we are not: so that it neither concerns the living nor the dead. The only

evils to be apprehended are bodily pain, and distress of mind. Bodily pain it becomes a wise man to endure with patience and firmness; because, if it be slight, it may easily be borne; and if it be intense, it cannot last long. Mental distress commonly arises, not from nature, but from opinion; a wise man will therefore arm himself against this kind of suffering, by reflecting that the gifts of fortune, the loss of which he may be inclined to deplore, were never his own, but depended upon circumstances which he could not command. If, therefore, they happen to leave him, he will endeavor, as soon as possible, to obliterate the remembrance of them, by occupying his mind in pleasant contemplation, and engaging in agreeable avocations.

"Justice respects man as living in society, and is the common bond without which no society can subsist. This virtue, like the rest, derives its value from its tendency to promote the happiness of life. Not only is it never injurious to the man who practices it, but nourishes in his mind calm reflections and pleasant hopes; whereas it is impossible that the mind in which injustice dwells, should not be full of disquietude.—Since it is impossible that iniquitous actions should promote the enjoyment of life, as much as remorse of conscience, legal penalties, and public disgrace, must increase its troubles, every one who follows the dictates of sound reason, will practice the virtues of justice, equity, and fidelity. In society, the necessity of the mutual exercise of justice, in order to the common enjoyment of the gifts of nature, is the ground of those laws by which it is prescribed. It is the interest of every individual in a state to conform to the laws of justice; for by injuring no one, and rendering to every man his due, he contributes his part towards the preservation of that society, upon the perpetuity of which his own safety depends. Nor ought any one to think that he is at liberty to violate the rights of his fellow citizens, provided he can do it securely; for he who has committed an unjust action can never be certain

that it will not be discovered; and however successfully he may conceal it from others, this will avail him little, since he cannot conceal it from himself. In different communities, different laws may be instituted, according to the circumstances of the people who compose them. Whatever is thus prescribed is to be considered as a rule of justice, so long as the society shall judge the observance of it to be for the benefit of the whole. But whenever any rule of conduct is found upon experience not to be conducive to the public good, being no longer useful, it should no longer be prescribed.

"Nearly allied to justice are the virtues of beneficence, compassion, gratitude, piety, and friendship.—He who confers benefits upon others, procures to himself the satisfaction of seeing the stream of plenty spreading around him from the fountain of his beneficence; at the same time, he enjoys the pleasure of being esteemed by others. The exercise of gratitude, filial affection, and reverence for the gods, is necessary, in order to avoid the hatred and contempt of all men. Friendships are contracted for the sake of mutual benefit; but by degrees they ripen into such disinterested attachment, that they are continued without any prospect of advantage. Between friends there is a kind of league, that each will love the other as himself. A true friend will partake of the wants and sorrows of his friend, as if they were his own; if he be in want, he will relieve him; if he be in prison, he will visit him; if he be sick, he will come to him; nay, situations may occur, in which he would not scruple to die for him. It cannot then be doubted, that friendship is one of the most useful means of procuring a secure, tranquil, and happy life."

No man will, we think, find anything in the foregoing summary to justify the foul language used against Epicurus, and his moral philosophy; the secret is in the physical doctrines, and this secret is, that Epicurus was actually, if not intentionally, an Atheist. The following is a summary of his physical doctrine:—

"Nothing can ever spring from nothing, nor can anything ever return to nothing. The universe always existed, and will always remain; for there is nothing into which it can be changed. There is nothing in Nature, nor can anything be conceived, besides body and space. Body is that which possesses the properties of bulk, figure, resistance, and gravity: it is this alone which can touch or be touched. Space is the region which is, or may be, occupied by body, and which affords it an opportunity of moving freely. That there are bodies in the universe is attested by the senses. That there is also space is evident; since otherwise bodies would have no place in which to move or exist, and of their existence and motion we have the certain proof of perception. Besides these, no third nature can be conceived; for such a nature must either have bulk and solidity, or want them; that is, it must either be body or space: this does not, however, preclude the existence of qualities, which have no subsistence but in the body to which they belong.

"The universe, consisting of body and space, is infinite, for it has no limits. Bodies are infinite in multitude; space is infinite in magnitude. The term above, or beneath, high or low, cannot be properly applied to infinite space. The universe is to be conceived as immoveable, since beyond it there is no place into which it can move; and as eternal and immutable, since it is neither liable to increase nor decrease, to production nor decay. Nevertheless, the parts of the universe are in motion, and are subject to change.

"All bodies consist of parts, of which they are composed, and into which they may be resolved; and these parts are either themselves simple principles, or may be resolved into such. These first principles, or simple atoms, are divisible by no force, and, therefore, must be immutable. This may also be inferred from the uniformity of Nature, which could not be preserved if its principles were not certain and consistent. The existence of such atoms is evident, since it is impossible that anything which exists should be reduced to noth-

ing. A finite body cannot consist of parts infinite, either in magnitude or number; divisibility of bodies *ad infinitum*, is therefore conceivable. All atoms are of the same nature, or. differ in no essential qualities—From their different effects upon the senses, it appears, however, that they differ in magnitude, figure, and weight. Atoms exist in every possible variety of figure—round, oval, conical, cubical, sharp, hooked, etc. But in every shape, they are, on account of their solidity, infrangible, or incapable of actual division.

"Gravity must be an essential property of atoms; for since they are perpetually in motion, or making an effort to move, they must be moved by an internal impulse, which may be called gravity.

"The principle of gravity, that internal energy which is the cause of all motion, whether simple or complex, being essential to the primary corpuscles or atoms, they must have been incessantly and from eternity in actual motion."

Epicurus, who boasts that he was an inquirer and a philosopher in his thirteenth year, was scarcely likely to bow his mind to the mythology of his country. The man who, when he was but a schoolboy, insisted upon an answer to the question, "Whence came chaos?" could hardly be expected to receive as admitted facts the fabulous legends as to Jupiter and the other gods. His theology is, however, in some respects, obscure, and unintelligible; for while he zealously opposed the popular fables, which men misname God-ideas, he at the same time admitted the existence of material gods, whom he placed in the intervals between the infinite worlds, where they passed a life undisturbed by aught, and enjoyed a happiness which does not admit of augmentation. These inactive gods play a strange part in the system of Epicurus; and it is asserted by many that these extraordinary conceptions of Deity were put forward by the philosopher to screen him from the consequences attaching to a charge of Atheism. Dr. Heinrich Ritter, who does not seem very friendly disposed towards Epicurus, or his philosophy, repudiates this no-

tion, and argues Epicurus was not in truth an Atheist, and alleges that it was a mere pretence on his part; and that from his very theory of knowledge the existence of gods could be deduced. This has been much litigated, (*vide* Electric Review for 1806, p. 606.) It is quite evident that Epicurus neither regarded "the gods" in the capacity of Creators, controllers, or rulers, so that his Theism (if it be Theism) was not of a very superstitious character. The God who neither created man, nor exercised any influence whatever over his actions or thinkings, could have but little to do with man at all.

If we attempt to review the whole of the teachings of Epicurus, we find they are defective and imperfect in many respects, and necessarily so. We say necessarily so, because the imperfect science of the day limited the array of facts presented to the philosopher, and narrowed the base upon which he was to erect his system. We must expect, therefore, to find the structure weak in many points, because it was too large for the foundation; but we are not, therefore, to pass it on one side, and without further notice; it should rather be our task to lay good, wide, and sure foundations, on which to build up a system, and develope a method, really having, for its end, the happiness of mankind. We live 2000 years later than the Athenian philosopher.—In those 2000 years many facts have been dragged out of "the circle of the unknown and unused." Astronomy, geology, physiology, psychology—all except theology are better understood. Men pretend they are searching after happiness, and where do they try to find it? Not here amongst the known, but in the possible hereafter amongst the unknowable. How do they try to find it? Not by the aid of the known, not by the light of facts, gathered in years of toil, and sanctified by the blood of some of the noblest of truth's noble martyrs; no—but in the darkness of the unknown and unknowable; in the next world. Question the men who fly to theology for happiness, and they will tell you that the most learned of the theologians sum up

their knowledge in the word "incomprehensible." Is it wonderful that their happiness is somewhat marred "here" by quarrels as to the true definition of "hereafter?" G. H. Lewes says, of the Epicurean philosophy, "that the attempt failed because the basis was not broad enough. The Epicureans are therefore to be regarded as men who ventured on a great problem, and failed because they only saw part of the truth." And we might add that Christianity, and every other religious "anity," fails, because the professors expect to obtain happiness in the next life, and neglect to work for it in the present one.

Epicurus says, no life can be pleasant except a virtuous life; and he charges you to avoid whatever may be calculated to create disquiet in the mind, or give pain to the body. The Rev. Habbakuk Smilenot, of Little Bethel, says that all pleasure here, is vanity and vexation in the hereafter; and he charges you to continually worry and harrass your mind with fears that you may be condemned to hell, and doubts whether you will be permitted to enter heaven. Which is the best, the philosophy of Epicurus, or the theology of Smilenot?

G. H. Lewes says:—"Epicureanism, in leading man to a correct appreciation of the moral end of his existence, in showing him how to be truly happy, has to combat with many obstructions which hide from him the real road of life. These obstructions are his illusions, his prejudices, his errors, his ignorance. This ignorance is of two kinds, as Victor Cousin points out; ignorance of the laws of the external world, which creates absurd superstitions, and troubles the mind with false fears and false hopes. Hence the necessity of some knowledge of physics." (We can scarcely blame Epicurus that he was not in advance of his time, as far as the physical sciences are concerned, and therefore imparted an imperfect system of physics. We must, with our improved knowledge, ourselves remove the obstruction.) "The second kind of ignorance is that of the nature of man. Socrates had taught men to re-

gard their own nature as the great object of investigation; and this lesson Epicurus willingly gave ear to.—But man does not interrogate his own nature out of simple curiosity, or simple erudition; he studies his nature in order that he may improve it; he learns the extent of his capacities, in order that he may properly direct them. The aim, therefore, of all such inquiries must be happiness."

We may add that the result of all such inquiries will be happiness, if the inquirer will but base his investigation and experiments upon facts.

Let him understand that, as he improves the circumstances which surround him, so will he advance himself, becoming happier, and making his fellows happy also. Remember the words of Epicurus, and seek that pleasure for yourself which appears the most durable, and attended with the greatest pleasure to your fellow men. "I."

BIOGRAPHY

OF

ZENO, THE STOIC.

In the previous number we gave a short sketch of the opinions of Epicurus. In this we shall deal with the founder of a rival sect—the Stoics. Amongst the disciples and students in the Stoic schools have been many illustrious names, and not the least worthy is the name with which we are now dealing.

Zeno was born at Cittius, a small maritime town in the Island of Cyprus. This place having been originally peopled by a colony of Phœnicians, Zeno is sometimes called a Phœnician; but at the period when he flourished, it was chiefly inhabited by Greeks. The date of his birth is uncertain, but must have been about the year B. C. 362. His father was a merchant, and Zeno appears to have been, in the early part of his life, engaged in mercantile pursuits. He received a very liberal education from his father, whom, we are told, perceived in his son a strong inclination for philosophical studies, and who purchased for Zeno the writings of the Socratic philosophers; which were studied with avidity, and which undoubtedly exercised a considerable influence over his future thinkings. When about thirty years of age he made a trading voyage from Cittius to Athens, with a very valuable cargo of Phœnician purple, but was unfortunately shipwrecked on the coast of Greece, and the whole of his

freight destroyed. It is supposed that this severe loss, which must have considerably reduced his means, materially influenced Zeno, and induced him to embrace the tenets of the Cynics, whose leading principle was a chntempt of riches. We are told that upon his first arrival in Athens, he went into the shop of a bookseller, and took up, by accident, a volume of the "Commentaries of Xenophon." After reading a few pages, Zeno was so much delighted with the work, that he asked the bookseller to direct him where he might meet such men as the author? Crates, the Cynic philosopher, passed by at the time, and the bookseller said, "Follow that man!" He did so, and after listening to several of his discourses, was so pleased with the doctrines of the Cynics, that he became a disciple. He did not long remain attached to the Cynic school—their peculiar manners were too gross for him; and his energetic and inquiring mind was too much cramped by that indifference to all scientific investigation which was one of their leading characteristics. He therefore sought instruction elsewhere, and Stilpo, of Megara, became his teacher, from whom he acquired the art of disputation, in which he afterwards became so proficient. The Cynics were displeased at his following other philosophy, and we are told that Crates attempted to drag him by force out of the school of Stilpo, on which Zeno said, "You may seize my body, but Stilpo has laid hold of my mind." The Megaric doctrine was, however, insufficient. Zeno was willing to learn all that Stilpo could teach, but having learned all, his restless and insatiable appetite for knowledge required more, and after an attendance of several years upon the lectures of Stilpo, he passed over to the expositors of Plato, Xenocrates, and Polemo. The latter philosopher appears to have penetrated Zeno's design in attending the various schools—*i. e.*, to collect materials from various quarters for a new system of his own; and when he came to the school, Polemo said, "I am no stranger, Zeno, to your Phœnician arts; I perceive that your

design is to creep slily into my garden, and steal away my fruit." After twenty years of study, having mastered the tenets of the various schools, Zeno determined to become the founder of a sect himself. In accordance with this determination, he opened a school in a public portico, called the Painted Porch, from the pictures of Polygnotus, and other eminent painters, with which it was adorned. This portico became famous in Athens, and was called (Stoa)—the Porch. From this Stoa the school derived its name, the students being called the Stoics. Zeno was a subtle reasoner, and exceedingly popular. He taught a strict system of morals, and exhibited a pleasing picture of moral discipline in his own life. As a man, his character appears deserving of the highest respect. He became exceedingly respected and revered at Athens, for the probity and severity of his life and manners, and consistency thereof with his doctrine. He possessed so large a share of public esteem that the Athenians decreed him a golden crown, and on account of his approved integrity, deposited the keys of their citadel in his hands. Antigonus Gonates, King of Macedon, was a constant attendant at his lectures whilst at Athens, and when that monarch returned, he earnestly invited Zeno to his court. During the philosopher's lifetime, the Athenians erected a statue of brass as a mark of the estimation in which they held him.

Zeno lived to the extreme age of ninety-eight, when, as he was leaving his school one day, he fell and broke his finger. The consciousness of his infirmity afflicted him so much, that he exclaimed, "Why am I thus importuned? Earth, I obey thy summons!" and immediately going home, he put his affairs in order, and strangled himself. In person, Zeno was tall and slender; his brow was furrowed with thought; and this, with his long and close application to study, gave a tinge of severity to his aspect. Although of a feeble constitution, he preserved his health by his great abstemiousness, his diet consisting of figs, bread, and honey. He was plain and modest in his dress and

habits, and very frugal in all his expenses, showing the same respect for the poor as for the rich, and conversing as freely with the slave as he did with the king. Independent in spirit, he broke off all communication with his friend Democharis, because that person had offered to procure a gratuity for Zeno from the King of Macedon. His system appears to have been little more than a collection from his various lessons of whatever was most in unison with his peculiar habit of thought, and an attempt to reconcile and combine in one system the various elements of different theories. Taking from so many schools various portions of their doctrine, he seems to have provoked the antagonism of many of his contemporaries, and several philosophers of learning and ability employed their eloquence to diminish the growing influence of the new school. Towards the close of his life, he found a powerful antagonist in the person of Epicurus, and the Epicureans and Stoics have since treated each other as rival sects. Zeno's school appears to have been generally a resort for the poor, and it was a common joke amongst his adversaries, that poverty was the charm for which he was indebted for his scholars. The list of his disciples, however, contains the names of some very rich and powerful men, who may have regarded the Stoic theory as a powerful counter-agent to the growing effeminacy of the age. After Zeno's death, the Athenians, at the request of Antigonus, erected a monument to his memory, in the Ceramicum.

From the particulars which have been related concerning Zeno, it will not be difficult to perceive what kind of influence his circumstances and character must have had upon his philosophical system. If his doctrines be diligently compared with the history of his life, it will appear, that having attended upon many eminent preceptors, and being intimately conversant with their opinions, he compiled, out of their various tenets, an heterogeneous system, on the credit of which he assumed to himself the title of the founder of a

new sect.....The dialectic arts which Zeno learned in the school of Diodorus Chronus, he did not fail to apply to the support of his own system, and to communicate to his followers. As to the moral doctrine of the Cynic sect, to which Zeno strictly adhered to the last, there can be no doubt that he transferred it, almost without alloy, into his own school. In morals, the principal difference between the Cynics and the Stoics was, that the former disdained the cultivation of nature, the latter affected to rise above it. On the subject of physics, Zeno received his doctrine through the channel of the Platonic school, as will fully appear from a careful comparison of their respective systems. The Stoic philosophy, being in this manner of heterogeneous origin, it necessarily partook of the several systems of which it was composed. The idle quibbles, jejune reasonings, and imposing sophisms, which so justly exposed the schools of the dialectic philosophers to ridicule, found their way into the Porch, where much time was wasted, and much ingenuity thrown away, upon questions of no importance. Cicero censures the Stoics for encouraging in their schools a barren kind of disputation, and employing themselves in determining trifling questions, in which the disputants can have no interest, and which, at the close, leave them neither wiser nor better. And that this censure, is not, as some modern advocates for Stoicism have maintained, a mere calumny, but grounded upon fact, sufficiently appears from what is said by the ancients, particularly by Sextus Empiricus, concerning the logic of the Stoics. Seneca, who was himself a Stoic, candidly acknowledges this. It may, perhaps, be thought surprising that philosophers, who affected so much gravity and wisdom, should condescend to such trifling occupations. But it must be considered, that, at this time, a fondness for subtle disputations so generally prevailed in Greece, that excellence in the arts of reasoning and sophistry was a sure path to fame.

The Stoics, with whom vanity was unquestionably a ruling passion, were ambitious for this kind of repu-

tation. Hence it was that they engaged with so much vehemence in verbal contests, and that they largely contributed towards the confusion, instead of the improvement, of science, by substituting vague and ill-defined terms in the room of accurate conceptions. The moral part of the Stoical philosophy, in like manner, partook of the defects of its origin. It may be as justly objected against the Stoics as the Cynics, that they assumed an artificial severity of manners, and a tone of virtue above the condition of a man. Their doctrine of moral wisdom was an ostentatious display of words, in which little regard was paid to nature and reason. It professed to raise human nature to a degree of perfection before unknown; but its real effect was, merely to amuse the ear, and captivate the fancy, with fictions which can never be realized.....The extravagancies and absurdities of the Stoical philosophy may also be in some measure ascribed to the vehement contests which subsisted between Zeno and the Academics on the one hand, and between him and Epicurus on the other. For, not only did these disputes give rise to many of the dogmas of Stoicism, but led Zeno and his followers, in the warmth of controversy, to drive their arguments to the utmost extremity, and to express themselves with much greater confidence than they would probably otherwise have done. This is, perhaps, the true reason why so many extravagant notions are ascribed to the Stoics, particularly upon the subject of morals. Whilst Epicurus taught his followers to seek happiness in tranquillity, Zeno imagined his wise man, not only free from all sense of pleasure, but void of all passions and emotions, and capable of being happy in the midst of torture. That he might avoid the position taken by the Epicureans, he had recourse to a moral institution, which bore indeed the lofty front of wisdom, but which was elevated far above the condition and powers of human nature. The natural disposition of Zeno, and his manner of life, had, moreover, no inconsiderable influence in fixing the peculiar character of his phi-

losophy. By nature severe and morose, and constitutionally inclined to reserve and melancholy, he early cherished this habit by submitting to the austere and rigid discipline of the Cynics. Those qualities which he conceived to be meritorious in himself, and which he found to conciliate the admiration of mankind, he naturally transferred to his imaginary character of a wise or perfect man.

In order to form an accurate judgment concerning the doctrine of the Stoics, besides a careful attention to the particulars already enumerated, it will be necessary to guard with the utmost caution against two errors, into which several writers have fallen. Great care should be taken, in the first place, not to judge of the doctrine of the Stoics from words and sentiments, detached from the general system, but to consider them as they stand, related to the whole train of premises and conclusions.....The second caution is, not to confound the genuine doctrines of Zeno, and other ancient fathers of this sect, with the glosses of the later Stoics.....Out of the many proofs of this change, which might be adduced, we shall select one, which is the more worthy of notice, as it has occasioned many disputes among the learned. The doctrine we mean is that concerning fate. This doctrine, according to Zeno and Chrysippus, implies an eternal and immutable series of causes and effects, within which all events are included, and to which the Deity himself is subject: whereas, the later Stoics, changing the term fate into the Providence of God, discoursed with great plausibility on this subject, but still in reality retained the ancient doctrine of universal fate. From this example, a judgment may be formed concerning the necessity of using some caution, in appealing to the writings of Seneca, Antoninus, and Epictetus, as authorities, in determining what were the original doctrines of the Stoic philosophers. .

Concerning philosophy in general, the doctrine of the Stoics was, that wisdom consists in the knowledge of things divine and human; that philosophy is such

an exercise of the mind as produces wisdom; that in this exercise consists the nature of virtue; and consequently, that virtue is a term of extensive meaning, comprehending the right employment of the mind in reasoning, in the study of nature, and in morals. The wisdom of the Stoics is either progressive, through several stages; or perfect, when every weakness is subdued, and every error corrected, without the possibility of a relapse into folly, or vice, or of being again enslaved by any passion, or afflicted by any calamity. With Socrates and the Cynics, Zeno represented virtue as the only true wisdom; but being disposed to extend the pursuits of his wise man into the regions of speculation and science, he gave, after his usual manner, a new signification to an old term, and comprehended the exercise of the understanding in the search of truth, as well as the government of the appetites and passions, under the general term, virtue. The great importance of the united exercise of the intellectual and active powers of the mind, are thus beautifully asserted by the philosophical emperor :—"Let every one endeavor so to think and act, that his contemplative and active faculties may at the same time be going on towards perfection. His clear conceptions, and certain knowledge, will then produce within him an entire confidence in himself, unperceived perhaps by others, though not affectedly concealed, which will give a simplicity and dignity to his character; for he will at all times be able to judge, concerning the several objects which come before him, what is their real nature, what place they hold in the universe, how long they are by nature fitted to last, of what materials they are composed, by whom they may be possessed, and who is able to bestow them, or take them away." The sum of the definitions and rules given by the Stoics concerning logic is this :—Logic is either rhetorical or dialectic. Rhetorical logic is the art of reasoning and discoursing on those subjects which require a diffuse kind of declamation. Dialectic is the art of close argumentation in the form of disputation or dialogue. The

former resembles an open, the latter, a closed hand.—Rhetoric is of three kinds, deliberative, judicial, and demonstrative. The dialectic art is the instrument of knowledge, as it enables a man to distinguish truth from error, and certainty from bare probability. This art considers things as expressed by words, and words themselves. External things are perceived by a certain impression, made either upon some parts of the brain, or upon the percipient faculty, which may be called an image, since it is impressed upon the mind, like the image of a seal upon wax.

This image is commonly accompanied with a belief of the reality of the thing perceived; but not necessarily, since it does not accompany every image, but those only which are not attended with any evidence of deception. Where only the image is perceived by itself, the thing is apprehensible; where it is acknowledged and approved as the image of some real thing, the impression is called apprehension, because the object is apprehended by the mind as a body is grasped by the hand. Such apprehension, if it will bear the examination of reason, is knowledge; if it is not examined, it is mere opinion; if it will not bear this examination, it is misapprehension. The senses, corrected by reason, give a faithful report; not by affording a perfect apprehension of the entire nature of things, but by leaving no room to doubt of their reality. Nature has furnished us with these apprehensions, as the elements of knowledge, whence further conceptions are raised in the mind, and a way is opened for the investigations of reason. Some images are sensible, or received immediately through the senses; others rational, which are perceived only in the mind. These latter are called notions, or ideas. Some images are probable, to which the mind assents without hesitation; others improbable, to which it does not readily assent; and others doubtful, where it is not entirely perceived, whether they are true or false. True images are those which arise from things really existing, and agree with them. False images, or phantasms,

are immediately derived from no real object. Images are apprehended by immediate perception, through the senses, as when we see a man; consequentially, by likeness, as when from a portrait we apprehend the original; by composition, as when, by compounding a horse and man, we acquire the image of a Centaur; by augmentation, as in the image of a Cyclops; or by diminution, as in that of a pigmy. Judgment is employed either in determining, concerning particular things, or concerning general propositions. In judging of things we make use of some one of our senses, as a common criterion or measure of apprehension, by which we judge whether a thing is, or is not; or whether or not it exists with certain properties; or we apply to the thing, concerning which a judgment is to be formed, some artificial measure, as a balance, a rule, etc.; or we call in other peculiar measures to determine things not perceptible by the senses. In judging of general propositions, we make use of our pre-conceptions, or universal principles, as *criteria*, or measures of judgment. The first impressions from the senses produce in the mind an involuntary emotion; but a wise man afterwards deliberately examines them, that he may know whether they be true or false, and assents to, or rejects them, as the evidence which offers itself to his understanding appears sufficient or insufficient. This assent, or approbation, will indeed be as necessarily given, or withheld, according to the ultimate state of the proofs which are adduced, as the scales of a balance will sink or rise, according to the weights which are placed upon them; but while the vulgar give immediate credit to the reports of the senses, wise men suspend their assent, till they have deliberately examined the nature of things, and carefully estimated the weight of evidence. The mind of man is originally like a blank leaf, wholly without characters, but capable of receiving any. The impressions which are made upon it, by means of the senses, remain in the memory, after the objects which occasioned them are removed; a succession of these con-

tinued impressions, made by similar objects, produces experience; and hence arises permanent notions, opinions, and knowledge. Even universal principles are originally formed by experience from sensible images. All men agree in their common notions or pre-conceptions; disputes only arise concerning the application of these to particular cases.

Let us pass on to the Stoical doctrine concerning nature. According to Zeno and his followers, there existed from eternity a dark and confused chaos, in which was contained the first principles of all future beings. This chaos being at length arranged, and emerging into variable forms, became the world, as it now subsists. The world, or nature, is that whole which comprehends all things, and of which all things are parts and members. The universe, though one whole, contains two principles, distinct from elements, one passive, the other active. The passive principle is pure matter without qualities; the active principle is reason, or God. This is the fundamental doctrine of the Stoics concerning nature.....The Stoical system teaches, that both the active and passive principles in nature are corporeal, since whatever acts or suffers must be so. The efficient cause, or God, is pure ether, or fire, inhabiting the exterior surface of the heavens, where every thing which is divine is placed. This ethereal substance, or divine fire, comprehends all the vital principles by which individual beings are necessarily produced, and contains the forms of things, which from the highest regions of the universe, are diffused through every other part of nature. Seneca, indeed, calls God incorporeal reason; but by this term he can only mean to distinguish the divine ethereal substance from gross bodies; for, according to the Stoics, whatever has a substantial existence is corporeal; nothing is incorporeal, except that infinite vacuum which surrounds the universe; even mind and voice are corporeal, and, in like manner, Deity. Matter, or the passive principle, in the Stoical system, is destitute of all qualities, but ready to receive any form, inactive, and without mo-

tion, unless moved by some external cause. The contrary principle, or the ethereal operative fire, being active, and capable of producing all things from matter, with consummate skill, according to the forms which it contains, although in its nature corporeal, considered in opposition to gross and sluggish matter, or to the elements, is said to be immaterial and spiritual. For want of carefully attending to the preceding distinction, some writers have been so far imposed upon, by the bold innovations of the Stoics in the use of terms, as to infer from the appellations which they sometimes apply to the Deity, that they conceived him to be strictly and properly incorporeal. The truth appears to be, that, as they sometimes spoke of the soul of man, a portion of the Divinity, as an exceedingly rare and subtle body, and sometimes as a warm or fiery spirit; so they spoke of the Deity as corporeal, considered as distinct from the incorporeal vacuum, or infinite space; but as spiritual, considered in opposition to gross and inactive matter. They taught, indeed, that God is underived, incorruptible, and eternal, possessed of intelligence, good and perfect, the efficient cause of all the peculiar qualities or forms of things; and the constant preserver and governor of the world; and they described the Deity under many noble images, and in the most elevated language. The hymn of Cleanthes, in particular, is justly admired for the grandeur of its sentiments, and the sublimity of its diction. But if in reading these descriptions, we hastily associate with them modern conceptions of Deity, and neglect to recur to the leading principles of the sect, we shall be led into fundamental misapprehensions of the true doctrine of Stoicism. For according to this sect, God and matter are alike underived and eternal, and God is the former of the universe in no other sense than as he has been the necessary efficient cause, by which motion and form have been impressed upon matter.

What notions the Stoics entertained of God sufficiently appears from the single opinion of his finite na-

ture; an opinion which necessarily followed from the notion that he is only a part of a spherical, and therefore a finite universe. On the doctrine of divine providence, which was one of the chief points upon which the Stoics disputed with the Epicureans, much is written, and with great strength and elegance, by Seneca, Epictetus, and other later Stoics. But we are not to judge of the genuine and original doctrine of this sect from the discourses of writers who had probably corrupted their language on this subject, by visiting the Christian school. The only way to form an accurate judgment of their opinions concerning Providence, is to compare their popular language upon this head with their general system, and explain the former consistently with the fundamental principles of the latter.— If this be fairly done, it will appear that the agency of Deity is, according to the Stoics, nothing more than the active motion of a celestial ether, or fire, possessed of intelligence, which at first gave form to the shapeless mass of gross matter, and being always essentially united to the visible world by the same necessary agency, preserves its order and harmony. The Stoic idea of Providence is, not that of a being, wholly independent of matter, freely directing and governing all things, but that of a necessary chain of causes and effects, arising from the action of a power, which is itself a part of the existence which it regulates, and which equally with that existence is subject to the immutable law of necessity. Providence, in the Stoic creed, is only another name for absolute necessity, or fate, to which God and matter, or the universe, which consists of both, is immutably subject. The rational, efficient, and active principle in nature, the Stoics called by various names: Nature, Fate, Jupiter, God. "What is nature," says Seneca, "but God; the divine reason, inherent in the whole universe, and in all its parts? or you may call him, if you please, the author of all things." And again: "Whatever appellations imply celestial power and energy, may be justly applied to God; his names may properly be as numer-

ous as his offices." The term nature, when it is at all distinguished in the Stoic system from God, denotes not a separate agent, but that order of things which is necessarily produced by his perpetual agency. Since the active principle of nature is comprehended within the world, and with matter makes one whole, it necessarily follows that God penetrates, pervades, and animates matter, and the things which are formed from it; or, in other words, that he is the soul of the universe.....The universe is, according to Zeno and his followers, "a sentient and animated being." Nor was this a new tenet, but, in some sort, the doctrine of all antiquity.....Pythagoras, Heraclitus, and after these, Zeno, taking it for granted that there is no real existence which is not corporeal, conceived nature to be one whole, consisting of a subtle ether and gross matter, the former the active, the latter the passive principle, as essentially united as the soul and body of man—that is, they supposed God, with respect to nature, to be, not a co-existing, but an informing principle.

Concerning the second principle in the universe, matter, and concerning the visible world, the doctrine of the Stoics is briefly this:—Matter is the first essence of all things, destitute of, but capable of receiving, qualities. Considered universally, it is an eternal whole, which neither increases nor decreases. Considered with respect to its parts, it is capable of increase or diminution, of collision and separation, and is perpetually changing. Bodies are continually tending towards dissolution; matter always remains the same. Matter is not infinite, but finite, being circumscribed by the limits of the world; but its parts are infinitely divisible. The world is spherical in its form, and is surrounded by an infinite vacuum. The action of the divine nature upon matter first produced the element of moisture, and then the other elements, fire, air, and earth, of which all bodies are composed. Air and fire have essential levity, or tend towards the exterior surface of the world; earth and water have

essential gravity, or tend towards the centre. All the elements are capable of reciprocal conversion; air passing into fire, or into water; earth into air and water; but there is this essential difference among the elements, that fire and air have within themselves a principle of motion, while water and earth are merely passive.....The world, including the whole of nature, God and matter, subsisted from eternity, and will for ever subsist; but the present regular frame of nature had a beginning, and will have an end. The parts tend towards a dissolution, but the whole remains immutably the same. The world is liable to destruction from the prevalence of moisture, or of dryness; the former producing a universal inundation, the latter a universal conflagration. These succeed each other in nature as regularly as winter and summer. When the universal inundation takes place, the whole surface of the earth is covered with water, and all animal life is destroyed; after which, nature is renewed and subsists as before, till the element of fire, becoming prevalent in its turn, dries up all the moisture, converts every substance into its own nature, and at last, by a universal conflagration, reduces the world to its pristine state. At this period, all material forms are lost in one chaotic mass: all animated nature is re-united to the Deity, and nature again exists in its original form, as one whole, consisting of God and matter. From this chaotic state, however, it again emerges, by the energy of the efficient principle, and gods, and men, and all the forms of regulated nature, are renewed, and to be dissolved and renewed in endless succession.

The above is collated from Ritter, Enfield, and Lewes, as a specimen of one of the earlier phases of Freethought. Freethought as then expressed had many faults and flaws, but it has grown better every day, extending and widening its circle of utterance, and we hope that it will continue to do so. "I."

BIOGRAPHY

OF

MATTHEW TINDAL.

It is easy to mark the progress of the age by recurring to the history of past Freethinkers. Bishops, established and dissenting, are now repeating the parts the old Deists played. *They* were sadly treated for setting the example, modern divines follow with applause. Matthew Tindal was an example of this. He labored to establish religion on the foundation of Reason and Nature. It was to be expected that Christians would be pleased at efforts which would have no effect but to strengthen its foundations. The effort was met by reprobation, and resented as an injury. It is but a just retaliation that believers should now have to establish in vain that evidence they once denounced.

Matthew Tindal was an English Deistical writer, who was born at Beer-Terres, in Devonshire, 1656.— His father, it appears, was a clergyman, who held the living of Beer-Terres, presented to him by the University of Cambridge, in the time of the Civil Wars.— Young Matthew was educated at Oxford, where at twenty-eight he took the degree of LL.D. Matthew Tindal, LL.D., was early tossed about by the winds of doctrine. First he embraced Romanism : afterwards he became a Protestant. Then politics interested him, and he engaged in controversy on the side of William III. He was appointed Commissioner of a Court for

Trying Foreigners. In 1693 he published an essay on the Law of Nations. When fifty-four, in 1710, he entered so vigorously into theological controversy, arising out of Trinitarian criticism, that his marked satire led to his books being condemned by the House of Commons, and burnt by the hangman. He resented this indignity by a spirited attack on the dominant priestly party in his "High Church Catechism," and he also wrote in defence of philosophical necessity. But his most notable work was the performance of his old age, his "Christianity as Old as the Creation: or, the Gospel, a Republication of the Religion of Nature." This was produced in his seventy-third year. He was attacked in Reply by Bishop Waterland. It is generally agreed that in point of good spirit and good temper, the Bishop was far inferior to the Deist. Dr. Conyers Middleton, says Thomas Cooper, in his brief sketch of Tindal, appeared in defence of Tindal in a "Letter to Dr. Waterland," whom he condemned for the shallowness of his answer to Tindal, and boldly and frankly admitted that the Freethinker was right in asserting that the Jews borrowed some of their ceremonies and customs from Egypt; that allegory was, in some cases, employed in the Scriptures, where common readers took the relation for fact; and, that the Scriptures are *not* of "absolute and universal inspiration." The following sentence, which will be found in this "Letter" of Dr. Conyers Middleton, does honor to his name:—"If religion consists in depreciating moral duties and depressing natural reason; if the duty of it be to hate and persecute for a different way of thinking where the best and wisest have never agreed—then, I declare myself an Infidel, and to have no share in that religion."

Matthew Tindal died at his house in Coldbath Fields, of the stone, 1773, aged seventy-seven.* Rysbrach, the famous statuary, took a model of him.

* Julian Hibbert gives 1656–7; Dr. Beard, 1556; Thomas Cooper, 1657, as the year of Tindal's birth. All agree that he died 1733—he was therefore seventy-six or seventy-seven at the time of his death.

Tindal opens his great work thus :—"The author makes no apology for writing on a subject of the last importance; and which, as far as I can find, has no where been so fully treated: he builds nothing on a thing so uncertain as tradition, which differs in most countries; and of which, in all countries, the bulk of mankind are incapable of judging; but thinks he has laid down such plain and evident rules, as may enable men of the meanest capacity, to distinguish between religion and superstition; and has represented the former in every part so beautiful, so amiable, and so strongly affecting, that they, who in the least reflect, must be highly in love with it; and easily perceive, that their duty and happiness are inseparable."

The character of the performance will be seen from a few of the propositions he maintains :—

"That God, at all times, has given mankind sufficient means of knowing whatever he requires of them.

"That the religion of nature consists in observing those things, which our reason, by considering the nature of God and man, and the relation we stand in to him, and one another, demonstrates to be our duty; and that those things are plain; and likewise what they are.

"That the perfection and happiness of all rational beings, supreme as well as subordinate, consist in living up to the dictates of their nature.

"That God requires nothing for his own sake; no, not the worship we are to render him, nor the faith we are to have in him.

"That the not adhering to those notions reason dictates, concerning the nature of God, has been the occasion of all superstition, and those innumerable mischiefs, that mankind, on the account of religion, have done either to themselves, or one another.

"The bulk of mankind, by their reason, must be able to distinguish between religion and superstition; otherwise they can never extricate themselves from that superstition they chance to be educated in."

Tindal deals with the question of the obscurity of

Revelation in these terms, sufficiently salient to alarm the very proper divines of that day :—

"Had God, from time to time, spoken to all mankind in their several languages, and his words had miraculously conveyed the same ideas to all persons; yet he could not speak more plainly than he has done by the things themselves, and the relation which reason shows there is between them. Nay, since it is impossible in any book, or books, that a particular rule could be given for every case, we must even then have had recourse to the light of nature to teach us our duty in most cases; especially considering the numberless circumstances which attend us, and which, perpetually varying, may make the same actions, according as men are differently affected by them, either good or bad. And I may add, that most of the particular rules laid down in the gospel for our direction, are spoken after such figurative a manner, that except we judge of their meaning, not merely by the letter, but by what the law of nature antecedently declares to be our duty, they are apt to lead us wrong. And if precepts relating to morality are delivered after an obscure manner, when they might have been delivered otherwise; what reason can you assign for its being so, but that infinite wisdom meant to refer us to that law for the explaining them? Sufficient instances of this nature I shall give you hereafter, though I must own, I cannot carry this point so far as a learned divine, who represents the Scriptures more obscure (which one would think impossible) than even the fathers. He tells us, 'that a certain author (viz., Flaccus Illyricus) has furnished us with one-and-fifty reasons for the obscurity of the Scriptures;' adding, 'I think I may truly say that the writing of the prophets and apostles abound with tropes, and metaphors, types, and allegories, parables, and dark speeches; and are as much, nay, much more unintelligible in many places, than the writings of the ancients.' It is well this author, who talks of people being stark Bible-mad, stopped here; and did not with a celebrated

wit* cry, 'The truly illuminated books are the darkest of all.' The writer above mentioned supposes it impossible, that God's will should be fully revealed by books; 'except,' says he, 'it might be said perhaps without a figure, that even the world itself could not contain the books which should be written.' But with submission to this reverend person, I cannot help thinking, but that (such is the divine goodness) God's will is so clearly and fully manifested in the Book of Nature, that he who runs may read it."

In the next extract we make, we find Tindal quoting two striking passages from Lord Shaftesbury, followed by an acute vindication of the integrity of the Law of Nature over the Scriptures:—

"Had the heathen distinguished themselves by creeds made out of spite to one another, and mutually persecuted each other about the worship of their gods, they would soon have made the number of their votaries as few as the gods they worshipped; but we don't find (except in Egypt, that mother-land of superstition) that they ever quarrelled about their gods; though their gods sometimes quarrelled, and fought about their votaries. By the universal liberty that was allowed by the ancients, 'Matters (as a noble author observes) were so balanced, that reason had fair play; learning and science flourished; wonderful was the harmony and temper which arose from these contrarieties. Thus superstition and enthusiasm were mildly treated; and being let alone, they never raged to that degree as to occasion bloodshed, wars, persecutions, and devastations; but a new sort of policy has made us leap the bounds of natural humanity, and out of a supernatural charity, has taught us the way of plaguing one another most devoutly. It has raised an antipathy, that no temporal interest could ever do, and entailed on us a mutual hatred to all eternity. And savage zeal, with meek and pious semblance, works dreadful massacre; and for heaven's sake (horrid pretence) makes desolate the

† Dean Swift—"Tale of a Tub."

earth.' And further, Shaftesbury observes, 'The Jupiter of Strangers, was, among the ancients, one of the solemn characters of divinity, the peculiar attribute of the supreme deity; benign to mankind, and recommending universal love, mutual kindness, and benignity between the remotest and most unlike of the human race. Such was the ancient heathen charity and pious duty towards the whole of mankind; both those of different nations and different worship. But, good God! how different a character do bigots give us of the Deity, making him an unjust, cruel, and inconsistent Being; requiring all men to judge for themselves, and act according to their consciences; and yet authorizing some among them to judge for others, and to punish them for not acting according to the consciences of those judges, though ever so much against their own. These bigots thought they were authorized to punish all those that differ with them in their religious worship, as God's enemies; but had they considered that God alone could discern men's hearts, and alone discover whether any, by conscientiously offering him a wrong worship, could become his enemies; and that infinite wisdom best knew how to proportion the punishment to the fault, as well as infinite power how to inflict it; they would, surely, have left it to God to judge for himself, in a cause which immediately related to himself; and where they were not so much as parties concerned, and as likely to be mistaken as those they would punish. Can one, without horror, think of men's breaking through all the rules of doing as they would be done unto, in order to set themselves up for standards of truth for God as well as man? Do not these impious wretches suppose, that God is not able to judge for himself; at least, not able to execute his own judgment? And that, therefore, he has recourse, forsooth, to their superior knowledge or power; and they are to revenge his injuries, root out his enemies, and restore his lost honor, though with the destruction of the better part of mankind? But, to do the propagators of these blasphemous notions justice, they do

not throw this load of scandal on the law of Nature; or so much as pretend from thence to authorize their execrable principles; but endeavor to support them by traditional religion; especially by mis-interpreted texts from the Old Testament; and thereby make, not only natural and revealed religion, but the Old and New Testament (the latter of which requires doing good both to Jews and Gentiles) contradict each other. But to return; if what the light of Nature teaches us concerning the divine perfections, when duly attended to, is not only sufficient to hinder us from falling into superstition of any kind whatever; but, as I have already shown, demonstrates what God, from his infinite wisdom and goodness, can, or cannot command; how is it possible that the law of Nature and grace can differ? How can it be conceived, that God's laws, whether internally, or externally revealed, are not at all times the same, when the author of them is, and has been immutably the same forever?'"

The following passage exhibits the judicious mixture of authority and argument for which our author is remarkable. The quotation is a good illustration of Tindal's best manner. He is replying to Dr. Samuel Clark:—

"It cannot be imputed to any defect in the light of nature, that the pagan world ran into idolatry, but to their being entirely governed by priests, who pretended communication with their gods, and to have thence their revelations, which they imposed on the credulous as divine oracles: whereas the business of the Christian dispensation was to destroy all those traditional revelations; and restore, free from all idolatry, the true primitive, and natural religion, implanted in mankind from the creation. The Dr. (Clark) however, seems afraid, lest he had allowed too much to the light of nature, in relation to the discovery of our duty both to God and man; and not left room for revelation to make any addition; he therefore supposes, 'there are some duties, which nature hints at only in general.'— But, if we cannot, without highly reflecting on the wis-

dom and goodness of God, suppose that he has not, at all times, given the whole rational creation a plain rule for their conduct, in relation to those duties they owe to God, themselves, and one another; must we not suppose reason, and religion (that rule of all other rules) inseparable; so that no rational creature can be ignorant of it, who attends to the dictates of his own mind; I mean, as far as it is necessary for him to know it? An ignorant peasant may know what is sufficient for him, without knowing as much as the learned rector of St. James's. Though the Dr. says, 'the knowledge of the law of nature is, in fact, by no means universal;' yet he asserts, that 'man is plainly in his own nature an accountable creature;' which supposes that the light of nature plainly, and undeniably, teaches him that law, for breach of which he is naturally accountable; and did not the Dr. believe this law to be universal, he could not infer a future judgment from the conscience *all* men have of their actions, or the judgment they pass on them in their own minds whereby 'They that have not any law, are a law unto themselves; their consciences bearing witness, and their thoughts accusing, or excusing one another;' which is supposing but one law, whether that law be written on paper, or in men's hearts only; and that all men by the judgment they pass on their own actions, are conscious of this law. And, the apostle Paul, though quoted by the Dr., is so far from favoring his hypothesis of any invincible ignorance, even in the wisest and best of the philosophers, that he, by saying, The Gentiles, that have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, makes the law of nature and grace to be the same: and supposes the reason why they were to be punished, was their sinning against light and knowledge. That which may be known of God was manifest in them, and when they knew God, they glorified him not as God. And they were likewise guilty of abominable corruptions, not ignorantly, but knowing the judgment of God, that they who do such things are worthy of death.

"Had the Dr. but considered this self-evident proposition, that there can be no transgression where there is no law; and that an unknown law is the same as no law; and consequently, that all mankind, at all times, must be capable of knowing all (whether more or less) that God requires, it would have prevented his endeavoring to prove, that, till the gospel dispensation, mankind were entirely, and unavoidably ignorant of their duty in several important points; and thus charging the light of nature with undeniable defects. I think it no compliment to external revelation, though the Dr. designed it as the highest, to say, it prevailed, when the light of nature was, as he supposes, in a manner extinct; since then an irrational religion might as easily obtain, as a rational one. The Dr., to prove that revelation has supplied the insufficiency, and undeniable defects of the light of nature, refers us to Phil., iv., 1, which he introduces after this pompous manner: —'Let any man of an honest and sincere mind consider, whether that practical doctrine has not, even in itself, the greatest marks of a divine original, wherein whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report, if there be any virtue, if there be anything praiseworthy; all these, and these only, are earnestly recommended to man's practice.' I would ask the Dr., how he can know what these are, which are thus alone earnestly recommended to man's practice; or, why they have, in themselves, the greatest marks of a divine original; but from the light of nature? Nay, how can the Dr. know there are defects in the light of nature, but from that light itself? which supposes this light is all we have to trust to; and consequently, all the Dr. has been doing, on pretence of promoting the honor of revelation, is introducing universal scepticism. And I am concerned, and grieved, to see a man, who had so great a share of the light of nature, employing it to expose that light, of which before he had given the highest commenda-

tion; and which can have no other effect, than to weaken even his own demonstration, drawn from that light, for the being of a God. I shall mention but one text more, which, had not the Dr. thought it highly to his purpose, for showing the insufficiency of the light of nature, he would not have ushered it in after this most solemn manner:—'When men have put themselves into this temper and frame of mind, let them try if they can any longer reject the evidence of the gospel. If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine; whether it be of God.' Is it not strange, to see so judicious a divine write after such a manner, as if he thought the best way to support the dignity of revelation, was to derogate from the immutable and eternal law of nature? and while he is depressing it, extol revelation for those very things it borrows from that law? in which, though he asserts there are undeniable defects, yet he owns that God governs all his own actions by it, and expects that all men should so govern theirs.

"But, I find the Dr.'s own brother, the Dean of Sarum, is entirely of my mind, as to those texts the Dr. quotes—viz., Rom. ii., 14, and Phil. iv., 8. As to the first—viz., Rom. ii., 14, he says, 'The apostle supposes, that the moral law is founded in the nature and reason of things; that every man is endued with such powers and faculties of mind, as render him capable of seeing, and taking notice of this law; and also with such a sense and judgment of the reasonableness and fitness of conforming his actions to it, that he cannot but in his own mind acquit himself when he does so; and condemn himself when he does otherwise.' And as to the second—viz., Phil. iv., 8, where the same apostle recommends the practice of Virtue, upon the forementioned principles of comeliness and reputation.—'These principles,' says he, 'if duly attended to, were sufficient to instruct men in the whole of their duty towards themselves, and towards each other. And they would also have taught them their duty towards God, their Creator and Governor, if they had diligent-

ly pursued them. For according as the apostle expresses it, Rom. i., 20, the invisible things of God from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead. The same fitness and decency that appears in men's regular behavior towards each other, appears also in their behavior towards God. And this, likewise, is founded in the nature and reason of things; and is what the circumstances and condition they are in do absolutely require. Thus we see therein moral virtue, or good consists, and what the obligation to it is from its own native beauty and excellency.'"

One more example of Tindal's style will show how skilfully and cogently he forced the great authorities of his day to bear witness to the truth of his leading proposition, the natural antiquity of all the reasonable precepts of the Bible:—

"The most accurate Dr. Barrow gives this character of the Christian religion, 'That its precepts are no other than such as physicians prescribe for the health of our bodies; as politicians would allow to be needful for the peace of the state; as Epicurean philosophers recommend for the tranquillity of our minds, and pleasures of our lives; such as reason dictates, and daily shows conducive to our welfare in all respects; which consequently, were there no law enacting them, we should in wisdom choose to observe, and voluntarily impose them on ourselves; confessing them to be fit matters of law, and most advantageous and requisite to the good, general and particular, of mankind.'

"That great and good man Dr. Tillotson says, 'That all the precepts of Christianity are reasonable and wise, requiring such duties as are suitable to the light of nature, and do approve themselves to the best reason of mankind; such as have their foundation in the nature of God, and are an imitation of the divine excellencies; such as tend to the perfection of human nature, and to raise the minds of men to the highest pitch of goodness and virtue. They command nothing that is

unnecessary, they omit nothing that may tend to the glory of God, or the welfare of men, nor do they restrain us in anything, but what is contrary to the regular inclinations of nature, or to our reason, and true interest; they forbid us nothing but what is base and unworthy to serve our humors and passions, to make ourselves fools and beasts. In a word, nothing but what tends to our private harm, or prejudice, or to public disorder and confusion.'

"The late Dean of Canterbury, in a sermon preached in defence of Christianity, says,* 'What can be a more powerful incentive to obedience, than for a rational creature clearly to discern the equity, the necessity, the benefit, the decency and beauty of every action he is called to do, and thence to be duly sensible how gracious a master he serves; one that is so far from loading him with fruitless, arbitrary, and tyrannical impositions, that each command abstracted from his command who issues it, is able to recommend itself; and nothing required but what every wise man would choose of his accord; and cannot, without being his own enemy, wish to be exempted from?' And this character of Christianity he makes to be essential to its being from God, and therefore must make it the same with natural religion, which has this character impressed on it.

"'There was none of the doctrines of our Saviour (says the late Archbishop of York)† calculated for the gratification of men's idle curiosities, the busying and amusing them with airy and useless speculations; much less were they intended for an exercise of our credulity, or a trial how far we could bring our reason to submit to our faith; but as on the one hand they were plain and simple, and such as by their agreeableness to the rational faculties of mankind, did highly recommend themselves to our belief; so on the other hand they had an immediate relation to practice, and

* Boyle's Lect., p. 26,

† Sermon before the Queen on Christmas Day, 1724.

were the general principles and foundation, on which all human and divine virtues were naturally to be superstructed.' Does not every one see, that if the religion of nature had been put instead of Christianity, these descriptions would have exactly agreed with it?

"The judicious Dr. Scot affirms, 'God never imposes laws on us *pro imperio*, as arbitrary tests and trials of our obedience. The great design of them (says he,) is to do us good, and direct our actions to our own interest. This, if we firmly believe, will infinitely encourage our obedience; for when I am sure God commands me nothing but what my own health, ease, and happiness requires; and that every law of his is both a necessary and sovereign prescription against the diseases of my nature, and he could not prescribe less than he has, without being defective in his care of my recovery and happiness; with what prudence and modesty can I grudge to obey him?'

"Nay, the most considerate men, even among the Papists, do not scruple to maintain there's nothing in religion but what is moral. The divines of Port Royal for instance, say, 'All the precepts, and all the mysteries that are expressed in so many different ways in the holy volumes, do all centre in this one commandment of loving God with all our heart, and in loving our neighbors as ourselves: for the Scripture (it is St. Austin who says it) forbids but one only thing, which is concupiscence, or the love of the creature; as it commands but one only thing, which is charity, and the love of God. Upon this double precept is founded the whole system of the Christian religion; and it is unto this, say they, according to the expression of Jesus Christ, that all the ancient law and the prophets have reference; and we may add also, all the mysteries, and all the precepts of the new law; for love, says St. Paul, is the fulfilling of the law.' And these divines likewise cite a remarkable passage of St. Austin on this subject, viz., 'He that knows how to love God, and to regulate his life by that love, knows all that the Scripture propounds to be known.' And I

might add the authority of a greater man, and a Papist too,* who says, 'Religion adds nothing to natural probity, but the consolation of doing that for love and obedience to our Heavenly Father, which reason itself requires us do in favor of virtue.'"

Tindal was a solid, rather than a brilliant writer: but he perfectly knew what he was about; and the work from which we quote, was well conceived and carefully executed. His ground was skilfully chosen, his arguments were placed on an eminence where his friends could see them, and where his enemies could not assail them. Dr. Leland, in his view of Deistical writers, is quite in a rage with him, because he discredits Book Revelation, to set up Nature's Revelation. His real offence was, that he did prove that Nature was the only source of truth and reason—the criterion by which even Divine Revelation must be judged. He carried men back to the gospel of nature, by the side of which the gospel of the Jewish fishermen did not show to advantage. Tindal did put something in the place of that which he was supposed desirous of removing. How unwilling Christians of that day were to admit of improvement in religion, is shown by the number of attacks Tindal's work sustained. The Bishop of London published a "Second Pastoral Letter" against it; Dr. Thomas Burnet "confuted" it; Mr. Law "fully" answered it; Dr. Stebbing "obviated the principal objections" in it. "The same learned and judicious writer," observes Leland, a second time entered the lists, in "answer to the fourteenth chapter of a book, entitled 'Christianity as Old as the Creation.'" Mr. Balgny issued a "Second Letter to a Deist," occasioned by Tindal's work. Mr. Anthony O'Key gave a short view of the whole controversy. Dr. Forster, Dr. John Conybeare, "particularly engaged public attention" as Dr. Tindal's antagonists. Mr. Simon Brown produced a "solid and excellent" answer; and

‡ Archbishop of Cambray: Lettres sur la Religion, p. 258, a Paris.

Dr. Leland, with many blushes, tells us that he himself issued in Dublin, in 1773, two volumes, taking a wider compass than the other answers.

"Christianity as Old as the Creation" is a work which Freethinkers may yet consult with advantage, as a repertory of authorities no longer accessible to the readers of this generation. What these authorities allege will be found to have intrinsic value, to be indeed lasting testimonies in favor of Rationalism. In passing in review the noble truths, Tindal insists that it is impossible not to wonder at the policy, or rather want of policy displayed by Christians. Tindal is an author whom they might be proud of, if they were really in love with reason. Tindal's opponents have shown how instinctively the children of faith distrust the truths of Nature. After all the "refutations," and "confutations," and "answers" made to the great Deist, Tindal's work has maintained its ground, and the truths he so ably and spiritedly vindicated, have spread wider since and taken deeper root. J. W.

BIOGRAPHY

OF

DAVID HUME.

Lord Brougham has rendered service not only to "Letters," but also to Freethought, by his admirable "Lives," incomparably the best we have, of Voltaire, Rousseau, Hume, Gibbon, etc. From Lord Brougham we learn (whose life in this sketch we follow) that David Hume, related to the Earl of Hume's family, was born in Edinburgh, in April, 1711. Refusing to be made a lawyer, he was sent, in 1734, to a mercantile house in Bristol. The "desk" not suiting the embryo historian's genius, we find him in 1737 at La Fleche, in Anjou, writing his still-born "Treatise on Human Nature;" which in 1742, in separate Essays, attracted some notice. Keeper and companion to the Marquis of Annandale in 1745, private secretary to General St. Clair in 1747, he visited on embassy the courts of Vienna and Turin. While at Turin he completed his "Inquiry Concerning the Human Understanding," the "Treatise on Human Nature" in a new form. Returned to Scotland, he published his "Political Discourses" in 1752, and the same year his "Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals." The "Essays, Moral and Metaphysical," are the form in which we now read these speculations. In 1752, Hume became librarian to the Faculty of Advocates. In 1754 he published the first volume of his "History

of England." In 1755, appeared his "Natural History of Religion." In 1763 he accompanied the British ambassador to Paris. In 1765 he became *charge d'affaires.* In 1766 he was appointed Under Secretary of State under Marshal Conway. In 1775 he was seized with a mortal disease, which he bore without any abatement of his cheerfulness; and on the 25th of August, "*le bon* David," as he was styled in Paris, died, to use his own words, having "no enemies—except all the Whigs, all the Tories, and all the Christians"—which was something to his honor, and a testimony of the usefulness of his life.

David Hume was the first writer who gave historical distinction to Great Britain. Lord John Russell remarked in a speech at Bristol, in October, 1854 :—"We have no other 'History of England' than Hume's..... When a young man of eighteen asks for a 'History of England,' there is no resource but to give him Hume." Hume was the author of the modern doctrines of politics and political economy, which now rule the world of science. He was "the sagacious unfolder of truth, the accurate and bold discoverer of popular error." More than a sceptic, he was an Atheist. Such is Lord Brougham's judgment of him.

Hume carried Freethought into high places. In originality of thought, grace of style, and logical ability, he distanced all rival writers on religion in his time, and what is of no small importance, his life was as blameless as his intellect was unapproachable.

Our first extract from his writings is a felicitous statement of the *pro* and *con.*, on the questions of polygamous and single marriages :—

"A man, in conjoining himself to a woman, is bound to her according to the terms of his engagement. In begetting children, he is bound, by all the ties of nature and humanity, to provide for their subsistence and education. When he has performed these two parts of duty, no one can reproach him with injustice or injury. And as the terms of his engagement, as well as the methods of subsisting his offspring, may

be various, it is mere superstition to imagine that marriage can be entirely uniform, and will admit only of one mode or form. Did not human laws restrain the natural liberty of men, every particular marriage would be as different as contracts or bargains of any other kind or species. As circumstances vary, and the laws propose different advantages, we find, that in different times and places, they impose different conditions on this important contract. In Tonquin, it is usual for the sailors, when the ship comes into the harbor, to marry for the season; and, notwithstanding this precarious engagement, they are assured, it is said, of the strictest fidelity to their bed, as well as in the whole management of their affairs, from those temporary spouses. I cannot, at present, recollect my authorities; but I have somewhere read, that the Republic of Athens, having lost many of its citizens by war and pestilence, allowed every man to marry two wives, in order the sooner to repair the waste which had been made by these calamities. The poet Euripides happened to be coupled to two noisy vixens, who so plagued him with their jealousies and quarrels, that he became ever after a professed *woman hater;* and is the only theatrical writer, perhaps the only poet, that ever entertained an aversion to the sex.....The advocates for polygamy may recommend it as the only effectual remedy for the disorders of love, and the only expedient for freeing men from that slavery to the females which the natural violence of our passions has imposed upon us. By this means alone can we regain our right of sovereignty; and, sating our appetite, re-establish the authority of reason in our minds, and, of consequence, our own authority in our families. Man, like a weak sovereign, being unable to support himself against the wiles and intrigues of his subjects, must play one faction against another, and become absolute by the mutual jealousy of the females. To divide and to govern is an universal maxim; and by neglecting it, the Europeans undergo a more grievous and a more ignominious slavery than the Turks or Persians, who

are subjected indeed to a sovereign that lies at a distance from them, but in their domestic affairs rules with an uncontrollable sway. On the other hand, it may be urged with better reason, that this sovereignty of the male is a real usurpation, and destroys that nearness of rank, not to say equality, which nature has established between the sexes. We are, by nature, their lovers, their friends, their patrons. Would we willingly exchange such endearing appellations for the barbarous title of master and tyrant? In what capacity shall we gain by this inhuman proceeding? As lovers, or as husbands? The *lover* is totally annihilated; and courtship, the most agreeable scene in life, can no longer have place where women have not the free disposal of themselves, but are bought and sold like the meanest animal. The *husband* is as little a gainer, having found the admirable secret of extinguishing every part of love, except its jealousy. No rose without its thorn; but he must be a foolish wretch indeed, that throws away the rose and preserves only the thorn. But the Asiatic manners are as destructive to friendship as to love. Jealousy excludes men from all intimacies and familiarities with each other. No one dares bring his friend to his house or table, lest he bring a lover to his numerous wives. Hence, all over the East, each family is as much separate from another as if they were so many distinct kingdoms. No wonder then that Solomon, living like an Eastern prince, with his seven hundred wives, and three hundred concubines, without one friend, could write so pathetically concerning the vanity of the world. Had he tried the secret of one wife or mistress, a few friends, and a great many companions, he might have found life somewhat more agreeable. Destroy love and friendship, what remains in the world worth accepting?"

Next we quote his famous statement of the principle of *utility* in morals:—

"There has been a controversy started of late much better worth examination, concerning the general foun-

dation of morals; whether they be derived from reason or from sentiment; whether we attain the knowledge of them by a chain of argument and induction, or by an immediate feeling and finer internal sense; whether, like all sound judgment of truth and falsehood, they should be the same to every rational intelligent being; or whether like the perception of beauty and deformity, they be founded entirely on the particular fabric and constitution of the human species. The ancient philosophers, though they often affirm that virtue is nothing but conformity to reason, yet, in general, seem to consider morals as deriving their existence from taste and sentiment. On the other hand, our modern inquirers, though they also talk much of the beauty of virtue, and deformity of vice, yet have commonly endeavored to account for these distinctions by metaphysical reasonings, and by deductions from the most abstract principles of the understanding. Such confusion reigned in these subjects, that an opposition of the greatest consequence could prevail between one system and another, and even in the parts of almost each individual system; and yet nobody, till very lately, was ever sensible of it. The elegant Lord Shaftesbury, who first gave occasion to remark this distinction, and who, in general, adhered to the principles of the ancients, is not, himself, entirely free from the same confusion.....In all determinations of morality, the circumstance of public utility is ever principally in view; and wherever disputes arise, either in philosophy or common life, concerning the bounds of duty, the question cannot, by any means, be decided with greater certainty, than by ascertaining, on any side, the true interests of mankind. If any false opinion, embraced from appearances, has been found to prevail; as soon as farther experience and sounder reasoning have given us juster notions of human affairs, we retract our first sentiment, and adjust anew the boundaries of moral good and evil. Giving alms to common beggars is naturally praised; because it seems to carry relief to the distressed and indigent;

but when we observe the encouragement thence arising to idleness and debauchery, we regard that species of charity rather as a weakness than a virtue. Tyrannicide, or the assassination of usurpers and oppressive princes, was highly extolled in ancient times; because it both freed mankind from many of these monsters, and seemed to keep the others in awe whom the sword or poniard could not reach. But history and experience having since convinced us, that this practice increases the jealousy and cruelty of princes, a Timoleon and a Brutus, though treated with indulgence on account of the prejudices of their times, are now considered as very improper models for imitation. Liberality in princes is regarded as a mark of beneficence. But when it occurs, that the homely bread of the honest and industrious is often thereby converted into delicious cakes for the idle and the prodigal, we soon retract our heedless praises. The regrets of a prince, for having lost a day, were noble and generous; but had he intended to have spent it in acts of generosity to his greedy courtiers, it was better lost than misemployed after that manner.....That justice is useful to society, and consequently that *part* of its merit, at least, must arise from that consideration, it would be a superfluous undertaking to prove. That public utility is the *sole* origin of justice, that reflections on the beneficial consequences of this virtue are the *sole* foundation of its merit; this proposition being more curious and important, will better deserve our examination and inquiry. Let us suppose that nature has bestowed on the human race such profuse abundance of all external conveniences, that, without any uncertainty in the event, without any care or industry on our part, every individual finds himself fully provided with whatever his most voracious appetite can want, or luxurious imagination wish or desire. His natural beauty, we shall suppose, surpasses all acquired ornaments; the perpetual clemency of the seasons renders useless all clothes or covering: the raw herbage affords him the most delicious fare; the clear

fountain, the richest beverage. No laborious occupation required: no tillage: no navigation. Music, poetry, and contemplation, form his sole business: conversation, mirth, and friendship his sole amusement. It seems evident, that, in such a happy state, every other social virtue would flourish, and receive tenfold increase; but the cautious, jealous virtue of justice, would never once have been dreamed of. For what purpose make a partition of goods, where every one has already more than enough? Why give rise to property, where there cannot possibly be any injury? Why call this object *mine*, when, upon seizing of it by another, I need but stretch out my hand to possess myself of what is equally valuable? Justice, in that case, being totally useless, would be an idle ceremonial, and could never possibly have place in the catalogue of virtues. We see, even in the present necessitous condition of mankind, that, wherever any benefit is bestowed by nature in an unlimited abundance, we leave it always in common among the whole human race, and make no subdivisions of right and property. Water and air, though the most necessary of all objects, are not challenged as the property of individuals; nor can any man commit injustice by the most lavish use and enjoyment of these blessings. In fertile extensive countries, with few inhabitants, land is regarded on the same footing. And no topic is so much insisted on by those who defend the liberty of the seas, as the unexhausted use of them in navigation. Were the advantages procured by navigation as inexhaustible, these reasoners had never had any adversaries to refute; nor had any claims ever been advanced of a separate, exclusive dominion over the ocean.....Suppose a society to fall into such want of all common necessaries, that the utmost frugality and industry cannot preserve the greater number from perishing, and the whole from extreme misery. It will readily, I believe, be admitted that the strict laws of justice are suspended in such a pressing emergence, and give place to the stronger motives of necessity and

self-preservation. Is it any crime, after a shipwreck, to seize whatever means or instrument of safety one can lay hold of, without regard to former limitations of property? Or if a city besieged were perishing with hunger; can we imagine that men will see any means of preservation before them, and lose their lives from a scrupulous regard to what, in other situations, would be the rules of equity and justice? The use and tendency of that virtue is to procure happiness and security, by preserving order in society. But where the society is ready to perish from extreme necessity, no greater evil can be dreaded from violence and injustice; and every man may now provide for himself by all the means which prudence can dictate, or humanity permit. The public, even in less urgent necessities, opens granaries without the consent of proprietors; as justly supposing, that the authority of magistracy may, consistent with equity, extend so far. But were any number of men to assemble, without the tie of laws or civil jurisdiction; would an equal partition of bread in a famine, though effected by power and even violence, be regarded as criminal or injurious? Suppose, likewise, that it should be a virtuous man's fate to fall into the society of ruffians, remote from the protection of laws and government; what conduct must he embrace in that melancholy situation? He sees such a desperate rapaciousness prevail; such a disregard to equity, such contempt of order, such stupid blindness to future consequences, as must immediately have the most tragical conclusion, and must terminate in destruction to the greater number, and in a total dissolution of society to the rest. He, meanwhile, can have no other expedient than to arm himself, to whomever the sword he seizes, or the buckler may belong: to make provision of all means of defence and security: and his particular regard to justice being no longer of use to his own safety or that of others, he must consult the dictates of self-preservation alone, without concern for those who no longer merit his care and attention.....But perhaps the diffi-

culty of accounting for these effects of usefulness, or its contrary, has kept philosophers from admitting them into their systems of ethics, and has induced them to employ any other principle, in explaining the origin of moral good and evil. But it is no just reason for rejecting any principle, confirmed by experience, that we cannot give a satisfactory account of its origin, nor are able to resolve it into other more general principles. And if we would employ a little thought on the present subject, we need be at no loss to account for the influence of utility, and deduce it from principles the most known and avowed in human nature..... Usefulness is agreeable, and engages our approbation. This is a matter of fact, confirmed by daily observation. But useful! For what? For somebody's interest, surely! Whose interest then? Not our own only; for our approbation frequently extends farther. It must therefore be the interest of those who are served by the character or action approved of; and these, we may conclude, however remote, are not totally indifferent to us. By opening up this principle, we shall discover one great source of moral distinctions."

The origin and mischiefs of Theistic influences is the subject of the following passage :—

"It must necessarily, indeed, be allowed, that in order to carry men's attention beyond the present course of things, or lead them into any inference concerning invisible intelligent power, they must be actuated by some passion which prompts their thought and reflection, some motive which urges their first inquiry. But what passion shall we here have recourse to, for explaining an effect of such mighty consequence? Not speculative curiosity, surely, or the pure love of truth. That motive is too refined for such gross apprehensions; and would lead men into inquiries concerning the frame of nature, a subject too large and comprehensive for their narrow capacities. No passions, therefore, can be supposed to work upon such barbarians, but the ordinary affections of human life; the anxious concern for happiness, the dread of future misery, the

terror of death, the thirst of revenge, the appetite for food and other necessaries. Agitated by hopes and fears of this nature, especially the latter, men scrutinize, with a trembling curiosity, the course of future causes, and examine the various and contrary events of human life. And in this disordered scene, with eyes still more disordered and astonished, they see the first obscure traces of divinity.....We hang in perpetual suspense between life and death, health and sickness, plenty and want, which are distributed amongst the human species by secret and unknown causes, whose operation is oft unexpected, and always unaccountable. These *unknown causes*, then, become the constant object of hope and fear; and while the passions are kept in perpetual alarm by an anxious expectation of the events, the imagination is equally employed in forming ideas of those powers on which we have so entire a dependence. Could men anatomize nature, according to the most probable, at least the most intelligible philosophy, they would find that these causes are nothing but the particular fabric and structure of the minute parts of their own bodies and of external objects; and that by a regular and constant machinery, all the events are produced, about which they are so much concerned.....There is an universal tendency among mankind to conceive all beings like themselves, and to transfer to every object those qualities with which they are familiarly acquainted, and of which they are intimately conscious. We find human faces in the moon, armies in the clouds; and, by a natural propensity, if not corrected by experience and reflection, ascribe malice or good will to everything that hurts or pleases us. Hence the frequency and beauty of the *prosopopæia* in poetry; where trees, mountains, and streams are personified, and the inanimate parts of nature acquire sentiment and passion. And though these poetical figures and expressions gain not on the belief, they may serve, at least, to prove a certain tendency in the imagination, without which they could neither be beautiful nor natural. Nor is a river-god or hamadryad al-

ways taken for a mere poetical or imaginary personage, but may sometimes enter into the real creed of the ignorant vulgar; while each grove or field is represented as possessed of a particular genius or invisible power which inhabits and protects it. Nay, philosophers cannot entirely exempt themselves from this natural frailty; but have oft ascribed to inanimate matter the horror of a *vacuum*, sympathies, antipathies, and other affections of human nature. The absurdity is not less, while we cast our eyes upwards; and, transferring, as is too usual, human passions and infirmities to the Deity, represent him as jealous and revengeful, capricious and partial, and, in short, a wicked and foolish man in every respect but his superior power and authority.—No wonder, then, that mankind, being placed in such an absolute ignorance of causes, and being at the same time so anxious concerning their future fortune, should immediately acknowledge a dependence on invisible powers, possessed of sentiment and intelligence. The *unknown causes* which continually employ their thought, appearing always in the same aspect, are all apprehended to be of the same kind or species. Nor is it long before we ascribe to them thought, and reason, and passion, and sometimes even the limbs and figures of men, in order to bring them nearer to a resemblance with ourselves.....It is remarkable, that the principles of religion have a kind of flux and reflux in the human mind, and that men have a natural tendency to rise from idolatry to Theism, and to sink again from Theism into idolatry. The vulgar—that is, indeed, all mankind, a few excepted — being ignorant and uninstructed, never elevate their contemplation to the heavens, or penetrate by their disquisitions into the secret structure of vegetable or animal bodies; so far as to discover a Supreme Mind or Original Providence, which bestowed order on every part of nature. They consider these admirable works in a more confined and selfish view; and finding their own happiness and misery to depend on the secret influence and unforeseen concurrence of external objects, they regard, with perpetual attention,

the *unknown causes* which govern all these natural events, and distribute pleasure and pain, good and ill, by their powerful but silent operation. The unknown causes are still appealed to on every emergency; and in this general appearance or confused image, are the perpetual objects of human hopes and fears, wishes and apprehensions. By degrees, the active imagination of men, uneasy in this abstract conception of objects, about which it is incessantly employed, begins to render them more particular, and to clothe them in shapes more suitable to its natural comprehension. It represents them to be sensible, intelligent beings like mankind; actuated by love and hatred, and flexible by gifts and entreaties, by prayers and sacrifices. Hence the origin of religion: and hence the origin of idolatry or polytheism."

More has been written by theologians in endeavors to refute the following passage, than has ever been called forth by the wit of man before by the same number of words:—

"A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined. Why is it more than probable that all men must die; that lead cannot, of itself, remain suspended in the air; that fire consumes wood, and is extinguished by water; unless it be that these events are found agreeable to the laws of nature, and there is required a violation of these laws, or, in other words, a miracle to prevent them? Nothing is esteemed a miracle, if it ever happen in the common course of nature. It is no miracle that a man, seemingly in good health, should die on a sudden; because such a kind of death, though more unusual than any other, has yet been frequently observed to happen. But it is a miracle that a dead man should come to life; because that has never been observed in any age or country. There must, therefore, be an uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwise the

event would not merit that appellation. And as an uniform experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full proof, from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any miracle; nor can such a proof be destroyed, or the miracle rendered credible, but by an opposite proof which is superior. The plain consequence is (and it is a general maxim worthy of our attention,) 'That no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact which it endeavors to establish. And even in that case there is a mutual destruction of arguments, and the superior only gives us an assurance suitable to that degree of force which remains after deducting the inferior.' When any one tells me that he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider with myself whether it be more probable that this person should either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact which he relates should really have happened. I weigh the one miracle against the other; and according to the superiority which I discover, I pronounce my decision, and always reject the greater miracle. If the falsehood of his testimony would be more miraculous than the event which he relates; then, and not till then, can he pretend to command my belief or opinion.....There is not to be found, in all history, any miracle attested by a sufficient number of men, of such unquestioned good sense, education, and learning, as to secure us against all delusion in themselves; of such undoubted integrity, as to place them beyond all suspicion of any design to deceive others; of such credit and reputation in the eyes of mankind, as to have a great deal to lose in case of their being detected in any falsehood; and at the same time attesting facts, performed in such a public manner, and in so celebrated a part of the world, as to render the detection unavoidable; all which circumstances are requisite to give us a full assurance of the testimony of men.....One of the best attested miracles in all profane history, is that which Tacitus reports of Vespasian, who cured a blind man in Alexandria by

means of his spittle, and a lame man by the mere touch of his foot; in obedience to a vision of the god Serapis, who had enjoined them to have recourse to the emperor for these miraculous cures. The story may be seen in that fine historian; where every circumstance seems to add weight to the testimony, and might be displayed at large with all the force of argument and eloquence, if any one were now concerned to enforce the evidence of that exploded and idolatrous superstition. The gravity, solidity, age, and probity of so great an emperor, who through the whole course of his life, conversed in a familiar manner, with his friends and courtiers, and never affected those extraordinary airs of divinity assumed by Alexander and Demetrius. The historian, a contemporary writer, noted for candor and veracity, and, withal, the greatest and most penetrating genius, perhaps of all antiquity; and so free from any tendency to credulity, that he even lies under the contrary imputation of Atheism and profaneness. The persons, from whose authority he related the miracle of established character for judgment and veracity, as we may well presume; eye-witnesses of the fact, and confirming their testimony, after the Flavian family was despoiled of the empire, and could no longer give any reward as the price of a lie. *Utrumque, qui interfuere, nunc quoque memorant, postquam nullum mendacio pretium.* To which, if we add the public nature of the facts, as related, it will appear that no evidence can well be supposed stronger for so gross and so palpable a falsehood."

These extracts will give some idea of the grace, and power, and penetration of Hume. The society he kept, the abilities with which he was justly credited, the reputation his works deservedly won for him, made him a man of mark and influence in his day. Read by the learned, courted by statesmen, he taught gentlemen liberality, and governments toleration. The influence of Hume, silent and inappreciable to the multitude, has been of the utmost importance to the nation. His works have been studied by philosophers, politi-

cians, and prelates. The writings of no Freethinker, except Voltaire, have maintained their ground with continually increasing reputation. Oddly enough, none of Hume's works were popular when they first appeared. In fact, his "Treatise on Human Nature" he had to reprint in the form of Essays, five years after its first publication. It then, for the first time, began to be bought; but not to any great extent. Five years later, he again made it re-appear, under the form of an "Inquiry Concerning the Human Understanding." It was not until this third publication that he "began to perceive symptoms of its coming into notice." The world has since made up for its negligence, by perpetual comment and solid appreciation. A king among thinkers, the clergy have in the provinces of politics and philosophical speculation to acknowledge allegiance to him, however they may rebel against his theological heresies. J. W.

BIOGRAPHY

OF

DR. THOMAS BURNET.

It was only a very narrow accident which prevented Dr. Burnet, an ultra Freethinker in the Church of England, from becoming Archbishop of Canterbury at the death of Tillotson. A combination of clergymen were prepared to immolate themselves providing Burnet could be overthrown. They succeeded. Thomas Burnet kept the Charter House, in London, and his conscience—happier, perhaps, in this than if he had enjoyed the ecclesiastical preferment which King William seemed so anxious to give him. Amongst the clergy, Dr. Burnet was, with the single exception of Dean Swift, the greatest Freethinker of whom we can boast, who held an influential position in the Church. This position is sometimes claimed for Bishop Berkeley, a man of vast talents, a sincere Christian, although an innovator in philosophy.

Thomas Burnet was born in the year 1635. At the age of forty-five, he published the work, in Latin, with which his name is generally associated, "The Sacred Theory of the Earth: containing an account of the Original of the Earth, and of all the general changes which it has already undergone, or is to undergo, till the consummation of all Things." This book gives us an idea, formed by its author, of the origin of the world, and is remarkable as one of the first grand

prophecies of geology; although of little value to us, it produced an impression upon the age by depicting the various strata of the mountainous regions, and comparing them in different countries, eliminating ideas of the nature of the vast changes we see in the universe, tracing the rise of most of the phenomena from the two elements, fire and water. Burnet thought that at one time the whole of matter was in a fluid state, revolving round a central sun, until the heavier particles sunk into the middle, and formed the stony strata which supports the earth, over which the lighter liquids coalesced until the heat of the sun effectually separated water from land. This is the foundation of a scheme which is elaborated in a poetic style, abounding in eloquent descriptions; in fact, it is a philosophic prose poem of almost unrivalled beauty. In it there is some resemblance to the measured sentences of Shaftesbury, although unequal to that fine writer in soundness of judgment or practical usefulness. In 1691 an English translation was published.

By far the most interesting work to us of Burnet's (also written in Latin) is "Archœologia Philosophica: or, an account of the Opinion of the Ancients on various Philosophical Problems." This work created great opposition by its free remarks on the Mosaic dispensation, although the writer in this, as in the case of his posthumous works, strongly protested against their being translated into the English language, as he was justly afraid of their influence on the minds of the laity, and from his high official station, with the influence his vast learning and his connection with Tillotson, and the Court gave him, he was, no doubt, apprehensive that the really religious champions of the Church of England would denounce him when exposed to the temptation of High Church preferment. Fragments of those works were translated by the clergy to prove to the unlearned what a dangerous character Thomas Burnet was. Charles Blount, writing to Gildon, says, "I have, according to my promise, sent you herewith the seventh and eighth chapters, as also the appendix,

of the great and learned Dr. Burnet's book, published this winter in Latin, and by him dedicated to our most gracious Sovereign, King William.....As for the piece itself, I think it is one of the most ingenious I have ever read, and full of the most acute as well as learned observations. Nor can I find anything worthy an objection against him, as some of the censorious part of the world pretend; who would have you believe it a mere burlesque upon Moses, and destructive to the notion of original sin, wherefore by consequence (say they) there could be no necessity of a Redemption, which, however, I think no necessary consequence; but, for my part, either the great veneration I have for the doctor's extraordinary endowments, or else my own ignorance, has so far bribed me to his interests that I can, by no means, allow of any of those unjust reflections the wholesale merchants of credulity, as well as their unthinking retailers, make against him. It is true, in the seventh chapter he seems to prove that many parts of the Mosaic history of the creation appear inconsistent with reason, and in the eighth chapter the same appears no less inconsistent with philosophy; wherefore he concludes (as many fathers of the Church have done before him) that the whole rather seems to have been but a pious allegory." Dr. Burnet took the meaning of much of the Bible to be but a "pious allegory," and, as such, he strove to popularize it with the clergy. We do not believe that he intended to enlighten any but the clergy. He foresaw the "flood of fierce democracy," and, like other able men with vested rights in the ignorance of the people, he strove to temporize, to put off still further the day of Christianity's downfall. We place him in this biographical niche not because he dashed into the fray, like bold Hobbes or chivalrous Woolston, and took part in the battle of priestcraft because he thought it was right, but rather because he was a Freethinker in disguise, longing for Episcopal honors; yet, by one false step (the publishing of "Archæologia,") lost an archbishopric, and gave the authority of a great name

to struggling opinion. His accession to our ranks was a brilliant accident. He died, at the age of eighty years, in 1715. After his demise, two works were translated (and published,) both expressive of his liberal views. The first, "On Christian Faith and Duties," throwing overboard the whole of the speculative tenets of the Bible, and giving practical effect to the morals taught in the New Testament, without striving to refute, or even apparently to disbelieve, their authority, but advising the clergy to treat them as a dead letter. The other posthumous treatise was, "On the State of the Dead and the Reviving," which shadows forth a scheme of Deism, inasmuch as Burnet here flatly contradicts the usual ideas of "hell torments" or "hell fire," while asserting the necessity of those "who have not been as good in this life as they ought to be" undergoing a probationary purification before they attained supreme happiness, yet, eventually, every human being would inhabit a heavenly elysium, where perennial pleasure would reign, and sorrow be forever unknown.

Those sentiments indicate a high degree of liberal culture, although they do not sufficiently embody our ideal of one of the great Freethinkers of the past. We should have preferred Burnet if he had systematically opposed the Church as Toland or Tindal, or if he had boldly entered the breach like William Whiston, whose singular talents and faithful honesty separated him alike from the Church, Dissent, and Deism, and left him shipwrecked on the world an able yet a visionary reformer. With more ability than Chubb, he resembled him in his weak policy; he chose to cut his sneers in slices, and served them up for a scholarly party rather than hazard the indignation of the ignorant amongst the clergy. We are, however, certain that although Thomas Burnet was deficient in many points where he might have done effective service, yet we honor him for the boldness with which he faced the scholars with his Latin works. He threw an apple of discord amongst their ranks which has served,

in a constantly increasing manner, to divide and distract their attention. The result has been a constant internecine war in the Church, by which Freethought has largely profited.

We conclude our sketch of Dr. Burnet by quoting some extracts from the seventh chapter of the "Archæologia Philosophica," as translated by Charles Blount in the "Oracles of Reason," concerning Moses's description of Paradise and the original of things:—

"We have (says Burnet) hitherto made our inquiries into the originals of things, as well as after a true knowledge of Paradise amongst the ancients; yet still with reference to sacred writ, where it gave us any manner of light on the subject, but think it altogether unnecessary to define the place or situation of Paradise, since in respect to the theory of the earth, it is much the same thing where you place it, providing it be not on our modern earth. Now, if you inquire among the ancient fathers where the situation of it was, either they will have it to be none at all, or else obscure and remote from our understanding; some of them, indeed, term it an intelligible Paradise, but confined to no one particular place; whilst others, at the same time make it a sensible one, and here it is they first divided about it, etc.....Now, the history of Paradise, according to Moses, is this:—When God had, in six days, finished the creation of the world, the seventh day he rested from all manner of work. And here Moses relates particularly each day's operations; but for the story of mankind, as well male as female, of which he makes a particular treatise by himself. Wherefore, omitting the rest at present, let us consider the Mosaic doctrine upon those three subjects, viz., Adam, Eve, and the Garden of Eden, together with those things which are interwoven within them. As to the first man, Adam, Moses says he was formed not out of stones or dragon's teeth, as other Cosmists have feigned concerning their men, but out of the dust or clay of the earth, and when his body

was formed, 'God *blew into his nostrils* the breath of life, and man was made a living soul.'

"But after another manner, and of another matter, was the woman built—viz., with one of Adam's small bones, for as Adam lay asleep, God took away one of his *ribs*, and out of that made Eve. So much for the forming of the first man and woman by the literal text. Moses has likewise given us a large account of their first habitation. He says that God made them in a certain famous garden in the East, and gave it to them as a farm to cultivate and to inhabit, which garden was a most delightful place, watered with four several fountains or rivers, planted with trees of every kind..... Amongst the trees, in the midst of the garden, stood two more remarkable than the rest; one was called the tree of life, the other the tree of death, or of the knowledge of good and evil.....God, upon pain of death, prohibits Adam and Eve from tasting the fruit of this tree; but it happened that Eve sitting solitary under this tree, without her husband, there came to her a serpent or adder, which (though I know not by what means or power) civilly accosted the woman (if we may judge of the thing by the event) in these words, or to this purpose :—*

"Serpent.—All hail, most fair one, what are you doing so solitary and serious under this shade?

"Eve.—I am contemplating the beauty of this tree.

"Serp.—'Tis truly an agreeable sight, but much pleasanter are the fruits thereof. Have you tasted them, my lady?

"Eve.—I have not, because God has forbidden us to eat of this tree.

"Serp.—What do I hear! What is that God that

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* We extract this portion not for its merits of buffoonery, but to show the real state of mind which could actuate a dignitary of the Church of England in writing it, as the eighth chapter is by far the most philosophical, but we wish to show Burnet's real sentiments.

envies his creatures the innocent delights of nature? Nothing is sweeter, nothing more wholesome than this fruit; why, then, should he forbid it, unless in jest?

"Eve.—But he has forbid it us on pain of death.

"Serp. — Undoubtedly you mistake his meaning. This tree has nothing that would prove fatal to you, but rather something divine, and above the common order of nature.

"Eve.—I can give you no answer; but will go to my husband, and then do as he thinks fit.

"Serp.—Why should you trouble your husband over such a trifle? Use your own judgment.

"Eve.—Let me see—had I best use it, or not? What can be more beautiful than this apple? How sweetly it smells! But it may be it tastes ill.

"Serp.—Believe me, it is a bit worthy to be eaten by the angels themselves; do but try, and if it tastes ill, throw it away.

"Eve.—Well, I'll try. It has, indeed, a most agreeable flavor. Give me another that I may carry it to my husband.

"Serp.—Very well thought on; here's another for you: go to your husband with it. Farewell, happy young woman. In the meantime I'll go my ways; let her take care of the rest.

"Accordingly, Eve gave the apple to the too uxorious Adam, when immediately after their eating of it, they became both (I don't know how) ashamed of their nakedness, and sewing fig leaves together, making themselves a sort of aprons, etc. After these transactions, God, in the evening, descended into the garden, upon which our first parents fled to hide themselves in the thickest of the trees, but in vain, for God called out, 'Adam, where art thou?' When he, trembling, appeared before God Almighty, and said, Lord, when I heard thee in this garden, I was ashamed because of my nakedness, and hid myself amongst the most shady parts of the thicket. Who told thee, says God, that thou wast naked? Have you eaten of the forbidden fruit? That woman thou gavest me brought

it; 'twas she that made me eat of it. You have, says God, finely ordered your business, you and your wife. Here, you woman, what is this that you have done? Alas! for me, says Adam, thy serpent gave me the apple, and I did eat of it.

"This apple shall cost you dear, replied God, and not only you, but your posterity, and the whole race of mankind. Moreover, for this crime, I will curse and spoil the heavens, the earth, and the whole fabric of nature. But thou, in the first place, vile beast, shall bear the punishment of thy craftiness and malice. Hereafter shall thou go creeping on thy belly, and instead of eating apples, shall lick the dust of the earth. As for you, Mrs. Curious, who so much love delicacies, in sorrow shall you bring forth your children. You shall be subject to your husband, and shall never depart from his side unless having first obtained leave. Lastly, as for you, Adam, because you have hearkened more to your wife than to me, with the sweat of your brow shall you obtain both food for her and her children. You shall not gather fruits which, as heretofore, grew of themselves, but shall reap the fruits of the earth with labor and trouble. May the earth be, for thy sake, accursed—hereafter grow barren. May she produce thistles, thorns, tares, with other hurtful and unprofitable herbs, and when thou hast here led a troublesome, laborious life, dust thou art, to dust shalt thou return.....

"Great is the force of custom and a preconceived opinion over human minds. Wherefore, these short observations of the first originals of men or things, which we receive from Moses, are embraced without the least examination of them. But had we read the same doctrine in a Greek philosopher, or in a Rabbinical or Mahometan doctor, we should have stopped at every sentence with our mind full of objections and scruples. Now, this difference does not arise from the nature of the thing itself, but from the great opinion we have of the authority of the writer 'as being divinely inspired.' The author here defines his ideas in

reference to fabulous writings, after which he proceeds in his inquiry. 'But out of what matter the first of mankind, whether, male or female, was composed, is not so easily known. If God had a mind to make a woman start from one of Adam's ribs, it is true it seems to be a matter not very proper; but, however, out of wood, stone, or any other being God can make a woman; and here, by the bye, the curious ask whether this rib was useless to Adam, and beyond the number requisite in a complete body. If not, when it was taken away, Adam would be a maimed person, and robbed of a part of himself that was necessary. I say necessary, for as much, as I suppose, that in the fabric of a human body nothing is superfluous, and that no one bone can be taken away without endangering the whole, or rendering it, in some measure, imperfect. But if, on the other side, you say this rib was really useless to Adam, and might be spared, so that you make him to have only twelve ribs on one side and thirteen on the other, they will reply that this is like a monster, as much as if the first man had been created with three feet, or three hands, or had had more eyes, or other members, than the use of a human body requires. But in the beginning we cannot but suppose that all things were made with all imaginable exactness.

"For my part, I do not pretend to decide this dispute, but what more perplexes me is, how, out of one rib, the whole mass of a woman's body could be built? For a rib does not, perhaps, equal the thousandth part of an entire body. If you answer that the rest of the matter was taken from elsewhere, certainly, then, Eve might much more truly be said to have been formed out of that borrowed matter, whatever it was, than out of Adam's rib. I know that the Rabbinical doctors solve this business quite another way, for they say the first man had two bodies, the one male, the other female, who were joined together, and that God having cloven them asunder, gave one side to Adam for a wife. Plato has, in his 'Symposium,' something

very like this story, concerning his first man, Anoroginus, who was afterwards divided into two parts, male and female. Lastly, others conjecture that Moses gave out this original of woman to the end that he might inspire a mutual love between the two sexes, as parts of one and the same whole, so as more effectually to recommend his own institution of marriage. .....But leaving this subject, I will hasten to something else.

"Now, the second article treats of God's garden in Eden, watered with four rivers arising from the same spring.....Those rivers are, by Moses, called Pishon, Gishon, Hiddekal, and Perath, which the ancient authors interpret by Ganges, Nile, Tigris, and Euphrates. Nor do I truly think without some reason, for Moses seems to have proposed nothing more than the bringing four of the most celebrated rivers of the whole earth to the watering of his garden. Ah! but, say you, these four rivers do not spring from the same source, or come from the same place; 'tis true, nor any other four rivers that are named by the interpreters. Wherefore this objection will everywhere hold good, as well against the ancient as modern writers.—But although you should reduce these rivers to only two, as some do, to Tigris and Euphrates, yet neither have these two rivers the same fountain-head, but this is really and truly an evasion, instead of an explanation, to reduce, contrary to the history of Moses, a greater number of rivers to a smaller, only that they may the more conveniently be reduced to the same spring; for these are the words of Moses, 'But there comes a river out of Eden to water the garden, and from thence it divides itself into four branches, the name of the first is Pishon,' etc., whereby it is apparent that either in the exit or in the entrance of the garden there were four rivers, and that these four rivers did one and all proceed from the same fountain-head in Eden. Now, pray tell me in what part of the earth is this country of Eden, where four rivers arise from one and the same spring? But do not go about

to say that only two came from that fountain of Eden, and that the other two arose from the Tigris or the Euphrates, where they split near the sea, and make, as it were, a bifrontic figure, since this does by no means answer the words of Moses. Besides, he mentions in the first place Pishon and Gishon, and afterwards Tigris and Euphrates as lesser rivers; whereas you, on the contrary, will have those to be derived from these last as rivers of an inferior order, which is a manifest distorting of the historical account. But to end all these difficulties concerning the channels of the rivers which watered Paradise, you will, perhaps, at last say, that the springs, as well as the courses of rivers, have been changed by the universal deluge; and that we cannot now be certain where it was they burst over the earth, and what countries they passed through. For my part I am much of your opinion, providing you confess there happened in the deluge such a disruption of the earth as we suppose there did. But from only an inundation of waters such a change could never happer. Besides, what geography will you have Moses to describe these rivers, ante-diluvian or post-diluvian?— If the latter, there has happened no considerable alteration of the earth since the time of Moses and the flood. If the former, you then render Moses's description of the earth totally superfluous and unuseful to discover the situation of Paradise. Lastly, it is hard to conceive that any rivers, whether these or others, can have subsisted ever since the first beginning of the world; whether you have regard to their water or their channels. The channels of rivers are made by daily attrition; for if they had been made as ditches and furrows are, by earth dug out and heaped on each side, there would certainly have been seen everywhere great banks of earth. But we plainly see that this is only fortuitous; forasmuch as they often run through plains, and the river banks are no more than level with the adjacent fields; besides, whence could there be had water at the beginning of the world to fill these channels? If you say, that on the third day, when the

great bed of the ocean was made, the smaller channels of the rivers were also; and as the greatest part of the waters of the abyss fell into the gulf of the seas, so the remaining part descended into these other channels, and therewith formed the primitive rivers. Admitting this, yet the waters would not only be as salt as those of the sea, but there would be no continual springs to nourish these rivers; insomuch as when the first stream of water had flown off, there being no fresh supplies of water to succeed it, these rivers would have been immediately dried up; I say because there were no perpetual springs; for whether springs proceed from rain, or from the sea, they could neither way have rose in so short a time; not from rain, for it had not as yet rained; neither was it possible, that in the short space of one day, the waters of the abyss should run down from the most inland places to the sea, and afterwards returning through ways that were never yet open to them, should strain themselves through the bowels of the earth, and ascend to the heads of their rivers. But of rivers we have said enough; let us now proceed to the rest.

"We have, in the third place, a very strange account of a serpent that talked with Eve, and enticed her to oppose God. I must confess, we have not yet known that this beast could ever speak, or utter any sort of voice, beside hissing. But what shall we think Eve knew of this business? If she had taken it for a dumb animal, the very speech of it would have so frightened her, that she would have fled from it. If, on the other side, the serpent had from the beginning been capable of talking and haranguing, and only lost his speech for the crime of having corrupted the faith of Eve, certainly Moses would have been far from passing over in silence this sort of punishment, and only mentioning the curse of licking the dust. Besides this, will you have the particular species of serpents, or all the beasts in Paradise, to have been imbued with the faculty of speaking, like the trees in Dodona's grove? If you say all, pray what offence had the rest been

guilty of, that they also should lose the use of their tongues? If only the serpent enjoyed this privilege, how came it about that so vile an animal (by nature the most reverse and remote from man) should, before all his other fellow brutes, deserve to be master of so great a favor and benefit as that of speech?

"Lastly, since all discoursing and arguing includes the use of reason, by this very thing you make the serpent a rational creature. But I imagine you will solve this difficulty another way; for (say the sticklers for a literal interpretation) under the disguise of a serpent was hid the Devil, or an evil spirit, who, using the mouth and organs of this animal, spoke to the woman as though it were a human voice. But what testimony or what authority have they for this? The most literal reading of Moses, which they so closely adhere to, does not express anything of it; for what else does he seem to say, but that he attributes the seducing of Eve to the natural craftiness of the serpent, and nothing else? For these are Moses's words:—'Now the serpent was more cunning than any beast of the field that the Lord God had made.' Afterwards, continues he:—'The serpent said to the woman, yea, hath God said,' etc.—But besides, had Eve heard an animal, by nature dumb, speak through the means of some evil spirit, she would instantly have fled with horror from the monster.—When, on the contrary, she very familiarly received it; they argued very amicably together, as though nothing new or astonishing had taken place. Again, if you say that all this proceeded from the ignorance or weakness of a woman, it would on the other side have been but just, that some good angels should have succoured a poor, ignorant, weak woman; those just guardians of human affairs would not have permitted so unequal a conflict; for what if an evil spirit, crafty and knowing in business, had, by his subtlety, overreached a poor, weak, and silly woman, who had not as yet, either seen the sun rise or set, who was but newly born, and thoroughly inexperienced. Certainly, a person who had so great a price set upon her head,

as the salvation of all mankind, might well have deserved a guard of angels. Aye, but perhaps (you will say) the woman ought to have taken care not to violate a law established on pain of death. 'The day you eat of it you shall surely die,' both you and yours; this was the law. Die! what does that mean, says the poor, innocent virgin, who as yet had not seen anything dead, no, not so much as a flower; nor had yet with her eyes or mind perceived the image of death—viz., sleep, or night? But what you add concerning his posterity and their punishment, that is not all expressed in the law. Now no laws are ever to be distorted, especially those that are penal. The punishment of the serpent will also afford no inconsiderable question, if the Devil transacted the whole thing under the form of a serpent; or if he compelled the serpent to do, or to suffer things, why did he (the serpent) pay for a crime committed by the Devil? Moreover, as to the manner and form of the punishment inflicted on the serpent, that from that time he should go creeping on his belly, it is not to be explained what that meant. Hardly any one will say, that prior to his catastrophe the serpent walked upright, like four footed beasts; and if, from the beginning, he crept on his belly like other snakes, it may seem ridiculous to impose on this creature as a punishment for one single crime, a thing which, by nature, he ever had before. But let this suffice for the woman and serpent; let us now go on to the trees. I here understand those two trees, which stood in the middle of the garden, the tree of life, and the tree of good and evil. The former so called, that it would give men a very long life, although, by what follows, we find our forefathers, prior to the flood, lived to very great ages, independent of the tree of life. Besides, if the longevity, or immortality of man had depended only upon one tree, or its fruit, what if Adam had not sinned? how could his posterity, diffused throughout the whole earth, have been able to come and gather fruit out of this garden, or from this tree? or how could

the product of one tree have been sufficient for all mankind?"

Such is a condensed abstract of Dr. Burnet's seventh chapter of "Archœologia." The eighth chapter equals the above in boldness; but far exceeds it in breadth of logic and critical acumen, without, however, appearing so iconoclastic or so vulgar. The next chapter abounds in classical quotations, the Creation of the world and the Deluge is the theme on which so much is advanced, at a time when such language was greeted with the stake and the prison. We cannot calculate the effect of Burnet's works on the clerical mind; but this we do know, that since his day, there has progressed an internal revolution in the tenets of the church, which, in the last generation, gave birth to the neology, now so destructive of the internal peace of the churches. Neology has not come from Deism, for this power assails the outworks of Christianity; while the school of criticism is but a severe pruning knife of internal verbiage. Although the language quoted is harsh, the arguments common-place, which, although true, are now discarded by the educated Freethinker; yet if for no stronger language than this men were imprisoned only ten years ago, what must we say to the moral courage which could publish them 150 years ago? There must surely have been greater risks than in our day; and when a man dare hazard the highest power of the church for the duty of publishing unpopular sentiments, it is clearly our duty to enshrine him as one of the guardians of that liberty of thought and speech, which have won for us a freedom we cherish and protect. Let the earth then lie lightly over the priest-Freethinker, Thomas Burnet. A. C.

BIOGRAPHY

OF

THOMAS PAINE.

"The wise by some centuries before the crowd,
Must, by their novel systems, though correct,
Of course offend the wicked, weak, and proud,
Must meet with hatred, calumny, neglect."

Thomas Paine, "the sturdy champion of political and religious liberty," was born at Thetford, in the County of Norfolk, (Eng.,) 29th of January, 1737. Born of religious parents (his father being a Quaker, and his mother a member of the Church of England,) Paine received a religious education at Thetford Grammar School, under the Rev. William Knowles. At an early age he gave indications of his great talent, and found pleasure, when a boy, in studying poetical authors. His parents, however, endeavored to check his taste for poetry, his father probably thinking it would unfit him for the denomination to which *he* belonged. But Paine did not lose much time before experimenting in poetry himself. Hence we find him, when eight years of age, composing the following epitaph, upon a fly being caught in a spider's web :—

"Here lies the body of John Crow,
Who once was high, but now is low;
Ye brother Crows take warning all,
For as you rise, so you must fall."

At the age of thirteen, after receiving a moderate education in reading, writing, and arithmetic, Paine left school, to follow his father's trade (stay-making.) Although disliking the business, he pursued this avocation for nearly five years. When about twenty years of age, however, he felt—as most enterprising young men do feel—a desire to visit London, and enter into the competition and chances of a metropolitan life. His natural dislike to his father's business led him to abandon for a period his original occupation, and, after working some time with Mr. Morris, a noted stay-maker, in Long Acre, he resolved upon a seafaring adventure, of which he thus speaks :—

"At an early age, raw, adventurous, and heated with the false heroism of a master [Rev. Mr. Knowles, Master of the Grammar School at Thetford] who had served in a man-of-war, I began my fortune, and entered on board the Terrible, Captain Death. From this adventure I was happily prevented by the affectionate and moral remonstrances of a good father, who from the habits of his life, being of the Quaker profession, looked on me as lost; but the impression, much as it affected me at the time, wore away, and I entered afterwards in the King of Prussia privateer, Captain Mender, and went with her to sea."

Sea life did not, as may be supposed, long satisfy a mind like Paine's. In April, 1759, after working nearly twelve months at Dover, we find him settled as master stay-maker at Sandwich; marrying, on September 27, Mary Lambert, daughter of an Exciseman of that place. But his matrimonial happiness was of short duration, his wife dying the following year.

Disgusted with the toil and inconvenience of his late occupation, Paine now renounced it forever, to apply himself to the profession of Exciseman. After fourteen months' study he obtained the appointment of supernumerary in the Excise, which he held, with intervals, till 1768, when he settled as Exciseman at Lewes, in Sussex, and married, 1771, Elizabeth Olive, daughter of a tobacconist, whose business he succeed-

ed to. About this time Paine wrote several little pieces, in prose and verse, among which was the celebrated song on the "Death of General Wolfe,' and "The Trial of Farmer Carter's Dog, Porter." The latter is a composition of "exquisite wit and humor."

In 1772 the Excise officers throughout the kingdom were dissatisfied with their salaries, and formed a plan to apply to Parliament for an increase. Paine being distinguished among them as a man of great talent, was solicited to draw up and state their case, which he did in a pamphlet entitled "The Case of the Salary of the Officers of Excise, and Thoughts on the Corruption arising from the Poverty of Excise Officers." Four thousand copies of this pamphlet were printed and circulated. Some time after this publication, Paine, being in the grocery business, was *suspected* of unfair practices, and was dismissed the Excise, after being in it twelve years. This *suspicion*, however, was never shown to be just. But to show how *very vigorous* the authorities were in *suppressing* smuggling, we will quote the following letter from Clio Rickman to the Editor of the Independent Whig, in October, 1807 :—

"Sir,—If there are any characters more to be abhorred than others, it is those who inflict severe punishments against offenders, and yet themselves commit the same crimes.

"If any characters more than others deserve execration, exposure, and to be driven from among mankind, it is those governors of the people who break the laws they themselves make, and punish others for breaking.

"Suffer me, Mr. Editor, thus to preface the following fact; fact, I say, because I stand ready to prove it so.

"When Admiral Duncan rendezvoused in the Downs with his fleet, on the 8th of January, 1806, the Spider lugger, Daniel Falara, master, was sent to Guernsey to smuggle articles for the fleet, such as wine, spirits, hair powder, playing cards, tobacco, etc., for the supply of the different ships.

"At her arrival in the Downs, the ships' boats flock-

ed round her to unload her and her contraband cargo. A Custom House extra boat, commanded by William Wallace, seeing the lugger, followed and took her; in doing which he did his duty.

"On his inspecting the smuggled articles with which she was laden, he found a number of cases directed to Admiral Duncan, the Right Honorable William Pitt, the heaven-born Minister of England, and to the Right Honorable Henry Dundas, Walmer Castle. In a few days, Wallace, the master of the Custom House cutter, received orders from Government to give the lugger and her smuggled cargo up, on penalty of being dismissed the service; and these cases of smuggled goods were afterwards delivered at the Prime Minister's, Mr. Pitt, at Walmer Castle.

"Mr. Editor, read what follows, and repress your indignation if you can.

"There are now in Deal jail fourteen persons for trifling acts of smuggling compared to the above of the Right Honorable William Pitt and the now Right Honorable Lord Melville.

"The former were poor, and knew not how to live, the latter were most affluently and splendidly supported by the people—that is, they were paupers upon the generous public, towards whom they thus scandalously and infamously conducted themselves.

"I am, Sir, your humble servant,

CLIO RICKMAN."

To those opponents of Thomas Paine who attach any weight to his dismissal from the Excise on suspicion of smuggling, we would mention the fact, that during Paine's service at Lewes, Mr. Jenner, the principal clerk in the Excise Office, London, wrote several letters from the Board of Excise, "thanking Mr. Paine for his assiduity in his profession, and for his information and calculations forwarded to the office." Shortly after his dismissal, Mr. Paine and his wife, by mutual agreement, separated. Many tales have been put in circulation respecting the separation. Clio Rickman, in his "Life of Paine," has the following passage:—

"That he did not cohabit with her from the moment they left the altar till the day of their separation, a space of three years, although they lived in the same house together, is an indubitable truth. It is also true, that no physical defect, on the part of Mr. Paine, can be adduced as a reason for such conduct.....Mr. Paine's answer, upon my once referring to this subject, was, 'It is nobody's business but my own: I had cause for it, but I will name it to no one.'.....This I can assert, that Mr. Paine always spoke tenderly and respectfully of his wife; and sent her several times pecuniary aid, without her knowing even whence it came."

In 1774 Paine left England, and arrived at Philadelphia a few months before the battle of Lexington. He made his appearance in the New World as editor of the Pennsylvanian Magazine; and it would appear that he then had in view the coming struggle, in which he took so prominent a part, for in his introduction to the first number of the above Magazine he states: — "Thus encompassed with difficulties, this first number of the Pennsylvanian Magazine entreats a favorable reception; of which we shall only say, that like the early snowdrop, it comes forth in a barren season, and contents itself with foretelling the reader that choicer flowers are preparing to appear." Upon the foreign supply of gunpowder being prohibited, he proposed a plan, in the Pennsylvanian Journal, of a saltpetre association for the voluntary supply of that article of destruction.

On the 10th of January, 1776, "Common Sense" was published, its circulation soon reaching 100,000 copies. The effect this remarkable pamphlet produced upon the minds of the American people, and the share it had in bringing to a successful issue the then pending struggle, may be gathered even from Paine's bitterest enemies. Mr. Cheetham, in his "Life of Paine," while endeavoring to damage the author of "Common Sense," admits the value of this pamphlet. He says:—"This pamphlet of forty octavo pages, holding out relief by proposing Independence to an op-

pressed and despairing people, was published in January, 1776; speaking a language which the colonists had felt, but not thought of. Its popularity, terrible in its consequences to the parent country, was unexampled in the history of the press. At first involving the colonists, in the crime of rebellion, and pointing to a road leading inevitably to ruin, it was read with indignation and alarm; but when the reader—and every one read it—recovering from the first shock, re-perused it, its arguments nourishing his feelings and appealing to his pride, re-animated his hopes, and satisfied his understanding that 'Common Sense,' backed by the resources and force of the colonies, poor and feeble as they were, could alone rescue them from the unqualified oppression with which they were threatened. The unknown author, in the moments of enthusiasm which succeeded, was an angel sent from heaven to save from all the horrors of slavery by his timely, powerful, and unerring councils, a faithful but abused, a brave but misrepresented people." Another of Paine's enemies and slanderers—Elkanah Watson—in a volume recently published, entitled "Men and Times of the Revolution," after speaking in very disparaging terms of Paine's appearance, habits, and disposition (which is proved false by the best of testimony,) admits the service rendered to America by "Common Sense." He says:—"Yet I could not repress the deepest emotions of gratitude towards him, as the instrument of Providence in accelerating the declaration of our Independence. He certainly was a prominent agent in preparing the public sentiment of America for that glorious event. The idea of Independence had not occupied the popular mind, and when guardedly approached on the topic, it shrunk from the conception, as fraught with doubt, with peril, and with suffering. In 1776 I was present at Providence, Rhode Island, in a social assembly of most of the prominent leaders of the State. I recollect that the subject of Independence was cautiously introduced by an ardent Whig, and the thought seemed to excite the abhorrence of the whole

circle. A few weeks after, Paine's 'Common Sense' appeared, and passed through the continent like an electric spark. It everywhere flashed conviction, and aroused a determined spirit, which resulted in the Declaration of Independence, upon the 4th of July ensuing. The name of Paine was precious to every Whig heart, and had resounded throughout Europe." Other testimony could be given to Paine's influence in the American struggle for Independence; but after the two already mentioned from his opponents, it is unnecessary to give further proof.

In the same year that "Common Sense" appeared, Paine accompanied General Washington and his army, being with him in his retreat from Hudson River to the Delaware. Although great terror prevailed, Paine stood brave and undismayed, conscious he was advocating a just cause, and determined to bring it to a successful issue. He occupied himself in inspiring hope in the Americans, showing them their strength and their weakness. This object drew from his pen "The Crisis," a continuation of the "Common Sense," which was issued at intervals till the cessation of hostilities.

In 1777 Paine was unanimously, and unknown to himself, appointed Secretary in the Foreign Department, where he formed a close friendship with Dr. Franklin. He did not retain his office, however, long, as he refused to become a party to the fraudulent demands of a Mr. Silas Deane, one of the American Commissioners, then in Europe; and he resigned the office.

In 1780 he was chosen member of the American Philosophical Society, having previously received the degree of Master of Arts from the University of Philadelphia.

When the Independence of America was attained, and when oppression had received a severe and lasting check in that rising country, we find that Paine, so far from being satisfied with his success in the New World, began to look for a fresh field where he might

render good service to the cause of right and freedom. Accordingly, in 1787, he visited Paris, his famous services to America giving him a welcome by those who knew the benefit arising from the establishment of human rights. His stay in Paris, at this time, was of short duration, as he returned to England after an absence of thirteen years, on September 3rd. After visiting his mother, and settling an allowance of nine shillings per week for her support, he resided for a short time at Rotherham, in Yorkshire, where an iron bridge was cast and erected upon a model of his invention, which obtained him great reputation for his mathematical skill.

The publication of "Mr. Burke's Reflections on the French Revolution" called from Paine his "Rights of Man," a book that created great attraction, and sold nearly a million and a half of copies. In politics Paine was clear and decided, and, from his moderation, what is called "sound." For the perusal of those who may not have read it, we give the following quotations, to show the principles upon which it is based :—

"Mr. Burke talks about what he calls an hereditary crown, as if it were some production of nature; or as if, like time, it had a power to operate, not only independently, but in spite of man; or as if it were a thing or a subject universally consented to. Alas! it has none of those properties, but is the reverse of them all. It is a thing in imagination, the property of which is more than doubted, and the legality of which in a few years will be denied. But, to arrange this matter in a clearer view than what general expressions can convey, it will be necessary to state the distinct heads under which (what is called) an hereditary crown, or, more properly speaking, an hereditary succession to the government of a nation, can be considered; which are, first, the right of a particular family to establish itself; secondly, the right of a nation to establish a particular family. With respect to the *first* of these heads, that of a family establishing itself with hereditary powers on its own authority, and independent of

the consent of a nation, all men will concur in calling it despotism: and it would be trespassing on their understanding to attempt to prove it. But the *second* head, that of a nation establishing a particular family with *hereditary powers*, does not present itself as despotism on the first reflection; but if men will permit a second reflection to take place, and carry that reflection forward but one remove out of their own persons to that of their offspring, they will then see that hereditary succession becomes in its consequences the same despotism to others, which they reprobated for themselves. It operates to preclude the consent of the succeeding generations; and the preclusion of consent is despotism. When the person who at any time shall be in possession of a government, or those who stand in succession to him, shall say to a nation, I hold this power in 'contempt' of you, it signifies not on what authority he pretends to say it. It is no relief, but an aggravation to a person in slavery, to reflect that he was sold by his parent; and as that which heightens the criminality of an act cannot be produced to prove the legality of it, hereditary succession cannot be established as a legal thing.....Notwithstanding the taxes of England amount to almost seventeen millions a year, said to be for the expenses of Government, it is still evident that the sense of the nation is left to govern itself by magistrates and jurors, almost at its own charge, on Republican principles, exclusive of the expense of taxes. The salaries of the judges are almost the only charge that is paid out of the revenue. Considering that all the internal government is executed by the people, the taxes of England ought to be the lightest of any nation in Europe; instead of which, they are the contrary. As this cannot be accounted for on the score of civil government, the subject necessarily extends itself to the monarchical part.....If a law be bad, it is one thing to oppose the practice of it, but it is quite a different thing to expose its errors, to reason on its defects, and show cause why it should be repealed, or why another ought to be substituted

in its place. I have always held it an opinion (making it also my practice) that it is better to obey a bad law, making use at the same time of every argument to show its errors and procure its repeal, than forcibly to violate it; because the precedent of breaking a bad law might weaken the force, and lead to a discretionary violation, of those which are good."

As may be supposed, such a work as "The Rights of Man," aiming directly at all oppression, regardless of party, could not be allowed to escape the Attorney-General's *answer*. Accordingly, we find a prosecution instituted against it. But instead of prosecuting the author, the publishers were selected. This drew from Paine a long Letter to the Attorney-General, suggesting the justice of *his* answering for the book he wrote. On the trial, Mr. (afterwards Lord) Erskine thus spoke of the author of "The Rights of Man:"—"The defendant's whole deportment previous to the publication has been wholly unexceptionable; he properly desired to be given up as the author of the book, if any inquiry should take place concerning it; and he is not affected in evidence, directly or indirectly, with any illegal or suspicious conduct, not even with uttering an indiscreet or taunting expression, nor with any one matter or thing inconsistent with the best subject in England."

On the 12th of September, 1792, Mr. Achilles Audibert came expressly to England, from the French Convention, to solicit Paine to attend and aid them, by his advice, in their deliberations. "On his arrival at Calais a public dinner was provided, a royal salute was fired from the battery, the troops were drawn out, and there was a general rejoicing throughout the town.....Paine was escorted to the house of his friend, Mr. Audibert, the Chief Magistrate of the place, where he was visited by the Commandant, and all the Municipal Officers in forms, who afterwards gave him a sumptuous entertainment in the Town Hall. The same honor was also paid him on his departure for Paris." Upon his arrival in Paris all was confusion. There were the King's friends mortified and subdued, the Jacobins split up into cav-

illing faction, some wishing a federative government, some desiring the King's death, and the death of all the nobility; while a portion were more discreet, wishing liberty without licentiousness, and having a desire to redress wrongs without revenge. These few accepted Paine as their leader, and renounced all connection with the Jacobin Club.

Paine, on all occasions, advocated the preservation of the King's life; but his efforts were thwarted by the appointment, by Robespierre, of Barrere to office. So anxiously was Paine sought after, that both Calais and Versailles returned him as Deputy. To show how the author of "The Rights of Man" opposed all physical force where reason may be used, it is only necessary to state, that when the Letter of Dumourier reached Paris with the threat of restoring the King, Paine wrote a letter to the Convention, stating a plan for re-adjustment, and was taking it personally, when he was informed "that a decree had just been passed offering one hundred thousand crowns for Dumourier's head; and another, making it high treason to propose anything in his favor." Whilst Deputy for Calais, Paine was sought and admired by all classes. He dined every Friday, for a long period, with the Earl of Lauderdale and Dr. Moore; and so frequent were his visitors, that he set apart two mornings a week for his *levee* days.—He soon, however, changed his residence, preferring less formality and a more select circle. His "History of the French Revolution" we are deprived of by his imprisonment, which Gibbon thought would prove a great loss. The historian often applied for the MS., believing it to be of great worth. The opinion Paine held of the Revolution may be gathered from the following:—"With respect to the Revolution, it was begun by good men, on good principles, and I have ever believed it would have gone on so, had not the provocative interference of foreign powers distracted it into madness, and sown jealousies among the leaders. The people of England have now two Revolutions, the Am-

erican and the French before them. Their own wisdom will direct them what to *choose* and what to *avoid*, and in everything which relates to their happiness, combined with the common good of mankind, I wish them honor and success."

His speech against the death of the King, shows how far he was removed from party spirit, or any feeling of revenge. Whilst he protested against the King being re-enthroned, he equally protested against his death, wishing him removed from the seat of his corruption, and placed in a more elevating atmosphere.—Entreating for the King's safety, he says :—"Let then the United States be the safeguard and the asylum of Louis Capet. There, hereafter, far removed from the miseries and crimes of royalty, he may learn, from the constant aspect of public prosperity, that the true system of government consists in fair, equal, and honorable representation. In relating this circumstance, and in submitting this proposition, I consider myself as a citizen of both countries."

The policy pursued by Paine was not consonant with the views of Robespierre. Consequently, he was seized in the night and imprisoned in the Luxembourg eleven months, without any reason being assigned. The readers are doubtless aware of the many *Providential* escapes he had from the death for which he was seized. While in prison he wrote part of his "Age of Reason," (having commenced it just previous to his arrest) not knowing one hour but he might be executed, and once being on the verge of death from fever. He knew the prejudice the "Age of Reason" would create, so he left its production to the latter part of his life, not wishing to make *that* an impediment to the good he sought to accomplish in the Political world.

After toiling in France to bring the Revolution to a *just* termination, and finding his efforts rendered abortive by that feeling which *former oppression had created*, he resolved to return to America, a country he saw thriving by a policy he wished to institute in France.

In 1802, Jefferson, then President of America, knowing his wish to return, wrote him the following letter:—

"You express a wish in your letter to return to America by a national ship. Mr. Dawson, who brings over the treaty, and who will present you with this letter, is charged with orders to the captain of the Maryland, to receive and accommodate you back if you can be ready to return at such a short warning. You will in general find us returned to sentiments worthy of former times; in these it will be your glory to have steadily labored, and with as much effect as any man living. That you may live long to continue your useful labors, and reap the reward in the thankfulness of nations, is my sincere prayer.

Accept the assurance of my high esteem and affectionate attachment, THOMAS JEFFERSON."

But circumstances prevented Paine going by the Maryland. He sailed, however, on the 1st of September, 1802, in the London Pacquet. He had often previously arranged to return to America, but luckily, *Providence* prevented him. One ship that he intended to sail by, was searched by English frigates for Thomas Paine, and another sunk at sea, whilst at other times British frigates were cruising off the ports from which he was to sail, knowing him to be there.

So much religious misrepresentation has been circulated about Paine's life and death, that it becomes a duty to restate the *facts*. The manner of life Paine pursued may be gathered from the *reliable* testimony of Clio Rickman. He says, "Mr. Paine's life in London was a quiet round of philosophical leisure and enjoyment. It was occupied in writing, in a small epistolary correspondence, in walking about with me to visit different friends, occasionally lounging at coffee-houses and public places, or being visited by a select few. Lord Edward Fitzgerald, the French and American ambassadors, Mr. Sharp the engraver, Romney, the painter, Mrs. Wolstonecraft, Joel Barlow, Mr. Hull, Mr. Christie, Dr. Priestley, Dr. Towers, Colonel Os-

wald, the walking Stewart, Captain Sampson Perry, Mr. Tuffin, Mr. William Choppin, Captain De Stark, Mr. Horne Tooke, etc., were among the number of his friends and acquaintances." His manner of living in France and America has already been noticed.

The perverted tales of Carver and Cheetham may be utterly disproved by referring to Clio Rickman's "Life of Paine." As his life, so was his death. When he became feeble and infirm (in Jan. 1809) he was often visited by those "good people" who so often intrude upon the domestic quiet of the afflicted. After the visit of an old woman, "come from the Almighty," (whom Paine soon sent back again) he was troubled with the Rev. Mr. Milledollar, and the Rev. Mr. Cunningham. The latter reverend said, "Mr. Paine, we visit you as friends and neighbors; you have now a full view of death, you cannot live long; and whoever does not believe in Jesus Christ, will assuredly be damned." "Let me," said Paine, "have none of your Popish stuff; get away with you; good morning, good morning." Another visitor was the Rev. Mr. Hargrove, with this statement:—"My name is Hargrove, Sir; I am minister of the new Jerusalem church; we, Sir, explain the scripture in its true meaning; the key has been lost these four thousand years, and we have found it." "Then," said Paine, in his own neat way, "it must have been very rusty." Shortly before his death, he stated to Mr. Hicks, to whom he had sent to arrange his burial, that his sentiments in reference to the Christian religion were precisely the same as when he wrote the "Age of Reason." On the 8th of June, (in the words of Clio Rickman) 1809, about nine in the morning, he placidly, and almost without a struggle, died, as he had lived, a Deist, aged seventy-two years and five months. He was interred at New Rochelle, upon his own farm; a handsome monument being now erected where he was buried.

It has been the object in the present sketch rather to give, in a brief manner, an account of Paine's life and services, than an elucidation of his writings. His works

are well known, and *they* will speak for themselves; but much wrong is done to his memory by the perversions and misrepresentations of the religious publications. No doubt had his views been different on "religious" subjects, he would have been held up as a model of genius, perseverance, courage, disinterestedness of purpose, and purity of life, by the men who now find him no better name than the "Blasphemer." We hope that those not previously acquainted with the facts of his life, will find in the present sketch sufficient reason to think and speak otherwise of a man who made the world his country, and the doing good his religion.

"As Euclid clear his various writings shone,
His pen inspired by glorious truth alone,
O'er all the earth diffusing light and life,
Subduing error, ignorance, and strife;
Raised man to just pursuits, to thinking right,
And yet will free the world from woe and falsehood's night;
To this immortal man, to Paine 'twas given,
To metamorphose earth from hell to heaven."

J. W.

BIOGRAPHY

OF

BAPTISTE DE MIRABAUD.

Jean Baptiste de Mirabaud was born at Paris, in the year 1675. Of his early life we can glean but very scanty information. He appears first to have embraced the military profession, but it not being consonant with his general character, he soon quitted the army, and devoted himself to literature. He was, however, nearly forty-nine years of age before he became known in the literary world. He then published a French translation of Tasso's "Jerusalem," which brought him much fame; and many of the contributors to the French Encyclopædia appear to have associated with him, and courted his friendship. He was afterwards elected a member of the French Academy, of which he became the Secretary in 1742. Mirabaud was a constant visitor at the house of his friend, the Baron d'Holbach, down to the period of his death. He wrote "The World: its Origin and its Antiquity," "Opinions of the Ancients upon the Jews," "Sentiments of the Philosophers upon the Nature of the Soul," and other minor works. The "System of Nature" was also for many years attributed to Mirabaud, but it appears now to be extremely doubtful whether he ever wrote a single line of the work. The Abbe Galiani was one of the first who pointed out D'Holbach as the author. In the memoirs of M. Suard, edited by M. Garat, the same hypothesis is supported with additional firmness. Dugald Stewart seems to put much faith in the latter authority, as fixing the authorship of the "System of Nature" upon D'Holbach. Voltaire attributes the work to Damilaville, in a somewhat positive manner, for which he is sharply criticised in the "Biographie Universelle," published in 1817. The

"System of Nature" is a book of which Dugald Stewart speaks, as "the boldest, if not the ablest work of the Parisian Atheists," and it has undoubtedly obtained great popularity. Voltaire, who has written against the "System of Nature" in a tone of bitter sarcasm, and who complains of its general dullness and prolixity, yet admits that it is "often humorous, sometimes eloquent." It certainly is not written in that lively, but rather superficial style, which has characterized many of the French writers, but it speaks in plain yet powerful language, evincing an extensive acquaintance with the works of previous philosophers, and much thought in relation to the subjects treated upon. Some of its pages exhibiting more vivacity than the rest of the book, have been attributed to Diderot, who (it is alleged by Marmontel and others) aided, by his pen and counsel, many of the Freethinking works issued during his life.

The "System of Nature" was not published during the life-time of Mirabaud, and it is therefore impossible to use any argument which might have been based upon Mirabaud's conduct in relation to it.

Mirabaud died in Paris in 1760, at the advanced age of nearly eighty-six years. Contemporary with him were D'Alembert, D'Holbach, Voltaire, Diderot, Helvetius, Condorcet, Buffon, Rousseau, Frederick II. of Prussia, Montesquieu, Grimm, Sir William Temple, Toland, Tindel, Edmund Halley, Hume, Gibbon, Adam Smith, Franklin, and Darwin, forming a *role* of names, whose fame will be handed down to posterity for centuries to come, as workers in the cause of man's redemption from mental slavery. If (as it appears very probably) it be the fact that Mirabaud had but little part in the authorship of "La Systeme de la Nature," D'Holbach, in using the name of his deceased friend, only associated him with a work which (judging from his other writings, the tenor of his life, and the noble character of his associates) Mirabaud would have issued with pride himself, had the book been really written by him.

BIOGRAPHY

OF

BARON D'HOLBACH.

PAUL THYRY, BARON D'HOLBACH, was born at Heidesheim, in the Palatinate, in the month of January, 1723. His father appears to have been a very wealthy man, and brought his son to Paris, for the purpose of superintending his education, but died while he was still a child. In his youth, D'Holbach appears to have been noted for his studious habits and retentive faculties, and ultimately attained to some eminence in chemistry and mineralogy. He married when very young, and he had not been married one year when his wife died. He afterwards obtained a dispensation from the Pope, and married his deceased wife's sister, by whom he had four children, two sons and two daughters.

D'Holbach appeared to have spent the greater part of his life in Paris, and for forty years he assembled around his table, every Sunday, the *elite* of the literary world, including nearly the whole of those who took part in the first Encyclopædia. If that table were only in the hands of some of our spirit friends of the present day, what brilliant anecdotes might it not rap out—the sparkling wit of Diderot, the good humor of our host, the hospitable and generous D'Holbach, the occasional bitterness of Jean Jacques Rousseau, the cautious expression of opinion by D'Alembert, the agree-

able variety of Montesquieu, and the bold enthusiasm of the youthful but hardworking Naigeon! If ever a table were inclined to turn, this table should have been; but perhaps it may be that tables never turn when reason is the ruler of those who sit around.

It seems more than probable that D'Holbach at first held opinions differing widely from those entertained by him during the later periods of his life, and it is asserted that Diderot contributed much to this change of opinion. D'Holbach was an amiable man of the world, fond of amusement, and without pretension; he was, notwithstanding, well versed in Roman and Grecian literature, mathematics, chemistry, botany, and modern languages. He was generous to every one. "I content myself," he said, "with performing the disagreeable character of benefactor, when I am forced to it. I do not wish to be repaid my money; but I am pleased when I meet with some little gratitude, if it be only as proving that the persons I have assisted were such sort of men as I desired."

Although about forty-five works are now ascribed to D'Holbach, not one of them was published during his life-time in his own name. The manuscripts were taken to Amsterdam by Naigeon, and there printed by Michael Rey. D'Holbach never talked publicly of his literary productions himself, and his secrets seem to have been well kept by his friends. Several of the works were condemned and suppressed by the government; but D'Holbach lived unsuspected and unmolested. The expression used by the Avocat, General Seguier, in his requisitoire against the "System of Nature" is worthy of notice. The Avocat General said—"The restless spirit of Infidelity, inimical to all dependence, endeavors to overthrow all political constitutions. Its wishes will not be satisfied until it has destroyed the *necessary* inequality of rank and condition, and until it has degraded the majesty of kings, and rendered their authority subordinate to the *caprices* of the *mob*." Note the three words we have italicised. For the first read unnecessary; for the second,

voice; for the third, peoples. We trust that Free-thought never will be satisfied until it has destroyed the unnecessary inequalities of rank and condition, and rendered it impossible for the authority of kings to be enforced in opposition to the voice of the people.

The following description of D'Holbach is given in a little sketch, published by Mr. Watson in 1834, as taken from Grimm's "Correspondence:" — "D'Holbach's features were, taken separately, regular, and even handsome, yet he was not a handsome man. His forehead, large and open, like that of Diderot, indicated a vast and capacious mind; but his forehead having fewer sinuosities, less roundness than Diderot's, announced less warmth, less energy, and less fecundity of ideas. A craniologist would say that in both D'Holbach and Diderot, the philosophical organs were largely developed, but that Diderot excelled in ideality; D'Holbach's countenance only indicated mildness, and the habitual sincerity of his mind. He was incapable of personal hatred. Though he detested priests and Jesuits, and all other supporters of despotism and superstition; and though when speaking of such people, his mildness and good temper were sometimes transformed into bitterness and irritability; yet it is affirmed that when the Jesuits were expelled from France, D'Holbach regarded them as objects of commiseration and of pity, and afforded them pecuniary assistance."

The titles of D'Holbach's works may be found in Barbier's "Dictionary of Anonymous Works," and in St. Surins's article in the "Biographie Universelle," also in the little tract before mentioned as published by J. Watson. D'Holbach contributed largely to the first French Encyclopædia, and other works of a like character. Of the "System of Nature" we have already spoken, and shall rather leave our readers to the work itself than take up more space in discussing its authorship.

After having lived a life of comfort, in affluent circumstances, and always surrounded by a large circle

of the best men of the day, D'Holbach died on January the 21st, 1789, being then sixty-six years of age. The priests have never pictured to us any scene of horror in relation to his dying moments. The good old man died cheered and supported in his last struggle by those men whom he had many times assisted in the hard fighting of the battle of life. J. A. Naigeon, who had been his friend for thirty years, paid an eloquent tribute to D'Holbach's memory, in an article which appeared in the "Journal de Paris" of February the 9th, 1789, and we are not aware that any man has ever written anything against D'Holbach's personal character.

EXTRACTS FROM "THE SYSTEM OF NATURE."

Although we may not attempt to express a decided opinion as to the authorship of "Le Systeme de la Nature," we feel it our duty to present some of its principal arguments to the consideration of our readers. The author opens his work with this passage:—

"Man always deceives himself when he abandons experience to follow imaginary systems. He is the work of nature. He exists in nature. He is submitted to her laws. He cannot deliver himself from them. He cannot step beyond them even in thought. It is in vain his mind would spring forward beyond the visible world: an imperious necessity ever compels his return—for a being formed by Nature, who is circumscribed by her laws, there exists nothing beyond the great whole of which he forms a part, of which he experiences the influence. The beings his imagination pictures as above Nature, or distinguished from her, are always chimeras formed after that which he has already seen, but of which it is utterly impossible he should ever form any correct idea, either as to the place they occupy, or their manner of acting—for him there is not, there can be nothing out of that nature which includes all beings. Instead, therefore, of seeking out of the world he inhabits for beings who can procure him a happiness denied by Nature, let him

study this nature, learn her laws, contemplate her energies, observe the immutable rules by which she acts."

Speaking of the theological delusions under which many men labor, and of the mode in which man has been surrounded by those delusions, he says:—

"His ignorance made him credulous: his curiosity made him swallow large draughts of the marvellous: time confirmed him in his opinions, and he passed his conjectures from race to race, for realities; a tyrannical power maintained him in his notions, because by those alone could society be enslaved. It was in vain, that some faint glimmerings of Nature occasionally attempted the recall of his reason; that slight corruscations of experience sometimes threw his darkness into light; the interest of the few was bottomed on his enthusiasm; their pre-eminence depended on his love of the wonderful; their very existence rested on the solidity of his ignorance; they consequently suffered no opportunity to escape, of smothering even the lambent flame. The many were thus first deceived into credulity, then coerced into submission. At length, the whole science of man became a confused mass of darkness, falsehood, and contradictions, with here and there a feeble ray of truth, furnished by that Nature of which he can never entirely divest himself, because, without his knowledge, his necessities are continually bringing him back to her resources."

Having stated that by "nature" he means the "great whole," our author complains of those who assert that matter is senseless, inanimate, unintelligent, etc., and says, "Experience proves to us that the matter which we regard as inert or dead, assumes action, intelligence, and life, when it is combined in a certain way:"—

"If flour be wetted with water, and the mixture closed up, it will be found, after some little lapse of time, by the aid of a microscope, to have produced organized beings that enjoy life, of which the water and the flour were believed incapable: it is thus that

inanimate matter can pass into life, or animate matter, which is in itself only an assemblage of motion. Reasoning from analogy, which the philosophers of the present day hold perfectly compatible, the production of a man, independent of the ordinary means, would not be more marvellous than that of an insect with flour and water. Fermentation and putrefaction evidently produce living animals. We have here the principle; with proper materials, principles can always be brought into action. That generation which is styled *equivocal*, is only so for those who do not reflect, or who do not permit themselves, attentively, to observe the operations of Nature."

This passage is much ridiculed by Voltaire, who asserts that it is founded on some experiments made by one Needham, who placed some rye-meal in well-corked bottles, and some boiled mutton gravy in other bottles, and found that eels were produced in each. We do not know sufficient of the history of Needham's experiments, either to affirm or deny their authenticity, but we feel bound to remind our readers of the much-decried experiments conducted by Mr. Crosse, and which were afterwards verified by Mr. Weekes, of Sandwich. In these cases, insects were produced by the action of a powerful voltaic battery upon a saturated solution of silicate of potash, and upon ferro cyanuret of potassium. The insects were a species of acarus, minute and semi-transparent, and furnished with long bristles, which could only be seen by the aid of the microscope. The sixth chapter treats of man, and the author thus answers the question, "What is man?":—

"We say he is a material being, organized after a peculiar manner, conformed to a certain mode of thinking, of feeling, capable of modification in certain modes peculiar to himself, to his organization, to that particular combination of matter which is found assembled in him. If again it be asked, What origin we give to beings of the human species? We reply, that like all other beings, man is a production of na-

ture, who resembles them in some respects, and finds himself submitted to the same laws; who differs from them in other respects, and follows particular laws determined by the diversity of his conformation. If then it be demanded, Whence came man? We answer, our experience on this head does not capacitate us to resolve the question; but that it cannot interest us, as it suffices for us to know that man exists, that he is so constituted as to be competent to the effects we witness."

In the seventh chapter the author, treating of the soul and spirit, says:—

"The doctrine of spirituality, such as it now exists, offers nothing but vague ideas, or, rather, is the absence of all ideas. What does it present to the mind but a substance which possesses nothing of which our senses enable us to have a knowledge? Can it be truth, that man is able to figure to himself a being not material, having neither extent nor parts, which, nevertheless, acts upon matter without having any point of contact, any kind of analogy with it; and which itself receives the impulse of matter by means of material organs, which announce to it the presence of other beings? Is it possible to conceive the union of the soul with the body; to comprehend how this material body can bind, enclose, constrain, determine a fugitive being, which escapes all our senses? Is it honest, is it plain dealing, to solve these difficulties, by saying there is a mystery in them, that they are the effects of a power more inconceivable than the human soul, than its mode of acting, however concealed from our view? When to resolve these problems, man is obliged to have recourse to miracles, to make the Divinity interfere, does he not avow his own ignorance? When notwithstanding the ignorance he is thus obliged to avow by availing himself of the divine agency, he tells us, this immaterial substance, this soul, shall experience the action of the element of fire, which he allows to be material; when he confidently says, this soul shall be burnt; shall suffer in

purgatory—have we not a right to believe, that either he has a design to deceive us, or else that he does not himself understand that which he is so anxious we shall take upon his word?"

The ninth chapter, after treating of the diversity of the intellectual faculties, proceeds, "Man at his birth brings with him into the world nothing but the necessity of conserving himself, of rendering his existence happy; instruction, examples, the custom of the world, present him with the means, either real or imaginary, of achieving it; habit procures for him the facility of employing these means:"—

"In order that man may become virtuous, it is absolutely requisite that he should have an interest, that he should find advantages in practicing virtue. For this end, it is necessary that education should implant in him reasonable ideas; that public opinion should lean towards virtue, as the most desirable good; that example should point it out as the object most worthy of esteem; that government should faithfully recompense, should regularly reward it; that honor should always accompany its practice; that vice should constantly be despised; that crime should invariably be punished. Is virtue in this situation amongst men? Does the education of man infuse into him just, faithful ideas of happiness—true notions of virtue—dispositions really favorable to the beings with whom he is to live? The examples spread before him, are they suitable to innocence of manners? Are they calculated to make him respect decency, to cause him to love probity, to practice honesty, to value good faith, to esteem equity, to revere conjugal fidelity, to observe exactitude in fulfilling his duties? Religion, which alone pretends to regulate his manners, does it render him sociable? does it make him pacific? does it teach him to be humane? The arbiters, the sovereigns of society, are they faithful in recompensing, punctual in rewarding, those who have best served their country, in punishing those who have pillaged, who have robbed, who have plundered, who have di-

vided, who have ruined it? Justice, does she hold her scales with a firm, with an even hand, between all the citizens of the state? The laws, do they never support the strong against the weak, favor the rich against the poor, uphold the happy against the miserable? In short, is it an uncommon spectacle to behold crime frequently justified, often applauded, sometimes crowned with success, insolently triumphing, arrogantly striding over that merit which it disdains, over that virtue which it outrages? Well, then, in societies thus constituted, virtue can only be heard by a very small number of peaceable citizens, a few generous souls, who know how to estimate its value, who enjoy it in secret. For the others, it is only a disgusting object; they see in it nothing but the supposed enemy to their happiness, or the censor of their individual conduct."

In the tenth chapter, which is upon the soul, the author says :—

"The diversity in the temperament of man, is the natural, the necessary source of the diversity of his passions, of his taste, of his ideas of happiness, of his opinions of every kind. Thus this same diversity will be the fatal source of his disputes—of his hatreds—of his injustice—every time he shall reason upon unknown objects, but to which he shall attach the greatest importance. He will never understand either himself or others, in speaking of a spiritual soul, or of immaterial substances distinguished from nature; he will, from that moment, cease to speak the same language, and he will never attach the same ideas to the same words. What then shall be the common standard that shall decide which is the man that thinks with the greatest justice?

"Propose to a man to change his religion for yours, he will believe you a madman; you will only excite his indignation, elicit his contempt; he will propose to you, in his turn, to adopt his own peculiar opinions; after much reasoning, you will treat each other as absurd beings, ridiculously opinionated, pertinaciously

stubborn; and he will display the least folly who shall first yield. But, if the adversaries become heated in the dispute, which always happens, when they suppose the matter important, or when they would defend the cause of their own self-love, from thence their passions sharpen, they grow angry, quarrels are provoked, they hate each other, and end by reciprocal injury. It is thus that for opinions, which no man can demonstrate, we see the Brachman despised; the Mahomedan hated; the Pagan held in contempt; that they oppress and disdain each with the most rancorous animosity: the Christian burns the Jew at what is called an *Auto-da-fe*, because he clings to the faith of his fathers; the Roman Catholic condemns the Protestant to the flames, and makes a conscience of massacreing him in cold blood; this re-acts in his turn; sometimes the various sects of Christians league together against the incredulous Turk, and for a moment suspend their own bloody disputes that they may chastise the enemies to the true faith: then, having glutted their revenge, return with redoubled fury, to wreak over again their infuriated vengeance on each other."

The thirteenth chapter argues as follows, against the doctrine of the immortality of the soul and a future state:—

"In old age, man extinguishes entirely, his fibres become rigid, his nerves lose their elasticity, his senses are obtunded, his sight grows dim, his ears lose their quickness, his ideas become unconnected, his memory fails, his imagination cools,—what, then, becomes of his soul? Alas! it sinks down with the body, it gets benumbed as this loses its feeling, becomes sluggish as this decays in activity; like it, when enfeebled by years, it fulfils its functions with pain; this substance, which is deemed spiritual, which is considered immaterial, which it is endeavored to distinguish from matter, undergoes the same revolutions, experiences the same vicissitudes, submits to the same modifications as does the body itself. In

despite of this proof of the materiality of the soul, of its identity with the body so convincing to the unprejudiced, some thinkers have supposed that although the latter is perishable, the former does not perish; that this portion of man enjoys the especial privilege of immortality; that it is exempt from dissolution; free from those changes of form all the beings in nature undergo: in consequence of this, man is persuaded himself that this privileged soul does not die.

"It will be asked, perhaps, by what road has man been conducted to form to himself gratuitous ideas of another world? I reply, that it is a truth man has no idea of a future life; they are the ideas of the past and the present, that furnish his imagination with the materials of which he constructs the edifice of the regions of futurity. Hobbes says, 'We believe that, that which is will always be, and that the same causes will have the same effects.' Man in his actual state has two modes of feeling—one, that he approves; another, that he disapproves: thus persuaded that these two modes of feeling must accompany him even beyond his present existence, he placed in the regions of eternity two distinguished abodes; one destined to felicity; the other to misery: the one must contain those who obey the calls of superstition, who believe in its dogmas; the other is a prison, destined to avenge the cause of heaven on all those who shall not faithfully believe the doctrines promulgated by the ministers of a vast variety of superstitions. Has sufficient attention been paid to the fact that results as a necessary consequence from this reasoning; which on examination will be found to have rendered the first place entirely useless, seeing, that by the number and contradiction of these various systems, let man believe whichever he may, let him follow it in the most faithful manner, still he must be ranked as an Infidel, as a rebel to the divinity; because he cannot believe in all; and those from which he dissents, by a consequence of their own creed, condemn him to the prison-house?—Such is the origin of the ideas upon a future life, so

diffused among mankind. Everywhere may be seen an Elysium, and a Tartarus, a Paradise and a Hell; in a word, two distinguished abodes, constructed according to the imagination of the enthusiasts who have invented them; who have accommodated them to their own peculiar prejudices, to the hopes, to the fears of the people who believe in them. The Indian figures the first of these abodes as one of inaction, of permanent repose, because, being the inhabitant of a hot climate, he has learned to contemplate rest as the extreme of felicity: the Mussulman promises himself corporeal pleasures, similar to those that actually constitute the object of his research in this life; each figures to himself that on which he has learned to set the greatest value."

"As for the miserable abode of souls, the imagination of fanatics, who were desirous of governing the people, strove to assemble the most frightful images to render it still more terrible; fire is of all things that which produces in man the most pungent sensation; not finding anything more cruel, the enemies to the several dogmas were to be everlastingly punished with this torturing element: fire, therefore, was the point at which their imagination was obliged to stop; the ministers of the various systems agreed pretty generally, that fire would one day avenge their offended divinities; thus, they painted the victims to the anger of the gods, or rather those who questioned their own creeds, as confined in fiery dungeons; as perpetually rolling into a vortex of bituminous flames; as plunged in unfathomable gulfs of liquid sulphur; making the infernal caverns resound with their useless groanings, with their unavailing gnashing of teeth. But it will, perhaps, be inquired, how could man reconcile himself to the belief of an existence accompanied with eternal torments; above all, as many according to their own superstitions had reason to fear it for themselves?—Many causes have concurred to make him adopt so revolting an opinion: in the first place, very few thinking men have ever believed such an absurdity, when

they have deigned to make use of their reason; or, when they have accredited it, this notion was always counterbalanced by the idea of the goodness, by a reliance on the mercy, which they attributed to their respective divinities: in the second place, those who were blinded by their fears never rendered to themselves any account of these strange doctrines which they either received with awe from their legislators, or which were transmitted to them by their fathers; in the third place, each sees the object of his terrors only at a favorable distance; moreover, superstition promises him the means of escaping the tortures he believes he has merited."

We conclude by quoting the following eloquent passage:—

"Oh! Nature! sovereign of all beings! and ye, her adorable daughters, Virtue, Reason, and Truth! remain forever our reverend protectors. It is to you that belong the praises of the human race; to you appertains the homage of the earth. Show us, then, oh! Nature! that which man ought to do, in order to obtain the happiness which thou makest him desire.—Virtue! animate him with thy beneficent fire! Reason! conduct his uncertain steps through the paths of life. Truth! let thy torch illumine his intellect, dissipate the darkness of his road.....Banish error from our mind, wickedness from our hearts, confusion from our footsteps. Cause knowledge to extend its salubrious reign, goodness to occupy our souls, serenity to dwell in our bosoms.....Let our eyes, so long either dazzled or blindfolded, be at length fixed upon those objects we ought to seek. Dispel forever those mists of ignorance, those hideous phantoms, together with those seducing chimeras, which only serve to lead us astray. Extricate us from that dark abyss into which we are plunged by superstition, overthrow the fatal empire of delusion, crumble the throne of falsehood, wrest from their polluted hands the power they have usurped."

"I."

BIOGRAPHY

OF

ROBERT TAYLOR.

MANY of the readers of this number will, from their own memories, be better able to do justice to him, whom Henry Hunt named "The Devil's Chaplain," than we shall in our limited space. Robert Taylor was born at Edmonton, in the county of Middlesex, on the 18th of August, 1784. His family was highly respectable, and his parents were in affluent circumstances; but, being a younger son in a family of eleven children, it was necessary that Robert Taylor should follow some profession. His father died when he was about seven years old, leaving him under the guardianship of a paternal uncle. When seventeen years of age, he was apprenticed to a surgeon, at Birmingham, and studied medicine afterwards under Sir Astley Cooper and Mr. Clive, passing the College of Surgeons with considerable *eclat*. When about twenty-three, he became acquainted with the Rev. Thomas Cotterell, a clergyman of the Established Church, of high evangelical principles, who induced him to quit physic for metaphysics, and in 1809 Robert Taylor entered Saint John's College, Cambridge, and in 1813 took his degree of Bachelor of Arts. He was publicly complimented by the Master of the College as a singular honor to the University in his scholarship, and was ordained on the 14th of March, 1813, by the bishop of

Chichester; from that time until 1818, Taylor officiated as curate at Midhurst. Here he became acquainted with a person named Ayling, who held Deistical opinions, and who induced Taylor to read various Freethinking works; this soon resulted in an avowal of Deism on the part of Taylor, who tendered his resignation to his Bishop. His friends and family were much alarmed, and much pressure was brought to bear upon him, and we regret to state that it had the effect of producing a temporary recantation. This, however, brought Taylor no relief; he found himself in distress, and shunned by his family. Through the kindness of an old friend, he obtained the curacy of Yardley, near Birmingham, but his previous apostacy having reached the ears of the Bishop, the necessary license was refused, and the rector received a peremptory notice to dismiss Taylor. This harsh treatment caused a reaction, and while the rector sought another curate, Taylor preached a series of sermons, by means of which he shook the faith of nearly the whole of his congregation. The following is an abstract of his last sermon at Yardley :—

"The text was, 'For as Jonah was three days and three nights in the whale's belly, so shall the son of man be three days and three nights in the heart of the earth'—Matt. xii., 40. He began, 'Then this glorious miracle of the man having been 'swallowed alive by a fish, and remaining alive for seventy-two hours, undigested and unhurt, in the fish's bowels, and being vomited up unhurt and safe upon the dry land, was as true as the gospel; and consequently the gospel was as true, but not more true, than this sea-sick miracle. He inferred that no person could have a right to pretend to believe in the death and resurrection of Christ, who had the least doubt as to the reality of the deglutition and evomition of the prophet Jonah. As to the natural improbabilities and physical impossibilities of this very wonderful Bible miracle, these were nothing in the way of a true and lively faith. Where miracles of any sort were concerned,

there could be no distinction into the greater and the less, since infinite power was as necessary to the reality of the least as to the greatest. We should never forget that it was the Lord who prepared the fish, and prepared him for the express purpose of swallowing the man, and probably gave him a little opening physic, to cleanse the apartment for the accommodation of its intended tenant; and had the purpose been, that the whole ship and all the crew should have been swallowed as well as he, there's no doubt that they could have been equally well accommodated. But as to what some wicked Infidels objected, about the swallow of the whale being too narrow to admit the passage of the man, it only required a little stretching, and even a herring or a sprat might have gulped him. He enlarged, most copiously, on the circumstance of the Lord speaking to the fish, in order to cause him to vomit; and insisted on the natural efficacy of the Lord, which was quite enough to make anybody sick. He pointed out the many interesting examples of faith and obedience which had been set by the scaly race, who were not only at all times easy to be caught in the gospel net, when thrown over them by the preaching of the word, but were always ready to surrender their existence to the Almighty, whenever he pleased to drop 'em a line. That as the first preachers of the gospel were fishermen, so the preachers of the gospel, to this day, might truly be said to be looking after the loaves and fishes, and they who, as the Scripture says, are 'wise to catch soles,' speak to them for no other purpose than that for which the Lord spake unto the whale—that is, to ascertain how much they can swallow. The moral of this pungent persiflage, aimed to admonish the proud and uncharitable believer, who expected his acceptance with the deity on the score of his credulity, that when his credulity was fairly put to trial, it might be found that he was in reality as far from believing what he did not take to be true as the most honest and avowed Infidel. 'Thou then who wouldst put a trick upon infinite wisdom, and prefer-

est the imagined merit of a weak understanding to the real utility of an honest heart—thou who wouldst

> 'Compound for sins thou art inclined to,
> By damning those thou hast no mind to;'

hast thou no fears for thy presumptuous self? Thou believest only that which seemeth to thee to be true; what does the Atheist less? And that which appeareth to be a lie thou rejectest; what does the Atheist more? Can we think that God has given us reason only to betray us, and made us so much superior to the brute creation, only to deal with us so much worse than they, to punish us for making the best use we could of the faculties he has given us, and to make the very excellence of our nature the cause of our damnation?'"

This concluded his connection with the Church of England, and his brother having consented to make him an allowance of one pound per week if he would quit England, he retired to the Isle of Man. After nine weeks his brother ceased to remit; and to support himself, Taylor wrote for the two newspapers then published in the island, but his articles attracting attention, he was summoned before the Bishop, and compelled to quit the island under a threat of imprisonment. In deep distress, he went to Dublin, where he lectured on Deism until 1824, when he came to London, and founded the Christian Evidence Society. Many of the discourses delivered by him were printed in "The Lion," which was first published in 1828. In 1827 Mr. Taylor was tried at Guildhall for blasphemy, and was sentenced to imprisonment in Oakham gaol for one year. In Oakham he wrote "The Diegesis" and "Syntagma." After his release from prison in 1829, he, together with Richard Carlile, made a tour through England on an Infidel mission, commencing with a challenge to the Cambridge University. In 1830 and 1831 he delivered a series of discourses, which are printed together under the title of "The Devil's Pulpit." On the 4th July, 1831, he was again tried for

blasphemy and sentenced to two years' imprisonment. In 1833 he delivered a number of discourses, which were printed in the "Philalethean." He was the friend and companion of Richard Carlile for several years. It is difficult to quote from Robert Taylor's works, unless at the risk of doing him great injustice, and we must therefore refer our readers to the works we have named. The following is from "The Devil's Pulpit:"—

"The gentlemen who distribute religious tracts, the general body of dissenting preachers, and almost all persons engaged in the trade of religion, imagine themselves to have a mighty advantage against Infidels, upon the strength of that last and reckless argument—that whether the Christian religion be true or false, there can be no harm in believing; and that belief is, at any rate, the safe side. Now, to say nothing of this old Popish argument, which a sensible man must see is the very essence of Popery, and would oblige us to believe all the absurdities and nonsense in the world: inasmuch as if there be no harm in believing, and there be some harm and danger in not believing, the more we believe the better: and all the argument necessary for any religion whatever would be, that it should frighten us out of our wits: the more terrible, the more true: and it would be our duty to become the converts of that religion whatever it might be, whose priests could swear the loudest, and damn and curse the fiercest. But I am here to grapple with this Popery in disguise, this wolfish argument in sheepish clothing, upon Scriptural ground, and on Scriptural ground only; taking the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament, for this argument's sake, to be divine authority. The question proposed is, 'Whether is the believer or the unbeliever the more likely to be saved, taking the Scriptures to be of divine authority?' And I stand here, on this divine authority, to prove that the unbeliever is the more likely to be saved: that unbelief, and not belief, is the safe side, and that a man is more likely to be damned for believing the

gospel, and because of his having believed it, than for rejecting and despising it, as I do.....:But, if a patient hearing be more than good Christians be minded to give us, when thus I advance to meet them on their own ground, their impatience and intolerance itself will supply the evidence and demonstration of the fact, that, after all, they dare not stand to the text of their own book, that it is not the Bible that they go by, nor God whom they regard: but that they want to be God-a'-mighties themselves, and would have us take their words for God's words; you must read it as they read it, and understand it as they understand it: you must 'skip, and go on,' just where a hard word comes in the way of the sense they choose to put upon't: you must believe what the book contains, what you see with your own eyes that it does not contain: you must shut your eyes, and not see what it does contain; or you'll be none the nearer the mark of their liking. .....Taking the authority of Scripture, for this argument's sake, to be decisive, I address the believer who would give himself airs of superiority, would chuckle in an imaginary safety in believing, and presume to threaten the unbeliever as being in a worse case, or more dangerous plight, than he. 'Hast thou no fears for thy presumptuous self?' when on the showing of thine own book, the safety (if safety there be) is all on the unbelieving side? When for any one text that can be produced, seeming to hold out any advantage or safety in believing, we can produce two in which the better hope is held out to the unbeliever? For any one apparent exhortation to believe, we can produce two forbiddances to believe, and many threatenings of God's vengeance to, and for the crime and folly of, believing. To this proof I proceed, by showing you:—1st. What the denunciations of God's vengeance are: with no comment of mine, but in the words of the text itself. 2d. That these dreadful denunciations are threatened to believers: and that they are not threatened to unbelievers. And 3d. That all possible advantages and safety, which believing could confer

on any man, are likely, and more likely to be conferred on the unbeliever than on the believer. That the danger of the believer is so extreme, that no greater danger can possibly be. 1st. What are the denunciations of God's vengeance? 'There are' (says the holy Revelation, xiv. 10,) 'who shall drink of the wine of the wrath of God, which is poured out without mixture into the cup of his indignation, and shall be tormented with fire and brimstone, and the smoke of their torment ascendeth up forever and ever: and they have no rest day or night.' There's 'glad tidings of great joy' for you! The Christian may get over the terror of this denunciation by the selfish and ungenerous chuckle of his 'Ah! well, these were very wicked people, and must have deserved their doom; it need not alarm us: it doesn't apply to us.' But good-hearted men would rather say, 'It does apply. We cannot be indifferent to the misery of our fellow-creatures. The self-same Heaven that frowns on them, looks lowering upon us.' And who were they? and what was their offence? Was it Atheism? was it Deism? was it Infidelity? No! It was for church and chapel-going; it was for adoring, believing, and worshipping. They worshipped the beast: I know not what beast they worshipped; but I know that if you go into any of our churches and chapels at this day, you will find them worshipping the Lamb; and if worshipping a lamb be not most suspiciously like worshipping a beast, you may keep the color in your cheeks, while mine are blanched with fear. The unbeliever only can be absolutely safe from this danger. He only who has no religion at all, is sure not to be of the wrong religion. He who worships neither God nor Devil, is sure not to mistake one of those gentlemen for the other. But will it be pretended, that these are only metaphors of speech, that the thing said is not the thing that's meant? Why, then, they are very ugly metaphors. And what is saying that which you don't mean, and meaning the contrary to what you say, but lying? And what worse can become of the

Infidel, who makes it the rule of his life 'to hear and speak the plain and simple truth,' than of the Christian, whose religion itself is a system of metaphors and allegories, of double meanings, of quirks and quiddities, in dread defiance of the text that warns him, that 'All liars shall have their part in the lake which burneth with fire and brimstone?' Rev. xxi. 8.

"Is it a parable that a man may merely entertain his imagination withal, and think no more on't,—though not a word be hinted about a parabolical signification, and the text stands in the mouth of him who, we are told, was the truth itself? And he it is who brought life and immortality to light, that hath described in the 16th of Luke, such an immortality as that of one who was a sincere believer, a son of Abraham, who took the Bible for the rule of his life, and was anxious to promote the salvation of his brethren, yet found for himself no Saviour, no salvation; but, 'In Hell he lifted up his eyes being in torment: and saith Father Abraham, have mercy on me, and send Lazarus, that he may dip the tip of his finger in water, and cool my tongue, for I am tormented in this flame.' But that request was refused. 'Then he said, I pray thee, therefore, Father, that thou wouldst send him to my father's house; for I have five brethren, that he may testify unto them, lest they also come to this place of torment.' But that request was refused. There's 'glad tidings of great joy' for you! That the believer's danger of coming or going into that place of torment is so great, that greater cannot possibly be: and that his belief will stand him in no stead at all, but make his plight a thousand times worse than if he had not been a believer; and that unbelief is the safer side—Christ himself being judge—I quote no words but his to prove. Is the believer concerned to save his soul, then shall he most assuredly be damned for being so concerned: for Christ hath said, 'Whosoever will save his soul shall lose it.' Matthew xvi. 25. Is the believer a complete beggar? If he be not so, if he hath a rag that he doth call his own, he will be damned to

all eternity. For Christ hath said, 'Whosoever he be of you who forsaketh not all that he hath, he cannot be my disciple.' Luke xiv. 33. Is the believer a rich man? and dreams he of going to Heaven? 'It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle.' Matthew xix. 24. Is he a man at all, then he cannot be saved,' for Christ hath said, 'Thou believest that there is one God;' saith St. James, 'Thou dost well, the Devils also believe and tremble.' 2 James xix. And so much good, and no more, than comes to damned spirits in the flames of Hell, is all the good that ever did and can come of believing. 'For though thou hadst all faith, so that thou couldst remove mountains,' saith St. Paul, 'It should profit thee nothing.' 1 Cor. xiii. 2. Well, then! let the good Christian try what saving his prayers will do for him: this is the good that they'll do for him; and he hath Christ's own word to comfort him in't, 'He shall receive the greater damnation.' Luke xx. 47. Well, then, since believing will not save him, since faith will not save him, since prayer will not save him, but all so positively make things all the worse, and none the better, there's one other chance for him. Let him go and receive the Sacrament, the most comfortable Sacrament, you know, 'of the body and blood of Christ,' remembering, as all good communicants should, 'that he is not worthy so much as to gather up the crumbs that fall from that table.' 'Truth, Lord! But the dogs eat of the crumbs that fall from their master's table!' O what happy dogs! But let those dogs remember, that it is also truth, that 'He that eateth and drinketh unworthily, eateth and drinketh damnation to himself.' 1 Cor. xvi. 29. O what precious eating and drinking!

> "'My God! and is thy table spread;
> And doth thy cup with love o'erflow?
> Thither be all the children led,
> And let them all thy sweetness know.'

"That table is a snare, that cup is deadly poison, that bread shall send thy soul to Hell. Well, then!

try again, believer: perhaps you had better join the Missionary Society, and subscribe to send these glad tidings of these blessed privileges, and this jolly eating and drinking, to the Heathen. Why, then, you have Christ's own assurance, that when you shall have made one proselyte, you shall just have done him the kindness of making him twofold more the child of Hell than yourself. Mat. xxiii. 15. Is the believer liable to the ordinary gusts of passion, and in a passion shall he drop the hasty word, 'thou fool?' for that one word 'he shall be in danger of Hell fire.' Mat. v. 22. Nay, Sirs! this isn't the worst of the believer's danger. Would he but keep his legs and arms together, and spare his own eyes and limbs; he doth by that very mercy to himself damn his eyes and limbs—and hath Christ's assurance that it would have been profitable for him rather to have plucked out his eyes, and chopt off his limbs, and so to have wriggled and groped his way through the 'Straight gate and the narrow way that leadeth unto life,' than having two eyes and two arms, or two legs, to be cast into Hell, into the fire that never shall be quenched, where their 'worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched.' Mark ix. 43. Well, then! will the believer say, what were all the miracles and prophecies of both the Old and the New Testament for? those unquestionable miracles, and clearly-accomplished prophecies, if it were not that men should believe? Why, absolutely, they were the very arguments appointed by God himself to show us that men should not believe, but that damnation should be their punishment if they did believe. 'To the law and the testimony.' Sirs! These are the very words:—'Of miracles, saith God's word, 'They are the spirits of devils, that work miracles.' Rev. xvi. 14. And it is the Devil who 'deceiveth them which dwell on the earth, by means of those miracles which he hath power to do.' Rev. xiii. 14. So much for miracles. Is it on the score of prophets and of prophecies, then, that you will take believing to be the safe side? Then 'thus saith the Lord of Hosts, the God of Israel, the prophets

prophesy falsely and the priests bear rule by their means.' Jer. v. 31. 'The prophet is a fool: the spiritual man is mad.' Hosea i. 7. 'Thus saith the Lord of Hosts, hearken not unto the prophets.' Jer. xxiii. 15. 'O Israel, thy prophets are like the foxes of the desert.' Ezekiel xiii. 4. 'They lie unto thee.' Jerem. xiv. 14. 'And they shall be tormented day and night forever and ever.' Rev. xx. 10. 'And the punishment of the prophet shall be even as the punishment of him that seeketh unto him.' Ezekiel xiv. 10. Nay more, then, it is, when God hath determined to damn men, that he, in every instance, causeth them to become believers, and to have faith in divine Revelation, in order that they may be damned. Believers, and none but believers, becoming liable to damnation; believers and none but believers, being capable of committing that unpardonable sin against the Holy Ghost, which hath never forgiveness, neither in this world nor in that which is to come. 'Whereas all other kinds of blasphemy shall be forgiven unto men, and all sorts of blasphemy wherewith soever they shall blaspheme. But there is no forgiveness for believers.' Mark iii. 28. For it is written, 'For this cause God shall send them strong delusion, that they should believe a lie: that they all might be damned.' 2 Thessal. ii. 11. So when it was determined by God that the wicked Ahab should perish, the means to bring him to destruction, both of body and soul, was to make him become a believer.

"I offer no comment of my own on words so sacred; but these are the words: 'Hear thou, therefore, the word of the Lord. I saw the Lord sitting upon his throne, and all the hosts of Heaven standing by him on his right hand and on his left. And the Lord said, who shall persuade Ahab that he may go up and fall at Ramoth Gilead? and one said on this manner, and another said on that manner. And there stood forth a spirit, and stood before the Lord, and said: I will persuade him. And the Lord said unto him wherewith? And he said, I will go forth, and I will be a lying spirit in the mouth of all his prophets. And he said, thou

shalt persuade him, and prevail also. Go forth and do so. Now, therefore, behold the Lord hath put a lying spirit in the mouth of all thy prophets.' 1 Kings xxii. 22. There were 400 of 'em; they were 'the goodly fellowship of the prophets for you; all of them inspired by the spirit from on high, and all of them lying as fast as they could lie.' So much for getting on the safe side by believing. Had Ahab been an Infidel, he would have saved his soul alive. As it was, we may address him in the words of St. Paul to just such another fool, 'King Ahab, believest thou the prophets? I know that thou believest: but no better than I know, that for that very belief, fell slaughter on thy soul: and where thou soughtest to be saved by believing, it was by believing thou wert damned.' So when Elijah had succeeded in converting the 450 worshippers of Baal, who had been safe enough while they were Infidels, and they began crying, 'the Lord He is God, the Lord He is God:' the moment they got into the right faith, they found themselves in the wrong box; and the prophet, by the command of God, put a stop to their Lord-Godding, by cutting their throats for 'em. 'Elijah brought them down to the brook of Kishon, and slew them there.' 1 Kings xviii. 40. Oh! what a blessed thing, you see, to be converted to the true faith! Thus all the sins and crimes that have been committed in the world, and all God's judgments upon sin and sinners, have been the consequence of religion, and faith, and believing. What was the first sin committed in the world? It was believing. Had our great mother Eve not been a believing credulous fool, she would not have been in the transgression. Who was the first reverend divine that began preaching about God and immortality? It was the Devil. What was the first lie that was ever told, the very damning and damnable lie? It was the lie told to make folks believe that they would not be dead when they were dead, that they should not surely die, but that they should be as gods, and live in a future state of existence. When God himself hath declared, that there is no future state

of existence: that 'Dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return.' Who is it, then, that prefers believing in the Devil rather than in God, but the believer?—And from whom is the hope of a future state derived, but from the father of lies—the Devil? But if in defiance of so positive a declaration of Almighty God, men will have it that there is a future state of existence after death, who are they who shall sit down with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, in the kingdom of Heaven, but unbelievers, let 'em come from the north, from the south, from the east, or from the west? And who are they that shall be cast out, but believers, 'the children of the kingdom?' As St. Peter very charitably calls them, 'cursed children.' 2 Peter ii. 14. That is, I suppose, children with beards, children that never grew to sense enough to put away childish things, but did in gawky manhood, like new-born babes, desire the pure milk and lollipop of the gospel. 'For of such is the kingdom of Heaven.' And who are they whom Christ will set upon his right hand, and to whom he will say, 'Come ye blessed of my father!' but unbelievers, who never troubled their minds about religion, and never darkened the doors of a gospel shop? But who are they to whom he will say, 'Depart ye cursed into everlasting fire, prepared for the Devil and his angels,' but believers, every one of them believers, chapel-going folks, Christ's blood-men, and incorrigible bigots, that had been bothering him all their days with their 'Lord! Lord!' to come off at last with no better reward of their faith than that he will protest unto them, I never knew ye.

"One text there is, and only one, against ten thousand of a contrary significancy: which, being garbled and torn from its context, seems, for a moment, to give the advantage to the believer; the celebrated 19th chapter of Mark, v. 16:—'He that believeth, and is baptized, shall be saved; but he that believeth not, shall be damned.' But little will this serve the deceitful hope of the Christian, for it is immediately added, 'And these signs shall follow them that believe;

in my name shall they cast out devils; they shall speak with new tongues; they shall take up serpents; and if they drink any deadly thing, it shall not hurt them; they shall lay hands on the sick, and they shall recover.' Can the Christian show these signs, or any of them? Will he dare to take up a serpent, or drink prussic acid? If he hesitate, he is not a believer, and his profession of belief is a falsehood. Let belief confer what privilege it may, he hath no part nor lot in the matter; the threat which he denounces against Infidels hangs over himself, and he hath no sign of salvation to show. Believing the gospel, then, (or rather, I should say, professing to believe it, for I need not tell you that there's a great deal more professing to believe, than believing,) instead of making a man the more likely to be saved, doubles his danger of damnation, inasmuch as Christ hath said, that 'the last state of that man shall be worse than the first.' Luke xi. 26. And his holy apostle Peter addeth, 'It would have been better for them not to have known the way (2 Peter ii. 21) of righteousness.' The sin of believing makes all other sins that a man can commit so much the more heinous and offensive in the sight of God, inasmuch as they are sins against light and knowledge: and 'the servant who knew his Lord's will, and did it not, he shall be beaten with many stripes.' Luke xii. 47. While unbelief is not only innocent in itself, but so highly pleasing to Almighty God, that it is represented as the cause of his forgiveness of things which otherwise would not be forgiven. Thus St. Paul, who had been a blasphemer, a persecutor, and injurious, assures us that it was for this cause he obtained mercy, 'because he did it ignorantly in unbelief.' 1 Tim. i. 13. Had he been a believer, he would as surely have been damned as his name was Paul. And 'tis the gist of his whole argument, and the express words of the 11th of the Epistle to the Romans, that 'God included them all in unbelief, that he might have mercy upon all.' Unbelief being the essential qualification and recommendation to God's mercy: not without good

reason was it that the pious father of the boy that had the devil in him, when he had need of Christ's mercy, and knew that unbelief would be the best title to it, cried out and said with tears, 'Lord, I believe, help thou mine unbelief!'. Mark ix. 24. While the Apostles themselves, who were most immediately near and dear to Christ, no more believed the Gospel than I do; and for all they have said and preached about it, they never believed it themselves, as Christ told 'em that they hadn't so much faith as a grain of mustard seed. And the evangelist John bears them record, to their immortal honor, that 'though Christ had done so many miracles among them, yet believed they not.' John xii. 37. And the same divine authority assures us that 'neither did his brethren believe in him.' John vii. 5. Which then is 'the safe side,' Sirs, on the showing of the record itself? On the unbelieving side, the Infidel stands in the glorious company of the Apostles, in the immediate family of Christ, and hath no fear; while the believer doth as well and no better than the devils in hell, who believe and tremble." "I."

BIOGRAPHY

OF

JOSEPH BARKER.

In any work, purporting to be a true record of Freethinkers, the name of Joseph Barker cannot be omitted. We find in him, from the commencement of his public life till the present time, an ardent desire for, and a determination to achieve, freedom of thought and expression on all subjects appertaining to theology, politics, and sociology. Possessing a vigorous intellect, a constitution naturally strong, great oratorical ability, and an unrivalled command of the Saxon language, he has made himself a power among each party with whom the transitory state of his mind has brought him in contact. It is seldom we find men with equal boldness, when once connected with Wesleyan Methodism, rising superior in thought to its narrow, selfish, dogmatic, unnatural, and humiliating views, and claiming for human nature a more dignified and exalted position; gradually advancing to Unitarianism; ultimately to land safely on the shore of Materialism. Joseph Barker has passed, amid persecution and privation, through these different phases of theology, to arrive at "Infidelity," to be, he states, a better, wiser, and happier man. In his autobiography, we read that he was born in Bramley, an old country town in the West Riding of Yorkshire, in 1806, the *day* of his birth being forgotten. His parents, and his ancestors, so far as is

known of them, were of humble means. His grandfather was addicted to drinking freely of those beverages which meet with so much opposition from Mr. Barker himself. His aunt also was unfortunate, having married a man who was a minister, a drunkard, and a cock-fighter. His parents appear to have been uneducated and pious; belonging to the old school of Methodists, those who look on this life merely as a state of trial and probation; always looking forward to enjoy their mansion in the skies — the house not made with hands eternal in the heavens, thinking nothing

> .....Worth a thought beneath,
> But how *they* may escape the death
> That never, never dies.

Although living *in* this world, they were not *of* it. It was to them, all vanity and vexation of spirit. They attended their chapel, their love feasts, their class-meetings, their prayer meetings, and their revival meetings, where they would lament over the wickedness and depravity of human nature, where they would "speak their experience," tell of their temptations, pray for the conversion of the world, and sing their hymns, such as the following, which was a favorite with Mr. Barker's family :—

> "Refining fire, go through my heart,
> Illuminate my soul;
> Scatter my life through every part,
> And sanctify the whole."

Such being the character of Mr. Barker's parents, it is no wonder that *he* was "brought up" under the same influence, with the same false notions of life, of humanity, and of the world; and we cannot prize too highly the man who had the industry to investigate, the ability to discern, and the courage to expose the falsity of such doctrines and the disastrous effects of such teaching.

In the extracts we shall give from Mr. Barker's works will be found that simplicity of style and force

of argument peculiar to himself. The first extract we take shows the falsity of the orthodox doctrine of the total depravity of human nature :—

"On looking back on the earlier periods of my life, I first see proofs that the orthodox doctrine of original sin, or of natural total depravity, is a falsehood. I was *not* born totally depraved. I never recollect the time, since I began to think and feel at all, when I had not good thoughts, and good feelings. I never recollect the time since I began to think and feel at all, when I had not many good thoughts, and strong inclinations to goodness. So far was my heart from being utterly depraved or hardened, that I sympathised, even in my childhood, with the humblest of God's creatures, and was filled to overflowing with sorrow at the sight of distress. I recollect one Sunday, while I was searching about for something in one of the windows upstairs, I found a butterfly that had been starved to death, as I supposed. When I laid hold of it, it crumbled to pieces. My feelings were such at the thought of the poor butterfly's sufferings, that I wept. And for all that day I could scarcely open my lips to say a word to any one, without bursting into tears.....And I recollect well what a struggle I had when I first told a lie. A school in the neighborhood had a feast, ours had not, so I played the truant, after a serious struggle, to have an opportunity of seeing the scholars walk. I had a miserable afternoon ; for I felt that I was doing wrong, and I was afraid lest my mother should find me out. My sister found me out and told my mother, but my mother was loth to believe her till she had asked me myself. When I went home my mother asked me if I had been to school, and I said yes, and my mother, as she had never found me out in a lie before, believed me. But I was sadly distressed afterwards, when I thought of what I had done. That lie caused me days of remorse, and my sufferings were all the severer in consequence of my mother having so readily believed what I said."

The unhappy and unnatural effects of theology on

the minds of earnest, truth-seeking men — the total prostration of manly dignity, the perversion of the mental faculties, and the debasement of human nature, is truly stated by Mr. Barker in the following extract:—

"I also recollect being very much troubled with dreadful and indescribably awful dreams, and for several months during certain parts of the year I was accustomed to rise during my sleep, and walk about the house in a state of sleep for hours together. I say in a state of sleep: but I cannot exactly describe the state in which I was. It was not *perfect* sleep, and yet I was not properly awake. My eyes were open, and I saw, as far as I can remember, the things around me, and I could hear what was said to me. But neither what I saw nor what I heard seemed to have power to penetrate far enough into my soul to awake me properly. During those occasions, I was frequently very unhappy, dreadfully unhappy, most horribly miserable. Sometimes I fancied I had been doing something wrong, and my fancied offence seemed horrible beyond all expression, and alarmed and overwhelmed me with unutterable terrors and distress. On one occasion I fancied that both I and my father had both been doing something wrong, and this seemed most horrible and distressing of all; and as I wandered about in my mysterious state, I howled most piteously, and cried and wept as if my heart would break. I never recollect being roused from that dismal state while I was walking about the house, except twice. Once when I struck my shins violently against a large earthenware bowl and hurt myself sadly; and another was when I was attempting to go up the chimney: I put my foot upon the fire and burnt myself, and that awoke me. I suffered in this way for several years. After I went to bed at night I soon fell asleep, and slept perhaps an hour or nearly two. I would then begin to cry, or moan, or howl, and at times to sing. One night I sang a whole hymn of eight verses through; the hymn in Wesley's Hymn Book, beginning

'With glorious clouds encompassed round,
Whom angels dimly see,
Will the unsearchable be found
Or God appear to me?'"

Few persons who have not attended the "class-meetings" of the Wesleyan Methodists can form an adequate idea of the stereotyped phrases and absurd sayings indulged in by those who "speak their experience," etc., at those meetings. Certain sentences are learned, and uttered indiscriminately, without reference to time, place, or other conditions. Mr. Barker, after speaking of the recklessness of speech thus indulged in, says:—

"In many cases this false way of speaking is the result of mere thoughtlessness perhaps, or of ignorance, joined with the notion that it is their duty to pray, or to say something in public. The parties have no *intention* to deceive: but being called on to speak, or invited to pray, they begin, and catch hold of such words as they can find, whether right or wrong, whether true or false. And their words are oftener foolish or false, than wise or true. Their talk is at times most foolish and ridiculous. I will give an example or two. It is customary for people, when praying for preachers, to say, 'Lord, bless thy servants when they stand up to declare thy word: be thou *mouth*, *matter*, and *wisdom* to them.' This has some meaning in it when offered in reference to a preacher, especially a preacher about to preach. In other cases it would be most foolish and ridiculous. Yet I once heard a person in a prayer-meeting at Chester use this same form of expression in behalf of the sick and the dying. 'O Lord,' said he, 'bless the sick and the afflicted, and those that are in the article of death;—be thou mouth, matter, and wisdom to them.' At another prayer-meeting at Chester, on a *Friday* evening, one of the leaders gave out the following lines:—

'Another six days' work is done;
Another *Sabbath* is begun,' etc.

I once heard a woman say in class, 'I do thank God that he ever gave me a desire to see that *death* that never, never *dies*.' "

Soon after Mr. Barker became "religious" and attended his class-meetings, he awaited the usual "call" to preach the gospel. Accordingly, having received the "call," he became a Methodist preacher, belonging to the Old Connexion, the New Connexion, and then advancing to Unitarianism, ultimately arriving at the climax of Freethought, in which cause he is now so distinguished an advocate. While a Methodist preacher, he was induced by a neighbor, an Atheist, to read Carlile's "Republican." We can readily understand why Christians are taught not to read "Infidel" works. The effect the "Republican" produced on Mr. Barker's mind would be augmented, did those Christians investigate what they so often ignorantly denounce. In reference to the "Republican," Mr. Barker says:—

"I was very much struck in reading some portions of the work [Carlile's], and agitated and shaken by its arguments on some points. The object of many of its articles was to prove Christianity irrational and false. The principal doctrines which it assailed were such as the trinity — the common notion about the fall of man, and its effects upon the human race — the Calvinistic notions of eternal, universal, and absolute predestination, unconditional election and reprobation — the Calvinistic notion of God's sovereignty or partiality — the utter depravity of every human being born into the world, and yet the obligation of those utterly depraved beings to steer clear of all evil, and to do all that is right and good, on pain of eternal damnation. The doctrine of satisfaction to justice, was also assailed, and the doctrine of the immortality of the human soul, and the notion that because it is immaterial, it must, as a consequence, be immortal.....The consequence was, that my mind was thrown into a state of doubt and suspense. I cannot say that I doubted the truth of the Christian religion exactly, but still I doubted the

truth of certain doctrines which I had been taught to regard as parts of that religion. I can briefly describe the doubts I had. I neither saw clearly that those doctrines to which he objected were no part of the Christian religion, nor could I see any way by which these doctrines could be defended and proved to be rational and true. One thing began to seem almost certain, either that Christianity was not true, or that those doctrines as generally laid down, were no parts of the Christian religion. This led to investigation. I was wishful to ascertain whether those doctrines which were assailed as irrational, were parts of Christianity or not. I began to converse on the subject with one of my religious companions, and I began to read on the subject as I had opportunity. My companion was rather troubled and alarmed at the doubts I expressed with respect to the correctness of some of the common doctrines of what was considered orthodoxy; still, what I had said had some influence on his mind, for he told me shortly after, that he wished he had never heard my doubts, for what I had said had spoiled some of his best sermons; he would never be able to preach them with comfort more.....During my residence in that [Newcastle] circuit, my views on many subjects became anti-Methodistical to a very great extent indeed. I now no longer held the prevailing views with respect to the nature of justifying faith, the witness of the Spirit, regeneration, sanctification, and the like. In reading Wesley's works, I was astonished at the great number of unmeaning and inconsistent passages which I met with. In many of his views I perfectly agreed with him, but with a vast amount of what he said on other subjects, I could not help but disagree.... ....About this time, finding that there was little likelihood that I should be tolerated in the New Connexion unless I could allow my mind to be enslaved, and feeling that I should be obliged sooner or later to break loose from Methodistical restraint, and speak and act with freedom, I thought of visiting Mr. Turner, the Unitarian minister of Newcastle, and seeking an inter-

view with him. I had heard something to the effect that Unitarians were great lovers of freedom — that they did not bind their ministers and members by any human creeds, but left them at liberty to investigate the whole system of Christianity thoroughly, and to judge as to what were its doctrines and duties for themselves, and to preach what they believe to be true without restraint and persecution, and I thought if this was the case, they must be a very happy people. But from other things which I had heard respecting them, I was led to regard them with something of horror — to look on them as persons who trifled with Scripture authority, as persons who had rushed from the extremes of false orthodoxy into the extremes of Infidelity. I was in consequence prevented from visiting Mr. Turner, and I remained in comparative ignorance of the Unitarian body, in ignorance both of their principles and of their character, still shut up in the dungeons of orthodox slavery."

"The dungeons of orthodox slavery" did not long contain Mr. Barker; for he afterwards became better acquainted with the Unitarians, and formed one of their most energetic preachers. But Unitarianism, appearing to him at first true in its doctrine and free in its advocacy, shortly became insufficient for the cravings of his mind; and, at length, he found himself outside all the churches. The Bible, which at one period of his life seemed to him a perfect revelation from "God," now appeared only the production of erring and half-informed men; and having a thorough knowledge of its contents, he resolved to employ the remainder of his life in confuting the false notions of its "divine authority." America presenting a congenial residence, he resolved to visit that country and purchase some land, upon which he might occupy his leisure from lecturing and writing. Having settled in the country, he considered something should be said on the Bible. Accordingly, in November, 1852, a Bible Convention was held at Salem, Ohio, Mr. Barker being appointed President. We extract the following from

his speech, as illustrating the uncertainty of the Bible translations, the character of the translators, and the nature of the manuscripts from which the translations are made :—

"We say, that the Bible bears on its very face the marks of human imperfection and error. This is true of every Bible in existence. We will begin with the Bible in common use, and what do we find? The title-page tells us it is a *translation* from the original tongues, by the special command of one of the kings of England. Does any one pretend that the translators were infallible—men above the possibility of error? Nothing of the kind. Even those who contend that the original *writers* of the Bible were infallible, do not pretend that the king's translators were so. The sects and priesthoods themselves show that they regard the common translation as imperfect. They all take the liberty to alter it. They alter it in thousands and tens of thousands of places. Nothing is more common than for theological disputants to appeal from the common translation of the Bible to what they call the original Greek and Hebrew. Every commentator takes the same liberty. The leaders of the sects and priesthoods of the day have testified their belief that the Bibles in common use are imperfect and erroneous by making *new* translations. There is scarcely an English sect or priesthood of any note in existence that has not produced a new translation of the Scriptures. John Wesley translated both the Old and New Testament. His translation of the New Testament continues to be used in the Methodist body to this day. Adam Clarke, in his "Commentary," translates afresh almost every important passage in the book. Many passages he translates in such a way as to give them meanings quite contrary to the meaning given them in the common Bible. Richard Watson, a Methodist preacher, commenced a new translation of the Bible. Dr. Boothroyd, a Congregationalist minister of England, published another translation. Dr. Conquest, a layman of the same denomination, published another,

in which he says he made twenty thousand emendations, or improvements. He must, therefore, have thought the common Bible had twenty thousand imperfections or errors. Mr. Belsham, and other English Unitarians, published a new translation of the New Testament. Mr. Wellbeloved, a Unitarian minister, published a new translation of a great part of the Old Testament, intending to publish a new translation of the whole Bible. Even ministers of the Established Church have spoken strongly against the common translation, and some of them have gone so far as to *publish* new translations of *portions* of the Bible. Alexander Campbell, the founder of the denomination which bears his name, has published a new translation of the New Testament. A Mr. Taylor published a new translation of the New Testament from Griesbach's Greek New Testament. A Mr. Sharp published another translation from Griesbach's Greek text. The Baptists have published a new translation of the Bible, I am told..... We are not alone, therefore, in believing that the Bibles in common use bear marks of human imperfection and error. The leading men in all the religious sects and priesthoods of Great Britain and America believe the same. We add, if the translators of the Bible had been the best and wisest men that ever lived, their work would not have been perfect. A translation from Greek and Hebrew cannot be perfect. But the translators employed by King James were not the best or wisest men that ever lived. They were, in some respects, exceedingly ignorant, prejudiced, and immoral.....They were liars and false-swearers. These dignitaries of the Church of England knew, as well as you know, that kings and queens are often vicious, profligate, and godless. They knew that among the kings and queens of England there had been some of the most loathsome lumps of filthiness—some of the most adulterous and lecherous sensualists—some of the most heartless and cruel tyrants—some of the most inhuman and bloody wretches that ever cursed the earth. They knew, too, that English kings and queens gene-

rally were under strong temptations to be thus cruel and profligate, and that it was too much to expect any of them to be strictly religious and virtuous. Yet they bound themselves on oath to call their kings and queens, whatever their characters might be, 'most gracious and religious.' They *did* call the monarch then living, 'most gracious and religious,' and they handed it down as a duty to their successors to give the same high titles to all their future monarchs, though they should be as filthy as that unwieldy, waddling mass of lust and rottenness, King Henry the Eighth, or at false and treacherous as the perjured Charles the First. These translators of the Bible also knew that many who were brought to them to be buried were godless, wicked men. They knew that some of them were drunkards, adulterers, false-swearers. Yet they bound themselves to call them all, as they lowered them into their graves, their 'beloved brethren,' and to declare that they committed them to the dust 'in sure and curtain hope of a resurrection to eternal life,' though they believed in their hearts that they would rise to eternal damnation.....They were the hirelings of the king and government. They regarded the king as the head of the church, and were sworn to obey him in all things. They were sworn to obey him in translating the Bible. The king gave them the rules by which they were to be guided in the work of translation, and they were sworn to follow these rules. These rules were intended to prevent them from putting anything into their translation of the Bible that was at variance with the established priesthoods, and to keep them from leaving out anything that was favorable to the Established Church and government. And they *kept* to their rules, and they were influenced by their interests, their situation, and their prejudices. It would be foolish to think otherwise. To make the Bible agree with their creed, they put into their translation things which were not in the Greek or Hebrew Bibles, and mistranslated vast multitudes of things which were in the Greek and Hebrew Bibles. I will

give you an instance or two. Their creed taught that God once died, or laid down his life. There was nothing in the Greek or Hebrew Bibles to uphold this doctrine, so in translating the Bible they so altered a passage as to make it to teach the doctrine. You may find the passage in 1 John, iii. 16. It is as follows:—'Hereby perceive we the love of God, because he laid down his life for us.' Now the word 'God' is not in the Greek; it was put into the passage by the translators. In one place in the Old Testament it is said that Elhanan slew Goliath the Gittite. The translators have altered the passage so as to make it say that it was the *brother* of Goliath that Elhanan slew. See 2 Samuel xxi. 19.....Before a man can give a perfect translation of the Bible, he must have a perfect knowledge of both the Greek and Hebrew Bible, and of the language into which he would translate it. But no man has that knowledge. The Greek and Hebrew languages, from which the Bible has to be translated, are dead languages—languages which are no longer spoken or written by any people—languages which exist only in ancient writings. The meaning of many of the words of those languages is, in consequence, lost. The writings of the Old Testament are the only books remaining in the Hebrew language. There are no Hebrew books to throw light on dark passages, or to settle the meaning of doubtful words and phrases. True, we have Greek and Hebrew dictionaries and grammars, but these dictionaries and grammars are the work of imperfect and erring men, who had no other means of understanding the meaning of the Greek and Hebrew languages than ourselves. These dictionaries and grammars differ from each other. None of them are perfect. The best abound with errors. We have better means of obtaining a knowledge of the Greek language than of the Hebrew—but the Greek of the New Testament is a peculiar dialect, not to be found in any other book. It is, therefore, as difficult to translate the New Testament as the Old. If, therefore, we would find a Bible that does *not* bear

the marks of human imperfection and error, we must look for it in what are called the original Greek and Hebrew. But there is no such Bible. The Greek and Hebrew Bibles are as really imperfect as the English translations. The Greek and Hebrew Bibles are as really the work of imperfect and erring men as the English translations are. Many people imagine that there is only *one* Greek and Hebrew Bible, and that that one was written by Moses and the prophets, and by the evangelists and the apostles. But this is not the case. There are *several* Greek and Hebrew Bibles, and all of them are the compilations of fallible men. We have several Hebrew Old Testaments, and quite a number of Greek New Testaments, all compiled by different persons, but drawn, to some extent, from different sources. It should be understood, that the oldest Greek and Hebrew Bibles are not printed books, but written ones. They were written before the art of printing was known among Jews or Christians. Those written or manuscript Bibles are more numerous than the Greek and Hebrew printed Bibles. They are the work of different men, in different countries, and different ages. And no two of them are alike. They differ from each other almost endlessly. Some contain more, some less. Some have passages in one form, others have them in other forms. John Mills compared a number of those manuscripts of the New Testament, and found that they differed from each other in thirty thousand places. He marked and collated thirty thousand various readings. Other men have compared the Greek manuscripts of the New Testament, and discovered upwards of a hundred thousand various readings—a hundred thousand places or particulars in which they differ from each other. A similar diversity of readings is to be found in the Hebrew manuscripts of the Old Testaments. Now it is from these imperfect and discordant manuscripts that men have to make their Greek and Hebrew Bibles. They have nothing else from which to make them. And those Greek and Hebrew Bible makers have no

means of knowing which of the various and contradictory manuscripts are the best.....You must understand that the original writings from which the manuscripts now in existence originated, have perished many ages ago. It is probable that the last of them perished more than sixteen hundred years ago. We have, therefore, no opportunity of comparing existing manuscripts with the original writings, in order to find out which are the true, the original readings. The discordant and contradictory manuscripts, therefore, can never be corrected.....It is not only of the common English Bible, therefore, that the words of the resolution are true, but of every Bible known, whether printed or written, whether in Greek and Hebrew, or in modern languages."

Since Mr. Baker has resided in America, he has visited England, and lectured for the Secular and Freethought Societies in England and Scotland; the total number of lectures he delivered during his visit amounted to 153, besides engaging in several debates, the principal one being with the Rev. Brewin Grant, at Halifax, during ten nights, on the "Divine Authority of the Bible," which is now published. The views now held by Mr. Barker on "God" and Secularism may be seen from the following extract of a letter addressed to the Editor of the Reasoner, written by Mr. Barker from America, on February 22, 1853:—

"I confess I know nothing of God but as he is revealed in his works. With me, the word God stands for the unseen cause of all natural phenomena. I attribute to God no quality but what seems necessary to account for what I see in nature. My Jewish and Christian notions of God are all gone, except so far as they appear to be the utterances of nature.....As to Secularism, I think our business is with the seen, the worldly, the physical, the secular. Our whole duty seems to me to be truly and fully to unfold ourselves, and truly and fully to unfold others: to secure the greatest possible perfection of being and condition,

and the largest possible share of life and enjoyment to all mankind in this present world. The machinery of sects and priesthoods for saving souls and fitting men for heaven, I regard as wasteful and injurious folly, except so far as it may tend to better men and improve their condition here. I have a hope of future life, but whatever is best for this life must be best for another life; whatever is best for the present, must be best for the eternal future. To reveal to men the laws of their own being, and to unfold to them the laws of nature generally, and to bring them into harmony with those laws, is, therefore, with me, the whole business of man. If there be another world, as I hope, it will, I suppose, be governed by the same laws as this. If men live on for ever, they will have all the better start in a future life, for having got well on in this. As an *art*, therefore, I believe in Secularism."

J. W.

Note by the American Publisher.—Soon after Mr. Barker's return from England, he resumed his lecturing in various towns and cities in the United States, giving great satisfaction, by his able addresses, to large and intelligent audiences. He still labors occasionally in the same pursuit, though at present he is residing on his farm at Omaha City, in the Territory of Nebraska. Much might be said in praise of his efforts to promote Liberalism in this country; but his greatest triumph, as we consider it, was his public debate with the Rev. Dr. Berg of Philadelphia. This took place on the 9th of January, 1854, and continued no less than *eight evenings*. The question was on "the origin, authority, and tendency of the Bible"—Dr. Berg affirming, and Mr. Barker opposing. This famous discussion was attended by thousands, and was probably the greatest affair of the kind that ever occurred. The speeches on both sides were published, making a large pamphlet of 190 pages. Of course, each of the debaters was victorious, in the opinion of

his friends; but the trick played by the Christian party, in the closing scene, showed a determination on their part to claim the victory whether or no! For, as soon as Dr. Berg (who made the last speech) had finished, one of his friends took the platform, and, while the audience were separating, read some resolutions in favor of the Doctor and the Bible. "Less than one fourth of the audience," says the Philadelphia Register, "voted for them. The more serious part of the audience did not vote at all. The great majority seemed to take the thing as a farce. The result of the vote made a good many long faces on the stage and front seats. A short silence ensued, followed by a burst of obstreporous laughter, and cries of 'the Infidels have it!' And so ended the most remarkable debate ever held in America."

The following correct and candid report of the above discussion, appeared at the time in the columns of the Pennsylvania Freeman:—

The Bible Discussion.—The discussion on the authority of the Bible, at Concert Hall, between Rev. J. F. Berg, of this city and Joseph Barker, of Ohio, closed on Thursday evening last, after a continuance of eight evenings. During the whole time, the vast hall was crowded with an eager multitude — numbering from 2000 to 2500 persons—each paying an admittance of 12 1-2 cents every evening, and on some evenings it is said that hundreds went away, unable to approach the door; nor did the interest appear to flag among the hearers to the last.

Of the merits of the question or the argument, it does not come within the scope of a strictly anti-slavery paper to speak, but we cannot forbear to notice the contrast in the manner and bearing of the two debaters, and the two parties among the audience. Mr. Barker uniformly bore himself as a gentleman, courteously and respectfully towards his opponent, and

with the dignity becoming his position, and the solemnity and importance of the question. We regret that we cannot say the same of Dr. Berg, who at times seemed to forget the obligations of the gentleman in his zeal as a controversialist. He is an able and skillful debater, though less logical than Mr. Barker, but he wasted his time and strength too often on personalities and irrelevant matters. His personal inuendoes and epithets, his coarse witticisms, and a bearing that seemed to us more arrogant than Christian, may have suited the vulgar and the intolerant among his party, but we believe these things won him no respect from the calm and thinking portion of the audience, while we know that they grieved and offended some intelligent and candid men who thoroughly agreed with his views. It is surely time that all Christians and clergymen had learned that men whom they regard as heretics and Infidels have not forfeited their claims to the respect and courtesies of social life, by their errors of opinion, and that insolence and arrogance, contemptuous sneers and impeachment of motives and character, toward such men, are not effective means of grace for their enlightenment and conversion.

Among the audience, there was a large number of men, who also lost their self-control in their dislike to Mr. Barker's views, and he was often interrupted, and sometimes checked in his argument, by hisses, groans, sneers, vulgar cries, and clamor, though through all these annoyances and repeated provocations, he maintained his wonted composure of manner and clearness of thought. On the other hand, Dr. Berg was heard with general quiet by his opponents, and greeted with clamorous applause by his friends, who seemed to constitute a large majority of the audience, and to feel that the triumph of their cause, like the capture of Jericho of old, depended upon the amount of noise made.

Mr. Barker, in giving an account of the origin of the discussion, says :—

"In December, [1853] in compliance with a request from the Sunday Institute, I began a course of lectures in Philadelphia, on the origin, authority and influence of the Scriptures. The object of the lectures was to show that the Bible is of *human* origin, that its teachings are not of divine authority, and that the doctrine that the Bible is God's word is injurious in its tendency.

"When I sent the Sunday Institute a programme of my lectures, I authorised the Secretary to announce, through the papers, that I was willing to meet any clergyman, of good standing in any of the leading churches, in public discussion on the Bible question."

[The Rev. Mr. McCalla, a Presbyterian clergyman, accepted the offer, and arrangements were made for a six nights debate; but, on the fifth evening, after trying to raise a mob, he withdrew from the contest.]

"The clergy, or a portion of the clergy, of Philadelphia, unwilling to leave their cause in this plight, demanded that I should discuss the question with Dr. Berg, a minister in whom they had fuller confidence. Being assured that Dr. Berg was a gentleman and a scholar, and that he was the ablest debater the clergy of Philadelphia could boast, I agreed to meet him, and the discussion was fixed for the 9th, 10th, 12th, 13th, 16th, 17th, 18th and 19th of January."....

"Though the Doctor did not prove himself so much of a gentleman as I had been encouraged to expect, I was sorry he declined to continue the discussion four nights longer, as we had not got more than half through the question when the eighth night closed. I wished for an opportunity of laying the whole subject before the public. Perhaps some other clergyman will take the matter in hand—one disposed and able to discuss the subject thoroughly."

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

In the High Court of Justice.

Queen's Bench Division, June 18th, 1877.

THE QUEEN

v.

CHARLES BRADLAUGH

AND

ANNIE BESANT.

(Specially Reported.)

LONDON:
FREETHOUGHT PUBLISHING COMPANY,
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PREFACE.

It is as a contribution to the discussion of the Population Question that we issue this report of the prosecution against ourselves for publishing Dr. Charles Knowlton's pamphlet, entitled "Fruits of Philosophy." Dr. Knowlton's pamphlet, although an ably and carefully written essay by a thoughtful and scientific man, is not, of itself, of vital importance; its importance lies in the fact that it is condemned—says Lord Chief Justice Cockburn—because it advocates prudential restraint to population, while also advocating early marriage. It is the advocacy of prudential checks *after* marriage that is now said to be a punishable offence. Many a better book than that of Dr. Knowlton might be written on the same subject to-day, for we have had 40 years of scientific improvement since "Fruits of Philosophy" was penned; until, however, the judgment against Knowlton is reversed, no better book can be published, for doctors will not write, and publishers will not sell, a work which may bring them within the walls of a gaol. It was for the sake of free discussion that we published the assailed pamphlet when its former seller yielded to the pressure put upon him by the police; it was not so much in defence of this pamphlet, as to make the way possible for others dealing with the same topic, that we risked the penalty which has fallen upon us. The accounts of the trial which have appeared in the daily and weekly papers have brought to the knowledge of thousands a great social question of whose existence they had no idea before this prosecution took place. Once more a cause has triumphed by the fall of its defenders. Once more a new truth has been spread every-

where by its persecutors, and has gained a hearing from the dock that it could never have won from the platform. It had been thought by many that the right to free discussion had been won by the gallant struggles of the earlier half of the present century; it was never dreamed that Lord Campbell's Act might be strained to include medical and scientific works; its author scouted the possibility of such misuse, and himself limited its object to the seizure of the foul literature of passion and sensuality. By the judgment in this cause every medical bookseller is put in jeopardy, and medical authors must find their own safety in the high price—and consequent restricted circulation—of their works. Ignorance has again become a cardinal virtue, and the tree of knowledge is again guarded by the fiery sword of the law.

What will be the ultimate issue of the struggle is certain; this battle will end, as every other such battle has ended, in the triumph of a Free Press. There is but one limit to that Freedom, and that is that slander and libel should be easily punishable by the law, so that the pen should not be permitted to vent private malice in assault on private reputation. The discussion of a question of ethics, of social science, of medicine, is an attack on no one; no one's reputation is injured by it; it can have nothing in it of the nature of slander. Such discussion has always been the medium of progress, and the right to it must be won at all hazards.

Charles Bradlaugh.
Annie Besant.

THE QUEEN

v.

CHARLES BRADLAUGH & ANNIE BESANT.

THE Lord Chief Justice took his seat at 10.30 A.M. precisely. The Solicitor-General, Sir Hardinge Giffard, Mr. Douglas Straight, and Mr. Mead appeared for the prosecution; Mrs. Besant and Mr. Bradlaugh appeared in person. On calling over by ballot the list of special jurymen, the following gentlemen answered to their names:—Alfred Upward, 16, Linden Gardens, N. H., gentleman; Augustus Voelcker, 39, Argyle Road, chemist; Captain Alfred Henry Waldy, 9, Stanhope Gardens, esquire; Thomas Richard Walker, 31, Colville Gardens, bank manager; Robert Wallace, 32, Lancaster Road North, gentleman; Edmund Waller, 33, St. Mary Abbott's Terrace, gentleman; Arthur Walter, 15, Queen's Gate Terrace, gentleman; Charles Alfred Walter, 7, Holland Road, gentleman; John Ward, 79, Ladbroke Grove, N.H., gentleman; Arthur Warre, 109, Onslow Square, Brompton, gentleman; and the two talesmen, who were afterwards added to make up the number, were George Skinner and Charles Wilson.

The Special Jury list having thus been called over, there were only eleven persons present who answered, and the eleventh made an application to the judge to be excused from serving as he was the director of a public company.

Mr. BRADLAUGH, rising, said: Before the jury are sworn, my lord—I think this will be the proper time—I have a motion to make to your lordship. The motion is to quash the indictment, on the ground——

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: I do not think I can allow that. I am sitting here in *nisi prius*.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: My lord, the 14th and 15th Victoria, cap. 100, says, "That any objection to any indictment for any formal defect apparent on the face of the indictment shall be taken by demurrer or motion to quash such indictment before the jury shall be sworn, and not afterwards," and it is for a defect on the face of the indictment that I move to quash it.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: Then you should move *in banco*, and *not* in this court. Surely that contemplates a motion *in banco*. What do you say, Mr. Solicitor?

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: Yes, my lord, that is, as I take it, the meaning of these statutes. These pleadings here are in the Crown Office, and if the defendant was intending to demur he should have moved in that way, or by motion in court.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: I do not intend to demur, my lord, but I do intend to submit that, under the statute, my right to move to quash the indictment is clear, and I should respectfully insist——

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: Well, I will reserve that point.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Then your lordship will reserve that point. Need I state to you the grounds?

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: No. I will reserve the point. If it is competent for me to hear the motion at all this will preserve your right.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: That will give us all I wish to obtain.

Mrs. BESANT: My lord, I presume that you will reserve it for me as well?

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: Oh, yes.

Mr. BRADLAUGH (handing in the Attorney-General's warrant): Then I will pray a tales.

On this, the usher was sent for one common juryman to make up the mystic twelve.

The jury were about to be sworn, when

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE said: This gentleman has a strong wish not to serve, as he is the director of a public company (indicating the juryman who had asked to be excused). If you have no objection to raise I will release him, as a tales has been prayed by Mr. Bradlaugh.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: If your lordship pleases.

A second common juryman was then added, and the jury were sworn in the usual way.

Mr. BRADLAUGH, handing up a number of copies of the

"Fruits of Philosophy," said: It may be convenient for the Court—I have spoken to the Solicitor-General on the subject—if your lordship does not object—for the jury to have each a copy of the work in question.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: It will be very convenient indeed to do so, and it will render unnecessary the reading of certain passages out of the book.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: It is absolutely essential that the jury shall be thoroughly possessed not only of the substance but of the actual language of the book.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: I quite agree in that, and cannot object.

Mr. MEAD, as the junior counsel, having formally stated the pleadings,

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL then commenced his address to the jury. He said: Gentlemen of the jury, the two defendants before you are indicted for having published an obscene libel, which is the form, according to our English jurisprudence, the criminal courts adopt for the purpose of preventing the dissemination of any matter which is calculated to destroy or corrupt the morals of the people, and, perhaps, it is not altogether immaterial that I should narrate to you, in the first instance, the mode in which this prosecution comes before you, because I cannot help feeling, and the magistrates who have moved in this prosecution probably could not help feeling, that, in itself, it is (I mean the prosecution) a thing which may produce mischief. I think, before the end of the case, it will be found it has produced mischief already; but the circumstances were such that those who, to some extent, possessed authority in the City of London, were put in the dilemma of either permitting this publication to be sown broadcast over the whole of the City, and to be placed in the hands of any person, however young, or else to institute this prosecution. Now, the circumstances were these: It would appear that a Mr. Watts had published (I believe some years ago) a book which he called the "Fruits of Philosophy; or, the Private Companion of Young Married Couples." Probably, gentlemen, you never heard of it, and, happily, I think, I may say, the world had never heard of it until it was published in Bristol, and became the subject of an indictment there, and attention having been called to it, the defendants appear to have come to the conclusion that the result of that case was unsatisfactory, and

they determined to test the question whether persons were not entitled to publish that book (substantially it is the same book, as you will see presently); and, accordingly, they appear, having published a new edition, to have sent a memorandum to the magistrates and to the police in these words:—"From the Freethought Publishing Company, 28, Stonecutter Street, Farringdon Street, E.C. All orders to be addressed to the manager, Mr. W. J. Ramsey. March 23rd, 1877. To Mr. Martin, Guildhall.—Charles Bradlaugh and Annie Besant will attend at the above address to-morrow, from four to five o'clock, to sell the enclosed pamphlet." That is the pamphlet which is the subject-matter of this indictment. Then they sent a similar notice to Detective-Sergeant William Green:—"Charles Bradlaugh and Annie Besant will attend at the above address to-morrow, from four to five, to sell the enclosed pamphlet; and this notice is sent to you officially to report to the superior person from whom you received instructions to prosecute in the case." Well, gentlemen, upon receiving this notice they proceeded to the place in question, without receiving any instructions; but the authorities subsequently confirmed their action in the matter. They proceeded to the place, and purchased some of these pamphlets; and the result is, that the question which, in truth, has to be decided by this indictment, is, whether or not the defendants were entitled to sell for sixpence this book, which I hold in my hand, to every person to whom it may occur that it is interesting, or amusing, or exciting to the morbid appetite, to purchase a book of this description. Upon the question (it sometimes is the question, of course, upon which matters of this sort turn) whether there has been any publication of the pamphlet, no question will arise here. The publication is of an absolute character. The sum sought to be charged is sixpence; and the only question, therefore, which will remain for your decision, will be whether or not this is an obscene book.

The Lord Chief Justice: Is that quite so? Is it not that the language, if it cannot be called obscene, is such that its effect might be to vitiate public morals; and although the work in point of language may be perfectly free from any objection, still I think that then, in point of law, it would be a libel. A work may not be obscene, it may not be prurient, it may not be open to objection in that respect, and yet it might tend to subvert public

morality. I do not know that by public morality we mean only those rules which regulate the intercourse of the sexes. It involves every rule of human conduct. If a person, in a book, were to teach a thing recommended in certain cases, assassination, you could not characterise that as an obscene book. It would yet be open to the objection that the book tended to subvert public morals in the other acceptation.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: I was using the word obscene rather in the sense in which your lordship has used it—in the sense of depraving morals; and in the case which I shall have to quote from, your lordship there uses the words: "Not using the word 'obscene' in the sense of involving any coarseness or vulgarity of expression, but as something which is calculated to destroy the morals," in giving judgment in the case of the Queen *v.* Hicklin, vol. 3 of the Reports of the Queen's Bench, page 371. That is the passage from which I am about to quote. The report commences at page 360, and your lordship, in giving judgment, said: "I think the test of obscenity is this: whether the tendency of the matter charged is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands it is likely to fall."

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: What was the character of the book?

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: The character of the book there was of this sort, that it was a publication of a Protestant society, which had taken a very strong view against the impurity of certain questions asked and ideas suggested by the Roman Catholic priests in the confessional, and it quoted a variety of the doctors of the Romish Church, Sanchez, Loyola, and a great many others, and the Protestant Society in question had published this book for the purpose of showing how wicked and immoral and depraving was the institution, and it seems to me that your lordship's words there are perfectly applicable to this case. The contention of obscenity seems to me to be exactly what I would suggest to the jury as applicable to the case before the court. Now, gentlemen, the book in question, as you will see, is a book comprehending in the edition with which we are dealing, forty-seven pages; and that which had been described in the original book from which it is taken and which gave rise to this prosecution, as "the private companion of young married couples," becomes in the edition to which your

attention will be called an "Essay on the Population Question," and the nature of the book—before I read any part of it, appears to me to be this—the writer contends that it is not an improper thing to gratify any animal passion which human nature may be susceptible of, that the gratification of the animal instincts in the commerce of the sexes produces in a great many instances an over-crowded population. The writer appears to contend that for the cure of that evil, and for the purpose of enabling persons to gratify their passions without that evil being so great as it is, and may be, in the world, it is lawful and proper, and expedient, to disseminate among the people a minute description of physical means whereby the population may be checked, that the commerce of the sexes may be permitted to continue, and that by various means which he minutely describes, the result of conception, and the consequent birth of children, may be averted.

The Lord Chief Justice: I think it is hardly right to say that unless you introduce another element into the argument, which is that the restrictions which another celebrated writer on population pressed as the means of correcting the evil of excessive population was the restriction upon marriage, and the author of this book says: "That is wrong. Marriage—and marriage at an early stage of life—should be encouraged;" but he argues that, as the effect of early marriage is to increase population, so those artificial means of preventing population should be resorted to, but you must not leave out one element of his reasoning, that he insists upon marriage, and does not profess to suggest these means of checking population as the reason why marriage may be dispensed with.

The Solicitor-General: I did not mean to represent that there was an actual mention of commerce between the sexes without marriage. Whether or not it might obviously suggest itself to persons who wished to gratify their passions without marriage, I will not say. I was about to say that marriage is continually mentioned in the course of the book. This was what I should be disposed myself to suggest as a mere colourable introduction of that which in terms suggests marriage, but which it will be for the jury, if they look at the whole scope and tendency of the reasoning, to consider whether it is more than a colourable—the introduction of the word marriage, from time to time, in the progress of the argument. But the argument which I was

dealing with was the mode in which it was suggested that the evils of over-population could be avoided by physical checks. (The Solicitor-General then briefly alluded to the contents of pages 11—18, 18—33, 44, and 38—41.) That is the nature of the book. The mode in which the subject is treated I am afraid you must hear more minutely hereafter. That is the scope and tenor of the arguments. As my lord has pointed out to you (and, indeed, as I had intended to point out to you), all this is put before the reader under—what, I should say, in speaking plainly—under the guise of philosophy. The writer professes to entertain deep sympathies with the poor curate, and the artisan, who is, by the circumstances of his life, unable to afford the means of the care and rearing of an enormous family. The book, I think it may be said, is carefully guarded from any vulgarity of expression; the whole tone of it is, as I say, under the guise of philosophy and medical science. Further, it may be said that the two defendants, who are the publishers, in the preface here, say that they are neither of them doctors, that they do not affirm the medical truths which are laid down by the author of the book, who, perhaps, I should have told you before, was a Mr. Knowlton, a medical man, and they profess, therefore, not to entirely assent to, or advocate, all the medical truths which the writer puts forward in the book; and, further, with respect to the philosophical proem which precedes the book, they profess to disagree with the propositions which appear in that part of the work.

The Lord Chief Justice: The book has been published in America, and was first introduced in this country forty years ago, I think?

The Solicitor-General: I believe so, my lord. They further proceed to say they do not agree with some of the propositions in the philosophical proem, and which I rather think they say are mistakes. But what underlies apparently the whole thing, and what may be taken to be the principle of the defence here as far as one gathers is this: that it is a subject of interest, that the subject of the population, and the relations between the sexes, may involve a subject of deep national interest, and, therefore, the defence appears to be of this character: although we do not agree with some of the medical knowledge, and although we do not agree with all the philosophical proem, yet, as it is a subject of interest we claim a right to publish it, because, in the conflict of opinion,

and the discussion which may ensue, the truth ultimately may be elicited. That appears to me to be the main proposition underlying the whole of the contention, that they have a right to publish this work. Gentlemen, I will now read to you the preface, which will put you into possession, at all events, of the ground upon which the writer, or the publisher rather, in this case, feels himself at liberty to publish this broadcast all over the country.

(The Solicitor-General here read the preface at length, and, when he came to the words where the change of the sub-title is spoken of, he said: Gentlemen, that is the title which I will remind you was in its original form—"The Private Companion of Young Married Couples"—and that is now omitted. The Solicitor-General then read the preface to the end.)

Now, gentlemen, I have thought it right that you should be at once in possession of the defence which it is intended to suggest for the publication of the work in question, because I think it will be found that what may be called the ultimate object and intention of the persons publishing is not the question which you have to determine. Although there are many passages in this work which might be the subject of unfavourable commentary, I would rather have you believe that the persons publishing this work were actuated by the motives which their defence sets forth. But the question will still remain, whether they are justified in publishing and circulating in the wholesale and unrestricted way which I have pointed out to you, that which—if in the result you should be of that opinion—is an obscene work. Gentlemen, that question arose some few years ago, it is in fact very much in the course of discussion at the present moment, as I had occasion to observe in speaking of the case from which I am about to quote. A discussion took place some time ago on the subject of the confessional in the Romish Church, and it was a subject of the deepest interest both to those who took the Protestant view that the confessional was wrong, and to the Roman Catholic party, who were of opinion that it was a sacrament, and essential to the discipline of their church. This discussion, no one can deny, was fraught with most important consequences on each side, and on the one hand the directions which were given to confessors by doctors of the Roman Church were veiled in the comparative obscurity of a learned language. Those who took the other view thought themselves justified, and it was held by

courts before whom the question came that it ought to be assumed in their favour in the discussion of the question that they really did believe that, for the purpose of getting rid of the evil effects of the confessional, they were entitled to publish to everybody the sort of questions which it was urged confessors were authorized to put to those who were confessing in the confessional. It was argued on the one side: this is a most important public question; this is a matter which affects the relations between the great Christian churches into which Christianity is divided, and, therefore, this is a matter of the greatest public concern, and should have the most absolute and unreserved publicity in discussing all that is relevant to the question. Gentlemen, that question came before this court, and I can do no better, I think, than read to you what was said upon that subject, because it seems to me to go to the very pith of the matter which we are at present discussing. Now here I might call to your mind the motive which is said to influence the persons who are publishing this book—viz., the motive of the general welfare of mankind, avoiding the evils due to the increase of the population, and the misery which it is said is inflicted on persons of small means who marry and are unable to sustain large families. There the object was to destroy what was considered to be a false system of theology, and now remembering that, I think I cannot do better than to read to you on that subject the judgment which my lord, who now so happily presides here, concurred in, as it was by the whole court present. The Solicitor-General then read as follows:—

"We have considered this matter, and we are of opinion that the judgment of the learned Recorder must be reversed, and the decision of the magistrates affirmed." This was a proceeding under 20 and 21 Vict., c. 83, s. 1, whereby it is provided that in respect of obscene books, &c., kept to be sold or distributed, magistrates may order the seizure and condemnation of such works in case they are of opinion that the publication of them would have been the subject-matter of an indictment at law, and that such prosecution ought to have been instituted. Now, it is found here, as a fact, that the work which is the subject-matter of the present proceeding was, to a considerable extent, an obscene publication, and, by reason of the obscene matter in it, calculated to produce a pernicious effect in depraving and debauching the minds of the persons into whose hands it

might come. The magistrates must have been of opinion that the work was indictable, and that the publication of it was a fit and proper subject for indictment. We must take the latter finding of the magistrates to have been adopted by the learned Recorder when he reversed their decision, because it is not upon that ground that he reversed it: he leaves that ground untouched; but he reversed the magistrates' decision upon the ground that, although this work was an obscene publication, and although its tendency upon the public mind was that suggested upon the part of the information, yet that the immediate intention of the appellant was not so to affect the public mind, but to expose the practices and errors of the confessional system in the Roman Catholic Church. Now, we must take it upon the finding of the Recorder that such was the motive of the appellant in distributing this publication—that his intention was honestly and *bonâ fide* to expose the errors and practices of the Roman Catholic Church in the matter of confession; and upon that ground of motive the Recorder thought an indictment could not have been sustained, inasmuch as to the maintenance of the indictment it would have been necessary that the intention should be alleged and proved—viz., that of corrupting the public mind by the obscene matter in question. In that respect I differ from the Recorder. I think that if there be an infraction of the law, the intention to break the law must be inferred, and the criminal character of the publication is not affected or qualified by there being any ulterior object in view (which is the immediate and primary object of the parties) of a different and of an honest character. It is quite clear that the publishing of an obscene book is an offence against the law of the land. It is perfectly true, as has been pointed out by Mr. Kydd, that there are a great many publications of high repute in the literary productions of this country, the tendency of which is immodest, and, if you please, immoral, and, possibly, there might have been subject-matter for indictment in many of the works which have been referred to. But it is not to be said, because there are in many standard and established works objectionable passages, that therefore the law is not as alleged on the part of this prosecution—viz., that obscene works are the subject-matter of indictment, and I think the test of obscenity is this, whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds

are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall. Now, with regard to this work, it is quite certain that it would suggest to the minds of the young of either sex, or even to persons of advanced years, thoughts of a most impure and libidinous character. The very reason why this work is put forward to expose the practices of the Roman Catholic confessional, is the tendency of questions, involving practices and propensities of a certain description, to do mischief to the minds of those to whom such questions are addressed, by suggesting thoughts and desires which otherwise could not have occurred to their minds. If that be the case as between the priest and the person confessing, it manifestly must equally be so when the whole is put into the shape of a series of paragraphs, one following upon another, each involving some impure practice, some of them of the most filthy and disgusting and unnatural description it is possible to imagine. I take it, therefore, that apart from the ulterior object which the publication of this work had in view, the work itself, in every sense of the term, is an obscene publication, and that, consequently as the law of England does not allow of any obscene publication, such publication is indictable. We have it, therefore, that the publication itself is a breach of the law. But then it is said for the appellant, 'Yes, but his purpose was not to deprave the public mind; his purpose was to expose the errors of the Roman Catholic religion, especially in the matter of the confessional.' Be it so. The question then presents itself in this simple form: May you commit an offence against the law in order that thereby you may effect some ulterior object which you have in view, which may be an honest and even a laudable one? My answer is emphatically, 'No.' The law says you shall not publish an obscene work. An obscene work is here published, and a work the obscenity of which is so clear and decided that it is impossible to suppose that the man who published it must not have known and seen that the effect upon the minds of many of those into whose hands it would come would be of a mischievous and demoralising character. Is he justified in doing that which clearly would be wrong, legally as well as morally, because he thinks that some greater good may be accomplished? In order to prevent the spread and progress of Catholicism in this country, or possibly to extirpate it in another, and to prevent the State from affording any countenance to the

Roman Catholic Church in Ireland, is he justified in doing that which has necessarily the immediate tendency of demoralising the public mind wherever this publication is circulated? It seems to me that to adopt the affirmative of that proposition would be to uphold something which, in my sense of what is right and wrong, would be very reprehensible. It appears to me the only good that is to be accomplished is of the most uncertain character." Gentlemen, I pause here to say that I most deeply regret that every word which I am now reading, applying to the "Confessional Unmasked," is applicable to this work. I have it on the face of the last edition, which bears on its title-page these words, "This is the one hundredth thousand." The Lord Chief Justice, in his judgment, continues: "This work, I am told, is sold at the corners of streets and in all directions; and, of course, it falls into the hands of persons of all classes, young and old, and the minds of the hitherto pure are exposed to the dangers of contamination and pollution from the impurity it contains. And for what? To prevent them, it is said, from becoming Roman Catholics, when the probability is that nine hundred and ninety-nine out of the thousand into whose hands this work would fall would never be exposed to the chance of being converted to the Roman Catholic religion. It seems to me that the effect of this work is mischievous and against the law, and is not to be justified because the immediate object of the publication is not to deprave the public mind, but it may be to extirpate Roman Catholicism. I think that the old sound and honest maxim, that you shall not do evil that good may come, is applicable in law as well as in morals, and here we have a certain and positive evil produced for the purpose of effecting an uncertain and remote and very doubtful good. I think, therefore, the case for the order is made out, and although I quite concur in thinking that the motive of the parties who published this work, however mistaken, was an honest one, yet I cannot suppose but what they had that intention which constitutes the criminality of the act, at any rate, that they knew perfectly well that this work must have the tendency which, in point of law, makes it an obscene publication, namely, the tendency to corrupt the minds and morals of those into whose hands it might come. The mischief of it, I think, cannot be exaggerated. But it is not upon that I take my stand in the judgment I pronounce. I am of opinion, as the learned

Recorder has found, that this is an obscene publication. I hold that where a man publishes a work manifestly obscene, he must be taken to have had the intention which is implied from that act, and that as soon as you have an illegal act thus established, *quoad* the intention and *quoad* the act, it does not lie in the mouth of the man who does it to say: 'Well, I was breaking the law, but I was breaking it for some wholesome and salutary purpose.' The law does not allow that; you must abide by the law, and if you would accomplish your object, you must do it in a legal manner or let it alone; you must not do it in a manner which is illegal. I think, therefore, that the Recorder's judgment must be reversed, and the order must stand."

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: In that case it was alleged that the questions put in the "Confessional" were calculated to suggest unchaste and unclean thoughts, and, therefore, it appeared to me, they were calculated to lead to immorality, and that a man could not say, "I published a work of an immoral tendency, but to effect what I thought would be a greater good." We all held that that was no answer.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: No doubt, my lord, your lordship will remember that the whole of the questions used in the "Confessional" were published side by side with the strongest protest against such questions being permitted to be put. The mere fact of publishing the work the full Court held to be illegal. The other judges concurred in your lordship's judgment, giving their special reasons.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: I think the questions were pretty nearly the same as those recently referred to in the House of Lords.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: I have no desire to unnecessarily interrupt the learned Solicitor-General; but I would submit, my lord, that he has no right to present to the jury something which he must not prove until after the verdict, and which does not relate to the matter at issue; and therefore I think it is hardly fair for him to introduce into his speech, for the purpose of influencing a verdict, the alleged fact he has recently referred to with regard to the publication of the work.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: Perhaps it would be better to confine the case to the issue there is to be tried.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: A part of my case is that the publication of this work recently must affect the act of publication, and is important for the jury to know.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: The indictment is for a publication on March 24th and March 29th.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: I decide that point for you, Mr. Bradlaugh.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Very well; I thank your lordship.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: I must not be taken to consent to its not being important now, and shall have to refer to it again.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: I will take my objection at the proper time.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: In questions of this kind it should be borne in mind by the jury, not only the nature of the work published, but the mode of publication, and I cannot do better than to read to you, gentlemen, his lordship's own language in the case I have already referred to—The Queen *v.* Hicklin. His lordship, at page 367 of "Common Law Reports, Q. B.," says: "A medical treatise, with illustrations necessary for the information of those for whose education or information the work is intended, may in a certain sense be obscene, and yet not the subject for indictment, but it can never be that these prints may be exposed for any one, boys and girls, to see as they pass. The immorality must depend upon the circumstances of the publication." Therefore, gentlemen, as it appears to me, it is a matter worthy of your consideration, not only the nature of the work itself, but the mode in which it was and is now claimed to be published. It is not whether a work of this kind can be submitted to a college of philosophy, but whether it can be sold at the price of sixpence about the streets of London and elsewhere, and it is with a view to stopping that publication that the law has interfered.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: That is assuming always that it is an obscene work. I did not intend it to apply to a work on a scientific question.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: No; it may be absolutely necessary for the medical profession that plates and works treating on obstetric matters should be published; but who would say it would be right to publish such things indiscriminately throughout England? And it is to that question that I venture to think the distinction of my lord seems to point. The morality or immorality in such a case must depend upon the circumstances of the publication. We have here, in the work before us, a chapter on restriction published, not written in any learned language, but in

plain English, in a facile form, and sold in the public streets at sixpence. Of course, as my lord has pointed out, although the question is one of publication, the mode of publication is involved. You must first establish that the work is an obscene work. Now, gentlemen, I do not wish to read you extracts from the work. I would rather refer you to the passages in the copies of the work you have before you, which we, the prosecution, rely upon as being obscene.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: Meaning by obscene, tending to influence the passions, or recommending some course of conduct inconsistent with public morals.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: I do not want, gentlemen, to trouble you in going through many passages of this work; but at page 34 you will find a chapter on promoting and checking conception.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: I am not sure, my lord, whether your lordship had a copy of the same edition as that which the Solicitor-General and the jury have; but I will hand your lordship one.

Having handed one to the Lord Chief Justice, the LORD CHIEF JUSTICE said: I found a difference in the paging. This, Mr. Bradlaugh, is the same edition as that which the Solicitor-General is about to refer to?

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Yes, my lord; and the same as the one on which the indictment is founded; there is a little left out of the one which is contained in the other edition.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: And the same as the jury have is this?

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Yes, my lord, and the same as that which is the subject of the indictment. The one your lordship had was the later edition, handed up on the motion for the *certiorari*.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: The whole chapter, gentlemen, is, as you will perceive, devoted to the subject of promoting and checking conception, referring, amongst other matters to the use of cayenne; and, gentlemen, I do not desire to read it. I would rather refer you to the chapter, and you will perceive for yourself what it purports to be.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: Are you not going to read it?

Mr. BRADLAUGH: I do not wish to compel the Solicitor-General to read the pamphlet, but I require to know the exact parts relied on to support the indictment. I have applied to the prosecution for a statement of the parts relied

on, and have been refused. I am afraid for our defence I shall have to require the prosecution to read the work to the jury, unless we are allowed to know the exact words relied upon by the learned gentleman.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: Yes, I think that is fair.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: I thought it would be unfair to the defendants in one sense to select any part of the book. I presume Mr. Bradlaugh's motion which he was about to make was on the ground that there were no passages mentioned in the indictment, but merely that the work was an obscene book. It seemed to me that it would be unfair to the defendants and to the prosecution to select any one part of the book. I thought we needed only to give the jury that which it seemed to me was the key to the whole publication. If not, the whole book must be read.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: I quite agree; but still I was supposing that if there was anything independent of the whole scope of the work that you could put your finger on and say it tended to obscenity, it is right that the defendants should know it. In one part he discusses the causes of sterility in females, and how it may be cured by means of certain remedies such as he suggests. One, for instance, you say, is by the use of cayenne. That, it may be argued, is medical information; but, on the other hand, it may be said to be an indecent and indictable passage. It is well known that sterility is a source of great discomfort to women who wish to be blessed with children, and any man who can suggest a mode for its removal would be a benefactor to humanity; but, as you say, that may be used as a disguise to instil bad notions into the mind. That is a question for the jury to decide, and for that purpose they must have the subject before them.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: I shall have to read the whole of that chapter; but I did not wish to give the jury the pain and trouble to hear it.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: Very well, read it. The book must be read, sooner or later, either by you, Mr. Solicitor, or the officer of the court.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: I thought it was unfair to read a part.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Whatever part of the work the learned Solicitor thinks it his duty to refer to, I have a large number of standard medical works, of the highest character, which I shall have to read extracts from, showing that every line of Knowlton is amply covered by the best authorities. I

mention that, as I should like the Solicitor-General to know how I put it.

The Lord Chief Justice: What I shall ask the jury will be very much like this: If they take the statements contained in the work to be a treatise on obstetric medicine, do they consider there is anything in it which the writer was not justified in writing? And, looking to the whole character of the work, do they think it is introduced into the work merely for the purposes of medical knowledge useful for the people to know, or do they think it tends to immoral results? Whether you read it, or whether it is read by the officer of the court, or the defendants, matters little; the jury must hear it.

Mr. Bradlaugh: I only want the passages the Solicitor-General relies on precisely stated, so that I may identify the parts I have to answer. I do not want to put the Solicitor-General, or the officer of the court, to the inconvenience of reading it. Nor do I desire thus to waste thet ime of the court.

The Solicitor-General to the jury: I will point out one of the passages which, I think, evidently not only shows the object of the writer but illustrates the mischief and evil that the work is liable to produce. It is really extremely painful to me, (hesitating) very painful, to have to read this. At page 38 you will find—[Here the Solicitor-General read to the end of the chapter]. Gentlemen, I have read the whole of that, and I assure you that it has been with extreme pain and regret that I have found myself compelled to read it, and if it were possible—I don't know that it is, but if it were—to do what the defendant said in his interlocutory statements, *i. e.*, to produce from any number of medical works observations supporting this book in its entirety, I should submit that a medical work, published as this is, would be properly the subject of an indictment. It must not be assumed that, peradventure, a great number of works having been published that have not been made the subject of indictment, that another should not be proceeded against. No one feels more deeply than I do that these prosecutions are fraught with danger, and that any number of authorities may be brought before you to suggest that these works are not novel. Any authorities of that sort I should recommend you to disregard. You may tell me about American doctors; but it is not to be permitted that doctors in England shall have a right to circulate such filth, and then be allowed to

substantiate it by instances from other medical works. Many things—medical treatises, recommendations for the use of medicaments, herbs, and so forth—applicable to the ills under which humanity may suffer may, in the study of the physician, be properly considered for the purpose of applying to mankind some kind of remedy for the evils under which they may suffer. But is it to be said that because these things may be discussed and considered in the closet of the physician, that they may be cast broadcast all over the streets? If you accept that, you entirely subvert the principle which is properly deducible, and there is no such thing as indecency and obscenity at all. A man who had the view that the human figure was the most beautiful in the world might claim the right to walk naked through the streets, and might triumphantly say, "I am exhibiting nothing but the natural parts, and it is only a prurient mind that will see anything improper in it." And you might push it to the extreme of saying that, inasmuch as sexual intercourse is a natural provision, there is nothing improper in publicly performing it.—[We paraphrase the extreme coarseness of the language here used by the learned counsel]. There is no limit to the extent to which a proposition like that may be carried. The question is for the good sense of an English jury, whether what I have read to you—and I don't wish to read any more—may be properly sold. I rely upon that passage read as indicating what is the nature, the extent, and the scope of that particular passage led up to, as I have told you it is, by a description of the parts engaged. It may be said that parts of this book—the defendant will be entitled to point to them, and I wish to make no concealment of such passages—contain passages in which the general scope and thesis enforced relates to marriage, which is introduced where the connection between the sexes is spoken of. Therefore, you may read it thus: I recommend this not as a mode by which persons who are unmarried may gratify their passions without the consequences which follow from that gratification. You may read it in every line that the defendant recommends and points out this simply as the use that is to be made of the preventive check, assuming that lawful connection between the sexes, and assuming that marriage has sanctified the intercourse of which he is speaking. Gentlemen, the question for you is, whether a book of this sort, published to everybody, would not suggest to the unmarried as well as to the married, and any persons into whose hands

this book might get—the boy of 17 and the girl of the same age—that they might gratify their passions without the mischief and the inconvenience and the destruction of character which would be involved if they gratified them and conception followed. Gentlemen, that is one of the questions which you will have to determine. I venture to submit that the whole scope and tendency of giving such a minute description of all that has relation to the sexual appetite and the apparatus concerned therein—the effect of that is to constitute an obscene book. Gentlemen, there is one passage at the very end of the book, pp. 44 and 45, which I will also read. [The Solicitor-General here read p. 44 and to the end of p. 45.] Now, gentlemen, I pause for one moment upon that. These expressions, which you find all scattered through the book, assuming that they are meant for married persons to put a check upon undue population, I submit to you that is colourable, and that the object of the whole book, the scope of this book, is to permit people, independent of marriage, to gratify their passions, independently of the checks which nature and providence has interposed. I say that the object of this book is to tell everybody how they may do that, and yet have no children, whether they are married or not. Now, I invite your attention to the last passage. You will observe the thesis is the necessity, in point of health and in point of morals and mental tranquillity, for the gratification of this particular passion, and observe—"It is a fact universally admitted, that unmarried females do not enjoy so much good health, and attain to so great an age, as the married." What is the inference from that? Here are the means by which the unmarried female may gratify her passions. The truth is, those who publish this book must have known perfectly well that an unlimited publication of this sort, put into the hands of everybody, whatever their age, whatever their condition in life, whatever their modes of life, whatever their means, put into the hands of any person who may think proper to pay sixpence for it—the thesis is this: if you do not desire to have children, and wish to gratify your sensual passions, and not undergo the responsibility of marriage; if you are desirous of doing that, I show you by a philosophical treatise, forsooth, how you may effect that object satisfactorily and safely, after a long experience, collected from a great number of scientific persons; the expedient I recommend has never been known to fail. And, therefore, this is to be put into the hands of every

one, and it is sought to be justified upon the ground that it is only a recommendation to married people, who under the cares of their married life are unable to bear the burden of too many children. I should be prepared to argue before you that if confined to that object alone it would be most mischievous. The Christian religion is happily still a part of the law of this country, and if it were confined simply to that recommendation, I certainly should have a great deal to say to you, and would point out that that is immoral in the higher sense to which my lord at the commencement of the case referred. I feel it would be inappropriate to enter upon a discussion of this character, because it would appear to concede that this book is only intended for circulation among persons so situated. I deny this, and I deny that it is the purport and intention of this book. This book is sold for sixpence, and at such a price as that it will induce a circulation, which you may well conjecture, and it may be induced amongst an enormous population, there will be so many sold to boys and girls and persons who may obtain it with perfect facility in the streets; I decline to argue the question, and it would be most inappropriate and inadequate to discuss the book as if it were a document handed to a young couple who are anxious to avoid the evil and misery, which, as the writer states, a large family produces. That is not the ground on which I should discuss it. I submit to you, that from what I have read, it is an obscene book. The mode of publication is such as does not justify the book, and it is calculated to deprave and destroy the minds of those young persons especially into whose hands it may come, and therefore, it is properly the subject of an indictment. Don't talk to me about doctors! I care not if every physician in England had written a book of this character—although God forbid that I should suggest any physician could do so!—if you collect into this book all that may be found relating to one subject-matter scattered in various books, it is a totally different thing. Apart from such a question altogether, if you were to prove to me that any physician in England had published a book like this, I submit that there can be no justification for that book to be quoted, which is calculated to deprave the minds of those into whose hands it may fall. I therefore ask your judgment that this book is an obscene publication.

William Simonds, detective officer, City of London police, examined by Mr. Douglas Straight:

Did you, on the 24th of March, go to 28, Stonecutter Street?—Yes, I did.

Is that the Freethought Publishing Office?—Yes, sir.

Did you go into the shop?—I did.

Whom did you see there?—I saw Mr. Bradlaugh and Mrs. Besant.

What did you say?—I asked for a copy of the "Fruits of Philosophy."

By the LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: Whom did you see?

Mr. STRAIGHT: He says he saw the two defendants. You purchased a copy?

WITNESS: Yes, I bought a copy of the "Fruits of Philosophy."

To whom did you address yourself?—To Mrs. Besant.

What took place?—She supplied me with a copy, for which I paid sixpence. I gave her a shilling, and she gave me sixpence change.

Did the defendant Mr. Bradlaugh hear what you said?—He was close beside, and could hear what was said.

Did you go again on the 29th of March?—Yes.

Did you purchase another copy on that occasion?

By Mr. BRADLAUGH: One moment, pray. Were either of the defendants there then?—No, they were not.

Neither of them were there. Who served you?—A young man in the shop.

By Mrs. BESANT: How long have you been in the detective force?—About 13 years a detective.

What wages do you get?—Thirty-one shillings and sixpence.

Has it been raised at all?—Yes; I get an extra portion for my clothes.

You did not get so much at the beginning?—No; about 28s. or 29s.

By Mr. BRADLAUGH: Have you the documents you produced before the magistrate?—I have, sir.

Will you just let me look at them?—I will, sir.

The documents were produced, and proved to be memoranda from Mr. Bradlaugh and Mrs. Besant to Detective-Sergeant Green, of the City Police, and to Mr. Martin, the Chief Clerk of the Guildhall Justice-room, intimating that Mr. Bradlaugh and Mrs. Besant would attend to personally dispose of the first hundred copies of the Knowlton pamphlet.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Have you received a letter from me

since the commencement of this prosecution?—Yes, about three weeks ago.

Have you got it?—No, sir.

Mr. Bradlaugh (to City Solicitor): Do you produce this letter. I gave you notice to produce it.

Witness: All the letters I received I handed over to the City Solicitor.

Mr. Bradlaugh: It is simply a letter asking him if he is the prosecutor. I ask did you give an answer to that question? Did you reply whether or not you were the prosecutor? Did you say yes or no?

Witness: No, I did not.

Edwin Williams, constable of the City Police, called.

Mr. Mead: On the 24th of March did you go to Stonecutter Street?

Witness: Yes, sir.

Whom did you see?—I saw Mrs. Besant and Mr. Bradlaugh. I asked Mrs. Besant to give me the book called the "Fruits of Philosophy."

Did she give you the book?—She gave me the book, and I paid sixpence for it.

Did the other defendant hear what was said?—Yes; he was standing close by, sir.

That is the only time, I think, you went?—That was the only time.

Have you the book?—Yes.

Hand it in, please.

(Book handed in.)

No questions were put to this witness by either Mr. Bradlaugh or Mrs. Besant.

Detective Sergeant Robert Outram, City of London Police, called.

Mr. Mead: On April 5th, did you obtain a warrant at the Guildhall Justice-room?—No; I received the warrant at the head office.

Did you go with the warrant to 28, Stonecutter Street?—I did.

With the two last witnesses?—Yes.

Did you see the two defendants?—I did.

Did you search the premises?—When I saw them I told them I was a detective-sergeant, and that I held a warrant——

Mr. Bradlaugh: Don't tell us anything about the warrant if you have not got it here.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: When you said warrant, you must have described it in some way.—I said I had a warrant for their arrest, also a search warrant. I read the warrant to Mr. Bradlaugh and Mrs. Besant, and I also searched the premises.

Did you find any books?—I did not.

LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: You did not find any books there?—No, my lord.

Mr. MEAD: Did the defendant say anything?—When I read the warrant to him he said there was no t a book on the premises which would come under the warrant.

Mr. Bradlaugh made that reply. What else did he say?—He said he had a few copies, which they would require for the defence.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: Require for what?

Sergeant OUTRAM: For their defence, my lord.

You then took both defendants into custody?—Yes. I afterwards took them to Bridewell police-station.

SOLICITOR-GENERAL: Now, my lord, I propose to prove what I referred to in opening, what the publication is since, and the extent of the publication.

LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: That the defendants have published you have proved.

SOLICITOR-GENERAL: This book bearing their imprint must surely make them publishers of other copies.

LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: Somebody else may have bought up all the other copies; if you can show that the sale took place in their premises—but you don't say so.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: I should submit that even this would be no evidence on an indictment charging us with specific sales on the 24th and 29th.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE (to Solicitor-General): I don't see what you want. You have proved the sale of two copies of this work by the defendants jointly. The only question for the jury is, what is the object or effect of the work. If the defendants should be convicted, you can produce the other evidence hereafter, by way of aggravation, that many other copies have been sold by the defendants. One sale is enough, and you have proved it.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: It strikes me as important that it was being published everywhere.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: Does not the preface sohw that it was intended for general circulation?

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: Simonds, I believe, has not identified the copy in court.

Simonds recalled.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL to Witness: Just look at the copy attached to the deposition; is that the copy you purchased on the 24th?

WITNESS: It is the copy purchased on the 29th.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: Then you have a copy purchased on the 24th; you should have handed both in. (To the Lord Chief Justice.) That is my case, my lord, but after wha tyour lordship has said it would be right to call attention to certain passages in the book, and to ask the officer of the Court to read them.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: To save both the officer's time, and that of everyone else, it will be sufficient if the passages are pointed out distinctly with the page, and identified as beginningwith such a word and ending with such a word; we do not wish to put the officer of the court to the necessity of reading them; it will only be uselessly taking up time. I will only ask the learned counsel to be particular in the references he gives.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: I should like the jury, if your lordship will be good enough, to look at page 8 (in any instance down to the end of the chapter), then page 11.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: But where do you finish?

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: At the end ot the chapter.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: That will be page 9.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: Then page 11?

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: What I said was page 8 to the end of the chapter. Then page 11 from "fully to effect," pages, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: The whole portion of the description?

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Then where will that end?

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: "Induced by too frequent and promiscuous intercourse."

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: All the way through to page 18?

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: Yes. Then page 27 "considering it important to do away with," down to the end of the chapter, page 33.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: The whole of the intervening pages?

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: Yes. I do not think I can draw any distinction in chapter 3, on checking conception.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: The whole of chapter 3?

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: Then page 44, beginning "every young married woman," down to the end of the chapter. That is my case, my lord.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: I will just call over the pages to see if we have got them rightly.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: I think you may assume that the learned Solicitor-General objects to the whole book from beginning to end.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Very well, my lord, then we must defend the whole. If your lordship will allow it, I have arranged, for our mutual convenience, that Mrs. Besant should make her defence first. I do not know whether your lordship would adjourn now (12.30), before the case for the defence is commenced; it will be utterly impossible for Mrs. Besant to conclude before the adjournment for luncheon.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: We have an hour yet.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: I only suggested it for the convenience of the Court.

Mrs. BESANT: My lord, and gentlemen of the jury—It will not seem strange to any of you if, in defending myself here to-day, I find myself slightly over-weighted by the amount of legal ability which the prosecution has thought it well to bring against me. I know that names such as those who stand as advocates against me must carry—and must rightly carry—a certain amount of weight with those to whom I have to appeal. When you find the learned Solicitor-General engaged in the case, and when his great legal knowledge is not enough to conduct it without the assistance of two other counsel learned in the law, you must come to the conclusion that you have two great criminals before you, because, if it were not so, the prosecution would not go into the very large expense entailed in this case. I might feel less hopeful of success did I pretend to rival the learned Solicitor-General in legal knowledge, in force of tongue, or in skill of dialectic. But, gentlemen, I do not rely on these: I rely on a far mightier power; I trust to the goodness of my cause, and I am sure that, when you have heard the evidence which I shall lay before you, you will feel that to give a verdict of "guilty" would be to give a verdict against the weight of the evidence, and would have a most unfortunate effect upon the public outside. But, gentlemen, I do not mean that I have had the impertinence

to come before you without a careful and thorough consideration of the case which I submit. I have spent the few weeks I have had between my arrest and the present time in studying the case I have to set before you. I have done my best during these few weeks which have intervened to make myself acquainted with those trials of the past which bear upon this subject, and those state trials from which I could gather some ideas by which I might move you, or some words which I could use when appealing to you. It is not as defendant that I plead to you to-day—not simply as defending myself do I stand here—but I speak as counsel for hundreds of the poor, and it is they for whom I defend this case. My clients are scattered up and down through the length and breadth of the land; I find them amongst the poor, amongst whom I have been so much; I find my clients amongst the fathers, who see their wage ever reducing, and prices ever rising; I find my clients amongst the mothers worn out with over-frequent child-bearing, and with two or three little ones around too young to guard themselves, while they have no time to guard them. It is enough for a woman at home to have the care, the clothing, the training of a large family of young children to look to; but it is a harder task when oftentimes the mother, who should be at home with her little ones, has to go out and work in the fields for wage to feed them when her presence is needed in the house. I find my clients among the little children. Gentlemen, do you know the fate of so many of these children?—the little ones half starved because there is food enough for two but not enough for twelve; half clothed because the mother, no matter what her skill and care, cannot clothe them with the money brought home by the breadwinner of the family; brought up in ignorance, and ignorance means pauperism and crime—gentlemen, your happier circumstances have raised you above this suffering, but on you also this question presses; for these over large families mean also increased poor-rates, which are growing heavier year by year. These poor are my clients, and if I weary you by length of speech, as I fear I may, I do so because I must think of them more even than I think of your time or trouble. You must remember that those for whom I speak are watching throughout England, Scotland, and Ireland, for the verdict you will give. Do you wonder I call them my clients, these poor for whom I plead? they cannot bring the fee of gold such as is received by the

learned gentlemen who are briefed against me here; but they bring what is better than gold—they send up a few pence week by week out of their scanty wage for as long as the trial lasts; they send up kindly thoughts and words of cheer and of encouragement; mothers who beg me to persist in the course on which I have entered—and at any hazard to myself, at any cost and any risk—they plead to me to save their daughters from the misery they have themselves passed through during the course of their married lives. Gentlemen, I may perhaps say one word for myself before I go right into my case. The learned Solicitor-General has had the kindness to say that he does not impute bad intent to us in publishing this work. What bad intent could there be? I had nothing to gain in publishing this work—I had much to lose. It is no light thing for a woman, whose ambition is bound up in the name which she hopes to make, to have the imputation thrown upon her of publishing indecent books and of disseminating obscenity amongst the young. I risk my name, I risk my liberty; and it is not without deep and earnest thought that I have entered into this struggle. And when I shall lay before you the indictment against me, I must ask you if you will be able to bring in a verdict of guilty on an indictment such as this. The cases of myself and my co-defendant are practically the same; and while we do sever in our defence, and each conduct our own, we have thought it wise that we shall not severally go over the whole of the case. I have thought that I shall best consult the convenience of the Court by leaving the purely physiological details to be dealt with by my co-defendant. Although I do not pretend to the extreme delicacy displayed by the learned Solicitor-General; while I should hardly have imagined it possible that a counsel who has had such wide and large experience in criminal cases should have hesitated to read extracts which deal with facts perfectly well known to any doctor; at the same time, I think it will be more fitting, more in good taste, more agreeable to the Court, if I leave these purely physiological details to my co-defendant. I do this, not as admitting that these details are obscene or indecent in any respect, but simply because I think that such a course will be pleasanter to all concerned. I propose to deal chiefly with the other parts of the pamphlet. The questions are: What is this pamphlet? What is it intended to do? What purpose is there in the circulation of it?

One or two physiological questions I shall touch upon and deal with generally, because I feel myself compelled to do so in the interest of my clients, in the interest of the poor woman who has only 6d. to spare, and should be allowed to purchase with that 6d. the knowledge which richer women can obtain for 2s. 6d., 5s., or 6s., at any of the railway bookstalls of Messrs. Smith and Sons. The learned Solicitor-General spoke most disdainfully of a book that should be sold for 6d.; but when people have to live on 13s. a week, 6d. is quite as much as they can afford to pay for a book containing useful and necessary sanitary information. Gentlemen, I do not think there is anything to fear in this presence, from statements outside, calculated to arouse prejudice against us. I do not think I need do more than refer to prejudice which has been sought to be aroused against us by certain newspapers—one in particular, which I will not here mention, whose editor, when attacked, has a habit of hiding himself behind an infant. That paper charged me with child murder, and referred to me as an advocate of promiscuous intercourse. Gentlemen, if some word as to promiscuous intercourse had not fallen from the lips of the learned Solicitor-General, I should have thought that such a charge was too foul and too baseless to have been founded on a pamphlet such as this. You will have seen some of these papers, but I am sure that you have left them outside the Court, and that you will not allow them to influence your verdict here, and that any word which may have fallen in another case will not be allowed by you to prejudice this. One great fault charged against us, though shut out by the ruling of the learned judge, is, that books which are not ours, and do not emanate from us, are sold by men who get drunk, and swear in the public streets. I am not here to defend these hawkers. I can only say that that to which objection has been made is the fault of the Solicitor-General himself, or of the prosecution which he represents. This pamphlet had a small sale for years back of about 700 copies annually, and for the number that have been sold since our arrest, you must blame the prosecution, and not me. It is the prosecution which has given the importance to this book. If we had wanted to do so we could have hired men to sell the work at the street corners, but we did not care to have our book in the hands of men bearing the—not good—character of too many of this class of persons. We sent these men away from

the shop when they came to buy, and we absolutely refused to supply them, and we have done nothing to spread the sale of this pamphlet, as we have done with our other publications. We have not even advertised it in our own paper, except once, and then only because we wanted to make it known that we were going to sell it for the first time at our office. Spurious copies were printed and sold at the street corners, because it was difficult to get the real pamphlet, and the whole annoyance is due to the action of the prosecution; they have given a purely factitious importance to an old and almost forgotten pamphlet which had been supplanted by more modern treatises; and the more they prosecute the more they will cause this annoyance to continue, because these men sell whatever they can get a high price for, and people buy it now simply because it is prosecuted. I come now, gentlemen, to the question of the indictment; I do not know if it has been laid before you or no. This indictment charges Charles Bradlaugh and Annie Besant that "unlawfully and wickedly devising and contriving and intending, as much as in them lay, to vitiate and corrupt the morals as well of youth as of divers other liege subjects of our said lady the Queen, and to incite and encourage the said liege subjects to indecent, obscene, unnatural, and immoral practices, and bring them to a state of wickedness, lewdness and debauchery," they did publish a certain book, which it then goes on to describe in words which I will not read because of their extreme and unnecessary coarseness. Gentlemen, I think I may fairly lay some complaint before you against the language of this indictment. I may be told that it is pleaders' language, and I have, fortunately, not very much knowledge of pleaders' language, but I must really put it to you that the learned Solicitor-General does not accuse me of what is charged against me in this indictment. If he wants to accuse me, as he has done, of publishing a bad book with a good intent, he ought to amend the indictment, which has been so clumsily drawn up. If you refer to Archbold, you will see that the ordinary indictment for selling an obscene book is very different to that to which I am called upon to plead to-day. You are told in this indictment that we intend, and devise, and contrive to corrupt the morals of youth as much as in us lies, and it then goes on to give the very coarsest possible description of the book. It seems to me as if the learned counsel who drew this up

had gone through every indictment he could find, and had picked out every unpleasant adjective which could prejudice us with those to whom we have to plead, and had thrown them together into this. The learned Solicitor-General says it was too much trouble to put the whole of the book into the indictment; but I say that unless every page of the pamphlet is indecent, you cannot convict us on this indictment. We have then to deal with a prosecution which endeavours to do too much, and which is likely, therefore, to do nothing. But, gentlemen, the malice of the prosecution has overreached itself. Since no distinction is drawn between one part of the book and the other, you must find that the whole of it is obscene before you convict me. You must take the whole book. You have heard the preface read—and I was very glad that the learned Solicitor-General did so read it—are you prepared to say that the preface is an obscene, immodest, and disgusting production? Unless you include the preface in your verdict, you must acquit the book in your verdict. The very way the indictment has been framed makes it fatal to the prosecution. But you have got more to do than to find the whole of the book obscene. You have got to find that our object in publishing it was to vitiate and corrupt the morals of youth as of divers others, and unless you believe that to have been our object, no verdict can be given against us on this indictment. I am perfectly aware that you must allow the intention to exist if you can prove that the work is thoroughly obscene; but then you must get at the intent. Take the case of two men, one of whom has a pistol, and the second man, who has not a pistol, is found shot. It does not follow that the second man, even if found with the pistol in his hand, has been guilty of murder. If that man were set before you on the charge of murder, you would find out what the intent was which might have governed his actions. You would ask if there had been malice between them, or quarrels between them, in the time that had gone. You would ask what intention perhaps was in the mind of the man who shot, before you would bring him in guilty of the murder of his fellow man. I put it to you that much more, in dealing with a medical book, you must show the intent to be malicious, before you can, by any possibility, bring in a verdict of guilty against me here. The Solicitor-General says the intent is good. If that be so, the duty of the Solicitor-General is to get up and

say that he drops the charge against us, for as the indictment falls through by his own admission, he has no right to keep you here wasting your time on an indictment which he himself confesses is bad. But, then, he puts it, that the intent does not matter. I say, gentlemen, that the intent is the vital part of the charge. The intent of the book is what you really will have to judge. The learned Solicitor-General put that strongly when he said there was a colourable pretence of philosophy, a colourable use of the word marriage, when really what was intended was not to give philosophy, but gratification of passion—not to teach married people how to restrain their families, but to teach the unmarried how wrongly to gratify their passions. How utterly untrue that is I shall show you as I go on through the pages of this book. The intent in a medical book must be taken to be the very essence of the character of the book. If Sir James Paget wrote a book simply on the diseases of the generative organs, no kind of description of those organs could make the book obscene, because Sir James Paget would write the book not with the intention of corrupting the mind, but with the intention of curing the diseases with which he dealt. In every book that contains physiological details, the intent, therefore, is the very essence of the charge. The intent makes the difference between decency and indecency. A medical book which describes these organs with the intent of a useful purpose is a proper book, and a book that may rightly be published. A medical book that makes such description with the intent to arouse passions is a bad book, and against such an indictment would fairly lie. I am not talking now whether or not it would be wise to prosecute a book of that kind, because I hold that such a prosecution really spreads the book more widely than otherwise it would be; but I must acknowledge that every medical book may be read for a bad purpose by an impure mind. There is no question that with great medical men (although the learned Solicitor-General says he does not care about medical men, and that we are not to talk to him about medical men, or to tell him what they have written)—I must submit to you that it is not wise, that it is not moral (for I hold morality to be that which makes individuals and societies happier and better than they were before, and wiser than they were before)—it does not conduce to morality to say that these men shall not spread knowledge, because that knowledge may be made

impure by the impure minds that read it. Every book, however good the book may be—any of your old classics, any of your standard English works, may be read for the vilest purposes, if the impure mind is to be permitted to characterise them and put upon them the shame that only comes from its own obscene impurity. Then I will put it to you, and I will venture here, instead of using my own words, to plead in the words of one of our mightiest advocates—that Erskine, whose name is known as one of our mightiest pleaders wherever the English language has made its way. The case is that of The King *v.* J. Lambert, J. Perry, and J. Grey, for a seditious libel, in "Howell's State Trials," 22nd vol. Erskine says:—"When a man accused of libel is brought before a jury, they are to consider only the mind and intention with which the matter was written; and, accordingly as they shall find that, they are to form their decision of guilt or innocence." Gentlemen, that is the contention I am raising to you—that you are to think of our minds and intents in publishing this book; and I take publishing to be the same as writing a book; and according to that you are to find us guilty or innocent. Mr. Erskine goes on:—"The jury are to dismiss from their minds every other consideration, and allow themselves to be biassed by no motive of party or of political convenience. There is this essential difference between criminal and civil cases: in criminal cases, the jury have the subject entirely in their own hands; they are to form their judgment upon the whole of it; not only upon the act alleged to be criminal but the motive by which it was influenced, the intention with which it was committed, and, according to their natural sense of the transaction, they ought to find a man innocent or guilty: and their verdict is conclusive. Not so in civil cases. In these the jury are bound to abide in their decision by the law as explained by the judge; they are not at liberty to follow their own opinions. For instance, if I am deprived of any part of my property, the loss of my property lays a foundation for an action, and the fact being found, the jury are bound to find a verdict against the person who has occasioned my loss, whatever might be his intentions. Here the judge pronounces the law, the jury only find the fact. The law and the fact are as distinct and separate as light from darkness, nor can any verdict of a jury pass for a farthing in opposition to the law as laid down by the judge, since the courts have a

power to set such a verdict aside. But in criminal cases the very reverse has been immemorially established—the law and the fact have been inseparably joined; the intention of the party accused is the very gist of the case. We are criminal only in the eyes of God and man as far as the mind and intention in committing any act has departed from the great principles of rectitude by which we are bound as moral agents, and by the indispensable duties of civil society. It is not the act itself, but the motive from which it proceeds that constitutes guilt." I ask you to bear that passage in mind, from one of the highest authorities in a court like this. When you are considering your verdict after the defence is made, Erskine reminds you: "You are solemnly set in judgment on the hearts of the defendants in the publication of this paper. You are to search for their intention by every means which can suggest itself to you. You are bound to believe in your consciences that they are guilty of malicious and wicked designs before you can pronounce the verdict of guilty. It is not because one of them published the paper, or because others are the proprietors of it, but because they were or were not actuated by an evil mind, and had seditious intentions, that you must find them guilty or not guilty." And Erskine states, gentlemen, that that was the law as laid down by the celebrated Hale; and I am sure, in putting it to you so, you will see the authority with which I am dealing here. He points out in another place that this had been contested in earlier days, but in his own time it was made law; and then, in dealing with this very case, where a book was held to be libel against the king, but where, because the intent of the publisher was good, no sentence was ever passed upon him, and the jury refused to find him guilty of a publication with malicious intent, as charged in the indictment; in dealing with that Erskine says: "If you give the defendants the credit of honest feelings and upright intentions, on my part any farther defence is unnecessary; we are already in possession of your verdict; you have already pronounced them not guilty; for you will not condemn the conduct when you have acquitted the heart." That, gentlemen, is Erskine's speech in pleading to the jury, and I will ask you to remember that if you bring me in guilty on this indictment you will have done it only because you believe my intent to have been bad, believe my desire

is to corrupt and deprave the young; and unless you find that, you are bound in justice, you are bound to give me a verdict of Not Guilty. Then the learned Solicitor-General turns to the case of the Queen *v.* Hicklin, and points out that the good intent of the publisher cannot be held to protect the work. But we find there that the work was an utterly obscene work, and in that part which the learned Solicitor-General read (and I was glad to hear him read it, because Lord Chief Justice Cockburn at that time made practically the very contention which I shall plead to you to-day) it was put that if the book was utterly obscene no amount of good intention could justify the publication of obscene matter. That book was to show that the questions asked in the confessional were depraving to the mind, and would vitiate the morals of youth. The whole of the object of the book, and the publication of the book, would fall to the ground unless the matter contained in the book was obscene. The very contention of the publisher was that the contents depraved and demoralised. Well, if they depraved and demoralised in the confessional box, they would do so still more when printed and circulated to the public in a book. The contention of the publisher destroyed his own case. Gentlemen, unless the book contained obscene matter there was no reason for the publication of the book for which he was put on his trial. This case of the Queen *v.* Hicklin does not in any fashion touch the case on which you are called to pass your judgment. I know the learned Solicitor-General says that some of the worst quotations in the book were veiled in learned language, and that side by side with them were placed some of the very strongest observations against their character. These observations condemned the book which the publisher had issued, for if he thought the questions in the confessional depraved and demoralised, he must have known that they would be likely to do the same thing with whoever should read them. But you don't pretend to say that physiology is in itself indecent, and you will find Lord Mansfield saying in the case of the King *v.* Woodfall: "Where an act is in itself indifferent, if done with a particular intent it becomes criminal; then the intent must be proved and found. But where the act is in itself unlawful (as in this case), the proof of justification or excuse lies on the defendant, and in failure thereof the law implies a criminal intent." You cannot pretend that physiology is in itself an indecent thing; you cannot say that medical studies

are in themselves indecent. All you can say is that physiology may be used for an indecent purpose and may be made the cover of indecent suggestions. We come, then, to the very case Lord Mansfield puts where the act is in itself indifferent and only becomes criminal when the intent is a criminal intent. The intent in the case of the Queen *v.* Hicklin was to break the law, and the Lord Chief Justice laid down that where a man publishes a work manifestly obscene he has no right to say that he breaks the law with a good intent. Gentlemen, I admit that to the very fullest extent. I admit that there is no justification in law for publishing an obscene book. I admit that if this book is obscene no amount of good and pure intentions on my part can possibly purge it from its obscenity. I bow thoroughly here to the judgment laid down by the Lord Chief Justice in this case. But I contend that this book is not an obscene book, and that therefore the case of the Queen *v.* Hicklin has no authority here. I will pass, then, to the matter of the book. I say that the matter is not obscene; that our intent in publishing the matter was good; that the knowledge conveyed in the book is useful and necessary, and that, because it is useful and necessary that knowledge ought to be within the reach of all. Unless you disbelieve, gentlemen, the whole of what I am going to say to you—unless you believe not only that the book is obscene—and if you do that you will be branding with the stigma of obscenity every great surgeon and medical man of eminence that has made our English name known throughout the world for our books; and I acknowledge that I reverence the medical profession for the work they do, and I trust you will not be a party to branding as obscene those men into whose hands at the most critical moment you place the health of your wives, your daughters, and your sisters!—a verdict of guilty, or not guilty, does not depend upon whether you approve of that book or not. It does not depend on whether you may think that there are passages in it which had better not have been there. It does not depend on that; nor is it enough you might have thought some of the language coarse, although the Solicitor-General has kindly stated that the language is free from any taint of vulgarity. You must take one part with the other. Turning to the case of the King *against* Daniel I. Eaton for publishing a libel, you find this plainly put by the Judge himself, the Recorder who summed up the evidence, which I hold to be analogous to the case

before you: "If the book was published as the work of a philosopher, for the benefit of mankind, then this man will not have to answer for the publication. If published with a malicious view, then he will have to answer for it, if you are convinced of the fact of publication."

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: What was the nature of the publication?

Mrs. BESANT: There, again, it was a case of a blasphemous libel, one of the many cases brought up at that time.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: It was for publishing one of Paine's works.

Mrs. BESANT: We find here, in this same case, that it was put that you must give a verdict upon the whole matter put in issue before you, that you must affirm every allegation in the indictment to be true; that if you disbelieve and negative any one allegation, you are bound to find the defendants not guilty. Gentlemen, I will ask you to remember that, when you go away to consider your verdict; I will ask you to take a copy of the indictment with you and read it through, and say solemnly whether, on your oath, you can find every count in that indictment has really justified you in a verdict against us; and if I press this specially upon you, gentlemen, it is because I feel that in this matter I have so much to lose if your verdict should go against me, and I will ask you, therefore, if at any time during the trial (which may, in some parts, perchance, become wearisome to you), if, at any moment, you think you are kept here to your own annoyance and inconvenience, I ask you to put that momentary annoyance of, at the utmost, but a few days' detention in a crowded court, against the penalty which lies on me, unless I can succeed in obtaining a verdict of not guilty — a penalty which does not mean confinement for a few days, or for any length of time which the judge can sentence, but which means, practically, almost the extinction of my future life until I can wipe off the stain which your verdict, if guilty, will put upon me. Do not mistake me by thinking that I should think myself guilty; I should not do so. I have done this thing with full thought and with full knowledge of the responsibility I incurred. Knowing it all, I should proceed to do it again, with the experience I have had since my arrest. I should bring in myself not guilty, whatever your verdict might be at the end of the trial. Now, alleging our intent to be good (and I

hold myself and Dr. Knowlton to be identical in the matter, for the words in the preface, where we said we did not agree in everything, were not intended in any fashion to avoid the responsibility of the publication of every word in the pamphlet), I acknowledge the responsibility to the very fullest extent—I stand responsible for every word from beginning to end. I challenge, practically, your verdict by the course I have taken, and, therefore, I am willing to take the responsibility of every syllable in the pamphlet. Let me, for a moment, deal with the word obscene, for on your consideration of that word will practically come your verdict in this matter. I contend that the book is not an obscene book, and you get the difficulty here that you have no statutory definition of the word obscene. You have not only no statutory definition of the word, but you have not even any unchallenged authoritative judgment on the matter, for I shall show you presently, dealing with the Lord Chief Justice's remarks, that the circumstances of that case unfortunately prevented him from giving a carefully defined meaning of the word, simply because the matter was admittedly obscene on every hand. In almost all other offences, you know with what offences you are dealing. Take murder. Murder is carefully defined in books of law. Take manslaughter: that is also carefully defined, and if you are in any doubt, you have only got to turn to the accepted legal authority and then judge whether the prisoner has committed a certain act or not; you are able to say whether he has committed a murder, or whether he has only committed what is called manslaughter. But you have no such thing to help you when you are dealing with the offence of an obscene libel. So far as I can find, I have not been able to discover a single case where a book, incriminated as this one has been, has been defended on the ground that the book was not an obscene book. Palliations have been brought in, excuses have been made, circumstances that made it justifiable have been caused to be pleaded, but I cannot find one case through the whole English law where the publisher accused of publishing an obscene book has stood up and said that the book did not contain bad matter, and has stood by it. That makes it very difficult for a jury to decide whether a book comes within the scope of the law. One might almost put it to you—though I do not intend to base my case on that ground—that no book ought to be considered as obscene which does not incite to the commission of those acts which are defined by the law to be

obscene, because, when you come to obscene acts, you find these acts laid down and specialised in the law books, and an obscene book may be fairly taken to be a work which incites to the commission of those obscene practices which are indictable under the common law as misdemeanours. For the purposes of this trial, I take a narrower definition than this. I put it to you that an obscene book is a book "written for the single purpose of corrupting the morals of youth, and of a nature calculated to shock the feelings of decency in any well-regulated mind." That is the definition on which I stand for my trial, and that definition is at least worthy of some reverence in this court when I tell you it comes from Lord Campbell, a man who was in the very highest position in our land, and who brought in the very act under which the seizure-warrant was issued which was brought to search at Stonecutter Street. I am quoting from Hansard, vol. 146, No. 2, page 329. It is a definition, gentlemen, which I put before you as the true definition of the word "obscene." And I am the more glad to do that because it thoroughly coincides with the words of the learned judge in the case of the Queen *v.* Hicklin, which was put before you. You will find him saying that "I think the test of obscenity is this: where the tendency of the matter charged with obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands publications of this sort may fall." That is what my Lord Chief Justice Cockburn laid down as the law; and, as I pointed out to you, it was, perhaps, unfortunate that the circumstances of the case did not enable his lordship to give us a thoroughly careful definition, which would have been so invaluable to us for our guidance on the trial of to-day. But on that trial there was no question raised as to whether the matter published was obscene or not, for on all hands it was admitted that the subject-matter was obscene; and where it was taken that the work was an obscene publication, the learned judge would have been going out of his way if he had carefully laid down a strait definition in what obscenity consisted. I will put it to you that obviously the Lord Chief Justice meant the same as Lord Campbell meant, and that the single word "well-regulated" should be inserted. The opinion of the two learned judges thoroughly coincided on that matter—a vital point; and that "well-regulated" is implied in the case of the Queen *v.* Hicklin. I cannot put it to you too strongly that it must

be a well-regulated mind which has to be dealt with in a question of this kind. Should you say that the book is to be adjudged obscene because some utterly ill-regulated mind found something which raised wrong passions or impure desires? You must take the normal mind—the normally-regulated mind—and think of the influence the book would have upon that, for to the impure mind the purest book will have a bad effect, because you get the reflection of the mind in the book. In dealing with the word obscene on any wider definition you will find yourself making a law which will have the most unfortunate effect in the time to come. In this very case you find a debate in the House of Lords, and of course I am not going to put this in evidence here, but simply as showing you the difficulties into which you will plunge the law if you take a wider definition than that of Lord Campbell. You find Lord Lyndhurst putting the objection that might easily arise. He objected to Lord Campbell because he said, "what is the interpretation which will be put on the word obscene?" "I can easily conceive (he says) that two men will give an entirely different conception as to the meaning of the word," and then you find him drawing a picture of a detective officer going into a print-seller's or a bookseller's, under the new act, and asking for photographs of all the most celebrated pictures, by the greatest masters, going with these photographs to the police magistrate, and not saying what the picture was intended to represent, and then getting a warrant from the magistrate to destroy all the works, which might include some of the greatest productions of art. The difficulty is, that if you are to allow the word obscene to be stretched into meaning anything which is coarse, which deals with the human figure, you must make a clean sweep of your literature and your art right through. I don't mean to say that because there is not another book before you, you should acquit the book which is before you; but I ask you where you will land yourself if by a verdict of guilty you are going to include books under Lord Campbell's Act, which were never intended to be included in it when the act was drawn? Nothing can be stronger than the way in which Lord Campbell put it that he did not intend to put down medical works, physiological treatises, and standard authors; and yet every one of them might be practically put down, if by a verdict of guilty here you make every

common spy and informer able to go to the shops of the best publishers of London, and put them to the annoyance and expense of such a prosecution as this, simply because by a verdict of guilty against us you will have given a verdict of guilty against every one of them. I think I may fairly argue that the difference between coarseness and obscenity is this—that obscenity is coarseness written with intent to corrupt, with intent to vitiate, with intent to destroy the good feelings and arouse the evil ones. Coarseness has not that meaning; it is low, it is revolting, but it does not endeavour to corrupt. The learned Solicitor-General pointed out a passage which, by itself, he thought would move your feelings, and I think he was wise in the matter of not reading the whole of the book to you, for if he had done so you would have seen that what he read as obscene was simply a part of the whole work. Take this passage from "Tristram Shandy," and judge what would be the feelings of some people in hearing it read out in public; I shall not read it, but will simply hand it up to you.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: I am very reluctant to interfere, my lord; but I think I must take your judgment whether or not such passages ought to be read.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: I should submit, respectfully, that it has been decided over and over again, that if we prove the publication of a work—and no work will be produced which we are not prepared to prove the publication of—we shall have the right to put in the passages as evidence at any rate, if not to read them as part of the defence.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: How can two negatives make an affirmative?

Mr. BRADLAUGH: I do not put it on that ground, my lord; but there have been some very strong arguments as to the right to refer to other publications——

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: Have you got the authority?

Mrs. BESANT: It is in the case of the King *v.* Carlile.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: Well, I remember a case that the late Serjeant Thomas defended here in which, upon an indictment of a similar character, I do not think it was reported, but I happened to be present in court; he read a long string of passages, and referred to a variety of public representations.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: I shall be prepared to argue the point later on, my lord. I have the case looked up, but I did not think it would arise so soon.

The Lord Chief Justice: Then, perhaps, this would be a convenient time to adjourn?

Mr. Bradlaugh: If your lordship pleases.

The Court then adjourned for lunch.

After the adjournment,

Mr. Bradlaugh said that, with regard to putting in the publication "Tristram Shandy," it was not intended by the defendants to do so in any way as evidence, but they were entitled to read or to communicate it to the jury as part of the defence.

The Lord Chief Justice: I have been consulting with my learned brothers, and they agree with me that it is so. I am bound to reject every publication as evidence, but I can't prevent Mrs. Besant from committing a passage to memory and reciting it as part of her speech, nor from reading from a book as if reciting from memory. But the book is not evidence, and need not be proved, nor must it be handed to the jury.

Mr. Bradlaugh: There is a curious case, but, unfortunately, it is only the informal report of a Recorder's opinion. It is the case of the King *v.* Carlile, in which a reference to a public newspaper was objected to because, as was said by Mr. Adolphus, it might have been printed in the defendant's back shop; and the Recorder said to Mr. Carlile, "If you mean to read that, you must prove its publication."

The Lord Chief Justice: A person could not be supposed to recollect the whole of it. [To Mrs. Besant]. You can read anything you wish.

Mrs. Besant: I do not propose to read any quotations from "Tristram Shandy," my lord; it would be an utter waste of the time of the Court. I was stopped when I was going to hand up to you "Tristram Shandy," and the Solicitor-General objected to the book being put in evidence. I quite agree that books ought not to be put in evidence on any point unless the publication of these books be proved, because if you do that you would open the door to a large amount of abuse; and, although we might not take advantage of it, it might seriously, if it were permitted by the learned judge, prejudice or unfairly decide trials in the future. Therefore, I do not think it would be worth while to read any passages of "Tristram Shandy" to you, although if it had been permitted and thought right by the learned judge, you might haved glanced at a single passage, and have seen

how far one passage might be used to destroy a whole book if, as the Solicitor-General has done, you were to pick out a passage most likely to prejudice the book. I simply want to show to the jury how books which you find in the library of every gentleman who has any pretence to culture or education might be branded in the same way, and put down by an ignorant jury as obscene publications. I have one great advantage—I do not for one moment conceal it from myself—and that is the fact that it has been thought right in this case to give us the very great advantage of a special jury, because, to hand up to an ignorant jury a passage from "Tristram Shandy" would be utterly condemnatory of the whole book; but from the circumstances of your education, and from your having had the opportunity of becoming perfectly familiar with the whole of our standard English literature, I feel that I have nothing to fear from a miscarriage of justice, such as I might fear from a jury less cultivated. I put it to you that in any one of those books which every one of you have in your libraries, you could find passages which, if taken by themselves, might be said to have a tendency to vitiate and corrupt, and I think I shall not be dealing unfairly if I say to you that in every great dramatist of England you would find such passages. I take Shakespeare as an example, whom no one would desire to see blotted out of our literature, and imagine that some spy of some society—we will say of the Society for the Suppression of Vice—took one of Shakespeare's poems, such as "Venus and Adonis," and founded a prosecution on it. We all know that it would break down. But you must not forget that a publisher's prosecution means an enormous amount of damage to him, whether a verdict is obtained or not. Some people (two or three in every town) devoted to us, and wishing to serve us in the same way that Hetherington was served, though most unwisely, might institute prosecutions against other booksellers for selling works of a similar character. Imagine the number of prosecutions to which your verdict would give rise. You would throw open prosecutions against every bookseller in London, with the exception, perhaps, of some little publisher who has not the power or the capital to publish books that the public want to read. You do not want to throw open the door to every mischievous man who seeks notoriety, to prosecute such publishers as Churchill, Longman, and Smith. I might also allude to the

works of Mr. Bohn, who will be one of the witnesses for the defence in this case, and whose Standard Library gives text-books for the education of your sons in every public school in England. Do you want to offer a premium to every miserable spy, who may wish to ruin these men by the chance he possesses of getting a verdict in his favour? I would remind you that you are going to take the effect of language into your consideration, and you will see that the comparison between Knowlton and these dramatists, on the question of the effect on the passions, is in Knowlton's favour, because medical books have no tendency to arouse sexual feelings. If you want a book of an improper character you must carefully avoid physiological works. Your common sense tells you that a medical book is a book that no man or woman would read for the purpose of arousing sexual passions of any kind. I will come to that in a later portion of my speech. If you want to arouse sexual passion you might do so by some foul works, and you might even do so by some of the grandest of our dramatists and novelists. You will find passages calculated to arouse sexual passion in Fielding, Congreve, and Wycherley, but you will never arouse that passion by dry physiological details put forward in dry technical language. I put that to you because I say that while the language in many of these books would arouse the sexual passions far more than the language of any medical book, it would be an utter blunder—I say it would almost be a crime—to prosecute these books because of occasional coarse passages in them. If you are going to give a verdict of guilty against me—a verdict that means to me the momentary destruction of all that I work for—you must make up your minds that no statement that certain passages might be more carefully worded will authorise you in giving that verdict. I say to you, remember that in the days to come you will never free your minds from the remembrance of what is happening in this court. The verdict that you give may mean to us almost destruction—destruction against which we are strong enough to fight—destruction that will not ultimately touch our future very much, though unkind things may be said about it. If you give a verdict thoughtlessly, carelessly, or indifferently, carried away by prejudice against me and my co-defendant—if, I say, you give a verdict against us which you would not give against your wife, your daughter, or your brother—a verdict based not on evidence, but based on a prejudice against us because of other work in which we

have been engaged, I remind you at the very outset of this case that a great responsibility rests upon you, and that you will remember during all the remainder of your lives the verdict you will give at the close of this trial. I do not say so to prevent you from giving a verdict of guilty. Every Englishman and citizen has the duty to discharge the functions of juror without any regard to the consequences that will flow from his verdict to those whom he convicts of crime. But I say, do not let any carelessness or thoughtlessness prevent your giving your whole brains and hearts to a decision that is vital to us both. I have now to remind you of the definition of obscene, which I put forward, and I ask you to bear it in mind; I do not propose to repeat the arguments, but simply to read the words upon which I rely. If you are to narrow it down to the definition of Lord Campbell, he says that his Act is intended to apply to works "written for the single purpose of corrupting the morals of youth, and which are of a nature calculated to shock the common feelings of decency in any well-regulated mind." We stand or fall upon the definition. I remind you—and unless you take Dr. Knowlton's pamphlet to be written with the single (but not possible) purpose, in the mind of the writer, and in the mind of the publisher (which for the purposes of this trial are identical)—unless you think it written for the single purpose of corrupting the morals of youth, you have no right to bring in a verdict of guilty against us; and I lay stress upon this, because Lord Campbell says, "The question whether the pictures or books impugned were obscene or not, is to be left to the jury to decide." My lord, I don't know whether I am going out of my case, but I think if the light could be prevented falling on the jury-box, it would be an improvement. It is a great point to me to keep the jury in good temper, my lord. (Laughter.)

The Lord Chief Justice directed that this inconvenience should be stopped, and added: I must do you the justice to say, that up to this time you have said nothing that could produce any other result.

Mrs. Besant: If I say anything that goes further, it will be because I think it necessary to win my case, and that is vital to me. The Solicitor-General made one remark which I had the pleasure of agreeing with, and I did not agree with much that fell from my antagonist's lips. He said that you are the guardians of public morals. There is no point on

which I feel more strongly than the value of our present system of law, and it is because of that that my co-defendant and myself, instead of publishing the work and leaving it to be prosecuted, thought it the best plan to challenge the verdict of a jury, because we believe that the verdict of a jury is the right, legal, and constitutional fashion of settling questions of this kind; so much is this the case, that the jury have the whole decision in their hands in these cases. I have no doubt that the learned Judge on the bench would endorse what I say to you, when I put it that even the judge's opinion is not binding on the jury. The judge has a right to lay down the law and explain the law, and the jury has the duty of finding a verdict in accordance with the law, and I press that upon you, for while I don't want for a moment to pretend that the Lord Chief Justice will rule against us; while I have the utmost confidence in his complete and thorough impartiality in this case—feeling sure that what he believes to be right he will say without favouring either the one or the other, and without fear of anything outside which may go in favour of one side rather than the other—while I have the most complete confidence in him, I do not want that one single member of the jury should for one moment imagine that he can throw his responsibility upon the learned judge who lays down the law in this case. I am dealing with a question on which I might pile up authorities one after the other; I do not intend to do that, although in a case so important as this I must guard myself step by step by those precedents of English justice which are the real safeguards of justice in our land. I will point out to you that the Lord Chief Justice Eyre, dealing with the case of the King *v.* Hardy—and I am now quoting from proceedings taken in the Old Bailey in a case of high treason—a case where the life of a man hung upon the decision of a jury—you will find that Lord Chief Justice Eyre distinctly lays down that the responsibility lies upon the jury, and not upon the judge: "Every verdict upon a clear point of fact ought to be the jury's own choice, and in a case of this nature more particularly so, because, to be sure one great object of this prosecution is, that the country may be satisfied, that they may see that the public justice of it has taken its fair course, and that the prisoner has that deliverance made for him which the laws and constitution of the country in his case call for." He laid it down that the responsibility of the

verdict did not lie with the judge. I find that the Right Hon. Chief Justice Pennefather, dealing, thirty or forty years ago, with one of those cases that aroused so much the popular feeling of the country—the case of The Queen *v.* Daniel O'Connell and others that I find in "Shaw's State Trials for 1844,"—the judge laid down the doctrine that, whatever the judge's opinion might be, the jury were "the constitutional judges to determine and to come to a just conclusion." And you will also find that Erskine, to whom I referred before, pointed out that the jurymen were the real judges, and added that they were to "examine the judge's opinion as rigorously as that of the advocate at the bar"; and the curious point in that case is, that, while the judge summed up directly against the prisoner, the jury gave a verdict against the judge. Gentlemen, I put these cases before you because I desire you to feel that it is not possible for you to shift in any way the responsibility on to his lordship, in whom rightly and naturally you must have such thorough trust. If this question were by English law to be decided by him, I should be fully content to put my fate in his hands; but when the English law bars the judge from the verdict, and gives it to the hands of the jury, then I must remind you that you cannot evade your responsibility. The learned Solicitor-General told you that you are the guardians of public morals; and if you give a verdict against us, it will make a grave breach of morality, which it will take many decisions to cure. If I say that, do not think that I say it because I have not confidence in the verdict of twelve men, sworn to do justice between the Queen and ourselves. I do not forget what Whiteside put so well in his great case, when he was speaking on behalf of some of those who were tried with Daniel O'Connell. Although an advocate there, you cannot forget that Whiteside afterwards became Lord Chief Justice of Ireland, and gave from the bench proofs of that genius which he had so long shown at the bar. Gentlemen, the question for your consideration is whether in days to come you would wish your names to be handed down to posterity amongst the juries who by their verdicts have induced freedom, or whether they shall be handed down with those who have narrowed freedom, those who, in cases such as this, wherein liberty of discussion has been concerned, have returned verdicts of repression, verdicts afterwards to be reversed, as all such verdicts are, on

appeal to the higher court of posterity. Do you, gentlemen, think for one moment that myself and my co-defendant are fighting the simple question of the sale or publication of this sixpenny volume of Dr. Knowlton's? Do you think that we would have placed ourselves in the position in which we are at the present moment for the mere profit to be derived from a sixpenny pamphlet of forty-seven pages? No, it is nothing of the sort; we have a much larger interest at stake, and one of vital interest to the public, one which we shall spend our whole lives in trying to uphold. The question really is one of the right to public discussion by means of publication, and that question is bound up in the right to sell this sixpenny pamphlet which the Solicitor-General despises on account of its price. We are not fighting simply to obtain your verdict for the sake of selling this work. I, personally, don't care, if your verdict is in my favour, to sell another copy. I sell it so long as the detective police spies and secret agents of a society calling itself a Vice Society resort to the practices that they do to get respectable booksellers into trouble; so long as that goes on, so long shall we endeavour to uphold those principles which we maintain with reference to the right of public discussion, by fighting this great battle until we win ultimate success. This pamphlet is valuable to us just as is the piece of silk to the soldier who wins the battle for his country: it is the flag which represents the cause we have at stake. It is with that feeling—and that feeling alone—that we stand here to-day to uphold the right to publish this pamphlet, and I fight that I may make here the right of open and free discussion on a great and important social subject. There are various rights of speech which the public enjoy. The right of discussion in theology is won; the right of publicly discussing politics is won; but as to discussion on social subjects, there is at present no right. There will be this day week, if your verdict is in our favour, because, you may depend upon it, that verdict once given no one will ever go against it; everyone will then feel free to discuss a point of vital interest to society; but till that verdict, that right is not one which can be exercised with impunity. However much you may disagree with Dr. Knowlton's theories—and I don't pretend to agree with him on all his points—however much I say you disagree, that is no reason why you should brand

his book as obscene. Difference of opinion is not to be taken as proof of obscenity against any particular subject, and the more you may differ in opinion from Knowlton so much the more jealously should you guard his right of discussion. If it were only to gain your sympathies with Dr. Knowlton's work, I would not waste your time or mine here to-day; but it is because I want you, by your verdict, to lay down this great and just principle—that opinion, honestly given opinion, honestly expressed opinion, freely and fairly published, shall not be prevented public expression because a police-officer does not agree with the opinion so expressed upon matters in which probably he is not at all informed. I have in my hand the opinion of Mr. John Stuart Mill, in which he treats of the right to free discussion: he says, in his Essay on Liberty: "But I deny the right of the people to exercise such coercion, either by themselves or by their Government. The power itself is illegitimate: the best Government has no more title to it than the worst. It is as noxious, or more noxious, when exerted in accordance with public opinion, than when in opposition to it. If all mankind, minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind." I put it to you that a medical work, published by a medical man of eminence to raise a great public and social question, must not be branded as obscene because you disagree with it; but the more you disagree the more you are bound to give weight to the arguments we put forward here. But, after all, does any single one of you believe that my co-defendant and myself desired, in publishing this work, that it should tend to corrupt the morals of the public? This is not a question merely of publishing an indecent work. For what reason are we dragged here—a man and a woman whose whole lives disprove the allegation against us? What hidden motive is there for bringing us here to answer so monstrous an accusation? Whiteside once said of a prosecution in which he defended the prisoner (and may not his words be used to-day with reference to the present proceedings?): "The whole object of this unprecedented prosecution is to stifle the discussion of a great public question. Viewed in this light, all other considerations sink into insignificance; its importance be-

comes vast indeed. Destroy the right of free discussion and you dry up the sources of freedom. By the same means by which your liberties were won can they be increased or defended." It is said that that principle of free discussion may be carried too far, but Whiteside, whom I have just quoted, deals with that point, in reference to prosecution on these matters. He holds that prosecutions, with regard to division of opinion, are unjust and unfair, as I shall show you this prosecution is in a few minutes. "Quarrel not," he says, "with the partial evils free discussion creates, nor seek to contract the enjoyment of that greatest privilege within the narrow limits timid men prescribe. With the passing mischiefs of its extravagance contrast the prodigious blessings it has heaped upon man. Free discussion gave to Europe the reformation, which I have been taught to believe the mightiest event in the history of the human race—illuminated the world with the radiant light of spiritual truth. May it shine with steady and increasing splendour. Free discussion gave to England the revolution, abolished tyranny, swept away the monstrous abuses it rears, and established the liberties under which we live. Free discussion, since that glorious epoch, has not only preserved, but purified our constitution, reformed our laws, reduced our punishments, and extended its wholesome influence to every portion of our political system. The spirit of inquiry it creates has revealed the secrets of nature—explained the wonders of the creation, teaching the knowledge of the stupendous works of God. Arts, sciences, civilisation, freedom, pure religion, are its noble realities. Would you undo the labours of science, extinguish literature, stop the efforts of genius, restore ignorance, bigotry, barbarism, then put down free discussion, and you have accomplished all. Savage conquerors, in the blindness of their ignorance, have scattered and destroyed the intellectual treasures of a great antiquity. Those who make war on the sacred right of free discussion, without their ignorance, imitate their fury. They may check the expression of some thought, which might, if uttered, redeem the liberties or increase the happiness of man. The insidious assailants of this great prerogative of intellectual beings, by the cover under which they advance, conceal the character of their assault upon the liberties of the human race. They seem to admit the liberty to discuss—blame only its extravagance, pronounce

hollow praises on the value of freedom of speech, and straightway begin a prosecution to cripple or destroy it." That is exactly what our prosecutors are to-day trying to do; don't forget that stopping us in our object will only tend to cause some others to rise on the same subject, who may do better than those who went before them; but if you find a verdict of guilty against us you may stop the discussion of the whole population question until we try the matter again. I will ask you whether, when I unfold to you the nature of this prosecution, you will not feel that Knowlton is not guilty of using the word marriage to cover obscenity, but rather that the prosecution is using the name of Knowlton to smother the right of free discussion and free press in this country. Now, gentlemen, I must appeal to you on a simple matter of justice. I must ask you to look at the way in which this prosecution is conducted. I asked Detective Simonds what his weekly wage was, and how long he had been in the detective force. Probably, when I asked him those questions, you may have thought that I was asking useless ones without an object, and although in most instances you would have been right in considering they were not directly to the issue, and therefore inadmissible according to the laws of evidence, I asked them with no idle intention. I asked them for this reason—It is one of the principles of English justice, that those accused shall be placed face to face with their accusers, and shall understand who brings them to answer before the bar of justice. Our difficulty in knowing the aim of the prosecution is, that we don't know at the present moment who is prosecuting us. When first we were arrested and taken to the Guildhall we were kept waiting for more than two hours shut up in the cold and uncomfortable cells under the Guildhall court of justice. We were then told that we were kept there to await the presence of the City Solicitor, who had the conduct of the prosecution. Hearing that, we thought we were to fight a prosecution conducted by the city authorities. We wrote to the City Solicitor, and our belief was strengthened by his answer, because the City Solicitor, writing on the paper of the Corporation, using the stamp of the Corporation, and signing under his name "City Solicitor," has only the right to use the funds of the city to conduct prosecutions for the city authorities; we naturally then believed that we were being prosecuted by the city authorities. Imagine our astonishment when on Mr. Bradlaugh asking whether that was

so, we were told that "the Corporation of the City of London has nothing and never had anything to do with the prosecution against you and Mrs. Besant"! This came to us as a greater surprise because Mr. Douglas Straight, instructed by the City Solicitor, said in open court that he appeared on behalf of the Corporation. You may imagine that we found it difficult to discover what private malice had been brought to bear in the institution of the prosecution against us. We tried to find out; we wrote to the solicitor and he wrote us telling us the Corporation had nothing to do with it, and referred us to the head of the Police of the city, who in his turn, in answer, said he had nothing to do with it and that we must refer to the information. We found upon the information the name of William Simonds, there being no address given. We wrote for the address, which was furnished to us, and we then wrote to detective Wm. Simonds asking if he were the man responsible. We received in return merely an answer expressing his pleasure at receiving our letter. Now Mr. Wm. Simonds has been in the force for 13 years. He commenced at 28s. a week, and has risen to 31s. 6d., and he has some clothes in addition. I will ask you to use your common sense whether Mr. Wm. Simonds on 28s. a week, rising to 31s. 6d., has made such large economies that he has been able to save sufficient money out of his salary to find the fees and engage the services of the Solicitor-General, Mr. Douglas Straight, and Mr. Mead, instructed by the City Solicitor, to prosecute us? If it be possible to live upon so small a sum of money and also put by sufficient means to fight one's difficulties with the aid of a powerful retinue of legal advisers such as the learned counsel engaged in this case, there can be no necessity for appealing to Dr. Knowlton's work with any desire to keep down one's family on the ground of want of means. (Laughter.). Why, when Dr. Knowlton's work was commenced to be published in England—that was forty-two years ago—Mr. William Simonds must have been a little boy. He must have made this prosecution the far-off ideal of his life, and undoubtedly he must have commenced to have saved the 6d. or 9d. a week, which he should have spent in sugar-plums or toffee, to have then commanded means sufficient to have retained the services of the Solicitor-General and these other gentlemen. Now, see the position in which we stand with regard to this prosecution, which is a disgrace to English justice. If we win. the

whole of the costs will fall on William Simonds—as the country allows nothing for expenses—as the only responsible prosecutor in this case. We know that the Queen is nominally our prosecutor, but there is no public fund out of which the costs of our prosecution can be paid. Where, I should like to know, do the costs come from, and who is hidden behind the city constable that they refuse to let us and you know? If we win the verdict, who is to pay the costs? Poor Wm. Simonds—is it possible that we can look to him? or are there people hidden behind the coat of the city detective, of whom we have a right to hear, and the hiding of whom tends to open the door to the greatest scandal in the prosecution of public justice in this country? Where has this sudden virtuous inspiration sprung from? I have a right to assume its real origin, because our names have been dragged into another prosecution which is being carried on, and which was only commenced in order to prejudice this case. Its representatives are here to-day, brought here lest the failure of the Solicitor-General and the two learned counsel whom he leads should need the fostering care of these hidden abettors. Forty or fifty years ago there was a society called the Society of Vice, but better known as the Bridge Street gang; in this Society, under cover of a few respectable names, a herd of spies and informers carried on their despicable work, and hunted down honest booksellers, whose works are now found on the shelves of every thinker. This society sank out of sight under a weight of shame and disgust, but it has again arisen, and is once more at its foul work. It is to-day worthily represented by its secretary, Mr. C. H. Collette, solicitor, and he boasts openly that he "prompts" the Solicitor-General against us. That he is starting all these prosecutions is very suggestive, and I ask you whether you will countenance a society like that, sheltering itself under a police detective in order to prosecute a man and a woman who are spending their lives in trying to do good to their fellow-creatures? If you think we are wrong in doing so, we must bow to the result of your verdict; but I submit that the whole conduct of this prosecution has been malicious and disgraceful, and I trust that in a case like the present you will pause before you give a prosecution, instituted as this one has been, any encouragement. I now come to deal with the pamphlet itself. The Solicitor-General has read the whole of the preface, and

has thus saved me from having to read it over again. Allow me to refer to the history of the pamphlet. The Solicitor-General exhibited a curious—if not a pretended—ignorance on the subject when he spoke of "Mr. Knowlton." No doubt the learned Solicitor-General's time has been so fully occupied in the conduct of his wide criminal practice, that he has had very little opportunity of studying the details of medical works; Mr. Chas. Knowlton might be anyone; but Chas. Knowlton, M.D., is a medical man, who, by reason of his position, has more right to deal with physiological details than a layman. He was an M.D. in good practice in Boston, which city is said to be considered by the Americans as the "hub of the universe"—the "hub," meaning the acme of culture, of education, of scientific thought and ability. Chas. Knowlton not only practised in Boston as a leading physician, but he was also a contributor to the foremost scientific journals of that city. That city is the American centre of pure intellect, and the greatest proof that I can give you of the qualifications of Dr. Charles Knowlton is the fact of his contributing to those journals, when I tell you that those leading medical journals of the city of Boston rank in the same category as do the *Lancet* and *Obstetric Journal* published in England. I point out that to you with a knowledge that these are not matters of evidence, but because I think it important to you to know that Dr. Charles Knowlton was not only looked up to and respected throughout his native town but throughout the whole of the United States. In consequence of its not being evidence we did not think it worth while to bring from America Messrs. Seaver & Mendum, the proprietors of the leading Boston Freethought paper, to prove that Dr. Knowlton was to their knowledge a man of blameless life. I contend that such observations as those of the Solicitor-General should not be allowed to be brought against the character of a man of Dr. Knowlton's capacity, and that it is going too far, even in a criminal prosecution, to cast unfair slurs on the name of a dead man. Dr. Knowlton's book was published in America, and was largely sold there. In 1833 it was published in London by Mr. James Watson, who died the year before last. He also was a man of unblemished life, who, while he had been prosecuted by the Government for the sale of political and other pamphlets, now generally published, had never had the smallest shadow cast upon him as seller of an indecent book. He was one of those men who persisted in selling

unstamped papers, and the penny newspaper press of this country is the result of the struggles in which Mr. James Watson took part; it was the result of those struggles which made it possible to sell for a penny those journals which were previously sold bearing a sixpenny stamp. When he died he was honoured by all who knew him, even by those who had prosecuted him in his lifetime. That was how this book was first issued forty-four years ago. Mr. James Watson died, as I have already said, about a year and a-half ago. We had thought of putting his widow into the box to prove the publication; but in consequence of her ill-health, and her desire not to be troubled with an examination in a public court, we have determined, in reverence for the memory of her dead husband, not to bring her here against her will. The book was not only sold by Mr. James Watson but also by Messrs. Holyoake & Co. One of this firm was Mr. George Jacob Holyoake, whose name is probably fairly well known to you. The other was Mr. Austin Holyoake. He it was whose "Thoughts in a Sick Room," written when he was dying, were spoken of admiringly by Miss Frances Power Cobbe, a lady whose opinions might not be supposed to be favourable to such a man as Austin Holyoake. He recommended this book, in a pamphlet of his own, in conjunction with Robert Dale Owen's "Moral Physiology," and the "Elements of Social Science," a book which no one yet has had the courage to attack. It was also sold by Brook & Co., 282, Strand, but I will not conceal from you that the moment the prosecution was instituted the last-named firm sold the copies they had at once, that they might not stand in the same position as we stand in to-day. It is not pleasant for booksellers to stand in such a position, and I cannot blame them if they did not persist in the sale of the pamphlet. From Mr. Holyoake the book went into the hands of a Mr. Charles Watts, and on James Watson's death he bought the plates of the work together with many others from the widow. His plea to the indictment of wilfully publishing an obscene book was, as you know, a plea of guilty. The Solicitor-General, doubtless from forgetfulness, entirely omitted any reference to that trial, and spoke as though we republished the book because of the Bristol affair. It is not the case that we published the book because of the prosecution of the man named Cook, at Bristol. We should never have troubled to republish a book because a man named Cook, at Bristol, had been

called up about it. It seems, from the reports I have seen, that he was not really called up for this pamphlet, although nominally he was prosecuted for it; he was a bookseller of known bad character, and he sold very few of these works, because they are not written in a style which a vendor of obscene literature would find it profitable to sell. It so happened that this Mr. Charles Watts had published for my co-defendant for some years, and for me for a short time, thus somewhat connecting our names with his, and bringing us into the disgrace of his yielding. Mr. Watts thought it right to plead guilty, and I feel this fact is calculated to prejudice our case, and that if you did not hear our defence the very plea of guilty, put in by the man who published the book, would make you put the book down to be one of that set of obscene publications which are sold for the purpose of making a large profit. We felt that the book could not be given up in that fashion. Gentlemen, that book had been published for more than forty years by those with whom my co-defendant had worked, and whose work I have inherited (for I have only come young into the work). That book being so published, we felt it our duty to the dead who had gone before, as well as to those yet living, that no plea of guilty should be allowed to stand, and that imprisonment should be braved rather than that the stigma of indecency should attach to those whom we reverence. Neither Mr. Bradlaugh nor myself had previously had anything to do with the purely technical details connected with publication. We took this new work upon ourselves in order that we might issue this book that everybody shrank from issuing. We were not printers before, but we became printers that we might print this book; we became publishers that we might publish this book; we took a shop that we might sell this book; and we did all this at a time when danger attached to it, and we had nothing to gain and much to lose by so doing. That, gentlemen, is the history of the book. The Solicitor-General stated that the sub-title of the book has been changed. Gentlemen, that is perfectly true. The sub-title of the book used to be "Private Companion to Young Married Couples," or, "Young Married People." That sub-title is just like the title of Dr. Chavasse's book. He calls his book "Advice to a Wife," and Knowlton's was called "Advice to Young Married Couples." Frankly, I don't like titles of that character. Dr. Chavasse's book is a good and a useful book, and labelling it "Advice

to a Wife" gives a kind of suggestiveness to it, and hints that you might get a special kind of knowledge, which is, I think, a mistake when you are dealing with a book to be put on railway bookstalls. But I hold that there is nothing indecent or obscene in calling a book "Advice to a Wife," or "Private Companion to Young Married People." Gentlemen, I have no experience of obscene literature; I have never seen a book which has been made the subject of a prosecution such as this, but I understand that it is the usual thing, where an obscene book is published, that the printer's and publisher's names are omitted, and they so evade responsibility. I may say there is no attempt at concealment here, when you find that right through this book is openly published; first by James Watson (holding up the works cited in turn), then by Holyoake & Co., then by Austin & Co., then by Brook & Co., then once more published by James Watson & Co. at a later address, then published once more by James Watson at another address, and, latterly, by the "Freethought Publishing Company," bearing the imprint "Printed by Annie Besant and Charles Bradlaugh." There is here throughout no concealment of publisher or printer. Having once found how the responsibility of the printer might be treated when it was challenged, we made up our minds to put our own names on everything we published for the future, so that we alone might be responsible for every word we thought it right to issue to the public. So much for the history of the pamphlet; now for the pamphlet itself. If it would not trouble you too much, gentlemen, I would ask you kindly to mark the passages with which I deal, because I don't want to give you the trouble of going over the same ground twice. I will first take the preface, for, although I thought that the preface could not be attacked, I heard it read by the Solicitor-General as part of the accusation. It might be thought that the case for the prosecution was so small that he was obliged to fill up the necessary time by reading the preface, for I don't see anything obscene or immodest in it. But to suggest that that could have been his object would be discourteous to my learned antagonist. I will refer to a passage at page 6, dealing with the publishers' preface, from "We publish this pamphlet" down to "sound judgment." I need not read it as you have already heard it read. The Solicitor-General said we do not "agree" in our preface with the medical views or the philosophical proem; we

simply wanted to guard ourselves against endorsing every one of the medical and metaphysical views of Dr. Knowlton. The Solicitor-General put it that we did not agree with them, but whether or not we agree with them, we are responsible for them for the purpose of this trial. However much we may disagree with Dr. Knowlton, we are responsible for every syllable that he has written. I hold that everyone who prints and publishes a book ought to be held to the fullest extent responsible for that which he issues to the public. I hold that nothing is so cowardly, nothing is so mean or so disgraceful, as for a publisher to issue a book, or for an editor to issue a journal, and then, when challenged by the law, to shrink back and say "I did not know what I was doing." If publishers are not aware of what is in the books they publish, they ought to be; and if editors do not know what is in their journals, they ought to know. You have no safety for character, or for morality, or for any of our valuable institutions, unless you make the publisher responsible for everything which he issues. Therefore, in saying that I don't endorse Dr. Knowlton on some points, I don't want to shirk full responsibility for all he has here written. That preface was written because we hold that, on social questions, discussion is a vital necessity, and we published Dr. Knowlton's views, not because we agreed with him, but simply because we think that his views ought to be heard. I agree with Dr. Knowlton's principle; I think that some kind of check to population ought to be adopted; but when this preface was written, I did not know enough of medical books to know whether his checks would tend to promote health. I put it to yourselves that it is a question very much discussed in France—what kind of checks are healthy to the women and the children. You must get that question settled, for on the question of the health of the women and children depends the deterioration or the improvement of the next generation. You cannot settle that question unless you permit doctors to discuss what checks are healthy and what are not. Amongst the French doctors' books I have read in the course of this defence, I have found some objections raised to some of the checks put forward by Dr. Knowlton. But, I say, you cannot deal with this question unless every man is free to put forward his medical knowledge without fear of prosecution, or of the disgrace of obscenity being attached to the book that he may issue. That may, perhaps, cover the

point of the Solicitor-General as to our agreement with Knowlton. I will only, in the next page, page 7, draw your attention to the three concluding lines of the first paragraph, with reference to the names of other works being given in foot notes. Not desiring that Dr. Knowlton's views should be taken without study, we thought it right to add the references, so as to afford any one the opportunity of seeing what might be said against as well as for. The preface says: "We advocate scientific checks to population, because so long as poor men have large families pauperism is a necessity and from pauperism grow crime and disease." I shall have to deal with that a little more fully later on, and I will only put it to you now, that you have got before you a great social question which is becoming more and more pressing as every year goes by—a question the gravity of which is recognised by men like John Stuart Mill, by men like Professor Fawcett, by men like Professor Cairnes and Professor Bain, as well as by some of those whom we shall put into the witness box. I must put it to you that if pauperism is the consequence of large families and that if from it grow crime and disease, then you will be bound to bring in a verdict of "not guilty," because we shall have shown that our object in publishing this pamphlet was not in any way to arouse the passions of the unmarried, but simply to prevent the curse of pauperism, which is becoming more and more a pressing question with every year that rolls over our heads. You will now permit me to refer to the former publisher's preface, which is not in the copy now before you. The Solicitor-General thought it right to put it to you, without offering one word of proof, that Dr. Knowlton used the word "married" to cover unmarried people, and that he really meant to suggest promiscuous intercourse. In fact, he speaks most warmly against it. You find he says: "It is a notorious fact that the families of the married often increase beyond what a regard for the young beings coming into existence, or the happiness of those who gave them birth, would dictate." He goes on to say that in publishing the pamphlet his only object is to enable married people to have some control over the number of children they bring into the world. It is a fact that the object of this pamphlet, so far from destroying marriage and so far from approving any kind of illicit connection between the sexes—it is a fact that this pamphlet is written by Dr. Knowlton, and circulated by us to-day, for the purpose which the learned judge suggested

was a question of great importance, that of making early marriage possible to a very large number of young men to-day. Our object is not to destroy marriage but to make it more widely prevalent; not to encourage prostitution, but to destroy that which is a very prolific source of prostitution, the shrinking of young men from marriage because of the terrible responsibility that marriage often brings with it. That is the object of my co-defendant and myself. I lay stress upon another part of the preface, because the Solicitor-General seemed to insinuate an objection to the idea: "without even a partial sacrifice of the pleasure which attends the gratification of the productive instinct." I put it to you that there is nothing wrong in a natural desire rightly and properly gratified. There is no harm in feeling thirsty because people get drunk; there is no harm in feeling hungry because people over-eat themselves, and there is no harm in gratifying the sexual instinct if it can be gratified without injury to anyone else, and without harm to the morals of society, and with due regard to the health of those whom nature has given us the power of summoning into the world. I put it to you gravely, that it is only a false and spurious kind of modesty, which sees harm in the gratification of one of the highest instincts of human nature—an instinct which goes through all the world, not only in the animal but in the vegetable kingdom; if you are to blame Dr. Knowlton because he recognises a great natural fact, then it is your duty to blame the constitution of the world, and the arrangements of nature, because you find that the reproductive instinct *is* attended with pleasure in its due gratification. The notion that pleasure *quâ* pleasure is wrong is an ascetic notion, which is at the base of a large amount of the profligacy of the present day. You even find it stated, right through the teaching of the Christian moralists, that Providence annexed pleasure to the reproductive function in order to ensue the perpetuation of the species. Take Jeremy Taylor. No one will say that in his "Living and Dying," he wrote a book intentionally calculated to arouse sexual desires. You will find he says that God appointed sexual pleasure in order to ensure the reproduction of the species. It is not only by those to whom the co-defendant and myself belong that this fact is recognised. You find it in the bishops of the Church of England and your great moralists. They say that it is the special plan of Providence so that the species in the animal and vegetable kingdom may be preserved. Mon-

taigne truly said, that it is only an impure mind which sees impurity in the function which brings mankind into the world. I put it to you that the pamphlet is specially addressed to the married, and there is not one single syllable in it that gives colour to the insinuation that the word "marriage" is used as a cover to unlawful desires. I now come to the Philosophical Proem. I do not agree with it, but I say there is not a single syllable which even the Solicitor-General can twist into indecency, and I hold that in order to convict on this indictment you must take the whole book to be obscene.

The LORD CHIEF-JUSTICE: I don't want to interrupt you, but that is going too far.

Mrs. BESANT: Is it putting it a little too strongly?

The LORD CHIEF-JUSTICE: You are wrong there. The question is whether the book is obscene, not whether there may be intermediary passages that are not obscene. You must take it as a whole. They have charged the whole book. The jury must look at the scope and effect of the whole.

Mrs. BESANT: I am much obliged to you, my lord. You must read the whole of the publisher's preface, and judge of that part which will tend to produce obscenity taken as a whole. I will call your attention to a sentence in the Philosophical Proem to show the tone of Dr. Knowlton. He speaks of—"Passions acquired by habit—habitually hankering for stimulants, as spirits, opium, and tobacco, is one of these." Dr. Knowlton, you will see, is not a man specially given to physical or sensual indulgence. You will find that on many points he is, what would be called by many people, ascetic. In the third paragraph you will see:—"That which gives rise to agreeable consciousness is good, and we desire it. If we use it intemperately such use is bad, but the thing itself is still good." How can the Solicitor-General, then, pretend that intemperate passion is advised by Knowlton? The only other passage in the philosophical proem with which I need trouble you is the second paragraph on page 3. We are told there, "Man by nature is endowed with the talent of devising means to remedy or prevent the evils that are liable to arise from gratifying our appetites, and it is as much the duty of the physician to inform mankind of the means of preventing the evils that are liable to arise from gratifying the reproductive instinct as it is to inform them how to keep clear of the gout or

dyspepsia." And I will put it to you that that is true. The doctor cannot pick out one portion of the human frame and say: I won't deal with that because, in so doing, I may be branded as indecent. It is the physician's business to deal with the whole man and woman, and so to deal with them that he may warn them from what disease is likely to arise, and what methods they may take in order to prevent such arising, and you will find right through this that Knowlton, writing as a scientific man to those whom he desires to instruct, is really giving them such physiological knowledge as will tend to the preservation of their health; and, more than that, you will find that duty thoroughly recognised by other doctors as well as by Knowlton. Now, take the case of Dr. Acton, where he is dealing with some of the questions which are most objected to by the learned Solicitor-General. Knowlton also deals with them, and I take leave to say that, after all, a doctor of medicine in America may surely be permitted to deal with subjects that a doctor of medicine in England is also allowed to deal with. You find in dealing with Acton that he publishes a book treating right through of the functions and disorders of the reproductive organs, a book which he does not intend to go amongst medical men, but which he intends for more general circulation, because he distinctly says he hopes it will exert good influence on public health and public morals. You will find Dr. Acton arguing: "I have been entreated over and over again to urge on parents, guardians, schoolmasters, and others interested in the education of youth, the necessity of giving their charges some warning, or some intimation of their danger." Dr. Acton, gentlemen, is dealing specially with one of the intemperate practices to which Dr. Knowlton alludes in some five lines, and which Dr. Acton gives a large portion of his book to, and he is dealing there with the question as to whether it is wise or not to publish details of that kind, and he publishes here details which Knowlton does not, and you will find, when my co-defendant comes to deal with his book, that he clearly puts there that you cannot possibly—especially with young men—avoid their having knowledge regarding their own bodies, and that it is better—especially so long as you allow them to read the classics—that they should have some kind of what I may, perhaps, call an antidote, in physiological knowledge, to that thoroughly sensual set of ideas that they get in dealing with the classical authors; and he says: "it is in this way that

men of my mode of thinking view the distinction between he modern newspaper details and the prurient literature which has been generally known as Holywell Street. In this last-named literary garbage, illicit pleasure was depicted in all its most attractive and meretricious forms, but the anonymous author, like the translators of the Greek and Latin lores of the heathen gods and goddesses omitted to allude to the frightful consequences that illicit love or bestial propensities produce on all those who directly or indirectly indulge their animal propensities." That, Dr. Acton says, is the distinction between decency and indecency, and right through this book you will find the strongest language employed by Dr. Knowlton against such intemperate indulgence as is bad for the health of those for whom he writes. With that, I think, gentlemen, I may almost leave this philosophical proem, although I had marked, to read to you, two sentences that follow the one I have just read to you, putting it that the reproductive instinct, being a physical need like hunger or thirst, comes as much within the province of the physician as any other part of the human body, and I will put here what is matter of fact—as later, I can show you from Mr. Darwin—that what Knowlton says about health is shewn to be true by the fact that married women live longer than unmarried women, and this is a point you get right through every census table that you can take up. You will find there that marriage has a distinctly lengthening effect on human life; you will find that bachelorhood or spinsterhood distinctly shortens life; and it is only reasonable it should be so, gentlemen, because those who despise the natural instincts of nature can scarcely be surprised if nature revenges herself by shortening the life which they do not know how to use. That, then, I will put to you, that you find—especially dealing with my own sex—that unmarried women (and if any of you are doctors you will know it well) suffer from a number of diseases, special to the reproductive organs, that married women, as a rule, do not suffer from, because they have not thwarted nature in the fashion that those who lead a celibate life must do. And I may say here, too, that Dr. Knowlton remarks that "mankind will not so abstain;" as a simple matter of fact, I must put it to you that men and women, but more especially men, will not lead a celibate life, whether they are married or unmarried, and that what you have got to deal with is, that which we advocate—early mar-

riage with restraint upon the numbers of the family—or else a simple mass of unlicensed prostitution, which is the ruin both of men and women when once they fall into it. I will pass, gentlemen, from that, on to the first chapter of Dr. Knowlton's essay. Dr. Knowlton writes the first chapter to show "how desirable it is, both in a political and social point of view, for mankind to be able to limit at will the number of their offspring, without sacrificing the pleasure that attends the gratification of the reproductive instinct;" and I will put it broadly, that mankind will not sacrifice the pleasure that attends the gratification of the reproductive instinct, and that you have got to deal with things as they are, and not with things as they might be—if ascetics could form the world better, as they think, than nature has already formed it. It has been put that the political economy of this pamphlet is only a cover for an indecent object. If so, it seems almost strange and suicidal on Dr. Knowlton's part that he should speak so strongly against profligacy as you find him do in this first chapter. It is not usual for a man who wants to induce young people to become profligate, to carefully point out to them all the harm that will come from their following his advice, and all the misery that will attend them in after-life if they carry out his suggestions. I am inclined to think, taking the learned Solicitor-General's point of view, that Dr. Knowlton, instead of being attacked for writing an obscene pamphlet, ought almost to have been shut up in a madhouse for taking the very means that must utterly destroy the end which he proposed to himself to attain. This chapter, then, which is part of the incriminated book, deals with a serious question of political economy, and I will draw your attention now to the first paragraph, "in a political point of view"—"If population be not restrained by some great physical calamity, such as we have reason to hope will not hereafter be visited upon the children of men, or by some *moral restraint*, the time will come when the earth cannot support its inhabitants. Population, unrestrained, will double three times in a century. Hence, computing the present population of the earth at one thousand millions, there would be at the end of one hundred years from the present time, 8,000 millions; at the end of 200 years, 64,000 millions; at the end of 300 years, 512,000 millions, and so on, multiplying by eight for every additional hundred years. So that, in 500 years from the present time, there

would be thirty-two thousand seven hundred and sixty-eight times as many inhabitants as there are at present. If the natural increase should go on without check for 1500 years, one single pair would increase to more than thirty-five thousand one hundred and eighty-four times as many as the present population of the whole earth!" I urge, gentlemen, that this chapter cannot be separated from the book when you are dealing with the intent of the book; that you have no right to presume an indecent intent unless you have some amount of proof which shall show that the intent is bad; and I urge that the whole of the tone of this first chapter directly negatives the contention which the Solicitor-General put forward to you in opening the case for the prosecution. That contention of Knowlton is one that is thoroughly and fully recognised by others; and when you are dealing with it, if you once allow my definition of this first chapter to stand, you cannot convict on the remainder of the book; because, if I can prove to you that you must have some checks on population—that you have only got the choice between the checks of vice and misery and the scientific checks for which we plead—if I can prove that to you, you cannot bring in a verdict of guilty against us. You may say, "physiological details are introduced;" but you cannot discuss the population question without introducing physiological details. You may lay down the law, as Knowlton does in his first chapter, without physiological details; but it is no good laying down the law if you don't apply the law; and you cannot apply the law until you make the people acquainted with the simple mechanism of their own bodies, as Dr. Knowlton does here; and I will put it that there is nothing more hopeless to us than if the increase of our knowledge is simply to point out to us the doom which we are powerless to avert; you had better have no political economy at all, no science at all, if that science is only to drive us to despair by giving us the knowledge of an approaching misery, while you forbid us in any fashion to discuss the means whereby we may avert it; you can no more discuss the population question without physiology than you can solve an arithmetical problem without figures. If you tried to do it you would utterly fail; you might lay down your law, but you could not apply it without the details. The economical law teaches the danger of over-production; nature teaches us that men and women will marry; and the object of medical science is to teach us how the

law of political economy, and the law of nature, may be shown so to dovetail into each other, that they may be both obeyed by human beings without wrong or harm being done to any one. The prosecution, when pressed specially—I may say pressed almost by the learned judge himself—picked out one or two extracts of the book which it characterised as specially obscene. Our duty is, then, to bring forward the other parts of the book which show that those parts of the book are simply necessary for the solving of the question in hand; and as the intent is part of the indictment, if I can show you that Knowlton's intent, and, therefore, our intent, is a scientific intent, you will be bound to bring us in not guilty of the indictment against us. That I think you will find to be so strongly decided in a number of trials that I have put down here, that unless my course of dealing with it is objected to by the prosecution I won't trouble you with the references I have made. On the fourth page you find Knowlton putting forward:—"Some check, then, there must be, or the time will come when millions will be born but to suffer and to perish for the necessaries of life. To what an inconceivable amount of human misery would such a state of things give rise! And must we say that vice, war, pestilence, and famine, are desirable to prevent it? Must the friends of temperance and domestic happiness stay their efforts? Must peace societies excite to war and bloodshed? Must the physician cease to investigate the nature of contagion, and to search for the means of destroying its baneful influence? Must he that becomes diseased be marked as a victim to die for the public good, without the privilege of making an effort to restore him to health? And, in case of a failure of crops in one part of the world, must the other part withhold the means of supporting life, that the far greater evil of excessive population throughout the globe may be prevented?" Gentlemen, that is practically putting that law of population, which was laid down first, in the year 1798, by the Rev. T. R. Malthus, who was a fellow of Jesus College, Cambridge, and a professor of history and political economy at the East India College, in Hertfordshire. Malthus wrote that the law of population, which he then pressed on the people of his time, was that "there was a constant tendency in all animated life to increase beyond the nourishment prepared for it. It is observed by Dr. Franklin that there is no bound to the prolific nature of

plants and animals but what is made by their crowding and interfering with each other's means of subsistence"; and he goes on to say, "And it may safely be pronounced that the population, when unchecked"—and I lay great stress on the "when unchecked," that you may find out the terrible nature of those checks, against which we are setting ourselves in this trial—"population, when unchecked, goes on doubling itself every twenty-five years, or increases in a geometrical ratio. The rate according to which the production of the earth may be supposed to increase will not be so easy to determine. Of this, however, we may be perfectly sure, that the ratio of their increase in a limited territory must be of a totally different nature from the ratio of increase in the population. A thousand millions are just as easily doubled every twenty-five years by the power of population as a thousand, but the food to support the increase of the greater number will by no means be obtained with the same facility. Man is confined in room. When acre has been added to acre until all the fertile land is occupied, the yearly increase of food must depend on the amelioration of the land already in possession." That is the way that Mr. Malthus puts it, and I may perhaps deal there with the figures he puts because he puts it so clearly that I think that by reading this I shall give you the whole gist of Malthus's "Law of Population." "Let us call," he says, "the population of this island eleven millions. Suppose the present produce equal to the easy support of such a number (and I may remind you, in passing, that the population which Malthus speaks of as eleven millions—which was then nearer ten millions—has since then gone up to something like twenty-three millions, while, as you know from the price of food, food has not multiplied itself with the rapidity which population has done), "in the first twenty-five years," he says, "the population will be twenty-two millions, and the food being also doubled, the means of subsistence would be equal to the increase. In the next twenty-five years the population would be forty-four millions, and the means of subsistence only equal to the means of twenty-three millions."

The Lord Chief Justice: He hardly makes any allowance for deaths. He gives the actual increase, and not the ratio?

Mrs. Besant: He deals with that further on, and I shall

show, in a few moments, the checks that keep it down. Mr. Malthus does make allowance for what should be the ordinary death-rate, and be points out the misery that results from war and starvation, which are the checks that are acting to-day; and that is the justification, my lord, for our pamphlet.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: I do not know how long your lordship will sit. At this stage Mrs. Besant is about half-way through the matter which she has to bring before your lordship. I have been following it on the brief.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: We must go on, I think, for another half-hour, unless Mrs. Besant feels exhausted.

Mrs. BESANT: Oh, no; I can go on.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: Then I think we must take another half-hour.

Mrs. BESANT: The reason why I am bringing this forward, gentlemen, is that I shall have to show you—as I can show you, and I shall bring some figures to-morrow morning to show you and the learned judge—that the population does double itself in 25 years, in countries where food is sufficient to support it. That, gentlemen, is really the justification of our pamphlet; for we believe that the present checks that keep population down are the misery and starvation that result from over-crowding, and we want to substitute scientific checks for those. I was quoting from Malthus, where he was pointing out the rate of subsistence that is natural to the human kind; you find in the "second 25 years the population gets to 44 millions, and the means of subsistence to only 33 millions. In the next period the population is 88 millions, and the means of subsistence just equal to half. At the conclusion of the first century, the population would be 176 millions, and the means of subsistence only equal to the support of 55 millions, leaving a population of 121 millions totally unprovided for"; and then he goes on to point out that the human species would increase, with a sufficiency of food, in the ratio of the numbers 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, and so on.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: In other words, geometrically.

Mrs. BESANT: Yes; in the geometrical ratio, my lord.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: Whereas the food increased in arithmetical proportion.

Mrs. BESANT: That is just how he puts it; I was putting it in figures, lest the technical terms should not so well

convey the idea. Then that is Malthus' "Law of Population," published by him, as I put to you, in 1798. Since that time, gentlemen, a very large number of books have been written, all bearing on this subject, and, almost without exception, the books of the leading political economists follow the theory propounded and laid down by Mr. Malthus. You may remember that Miss Martineau said that it would be as absurd to try to upset the law of population as to upset the law of arithmetic. That is putting it very plainly. But it just shows you the view that thinkers take on the subject. I do not mean to give all the quotations I might to back up Malthus, or many except on special points, but I may say that both John Stuart Mill and his father, Professor Cairnes, Professor Fawcett, Mrs. Fawcett, Professor Bain, and many others, whose works, at the present time, are the text-books for the instruction of young men at the Universities of Oxford and of Cambridge, as well as at other universities, that all those do agree, without exception, in the law laid down by Malthus ; that they all, without exception, acknowledge his division as to positive and preventive checks, which I shall have to deal with to-morrow, and all, without exception, do say that unless you can find some way of limiting the population of the world by preventive checks, you must be content to remain with those old barbarous means, which the Solicitor-General said were the provisions made by God and nature for our benefit: those provisions are — war, famine, disease, misery, starvation, overcrowding, preventible disease, infanticide, baby-farming, and all other horrors of our civilization : those are the means which the Solicitor-General says God and providence give us in order to prevent the over-increase of our population. Gentlemen, when the Solicitor-General said that, I remembered the same expression being used, now almost one hundred years ago, when, in the House of Lords, it was ventured to be put forward that the use of the Red Indians to scalp our American brethren was a means that God and nature had put into our hands to crush the powers of rebellion, and I remembered the fiery indignation of Lord Chatham, who, whatever may have been his faults, at least remembered England's honour in dealing with this point, and he said—"God and nature ! I have yet to learn, my lords, that these sacred names are to be employed in fashion such as that !" and when I heard the Solicitor-General, when telling you of nature and providence, as

he put it, when he spoke of the miseries I have seen in our cities as one of the means God and nature have employed to destroy children brought into the world, children often born from drunken parents, in misery, in wretchedness and filth, which, gentlemen, your circumstances have happily removed you from; when I heard those things put down as a provision of God and nature, I trusted that, at least with you, terms used in cant fashion such as that would not have more influence than when used in that other fashion in the House of Lords in the last century. That, you will find is the law, and now what is the application which the learned judge suggested when I was speaking? Twenty-five years was the time within which Mr. Malthus said population doubled itself unless checked by misery, and war, and starvation. Refer, gentlemen, to the Northern States of America, and you find there, as a matter of fact, put forward here by Mr. Malthus and since then endorsed in America by Professor Draper—whose works are probably familiar to all of you—that in the Northern States of America, "where the means of subsistence have been more ample, the manners of the people more pure, and the checks to early marriages fewer than in any of the other modern States of America and Europe, the population has been found to double itself, within the last century and a half, in less than twenty-five years." That was written in 1798; during the time that has passed since then, you will find, gentlemen, if you consult the census returns of the United States, that the population has doubled itself in every twenty-five years, and in some of the States—if I may take the evidence of Professor Draper as thoroughly reliable on that point—in some of the States, he says, it has doubled itself in twelve years, instead of in fifty.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: Is that including the results of emigration?

Mr. BRADLAUGH: That is excluding the emigration returns.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: Is that so?

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Yes.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: It is very astonishing!

Mr. BRADLAUGH: It is very astonishing, but it is the result, after carefully excluding the emigration returns.

Mrs. BESANT: One may weary you with it, my lord, but so many of these things are not known generally, that you will pardon me if I put them to the jury, so that they may

see how we, who have studied this matter, put the question, and why we think it so vital a question, when dealing with it before you. The population does not increase, as my lord fairly pointed out, at this rate in this and other countries. Why not? "Population," says Malthus, "is necessarily limited by the means of subsistence. Population invariably increases where the means of subsistence increase, unless prevented by some very powerful and obvious checks. These checks, and the checks which repress the superior power of population, and keep its effects on a level with the means of subsistence, are all resolvable into moral restraint, vice, and misery." I shall put it to you, gentlemen, that you must have some checks, that the only choice you have got is, not whether there shall be checks, but what the checks shall be. You have got that choice, if you agree with the Solicitor-General. You may think the means of nature (for I won't bring the other name into a contention such as this)—you may think the means of nature are those you prefer, and then I put it to you, if so, that you go back to the old savage times where you get those checks in their full swing. You do get them there, gentlemen. If you want to go back, you must decide for these checks. I will now lay before you the division of checks made by Malthus, and it is with that division, I almost think (with my lord's permission), that I shall finish my speech of this afternoon, simply because, my lord, it makes a clear division of sense which it will be valuable to me to keep.

Those checks are divided into what are called "positive" checks, and what are called "preventive" checks. Positive checks for a moment I will call "natural" checks, following out the line of thought which the learned Solicitor-General kindly draws for my guidance, but they are "natural" only in the sense of being general throughout Nature; that is to say, it is the death-producing check which is the positive check, the check that produces death. You find it in the vegetable kingdom; you find it in the animal kingdom; the trees produce a number of seeds more than can ever grow into plants, animals produce far more young than ever can grow into maturity. If any of you have taken an interest in natural history, you will have seen there (and even without that you must know it from the common every-day matters of life), that the death producing check is the one check that acts throughout nature of all the young brought into the world, not one tithe survives to grow up into maturity; but that check is only a natural check in the

sense that nature is opposed to art, to science, or to men's reason. It is only natural, when you exclude man from nature and treat nature as simply brutal animal instincts and passions, and nothing more. The moment you admit man's reason into nature, that death-producing check is no longer a natural check, because man's reason is given him by nature, in order that by being thrown into the mass of a number of mute laws he may learn to balance law against law, and in doing that may use his reason to bring him out of the terrible crushing wheel of nature, that breaks down the lower organisms that have not our brain. I plead for preventive check. Preventive check means that man's brain is used—preventive check means birth-restricting check as opposed to death-producing check ; and I hold, in the words of our preface, gentlemen, that it is more moral to prevent the birth of children than it is after they are born to murder them as you do to-day by want of food, and air, and clothing, and sustenance. Gentlemen, I call it a birth-restricting check—an artificial check if you will, because all comfort and all civilization are artificial. It is the natural way, as the Solicitor-General put it (although not delicately, perhaps), for a man to go about naked ; though that is not respectable, that is the natural way of doing things. We, however, prefer the artificial fashion, which has the decency of clothing, instead of that which the Solicitor-General put, and I plead for what is called the artificial check—the preventive check ; and I say that man's reason is given him by nature in order that he may, by his reason and by his intellect, prevent that suffering which results from the laws of nature, if you take nature without man. That, gentlemen, is what I shall plead for to-morrow. I have brought you down now partly through our pamphlet, with our reasons for doing it. I have put to you as plainly as I can the meaning of the word obscene, which will govern your verdict ; I have pleaded that our intent is good, and that the purpose at which we aim is good, because it conduces to human and to social happiness. I have shown you from Malthus—and he has never yet been disproved—what the law of population is. I have shown that some checks must prevail, either positive or preventive, and to-morrow I will deal with these.

SECOND DAY.

THE Court sat again, exactly at 10.30, and on taking his seat the Lord Chief-Justice intimated that he had received a letter from a gentleman who did not append his signature, complaining of the want of ventilation in the court, and requesting that more windows might be opened. He should certainly most willingly have granted the request, only that there were no more windows to open.

Mrs. BESANT, resuming her address, said: My lord, gentlemen of the jury: You will remember that when the Court rose, yesterday afternoon, I had just brought my argument down to the necessary checks on population which, following the rule laid down by Malthus, I had divided into two classes—one class being those positive, which I characterised as death-producing checks, which the learned Solicitor-General named as being that with which Nature and Providence had interposed, and the other those preventive, prudential, or birth-restricting checks, of which I am here the advocate. I propose, this morning, to take up my argument exactly where I laid it down, for it is very important for me in this trial that I should build up, step by step, the arguments which I desire to lay before you, and by which I hope to overthrow the contention of the learned Solicitor-General, that the whole of the philosophy of this book is only a cloak put to cover the body of a vicious and demoralising intent. I laid the foundation of the argument yesterday, and I shall proceed to take it step by step to-day, and while I shall do my best to compress my arguments so far as I can, I am quite sure that I may ask from your sense of justice, and from your patience, the full consideration which will be necessary, if I am to put before you the contention which I raise. I feel slightly encouraged to-day, in trespassing on your time, from the fact that even this morning we have had the pleasure of receiving a letter from Professor Bain, a man who will be known to all of you, a man who is known wherever thought has spread, in which he says, that he regards this trial "as one of the most critical trials in the history of our liberties." If that be true, or if it is possible that it can

be true, you will not think I am unduly trespassing on your time if I leave no argument untouched which may avail to move you at a crisis so important. It is the positive checks with which I have to deal first. Malthus puts it that the ultimate check on population appears to be "want of food arising necessarily from the different ratios according to which population and food increase." You will remember that the learned judge pointed out that population increased in a geometrical ratio, while the means of supporting the population only increased in an arithmetical ratio. "The immediate check," says Malthus, "may be said to consist in all those customs and all those diseases which seem to be generated by a scarcity of the means of subsistence, and all those causes independent of this scarcity, whether of a moral or a physical nature, which tend prematurely to weaken and to destroy the human race." These are the checks of which, for the purpose of his argument, the learned Solicitor-General thought it right to speak in words of praise. These checks are found to apply most rigorously in savage nations, the tendency of civilisation being, instead of leaving the rough natural checks and other injuries to operate, to bring the means of neutralising the effect of natural laws. It is to savage nations, then, that we first turn. You get as a check on population, war, that in savage nations mows down so many of the strongest of the tribe, and, by destroying men in the prime of their life, acts, to a very great and wide extent, as a check on population. You get also the hardship of the daily life killing off the sickly and the young—a check that Malthus characterises in the very strongest terms, pointing out, as he goes through his great work, that, amongst some savage nations, a large proportion of children die because their baby frames are unable to support the hardships of their life. You have the difficulty of subsistence and of getting food, on which Darwin lays special stress as being a universal check; in his great work on the "Origin of Species," p. 61, he remarks that "of the many individuals of any species which are periodically born, but a small number can survive," and on p. 63, he says: "A struggle for existence inevitably follows, from the high rate at which all organic beings tend to increase. Every living being which, during its natural lifetime, produces eggs or seeds, must suffer destruction during some period of its life, and during some season or occasional year; otherwise, on the principle of geometrical increase, its numbers would quickly

become so inordinately great that no country could support the product. Hence, as more individuals are produced than can possibly survive, there must, in every case, be a struggle for existence, either one individual with another of the same species, or with individuals of distinct species, or with the physical conditions of life. It is the doctrine of Malthus applied with manifold force to the whole animal and vegetable kingdoms, for in this case there can be no artificial increase of food, no prudential restraint from marriage. . . . . There is no exception to the rule, and every organic being naturally increases at so high a rate that, if not destroyed, the earth would soon be covered by the progeny of a single pair. Even slow-breeding man has doubled in twenty-five years, and, at this rate, in a few thousand years, there would literally not be standing room for his progeny." He further goes on to point out that people do not recognise "this fact as thoroughly as they ought to do, owing to the fact that among the larger domestic animals we see no great destruction falling on them, and we forget that thousands are annually slaughtered for food, and that in a state of nature an equal number would have somehow to be disposed of." You get another check on population, operating in savage nations, and I shall have to put it to you as largely prevailing amongst ourselves. Amongst savage nations you get infanticide openly practised to a large extent. In the ruder tribes of America it is practised by many mothers, who do not wish to burden themselves by rearing more than two out of their offspring. If a mother endeavours to rear the whole of her children, a large proportion inevitably perishes under the rigorous treatment which must be their lot in a savage state, where, probably, none of those who laboured under any original weakness or infirmity could possibly attain the age of manhood. If they do not get cut off as soon as they are born they cannot long preserve their lives under the severe discipline that awaits them. You get another check in the murder of the aged, for the moment they cease to become productive, and can no longer make food for the tribe, their lives are put an end to. You get the whole thing well summed up in Malthus, who urges that all the checks you find in the savage state may be summed up in misery. He speaks of "the frequent wars of these savages with different tribes and their perpetual contests with each other; their strange spirit of retaliation and revenge, which prompts the midnight murder and

the frequent shedding of innocent blood; the smoke and filth of their miserable habitations, and their poor mode of living, productive of loathsome cutaneous disorders; and, above all, a dreadful epidemic like the small-pox, which sweeps off great numbers" (p. 17). It is thus that Malthus sums up those checks on the increase of mankind which prevail amongst savage nations, and what I want you to bear in mind, gentlemen, if you will kindly do so right through, is that we have got to deal with phases of these checks amongst ourselves, and it is to you that the poor of this country are now looking, hoping that you will say that, instead of these checks that mean misery and vice, you will give them the chance of a scientific check, which means happiness and comfort for the home. Looking through history, all the great periodical famines that kept down the European population may be traced back to this same species of check. All the great incursions of the Northmen and of the Goths were simply produced by the want of the means of subsistence, and, overcrowded in their own land, these strong and vigorous races they overflowed into more fertile lands that they might find them there. These are the only answers that savage nations have found to the great population question—simply starvation, war, famine, and disease; these are the checks which have prevented savage nations from increasing as rapidly as they would have done otherwise. Now, we come to a slightly more advanced state of civilisation, and since I do not want to follow Malthus in his great work from country to country, because to do that would make my speech last nearer a week than the day to which I hope to confine it, I will take one single instance, that of China, which may be considered as a representative country, where the population difficulty is bringing now tremendous social and political difficulties that have already touched America, and have touched our own colonies in Australia, and that may touch England as well, unless we can find some better solution than is at present afforded. China, as you know, is a country that may almost be said for thousands of years to have been growing into such an instance as I want to lay before you. They were against emigration, were shut up within their own circle, and, in addition to that, their creed gave them special encouragement to marry, to marry at a very early age, and to bring into the world as many human beings as

possible. We find in the "Statesman's Year Book" that the population of China in the year 1877 is reckoned at 405,213,134.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: For what year?

Mrs. BESANT: The present year, my lord.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: Is it the present population?

Mr. BRADLAUGH: It is an estimate; hardly an official census.

THE LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: It refers to the present population?

Mrs. BESANT: It does; and it is taken upon estimates based upon the Chinese official returns. The "Statesman's Year Book" goes on to point out that the above population, giving 263 souls per square mile, appears to be excessive, considering that some of the outlying portions are by no means densely inhabited. It goes on to say that the census taken in 1842, which would be rather before the enormous amount of emigration, showed a population of 419 millions, and in 1852 it was 450 millions, that increase being enormously rapid, while it has, during the last few years, been somewhat checked by the very large emigration which has had most lamentable results. The result in China, as laid down by Malthus, has been most unfortunate, for he points out that, "notwithstanding the great sobriety and industry of the inhabitants of China, the prodigious number of them occasions a great deal of misery. There are some so poor that being unable to supply their children with common necessaries they expose them in the streets," and that, gentlemen, is a resource which you know is unfortunately not confined to the inhabitants of countries like China. We are told that the country, "extensive and fertile as it is, is not sufficient to support its inhabitants," and that "four times as much territory would be necessary to place them at their ease," and he points out that that wretchedness has been the consequence of the over rapid increase. You get in China, as another result of this population question, an enormous amount of infanticide, chiefly amongst female children—because the males being more productive the female children are those who suffer most—and you find, as a consequence of this, that terrible prevalence of unnatural crimes right through China,—crimes so shocking in their character that I will not even mention them in this Court. You find in America, where these Chinese have spread, carrying with them those unnatural crimes which always result from

a thwarting of nature—you find in America continual complaints of the Chinese servants, who are beginning to overrun the land, so that it is impossible to put children into the care of Chinese men because of the terrible habits that they have brought with them from their over-populated county. The very reason of our last war in China recalls us to another branch of the great question that we are discussing to day. We went to war on the question of the opium traffic. Opium is simply taken there in order to buy escape from the terrible sexual difficulty which arises from the fact that the number of men far exceeds the number of women in that unfortunate land; for taking opium does at first give rise to some of the feelings which should be only naturally aroused, and then later it entirely destroys the sexual instinct; that is one of the answers that China has given to this question in her utter ignorance. In Australia, our government there sent home to complain that the proportion of women amongst the immigrant Chinese was utterly inadequate to sexual needs, for only four or or five women went over, amongst literally cart-loads of men. Sixteen women, my co-defendant tells me, to some 15,000 men, was the proportion that one table shewed, as having emigrated from China. Your experience is sufficient to tell you the terrible amount of crime and disease to which such a state of things must necessarily give rise. Leaving then that part of the question, because your own reading must have made you familiar with so many of these questions that I need not trouble you more with them here—I will come to those checks on population in Europe, which, as my lord pointed out, seemed to neutralise, to some extent, the conclusions of Malthus. You find, in Europe, that these positive checks have been so extremely marked, so curiously and strongly marked, that right through the 1000 years that are taken as the Middle Ages, the population of Europe had not even doubled. During the whole of that long period some tremendous checks must then have been in operation in order to keep down the natural fertility of the human species. Later, the increase has been very rapid, and it is only reasonable, therefore, to try to find out what has caused the change between the stationary state of things for 1000 years, and later, the very rapid increase. The rapid increase has simply been due, generally, to the fact that civilization has removed many of those checks which, in

the more barbarous time of the Middle Ages kept down the population of this Continent. Now, instead of the sickly being left to die without treatment, they are cured by the advance of sanitary science, and we now take more care to prevent disease, as well as possess more skill in curing it. These are the reasons why you find the population to-day increasing so rapidly, and it becomes a practical question for us to grapple with the ever-growing danger. And not only is it the tendency of civilisation to reduce all those checks that are called death-producing checks or positive checks by Malthus, but you have the tendency to reduce these ever more and more rapidly. War is beginning, although very slowly, to be replaced by arbitration, and although that has not yet been thoroughly carried out, we may hope that, as nations become wiser and more civilised, we shall have fewer wars and more frequent resorts to arbitration and to legal and reasonable remedies. One may hope also that we shall be able to cure disease more extensively the more doctors discover of the secrets of nature; and as many diseases are preventible, we may look forward to the time when the returns of the Registrar-General will showmore deaths from old age than from any other cause. You thus come to the point put by Knowlton on page 4, "that some check there must be, or the time will come when millions will be born but to suffer and to perish for want of the necessaries of life." The advantages of civilisation are to some extent neutralised by the terrible idea that the more civilised we become the more we remove the natural checks, and, therefore, the more quickly approaches the period of actual general privation; the sick, instead of being left to die, are cured by medical skill; hospitals are built, wherein they are sheltered, and not only is it that the sickly do not die, but they survive and marry, and so pass on the inheritance of their own feebleness to the children who proceed from such marriages. The aged in the Middle Ages died far more rapidly than they do now; now their life is lengthened by the care, nourishment, and comfort which they enjoy. Then, such plagues as that which visited Florence, and the great plague of London, in the reign of Charles the Second, have now become almost impossible, owing to our improved sanitary arrangements. Since these checks are now so much diminished by science, it is necessary to bring in some scientific checks to take their place. Nature, left to herself, balances herself; but if we interfere with nature by curing the sickly

whom she is killing, and preserving the life which she has doomed, it becomes necessary to substitute scientific for natural checks—for you must not interfere on one side without interfering on the other; the increase of science otherwise means only the increase of human misery. It may be said that the result is a long way off, and that it is not worth while to trouble ourselves with what will only affect the century that follows us. Is this so? You find that a gentleman called Mr. Montague Cookson, who is well known in this court, and who would not be inclined to frighten people for the purpose of causing an effect, says, in an article which appeared in the *Fortnightly Review* of October, 1872: "But, without being extravagant, we may, nay must, go further. If there were no counteracting causes, sooner or later the time would come when this little island would be overstocked to such a degree that the great bulk of the inhabitants would be unable to procure the bare necessaries of life, and ultimately this would be the case, not only in England, but in all the countries of the globe. However unpalatable the truth, it is useless to disguise the fact that the sources of food are limited, whereas, but for war and disease, which many people"—(Mr. Cookson says, here anticipating the Solicitor-General)—"openly treat as special interferences in man's favour, the augmentation of human beings would be unlimited. Emigration somewhat interposes; but emigration is only effectual so far as it aids equal distribution, and is, therefore, but a temporary method of dealing with the difficulty which will have to be disposed of at no distant day, on a more gigantic scale." That is the argument put forward by Mr. Cookson in an article in which he is dealing with the very subject under discussion here. It is entitled "The Morality of Married Life," and I shall refer to it several times, in order to show that if you give a verdict of guilty against us you must remember that you are not only branding us but half of the leading writers in England, every one of whom has substantially taken our side on this great question. What, then, are the checks in England? In 1821 the population of England was 12,000,236, and you find that fifty years later—in 1871—it was 22,712,266. When you think, gentlemen, how, during that time, the cost of food and living has risen, I think you will say with me that this population question is not a question for the future, for if we have nearly doubled our numbers in fifty years, in spite of those lamentable checks

to which in a moment I shall have to draw your attention, what will be the rate of increase during the next fifty years—the time that our children will have this country—unless some greater thought can be brought to bear upon it? You know from your own experience how rapidly food is rising at the present day. During the last ten or twelve years, those things which are regarded as most necessary to human life have increased in the most rapid proportion. Bread, meat, and milk, all most necessary things for men, women, and children, have gone up in price. These are things known to every housekeeper—and this is a point where a woman may speak with almost more knowledge than a man would be expected to possess, seeing that though men have to pay the bills generally the women have to buy the necessaries,—and, therefore, the question is a personal one to ourselves. I find that Professor Fawcett, in his essay on "Pauperism, its Causes and Remedies," published by Macmillan and Co. in 1871—I may say, my lord, that we are prepared to prove the publication of every book we use in this way—Professor Fawcett puts it very strongly and clearly. He says that the "population of England and Wales in 1810 was about 10,000,000, and 50 years later, in 1860, it had grown to 20,000,000. At the present time it is growing at the rate of 200,000 every year, which is almost equivalent to the population of the county of Northampton. If in 50 years the descendants of one million become two millions, it is obvious that in 100 years the two millions will have become four millions, so that if the population of England were eight millions in 1810 it would be 80 millions in 1960." So he goes on to point out that if 22,500,000 now find it difficult to obtain sufficient food, what would it be if there were 40 millions to be maintained! This will be our population in 40 years if the rate of increase which has prevailed since the beginning of the century continues. "At the present time it is said that there is a great redundancy of labour. Many who are willing to work cannot find employment; in most of our important branches of industry there has been great over-production; every trade and every profession is over-crowded; for every vacant clerkship there are hundreds of applications. Difficult as it is for men to obtain a livelihood, it is ten times more difficult for women to do so; partly on account of unjust laws, and partly because of the tyranny of society, they are shut out from

many employments. All that has just been stated is admitted by common consent—it is the topic of daily conversation, and of daily complaint—and yet with the utmost complacency we observe 200,000 added to our population every year, and we often congratulate ourselves upon this addition to our numbers, as if it were an unerring sign of advancing prosperity. But viewed in relation to the facts just mentioned, what does this addition to our numbers indicate? To this question only one reply can be given—that in ten years' time, where there are a hundred now seeking employment, there will then be a hundred and twenty. This will not apply simply to one industry, but will be the case throughout the whole country. It will also further happen that in ten years' time, for every hundred who now require food, fuel, and clothing, a similar provision will have to be made for a hundred and twenty. It therefore follows that, low as the general average standard of living now is, it cannot by any means be maintained, unless in ten years' time the supply of all the commodities of ordinary consumption can be increased by 20 per cent., without their becoming more costly." Gentlemen, if I may trouble you to look at it from that point of view, you will understand how grave is the feeling with which we argue for this pamphlet—not because we want this pamphlet carried on—not because we attach special value to this one pamphlet—but because a verdict of guilty against this pamphlet means that it will not be safe for medical men, or for political economists, to discuss the question of population at all; and we feel that unless the question of population may be discussed, you will come, in ten or twenty years, to an amount of suffering of which we can scarcely realise the extent. Professor Fawcett quotes Ireland as showing the effect of overcrowding on population —and when we are dealing with Ireland you must admit that you are dealing with a land at our very doors, and in whose prosperity we are deeply interested. Professor Fawcett says, "Ireland should serve to warn us of the terrible misfortunes brought upon a country by an undue increase of population. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, the population of that country was about two millions: maintaining for the next 150 years a smaller rate of increase than is now going on in England, the two millions had grown into eight millions in the year 1847. The country, at this time, became so densely peopled that a considerable portion of the nation could only obtain the barest subsistence; still, nothing was

done to avert the suffering that was certain to ensue; the people went on marrying with as much recklessness as if they were the first settlers in a new country possessing a boundless area of fertile land. All the influence that could be exerted by religion prompted the continuance of habits of utter improvidence; the priests and other ministers of religion encouraged early marriages. At length there came one of those unpropitious seasons which are certain occasionally to recur: the potato, the staple food of the people, was diseased, and it was soon found that there were more people in the country than could be fed." And then he comes to a description of the terrible Irish famine, which was only really put an end to by the enormous emigration from Ireland which carried off the surplus population. I put this to you: what is there to prevent that happening in England which has happened in Ireland? We are following the Irish plan, we are increasing the population with more rapidity than we are increasing the food supply. What right have we to think that we shall escape the terrible sufferings of Ireland, if we go on ignoring with Irish recklessness questions like that for which I am pleading to-day? But the justification of this pamphlet lies in the checks that are operating round us on every side. I have put it to you that there must be some checks in operation, because we are not increasing at the natural rate. Malthus puts it that every check on population may be put down as referable either to moral restraint, to misery, or to vice. Moral restraint being unfashionable in this country, and it being dangerous to venture to treat the subject at all, as my presence here to-day shows you, we are driven back to accept those checks of poverty and vice which Malthus says are the only checks except moral restraint that can be brought to bear. The justification of this pamphlet is, therefore, the nature of the checks that are operating on every side. First, I shall put the overcrowding in towns which you, gentlemen, from your happier circumstances, may not have seen much of, but which I, who have gone much among the poor, know from personal experience. When the time comes to bring evidence before the Court, I shall call one or two clergymen of the Church of England, who will bear witness to the terrible nature of the evils against which we speak. The Rev. Mr. Horsley, late of St. Michael's, Shoreditch, and now chaplain of the House of Detention at Clerkenwell, will tell you that I am not in any way exaggerating the extent of this

check, and he will speak from his own personal knowledge. I also propose to call the Rev. Stewart Headlam, now of the parish of Bethnal Green, who from his own knowledge and experience will tell you the nature of these checks on population. He will also give you some idea of the extent to which it has a terribly demoralising effect on the young of both sexes, who are necessarily subject to it. Personal witnesses will perhaps be more effective than any books I could read. When you are dealing with a scientific subject, it has always been ruled that scientific evidence may be adduced, not as giving an opinion on the special subject at issue, but simply as a doctor may bear witness to a certain fact as having come within his own personal knowledge. In the proceedings of the National Association for the Promotion of Social Science, there is an essay read by George Godwin, F.R.S., pressing this question of population very strongly. He states that he himself traced it out in one of the poorest districts of the metropolis. Mr. Godwin says : " Evidences of overcrowding turn up from time to time where they are not looked for. It was but the other day that a child was found dead in Brownlow Street, and, on inquiry, it was learnt that the mother, a widow, and six children slept in one bed in a small room. The death of the child was attributed to the bed clothes. In such an atmosphere as a room so occupied must have, the vital power necessarily becomes weak, and to kill is easy. In a house of respectable appearance outside I found a hole under the stairs made the sleeping place for three persons, twenty-one, seventeen, and fourteen years of age. It was intended originally for the reception of coals ; it is not more than four feet deep, and the height, of course, diminishes to nothing, as the steps descend. When the door is closed there are only seven small gimlet holes in the stairs for ventilation. Is it surprising that fevers break out under such circumstances ? One is struck, sometimes, with the strange contrivances resorted to to meet the difficulty of want of room. Thus, in a model lodging-house for families, a father, who with his wife and one child occupies one room, has accommodated six of his nine other children cross-way on two camp bedsteads, while three elder girls, one sixteen years old, sleep on a small bedstead near. The room is well ventilated and clean, but the same sort of stowing away is to be found in hundreds of cases, under circumstances which render it deadly. In another

room in the same building, a wooden shelf has been contrived, which can be pushed under the bed during the day, and drawn out at night to accommodate a pile of children. In a respectable house, not far from the last, occupied by steady artisans and others, I found that nine persons slept in one of the rooms (12 feet by 14 feet)—a father, mother and seven children; eleven shoemakers worked in the attics; and in each of the other five rooms there was a separate family. I could quote scores of cases of overcrowding, in what would seem to be decent houses, but the repetition might tire. No words, even aided by the pencil, can give a full idea of some of the dens which are occupied by a lower and different class; many born to evil and without the power to rise; others the victims of more recent misfortunes or their own conduct. The world has still an interest in improving their condition: children, as yet innocent, cry aloud to be rescued from the otherwise inevitable gulf. In some places, in the eastern districts, quite recently visited, I have found ten, eleven, and in more cases than one, fourteen persons occupying a single room." These are some of the facts which being known to my co-defendant and myself have made us feel it a duty which no personal considerations can make us shrink from, to publish for sixpence that information which might be utilized to prevent continuance of such misery—information which wealthier women can obtain in higher-priced publications. When it comes to a question of immorality, you get far more immorality by crowding five or six boys and girls together than you can get from giving them dry physiological knowledge, such as is given in the pages of Knowlton. Mr. Godwin gives a number of cases, of which I take one more, the description of a house in Bemerton Street, Caledonian Road: "The basement below the level of the street contains, in the front room, an old man and his wife; in the back room, two lodgers; in the parlours, there are a man and his wife and eight children; on the first floor a man and his wife and infant, two girls 16 and 18 years of age, and occasionally their mother, all in the front room; and in the small back room, two women, a girl, and two young children. On the second floor, a father, mother, two young grown-up sons, an infant, and a brood of rabbits. Two women and two boys in the back room make the whole population of the house thirty-four. In the next house there were thirty-three

persons similarly divided." These are things which will be explanatory to many of you gentlemen, who may wonder what motive we could have for bringing forward such a question as this, for it will show you how the overgrowth of population affects the poor. Dr. Lankester, who, as coroner for Middlesex, is surely some authority, says that, "In the parish of St. James, which is not one of the poorest districts in the metropolis, there are 10,000 persons who, for the sake of their health, ought to be removed from the parish." That is not the amount of the whole population, but the amount of the surplus population, whom Dr. Lankester states should be removed from the parish if that parish is to be put into a healthy condition. You find him urging that over and over again. At a vestry meeting of Marylebone, Dr. Bach, medical officer, said the horrible state of some of the places could scarcely be described; "human beings were there living in such a state of squalid misery that a horse that was kept in the worst possible stable was better provided for. There were 19 houses in which were 89 families, comprising 300 persons. There was one room eight feet square, with a small opening for a window, but no glass, and a man, his wife, and five children lived in it, and there had been seven children." I find that Mr. W. Rendle, who is thoroughly acquainted with this subject, when speaking to an audience of doctors at a meeting of the British Association, said that, though there was this overcrowding in the face of a steadily-increasing population, no real attempts were being made, to any appreciable extent, to prevent it; and he dilated upon the consequent evils: "Overcrowding, the mixing of the sexes, and the results—incest, bastardy, filthy and degrading habits, and, as a consequence rather than a cause, a degraded home, drunkenness, and generally an absence of religion and morality in any true sense." This is the testimony of one who had seen what he speaks of. It is these terrible evils that we are striving to grapple with in some fashion; and if you think our view a mistaken one, and that we are blundering in the remedy we propose, you must say that we are grappling with an evil the gravity of which you cannot overestimate; and, therefore, if we err, it is from want of knowledge, and not from evil will. If this effort of ours is to be met, it is not by the brutal method of repression. The proper way of meeting mistake is argument, and the proper way of meeting error is to bring truth to oppose it. If Dr. Knowlton

is wrong in his checks, let some one who is competent to do it write a pamphlet pointing out his objections, but do not bring us in as criminals when we are trying to grapple with a terrible amount of immorality in our capital. You find this immorality quite as prevalent in the agricultural districts as in the towns. I am now going to quote from a report of the evidence which came before the "Royal Commission on the Employment of Women, Young Persons, and Children in Agriculture," published in 1868. I shall quote the evidence of one gentleman, the Rev. J. Fraser, now so worthily elevated to the see of Manchester, and who has made himself remarkable as a bishop by his intense sympathy with the poor. I am willing to base my case here purely on the report, and I shall not weary you by unnecessary comments. I find that in this report Dr. Fraser, dealing with this very question of overcrowding, puts the case in a terribly strong fashion:—"It is impossible to exaggerate the ill effects of such a state of things in every respect—physical, social, economical, moral, intellectual. Physically, a ruinous, ill-drained cottage, 'cribb'd, cabin'd, confined,' and overcrowded, generates any amount of disease—fevers of every type, catarrh, rheumatism—as well as intensifies to the utmost that tendency to scrofula and phthisis which, from their frequent intermarriages and their low diet, abounds so largely among the poor. Socially, nothing can be more wretched than the condition of 'open' parishes, like Docking, in Norfolk, and South Cerney, in Gloucestershire, into which have been poured remorselessly the scum and offscouring of their 'close' neighbours. Economically, the imperfect distribution of cottages deprives the farmer of a large proportion of his effective labour power. The employer who has no cottages to offer those whom he employs must either attract labourers by the offer of higher wages or must content himself with refuse; and in either case, when he gets his man gets him more or less enfeebled by the distance he has had to travel to his work. The moral consequences are fearful to contemplate. 'I only wonder,' writes one clergyman to me, 'that our agricultural poor are as moral as they are.' Modesty must be an unknown virtue, decency an unimaginable thing, where, in one small chamber, with the beds lying as thickly as they can be packed, father, mother, young men, lads, grown and growing up girls—two and sometimes three generations—are herded promiscuously; where every operation of the toilette, and of

nature—dressings, undressings, births, deaths—is performed by each within the sight or hearing of all; where children of both sexes, to as high an age as twelve or fourteen, or even more, occupy the same bed; where the whole atmosphere is sensual, and human nature is degraded into something below the level of the swine. It is a hideous picture; and the picture is drawn from life. Mr. Clarke, of Norwich, can tell any one who will ask him tales of things that he has himself seen, horrifying enough to make the very hair stand on end. The medical gentleman, whose evidence I publish, assures me that cases of incest are anything but uncommon. We complain of the ante-nuptial unchastity of our women, of the loose talk and conduct of the girls who work in the fields, of the light way in which maidens part with their honour, and how seldom either a parent's or a brother's blood boils with shame—*here*, in cottage herding, is the sufficient account and history of it all." It is, indeed, a fearful picture, but it is one drawn from the life by the Bishop of Manchester, whom you cannot imagine is making a sensational tale for the purpose of attracting popularity. I have myself seen four generations of human beings crowded together into one small room, simply divided into two or three beds, and I will ask you if, after such an experience as that, you wonder that I risk even prison and fine if I can bring some salvation to those poor whose misery I have seen. I will not trouble you to read an extract from proceedings before the Truro magistrates, concerning a man named Tonkin, with nine little ones, seven of whose children were found huddled up in one corner, while the rest were lying about the floor without bedding. He was told that he must clear out; he did not want to go to the workhouse, but he was told that "the nuisance must be abated," and he had to go. There are so many of these Tonkins, but they only come to the top when the crimes that flow from their habits of life shock the public ear. These crimes are the natural results of the way they live; and if we took our own children, gentlemen, and herded them among the filthy associations of these poor people, could we expect from them in their manhood and their womanhood that purity and refinement which we pride ourselves on making possible for them? There is one additional evil, and that is the large amount of illegitimacy which overcrowding gives rise to in country parishes. It is no doubt a fact that among illegitimate children you get a far higher death-rate, the

reasons for which are so obvious that I need not dwell upon them. At Sheffield, the proportion of deaths of illegitimate children is just now 305 per 1000 in the first year. I think, my lord, that is a check on population of a most terrible character, and the report of the registrar of Sheffield has been copied into the papers as showing the terrible way in which that check has affected the increase of the population. Leaving the question of overcrowding, there is the question of insufficiency of food, and of its unwholesome character. I put it to you that this is caused by the fact that many a man does not earn sufficient wages to maintain the number of children he brings into the world. It was said when the Corn Laws were repealed that the effect of that measure would be an enormous reduction in the price of bread, which would enable the poor to live in comfort. Starvation then got so far in England that it was common in the agricultural districts to get up riots against the farmers because the people, in the misery of their starvation, imagined that the farmers hoarded up the corn, and so kept up the price of bread. There is no question that if books of this character had been circulated then, you would not have had that sudden increase of the population which was one of the most remarkable effects of the repeal of the Corn Laws. In the Registrar-General's returns you find that, in consequence of the high rates of wages, marriages are more frequent in certain districts. It is an unfortunate thing that wherever you get more food you find this reckless, improvident fashion of never pausing to think whether the increase of to-day may not be followed by a decrease to-morrow, and that, if so, the food will be insufficient for the little ones to be brought into the world, for the food which would be sufficient for a small family is quite insufficient for a large one. We hear much talk about the physical deterioration of Englishmen; we hear much talk about the artisan of Sheffield or of Manchester not being the same strong, healthy man that his grandfather was, and the reason is not far to seek. When his grandfather was born the population of England was about half what it is at the present time, so that the man of to-day has less room to live in, less food, less clothing, less possibility of health, and that will (grow and is growing) worse year by year unless some scientific thought may be brought to bear upon this great question. I need not repeat that all these are the checks which the Solicitor-General

said were afforded by nature and providence. Another of the natural checks is the terrible drunkenness prevailing among a large number of our poor. It is oftentimes the result of want of food, simply because with so little money they seem to think they can get temporary oblivion with a small amount of drink, while they cannot get enough wholesome food to stop the craving which nature gives. All these causes operate in a double fashion, causing premature death among the adults, and acting in an even more terrible fashion upon the unhealthy children who are born of drunken and dissolute parents, amidst such awful associations, growing up feeble, blood-poisoned, and only half human in many ways. It has often been remarked that when you get to the lowest grade of the criminal class you observe a kind of marked type. This is because the lives of their parents have so unhumanized them, that the children born of such parents are literally a lower race than those of parents whose happier circumstances have raised them above that condition. If you want to know how these checks operate there, again, I think I shall be able to call before you clear medical evidence. For instance, we find Dr. Drysdale, whom we shall, by and bye, put into the box, who will tell you, I have no doubt, how these checks operate, and the reflex results which arise from over-crowding, with the consequent and continual advance of death rate among the children of the rich as well as among the children of the poor. I say among the rich as well as among the poor, though among the poor the death rate is three times as heavy as among the rich. If you go to Islington you find a million of children, all under five years of age, and among them the death rate is 66·9 in a thousand, although Islington is one of the healthiest districts in the metropolis. The death rate, however, is nearly double that in the eastern districts. If you go to Whitechapel, for instance, there the death rate is as much as 102 in a thousand; they die before reaching the age of five years. In Manchester, again, the death-rate is 117 in a thousand; in Liverpool it is 132 in a thousand; and all that death rate I put down as death resulting from what I call preventible diseases, and I urge that you can only judge upon this case when you put before yourselves clearly whether it is either moral or right to allow children to be brought into the world, inoculated with the predisposition to be attacked by these preventible diseases, instead of putting, as

I believe you ought to do, a check which would effectively relieve the population so terribly overcrowded; and you have to consider whether by refusing to apply such a check, we are not, by the very refusal, making a large class of criminals. I will put it to you whether such a check would not be a moral one, and I need not enter very fully into all the details, my point being only that some preventive check, is necessary and would be effectual. "This excessive mortality is no doubt mainly due to our crowded and unwholesome dwellings, and to insufficient food and clothing; these causes more or less directly originate from poverty, and therefore would work with intensified effect if poverty were increased. It may be, therefore, thought that the evil of over-population carries with it its own cure; that as the people increase in number poverty beomes greater; that, if there is more poverty there will be a larger number of deaths. A check to increasing population is thus brought into operation, and hence things will be restored to the same state as they were before. The hardest words which have been ever used against Malthusianism altogether fail adequately to characterise such a doctrine. . . . . Some definite idea may be formed on the subject by considering the results involved in the present high death-rate prevailing amongst the children of the poor. Assume that there are 1000 of these children, that 500 of them die before the age of five, whereas if they were as well cared for as the children of more wealthy parents, only 200 of them would die before this age. The death, therefore, of 300 is to be traced to defects in our social and economic condition. These children are literally slaughtered and in a manner, moreover, which indicates prolonged suffering. But this is only a part, and perhaps the smaller part, of the mischief which is done: the causes which produce this excessive mortality do not alone affect the children who die; all those who survive are also brought under the same blighting influence. Consequently, to all, the struggle for existence becomes more severe, the more weakly succumb; even the stronger who survive, in passing through the trying ordeal, often contract the germs of future disease, their constitutions being in too many cases undermined. Physical deterioration ensues, and a whole people may thus become gradually stunted and enfeebled." Mr. Fawcett, in his essay on "Pauperism, its Causes and Remedies," page 107, says:—"There is amongst

the poorer classes an excessive mortality amongst children. In the wealthy parish of St. George's, Hanover Square, less than one-third of the total number of deaths is of children under five years old; whereas, in the poor parish of Bethnal Green the deaths of children under five amounted to more than half the total number of deaths." Another check on the population is what is called baby farming. Some years ago, as you may remember, there were brought before the police courts very terrible facts in connection with this point, in consequence of prosecutions that were instituted with reference to what was called "baby farming." Just take one instance which I find mentioned as occurring about that time. A child three years of age was employed in one of those places as a ganger over eight other children, in the midst of whom it sat up in bed and as soon as any one of them awoke it was its duty to put the bottle into its mouth. If any of you, gentlemen, have children three years of age, what would you say of putting such babies over eight other children still younger than themselves, which it would be their duty to take care of all night? Consider this fact, gentlemen, and then say if you can wonder at the terrible preventible morality among the children of the poor? These are the views which we hold, and however this trial may end, whether we succeed in the action that is pending or not, it will still be our bounden duty to proceed on the course in which we have set out—not, I wish to say, in a spirit of undue defiance, but in a patient and yet persistent manner on the path of duty which every good citizen owes to the country—to bring these subjects manfully forward, and to urge them upon the careful consideration of our countrymen and countrywomen until, even if we have to pass through a prison in the doing, we shall at last succeed, as all great causes do, and we shall relieve the ruin caused by over-population, and shall bring happiness to the poor, the down-trodden, and the oppressed. There is another kind of check which Dr. Drysdale puts, about which, when he comes before you, he may have something to say. I refer to the very common occurrence of overlying children amongst the poor. Dr. Lancaster puts the case, let me say, very strongly when he states that there are 16,000 mothers in London who have in this way committed child murder. I should be very sorry to believe that this is the case, and I may venture to hope that it savours something of

rhetorical exaggeration; but in spite of that, this habit of overlying amongst the poor, resulting in coroner's inquests and verdicts of accidental death, is far too common, when in one district in the metropolis alone we find that it gives rise to 101 inquests in the course of a single year, and I cannot help thinking that this is one of those preventible causes of death to which I have been referring. In many cases doctors, driven to their wit's-end, have been forced to give certificates of accidental death from suffocation, while they were aware that there might have been motives for the occurrence, as evidenced by the fact that the child was considered by the parents unwelcome, and as adding a new burden in the struggle with which the poor are afflicted. One other cause I shall put before you, upon the clearest possible evidence, and it shall be the last of the direct checks of which, for the moment, I must speak. One other check, I say, to the growth of the population, of the most fatal character to the mind, as well as to the body, is the great, and I fear ever increasing, prevalence of what is rightly and justly called the social evil, the characteristics of which are known to you all. Knowlton puts it that this terrible scourge leads to sterility, and that sexual intemperance brings in its train the most baneful results. Another of the results which flow from sexual vice is illegitimacy, and, in the case of such children, the chances of life are very small, as will readily be seen, when we consider the circumstances under which such children are born. These are the direct checks which, among us, are at present keeping down the ever-growing increase of the population, in addition to the most fatal diseases that flow from them, all of which, or at any rate, most of which, are, as I contend, preventible, and which will, I fear, still more increase unless we take steps to remove the cause. These diseases I need scarcely add are a fruitful cause of the gradual deterioration which we see taking effect among the working classes, and unless some means can be adopted to stop them, they will increase more and more. Professor Fawcett, in his Manual of Political Economy, I find urges upon his readers, on the very same grounds, this question which I have ventured to put before you, and I need not add that it comes from him with far greater weight than it possibly can from me. He states that among "children belonging to the upper and middle classes 20 per cent. die before they reach the age of five;" and he adds

that the amount is more than doubled in the case of children belonging to the labouring classes. This great mortality amongst poor children is caused by neglect, by want of proper food, and by unwholesome dwellings. When we take these facts, and find that this large number of children have literally been murdered; when you consider that the number of these children who, if they had been born in a higher rank would not have died, is calculated by Professor Fawcett at 1,150,000, taking the proportion into account that die amongst the poor more than among the rich, you will see what a large and important question this is, and you will be able to estimate the nature of the evil against which I am pleading to-day. Professor Fawcett in this matter is, I may say, strengthened by the observations of Mrs. Fawcett, that Millicent Garrett, who has become so well and so honourably known. She, too, says that the alarming death-rate amongst the children of the poor, which is induced chiefly by the want of food, clothing, and attention, and from over-crowding "in those districts where they herd together," is "appalling, and is a blot upon the civilisation of this country" ("Political Economy for Beginners," p. 110). Are you, gentlemen, going to give a verdict of guilty against my co-defendant and myself—against a man and a woman whose only efforts have been to consider seriously the means by which this wholesale death may be arrested, and thus to remove the blot which Mrs. Fawcett says has been put upon the civilisation of the country to which we are all proud to belong? These are the natural checks to the overgrowth of the population imposed "by Nature and Providence;" and I will now ask you to consider the means by which the wholesale misery can be avoided which is caused by the operation of those checks. I put it to you whether you are prepared to take upon yourselves the task of bringing in a verdict against us, who, feeling the terrible responsibility lying upon us with regard to the poor, and seeing that the natural checks are incapable of keeping down the population to legitimate limits, and that its undue increase brings about us a mass of human crime and misery, try to substitute prudential for positive checks. It is that crime and misery which we desire to alleviate by applying checks to the over-population of the country—checks so much required at the present time. In that endeavour, so far as it is set forth in this publication, we—Dr. Knowlton, my co-defendant, and myself—we are

all equally responsible. Our desire is common. We wish to bring in effectual checks if possible, and checks which, at the same time, will not harm those who apply them, and which in themselves are neither immoral nor degrading. If the preventive check, the birth-restricting check, does not touch human happiness or affect national morality, it is surely preferable to the terrible checks provided by "nature and providence." One argument only of those which are used against the checks which we propose to introduce is deserving of smallest consideration. Mr. Darwin in his "Origin of Species" puts that argument in the strongest light. Mr. Darwin thinks rightly, with reference to the lower animals, that the application of "natural" checks upon the natural rate of increase is really for the welfare and progress of the various classes of brutes; and Mr. Darwin thinks this "natural" check good for the human species, and in this he is supported to a certain extent by Mr. Herbert Spencer. I will venture to lay before you what I consider to be his strongest statement of that argument, and therefore of any possible objection. Mr. Darwin, writing to us a few days since, pointed our attention to the following extract from his "Descent of Man," p. 618:—"The enhancement of the welfare of mankind is a most intricate problem; all ought to refrain from marriage who cannot avoid abject poverty for their children, for poverty is not only a great evil, but tends to its own increase by leading to recklessness in marriage. On the other hand, as Mr. Galton has remarked, if the prudent avoid marriage, whilst the reckless marry, the inferior members tend to supplant the better members of society. Man, like every other animal, has no doubt advanced to his present high condition through a struggle for existence, consequent on his rapid multiplication, and if he is to advance still higher it is to be feared that he must remain subject to a severe struggle; otherwise he would sink into indolence, and the more gifted men would not be more successful in the battle of life than the less gifted. Hence our natural rate of increase, though leading to many and obvious evils, must not be greatly diminished by any means." That is Mr. Darwin's position, and, putting aside for a moment the awful amount of human misery which it accepts as the necessary condition of progress, let us see if the position be defensible. I have no doubt that if natural checks were allowed to operate right through the human, as they do in the animal, world, this re-

sult would follow. But I may be allowed to direct attention to the point that Mr. Darwin has overlooked, the fact that these natural checks are not so allowed to operate among men and women. Mr. Darwin, you must remember, is accustomed to dealing chiefly, if not exclusively, with the animal kingdom—I mean the animal kingdom as excluding man. He, therefore, overlooks the elements which accompany the struggle for existence as it goes on among the higher class of animals—*i.e.*, man—and that it is in no way comparable with that which goes on among the lower. Among the brutes the weaker are driven to the wall, the diseased fall out in the race of life, and the old brutes, when feeble or sickly, are killed. We all know and have read of instances in which wounded stags have been set upon by their companions and killed. If that were the case amongst men—if the drunken and the improvident were over-ridden in the struggle for existence by those who were careful and temperate—the result might be to improve those who survived, and Mr. Darwin's position might be true. If men insisted that those who were sickly should be allowed to die without help of medicine or of science—if those who were weak were put upon one side and crushed—if those who were old and useless were killed —if those who were not capable of providing food for themselves were allowed to starve,—if all that were done, the struggle for existence among men would be as real as it is among brutes, and would doubtless result in the production of a higher race of men; but are you willing to do that, or to allow it to be done? If not, you are taking away the natural checks instead of keeping them; and instead of improving the race of human beings in the midst of a struggle for existence, you are perpetuating that which tends to the deterioration of the race. For what are you doing? You are protecting and fostering the most careless, the most improvident, the most thoughtless, the most drunken, the most miserable, the most criminal elements of your population, and so you are perpetuating improvidence, crime, misery, disease, and all that tends to the deterioration of the race, while the more provident and more thrifty—those whose qualities should be transmitted, are exactly those who do not marry. Put in this way, the objection, I think, is not valid; and it seems to me that in his argument Mr. Darwin has altogether overlooked this aspect of the question, which is fatal to the ground that he has taken up—the

ground that the natural checks should be sufficient in the human as in the animal kingdoms to overcome the tendency to over-population. We have not, therefore, to deal with natural so much as with scientific checks.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: I think that is a point very well worthy the serious consideration of Mr. Darwin. Whether there may result, as a consequence of the struggle for existence among mankind, the survival of a smaller number of the strongest, or a larger number of the weaker, and whether, should it be found that the weaker survive, the race is not by that means in process of deterioration. The process might result in a few of a higher race, but the effect on the masses would be an increase of suffering and of misery.

Mrs. BESANT: That, my lord, is just the point that I have been endeavouring to make. My contention is that these natural checks cannot have free operation among men, and, although where they have, they eliminate the weaker portions of races, they cannot be fairly applied to mankind; and I trust I shall be able to show that as they cannot be so applied, we are left with the great difficulty that the weaker, who, in the animal world would be pushed out of existence, are, among men, capable of communicating their weaknesses to their offspring, and so they deteriorate succeeding generations. It is for that reason that we seek to bring in an artificial check. Nature balances herself, but if we remove her checks by civilization, and cure those whom she would kill, we must put some other checks in their place. Mr. Darwin believes with us that is necessary to apply some check, in order to promote civilization among men, and to eliminate the elements which all are agreed should be suppressed if possible. He points out (p. 133), that among "savages, the weak, in body or mind, are soon eliminated," and that "we civilized men, on the other hand, do our utmost to check the process of elimination; we build asylums for the imbecile, the maimed, and the sick; we institute poor laws; and our medical men exert their utmost skill to save the life of every one to the last moment. There is reason to believe, that vaccination has preserved thousands, who, from a weak constitution, would formerly have succumbed to small-pox. Thus the weak members of civilized societies propagate their kind. No one who has attended to the breeding of domestic animals will doubt that this must be highly injurious to the

race of man." But Mr. Darwin does not meet his own argument. He states his case, he puts the fact upon record, but he does not suggest any positive remedy, nor does he show how such a remedy, if known, can be applied, so as to ensure success. The checks we propose might eliminate the sickly, just as does the struggle for existence. Dr. Knowlton insists that the proper check to be applied is, not to interfere with the natural and healthy play of the feeling of mankind, but one which may be applied after marriage, and that check, he contends, would deal with the evils of over-population successfully. He does not propose that the check should involve any undue or any unnatural restraint, and so far he is at complete issue with Mr. Malthus, who argues in favour of late, and against early, marriages. Differing, as I do, with Malthus on this point, I here utterly sever my allegiance to him. I do not believe in delaying marriage until a late age in consequence of the considerations he urges for doing so. Malthus puts his argument very clearly and strongly, and it is one which, in my opinion, very few people indeed will be found ready to adopt. No doubt late marriage, from his point of view, would provide some sort of check, but the attendant evils are so great that I infinitely prefer a check which does not necessitate late marriages. Such a check, I believe, has been found by Dr. Knowlton. Malthus says, pp. 404, 405 : "When the wages of labour are hardly sufficient to maintain two children, a man marries and has five or six ; he, of course, finds himself miserably distressed. He accuses the insufficiency of the price of labour to maintain a family. He accuses his parish for their tardy and sparing fulfilment of their obligation to assist him. He accuses the avarice of the rich, who suffer him to want what they can so well spare. He accuses the partial and unjust institutions of society, which have awarded him an inadequate share of the produce of the earth. He accuses, perhaps, the dispensations of Providence, which have assigned to him a place in society so beset with unavoidable distress and dependence. In searching for objects of accusation, he never adverts to the quarter from which his misfortunes originate. The last person he would think of accusing is himself." I shall put it to you that whether the man be a labouring man or one of higher rank who marries, and, in course of time, brings into the world a number of children, when he has not sufficient income to provide adequately for

their wants, is a man who commits a crime, not only against the children themselves, who are born into misery, but commits a crime against the society of which he is a member, because all the children brought into the world, which cannot be sufficiently provided for by their parents, are thrown, for maintenance, upon the saving, the thoughtful, and the self-restraining portion of the community, who have not given rein to their passions. You have Malthus saying that, by the proposal he puts forward, there is a fair prospect that those who bring children into existence shall have a fair means of supporting them; but it did not strike him that young men would not exercise that self-restrain which he advocated, and which he holds to be the bounden duty of men before marriage. He says: "Our obligation not to marry till we have a fair prospect of being able to support our children will appear to deserve the attention of the moralist, if it can be proved that an attention to this obligation is of most powerful effect in the prevention of misery; and that if it were the general custom to follow the first impulse of nature, and marry at the age of puberty, the universal prevalence of every known virtue in the greatest conceivable degree would fail of rescuing society from the most wretched and desperate state of want, and all the diseases and famines which usually accompany it." And he urges: "All that the society can reasonably require of its members is that they should not have families without being able to support them. This may be fairly enjoined as a positive duty." "This preventive check does act," he says, "to some extent. The most cursory view of society in this country must convince us that throughout all ranks the preventive check to population prevails in a considerable degree. Those among the higher classes, who live principally in towns, often want the inclination to marry, from the facility with which they can indulge themselves in an illicit intercourse with the sex. And others are deterred from marrying by the idea of the expenses that they must retrench, and the pleasures of which they must deprive themselves, on the supposition of having a family. A man of liberal education, with an income only just sufficient to enable him to associate in the rank of gentlemen, must feel absolutely certain that if he marry, and have a family, he shall be obliged to give up all his former connections. The woman whom a man of education would naturally make the object of his choice, is one brought up

in the same habits and sentiments with himself, and used to the familiar intercourse of a society totally different from that to which she must be reduced by marriage. Can a man easily consent to place the object of his affection in a situation so discordant probably to her habits and inclinations? Two or three steps of descent in society, particularly at this round of the ladder, where education ends and ignorance begins, will not be considered by the generality of people as a chimerical, but a real evil." Malthus also points out, but I will not trouble you or take up the time of the Court by quoting the passage, that this check acts in the most unfair fashion. It is not those who ought to refrain from marriage, but those who ought to marry who hesitate. It is those who by extra carefulness and foresight fear the results, those who feel the full weight of the responsibility pressing upon them, to whom marriage is disagreeable, and on the other hand it is those who have no care or prevision for those whom they will in the natural order of events have to support, who rush into marriage, and never think of consequences. But is late marriage a good check, and is it productive of morality? The Lord Chief Justice pointed out yesterday that the object of this book was not to prevent early marriages, because the author of it speaks strongly in favour of them, but simply to discover some way in which the moral effects of early marriages might not lead to the immoral effects which occur from over large families. To put off marriage to a late age is, in my opinion, almost certain to lead to immorality, and to consequences of the most unfortunate and regrettable kind. In the first place, people would never consent to the long continuance of self-denial which is involved in the idea. You will never get any large majority of men or women whose natural instincts lead them to join their hands in marriage to forbear, and, therefore, I consider that this is one of the most impracticable schemes which ever entered into the brain of a man of intelligence to propound. Dr. Knowlton's scheme is a very different one. He states that it is a piece of folly to suppose that men and women "will become monks and nuns during the very holiday of their existence, and abjure during the fairest years of life the nearest and dearest of social relations, to avert a catastrophe which they and perhaps their children will not live to witness." I say that men and women will marry young—in the flower of their age—and more especially will this be the case amongst the poorer classes. You

will find that Mr. Montague Cookson, who is one of Her Majesty's counsel learned in the law, and whose duty it is to assist and promote, not to hinder, public morality, ridicules the idea that a young man who has the chance of marrying will refrain from doing so. He says: "To tell a labouring man who has the chance of a cottage that he is not, on prudential grounds, to think of marrying until he has mastered the law of averages, and that even then he is running a considerable risk, is little else than a solemn mockery, and he is entitled to retort that he does not care to be more prudent than his betters. To him a wife is infinitely more necessary than to those of ampler means; for, the public-house apart, all his material comforts must be looked for in his own home, whilst his richer neighbours may satisfy all their wants abroad. It is one thing to have a club-kitchen, and another to have a kitchen for your club." That passage puts shortly and fairly the very feeling that I have myself. I cannot go to the poor man, and tell him that the brightest part of his life is to be spent alone, and that he is to be shut out for years from the comforts of a home and the happiness of married life. I shall have to press this point strongly upon you because the Solicitor-General, in the remarks he addressed to you yesterday, told you that Dr. Knowlton used the word "marriage" merely to cloak his hidden object of advocating a system of immorality. If that is true, the same censure passed on the author of this book must equally attach to my co-defendant and to myself; but let me point out to you that to put forward such a theory is really preposterous, and had it come from any one else than a Solicitor-General who is so high in his profession, so well practised at the bar, and so thoroughly acquainted with the courtesies which belong to a court of justice, I should say that it was one of the most unjust and malicious suggestions that could have fallen from the mouth of an unjust advocate against any defendant whom he was prosecuting. I am going to put this point strongly before you. What do you find? Why, that amongst young professional men marriage is less common than it was; not that they have any disinclination to the married state, not that they shrink from the enjoyment of wife and home, but because they have seen and taken to heart the miseries which too often follow early marriages, and a consequent large family, and they refrain from following their natural incli-

nation from prudential motives. The struggle through which they have to pass before they arrive at an honourable position either at the bar, in medicine, or in the church is such that they reflect three times—ay, four times, before they ask a woman of culture and refinement to place herself in a position where for perhaps eight or nine years her home-life will be a mockery of comfort and a weariness. And yet I say that to put off marriage to a late age is utterly demoralising in its tendency. You will find that fairly put in the first chapter of the "Fruits of Philosophy;" and while I read the extract, I ask you to remember that of such a passage it is put to you by the Solicitor-General that the language is only used as a cover for the advocacy of public immorality. Dr. Knowlton says of late marriage: "But, besides being ineffectual, or if effectual, requiring a great sacrifice of enjoyment, this restraint is highly objectionable on the score of its demoralising tendency. It would give rise to a frightful increase of prostitution, of intemperance and onanism, and prove destructive to health and moral feelings." And he goes on: "Let us now turn our attention to the case of unmarried youth. Almost all young persons, on reaching the age of maturity, desire to marry. That heart must be very cold, or very isolated, that does not find some object on which to bestow its affections. Thus, early marriages would be almost universal did not prudential considerations interfere. The young man thinks 'I cannot marry yet, I cannot support a family. I must make money first and think of a matrimonial settlement afterwards.' And so he goes to making money, fully and sincerely resolved, in a few years to share it with her whom he now loves. But passions are strong and temptations great. Curiosity, perhaps, introduces him into the company of those poor creatures whom society first reduces to a dependence on the most miserable of mercenary trades, and then curses for being what she has made them. There his health and moral feelings alike make shipwreck. The affections he had thought to treasure up for their first object are chilled by dissipation and blunted by excess. He scarcely retains a passion but avarice. Years pass on—years of profligacy and speculation —and his first wish is accomplished, his fortune is made. Where now are the feelings and resolves of his youth? He is a man of pleasure, a man of the world. He laughs at the romance of his youth, and marries a fortune. If gaudy equipage and gay parties confer happiness, he is

happy; but if they be only the sunshine on the stormy sea below, he is a victim to that system of morality which forbids a reputable connection until the period when provision has been made for a large expected family. Had he married the first object of his choice, and simply delayed becoming a father until his prospects seemed to warrant it, how different might have been his lot. Until men and women are absolved from the fear of becoming parents, except when they themselves desire it, they ever will form mercenary and demoralizing connections, and seek in dissipation the happiness they might have found in domestic life." This is written by the man whom the Solicitor-General would have you believe advises young people to rush into promiscuous intercourse and give the reins to their unrestrained passions. You are asked ito believe that, and I can only hope that the sudden strain of parliamentary duty which has lately taken up so much of the time of the Solicitor-General has prevented him from reading this book over with that carefulness which it deserves. If it is not so, I fear I should have to accuse him of something worse than I feel disposed to do under the circumstances. There is no word or suggestion of promiscuous intercourse here. Gentlemen, this is the language of a man who is put before you as one desirous of stirring up the passions of youth, and I ask you whether a man with that intention at heart would be likely to preface his book with remarks directly aimed against profligacy of every sort, and with such solemn warnings against every kind of unfair and immoral living. I think, therefore, I may fairly put it that every young man naturally desires to make a home and enter upon married life when first he comes out into the world. I do not believe that any young man sets out with the intention of rushing into fast life and dissipation, but men are frequently drawn into habits of that kind because they fear the results that follow from early marriage. Since I am told that our object is to increase immorality, and that we only use the word "marriage to conceal the foulest designs upon the purity of society, I may say freely that I hold early marriages to be the very salvation of young men, and especially of young men in our large cities. I hold the belief with a depth of conviction which I cannot put to you in words, that for one man and one woman to help, comfort, and support one another, which they are by nature adapted to do, is a state which

is to be reached, which is to be perpetuated by marriage, and in no other way. It is only by companionship, and the union between a man and a woman, that this is possible. Shut a young man out from the loving influences of home, the golden institutions of the fireside, his wife's society, and the happiness of becoming a father, and you induce a life of profligacy. Gentlemen, do not be deceived. There is no talk in this book of preventing men and women from becoming parents; all that is sought here is to limit the number of their family. And we do not aim at that because we do not love children, but, on the contrary, because we do love them, and because we wish to prevent them from coming into the world in greater numbers than there is the means of properly providing for. Children, I believe, have an influence upon parents purifying in the highest degree, because they teach the parents self-restraint, self-denial, thoughtfulness, and tenderness to an extent that cannot possibly be over-estimated; and it is because I wish to have it made possible for young men and for young women to have these influences brought to bear upon them in their youth, that I advocate the circulation of a book that will put within their reach the knowledge of how to limit the extent of their families within their capabilities of providing for them; for no man can look with pride and happiness upon his home if he has more children than he can clothe and educate. It is because I wish them to marry in the springtime of their youth that I ask you by your verdict in this action to make discussion on these subjects possible, and that men should not be driven to find a substitute for true and pure womanhood and wifehood in other directions. If you render this possible you will make your streets purer and your families happier than they are at present. You have frequently heard the question of disinclination to marry brought forward, and it was not so long since discussed in the public newspapers, and I put it to you whether that was the case fifty years ago? If it was not, what is the reason? Any young man might have married and brought up a family then in comfort, while with the same income he would find it impossible to do so to-day; marriage is less frequent because young men have felt the effects of the law of over-population without knowing clearly from what they are suffering. The increase of population has decreased the value of income, and where the income does not in-

crease with the family, an over number of children brought into the world only means pauperism. Hence it is that the natural desire for marriage is thwarted by the present state of things, and this leads, as Dr. Knowlton puts it, either to proflicacy or to asceticism. I need not re-read the passage on profligacy to you; you have seen he speaks strongly against it. Take a passage from Mr. Montagu Cookson on the same subject. He says: "If, indeed, we could all become perfect beings, the rule of life deduced by Malthus from the unalterable law of population would be both practicable and safe: as it is, it has a direct tendency to promote the cardinal vice of cities—that of unchastity. The number of women in England who ply the loathesome trade of prostitution is already large enough to people a county, and, as our great thoroughfares show at nightfall, is certainly not diminishing. Their chief supporters justify themselves by the very plea which Malthus uses to enforce the duty of continence, namely, that they are not well enough off to maintain a wife and family. If they could be sure that they could limit the number of their children, so as to make it commensurate with their income, not only would the plea be generally groundless, but I believe it would not be urged, and the so-called social evil would be stormed in its strongest fortress. The vice itself would become more immoral, because more without excuse, and its greater immorality would, as in the case of other offences, help to make it more rare. The world at large is only tolerant in matters relating to the sexes when the frailty of human nature makes it necessary that it should be." But, gentlemen, we are not perfect beings; and if young men only knew how to limit the number of their families, then they would have no disinclination to marry. I may just put before you the terrible results of profligacy, and in doing so do not imagine that I think you do not know far better than I do the enormous amount of damage which comes from that which is called "the great social evil," against which it has been thought necessary to invoke a special class of most unfortunate legislation. It is not only a danger for the bodies of young men, but, perhaps, a still greater danger to their minds, for association with women of the character of those to whom I refer makes a man lose his respect for pure womanhood, and taints the sacred bond of married life even when it is at last entered upon; and to the unhappy women who are the victims of this terrible evil the injury is yet

worse: they become hardened out of all that is womanly, reckless in their shame, they rush into drunkenness and excess, and end, too often, a miserable life with a disgraceful death. These are some of the miseries which flow from the social evil; and if we could introduce checks after marriage has taken place, we should wound the evil in its vital point. If the Solicitor-General should again endeavour to make you imagine that we are using the word marriage because our real and our avowed objects are opposed, let me ask you to remember what I have said on this point. If profligacy is bad, what shall we say of asceticism? If you now take up the passage on page 7, where I left it a short time ago, you will see how he treats the matter of asceticism: "Sometimes, if even rarely, the young mind does hold to its first resolves. The youth plods through years of cold celibacy and solitary anxiety, happy, if before the best hours of his life are gone, and his warmest feelings withered, he may return to claim the reward of his forbearance and his industry. But even in this comparatively happy case, shall we count for nothing the years of ascetic sacrifice at which after happiness is purchased? The days of youth are not too many, nor its affections too lasting. We may, indeed, if a great object require it, sacrifice the one and mortify the other. But is this, in itself, desirable? Does not wisdom tell us that such a sacrifice is a dead loss—to the warm-hearted often a grievous one? Does not wisdom bid us temperately enjoy the springtime of life, 'while the evil day come not, nor the years draw nigh, when we shall say we have no pleasure in them.' Let us say, then, if we will, that the youth who thus sacrifices the present for the future, chooses wisely between the two evils, profligacy and asceticism. This is true; but let us not imagine the lesser evil to be a good. It is *not* good for man to be alone. It is for no man or woman's happiness or benefit that they should be condemned to Shakerism. It is a violence done to the feelings and an injury to the character. A life of rigid celibacy, though infinitely preferable to a life of dissipation, is yet fraught with many evils. Peevishness, restlessness, vague longings, and instability of character, are amongst the least of these; the mind is unsettled and the judgment warped. Even the very instinct which is thus mortified assumes an undue importance, and occupies a portion of the thoughts which does not of right or nature belong to it, and which during a life of satisfied affection it would not obtain." So he goes on to

point out that both are evils, but that it is more wise to choose asceticism than profligacy; yet at the same time he points out clearly the evils that flow from asceticism as well as those that result from profligacy. For aceticism is an evil, though not so great a one as profligacy; it is unnatural, and therefore it is unhealthy. We know from a large mass of statistics collected from the census returns that married people live longer than the unmarried. In 1853, for example, we find that the unmarried men in France between the ages of twenty and eighty died in a much larger proportion than did those who were married. The figures show that 11·3 annually die out of a thousand among the unmarried, whilst the proportion of married men is only 6·5. Similar results are found in 1863-4 with reference to the entire population of Scotland above the age of twenty. Out of a thousand between the ages of twenty and thirty 14·97 unmarried men died, whilst the proportion of married men was only 7·24, which is less than one-half. These figures, it seems to me, are destructive of the theory of Malthus against early marriages. One other point I will put before you. Dr. Drysdale, in his pamphlet on Prostitution, dealing with the evils of celibacy, says :— "Sir Benjamin Brodie at the meeting of the Social Science Association in Birmingham, said that the evils of celibacy were so great that he could not mention them; but that they fully equalled those of postitution." We find also that Mr. Holmes Coote, late surgeon to Bethlehem Hospital, used to speak in the same way, and regarded celibacy as one of the causes of lunacy. Evidence so strong, you will agree with me, tells convincingly in favour of early marriages, and against either profligacy or celibacy. You can find, indeed you know without my telling you, what is the opinion of medical men regarding the evils which follow from subduing the natural instincts and living in a state of entire celibacy; and perhaps the evils that result from an unmarried life are more terrible amongst women than amongst men, because when women are unmarried they generally lead purer lives than do the majority of men. And you find among monks and nuns the natural sexual desires coming out in the most curious forms. In countries where monasteries and convents abound a kind of thwarted sexual feeling arises, and it is strangely exhibited even in the hymns that are sung and the prayers that are used. Anyone who is familiar with Roman

Catholic or with High Church manuals will recognise this fact. The misplaced sexual feelings run, in the case of the monks, towards the Virgin, and in that of the nuns to the son of the Virgin, and so nature avenges herself when she is dwarfed and stunted, when the natural affections are not allowed to flow in the channel prescribed by nature. The same thing is observable among High Church sisterhoods in this country, and is exemplified in the character of the hymns and prayers used. These are some of the evils that arise from celibacy, and on this point let me refer you to the last paragraph on page 8, which I will not read, as you have the books before you. I want to draw your attention to the diseases that arise from celibacy, and I would specially point out to you the value of Knowlton in such a case as is there alluded to. You know the unhappy position of those who are persuaded by quack doctors, playing upon their ignorance, that they are not in a condition to enter the married state. You can imagine the unhappiness of those who fall into the hands of these people. They play upon the fears of young men, and are the ruin, both in pocket and in body, of all those who have anything to do with them. Many of these poor victims would have been saved a life of misery if this little sixpenny book had fallen into their hands when they were entrapped by quack doctors; yes, even if the book had been sold them by a hawker—one of those who have been sent to prison—at the corner of a street; for on reading it they would have learned to distrust the men who falsely told them they were unfit to marry, and they would, in later life, have blessed the chance opportunity that threw the publication in their way, as they enjoyed the blessings of a happy home, and looked around with thankfulness upon their two or three children. Such are a few of the evils of profligacy and asceticism, both of which are bad, and both of which may be obviated by early marriages. Perhaps I may here advert to what Mr. Montagu Cookson says of the evils resulting from celibacy to both sides. We have often heard those hard and unwarrantable sneers that are levelled at old maids in this country. It is true they are often hard and sour, because, nature being thwarted, they are thrown back upon themselves; they are dwarfed, dried up, and withered, all the more certainly because they have no means of preventing their solitary condition. Mr. Cookson puts this point very

strongly. He says: "To refuse marriage to men altogether, or to require them to postpone it indefinitely after the maturity of their judgment has justified their choice, is to inflict an injury on the whole community by encouraging special forms of evil, perhaps even calling them into existence. Many a woman whose daily life is now dedicated to her dress, or her household, or who has become so entangled in the narrow meshes of acquaintanceship—which she dignifies by the name of society—as not to have an idea beyond, might have escaped all this bondage if imagined necessity had not doomed her to spinsterhood. Many a man into whose soul has stolen the slow poison of moral and intellectual cynicism, might have retained his early freshness if the example of some friend had not taught him to remain single, rather than succumb to the yoke of marriage, with its heavy, because uncertain, burdens. Meantime better, perhaps, not to pry too closely into the consolations he allows himself, or the mode in which he seeks to reconcile what is with what might have been." That is the way in which Mr. Cookson pleads against late marriages. By postponing marriage, people in middle life often find, when they take upon themselves its duties, that nature revenges herself upon them for having thwarted her teachings, and too often such marriages turn out barren, simply because the married persons, from their long celibacy, are incapacitated from producing children, Nature denying her blessings to those who have despised them. I leave these remarks for your consideration. I do not now deal with the effect of all this upon society, because I have already said as much upon that aspect of the question as I think necessary, and I conclude that both profligacy and celibacy are evils, and if it is argued that early marriages produce as great evils, we are placed in a dilemma as to what course should be recommended. We must inquire whether we cannot secure the benefits of early marriages without undergoing the evils of over-population which result from them; but to do that we must maintain the preventive, the birth-restricting, check, as preferable to the death-producing, but we must bring this check into operation after marriage, and not before.

This is the object which this book has in view, and it is no part of its object either to destroy marriage, or to favour profligacy, or to promote promiscuous intercourse; but, on the contrary, to enable people to marry early, and, at the same time, to avoid those evils which come by over-population.

John Stuart Mill's work on Political Economy—which is regarded everywhere as a standard work, and is accepted as a text-book at the universities of Oxford and Cambridge for the instruction of young men, and on which young men are examined, and in which they are taught—invites them to restrain their passions, and to limit the number of their families; but, so far as this work goes, they are left in ignorance how the recommendations it contains are to be carried out, and, therefore, they are unable to save themselves from the very evils against which they are warned. Take the following passage as a fair sample of John Stuart Mill's opinion :—"Poverty, like most social evils, exists because men follow their brute instincts without due consideration. But society is possible, precisely because man is not necessarily a brute. Civilisation in every one of its aspects is a struggle against the animal instincts. Over some, even of the strongest of them, it has shown itself capable of acquiring abundant control. It has artificialised large portions of mankind to such an extent, that of many of their most natural inclinations they have scarcely a vestige or a remembrance left. If it has not brought the instinct of population under as much restraint as is needful, we must remember that it has never seriously tried. What efforts it has made, have mostly been in the contrary direction. Religion, morality, and statesmanship, have vied with one another in incitements to marriage, and to the multiplication of the species, so it be but in wedlock. Religion has not even yet discontinued its encouragements. The Roman Catholic clergy (of any other clergy it is unnecessary to speak, since no other have any considerable influence over the poorer classes) everywhere think it their duty to promote marriage, in order to prevent fornication. There is still in many minds a strong religious prejudice against the true doctrine. The rich, provided the consequences do not touch themselves, think it impugns the wisdom of Providence to suppose that misery can result from the operation of a natural propensity : the poor think that 'God never sends mouths but he sends meat.' No one would guess from the language of either, that man had any voice or choice in the matter. So complete is the confusion of ideas on the whole subject : owing in a great degree to the mystery in which it is shrouded by a spurious delicacy, which prefers that right and wrong should be mismeasured and confounded on one of the subjects most momentous to human welfare, rather than

that the subject should be freely spoken of and discussed. People are little aware of the cost to mankind of this scrupulosity of speech. The diseases of society can, no more than corporal maladies, be prevented or cured without being spoken about in plain language." You have the testimony, gentlemen, of the Solicitor-General that in this pamphlet there is no vulgarity of language and no coarseness of expression. He puts it as strongly as a counsel for the defence could possibly put it; and therefore if it is only spoken in plain language, without unnecessary vulgarity or coarseness, we will deal with it, if you please, as just one of those productions which you think it is right should speak in plain terms of corporeal maladies, and ought not to be dragged—utterly unfairly as it is dragged now—within the reach of the criminal law in this country (for it is only in this country that this subject is thought outside the barrier of ordinary decent discussion: in any foreign country—in France or Italy—all scientific men have full liberty in discussions of this kind). Mr. Mill goes on: "All experience shows that the mass of mankind never judge of moral questions for themselves, never see anything to be right or wrong until they have been frequently told it; and who tells them that they have any duties in the matter in question, while they keep within matrimonial limits? Who meets with the smallest condemnation, or rather, who does not meet with sympathy and benevolence, for any amount of evil which he may have brought upon himself and those dependent on him, by this species of incontinence? While a man who is intemperate in drink, is discountenanced and despised by all who profess to be moral people, it is one of the chief grounds made use of in appeals to the benevolent, that the applicant has a large family and is unable to maintain them. One cannot wonder that silence on this great department of human duty should produce unconsciousness of moral obligations, when it produces oblivion of physical facts. That it is possible to delay marriage, and to live in abstinence while unmarried, most people are willing to allow; but when persons are once married, the idea, in this country, never seems to enter any one's mind that having or not having a family, or the number of which it shall consist, is amenable to their own control. One would imagine that children were rained down upon married people, direct from heaven, without their having art or part in the matter; that it was

really, as the common phrases have it, God's will, and not their own, which decided the numbers of their offspring." That is the way John Stuart Mill puts the law, and presses on all those who marry the duty of limiting their families. Professor Leone Levi, whom we find lecturing recently to working men on their "Work and Pay," points out that "a proper restraint in the matter of matrimony and prudence as regards the increase of our families" is necessary; showing that the prudence must be after marriage, since he is speaking of the increase of families, and saying that "we cannot trust on so much wisdom on the part of the people," and so we must turn to emigration. Clearly he thinks that true "wisdom on the part of the people," as he puts it, would lead to prudence as regards the increase of families; and he says, as we cannot trust to so much wisdom on the part of the people, "our only hope must lie in the vast fields of emigration." Mrs. Fawcett puts exactly the same thing, in words whose meaning cannot be disputed. She had been writing on pauperism, and had been showing that "no speculations as to the industrial prospects of England are worth the paper they are written on if they do not take into account the probable future of pauperism." She says: "If, in the future industrial competition of nations, England is to keep either first or second in the field, she must devise some means, not only of checking the growth of pauperism, but of eradicating the disease from her social system. And those who deal with this question of pauperism should remember that it is not to be remedied by cheap food, by reductions of taxation, or by economical administration in the departments, or by new forms of government. Nothing will permanently affect pauperism while the present reckless increase of population continues. And nothing will be so likely to check this increase as the imposition by the State on parents of the whole responsibility of maintaining their offspring." When Mrs. Fawcett says that you must check population by making parents maintain their own offspring, she necessarily means that if, after marriage, parents found they had to maintain their own children, they would find some means of checking the rapid increase of the family. That same argument I might bring to you very strongly from Mr. Montagu Cookson, who is on some points so extremely clear, that I do not propose to read very much of him, because I am inclined to think that the pages of a magazine are not exactly the medium which I myself should

choose for the discussion of a question of this kind. When people wish to discuss questions of this kind, they should do so in medical or physiological works. I think that in ordinary magazines physiology and other kindred subjects should not be mixed up with more general questions, and I urge specially in regard to Knowlton that no one need buy his book unless they desire to read it, and that every one who buys it knows exactly what the character of the book is on which he is spending his money. That is hardly so with respect to a magazine of the ordinary character. I think part of Mr. Montagu Cookson's article is far more plain-spoken than I should myself have cared to put in the pages of an ordinary magazine; but that is, of course, a question for his own taste and not for me. He says he need not say more to explain his meaning, which is perfectly true, for he had said quite enough to explain his meaning very thoroughly. Then he goes on : "Those who have followed me so far will hardly need that I should add more by way of explaining my meaning; and I rejoice to think that there are not a few who are familiar with the moral lesson deducible from these remarks, and whose daily practice it has long since served to shape." And he goes on to point out that many may "Think the practical conclusion to which I point, *i.e.* prudential restraint after marriage, wilder than anything Malthus ever dreamt, whilst others will regard it with pious horror on moral or religious grounds. To the former I would say it is premature to predict that any untried experiment will fail until you have shown that the conditions of its success are at variance either with the established facts or with the ascertained laws. In the case before us, the facts do not belie the conclusions, for, I repeat, there already exists a school of moderation, based on the convictions here stated, which boasts several disciples. I believe there would be vastly more if the force of public opinion were brought to bear upon the question. Of ascertained laws which are fatal to its success there is absolutely not a trace, except it be the law of our own inclination, which, if in earnest, we can mould as we choose, each strengthening each in the task. At present, however, no one thinks of lifting a finger to assist his neighbour in the matter, and as long as such perfect indifference prevails, and an impenetrable veil of mystery is drawn over the whole subject, every man's secret will perish with him, and the advance of the human race in this all-important department of knowledge will, for want of the

power of transmission, be no more rapid than that of the brutes. To those again who raise objections which appear to them to have their root in morality, as distinct from revealed religion, I answer :—It would be interesting if it were not melancholy, to observe the way in which, both in writing and speaking, men are perpetually admitting the material inconveniences due to an excess of population, whilst they give the go-by to the obvious solution that the numbers of children born after marriage should be limited in the manner I have endeavoured to indicate." I ask you, gentlemen, whether by writing that an impenetrable veil of mystery is drawn over the whole subject, and that "every man's secret" perishes with him, whether Mr. Montagu Cookson does not thoroughly suggest to those who are well acquainted with physiological details, that it would be well that every man's secret should not perish with them, but that for the benefit of their neighbours they should transmit to each other that which has been of benefit to themselves. You find him saying that as landlords cannot make the cottages large enough for the labourers, the labourers must limit their families to their room. He says the limitation of the number of the family ought to be secured "by obedience to natural laws which all may discover and verify if they will, and that such limitation is as much the duty of married persons as the observance of chastity is the duty of those that are unmarried. One of the main wants of the day is, as I conceive, the formation of a sound public opinion on this subject." He does not ask from married people that chastity after marriage which he demands from the unmarried. He tells them to discover natural laws, and to apply them, and he says that such limitation is the morality of married life. He says that one of the most important wants of the day is the formation of a sound public opinion on this subject. Taking that article, and that he says it is to be after marriage that he wants the cottager to limit his family, that it is after marriage he wants the hedger and the ditcher to practise this duty, I ask you how his suggestions can be carried out unless you publish a physiological treatise giving those natural laws which cottagers and hedgers and ditchers could not discover for themselves, however much Mr. Montagu Cookson may be able to do it? How is it possible his wishes can be carried out unless at a low price, in plain Saxon English, you get these natural laws put forward whereby the offspring can be limited after marriage? I believe that in

dealing with that point Mr. Bradlaugh will have something to mention, because I believe Mr. Montagu Cookson wrote to Mr. Bradlaugh—when he found he was likely to be quoted in a court of law—putting some limitations on the meaning of his words which we do not find in his essay, an essay which is utterly unguarded, and is couched in the strongest terms. I have simply read the passages which give the counsel on this point of Mr. Montagu Cookson, and I have not read certain others which are more suggestive in their wording, because I do not want to make any unpleasantness of feeling in dealing with a subject which is a difficult one for a woman to touch at all in a court of this kind. You have got here to deal with this dilemma: that over-population must be kept down, must be killed down, with misery; or that you must have delayed marriages, with personal and social evils such as I have hinted at; or that you must have early marriages with limitation of families. That I conceive is the dilemma with which my antagonists have to deal, and I will go now to the end for which this book is put forward by Dr. Knowlton. You will find on the sixth page some sentences, which I will not read, if you will kindly look at the book, commencing "In a social point of view." In the first place we find it is there stated that "the families of the married often increase more rapidly than a regard for the young beings coming into the world or the happiness of those who gave them birth" ought to permit. I will speak for a moment on women's health in connection with this subject, for to me that is a very vital point in dealing with this book. We have seen the effect on society of over-population; we have not seen the effect on the women themselves, for the premature deaths which keep down the population do not save the health of the mother, who is exhausted by the over-rapid child-bearing. It may save some of the social effects of over-population; it does not save the unfortunate mothers whose health is ruined, and you will find that put very plainly in Dr. Knowlton's work, when he says the health of the mother is very often sacrificed, and she is "compelled to toil on even at those times when Nature imperiously calls for some relief from daily drudgery." Here is one point I shall want to prove to you, more from the evidence of witnesses than from a book. There is no question that amongst the women of the poorer classes there is a vast amount of suffering caused by over-rapid child-bearing. You get one special class of disease, that every doctor would tell you

about, and called, in common parlance, among themselves, "falling of the womb," which is merely the result of this excessive child-bearing, which is caused by their being compelled to go about among their families long before they ought to do so, when health and reason demand a certain amount of rest after child-bearing. I have often myself seen a poor woman, a mother of a large family, standing over the wash-tub three or four days after having borne a child, and upon my representing to her the utter ruin to her health which was involved in such a proceeding I would get the reply: "What am I to do? There is another mouth to feed; the children are there and must be provided for, and I must get about." Doctors tell you that you will very rarely find women among the poor who are mothers of large families, who do not suffer from a weakness of this kind, which is entirely referrable to the fact that year after year, without any intermission, they are in an almost continual condition of pregnancy. Dr. Bull in his "Hints to Mothers"—which is a book sold by Messrs. Smith, and seen on nearly every book-stall, and about which there is no pretence of secrecy, for it is nearly always to be seen standing side by side with Dr. Chavasse's "Advice to a Wife"—Dr. Bull says: "It is scarcely necessary to advert to the well-known fact that a woman may conceive while nursing." It is thought by the poor, and by many well-educated people too, who ought to know better, that a woman by keeping a child at the breast can check the likelihood of conception. No mistake is more frequent or more fallacious than this, and Dr. Drysdale and Miss Vickery will tell you that a number of diseases result from over-lactation. It gives rise to a peculiar class of diseases, but it does worse, as you will find from the testimony of a man like Dr. Churchill, whose wide experience in these matters no one can dispute. He gives you his opinion on one disease, and says "Among the many causes of this disease rapid child-bearing and over-suckling are the most frequent. The latter is done by the poor to prevent a rapid increase of their family, which it does very effectually when it gives rise to the disorder mentioned, but at the expense of much suffering and loss of health to the mother." That same point is dealt with by Chavasse, and it will be spoken to by Dr. Drysdale and Miss Vickery, and you will see that these poor women are so convinced of the necessity of some check that in their ignorance they adopt this injurious means. You cannot expect man and wife

to live as if divorced; you cannot expect them to do so; and to have some check, therefore, poor women actually resort to the fatal practice of nursing children for a year or longer with the hope that by doing that they may keep off the dreaded increase in the family which they desire to escape. It is ruinous to the health of the mother, to the child at the breast, and also to the health of the unborn child. Thus are three human lives simply sacrificed to the ignorance of the poor—the poor who, in their ignorance, struggle to find some check—and yet we are forbidden to enlighten them, to give them some means which would act as the check they need and yet would not harm them. It is not only amongst the mothers of the artisan classes that you find this special suffering; you find it even amongst the wives of professional men; and here I need not urge upon you that one vast source of suffering in the home is the almost continual ill-health of the wife, whose health is so often broken down by the almost annual increase of the family. I need not tell you, because your own experience tells you, that a large number of injurious checks are not only used, but are constantly talked about by married women for preventing the increase of their families. And this would not be done if you did not deny to them that physical knowledge which it is said to be immoral to give to them; but, gentlemen, I think it is far more immoral to force them into ill-health by withholding from them that knowledge which they need. Much of the knowledge needed is given to the wealthier women who wish to have it. That edition of Chavasse which I have, I gave six shillings for at Paddington railway station, and you may get the book much cheaper in paper covers for those who can afford to pay one shilling or eighteen pence, and I know of no reason why Messrs. Smith and Son can go to people who can afford to pay 1s. 6d. and sell them without fear exactly the same knowledge which you say becomes obscene when poor people pay sixpence for it. The knowledge given by Chavasse is of the same character as that given by Knowlton, and gives so much information that any intelligent person would use it for the purpose of checking as well as of increasing the family. On the father I will not say what is the effect of the yearly increase, because you yourselves can judge of the struggle at home with an ever-growing family while the salary does not grow in the same proportion, and I will only say here that, since this prosecution has been begun, one class of men especially have written to us begging

us to carry on this work. I am not now speaking of the very poor, but we have had a number of letters from country clergymen and town clergymen (who from their position many people would expect to be prejudiced against my co-defendant and myself) expressing pleasure that we have had the courage to take this subject up and begging us to go on with it because of the need they see for it. I put that so because, with two clergymen in the witness box, it is well that you should know that religious feeling is not against us on this point, although many people would think it would be in a discussion of this kind. There is another point as to the health of the woman which Dr. Knowlton has put somewhat strongly; he urges that "many women are so constituted that they cannot give birth to healthy, and sometimes not to living, children. Is it desirable, is it moral, that such women should become pregnant? Yet this is continually the case." I am still reading from page 6 of Knowlton. There is no doubt that many men and women have diseases of the constitution, have, say madness or consumption, in the family, with many other kinds of hereditary diseases, and that these people will marry. I ask you, gentlemen, whether it is moral that these people should be allowed to marry, to bring into the world children who will be the inheritors of their own diseases? Yet it is hard to say that because there is a trace of madness in the family, all the members of that family should be forbidden marriage. If they do marry a sad experience often shows that the diseases lying dormant in the parent break out in the child, and cause much misery and suffering. Had you not better teach that they may have the comfort of home, the comfort of married life, but that they must, remembering that they might transmit diseases, keep such restraints over themselves as should prevent them from bringing children into the world to inherit the diseases from which their own families have suffered? Then there are the other cases referred to by Knowlton—cases where the delivery of a living child is impossible, and may even have been proved impossible. Here I am going to put a point to you which may astonish you as much as it did myself. Dr. Fleetwood Churchill, in dealing with "the diseases of women" (I quote from the fifth edition), points out that there are many cases where, from previous experience, they know that a woman cannot give birth to a living child. You will easily understand that there may be cases of that kind which could not be discovered

before marriage, or even until the first child was brought into the world. A large number of cases are given here where the doctors found it was impossible for a mother to give birth to a living child. Instead of telling the mother that it was utterly immoral to conceive a child which could never be born alive, Dr. Churchill comes to the conclusion that where they had once found out that a woman could not be delivered of a living child, it was better to induce premature labour, or to induce abortion at an early stage. I must put it to you, that it is most immoral to allow a woman to go on conceiving children that she will never be able to bring into the world—for I hold that to destroy life, after it once lives, is the most immoral doctrine that can be put forward; and that when a doctor goes to a man and tells him that his wife can never bear a living child, he ought to be able also to impart to him such physiological instruction as should prevent the recurrence of the conception in future. It can never be right to deliberately give life to a child who can never, as you know, live to the birth—to give a life which you are beforehand determined to destroy. It seems to me that an argument of that kind is the most disgraceful that can be put forward. If you are going to talk about circulating knowledge which makes unchastity safe, I ask you which is the most likely to cause unchastity—to allow such principles as these to be disseminated abroad, or to allow the publication of such checks as are advocated by Dr. Knowlton? Surely the latter are far less likely to do harm, and if knowledge of the ease with which the consequences of unchastity may be warded off is injurious to public morality, then how can you permit a book to be circulated which, as Dr. Churchill's does, gives a detailed account of the fashion in which abortion may be induced—means of which any woman, wicked enough to use them, might most easily avail herself? Another point worthy your consideration is taken from the *Obstetrical Journal*, which is sold at all the railway bookstalls at 1s. 6d., and is published by Messrs. Churchill, the great medical booksellers of Burlington Street—a journal which is illustrated, and being so, when the jury see it, I think they will say it is far more likely to spread unchastity than is Knowlton's work. It says there, that in a case where it was found necessary to perform the Cæsarian section on a woman, "while absorbed in this operation it did not occur to anyone of us to so treat the fallopian tubes as to prevent a future conception." If

it is right for one doctor to go through that operation to prevent conception in a married woman, surely it is not wrong in another doctor to show a woman how the conception of too many children can be prevented. I must urge upon you that if you are going to pass a censure on me, and say that it is wrong and immoral to teach married women how to prevent conception, you really ought to take steps to pass a far stronger censure in cases where people are induced to conceive children which it is deliberately proposed to murder on bringing them into the world. I would ask the jury to make a particular note of that, and to remember it in dealing with their verdict. In other cases the doctor warns the father that the mother's health is so bad that the birth of another child is likely to kill her. What can you do? You cannot expect man and wife to live on as if divorced. What happens? Another child "comes," and the woman dies. Is it immoral to teach how the wife may live and yet not be divorced from her husband? There is another class of cases so often known that I need not dwell on them. You do not expect a young man to live an absolutely celibate life after marriage. If he does not, what happens? You get a strong man and a delicate woman. That which is necessary to the health of the man is fatal to the health of the woman. There are too many instances where the home is unhappy because the husband complains of the "coldness" of the wife, but this coldness is often not from lack of love, it comes simply from physical exhaustion. The consequence is that the man finds a kind of supplement to the home which is simply destructive of everything we wish to see in family life. I urge that it is not fair to bring against us a charge of obscenity, when you find that we are doing what we can to show men and women how to remain thoroughly loyal to each other without injury to the health of either, and so to enable one man and one woman to be thoroughly true to each other throughout the whole of their married life. We find that Dr. Knowlton puts forward these checks as "the only moral restraint to population" (p. 5) with which he is acquainted, but that would not prevent another doctor from presenting checks which are better than Dr. Knowlton's. It is for that that I am so anxious to gain a verdict. You will find a discussion going on in France as to these checks, and as to their effects on the health of the married, and it is a vital point to the happiness of the community that

doctors should be allowed to express their thoughts on this subject without the fear of a criminal prosecution, and that they should not be liable to be told that they were endeavouring to promote promiscuous intercourse between the sexes. That, gentlemen, is the first chapter of the book which is here incriminated, and I will ask you whether, on looking through that chapter, there is one single word which bears out the contention raised yesterday morning by the prosecution? Is there one word which shows that the writer is using the word marriage as the cover for something worse? Can you, from the beginning to the end of that chapter, honestly and fairly say that this is a cloak of physiology, this is a pretence of morality, put on to cover an immoral purpose, such as we are here charged with? That is dealing with the whole chapter; and I may again inquire, while I thoroughly bear in mind the ruling of my lord of yesterday, that you are not obliged to find obscenity in every page; yet, I think, my lord, I may fairly put it that some intent ought to be discoverable from this chapter, something which should lead you to think that the writer's purpose was an immoral one, for it seems unfair to brand a book as immoral unless it is so in intent and in purpose.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: Read by itself it might be an introduction to a Malthusian treatise.

Mrs. BESANT: Just so, my lord.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: The only way in which this chapter can be attacked is, by saying what is the conclusions to which it is intended to lead up, and then, from that conclusion, it may be argued that, although in form and *primâ facie* it is perfectly moral, yet that, from the conclusions it is intended to lead up to, a different construction might be put upon it. That was the argument of the Solicitor-General yesterday, and it is the only way in which this first chapter can be taken to mean anything else than what it says. Judging from what it says, it might be regarded as perfectly honest and perfectly pure. Take it by itself, and there is not a word in it which could be construed into any impropriety of expression or thought.

Mrs. BESANT: There are, on the contrary, my lord, a great many expressions which show a very earnest mind.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: It is perfectly open for you to argue that to the jury.

Mrs. BESANT: I do not propose, gentlemen, to read to you any more of this chapter.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: Will you not read the concluding paragraph to the jury?

Mrs. BESANT: I feared, my lord, to take up more of the time of the Court than your lordship might think necessary for the proving of my case, and I did not wish to try too severely the kindness and patience shown me by the Court.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: The paragraph is very important, it seems to me, as touching the purpose of the pamphlet.

Mrs. BESANT: Thank you, my lord; I will, then, gentlemen, just read the last paragraph of the chapter. "Inasmuch, then, as the scruples of incurring heavy responsibilities deter from forming moral connections, and encourage intemperance and prostitution, the knowledge which enables man to limit the number of his offspring would, in the present state of things, save much unhappiness, and prevent many crimes. Young persons, sincerely attached to each other, and who might wish to marry, would marry early, merely resolving not to become parents until prudence permitted it. The young man, instead of solitary toil and dissipation, would enjoy the society and the assistance of her he had chosen as his companion; and the best years of life, whose pleasures never return, would not be squandered in riot, nor lost through mortification." Is that written, gentlemen, with intent to deprave and corrupt?

The Court here adjourned for lunch.

Upon re-assembling, Mrs. BESANT continued: I take up the subject at the beginning of the second chapter, and it is only the first and the second paragraphs with which I propose to deal. The whole of the remainder of the chapter I propose to leave to my co-defendant, for I understand that any defence of his which is effectual will practically, if not quite in legal strictness, be taken to cover myself, and, with your lordship's permission and the consent of the jury, I think it would be pleasanter for all of us that I did not go through the whole of the details in this chapter.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE made a motion of assent.

Mrs. BESANT: It will be pleasanter to let it come from my co-defendant, Mr. Bradlaugh, than from myself, so I will only take the first paragraphs of this chapter. I have only taken the liberty of putting it so, that one might not be thought to be shirking one's duty in the matter. It will be fully dealt with by my co-defendant. I go on then with page 9 of the

pamphlet and the first two paragraphs of Chapter II. I will take the paragraphs separately. Dr. Knowlton says: "I hold the following to be important and undeniable truths. That every man has a natural right both to receive and convey a knowledge of all the facts and discoveries of every art and science, excepting only such as may be secured to some particular person or persons by copyright or patent. That a physical truth, in its general effects, cannot be a moral evil. That no fact in physics or in morals ought to be concealed from the inquiring mind." The first half-dozen lines are not worth troubling you with, but I will take "that a physical truth cannot be a moral evil," and I may say that I thoroughly and entirely endorse that; that I hold that no physical knowledge, properly taught and properly understood, can for one moment be taken to be a moral evil; and I think here I may, perhaps, take leave to point out that the case in which your lordship and your learned brethren gave judgment—the case of the Queen *v.* Hicklin—in that case there were no physiological truths dealt with at all. In fact, that case has really no bearing of any kind on this present case, and has nothing in common with it. There is no kind of connection between a case where obscene matter is put forward, with the admission that it is obscene—matter that cannot be any good; because questions as to certain crimes can never be supposed to convey knowledge that may be useful to either man, woman, or child, and the questions there are all of the most—I was going to say—of the most disgusting character, without conveying one scrap of knowledge that could possibly be useful to any one, and it stands on an entirely different footing to the case where, rightly or wrongly, a pretence of medical knowledge or instruction is put forward. I say a "pretence," because it is said by the prosecution that it is only a pretence, and supposing it were so, nothing in the Queen *v.* Hicklin would touch this, because, in that case, there was no pretence made of any sort that knowledge useful to the community was sought to be given by the publication. (The Lord Chief Justice nodded assentingly.) Knowlton points out that no physical truth can be a moral evil. It is a point vital to me in this, that you should recognise the fact that no physical truth is in itself indecent. I do not mean that under cover of a physical fact indecent suggestions may not be made. I am bound to admit that they may be made under cover of physical knowledge, but I contend

that in itself no physical fact is an indecent fact. I will put it that that is especially and strongly shown by the whole action of our present Government. And speaking of governments, I do not mean, in any fashion, to raise a question of the particular Government with which my prosecutors are connected, or even for one moment to insinuate that the matter of party may lend a spirit of maliciousness to this prosecution. In the question of physiology, Whig, Tory, or Radical Government would, I think, act alike, in that of which I am going to speak. You will remember that the learned Solicitor-General said, that if this book were published in a medical room, or sold to medical students, it would not be indecent, but he contended it was obscene because it might be sold to boys and girls in the public streets, and he contended that practically a book, which to a medical man is a useful book, a decent book, a moral book, would become utterly obscene and utterly indecent the moment it was published in a girls' school, and placed in the hands of girls and boys. Now that, gentlemen, is a very important point. For I hold in my hand the directory authorised by the Government (and for the moment I remind you that the Solicitor-General, being a law officer of the Crown, may fairly be said to be bound by the acts of his Government). You will find, that at the present moment, the Tory Government—and I mean nothing here as against the Tory Government, for they are carrying on exactly the same system that was carried on by the Government preceding—in the directory that I hold here—this directory, my lord, is revised to August, 1873, and is the 28th edition, with regulations for establishing and conducting science schools and classes, and it is issued by the Science and Art Department, the Committee of the Council at South Kensington—it is printed by Eyre and Spottiswoode, whom you well know, gentlemen, as the Queen's printers, the authorised printers of blue books and Acts of Parliament, so that it comes before you with the whole authority that a Government can give to any publication. You will find that they issue a list of books in which they examine the young boys and young girls who present themselves for examination in the science classes in connection with South Kensington, and your lordship and the jury will be thoroughly well aware that these classes are not intended for adult men and women, but are intended for young boys and girls; and boys and girls, under the age

of sixteen years of age, are in the habit of attending them, and in the habit of going up for examination ; and you will find in the examination for honours, that candidates will be examined in any subject treated of in the standard English works upon physiology, such as Carpenter's "Principles of Human Physiology," Marshall's "Outlines of Human and Comparative Physiology," &c. You will find the Government putting into the hands of young girls, under the age of sixteen, as text-books : "Lessons in Elementary Physiology," by Huxley, "Human Physiology," by Carpenter, a "Handbook in Physiology," by Kirke, and another one by Marshall, in each of which they may be examined. Then in the syllabus, they are told that the knowledge of the candidates respecting anatomy and physiology will "be expected to be real and not mere book work," and that the candidates should be able to study the bones of the human skeleton, and also the soft parts, as well as the bones, of the higher domestic animals ; and you will find that it is very carefully put forward that they be examined on the whole of the system of reproduction, that they are to be thoroughly well acquainted with the structures and character of the male and female organs of reproduction, that they are to know (I will not trouble you here with the technical terms) the whole mode of development of the unborn being, and that right through they are to be prepared to put down in answers to an examination not only what Knowlton gives, but—in addition to that which is given by Knowlton as necessary for the point of which he treats—a whole mass of technical and of detailed physiological instruction, not about one sex alone; and young girls of thirteen, fourteen, and fifteen, are by order of the Government instructed in every detail of the male organs of generation from beginning to end, not one point left out, and it is not dealt with in Carpenter and Kirke in the dry fashion in which Dr. Knowlton deals with it — mere dry physiological details; it is dealt with, as you will see when my co-defendant speaks, in language which is calculated to arouse passion, because, while Knowlton carefully avoids one syllable which gives the outward form, the attraction which might be supposed to rouse passion; while, for instance, he speaks of a girl gaining "a more womanly appearance," and says nothing more, you will find in Carpenter's, and in Kirke's books, put into the hands of children, at the express sanction of the Government, of which the Solicitor-General is an officer,

a detailed description of the attractive results of the development of a girl's form, going through every detail in a style that I should scarcely think it wise to put into the hands of those so young, and also speaking of the attractive influence these changes have on the opposite sex. By the authority of the Government these things are put into the hands of young girls and boys, and I ask you with what kind of decency is it that the Solicitor-General, an officer of the Government which authorises a list of books of that kind, comes here to prosecute us for putting into the hands of people and issuing a book, beside which their own books are, if physiology is obscene and if there is any measure in obscenity, immeasurably more obscene than the one for which I plead to-day? We can bring you the very people who have received these books as prizes for studies under the Government examinations. We can bring you a boy who received Carpenter's "Human Physiology;" and not only does Carpenter deal with the question in a manner beside which our book is the utmost extreme of delicacy, but Carpenter is illustrated with a number of plates, and when the jury see them—if they have not already dealt with the subject before—they will be astonished that with the authority of the Government such books are put into the hands of young boys and girls. For myself, I do not object that this should be done, but I do object that the Solicitor-General should say to you that this book circulated in a girls' school would be obscene, because if so it would be hardly consistent that such books as those I have mentioned should be placed in the hands of boys and girls under Government authority, and that, then, he should come here and try to rouse your virtuous indignation to pronounce as obscene that for which we plead.

The Lord Chief Justice: What classes do you mean?

Mrs. Besant: The school and classes of science now held, my lord, at South Kensington, and the Government put forward a number of books which they require as text-books for the children to be examined in.

Mr. Bradlaugh: In the larger directory, under the head of physiology, and in the small one, the instruction for the reproductive organs.

Mrs. Besant: That is a point which is most important, because one would not like to accuse the Solicitor-General of acting an indignation before you that he did not thoroughly feel. We can only suppose, for a moment, that

he was utterly ignorant that the Government had done the very thing which he characterised as obscene, for I am sure all ties of party, if nothing else, would prevent a gentleman in open court from characterising the action of his colleagues in office as actions which were thoroughly obscene, and ought to be indicted at common law. I will claim that if you bring in a verdict against us it will only be fair that you should also sit in judgment upon my Lord Beaconsfield, my Lord Salisbury, and my Lord Derby, and that they should hold the same position we hold in court to-day, to answer for circulating books which are distinctly obscene, which we find them putting into the hands of young girls; and if you are going to fine us, or imprison us, or if you are going to give a verdict which shall make it the duty of the learned judge to sentence us to fine or imprisonment, you will remember that we have taken no steps to circulate these books in girls' schools at all; we have simply treated them in the ordinary way, with no special pressure, and have never, as the Government has done, issued special lists and offered special rewards for the preparing of young girls in them; we have made a point of putting it to married people, while the Government makes a point of putting it to young unmarried girls scarcely out of their childhood. And I hold so thoroughly that the Government is right in putting that information in the hands of boys and girls (and I am speaking to you here as the mother of a daughter for whose education you must at least suppose I have some care and some interest), that I say deliberately to you, as mother of a daughter whom I love, that I believe it will tend to her happiness in her future, as well as to her health, that she shall not have made to her that kind of mystery about sexual functions that every man and woman must know sooner or later; that I feel, with Dr. Acton, that it is better to give instruction honestly, decently, and carefully, than to allow it to be thrown into children by their experience of the world (possibly in a bad and evil way), and I put it distinctly that the Government is doing a service to the coming generation when it places in the hands of young boys and girls the exact physiological facts which we are seeking to spread among adults to-day. And further I put it that when this Government teaching has had its full course for a generation, this work of Knowlton's will not be wanted any longer. Unfortunately, the adults of the present time have not had the advantage of the instruction which the Government

is now giving to the young: when the young have been instructed in Carpenter, Kirke, and in other books of physiology, this little pamphlet will not be needed, because every scrap of information which is found in it, every line which you can point out as covering any sort of words which you may think to be obscene, will, as you will find from my co-defendant's speech, have been thoroughly covered by words put into the hands of children by the Government, and when they have been trained in this fashion there will be no need to circulate among them that for which we are now indicted. It is only because former Governments have not thought it their duty to circulate physiological knowledge that we are condemned for doing it; it would be far better that people should gain that information from the mouths of professors in the schools and classes of science. Some 20 or 30 years hence Knowlton will no longer be required; Government will have taken his position, and will have taught all he teaches, and when the coming generation have had the advantage of that training from men selected by the Government, then will there be no need to give them the physical truths which Knowlton wrote for a generation even more ignorant than the present. Further, not only is a physical truth no moral evil, but I will put it yet more broadly that no physical description in any fashion tends to arouse impure thoughts; in fact, that it has exactly the opposite effect. Physiological knowledge tends to inspire so deep a reverence for the marvellous way in which Nature acts, for the fashion in which she evolves from the apparently most unlikely materials the most unexpected results, that physiological knowledge and teaching inspire a feeling for Nature of reverence so deep and intense that there is no room left for a coarse or an impure thought to enter into connection with the matter. There has been no coarseness attached to the reproductive system spread throughout the vegetable kingdom; and if less mystery were made about the matter, if children were taught that, above all physical functions, they were bound to reverence and think carefully of, and dissever from every element of indecency, that power whereby Nature crowns them with the power of giving new life—if you gave them information such as that, you would do away with the whole suggestion of indecency which hangs around it now. If, for a moment, you will think of the point with which I am dealing, you will acknowledge that in no sense can physiological knowledge be treated as

obscene. Think, for a moment, that every doctor who comes into your homes in time of trial or sickness is a man to whom every physiological detail of the frame is as familiar as possible: to a scientific man, or a medical man, there is no difference between one part of the body and another. There is no more thought of indecency in the mind of the student connected with the reproductive organs than is connected with the brain. It is simply that the course of habit has thrown over them a stigma of indecency which it is ours to try to remove by taking away that cover of ignorance which has covered them with curiosity. You find Dr. Acton pleading for that knowledge in language and expression which I cannot pretend to rival. He says that the whole attraction of impure literature simply gains its strength from the fact that people make a parade of concealment about the functions of Nature, thus giving them a factitious allurement that they never would have if they had been dealt with in a a proper manner. So far from a book of this kind raising sexual passions, nothing can show more utter ignorance of mankind than to pretend that it were possible it should do so. If you were going to sit down to a special breakfast or dinner—and, if I were speaking within the confines of the city, I might say to a Lord Mayor's dinner, for you as citizens might have been there—you would not choose to stimulate your appetite with a dry physiological treatise on the digestive organs. It is very much the same with physiological treatises of the other kind. No man with an impure mind, who wants to rouse sexual passion, who wants in any way to give reins to his passion, will go carefully through dry details which, by the kind of thought they give, and by awakening the brain, utterly destroy all possibility of passion, as I am sure your own experience will tell you amongst medical men who make these things their study. Passing then from that, I will take the following paragraph: "Some," Dr. Knowlton says, "may make a misuse of knowledge; but that is their fault, and it is not right that one person should be deprived of knowledge, of spirits, of razors, or of anything else which is harmless in itself, and may be useful to him, because another may misuse it." That point, my lord, is a vital one in this instance, because it is urged, and has been urged in this presence, and urged very strongly outside the court (though I have no right to introduce that here); it has been urged here by the learned

Solicitor-General that while this pamphlet, if confined to married people, might do no harm, the danger of the pamphlet is that, while addressed to married people, amongst whom the knowledge is not injurious, it may fall into the hands of young people, and people who are unmarried, and may point out to young women especially (for young men do not seem to be taken into consideration on matters of this kind; it is apparently allowed that they may be as fast or as objectionable as they choose)—it has been urged that young women of bad character really, but of good character outwardly, may find that they may become safely unchaste by the knowledge which is given to them by Knowlton. I have found very great stress laid upon that by the Solicitor-General, for he not only assured us that in publishing this pamphlet our intention was to destroy married life, and to promote promiscuous intercourse, and to make unchastity safe—he not only did us the honour to suppose that we should place ourselves in this dangerous position for nothing except for the pleasure of corrupting young girls—not only did he say that was our intent, but also that the book was specially calculated to point out to unmarried females the way in which they could be unchaste without the danger of discovery, which might otherwise arise. Now, for a moment, let me say that the misuse of knowledge does not make the knowledge bad; using knowledge wrongly does not make the knowledge obscene; the knowledge remains the same whether it be used or abused, and the fault of the misuse does not lie with the giver of the knowledge, it lies with the person who abuses the knowledge. I will lay that down as a principle which none will venture to dispute. Suppose you say that a knowledge of poisons enables the person who obtains it secretly to kill another, or to poison a family with a safety which he might not secure were it not for the knowledge, would you, because one person might sooner or later poison his neighbour, venture to say that a botanical book which gave all the properties of plants and included poisons, and which was found extremely useful in a medical sense—would you say that was a book calculated to injure the morals of society because it gave that necessary information, and at the same time enabled some one person to obtain knowledge which enabled him to administer a poison which was not discoverable by medical analysis? My lord pointed out to the learned Solicitor-General, I thought very fairly—it struck me as a very just point to be put by the

judge—he pointed out that in dealing with the word "obscene" it was not in any fashion necessary that the book should in itself contain language obscene and coarse; on the contrary, he stated that you might, under the meaning of such an indictment as this, include words which would be calculated to deprave the morals of society, and that it was not merely whether the book was obscene in the common sense of the term, but whether its tendency was to vitiate public morality. And while for a moment that might be thought to be a remark which might have been directed somewhat unfavourably upon my co-defendant and myself, I yet so thoroughly felt that the learned judge was raising a point which ought to be put before you, that I felt almost grateful to him—if one could be grateful for a momentary disadvantage—for having raised the point. I think, however, that the point I put to you about a botanical treatise exactly covers the contention raised by the learned judge, for no one would pretend that the knowledge of poisons in a botanical book ought to be withheld from the public on the ground that that knowledge might tend to harm public morals by giving to already vicious people the knowledge that they might turn to a bad purpose. That is a point which I will take leave to submit to the learned judge and to the jury as clearly bearing on this case. And take that part to which I referred as dealt with in Churchill's "Diseases of Women," where knowledge as to the procuring abortion is given. It might be urged that that gave a power of harm, but even then you cannot limit medical thought and medical science by this argument, that people of impure and obscene minds may put a bad use on the knowledge which is given. In all knowledge you must get an increased power of harm as well as of good. It is the very condition of knowledge that you have the knowledge of good and evil side by side. You cannot say you will have the one thing without the other; that is entirely beyond your choice, that you cannot have; you must have the knowledge, and with the knowledge of good must necessarily, unfortunately, come also the knowledge of the abuse of what is good, that may fairly be taken as evil. And I put it to you that the argument against Knowlton because Knowlton may be misused is an argument which, if generally applied, would forbid any information to be published, and would make the only virtue of society consist in the utter ignorance of all its members. Take any case you like. Take knives,

for instance; knives are sold, not for the purpose of cutting people's throats; but, if you take the case of the sailors round the docks in Eastern London, you will find that every man there carries a clasp-knife in his pocket, and that it is very common for cases of stabbing to arise. The men do not carry the knives to stab their fellows with, they carry them to cut the rigging, among which their work lies, and they are very handy in that capacity; but you find cases of stabbing arise with far greater frequency than they otherwise would, because the means of stabbing are ready in the pockets of the men whose passions are aroused. Are you going to forbid the use of knives among the sailors because some of them use their knives for the bad purpose of stabbing instead of for the good purpose of cutting the rigging of the vessels? Are you going to forbid the use of guns because a poacher may misuse one to shoot a gamekeeper instead of using it for a legitimate purpose? Do you mean to argue that taking the licence off guns is wrong because it enables more people to carry them? Are you going to argue that ropes ought not to be sold in the public streets because a rope can be bought for 6d., and that that rope can be used by a murderer to hang his victim, and that you must not sell it because a murderer will find it so easy to buy a rope? Look at lucifer matches. Fifty years ago, when lucifer matches were less common than they are now, it might have been urged that you should not sell lucifer matches among farm labourers because it would be so easy to set fire to farmers' ricks with them. With the old flint and steel it was not so easy to fire a rick as it is with lucifer matches, and clearly, therefore, you must not permit them amongst the agricultural population, because you put a power to injure into their hands that they would not possess if they kept to the old flint and steel. Gentlemen, that argument would never have been brought before you if it had not been that this is not a fair prosecution at all. This is simply a trumped up and malicious prosecution. This book has been in circulation for forty years, and now private spite and private malice have dragged it forward from the obscurity of the very small circulation which it had, and has given it a circulation of an enormous extent, which, otherwise, it never would have had. This prosecution has been made purely and distinctly out of private and party spite, and those who conduct the case are compelled to make up ridiculous arguments of this kind, and to read long quotations, in order to fill up the time for which they feel

compelled to speak to the jury. We have heard for this reason the whole of the preface on which I should almost be ready to rest my defence, and of which practically I am following out the lines. They talk of the harm which may ensue to one or two people, and so drag you into the belief of corruption that has no existence in the book, and was never in the minds of the people who published it. You are asked to prevent the circulation of this book because women and others may abuse the knowledge there given. The circulation of this book, if I may judge in any fashion from my own personal experience, is valued by poor men and women in all parts of the country (and I can't help remembering that the editor of the *Times* newspaper said that he judged the c ling of the country by the state of his letter bag in the morning). If the remark of the editor of the *Times* may be taken as a proof of the feeling of the country, then what you are asked to do is nothing less than to prevent the circulation of a book that may bring comfort to thousands of English homes, because one woman here and there may abuse the knowledge which it contains. Why, the knowledge is given in a variety of ways, as I shall be compelled to show you before I sit down. The very knowledge given in Knowlton's book is given in a book practically authorized by Government; I am referring to the report under the Royal Commission on the working of the Contagious Diseases' Acts, and you will find presently that the knowledge most objected to in Knowlton is given there, and it is sold by Messrs Longman, who are not medical publishers, at the price of one shilling. I will only now say that that is a book which, from its very title would attract those by whom the knowledge would be most likely to be misused. I put it to you, is it likely that this knowledge would increase unchastity among women? If you read the appendix—and I may say, though we have printed the appendix, we do not know who wrote it. We have printed it because it formed part of the book which was prosecuted before; and we felt bound to do so, in order to thoroughly challenge the verdict of the jury upon it—in the appendix you will find the argument I am alluding to very clearly put forward. Who this is written by, as I have said, I can't tell; but it was published in the columns of the *Boston Investigator*. If you will carefully glance over it, it will save your time, and I will not read it through, as I do not want to weary

you. You will see that the objection put forward by some against diffusing the knowledge contained in the book is the fear that it would increase illegal connections; and you will clearly remember that I put it to you this morning that the knowledge would have exactly a contrary effect, and it is here put that it is "an outrageous slander" to contend that women are preserved in chastity from the fear of the consequences that may result from the contrary. In this English court of justice need I argue for one single moment that English women are not only kept chaste from the fear of becoming mothers? To do that would be to insult your common-sense and to waste your time. I am sure you feel with me that the chastity of English women is maintained by a feeling purer and nobler than the mere fear of the shame and disgrace that might ensue from a motherhood which was unsanctioned by the law. The fact is, that anyone who could misuse the knowledge that is given here, is so far gone already that there is very little to gain by keeping this knowledge from her. If a woman has been so carried away by passion as to desire the book for purposes of passion, she will not be pushed any further by the possession of this knowledge. Fear, as you know too well, does not keep women chaste, and the only effect the book could have on a woman who, for one moment, contemplated the consequences which are spoken of by the prosecution, would be to dissuade her from her passion. The fact that the woman had the patience to wade through dry physiological details, to make the preparation that is in this book contemplated, shows that it is no longer a question of passion carrying her away, but a quiet and steady determination to go on the wrong path, which no amount of persuasion would keep her back from. If you are going to say that the mothers of England who seek for this knowledge, that those who plead to me to fight this question for them, are to be kept in ignorance because one woman here and there, already unchaste in thought, may become unchaste in act, I say you are sacrificing the many scarcely even for the benefit of the few. You are injuring the great majority of decent, modest, respectable women, who desire to have this knowledge, for the sake of one here and there whom no care on our part can prevent from getting the knowledge she desires. Do not think you can stop the knowledge by stopping this book. There are plenty of books, unfortunately, of a very different character,

from which those who desire to be unchaste can gain their knowledge. This book will not help them, for Knowlton warns them too sternly against the evils of unchastity He tells them too much of the dangers that result from unchastity, too much of the dangers that come from excess. Put the book into the hands of man or woman who is known to be running wild in this matter, and you will find that the dangers pointed out in the book will frighten them back and destroy the charm of the temptations which they feels. You will never do harm with a book like that; there are too many books to which they may turn on the matter for them to go to a dry book like Knowlton's. I put it to you now, as I do not propose to carry on this chapter further, that it is the mothers of families, as a matter of fact, who express so keen an interest in this book; and if we had been so fortunate, as naturally we have not been, as to have had the pleasure of seeing any of you, or the learned judge, at any of the meetings which have been held on the subject, you would have marked one very curious point—that the whole audience, except the very smallest minority, was composed of the rather more than middle-aged, somewhat hard-featured, men and women, who certainly would not have been drawn there from any feeling of prurient curiosity, but were simply drawn there by feeling the pressure of their need to know something more than they did at the present time, to learn how they might preserve their children from the sufferings they had themselves undergone. If it were in any degree admissible—and I do not think it is—I believe that the learned judge would feel it his duty to stop me if I brought here in evidence a large mass of letters from women of all classes which I have received: as a mere point of law I might read them one after another, but I think, to do that would be to shelter myself under a point of law which it would not be fair to raise; for though the learned judge said yesterday that he could not prevent my learning a quotation by heart, and reciting it as part of my speech, and therefore could not prevent me from reading, yet I do not want to weary either the judge or the jury with any unfair amount of matter of that kind. I will therefore, only put it to you shortly that amongst these letters, some of them of the most touching character—letters, gentlemen, that however much you might be prejudiced against me, you could not hear me read without being touched by the tone of their contents—letters of women who have had nine,

ten, or twelve children, imploring me to save their daughters from going through their own deplorable and terrible experience. You would feel, had you seen these letters, that even a man in the rank in the law of the learned counsel for the prosecution, who stands up and puts the taint of obscenity on my intent, simply insults your common sense, and makes a verdict given in favour of the prosecution an entire impossibility to be given consistently with your conscience. You will find a mass of letters coming from those who have had this book in early life, and who have experienced the benefits of the work. One I have particularly in my mind at the present moment, from a certain station-master in Scotland, who says that his wife, almost dying after her last confinement, the whole future of their lives looked black and gloomy. Some mere chance threw this 6d. pamphlet into their hands, when it was published by James Watson. He tells how they read the book; how they acted upon it; how his wife grew strong and healthy, and how, at the present time, years afterwards, they are looking forward to an addition to their family with a pleasure they would never have been able to experience had they not had this book. You may think that in a matter of this kind, I somewhat overdraw it, and that I lay too much stress on a mere 6d. pamphlet, but if you knew the feeling about it, the earnestness, the intensity with which men and women look upon this question, you would not wonder at my zeal. Those who read a book for the sake of the impurity contained in it will not find this pamphlet attractive to them, It is circulated amongst those who need its teachings, and it is those for whom I plead. I acknowledge that medical periodicals may be read for a most impure purpose by impure minds; I acknowledge that the *Lancet*, which is published at all the railway bookstalls, that the *Medical Observer*, which is sold on the Metropolitan Railway, I acknowledge that all these works may be read for impure purposes by impure minds; but that is no reason why this book, or those journals, should be suppressed, because the impure gets from them the knowledge which he would certainly get in some other way if he did not get it through these. That is no reason why earnest and respectable people should not obtain the knowledge which may contribute to their married happiness. The rest of this chapter I propose to pass right over, and to leave to my co-defendant. I stop for one moment on pages 31,

32, and 33, which I shall not read, only asking you to glance at the subject-matter: but I want first to make a general remark on this chapter; the learned Solicitor-General, doubtless through utter ignorance of medical science, used an expression in dealing with this chapter which is calculated to mislead you. He pointed out to you, I don't know whether he intended you to read the book or not, or whether he took the point for granted, that this book dealt not only with the reproductive organs but also with the external forms. The word "external," if you had not read the book, would convey an utterly false idea to you; "external" and "internal," used as medical terms in the ordinary medical division, were pointed out to you as evidence of indecency. The word "external" used as the Solicitor-General used it, conveyed an utterly false impression which there is nothing in the book to cover. When you come to deal with Carpenter you will find expressions which do convey indecent impressions to indecent minds, but you will not find anything here to justify the idea the learned Solicitor-General conveyed. I trust he did that under a mistake, and made a suggestion he will regret. I will now put to you another point which my co-defendant will put to you more fully: the Solicitor-General inferred that the indecency of the publication was increased because it only dealt with one sex and not with the other. The suggestion was most unwarranted. Knowlton only deals with the physiological details which are necessary for the application of his arguments. He does does not deal with the other sex any further than is absolutely needful, and for the learned Solicitor-General to put as a suggestion of indecency what is simply a delicacy on the part of Knowlton is most utterly unjust. I ask you to remember, as I do not doubt you will have more fully impressed upon you than I will venture to do, that what is really a proof of the delicacy of Knowlton's work the Solicitor-General tries to turn into a suggestion of its complete indecency. Now I will refer you to pages 31, 32, and 33 for a special reason, but shall have here to put in evidence a book by Dr. Chavasse called "Advice to a Wife," and another book by Dr. Bull, called "Advice to a Mother." The two books are exactly the same in character, and they deal throughout with the whole of the questions which affect a married women from her marriage day. The only difference between Knowlton

and these books is that both Chavasse and Bull and are far more detailed in their descriptions. They give a large number of stories to make their works read pleasantly instead of writing a mere dry treatise like that of Knowlton. I put it to you, as to the information given in those pages which are objected to by the prosecution, that the value of the information to a young married woman cannot be over-estimated. So great is the truth of this that you will find that many medical men, of careful delicacy of mind, give these books to young married women who are their patients, for the very purpose of avoiding the necessity of going into many personal details which otherwise they would be compelled to deal with. I am speaking here from my own personal experience, because when I was first married my own doctor gave me the work of Chavasse, on the ground that it was better for a woman to read the medical details than it was for her to have to apply to one of the opposite sex to settle matters which did not need to be dealt with by the doctor; practically these pages in Knowlton's work are a very short and very careful summary of the subject dealt with by Chavasse and Bull: where you have got to deal with a sixpenny book you must summarise the details. Many a young married woman does not like to apply to a medical man on many points that may arise; she sometimes does herself serious harm, and perhaps brings on miscarriage, and lays the foundation of future ill-health; or she sometimes thinks herself seriously ill when no real disease exists; these pages are simply invaluable to a woman, and they give to a poor woman for sixpence that which a richer woman can buy for five or six shillings. I will ask you whether for one moment, seeing that these books are both sold by a member of Her Majesty's Government, that they are not sold with any restrictions, that they are sold on railway bookstalls, whether, if any blame is to rest upon us because we publish a short quietly worded treatise on that which others publish far more warmly worded, no blame is to rest on them? Surely English justice, whatever your opinion may be, common English justice compels you, if you bring a verdict of guilty against us, to at once institute a prosecution against Mr. Smith, who is one of Her Majesty's Government, for circulating amongst the higher classes at 2s. 6d. a work which you say is indecent when circulated amongst the poorer classes at 6d. The point as to the use of these books seems

to me so thoroughly pertinent, that I will here quote to you what Dr. Bull puts in issuing this work; in his preface he says: "In the minds of married women, and especially in young females, those feelings of delicacy naturally and commendably exist which prevent a full disclosure of their circumstances when they find it necessary to consult their medical advisers. To meet this difficulty, as well as to counteract the ill-advised suggestions of ignorant persons during the period of confinement —are the chief objects of the following pages." This book is now edited by Dr. Parker, who has edited the work since the death of Dr. Bull. The same remark also applies to another part of the book (pp. 15 and 16), where you will find a number of remarks objected to by the prosecution. You will also find, when my co-defendant comes to speak, that all its details are collected from books whose circulation has never been interfered with, and that the only difference between Chavasse and Knowlton is that Knowlton is dry and very brief when compared side by side with Chavasse and Bull, both of whom use a large amount of what is called "literary padding." Once more I shall have to ask you to look at the book itself for one moment, and refer to pages 34, 35, 36, and 37; these pages deal with cases of sterility and impotence, and the Lord Chief Justice—I thought very wisely—pointed out to the learned Solicitor-General that, in dealing with sterility, any man who could give some cure which would remove sterility might fairly be described as a benefactor to the human race. As this point has already come from the Bench as an expression of opinion, I do not think I need trouble you with any argument on it. Knowlton, in dealing with it has dealt with it thoroughly within the bounds of his subject, and has not included any unnecessary information, but has only given that which it was his duty to include in order that he might be understood by those for whom he wrote. The remedies are here very much the same as those which are approved of in the other medical books; but suppose they were not, suppose that there was anything in the suggestion of the learned counsel against one remedy—difference of remedy, surely, cannot constitute obscenity in medical works; when the remedies which are proposed are different they may be matters of discussion amongst those who are qualified to discuss the question, but it cannot be pretended that one remedy is a remedy that can be de-

fended as decent and the other one condemned as obscene; that in the mere language in which they are advocated there is nothing, which, to a well-regulated mind, could suggest indecency, has already been allowed. I would draw your special attention to pages 36 and 37 as showing the intent of Knowlton in writing. He puts there the very point which the learned judge raised yesterday morning. He says that "Impotency, at a young or middle age, and in some situations especially, is certainly a serious misfortune to say the least of it. The whole evil by no means consists in every case, in the loss of a source of pleasure. All young people ought to be apprised of the causes of it—causes which in many instances greatly lessen one's ability of giving and receiving that pleasure which is the root of domestic happiness. I shall allude to one cause, that of premature, and especially solitary gratification, in another place. Intemperance in the use of spirits is another powerful cause. Even a moderate use of spirits, and also of tobacco, in any form, have some effect. It is a law of the animal economy, that no one part of the system can be stimulated or excited, without an expense of vitality, as it is termed. That part which is stimulated draws the energy from other parts." Gentlemen, I ask you whether that is the kind of language that would be used by a man writing with intent to corrupt? And now I will ask you to look at page 37, on which I will call your attention to the following passage:—"As to the remedies for impotency, they are much the same as for sterility. It is of the first importance that the mind be relieved from all care and anxiety. The general health is to be improved by temperance, proper exercise in the open air, cheerful company, change of scenery, or some occupation to divert the mind without requiring much exercise of it; nourishing food of easy digestion; flannel worn next to the skin. The cold bath may be tried, and if it be followed by agreeable feelings, it will do good."

I will only ask you whether any possible remedies could show more common sense or less desire to deprave or corrupt the minds of the young. Knowlton simply gives that knowledge which it is to the benefit of men and women to possess, and nothing can be stronger than this chapter to show that he was guided by good and pure motives. This curse of sterility is so great a curse upon married people, that any man who, for 6d., can point out the way to avoid 't, may be taken, as my lord said, to be a benefactor of the

human race. The remainder of the chapter deals with checks to population, with which, as I said at the beginning of my address, I propose to leave it to my co-defendant to deal. The whole of this remainder was read out by the learned Solicitor-General, and he put it to you that he read it with a large amount of pain. If it pained him so very much, I do not quite know why he should have read it as he did, because, as you all, every member of the jury, and your lordship, had the book before you, the extreme delicacy of the learned counsel might have excused him from a task he said was so painful.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: The learned Solicitor-General is not here, and I think you must be just to him. He was rather challenged to read them.

Mrs. BESANT: Do you think that I ought to be gentle with him, my lord, as he is absent? (Laughter.)

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: What I said was, that you must be just to him.

Mrs. BESANT: I did not mean to be unjust to him, my lord.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: I said he was called upon to read the passages. I thought it fairer to you that he should point out the passages upon which he relied, and upon which he will rely by-and-by, when he comes to address the Court.

Mrs. BESANT: That is quite fair; but I thought, if he felt so very much pain, he might have avoided the special anguish of mind he seems to have had in dealing with these passages. I will not press the point any further, however, as the learned counsel is not here. I do feel the position is especially painful for him, because, if he does not get a verdict against a woman, it does make the position of a learned counsel very painful. (A laugh.)

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: You have gone through this long—and, I must say, very able—address up to the present without saying anything that could be regarded as painful or offensive to any one.

Mrs. BESANT: And I will try to do so to the end. My feelings towards the Solicitor shall be more charitable than his were to me, for he accused me of some of the vilest things a woman could do. But I will not press the matter further, and perhaps, by not too roughly defending myself against him, I shall make my case the stronger. I do not say these checks pointed out by Knowlton are the best pos-

sible; but, if they are not, that is a question which should be left to the discussion of medical men. Dr. Knowlton himself is a man of immense learning and culture, and, at any rate, his opinion is entitled to a respectful hearing. If his views are considered erroneous, the proper course is to write a pamphlet pointing out where Knowlton is wrong, and not to bring in this system of police supervision. There is now only one single piece more in this chapter that I shall trouble at all to draw your attention to, and you will perhaps kindly excuse me from reading it. I do not know whether I shall be in order if, instead of reading it, I hand the passage to your lordship.

His LORDSHIP: What is it?

Mrs. BESANT: It is a passage from the files of evidence taken before the Contagious Diseases Commissioners; and it is simply a special point that covers much in Knowlton.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: If it is anything you would rather not read, you can leave it to your co-defendant.

Mrs. BESANT: Very well, my lord; then I will only say that it instructs unmarried people to use one of the checks given by Knowlton. I do not propose to deal further with the third chapter. All in that chapter that has given offence you will find put forward in other books, but I do not propose to deal with the details of it in any way. I understand this supposed objectionable portion is confined to three pages and a quarter, and if the object of the book is bad and immoral, then the whole of the remainder must be supposed to lead up to these three pages and a bit; but this can scarcely be contended to be the case. The whole object of the book is to promote marriage, and to teach temperance to those who are married, and it is utterly wrong that you should judge from these three pages, instead of from the rest of the book, which is manifestly good and manifestly pure. I come now to the fourth chapter, in some respects the most valuable in the book, a chapter which is its own defence almost more strongly than anything I can say will make it. You find Knowlton putting forward a quotation from Mr. Robert Dale Owen on the reproductive instinct: "Controlled by reason," he says, "and chastened by good feeling, it gives to social intercourse much of its charm and zest, but directed by selfishness or governed by force it is prolific of misery and degradation. In itself, it appears to be the most social and least selfish of all instincts. It fits

us to give even while receiving pleasure, and among cultivated beings the former power is even more highly valued than the latter. Not one of our instincts perhaps affords larger scope for the exercise of disinterestedness or fitter play for the best moral feelings of our race. Not one gives birth to relations more gentle, more humanising and endearing, not one lies more immediately at the root of the kindliest charities and most generous impulses that honour and bless human nature. It is a much more noble, because less purely selfish, instinct than hunger or thirst. It is an instinct that entwines itself around the warmest feelings and best affections of the heart." You will observe that it is not as the Solicitor General put it, as if this instinct were to be unrestrained, but that it is to be "controlled by reason, and chastened by good feeling." And I think that one may fairly put it to you that no more elevating idea of love, regarded as a physical passion, can possibly be put forward than is put forward here. In the next paragraph Dr. Knowlton says: "But too frequently its strength, together with a want of moral culture, is such that it is not 'controlled by reason;' and, consequently, from time immemorial, it has been gratified, either in a mischievous manner, or to such an intemperate degree, or under such improper circumstances, as to give rise to an incalculable amount of human misery." That paragraph points out the mischief that may come from sexual intercourse, and the chapter goes on to show how that mischief may be avoided. I am utterly at a loss to understand how it can be suggested by the prosecution that a part of this book gives encouragement to a loose way of thinking, when the rest of the book is so distinctly against intemperance. In the following paragraph Dr. Knowlton goes on to deal, I think fairly from a medical point of view, with some of the evil consequences that arise from this instinct under the present state of things. Some of these consequences he says it is the business of the "moralist to point out, whilst of others it [falls within the province of the physician to treat." He complains that "physicians have hitherto fallen far short of giving those instructions concerning this instinct which its importance demands. In books, pamphlets, journals, &c., they have laid much before the public respecting eating, drinking, bathing, lacing, air, exercise, &c., but have passed by the still more important subject now before us, giving only here and there some faint allusion to

it." Dr. Knowlton wrote to that effect some three-and-forty years ago, but since that time many medical works of a similar character have been published, so that Knowlton's complaint would no longer be real. Dr. Knowlton then goes on to say that "true philosophy dictates that this and all other appetites should be so gratified as will most conduce to human happiness—not merely the happiness attending the gratification of one of the senses, but all the senses —not merely sensual happiness, but intellectual—not merely the happiness of the individual, but of the human family." Taking that position, I will simply ask you whether you think that is the attitude of a man who wishes to degrade the tone of society, and do harm to the morals of the young. The next paragraph I will not read through. It is the paragraph commencing at the foot of page 42 and finishing on page 43. But I may point out that whilst it is said that this pamphlet encourages young lads of seventeen or eighteen to ruin their health by premature indulgence, yet in this paragraph Dr. Knowlton points out that early intercourse means ruin to their health when they come to later years. The next point in the paragraph that I would suggest as extremely useful is that he points out that the marriage ceremony ought not to remove all restraint to indulgence, or do away with the necessity of temperance. He points out how much harm many young people have caused themselves to suffer, because they utterly disregard, after marriage, all those restraints which all moral people observed before marriage. In the last paragraph of page 43 Dr. Knowlton shows that "temperance in this thing is not to be decided by numbers, but that it depends on circumstances; and what would be temperance in one may be intemperance in another. And with respect to an individual, too, what he might enjoy with impunity were he a labouring man, or a man whose business required but little mental exercise, would, were he a student, unfit him for the successful prosecution of his studies. Intemperance in the gratification of this instinct has a tendency to lead to intemperance in the use of ardent spirits. The languor, depression of spirits, in some instances the weakness and want of appetite induced by intemperate gratification, call loudly for some stimulus, and give a relish for spirits. Thus the individual is led to drink. This influences the blood, the passions, and leads to further indulgence. This again calls for more spirits, and thus two vicious habits are commenced which

mutually increase each other." Now I ask you whether that is the language of an immoral or sensually minded man? Is it not true that in these words he very shortly but clearly points out to married people that they must continue their self-restraint right through life, and that the harm that may be done by lacking self-restraint may lead them to intemperance, which in its turn will re-act again and so make utterly miserable the whole of their lives. I put that to you as utterly destroying the idea that the book was written for the purpose of corrupting morals; I urge that this charge cannot be maintained against Dr. Knowlton, and therefore cannot be maintained against those who have published his work. The succeeding paragraph is of exactly the same character, and I do not think that any advice can be purer or more temperate, or more utterly apart from any desire to corrupt than his advice to the married people whom he is addressing—no advice could be more moral, more beneficial, more wholesome, more free from any intention to corrupt than that contained in these passages. Gentlemen, what is Dr. Knowlton's intention and object? Take this chapter—the last paragraph in which I do not read because it has been read already—and we see that his purpose is to promote marriage, and to restrain intemperance. He is charged with writing a bad book with impure intent. But a man of impure intent does not speak against profligacy; a man of impure intent does not speak in favour of marriage; a man of impure intent does not urge temperance after marriage as well as before it; nor does such a man plead for self-restraint as we find Dr. Knowlton doing. The very idea of bad intent—and bad intent is the essence of the charge against which I plead—the very idea is a monstrous idea, and not one shadow of proof has been brought forward which will show you in what Dr. Knowlton's bad intent consisted. It is said that Dr. Knowlton was actuated by a bad intent, but it is not shown in any way how that bad intention appears in this pamphlet. But an objection has been raised to its price. I have now finished what I want to say about the book itself, and I now come to the question of price, which has been made the subject of hostile comment. I think I may fairly put it to you—as was almost suggested by the learned judge himself—that if a book is not obscene in itself, the price will not make it obscene. Its low price is part of the value of the book to

us, because a book at a high price could not reach those poor people in whom we are specially interested at the present moment; the poor cottager, the labourer, the artisan,—those, in short, whom Mr. Montagu Cookson desired to reach—cannot possibly be reached and taught how to proportion "their families to their room" except by means of low-priced books. They might get all this from Dr. Churchill, Dr. Acton, Dr. Marion Sims, if they could obtain them; but all these books are dear, and it is simply mockery to offer poor people books at 30s. or two guineas each. It is said that we sell a book for sixpence to anybody, and that somebody might desire to read it "from curiosity or morbid appetite;" but I will put it that it is not fair to put a bad motive into the minds of people who are desirous of reading a certain medical book. It does not follow that people who can only afford to spend sixpence on a book have a desire to gain a bad knowledge with their money. But if the price of this book is really an objection, then it does not stand alone. Take the *Lancet*, a paper which contains medical details beside which Knowlton is chaste in the extreme. The *Lancet* is sold openly on the bookstalls at *7d.* to anyone who chooses to buy it. The *Medical Observer* is sold for threepence—just half the price of Knowlton. That journal contains medical details of what would be called by the prosecution the most obscene character. Then there is the *Obstetrical Journal*, published at 1s. 6d., and bearing on its cover a special advertisement of a book on this very subject at 3s. 6d. By what reason, by what argument, by what logic are you asked to suppress Knowlton because he is sold at 6d., when these books remain unchallenged, some sold at 3d., some at 7d.? The price cannot make a book obscene. If it is not obscene at a high price, it will not be obscene when sold at 6d. We must remember that cheap knowledge is one of the great glories of the day; and such firms as Messrs. Cassell, Petter, and Galpin have made their names famous just because they have put before the world useful books at a price within the reach of everybody. I will ask you not to allow it to go out from this court as the verdict of twelve English jurymen that you measure indecency by the price at which it may be bought, and that you would allow that to pass at a high price which you count worthy of condemnation at a low. Then we are told that the book is being sown broadcast over London; but why is that?

The book never would have been spread over London had it not been for this prosecution. Seven hundred copies a year was its circulation before this most ill-judged and most ill-advised prosecution had given the book an importance it did not deserve. This prosecution has given the book a factitious importance, because people fancied that when such a large amount of legal talent was brought against it there must be something in it to induce people to buy it. It has been put to you that if medical works were published generally to the public the publishers would be indictable, but I scarcely think the learned judge will allow that that is a fair construction of the law, because every medical book we have here to-day is published generally. There is no restriction in the sale of medical works. Anyone can go to Messrs. Churchill for a copy of any book, and no question will be asked except "have you the money?" There is no such thing as restriction of the sale of medical works. If a book is printed for private circulation only, that is a different matter; there may be no publication then, because there is no sale; but if the book is once published there can be no pretence raised that it is restricted in its circulation. The enormous number of these medical works published shows that they cannot have been in any way restricted in their sale, for they have been circulated by tens of thousands. But even though the sale were restricted—as it is not—medical works, if obscene at all, would be quite as obscene in the lecture-room as in the street. And provided they are sold, and generally published, I do not see that the price at which they are sold at all touches the question of their obscenity. Nay, the very fact that we have got these medical works here to-day is proof that they are generally published. I do not think Mr. Bradlaugh has himself bought any of them, but they have been bought by Mr. Parris, who is not a doctor, by Mr. Wells, who is still a youth, and one or two by myself. When I happened to want to buy an edition of Bull I simply wrote to Messrs. Longman for it and got it; they never dreamt of making any inquiry, but simply treated it as a matter of business, fastened the book up and sent it through the post. If general publication makes a work of this kind obscene we ask you, why we should be specially singled out for prosecution, why this one book should be specially taken up? When Mr. Smith is in the box he will tell you there is no restriction placed upon these books; he will tell you that

their own agent at Paddington sold the book to me and would sell it to anybody and never dream of making any difficulty of any kind. And he will also tell you that the sale of this book has been enhanced by the course taken by this prosecution. The sale of Knowlton has increased enormously during the last three months. Instead of the 700 copies published in one year before the prosecution, about 125,000 copies have been sold in three months. The book undoubtedly has circulated largely in all directions, and we have allowed it to do so believing that we were right in defending its free circulation. To have stopped it, it appeared to us, would have been an act which might very justly have been construed into an acknowledgement, on our part, of guilt; and therefore, I say frankly, we have not tried to stop the sale of it. I openly state to you that we have let the book go its own way, and whilst, on the one hand, we have not taken the trouble of advertising, we have, on the other hand, put no difficulties in its way. We did, however, stop the sale of it at our own place of business. Not that we feared the consequences of selling it; but because we did not wish our shop-people to be subjected to the same annoyance that we have been subjected to. We stopped the sale of it over the counter at Stonecutter Street; and we have stopped also the supply to the hawkers in the streets, for the simple reason that we did not like their manners and customs. Notwithstanding that, however, the sale has risen since the proceedings taken against us by the prosecution from 700 a year to 125,000 in three months. That is one of the effects of trying in a free country to stop the sale of a book which has been uninterruptedly sold to the public for forty-three years. If, gentlemen, we win your verdict, the book will find its own level. Do not understand me to pretend to say that there is anything specially valuable in Knowlton himself that will cause his book to live long; far from it, and I, for one, shall not, after an acquittal, care to sell another copy of it. We only want to make the right for others to sell it freely to whoever desires to buy it. We do not desire to make a gain, and we knew when we were selling it that we were running a risk which no money gain would compensate. We felt that it was necessary to raise the question of the right to sell the work; that we have done, and now, if we obtain your verdict, our interest in the pamphlet ceases. The

moment your verdict is returned in our favour, that moment anyone can publish it. It will find its own level as a work out of date ; but the great question we are fighting is one of liberty of publication, and we ask you by your verdict to say that there is a right to sell all honest thought honestly expressed. That is the point I put to you. I do not, however, pretend to say or think that if we fail to-day—although I think that an impossible result—that then the circulation will cease ; because I think the feeling in this country on the subject is so strong, that if we are convicted and punished, you would find it necessary to institute innumerable prosecutions against persons who entertain our views on this subject. And now I would ask you, gentlemen, in concluding the remarks which I have thought it right to put before you, and in thanking you for the extreme patience you have exhibited in listening to me throughout what I know has been a very long address, I would ask you, in dealing with your verdict, to consider that you have not only to deal with the two defendants now standing here to take their deliverance at your hands, but with that great public feeling of England, which by no other means can so rapidly be raised as by any interference with the liberty of the press. It is not only the question of the publication of an obscene book that brings us here to-day. Had it been so there would have been no necessity to have occupied the time and attention of my lord and of you, gentlemen. Had that been the only question the whole matter would have been very quickly settled, and my co-defendant and myself would have been dealt with at the Old Bailey. It was with a feeling that such a work as the present had no right to be made the subject of a criminal prosecution, that we determined to avail ourselves of the right which a free English justice gives us, of coming into this court and pleading here in defence of our cause, knowing, as we do, that thousands of the English people think us right. Under those circumstances, I do not know how you, gentlemen, will reconcile it to your consciences to bring in a verdict of guilty against us, a verdict which means that the work of Dr. Knowlton is one of a most disgraceful kind. And I now leave the matter in your hands, with every confidence, leaving the remainder of my case in the hands of my co-defendant, knowing that his defence really, though not technically, will cover mine, with the addition of the evidence of skilled witnesses, who

will tell you, not their opinions, but their experience, and who will indorse the points I have put to you. I fairly put it that unless you honestly believe that my whole speech to you has been one mass of falsehoods; unless you believe my intent to be a bad intent; unless you believe I have been deliberately deceiving you throughout, and stand here before you in the very worst character a woman could take upon herself, namely, that of striving to corrupt the morals of the young under the false pretence of purity here put forward, and unless you think that, for the after-part of my life, I deserve to pass through it with the brand upon me that twelve gentlemen, after all patience, thought, not only that the book was a mistake, the opinions wrong, and the arguments unconvincing, but, in the terrible language of the indictment, that I am guilty of "wickedly devising and contriving as much as in me lay to vitiate and corrupt the morals of youth" as well as of others,—unless, I say, you believe that that has been my object and purpose, on this indictment, I shall call upon you, gentlemen, to return a verdict of "Not Guilty," and to send me home free, believing from my heart and conscience that I have been guilty only of doing that which I ought to do in grappling honestly with a matter I consider myself justified in grappling with—that terrible poverty and misery which is around us on every hand. Unless you are prepared, gentlemen, to brand me with malicious meaning, I ask you, as an English woman, for that justice which it is not impossible to expect at the hands of Englishmen—I ask you to give me a verdict of "Not Guilty," and to send me home unstained.

The conclusion of the address was received with applause, which the officers of the court suppressed.

Mr. Bradlaugh then proceeded to open his case. Addressing the Bench,

Mr. Bradlaugh said: Before I commence my opening to the jury I haye again to trouble your lordship, as to the indictment, and I hope, after your lordship's intimation of yesterday morning, you will not think I do so unduly or disrespectfully. I only want to preserve what I think are my legal rights.

The Lord Chief Justice: I cannot deal with that. I have told you I will reserve that point if necessary.

Mr. Bradlaugh: The only doubt is this, my lord. I have been looking at the case of the Queen *v.* Goldsmith; but if your lordship will reserve any rights——

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: I have told you I will, already.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Then, my lord, I will not press the matter any further. There is, however, a very strong dictum of Lord Chief Justice Bovill in the case of the Queen *v.* Goldsmith I should have liked your lordship to have seen. I trust your lordship will not think I wish in any fashion to trespass on the Court, but there is another case I would wish your lordship to take a note of. It is the case of the King *v.* James, reported in Cox's "Criminal Cases," vol. 12, page 127, and I will not trouble your lordship one word more, the points being reserved to myself and co-defendant.

My lord and gentlemen, I feel the grave responsibility that rests upon me in this case the more because I know that any want of tact in speaking upon the extremely delicate matters which I shall have to deal with may probably tend to damage my co-defendant, who has so ably, and if his lordship will permit me to say, so modestly, but earnestly put her case before you; and I will ask you to dismiss from your minds in the beginning the whole of the references made by the learned Solicitor-General to some other proceedings which may have been taken in some other place against this pamphlet or some pamphlet similar to it. It was laid down in the case of the King *v.* Drakard, Howell's "State Trials," vol. 31, page 534, where it was sought to plead the acquittal of a defendant indicted for publishing a similar libel to the one alleged against Drakard, that any evidence of such acquittal was not admissible—that one jury was not bound by the verdict of another jury, and that each jury was equally capable of judging of the merit of any case submitted to it; and I draw your attention to that lest you should think that some judgment which was alluded to by the learned Solicitor-General, but of which no sort of evidence was or could have been tendered in this case, ought to influence you; and lest you should think that that judgment ought to have any practical effect on your verdict here. I ask you, therefore, to utterly discard the learned Solicitor-General's statement. I will now beg you to consider the indictment on which you are asked to pass your verdict against us. The indictment in effect is for publishing an alleged obscene book, and, as has been pointed out by my co-defendant, there is no statutory definition whatever of the word obscene. In the 20th and 21st Victoria, known as Lord Campbell's Act, there is a reference there to books which are described as obscene books, and if one wanted

to gather what was meant by the word obscene one would try to do so by examining the explanation which was given by the learned judges themselves in debating that statute. In the debate in the House of Lords which took place on the moving for the second reading of the statute under which the seizure warrants are issued against obscene books, Lord Campbell gave the definition already read to you by my co-defendant; but I shall have to trouble you at a little more length on the subject of that definition and debate, for I am going to submit to my lord and to you that we are indicted under the common law, and that common law is common usage, and that there never has been an indictment tried out under the common law against a work similar to this. I shall show the character of works usually known as obscene to be entirely different to the one under prosecution, and that fair physiological treatises of whatever price and however widely circulated and published, either by laymen or physicians, are not and ought not to be considered as obscene works. I have one difficulty to contend with in this case, and that is that this is the first instance of a prosecution for alleged obscene libel where the publisher has stepped forward and said the book is not obscene. Sometimes the defendants have denied the publication, sometimes pleaded ignorance of the contents. We make no denial of the publication of the pamphlet; we come here admitting that we published it, knowing every line in it, and we say that we believe it not to be obscene. And I hope that before I conclude this speech I shall succeed in showing you that there is not a line or a word in this book which can be fairly or properly put as being of an obscene character. That much may be unfamiliar to you, I can well conceive, for when my attention was first called to this book in my own judgment it seemed to me to contain objectionable features in many of its details. But since I have read Dr. Carpenter's works, line for line of which it will be my duty to take you through, given as prizes at public schools even by the Recorder of the City of London, who charged the grand jury, at the Old Bailey, which found the true bill which has sent us here, and put us on our trial before you, and again, when I read the works of Dr. Kirke, of Dr. Fleetwood Churchill, Dr. Marion Sims, Dr. Nichols, Dr. Brinton, Mr. Hilles, Dr. Graily Hewitt, Dr. Chavasse, Professor Wilder, and many others most probably known to you, but whose

writings can never be said to have been intended to inflame the passions, I felt ready to stand before you, not to ask you for deliverance from any limited punishment my lord might give me on your verdict, should it be adverse to me, but from the more severe consequences that a conviction of intent to corrupt the public mind will cause me. The stain which will rest on me in such an event will be one which would sorely check and bar the career in which I have hoped, and still hope, to make my way. This punishment, I say, to me would be immeasurable in its severity, compared with the mere sentence that would follow as the measure of punishment I should receive here for what I have done. And in speaking of that alone, I will affirm to you that there is not a line of physiological information in Knowlton that is not chastely put, and that the tone of the work is not calculated in any way to inflame the passions or to deprave the mind. The learned Solicitor-General—and unfortunately my voice does not possess here the weight which his position gives him—in conducting this prosecution against us, suggested to you that the work was full of colouring. If there be a colouring in the work it is a colouring we do not make: it is a colouring drawn from the misery, a colouring drawn from the suffering, a colouring drawn from the poverty, a colouring drawn from the despair with which we have to deal. The learned Solicitor-General, I am sorry to say, used one word that I wish he had thought fit to have left out of his speech. I am willing to believe, although not having the honour of being a member of the profession and not having the honour, at least on this side of the water, to be the friend of any of its members,—I am willing to believe that a gentleman in the position of the learned Solicitor-General would not—to obtain a verdict in this case—have used the word had it not been in the instructions given to him in his brief; but I have a great difficulty in reconciling to my own mind how he can admit that there is not a trace of vulgarity in the work which he thinks right to describe as "filth." I cannot help thinking that he forgot he was pleading for the conviction of a man and woman, and for the moment was led away by the thought that he was conducting a civil case where some trick practice would win the verdict of the jury in his favour for the moment, to be ultimately reversed by the deliberate judgment of thinking men. Now, let us consider first what the word "obscene" means. When the matter was first

debated in 1857, not at some common debating society, but before an assemblage including the finest intellects in the world, it was objected to by Lord Brougham with reference to Lord Campbell's Act, that there was no definition of the word "obscene." Lord Brougham asked—Hansard's "Parliamentary Reports," vol. 146, No. 2, p. 329—"How did he (Lord Campbell) propose to define what was an obscene publication?" and Lord Brougham reminded the House that "In the works of some of the most eminent poets there were some objectionable passages which, under this measure, might cause them to be considered obscene publications." What was the reply of Lord Campbell? If you accept it, it is impossible for you to give a verdict against us. Lord Campbell's reply was that "He had not the most distant contemplation of including in the Bill the class of works to which the noble and learned lord referred. The measure was intended to apply exclusively to works written for the single purpose of corrupting the morals of youth and of a nature calculated to shock the common feelings of decency in any well-regulated mind." And lest there should be any mistake as to what Lord Campbell meant, he added, "Bales of publications of that description were manufactured in Paris and imported into this country." And to make the distinction still stronger, Lord Campbell then said that the need for the statute was that the people who published them, that is these obscene works, hid their names, were not to be found, and that it was necessary to send spies and informers after them. This was not needed for persons who sent previous notice to the public authorities that they were going to publish a work. The whole offence lies in the intent with which it is published. When did you ever see two people give notice to the police authorities under circumstances involving a wicked intention of the act they are about to commit. Before one copy was sold by us, as you have heard from the witnesses for the prosecution, myself and my co-defendant gave notice to the police authorities of our intention to sell. However wrongful our act may be adjudged by you, I deny that you can say we have not acted with frankness and fairness. I deny that you can assume against us any corrupt intent.

The Lord Chief Justice: That may be sought in the work itself.

Mr. Bradlaugh: I am content, my lord, to accept that, and your ruling in the case of the Queen *v.* Hicklin,

that if within the four corners of the work it tends to corrupt and deprave the public mind then no good intent, either unmistaken or mistaken, can save us from conviction. I would not be so impertinent—ignorant though I may be on some matters of law—as to raise an argument which I thought had no bearing on the matter. I wished to show the jury that on the facts as proved we are not persons who would be likely to publish a corrupting work. The Lord Chancellor, replying to Lord Campbell, said that which I unfortunately know to be true—"Who could tell but that the superintendent of police or the magistrates before whom the application came would take a different view of what were obscene or indecent publications from the noble and learned lord."

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: The Lord Chancellor of that day was Lord Cranworth?

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Yes, my lord. Lord Lyndhurst, in the same debate, asked, "What is the interpretation which is to be put on the word 'obscene'? I can easily conceive that two men will come to entirely different conclusions as to its meaning." No one can help taking a very different view, but in a case where there is no suspicion that one was going to run away, where we went to the police office to look after the authorities, so as to be in readiness if summoned, it is a little hard that difference of opinion should involve personal indignity. Instead of treating us reasonably, fairly, and summoning us, we were taken on warrants—an indignity I do not complain of personally, but I do complain of such conduct towards the lady who is my co-defendant, and if I have a greater sense of responsibility in now addressing you it is because this lady, who has to share the result of this trial with me here, has been to no inconsiderable extent influenced in her course of action by my views on the law of population. With me this question is no new question. I have been a journalist for the last nineteen years, and in my first prospectus I put forward the Malthusian view as part of the editorial intention of that journal, and lest the jury should think that we now take up this struggle in any mere desire for novelty or notoriety, I may mention that the late Mr. John Stuart Mill left me, written by himself, in his autobiography, a few lines stating that I commended myself to him because I took upon myself the advocacy of these Malthusian views when they were even more unpopular than to-day. If

the work of my life has in your judgment been corrupt when I have sought to teach prudential checks, if you think that I have been criminal in that I have tried to cure poverty by these remedies, try, gentlemen, to decide for yourselves in what fashion the growing evil of poverty is to be dealt with. My co-defendant has sought to show you what is the condition of the poorer classes. Permit me to add a word from my own experience. Some working men in the North of England recently made me arbitrator in a dispute as to the wage of those men who were workers in one of our coal mines. By my award I took 15 per cent. off that wage, and most of those men are earning at this time less than £1 a-week. If I am not to be permitted to show to these men how they may prudentially alleviate their poverty, what am I to do for those poor toilers who put their confidence in me, and whose wage I have reduced? It is with a view to ensure the welfare of these poor people, that my co-defendant, perhaps influenced for some time by my strong views on the question, but now governed entirely by her own views of duty, has with me published the pamphlet which has caused her to be placed in a position which but few gentlewomen would like to take. Is it "obscene" to teach the poor and wretched not to crowd hungry mouths together where food is short and misery plentiful? Lord Lyndhurst asked "what is the interpretation which is to be put on the word obscene?" And in trying to deal with this question I will endeavour not to travel over that which my co-defendant has so clearly stated to you in her speech. Lord Campbell said the question was for the jury to decide, and I will ask them here so to decide it that no such stain shall rest upon us as the indictment seeks to cast. An expression of opinion fell from the Lord Chief Justice yesterday to which I cannot quite assent. I agree with my lord that there are works which do not come under the ordinary definition of the word obscene, but which might tend to corrupt public morals, and I also agree that a work which recommended assassination would be a work tending to corrupt public morals, but I deny that any such work would be prosecutable under this indictment. I am not indicted for such a work. This is a specific indictment for publishing a book specially described and the verdict must be in the language of the indictment.

THE LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: Of course.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Then I will not press that a moment longer on your lordship.

THE LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: A book recommending assassination would not be an obscene book. But how does that help you?

Mr. BRADLAUGH: I will put a case to you, because of what fell from the learned Solicitor-General. Supposing—which I utterly and indignantly deny—that this Pamphlet, which, it has been alleged, recommends abortion, actually did so, while I agree it would be an offence of a fit character to justify a prosecution, yet I say it is not one punishable under an indictment such as the one under which we stand charged, and I wish to submit that to your lordship very strongly, because I do not want to raise issues unnecessary to be raised, nor do I want to have a view passing through your lordship's mind which would involve me in the supposition that I am arguing with reference to one kind of supposed guilt, when actually arguing against another. The offence charged against us is under the common law, that is the common usage of the country, and it is, comparatively, a modern offence so far as the common law is concerned. The case of the King *v.* Curl, in 1727, is the first case which, as far as I am aware, was ever tried out at common law, so as to obtain condemnation of the defendant. It is reported in Howell's "State Trials," vol. xvii., page 154, and I cannot help thinking that anyone reading, with care and attention, the decisions from the case of King *v.* Curl forwards to the present day, could come to but one decision, as to what works are intended to be indictable as obscene works, *i.e.*, works which incite to the commission of acts which have been considered by proper legal tribunals to be acts of obscenity. And I submit that, under the common law, you will not now find out, or extract for my prejudice, a definition of the word obscene, which has never yet been laid down by the judgment of any court, or affirmed by the verdict of any jury. I will now deal with the details of the physiological part of the work, with respect to which his lordship has made a remark.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: It was not altogether with reference to the physiological details I interfered; it was rather that these details, though perfectly pure, must be looked at through the intent and purpose of the whole book.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Very well, my lord. They say then, in

effect, *qua* detail, the work is not indictable, but the intent of the work being to prevent conception under certain circumstances, the whole of the book is assailable as an immoral book. Now can it be an offence to advocate checks to conception?

The Lord Chief Justice: If it corrupts the public morals with relation to birth it is. That is a matter for the jury. I certainly shall not withdraw from the jury the question whether the proper construction to be put upon the book is that its opinions with regard to the duties of women had a demoralising tendency. That is for the jury to decide.

Mr. Bradlaugh: Then comes the difficulty, indicted as we are under the common law, into which I am placed, that there has never yet been a similar book submitted for judicial decision.

The Lord Chief Justice: It is for the jury to say whether that is or is not an offence; that is, whether a recommendation which shall have for its effect this restriction of births does or does not tend to the depravation of the public morals.

Mr. Bradlaugh: I submit we do not come within the terms of an ordinary prosecution where your lordship would direct the jury that the offence is within the statute, or clear under the law declared, because the question is for the first time now to be decided before a judge and jury.

The Lord Chief Justice: It is useless to repeat. What I shall leave to the jury in time is that which has been laid down over and over again when the offence has been committed—*i.e.*, that published matter that tends to deprave the public morals, the effect of which is in the opinion of the jury to corrupt the minds of youth or anyone else, is an offence.

Mr. Bradlaugh: Then it will be a question for the jury whether, taking a fair and unprejudiced view of the matter in this pamphlet, it does tend to deprave and corrupt.

The Lord Chief Justice: That is the question I shall put to them.

Mr. Bradlaugh: I am quite willing to accept that, and it is what will govern me in my presentation to the jury of my defence in this case; and I call your lordship's attention now to the case of the Queen *v.* Hicklin, and especially to the case of Steel *v.* Brannan, which was a case of the almost entire republication of the same pamphlet in the report of

the trial. There the defendants submitted that they had left out some of the "most filthy and abominable passages occurring in the former edition," the use of which words precluded the supposition that even the defendants in the Queen *v.* Hicklin case could contend that the pamphlet there was not obscene. Your lordship's own language in the case of the Queen *v.* Hicklin seems to me most vitally in my favour. Your words were, "I think if there be an infraction of the law, and an intention to break the law, the criminal character of such publication is not qualified or affected by there being some ulterior object of a different and of an honest character." Upon that I submit that, to find us guilty, the jury must not only be of opinion that there has been an infraction of the law, but an intention to break the law.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: That is not what I said. What I said was, if the effect of the publication was to corrupt the minds of the individuals composing the public it was not because the publisher thought some ulterior good was likely to arise from it, that he was excused.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: I do not in any sort of fashion wish to insist on any words that may be incorrectly applied to you lordship, but I was reading from the *Law Journal* report.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: No, that is what I think I said, that is what I meant to say, and what I shall say now. Suppose the effect of this work—I am only putting it hypothetically—suppose the jury think the effect of this language is to corrupt public morals, it is not because of a desire to alleviate poverty—it is not that which would excuse an infraction of the law, if there has been any. That is all I meant to say then, and shall say now.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: The difficulty, my lord, still passing through my mind is, suppose myself and co-defendant to have believed the pamphlet not to have been an infraction of the law—suppose we made it clear to your lordship and the jury with whom the decision rests that there never has been any hostile judgment against a work of this class, and that, on the contrary, works—innumerable works—containing the same matter had been published unchecked, I only want—not to press it unfairly, but—to have your lordship and the jury in full possession of the contention I wish to raise, that, if so, this is no offence at common law, there having been nothing decided during the last hundred and

fifty years to govern us; I wish to convince your lordship that we cannot be convicted on this indictment.

The Lord Chief Justice: I shall be bound to direct the jury to the contrary.

Mr. Bradlaugh: Very well, my lord; I will not press it further. I will come, then, to the dictum in the same case of Mr. Justice Mellor, and that I feel bound to urge on your lordship. In the case of Queen *v.* Hicklin his lordship, after saying that he arrived at his decision with some difficulty, says:—"The subject itself, if it is a subject which may be discussed at all, and I think it undoubtedly may, is one which cannot be dealt with without, to a certain extent, producing authorities. Now I take it for granted that the magistrates themselves were perfectly satisfied that this pamphlet went far beyond anything that was necessary or legitimate for the purpose." Supposing the population question is a fair subject for discussion one must examine what the object of this pamphlet purports to be, and whether it is reasonably and fairly what it purports to be? It purports to be an essay on the population question, and I will not venture to go over the grounds put forward so ably and exhaustively by my co-defendant, who has amply proved that the pamphlet is really what it purports to be. Is it an indictable offence to put forward views on the population question, or to discuss checks to over-population, or to recommend some kind of checks? Where is any authority for any one of these propositions laid down? I venture to say it has never been laid down that it is an indictable offence to advocate the Malthusian view of the population question.

The Lord Chief Justice: Certainly not.

Mr. Bradlaugh: Then, if not, comes the next question of advocating checks. It surely is not indictable to advocate checks to over-population?

The Lord Chief Justice: If you do not advocate it by means which are inconsistent with public morality.

Mr. Bradlaugh: Then comes, is it indictable to advocate checking population by one means, and not indictable to advocate checking population by some other means?

The Lord Chief Justice: It might be by late marriages instead of early marriages. There is nothing indictable in that.

Mr. Bradlaugh: Professor Fawcett and Mr. Malthus no doubt advocated late marriages; then comes the question,

is it indictable advocating early marriages, and advising checks to operate after marriage? I respectfully contend that it is not. The checks have been divided by my co-defendant into death-producing and birth-restricting; the birth-restricting can only be divided into two kinds, having sub-divisions—the one, late marriage, which I will dismiss for a moment, and the other early marriage and small families; early marriage coming first and the check coming afterwards. You have had many extracts from an essay on the morality of married life by Mr. Montagu Cookson, and it is only fair for me to say of Mr. Montagu Cookson that he has written me a letter in which he says that it is not his view which is put forward by Knowlton in this pamphlet. He holds the doctrine that it is possible for married people to produce or check conception according to the special period of cohabitation, and that, I think, is fairly what Mr. Cookson would say if in my place, although it is not my duty to press his language in this way. I do not wish to do any injustice to him. He says it is the right thing to marry early, but you must restrain yourself after marriage, and in his letter he says you can do so by knowing and observing the laws governing the reproductive system of women. There are the mensual periods when women conceive more easily than at other times, and therefore at such periods restraint is necessary. If that be true, you must instruct the persons whom you desire to practise restraint, and then the whole of that part of the Knowlton Pamphlet, as to the menstruation and the liability to conception, is instruction necessary to be communicated to the mass of the people whom you desire should utilize that knowledge. I must say I heard with some surprise from the learned Solicitor-General that this instruction must be confined to the medical schools and not communicated generally to the public. I submit that such a contention is the height of absurdity. If it is the population you wish to check, you must publish the instruction, enabling such checks to be applied, to the masses of the people, and more especially you must publish to that class, some of whom are even now only earning something like 12s. a week. In Hereford, the other day, I learned from proceedings before the magistrates that there were men in that county who earned but 8*s.* 6*d.* a week. You say, then, that such men as those are to consult medical practitioners, to whom they must pay a fee for advice on the subject, and that they must not have this work for six-

pence, although works of a similar nature, at prices varying from 1*s.* 6*d.* to half-a-guinea, are sold by Messrs. Churchill, Messrs. Renshaw, Messrs. Longman, and Messrs. Trübner, and are to be bought on the railway bookstalls, by all who can afford? It has been said by the learned Solicitor-General that the book is an obscene one, because it may get into girls' schools. I shall show you that Dr. Carpenter's works and Dr. Kirke's "Handbook of Physiology" are used for the examination of boys and girls in Government schools, for the education of both boys and girls. I am within the ruling of his lordship; but I am prepared to put into the box scholars who were instructed in these works, and who received them as prizes. It is a work of great difficulty to collect this class of evidence, and in our case it has been immense, for there is a reluctance to come forward in a case where obscenity is alleged. What we have the question narrowed to is this, holding the view that the population has a tendency to increase faster than its means of subsistence, we urge that it is necessary to encourage preventive checks on population. In an essay of my own, entitled "Jesus, Shelley, and Malthus," I have thus stated the Malthusian position —"Mr. Malthus advanced three propositions:—1. That population is necessarily limited by the means of subsistence. 2. That population invariably increases when the means of subsistence increase. 3. That the checks which suppress the superior power of population, and keep its effects on a level with the means of subsistence, are all resolvable into moral restraint, vice, and misery." Take that as a fair summary of Malthus. I say it is not wrongful to advise, as John Stuart Mill, Professor Leone Levi, and Mr. and Mrs. Fawcett have done, that there should be prudential checks in lieu of the positive ones of starvation, disease, and crime; and how is the general public to know anything about prudential restraint, or to practise prudence as recommended, unless you publish cheap works in plain language, so that they may be widely circulated? If you tell me that this is a colourable work written for another purpose, that is another thing, and I understood the learned Solicitor-General rather to put it on that issue; but I emphatically deny that there is anywhere in the book the slightest particle of evidence of any such colourable character. If you tell me that this book is indictable because of its advocating checks which have not become commonly known, and which the English public

have not yet understood, I utterly repudiate the proposition. There are many means of preventing births in cases of disease which are urged by medical writers who have never been made the subject of a criminal prosecution. I will ask your lordship if this is to be denounced as obscene? If it be obscene at all, whether it is to be published in a medical student's room or at Stonecutter Street cannot matter at all. The mere fact that it is widely sold and that it is cheap in price cannot, I submit, in any way affect the judgment which my lord will ask the jury to give upon this indictment. It is not necessary that I should go in any fashion into the long argument with respect to this point of over-population, as my co-defendant has already gone into it so thoroughly; but I must ask your lordship to bear with me for a moment while I deal with some expressions of opinions of persons nine or ten years ago treating on this question,—a number of persons of whom I was one. The matter is printed in the *Journal of Health*, then edited by Dr. Hardwicke, the present coroner for Middlesex. In 1868 there was a debate at the London Dialectical Society on a paper read by Mr. Laurie, where I made a speech, with which I will not trouble you. The son of one of the leading statesmen of our time on the Liberal side, Lord Amberley, who is now dead, took part in the discussion. Mr. Laurie had been the tutor of Lord Amberley, and the following is from the report: "Lord Amberley said that the subject brought forward by Mr. Laurie was of first-rate importance. There was no doubt that prevention of over-population was far the best method of attacking the evil. How was that motion best to be spread? He was glad to hear Mr. Bradlaugh say that the working-classes were beginning to debate this vital point. Unfortunately, the influence of the clergy, in common with that of society and the natural passions of mankind, were opposed to the prevention of over-population. He believed, indeed, that women would naturally have a stronger feeling against large families, had they any say in the matter, and if these opinions were more heard. He was truly glad to hear the credit of the discovery given to the great Malthus. Like all other discoveries, there was something wanting to work out the details of Malthus' views and the way in which population could be prevented with the least pain and discomfort. . . . Emigration was good, but not rapid enough to relieve the pressure caused by rapid multiplication. The practical con-

clusion from all of which considerations seemed to him to be, that Malthus was correct, and that if we were to escape from poverty, it must be by means of limitation of our families. We naturally objected to war and famine. He (Lord Amberley) objected to celibacy. Well, then, the only remaining alteration seemed to him to be small families; and this was, in fact, a medical question. He much wished he could stay to hear the opinion of the medical gentlemen in the room whether it was possible to restrain the size of families without measures which were injurious to health. The American ladies were in the habit of keeping back their families: but the means used by these ladies seemed to him, as far as he had heard, dangerous to health; and hence he should much like to hear discussion upon the point whether some less hurtful means could be suggested." I should tell your lordship, that in New England, in the old and settled parts of America, in France, and other countries, the use of checks to prevent large families by poor people is a matter of everyday practice; and I don't know, my lord, how morality is to be measured if I am to be told it is immoral to prevent the birth of those miserable and wretched beings whose state is so depicted in Bishop Fraser's report. No doubt, if so, we are immoral. But, says the learned Solicitor-General, if the work were limited to married people there might be no objection, whereas you put it within the reach of unmarried persons who may abuse it. A man who sells a razor puts in the hands of a person an instrument with which he might cut another's throat, but that man does not advise the other to commit murder, nor would he be indictable if without his participation murder were done. I must complain of unfair suggestions on the part of the learned Solicitor-General, when he said that there was mentioned in the work an instrument for checking population which might be purchased at any chemist's shop for one shilling; he was not familiar, evidently, with the works of Hewitt, Sims, Churchill, and the "Ladies' Companion," which is a journal published by the Homœopathic Society, or he would have said in so many words that that mysterious instrument was a harmless syringe, which is commonly used for personal cleanliness. The use of the word instrument was calculated to convey an improper impression which the language of the work does not justify. What I have to contend is that it is lawful to argue the question of restraint to population, and that the physiological details of this pamphlet do not, in the language of Mr.

Justice Mellor, go beyond what may be termed necessary or legitimate for the purpose. I was most pained to hear from the learned Solicitor-General the declaration that the work was to be condemned as obscene because it only described the female organs.

The Lord Chief Justice: I confess when I heard the Solicitor-General say that I was surprised, because I thought that it was the more a proof in favour of the pure intention of the work. If the work had been intended to corrupt the morals of the young, it would have contained statements which would tend to corrupt the minds of females as well as of males, and if a description of the female tended to corrupt the male youth, it would be natural to suppose that there would be the converse—the description of the male. I don't, therefore, feel any force in the observation of the Solicitor-General.

Mr. Bradlaugh: I will not add one word to what your lordship has said. I have so many details to go through that I feel I may weary the jury, but the length of the case is not my fault. I have asked the prosecution, "What do you rely on?" and they say, "The whole book." Line by line my co-defendant has gone through a portion of it, and I will go line by line through the other part for the purpose of showing you that no part of it is obscene, and of pointing out to you what I think ought to be your verdict; and I submit that in this work of Knowlton the whole of the physiological details given here, beginning with page 11 and going forward, are descriptions only of such parts of the female organism as are thought necessary for the reader to know with relation to health and disease of the female when capable of the exercise of her reproductive functions, and from conception to birth. The learned Solicitor-General, with the business of an advocate, regarding the gain of his cause rather than accuracy of statement, said that the sexual act was described with a disgusting fullness and particularity. Not only is there no such particularity, but, on the contrary, the details are scant compared with such works as I shall have to compare it with, line by line, until I have convinced you. You will say nothing can be more chaste or delicate than Knowlton, if he is to refer to these matters at all. I need hardly concern myself with the inquiry as to who is prosecuting us, because, if we have committed an offence, it does not matter; and if not, no kind of outside influence will here govern the verdict to be given. I will

only put it, that it would have been better that we should have stood face to face with our actual prosecutor—the one who really finds the means of briefing the learned gentlemen against us. But we do, I hope and believe, stand face to face with a judge and jury who have not only fairness and patience to hear the arguments we have to offer them, but who would all dismiss any sort of prejudice that might be sought to be imported into this inquiry. I wondered at the learned Solicitor-General introducing a topic such as the Christian religion into his address here, and I pass without reply the words so used. If this work is to be considered obscene because it is cheap, what becomes of "Chambers's Encyclopædia" and other works issued in numbers, which publish descriptions and illustrations of the generative organs. Now, I put it that the fact that some one else may make an ill-use of this work is, as my co-defendant put it to you, a matter to be entirely dismissed from your mind; that a work on toxicology is not indictable simply because some one may learn how to practise from it a mischief to the community by taking life with poison. The Recorder, in his charge to the grand jury, who have sent us before you, said that a medical work, though indecent, published for medical students in a medical lecture-room, would not be indictable, but that, circulated widely, it would become so. I submit that if the book be indictable in itself it is indictable wherever published, and that if not so indictable, the increase in its publication cannot create it an offence. The Solicitor-General said that we contended for the right to expose the human frame in public, and he gave another illustration not so pleasant to the ears. We make no such contention. There is a distinction that is admitted with regard to acts which are a nuisance and annoyance to others; a distinction recognised in this country, and, I may say, recognised in every civilized country. I reply that the exposure of the naked human form is criminal.

The Lord Chief Justice: I suppose you would admit that an illustration of the human form in all its details in natural size placarded about the streets would be an offence?

Mr. Bradlaugh: Oh, yes, my lord.

The Lord Chief Justice: It is not the subject in itself that is indictable.

Mr. Bradlaugh: I only say that exposing the human

form in all its details, in any size, to the annoyance of the public, is a fair matter to be dealt with and punished by the law. I am not here to start false arguments or to contend for absurd positions.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: Go further than that. If a man took it into his head that the exposure of such a matter would tend to the profit of the State, if he went to such an extent, he must take the consequences.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Which ought to be "Colney Hatch," my lord. (Laughter.)

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: I should think so.

At this stage of the proceedings the Court rose.

THIRD DAY.

LORD CHIEF JUSTICE COCKBURN took his seat at 10.30 A.M., and the Court was again densely crowded. Mr. Bradlaugh immediately rose to resume his defence.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: There is, in the extremely accurate report in the *Times*, a comment, my lord, which makes me fear that I failed to convey quite the explanation I intended to put to your lordship on Montagu Cookson's paper in the *Fortnightly Review*. I intended to put to your lordship what Mr. Cookson, in a private letter to myself, had expressed: that the restraint after marriage, upon which he relied, was a restraint in association at certain periods before and after the menstrual period of the woman; but there is nothing whatever in the article of Mr. Cookson which in any fashion limits his explanation and the language, as reported in the *Times* seems to convey the notion of restraint in the sense of a sort of celibacy after marriage. The language of Mr. Cookson's article is entirely at variance with that construction, and I hope your lordship will pardon me putting that before you, as I wanted to make quite clear my view so as not to misrepresent Mr. Cookson, or, on the other hand, to injure my cause. There is one other point—the letter sent to the *Times*——

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: We really cannot go into that.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Very well; I will only ask that nothing that appears in connection with the reports may be taken as militating in any fashion against what is put here in this case. Now, my lord, I submit that the intention to break the law by publishing obscene matter is governed in this way. I will use your lordship's own words, in the case of the Queen *v.* Hickling—words which, if it were not impertinent, I should say that I urge in the strongest fashion—"Where a man publishes a work manifestly obscene, he must be taken to have had the intention——"

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: Equally so, if he publishes a book manifestly immoral. Is it desirable to discuss this

legal question? I must remind you that you are addressing the jury, not me.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Well, my lord, I will pass away from that entirely, and I will put to your lordship, and to the jury, a series of propositions on which I shall ask their consideration, and the answer to which will govern the verdict which you will give in this case. The first proposition I shall submit is one that has already been more than proved to you, that the essay indicted is an essay on the population question, and I submit next, under my lord's correction, that the question is one lawful to be discussed. I submit next that it has been amply shown to you, and could be proved over and over again, that over-population is a fruitful source of poverty, ignorance, crime, vice, and misery; that therefore the advocacy of prudential checks to population is not merely lawful, but is highly moral. That the prudential checks are all birth-restricting checks. That birth-restricting checks are by delays of marriage or by restraint after marriage. That late marriages and celibacy or general abstinence after marriage involve horrible diseases and crimes, and perpetuate prostitution. I had, when I framed that last proposition, in thinking of the best way of putting it to the jury distinctly — I had simply put it that late marriages and celibacy involve horrible diseases and crimes, and perpetuate prostitution. But when I found that there seemed to be a possible contention that it might be lawful to advocate that which was equivalent to absolute celibacy, so far as all sort of consummation after marriage was concerned, after going through the marriage ceremony; that proposition seemed to me to involve all the terrible consequences of ordinary celibacy, both to the man and the woman, with the addition that there would in that case be the provocative excitement of association, and the worse disease arising from a denial of it, if you can suppose such a denial possible amongst people of the poorer classes, from whom the great mass of the population spring. That early marriages involve the advocacy of restraint of, and intelligent gratification of, the reproductive functions. I submit that if you are dealing with the question of population, having admitted the law of population, and the doctrine of early marriages that then you must admit the right and duty to advocate restraint; if you hold that doctrine of celibacy

is attended with disease and crime, and perpetuates prostitution, then you must also advocate the intelligent gratification of the reproductive functions. That restraint after marriage must be of two kinds: one, the abstinence from cohabitation which has been advocated by many doctors, who contend that during certain periods, *i.e.*, within a certain time before or after the menstrual period, conception is either impossible, or, at any rate, difficult. Against that you have the fact that a well-known people, by their ceremonial laws, are prohibited from sexual intercourse during the period indicated, and notwithstanding that they are notoriously a most prolific people, so that I submit that the restraint after marriage must mean the intelligent gratification of the functions, so that the act shall not involve bringing into life a child whom the parents are unable to support. I submit that advocacy of such a restraint has never been declared unlawful, my lord, and that it is not unlawful, and I submit that advocacy of such a restraint does not tend to deprave and corrupt the public mind, but tends to promote and to increase the morality of the people. I submit further, that the worst evil that could happen, supposing the acceptance of this doctrine, is that unmarried people might cohabit without having children, and that this is not an evil for which we should be held criminally responsible, as the pamphlet urges and insists on marriage in such terms as demonstrates that the insistment is not a colourable pretence; and here I repeat, with all the force that any earnestness can add to the eloquent repudiation by my co-defendant of any consciousness on our part of any colourable pretence by Charles Knowlton, that there was no evidence even tendered of any such consciousness. I say, except the unsupported inuendo of the Solicitor-General, required by the exigencies of his brief, there is not a paragraph from one end of this pamphlet to the other to warrant the supposition that it is directed against marriage; and I say that, in point of fact, at the present time unmarried people do cohabit and have children, and that there are serious consequences flowing from it—consequences so serious that, to use the words of Dr. Lankester, now dead, quoted from the *Journal of Public Health* in 1868, by my co-defendant in her speech—he said that there were in London in that year 16,000 women who had murdered their offspring. I say that at the very worst this pamphlet might have prevented the repetition of

these 16,000 murders annually. I submit to you, gentlemen of the jury, that it is moral to teach poor people to marry early, and that this teaching avoids and will diminish illicit intercourse. I will not weary you with reading the whole of the report on the "Employment of Women and Children in Agriculture," from which my co-defendant quoted that terrible extract from the report of Bishop Fraser. You will there find that the illicit intercourse which we are charged with trying to produce is an illicit intercourse which is going on and bringing with it the birth of the child, and bringing with it the murder of the child by the mother, because there is the pang of starvation and misery and shame to contend with. I say that it is amongst the poor married people that the evils of over-population are chiefly felt, and that it cannot tend to deprave their morals to teach them how to intelligently check this over-population; and I submit, and I ask your gravest attention to this submission, because if you decide it in my favour it will, without anything else, determine your verdict in this case—that the advocacy of all checks is lawful except such as advocate the destruction of the fœtus after conception or of the child after birth. I say that the advocacy of every birth-restricting check is lawful which is not the advocacy of the destruction of human life in any form after that life has been created. Now, gentlemen, if you should decide that in my favour there is an entire end of the whole case; and I submit to your lordship, and to you, gentlemen of the jury, with whom the arbitrament under his lordship's direction rests, and in whose hands our future is placed, that that is a proposition on which we are entitled to ask an affirmative answer at your hands. The proposition is not very long; permit me to repeat it to you again, because it governs the whole of the case I am going to submit to you: That the advocacy of all checks to over-population is lawful except such as advocate the destruction of the fœtus after conception or of the child after birth. I admit in the fullest sense that any advocacy of the destruction of human life is not simply illegal under statute, is not simply illegal under common law, but is illegal under that moral law which obtains wherever there is an intelligent appreciation of what morality should be. That is, such advocacy is moral because it tends to the greatest happiness of the greatest number with the least injury to any. I say that the advocacy of any checks amongst the masses to be useful must of necessity be put in the plainest

language and in the cheapest form, and be widely spread; and I press that upon you because I understand that the learned Solicitor-General in his argument put it that one of the faults of this pamphlet was that it was not obscured in learned language. If we possessed the facility of expressing ourselves in French, or Italian, or Greek, or Latin, or Hebrew, or Arabic, what earthly use would that be to the poor unfortunate wretches whose misery we want to redress? It was objected over and over again, as my co-defendant reminded you, that there seemed to be some crime in the price of the book being sixpence, which made it specially objectionable. But if you take the fact, as fact it is, that in the whole of the counties of Northumberland and Durham, while I speak, the best paid class of hewers of coal are not now averaging much more than £1 per week; take that for a man and his wife and three children only. But suppose him to have five. The Pauper Unions allow 4s. 6d. per week, and sometimes a little more, for boarding out a pauper child. Suppose the coalhewer has a family of five, six, or seven—do the multiplication for yourselves, and leave nothing for luxury or dissipation on the part of the bread winner—I ask what means has he of purchasing the expensive treatises from which I shall quote? If it be right to advocate such checks —and that is why I say that on the decision of this question depend all the other propositions—it must be in language which shall be intelligible to the people whom you want to reach, and at a price at which they can buy it. It must be widely spread, for it is not to the few, but to the many, that the misery comes of crowding—from the many births of the poor—the crowding of people, jostling each other out of life in the search for employment, and the crowding into narrow dwellings, where disease, vice, squalor, and misery attend them. And it must be plainly put, because they are ignorant—very ignorant, because they are poor. They are ignorant because the misfortune of their life has made them so. They have to rise early, and work till they are tired, and then some of you who have opportunities for culture and recreation to which you can turn with intelligent pleasure, you may ask me why some of these men go to the beer-house, or waste their money in the gin-palace? But if your homes were wretched and miserable; if you were crowded as I have seen hundreds and thousands of men and women crowded in different parts of the country—three, four, five, or six in one room, something like that described in Bishop

Fraser's report. Let us take the case of a miner, for example, who has gone down into the mine at four o'clock in the morning and works there till eleven, as they do, in a temperature higher than your Turkish bath in Jermyn Street. He has come out, clogged at every part of the skin with coal-dust and dirt. His home—we will suppose it is a hot day like this—is dirty, the floor is dirty, the drainage of the village is bad, there are a few pit cottages together, and the refuse and filth is in front and behind. Do you wonder that he runs to the public-house, driven away by the misery of the home, and yet you tell me that it is immoral to try to do something to prevent the crowding of these little mouths, that by their hungry needs drive away everything like comfort from the home. If you give a verdict against us it should be with grave consideration as to whether the course we are taking is moral or immoral. And then I admit that such advice is liable to be misused by the criminal classes. I have in memory one of Chambers' Encyclopædias of "Useful Information for the People," in which, dealing with the human frame, the writer points out where it might be extremely easy to destroy life. Unquestionably that passing into the hands of many persons for three-halfpence would enable them to commit murder, but this pamphlet, passing into the hands of hundreds of thousands would enable them to avoid calamities which result in disease and death. Such hypothetical or possible misuse cannot make the ground for an indictment for misdemeanour. To say that some time or other such people may do something we have not recommended under circumstances we have not contemplated, cannot make a ground for indicting us here. I now submit that it is impossible to advocate sexual restraint after marriage amongst the poor without such medical or physiological instructions as may enable them to comprehend the advocacy and utilise it. Of what use is it to take a man or woman, totally uneducated, and to tell them their duty, unless you show them how to perform it. The telegraph is an admirable means of communicating from one country to another: but suppose you took a labourer or his wife into the operating room and showed them the apparatus for working the electric machine; they could not comprehend it, to them it would be useless; you must give them the information which would enable them to turn it to account. If it is right to advocate checks on population, it cannot be wrong to teach the poor how to apply such

checks. I now submit the next question, and I shall use the words of Justice Mellor, in the case of the "Queen against Hicklin." Does this pamphlet, in such physiological details, go beyond what is necessary or legitimate? I reduce it into four propositions: one, that over-population is a cause of immorality, and that which hinders over-population hinders immorality, and, therefore, its advocacy cannot be with intent to corrupt and deprave. I submit upon that, that to restrain the population after marriage necessitates giving to the poor and to the ignorant, from whom the bulk of the population springs, the information which shall enable them to comprehend and utilise these propositions. I submit to you that in this pamphlet there is not a single word which is unnecessary or which is illegitimate, or which goes beyond what is absolutely necessary for instructing the poor and ignorant. I hope I shall succeed in establishing that, and if I do so I shall with confidence ask a verdict at your hands. I am sorry to say that I have a very wearisome task before me, which will not only be wearisome to myself but which, I am afraid, must necessarily be wearisome to you. For I have got to go through the whole of this pamphlet, except the portions gone through by my co-defendant, not one of which I shall touch; and I shall have to make out to you, and I believe I shall succeed in doing so, that there is not a solitary syllable on which the Solicitor-General can put his hands which is not chastely, carefully written, and painstakingly put, in the view of avoiding any sort of morbid excitement, any sort of improper allurement or enticement; and if, during this speech, I shall be occasionally using words which may seem to you better avoided, I will beg you to think that I feel to the fullest the responsibility resting upon me, and that I will try to use no word that is unnecessary in submitting to you the proposition that in this pamphlet there is not a word, so far as the sexual details are concerned, which may not be found in works of the highest class. I shall take work by work; I don't know whether, my lord, you would like to have them as I quote from each work. I have the publisher of each book present in court. I shall ask you, gentlemen, having your books before you, to mark upon the copies of your pamphlets the passages to which I shall draw your attention. The work from which I am now about to quote is "The Functions and Disorders of the Reproductive Organs in Childhood, Youth, Adult Age, and Advanced Life, considered in their

Physiological, Social, and Moral Relations, by William Acton." This was published by Messrs. Churchill, the eminent publishers of New Burlington Street, and has gone through a large number of editions. I will refer you first to page 8 of the Knowlton pamphlet. You will remember that my co-defendant left unread the last paragraph on that page. I will now quote from Acton. He speaks of young men "who have arrived at puberty and whose innocence has been preserved from unfortunate initiation. Their disposition becomes sour, impatient, and sad. They fall into a state of melancholy." (Mr. Bradlaugh here read pages 28, 29, 30, 31, and 32 of Mr. Acton's book.) He then goes on to describe in the strongest language the evils that result from a life of celibacy, and then referring to the last paragraph on the page, I bring you to the part which one has some little difficulty in dealing with, in Acton's own words, which are so much stronger and so very much more terrible than anything which occurs in this Knowlton pamphlet, where he describes the disease dealt with by Knowlton, where he describes the exaggeration of the fears of the person and of his sufferings when his feelings are played upon by improper people, and, where he puts it just as Knowlton puts it, and in precisely the same fashion, except that Knowlton is careful and chaste in the extreme in the language he uses. And then, dealing still with the same subject, he speaks of the necessity for giving instructions on this to boys. I am quoting now from the thirteenth page of Acton. He says—"I have been often urged by parents and schoolmasters to draw up a plan which might be of service in teaching them properly to address children, as well as boys." (Mr. Bradlaugh read, at length, from pages 14 and 15 of Acton's work and also from page 136.) And on pages 65 and 73 and thence to page 80 Dr. Acton deals with some of the terrible evils arising from celibacy in language which I find it difficult here to go right through to you, but respecting which I am placed in the greater difficulty that at some other period in the case I may be told that I had no right to call witnesses to prove this publication or to put it into your hands so that you may read it for yourselves. Acton in some eight or nine pages, from 65 to 73, deals with the whole of the points on pages 8 and 9 of Knowlton, and also with the whole of the points on pages 44 and 45, and I urge to you that the language of Knowlton's summary on this sad topic, if judged by Acton,

is as careful, as chaste, as thoughtful, and as delicate as it is possible for language to be. I come next to page 12 of the Knowlton pamphlet, because there seems to be some suggestion that the first five lines of the Knowlton pamphlet were specially indelicate, and on that I will refer you to pages 115 to 138 of Acton. There the language of Acton is just as precise, except that it is more full, so that, to use the words of Alderman Figgins, into whose hands I put the book when pleading before this case was committed for trial, it would seem as if Acton had taken his words, not as Alderman Figgins said, from Knowlton—it was impossible that Knowlton could have taken from Acton, because Knowlton published 30 years before Acton—but that both must have taken from some common source, which source I believe I have discovered through the aid of Mr. Bohn and which is a work now in the library of the British Museum. Curiously in the works of Acton, Carpenter, Kirke, and Churchill, it is evident that they have all taken, along with Knowlton, from some common and unacknowledged source. The description is however much stronger in Acton, the difference being that Acton had to write for boys and men, whilst I am urging to you that Knowlton wrote a work for women. Acton is more special in his references to the male organs than is Knowlton. Knowlton limits himself entirely to a description of the reproductive organs in the woman, giving only the most general of references to the functions of man, because it was not necessary to his object. Now, it may be said, and in fact it was said by the counsel for the prosecution before the magistrate: "Oh! but Acton's book is a book simply meant to be limited to medical students," or, to use the words of the learned Solicitor-General, only by those in some medical college, or medical school. But on the contrary, in page 21 of Acton—and I may tell you, gentlemen of the jury, that I have furnished more than six weeks ago a list of all the books to which I shall have to refer to the prosecution; and in the case of this book and the two next to which I shall refer, I have given this to them with the references all carefully marked for comparison with the comparison passage in Knowlton; so much do I rely on the strength of my case—Acton says that he means this book to be circulated. He says:—"I would not have that exotic virtue which is kept from the chill blast." And he urges the necessity for instructing the young on sexual questions for the purpose of

avoiding immorality. Now, the learned Solicitor-General talked of the extreme minuteness with which the female organs were described, and to the mind of the learned Solicitor-General that seemed to convey an absolute proof that the book was written for the purpose of depraving and corrupting the public mind. And as the learned Solicitor-General has had Acton's book, or, at least, those who instruct him have had it, and he knows from my own written notices that it is one of those on which I rely, he has doubtless read the paragraph from which, in his presence, I will now read to you, as being the completest answer to his allegation these lines: (Mr. Bradlaugh then read from Dr. Acton, pp. 114 and 115). He goes on to say that he deals with these things not for the purpose of depraving and corrupting the public mind, but because he considers it is necessary to point them out for the purpose of avoiding evil habits and for the cure of disease, against which his book is directed. I am obliged to press that upon you, because this minute particularity was specially alleged as an illustration of what I think the learned Solicitor-General called the "abominable filth" to be found in Knowlton's book. Well, the book is published by Churchill. It has been said that two blacks do not make one white, and I do not want to urge that plea. I urge that neither book is a book which ought to be attacked under the law. I urge that impurity is not to be found either in Acton or in our book, and that both are written for the purpose of promoting morality, and not for the purpose of depraving morals; but having to deal with the sexual functions, you are obliged to use the words which will indicate them for the purpose of making the instruction clear. I will now refer you to page 16, which is one of the incriminated portions of the pamphlet, and I will call your attention to page 142 of Acton, the page furnished to the prosecution six weeks ago, and which they have had the fullest opportunity of considering. I must read this language because it gives you the means of judging of how far in these five lines which I shall ask you to mark, how far they have been distorted by the prosecution, and used in an improper and unfair way. (Mr. Bradlaugh then read from Acton, page 142, and commented on the character and effect of the illustrations used by Acton.) If you take the words of Knowlton and the words of Acton and compare them, I cannot understand how any man could have thought it necessary to lodge an indictment against the former,

knowing that it was impossible, under ordinary circumstances, for poor women to get the necessary knowledge before it was too late, and to avert the misery which was certain to ensue if they were allowed to remain in ignorance, and that the author had made his language as chaste as it was possible for anyone to make it. I will take you now to the analysis on page 16, which has also been urged as part of the immorality. I think of the words of the learned Solicitor-General, "the enormous filth of this book," and here you find that only a few of the baldest lines are given: a few lines in a pamphlet which the Solicitor-General himself had the justice to say had not the faintest semblance of vulgarity, while Acton is not only full in his details, but actually gives printed figures to illustrate his meaning. The Solicitor-General may say "it is published for medical students," but it is advertised and described in Messrs. Churchill's catalogue, and anybody may buy it for himself across the counter, or he may get it by sending postage stamps. And Messrs. Churchill have not been slow to utilise this prosecution, by sending out circulars specially referring to one of these works used by me, in order to increase the sale. I do not complain of that, because I believe the books are useful and instructive publications and intended to promote public morality. But I say it is a horrible thing to put us in danger of imprisonment for giving that information to the poor, which may with impunity be given to the rich. I now take you to page 17 of the Knowlton Pamphlet, to which I will draw your attention. Not only does Acton (177 to 184) say all that Knowlton says, but he gives plates in order to describe the subject, so that there should be no mistake about it. If you hold up the one against the other, the book of Acton far out-Herods Herod, as against that of Knowlton. As I may not have another opportunity of having the learned Solicitor-General to listen to what I say, I will draw his attention to a book circulated by the Government of which he has the honour to be the legal adviser. Acton, I say, is purity itself compared with the books that have been issued for girls' schools by the Government, in the schools at Kensington and the schools under the Science and Art Department, wherein are used the works of Carpenter and of Kirke with plates larger than these, with descriptions fuller than these, with an analysis more complete than these. I say that when a description far much more voluptuous than anything in Knowlton is put into the hands of girls by order of the Government

of which he is the legal adviser, how can he say that that is filth in my case which ten thousand times magnified becomes chaste instruction in theirs? Still keeping you on the same page 17, you will find a subject discussed, which you see carefully stated in Knowlton, discreetly stated in Knowlton, and which you also find stated in Acton, page 180, I do not say without care and discretion, but comparatively stated with an enormous deal of fulness. You will also find the same thing, as I shall show you presently, in the work of Kirke, which is circulated in boys' schools and girls' schools, and also in this work of Carpenter, which, as shown by the certificate in it, was given away as a prize at Greenwich by Sir John Lubbock, Bart., M.P.; and the Right Hon. the Recorder of the City of London, who charged the jury against me, has given away, as a prize, the very book I have in my hand, Carpenter's "Human Physiology." I say that, compared with these works, the details in Knowlton which have been quoted, are chaste and delicate, and are the most carefully-made summary that it is possible for a man to write who wanted to tell the people as much as he could in short compass, so as to give them sufficient information for the purpose. Still keeping on the same page of the pamphlet, I bring you down now to the part treating on the changes at puberty. On that, I may refer you to the language, which I shall read to you from Acton, page 25. Now, while the language in Knowlton is very quiet, you will find, when we come to deal with Kirke and Carpenter, that if the language were intended—which going into the hands of boys and girls of the Science and Art Department, I do not believe it is—to have the effect of depraving the morals, it certainly might be supposed to have that effect from glowing descriptions of the comely figure of the opposite sex, and the attractions which the changes after puberty produce. These are omitted by Knowlton, because it is no part of his business to give such exciting descriptions. He merely wants to give the information which shall prevent men and women being surrounded by a large number of starving children. If the "filth," the "allurements," are to be found in the prize books issued by the Government, the representative of which is pleading for your verdict against me here, they are not to be found in my pamphlet. I ask you to look at the dry way in which in the line and a half Knowlton states the fact which is necessary, and the fuller way in which you have it here, occupying considerable space. Do not under-

stand me as putting any sort of insinuation upon Acton, who wrote that he meant his book to go into schools, and who is now dead; do not let me be supposed to insinuate either that he would think he was writing a work that was filthy, or that he would imagine any one else would think it was filthy. I doubt myself whether, apart from the atmosphere of a law court where it was necessary to win a verdict, the calmer judgment of the Solicitor-General would not feel that the word was unfairly used against a book which he himself describes as entirely free from the faintest trace of vulgarity. How the two ideas can coincide in the learned Solicitor-General's mind is, to me, a problem that I am unable to solve, not having had that high legal training which enables me to misunderstand the case of my antagonist when it is necessary I should do so in order to misrepresent him. You will find that Acton says in page 4, that this point of which he speaks and which the learned Solicitor-General describes as being part of the filth "Ought to be explained to the youngest child." He says, "We must recollect that the child has never been taught." And that which Dr. Acton thought ought to be explained to the youngest child in schools, the learned Solicitor-General coming here, asks you to correct me for circulating, at the same time having himself been a law officer of the Government which does send that kind of instruction into the schools—which not only does that, but in its syllabus on "animal physiology," says to the children: "You are to be examined on the subject of reproduction, and are to give answers to 'the structure of the ovum and of the spermatozoon. The process of yelk division. The formation of the blastoderm and the development therefrom of the body of the embryo, with amnion, allantois, and yelk sac. The nature of the chorion, of the decidua, and of the placenta. The mode in which the fœtus is nourished. The development of the heart and the fœtal circulation. The changes in the circulation which take place at birth. The lacteal glands and lactation. The modifications in the proportions of the body from birth to adult age.'" And now I will ask the learned Solicitor-General, how are children in these schools to explain what these things mean, without much more complete instruction and full detail than even Knowlton can give? Carpenter gives the detail, Kirke gives it, Chavasse gives it, Marion Sims gives it, Graily Hewitt gives it, Kennet gives it, and a large number of other writers give

it to you, and how are you to examine children at all without giving them this knowledge? You are to discuss and be prepared to answer, on the process of yelk division, the nature of the ovum and the placenta, the mode in which the fœtus is nourished, the development of the fœtal germs, &c., and how are your boys and girls to do that in your schools unless you give them this knowledge? This is a syllabus for your science and art schools, issued by the Government, and prepared for their instruction, and they are referred for that instruction to the works of Carpenter, and to the works of Kirke, the works on which I am going to rely to make out more fully that which I am dealing with here. You come next, still on the same page 17, and if you, gentlemen of the jury, do not think it too much trouble to mark the pages as I go on, I will undertake not to leave you a single word by the time I have finished my speech which is not marked with a black line, as corroborated from these authors at least half a dozen times over, and that out of the very books authorized by the Government and circulated and put into the hands of the boys and girls whom the learned Solicitor-General deplored anything of this kind reaching. You will find a description given which is under the last sentence. I read to you of the effect of impotency upon certain classes of people, and I can read to you the words of Acton, of page 120 in his book, which you can compare with the words of Knowlton which you have in your hands, remembering that the prosecution have had all these books in their hands for comparison for six weeks. I ask you whether you are to imagine that Dr. Acton—and it is not of him alone: I take him because I do not think that even a Solicitor-General ever urged anything against his morality—this book has been circulated widely by Messrs. Churchill, who have the character in London of being amongst publishers *par excellence* the head of the branch of the business they pursue. I put it to you, whether indicted at common law, and measuring common law as common usage, whether you will find that to be depraving and corrupting in Knowlton, when published by me, and at the same time find it to be neither depraving nor corrupting in Acton, when published by Churchill? And the Solicitor-General cannot shelter himself by saying that it is a medical work only intended for medical students, for Acton himself says his book is intended for young people; that its knowledge may, if possible, prevent evils which if not prevented in youth can never be remedied

in after age, evils which Knowlton tries in very, very chastest language to put to the poor and the rough with whom he has to come in contact, and which evils he tries to warn them against and prevent; yet the learned Solicitor-General says that this is a book issued to deprave and corrupt the public mind, and that, in the words of the indictment, it is an indecent, a lewd, and a bawdy book. These, gentlemen of the jury, are some of the adjectives which are piled on me, and of which you are asked to find me here guilty. I will now, if you please, take you for one moment, still on the same page, to a reference at the very end of the last paragraph; I may refer to the end of the complete paragraph before it, because, if I understand the Solicitor-General's argument at all, and I am not quite sure that I always did, I find him there putting it to you as a sort of evidence of the immorality of this book, for he refers to the delight which might happen in the gratification of the sexual passions. Compare what Acton says (page 154) with the quiet, chaste description in Knowlton, and then, gentlemen, I ask you can you tell me that this book treating on the same subject has been issued for the purpose of depraving and corrupting the public mind—whether the learned Solicitor-General made a mistake and only read the works of the different doctors instead of the pamphlet he was charged to prosecute? Whether he read Carpenter's "Physiology," now issued to children under his own authority, instead of my pamphlet, in order to find a strong description for it, I do not know; but I will appeal to you, step by step, whether such condemnation is possible here. Now, gentlemen, I will bring you to page 18 of the Knowlton pamphlet, and ask you to take your pencils and then listen to Acton, pages 96 and 97. I will ask you to bear those words in mind when people are talking to you of celibacy, or of restraint after marriage without cohabitation. And the learned Solicitor-General thinks this ignorance, which Knowlton and Acton both deplore, ought to be allowed to continue. At any rate the learned Solicitor-General thinks that the education should not be given to poor people at a cheap price. He would have it limited to circles where they would be unable to get it, sold at a price at which they cannot purchase it. They are to suffer in misery—they are to feel the pain of their diseases, they are to know nothing of the possible remedies; they,

with their 13s. or 14s. a week, are to consult a physician to whom they are unable to pay the guinea fee, and whom from their agricultural parish they are unable to reach. Gentlemen of the jury, I trust your verdict will be a deliverance from the perpetuation of such a state of misery as this. Now, then, at page 20 of the Knowlton pamphlet, and I take you to the bottom of the last complete paragraph on transmitted peculiarities; I will ask you whether Knowlton has not, in two lines and a half, a quiet, delicately worded summary of those facts which Acton considers it necessary to teach. On page 22 of the Knowlton pamphlet your attention is called to the paragraph beginning "In relation to these objections;" and to page 24, where Knowlton speaks of the same subject, Acton writes of it in a far fuller manner (pages 90, 91, 142, 149, 150, and 157). Take and compare then pages 22 and 24 of Knowlton with those of Acton, remembering the words of the learned Solicitor-General, "That the sexual act was described with a minuteness and particularity that could only have been done for the purpose of corrupting and depraving the public morals." I cannot understand how it is that the learned Solicitor-General can have said this, when he had reference to all these books from which I am quoting six weeks ago. Why, I have done what I suppose no other defendant in a criminal prosecution ever did. I have furnished to the prosecution a list of the whole of the books (no sort of compulsion being on me to do so, I might have hidden my case from them as much as I could, and as they have hidden their case from me); but, to put it frankly, I did hope that common sense and common decency would have prevented even a Solicitor-General from having attributed to me that which, having fairly shown to be applicable only to others, he ought to have known should not have been attributed to me at all. Carpenter's work is a book which the learned Solicitor-General's Government puts in the hands of children! Listen, and then compare this to the words given by Knowlton on page 22. (Extract read from Carpenter as given in Acton, page 24). Now, compare that with the three or four lines of Knowlton, and tell me whether Knowlton is not chaste and delicate beside this book, which is put into the hands of girls and boys by the Government, which is represented here by the learned Solicitor-General as one of its law officers. I ask you how can you convict me with this directory of the Science and Art Department of the Com-

mittee of the Council of Education before you, telling the children, on pages 134 and 135, that this Carpenter's "Human Physiology" is a book in which they are to be examined for honours, and which they are expected to know all about. It is simply monstrous to put the words of that indictment to me at all—it is monstrous to tell me that Knowlton is "filth," that he states the act with minute particularity, when, gentlemen, if I do not succeed in winning your assent I shall have to show you in works—in other works by the highest medical men—medical men whom I would rather call to tell their own story, but that I am afraid, my lord, would feel it his duty to rule that such evidence could not be put in, and I am reluctantly striving to make myself my own witness at the risk, I am afraid, sometimes of sorely wearying you. But, if I do not give these statements now, I probably never can give them at all, and I am bound to cover every line of this pamphlet, which can only have been attacked in the manner it has been by a person knowing nothing about medicine or, having the knowledge, wilfully twisting it for the purpose of injuring someone. Here is Carpenter's "Manual of Physiology," published by Churchill, and also Kirke's "Handbook of Physiology," published by James Murray. These are the books which are put in the hands of girls—are given to them as prizes and as books in which they are to be examined. I do not want to use words for which my lord might rebuke me. I do not want to use one wrong phrase, but I am pleading here for my liberty. I am pleading for my future. I am pleading for my reputation. It is not pleasant to be indicted as the utterer of an obscene book. From a charge of theft those who know you will acquit you; from a charge of murder, even, it must be proved ere odium attaches; but the charge of obscenity is one of those sort of charges which is so difficult to deal with. The very wording of the charge casts a shadow. There is mud enough left on the garment however much you may wash it; after filth has been so freely thrown some of it is sure to stick—some one is sure to see the stain of it; some of those who have always malice to see these things kin to their lesser selves. On page 22, of Knowlton, you find in four lines an attempt to state the subject of satyriasis as chastely as possible, with nothing that could be offensive, without anything which could shock any well-regulated mind, or go in any sense beyond the instruc-

tion intended to give ; you find here that which Dr. Acton, I will not suggest unwisely, thought it necessary to state with a degree of fulness, which—while I may not use the words of the learned Solicitor General, "it gives me pain to repeat"—I will say it gives me pain to know that there are such terrible diseases to be dealt with, but most of all to know they prevail from ignorance and from misunderstanding of physical laws. I shall be within the correction of my lord, who has travelled many assizes, and I appeal to him whether there are not, at nearly every agricultural assize, cases which the press wisely refrains from reporting, crimes which though existing, English language hesitates to characterize ; whether they do not come before him, arising from this very satyriasis among the poorer classes of wretched, ill-fed, ignorant people, who if they had been instructed earlier in their lives and wisely trained, would have been probably saved from such a distortment of their nature. (After full comparison of pages 22 and 23 of Knowlton and page 157 of Action, Mr. Bradlaugh went through pages 25 and 27, and then said—Now I go to page 35 upon which the learned Solicitor-General expended a very large amount of denunciation, and the denunciation was then coupled with the word "cayenne." I have heard Frenchmen denounce Cayenne, because it is a criminal colony to which some of the political convicts are transported, but I hear for the first time in this court that the suggestion that cayenne as a possible remedy or a possible alleviation in some cases of disease can be associated with obscenity and denounced as filthy; and if I fail to answer the learned Solicitor-General on that point, it will only be because I utterly fail to comprehend what he meant when he was putting it to you. There is a still stronger remedy on the same page, that of cantharides, and if you will look at page 132 of Acton—and I shall substantiate this over and over again from the works of other physicians —I shall show you the same thing, as to cantharides and cayenne ; indeed, there is not a single prescription in this book of Knowlton's which is not over and over again g ven in all the authorities which I have before me—given with full language as to the diseases, and full details as to the remedies. Does cayenne become obscene put into a pamphlet and published at sixpence? and is it all right when advocated in a medical book published at thirty shillings or two guineas? Oh, gentlemen, I cannot believe you will stultify yourselves in any such fashion. Whether the Solicitor-

General's experience in criminal cases ever included cayenne in any fashion which might convey to him any idea of an obscene kind, I do not know, and I should not have dreamed of trying to answer it, had I not heard it put in a fashion which was to me utterly inexplicable, as part of the ground of the indictment against me. The same things I say as to the remedies on page 35 will apply as to the remedies on page 37. You will find Acton, over and over again, and at great length, showing the effect of study and excess. This chapter as to sterility has been so much spoken on that I must still ask leave to use a little more of Acton's own words, only regretting that the learned counsel for the prosecution did not think it right to state at least some things which he knew might have fairly been said for the defence. I probably have utterly miscomprehended English jurisprudence. I had known that in civil cases, that it was not considered sometimes unfair to leave the advocate for the defence to make out his case, but I had thought that in a criminal case, the second legal leader in England, matched against a man and a woman, with the knowledge before him put into the hands of his clients for six weeks before the commencement of the trial and actually furnished to them by the defendants—I had thought that there was some pressure of honour upon him to put to you in pleading to you for your verdict against us, at least, a little of what we contended for on our side. It was hardly fair to take this chapter, and this was the one that had so "pained" him—it was hardly fair to do that without saying (in justice to the defendants) that they had furnished him with the whole number of books showing the identity of the Knowlton pamphlet with what medical and English doctors of the highest repute had written. You will remember the Solicitor-General's words, "American doctors"—"perhaps some English doctors"—"God forbid"—were the words of the Solicitor-General, "that there should be any writing—such things." If he did not know that we were going to read these authorities it was only because the solicitors who instructed him did not perform their duty—nd I will not do the solicitor to the city the injustice to think that he did not furnish to the Solicitor-General all the detailed references I had written to him, and given him, with every page carefully marked six weeks ago; the learned counsel appeared before the magistrates against me, with some of my references in their hands. And I ask you,

is it fair for the Solicitor-General to trust to our want of ability, or to our want of memory, to make good our case in important details of the kind? You, gentlemen of the jury, as my lord has well said, you are sitting there as arbiters in this case. It is you I have to convince, and from you I have to win a verdict, and is it fair that the learned Solicitor-General should have left out the whole of these facts, which he must have known if he had been properly instructed? At any rate, I know the junior counsel knew it, because I myself saw in their hands on the last occasion of appearing before the magistrate my analysis of Acton, furnished them by myself. I do not think that that suppression is quite right. I can scarcely deem it quite honourable. I quite admit that the learned Solicitor-General is fully occupied by questions to him much more important than the simple one of whether I shall go to jail or not; he has his Parliamentary duties to occupy his time, he has his other important and profitable engagements, but I do not think he should have come here and suppressed and kept hidden from you these matters of our defence which have been so carefully furnished to the prosecution; for when I afterwards found that I should have to use one or two books not included in the first list, I wrote to the City Solicitor acquainting him with the fact, and giving them the authorities, so that in no case can myself or my co-defendant be said to be acting otherwise than honourably and openly. We may be wrong, but, at any rate, we have fought fairly. Without wishing to use any words from which my lord would think that I have exceeded the privilege given to a defendant to plead for his own justification, I am bound to repeat that I do not think it was entirely fair to conceal all these things from you. I did give the prosecution clear notice that Kirke and Carpenter were used in schools, that other works to which I have referred you were so used, and yet the harsh language came from the Solicitor-General as if these things had never been heard of in the history of the English people except in the Knowlton pamphlet. Well, now I come to page 36, on sterility. Now I ask you to look at that while I read to you from page 192 of Acton. I might continue them *ad nauseam*. I am in this difficulty: I do not want to read to you to weary you, to prejudice you against me, but I am trying to prove my case. I must read enough to show you how utterly unreliable is all that the learned Solicitor-General has said about

Knowlton's particularity of detail; I ask you, are not these words as completely chaste as it is possible to be, if he is to deal with the question at all? Then, however, on the same page, 36 of Knowlton, treating of premature, and especially solitary gratification, I read to you on that from page 28 to page 31 of Acton, where he goes on at length page after page, and shows the evils, including insanity, which arise from this. Knowlton has dealt with this sad phase in the most quiet way, the most simple way, the briefest way human pen can touch it, and yet the learned Solicitor-General indicts me for publishing obscenity! The same, in order to prevent repetition, may be said in reference to the Knowlton pamphlet, page 44, at the end. I will try as much as possible to prevent repetition, if I can. If you will mark what I mean in that page it will save me again referring to it. But I will ask you, as indeed I think—I am not quite sure, if not in that, at any rate in another part—my co-defendant did ask you, whether the language at the bottom of page 36 is the language of an indecent writer. He speaks of intemperance in the use of spirits, and says, even a "moderate use of spirits, and even tobacco in any form, have some effect. It is a law of the animal economy, that no one part of the system can be stimulated, or excited, without an expense of vitality, as it is termed." I ask, is that the language of a man who wants to make people immoral? He does not teach them to drink and smoke in excess, but rather speaks against both altogether, and the Solicitor-General insults this man—and I stand here in his place, I acquit myself of no responsibility for his words. He has been dead for more than a quarter of a century, and your verdict, though it may touch his memory, cannot touch him. It is myself, and my co-defendant, who are pleading here; I seeking to win your verdict with all the more force, because the advocacy of these views have been mine for so long and hers for so short a time, and she has to pay, with me, the penalty of inculcating what we both believe to be absolutely, and in every sense, the reverse of what the learned Solicitor-General says. The Solicitor-General talked of the colouring; if we wanted to retort, was not the colouring somewhat in the Solicitor-General's speech? You may think that we have done unwisely in trusting our own tongues to reply to the trained ability matched against us; but we have the confidence, whether right or wrong (a confidence which we

still have), that the liberty of the press, in every age of the history of this country, has been conserved by English juries, and my reading, at any rate, has always compelled me to remember that, even in the worst of our times, when Solicitor-Generals' voices had more influence—I will not venture to say that the Solicitor-Generals themselves had a higher ability, although some of the grandest names afterwards known on the bench were amongst those—it has been the jury that has always stood between the prisoner and the power arrayed against him, and has given him a deliverance from an intent which ought never to have been alleged against him at all. Gentlemen, I am inclined to leave Acton, although I have a very large number of other passages marked right through, dealing with the whole of pages 38 to 41, 42, 43 and 44, because I shall only be repeating to you the same kind of language, and if the learned Solicitor-General in his reply should venture to say to you that I did not read these passages because they did not make out my case so strongly, then I will ask you to ask him why it is that, having had from me the paged references to Acton's book entirely in his own hands for so long, he has not stated to you the slightest word about them. There are one or two points which it is absolutely necessary that I should briefly allude to, although I will not read them at any greater length than I can help. One is on page 38, where there is a reference to the exhaustive efforts of sexual gratification, and I am obliged to allude to that because it was one of the parts that the Solicitor-General said that he alluded to with so much "pain." (Mr. Bradlaugh here read from Acton, pages 93, 94, and 95.) Compare that with the language of Knowlton, and then say, gentlemen, is not the language of our pamphlet carefully chaste? and you will remember that the learned Solicitor-General, in his speech, alleged to you that the happy gratification of the reproductive instinct was one of the most alluring, and most calculated to deprave by its indecency. I now will only take you for one moment to page 43, simply because, although I might occupy a very long time still with Acton, I have so many volumes before me that I am myself feeling that I may be transgressing unduly upon your patience. I will take you to the part of page 43, beginning "Begin temperately." Then on pages 104 to 107, Acton says (Mr. Bradlaugh here read a lengthy extract), and Acton goes into the details of a large number of cases to illustrate it. Now, I might occupy much

time with pages 43, 44, and 45, the whole of which is relied in by the Solicitor-General as warranting your indictment here. I might rely on an enormous number of quotations from Acton to cover every word of these pages, but this is the closing paragraph on page 45, to which I must allude, because I understood the learned Solicitor-General to suggest that these words on this were sufficient to warrant you in finding a verdict of guilty of publishing a filthy book to deprave and corrupt the public mind. I will read the words of Knowlton, although they were read by the Solicitor-General. (Mr. Bradlaugh here read slowly the paragraph on p.45.) I avow, gentlemen, that I do not know what impression that made upon your minds, nor do I know either what impression it made on the mind of his lordship, but I avow that it seems to me that the whole of the argument of the learned Solicitor-General was more than amply answered by his own quotation. He has told you that this book for which we are prosecuted is directed against marriage. It is said that where distinct declarations are made regarding unmarried females, filthy and corrupt inuendoes are intended, but in pages 84 and 85 of Acton we have the most distinct declarations of this character, and corroborations in the most precise way of all that is put in Knowlton. I have now, for one single moment, before I take up another book, just to draw your attention to the character of the book I have been quoting. It is a book published by a man who was in his lifetime one who was accredited with the highest medical reputation, a man against whom either in his lifetime or afterwards there was never uttered the slightest suspicion of quackery, nor was such an insinuation ever urged. The person who reads this book will find it to be full of very painful things. I do not know whether my lord will think that I have the right to hand up to the jury such books as I quote from, where these things——

The Lord Chief Justice : No, I think not.

Mr. Bradlaugh : You think not, my lord. That being so, I am prevented from putting in these books, and I am afraid that I shall in consequence, in the duty that lies before me, be obliged reluctantly, for the sake of the argument, to go line by line through the concurrent statements in other books till I have succeeded in impressing you with the defence upon which I have to rely. I am unable to put these books into your hands because——

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: Because they are not evidence.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Just so, my lord, because they are not evidence, and that being the case, I have only the opportunity of reading them to you as part of my speech. But if I could hand you these books, or if I could put the authors of them into the witness-box, I should be able to show you conclusively that the charges made against this Knowlton pamphlet cannot be sustained. What an unfair position, then, am I in—what a position of difficulty compared with that of the Solicitor-General, who might have told you all these things, as well as saying the ill he did of this pamphlet. I do not say this by way of making any complaint, for since I am in this court I am willing to abide by its decision; but I am simply making the remark because the rules of the court prevent me putting before you these works, and I am reduced simply to telling you in the best way I can what they contain. I am sorry to be obliged to weary you, and to detain you from your usual occupations, while I have to go through book by book, of which some parts are as dreary as parts of books can be; and had not the learned Solicitor-General hurled the inuendo at us that we have made a deliberate attempt to corrupt the public morals, it would not be necessary for me to go through this pamphlet line by line to show that its statements are simply chaste abbreviations of those which are put at greater length, and more elaborated in other works written by the highest physicians and openly sold by the most respectable publishers. I only add one word in laying down Acton, if I may be permitted to do so, and that is that as far as my evidence is worth anything, there has never the slightest attack been made upon it, and no charge of obscenity was ever brought against it. The next book I shall refer to, not being able to hand it up, is "Notes on Uterine Surgery," by J. Marion Sims, which is published by the very respectable firm of Messrs. Hardwick and Bogue. Dr. Sims was a graduate of a university, had obtained a large number of very honourable distinctions, and held a very high position in his profession, and although I am not permitted to put this in evidence, I wish you clearly to understand that I am not quoting from some disreputable quack, or from some person who, for his own ends, would write and circulate any kind of obscenity. With this book I shall have to deal, step by step, or at any rate with so much of it as I think will con-

vince you into the belief that there can be no such charge as the obscenity or indecency maintained against Knowlton after hearing what Sims has written, or if you are not convinced of that, I shall not be able to comprehend the effect of evidence, or at any rate I shall wonder that the plainest possible statements that the English language is capable of can produce upon different minds so different results. Let me direct you to a paragraph on page 12 of the Knowlton pamphlet. I trust you will bear with me now; after the clear and explicit declaration of the Lord Chief Justice, that I cannot put in this medical evidence, the necessity that lies upon me in my speech to put fully before you everything which will entitle me to win a verdict at your hands. I have no wish, believe me, to keep you there a moment longer than is absolutely necessary, still less have I the desire to act in a manner unworthy of the fairness shown to us by the Court; but I am obliged, not only for myself, but also for my co-defendant—who is in this entirely in my hands—to do all that my poor wit will enable me to clear ourselves, and I have no right to allow one thing to escape to bring about the result. On the 12th page of the Knowlton pamphlet, near the end, you note the paragraph (reading it), and I now take you to page 323 and page 324 of Dr. Marion Sims. (Mr. Bradlaugh here read some extremely strong passages.) After that he gives—through several pages, and with great detail—a large number of cases of this disease, and goes on to describe all the operations of this kind which he has had to perform for the purpose of dealing with this which the learned Solicitor-General has put before you, and which he has chosen to allege is part of the filth which we have published. Dr. Sims enters upon this subject with great fulness of detail. Turn now to page 13 of the pamphlet, where Knowlton is dealing with the female reproductive organs. The learned Solicitor-General laid great stress, in his speech, on what he chose to call the obscene particularity of detail; but if I were able to put Sims into your hands, I should, I think, be able to show you that here are far fuller details, and that they are accompanied by a plate of everything described, in order that it should be more certainly understood. I will read the language of Sims, however, and ask you to compare it with the modest reference in Knowlton. (Mr. Bradlaugh then read page 181 and page 234 from Dr. Sims.) And then he spends exactly two pages and a half, which I will not weary you with, in

describing technically the whole of its position, its form, and its size, as well as thickness and capacity. I will still ask you to follow me carefully. We are still at page 12 of Knowlton and 181 in Sims. If you will look at Knowlton, you will see the exact correctness of the description. (Here Mr. Bradlaugh read another long extract, and held towards the jury box the illustrated plates in Sims' book). Go now, a few lines lower on, to page 13 of Knowlton, while I read a piece from page 204 of Sims. (Mr. Bradlaugh read another extract.) This subject is referred to by Knowlton on page 14, and on pages 181-2 of Sims; you will find how accurately he has written. I want, here, to press upon you—because it has been expressly referred to in the speech of the Solicitor-General in opening this case, and may be again referred to when he comes to reply, for he has the right of using every word in this pamphlet against us—that the charge made against Knowlton presses much more heavily upon Sims, for not only is there an enormously long description here, but, if I were able to hand this book up to you, I should show you that it is accompanied by a picture with the end in view of making the description more comprehensible. That which is put here in Sims with a bold completeness of detail, is delicately and chastely abbreviated by Knowlton, and yet you are called upon to believe that I and my co-defendant have set out with the intention of corrupting the public mind by publishing a pamphlet stating the fact in that guarded way. (Mr. Bradlaugh read further from Sims, page 182, and added), Gentlemen, I will not attempt to weary you with the whole of the pages, for it goes on to give every minutest detail: and yet, when the same facts, which to prevent disease, should be known by women, are so briefly stated in Knowlton, they are characterised by the learned Solicitor-General as filth, and I am prevented from showing you by evidence that the pamphlet is a pure work of medical instruction. Although I cannot help thinking that my case is one that should meet with your sympathy, I will not complain as to the disadvantage at which I am placed, for it is my duty to accept the regulations of the court. On the same page, I might read another extract, corroborating Knowlton on this point, but I will leave that, gentlemen. I might indeed occupy much more of your time with this page, but there is nothing in it which suggests sensual ideas to my mind in reading it, although some filthy-minded

persons have tried to manufacture a complaint—in using the word filthy I may have spoken too strongly—I will say that people entirely ignorant of medicine and medical works, or anything of the mass of detail that belongs to them; people who are only used to reading law books, have the impertinence to come here and call scientific facts filth. I avow I cannot understand how they can have come to that conclusion from reading this array of books (Mr. Bradlaugh here pointed to several piles of marked medical works, arranged round him, ready for reference), and if they have not read them, although they had notice six weeks ago that I should refer to them, it is more shameful still for the Solicitor-General to have used such language. I now bring you, gentlemen, to page 15 of the pamphlet; there you will find the subject treated of is menstruation. Sims also treats on the subject. (Mr. Bradlaugh here read at considerable length, from pages 39, 40, and 139 of Sims). I am endeavouring now to limit the words as much as possible to those of Knowlton, leaving out as much I can. Sims then goes on to give a large number of cases in illustration, which are painful, and adduces the reasons, with which I need not trouble you, but contenting myself with simply assuring you that Knowlton is chaste and delicate compared with him. We now come to page 16 of the pamphlet, and the same subject is spoken of on page 5 of Sims. You will notice, gentlemen, the very slight reference to pregnancy and menstruation, and the guarded way in which it is put by Knowlton. Sims on page 29 and 30, and on pages 380 to 385, gives with most full details several unpleasant cases which he investigated. I am told that Knowlton goes into minuteness of detail. I am surprised that the Solicitor could have ventured to say so if he had read this book. Listen to a passage of pp. 384 and 385 of this book of Sims, and tell me what you think. (Mr. Bradlaugh then read a long extract from Sims.) Compare all that with the delicate way in which Knowlton puts it—states the bare, actual facts. I do not think that the book has had the effect upon the mind of the Solicitor-General which it ought to have had, and I urge that he was utterly unwarranted in alleging that it was calculated and published for the purpose of corrupting the public mind. We are still on the same page of Knowlton, gentlemen.) Mr. Bradlaugh then verified further parts of p. 16 by Sims, pages 361 and 367, in each case showing the

superior style of the Knowlton pamphlet, of which he then took page 17. (The learned Solicitor-General talked of the particularity of detail; but if I had the power to put Dr. Sims in the box, I could, I believe, show you that he goes on to speak on all the same topics, accompanied on p. 363 by plates, clearly illustrative of their appearance, and when the learned Solicitor-General speaks of filth, and I find in the books of Carpenter, of Kirke, of Valentine, of Hilles, the same sort of descriptions on this topic, accompanied by similar plates, and that some of these books are put into the hands of girls for instruction and study at schools regulated from South Kensington, surely I have a right to complain of the use of such expressions. Yet I am indicted, and your verdict is asked for against me for the minute particularity with which we put these things. I do not think that I will weary you with the full description on p. 17, but if I could put the book into your hands you would, I am sure, say that the language of Knowlton is unmistakably most chaste and delicate when read side by side with this, notwithstanding the unsupported allegations of a Solicitor-General, who, perhaps, had not even read the pamphlet he vilified. I will go on now to page 11, the second paragraph—it is the first complete paragraph about the middle of the page—and refer you to page 340 of Sims, where I find similar declarations uniformerly accompanied by matter which, when I come to deal with pages 19 and 22 of Knowlton, I shall have to read to you. (Mr. Bradlaugh read a long extract). The same sort of remarks are made by Carpenter, by Kirke, by Valentine, and in the "Ladies' Own Companion," which is issued by one of the most respectable homœopathic publishing firms in London, any of which can be bought openly and without question. Any number of cases in relation to this subject are given in the various books in which young girls have to be examined. In the list of subjects printed on the Government syllabus they have to deal with this, and they are to comprehend the results incident to pregnancy, and do you mean to tell me that the delicate references to the same subject used in this Knowlton pamphlet are fairly called "filth," are more likely to corrupt the public mind or to destroy public morality? And how shall I speak when I am indicted, may be punished, may be sent to prison for doing so, and yet see all these unchallenged. I come now to page 19, where Knowlton repeats the same doctrines as are laid down in the paragraphs to which I have

referred. He then goes on to the question, difficult to treat here and I am afraid I must give you a case preceding the paragraph in Sims which I have annotated in connection with this in order not to be obliged to have to refer to the subject again. I will on the same topic take you to page 22 of Knowlton, and ask you where he uses one word which is impure, or puts one fact which leads you to think libidinously? Sims, on 340, 341, and 342 gives a collection of cases. Now I will ask you again, is not the language of Knowlton chaste and delicate in the extreme compared with that? Dealing with the same subject on page 372, Sims precisely states what Knowlton gives, and on page 197, still dealing with the same subject, he puts the words still more plainly, and he puts it that this is the medical view. If I were permitted to do so I would show you the plate in this page by means of which he describes exactly what he means, so that there is no possibility of misunderstanding, and yet I am told by the Solicitor-General, in this pamphlet I have given currency to the most abominable filth, minutely particular details, calculated to corrupt the public mind. Can that be so? Can the learned Solicitor-General have used such language and yet have read this book by Dr. Marion Sims, which I gave him notice, weeks ago, I should have to refer to? We are still dealing with page 19 of the pamphlet and I go now to page 182 of Sims, where he speaks more plainly and less delicately. (Mr. Bradlaugh read words.) I think I have now also disposed of page 22 of Knowlton, and I need not refer to it again. I come now to page 23, just after the words "John Hunter," about the middle of the page, and go on to the same subject on pages 25 and 26. I will read to you from Sims, who, after long and minute details, gives another series of plates, giving the fullest illustrative descriptions. (Mr. Bradlaugh here read from pages 116, 119, 363, and 372, of Sims). The same facts, however, as you see, are very guardedly and very quietly put by Knowlton at the bottom of page 26. Compare this with the language of Sims, and then say if Knowlton can be called indelicate. I must also trouble you with the whole of the paragraph, beginning page 29 of the Knowlton pamphlet. I am afraid I am asking you to listen to rather too much from Dr. Marion Sims, but, as I am prohibited handing you the book, I must read some of the passages, or you would never imagine to what extent they go. (Mr. Bradlaugh commenced reading

from page 350 into 351). He goes on there to give an enormously long description which I will not pain you with, and adds, on page 354, a plate of the foulest description, according to the theory of the prosecution, which, unfortunately, I must not put into your hands. But plates almost identical are put into the hands of boys and girls at school for the purpose of enabling them to study these and kindred subjects, and are even included among the list of prizes distributed to them. Such facts, I say again, are by Knowlton put in the simplest, most chaste, and delicate language, in his pamphlet. I will now read you a paragraph in Sims, on page 372, and refer you to the bottom of the same page in Knowlton; and on that I will also read you two from pages 381 and 387 of Sims, in which is given, in language as explicit as possible, all that is so briefly said by Knowlton. I will now take you to page 330 Knowlton, to the very last three lines of the page, in which, having stated the plain simple fact, you can easily compare his manner with the way in which Sims treats it. He tells you how he visited his patient, and how, at visit after visit, experiment after experiment was resorted to to discover the best way of ascertaining the facts. He goes on for something like two pages describing that, and I ask you whether, assuming the need of plates to aid in the examination of these subjects, Knowlton is not again and again far more chaste and cautious as to entering too minutely into extremely particular details? I now come to the question of sterility, which is dealt with on page 34 and the first paragraph of chapter 3. Sims says, on page 216, not only that Knowlton gives an accurate summary in a third of a line, but on this point he gives two plates for the purpose of showing what he means. Then you will find a fewer lines further down, on page 34 of the pamphlet, and on that I will again refer you to the exact corroboration to be found in the language used by Sims on page 39. (After reading, Mr. Bradlaugh said.) I must here ask you to remember that the learned Solicitor-General, when pleading against me, read a portion of the book on page 44 as one of the most filthy suggestions which he could conceive it possible to make in a publication. I am not myself unacquainted with medical technicalities, but I know the difficulty without a trained technical skill to pass a criticism upon these dry questions, and to make out a case to you which you will think sufficient; but I venture to say that we find here much more of what the learned gentleman

calls filthy suggestions than in the pamphlet for which I am indicted, and that, too, in a book not published by any common quack, but written by a high authority, and circulated by a publishing firm of the first-class. I say this book is much more calculated to deprave. But this book is circulated at a guinea or two, perhaps; do you mean to tell me that obscenity is measured by the price of a book? I am not pleading, let me crave to observe, that two blacks make one white, and that because one book is published, for which I am indicted, another book of a similar character should not be allowed to be issued; but I am saying, and I do most earnestly contend, that it is unfair to prohibit the circulation of a book merely because it is sold at a low price and distributed among the poor and ignorant for the purpose of improving their minds and instructing them in things they ought to know; and I say that I should not be held responsible for mere facts put in as clear and chaste a way as they can be. I now refer you to the language of Sims on page 5. (Mr. Bradlaugh again read.) Then let me ask you to read the paragraph on page 35 of Knowlton, against which the learned Solicitor-General directed so much of his choicest ire and indignation. You will see that the authority quoted by Knowlton is Dr. Dewees, and I may say that we have luckily just at the last moment procured a copy of his works, for it has been out of print a great number of years, and difficult to get. The remedies given by Knowlton were given on his authority; and on page 144 Sims prescribes exactly the same remedies; among them tincture of guaiac. And, really, gentlemen, it seems to me a little too much that you should send me out of this court branded as a criminal, and commit me to gaol for depraving the public mind, because I have given for the sum of sixpence information which for the last half-century has been given in various forms and shapes, and for printing a recipe as others have done; and because the eye of the learned Solicitor-General caught the word "cayenne" amongst other things, that must forsooth be evidence of the most gross immorality. I will now pass over several pages and go to page 38 of the pamphlet, because there are a number of things referred to there which are more fully given by other books; but I will make my remarks thereupon as short as possible, in what I fear must at briefest be a wearisome and long speech. I will take you to the instrument purchasable for a shilling, which is to be made a ground for convicting me;

and here let me say that I cannot help wishing that the learned counsel who has addressed you had not used language which was capable of being misunderstood. When you talk of an instrument in connection with such a topic instead of a harmless syringe, one of the simplest instruments, here recommended, the mind would be taken by the Solicitor-General's words to instruments familiarly known in medical jurisprudence, and used for the commission of crime. I venture to say it is outraging all reason and sense when you offer the suggestion that it is recommended here for a criminal or immoral purpose. I think, however, I may manage to save time if I take several paragraphs together, so I will take the paragraphs on pages 38, 39, 40, and 41, so as not to have to refer to them again. And, first of all, perhaps you would hardly believe, but I can assure you that in pages 375-6-7, 380-89, Sims in this book actually gives cases where the use of the syringe has been resorted to for the very purpose recommended in Knowlton, in that one case which is given on page 376. If details of that kind are fairly permissible in a book whose distribution and publication are not restricted, I do not see why I should be precluded from publishing statement so carefully worded as those of Knowlton. Oh, but it is said, such things excite sexual feelings. Let me say that I do not believe that they do anything of the kind. At any rate they do not produce any lascivious thoughts in my mind, but, on the contrary, I assure you that going through these details as I have had to do for the purposes of making my defence, produced upon me, unused as I am generally to such a class of study, the very same kind of revolution which is, I venture to say, passing through your minds at this moment, in being compelled to listen to the reading. A syringe can be bought for a shilling, and can be used for sanitary purposes, some of which are enforced on wretched women under police authority, but here, in Sims, we have plate after plate setting forth the manner in which it is to be used, and yet the pamphlet of Knowlton is brought into Court, because it suggests a similar use but in much more decent language, and is, therefore, characterised as "filth" by the learned Solicitor-General. Books of the very same character may be sold to the rich, but the poor are not to be allowed to get the cheap information because they can purchase it for a shilling.

The Lord Chief Justice: The argument of the Solicitor-General, do not understand me for a moment to say

that it cannot be met, was to this effect, that that which it is essential for medical men to know, is not essential for the general public to know, or at least it may not be, and that such information may be used to corrupt the public mind. The Solicitor-General did not say that those things were not to be found in medical works, nor did he argue, as far as I understood, that if those books were published to the world generally they would not be subject to legal consequences, but he said they were allowed to pass unchallenged because they were written for a particular purpose, to give the result of experiment and experience with the view of instructing, and, undoubtedly, in works of that character—works intended to give medical information—it is absolutely necessary to give those minute details to which you have referred. The argument is that it is unnecessary to give these details to the general public, and I refer to it because I think if the argument can be met it should be met, and if they are so given the tendency is to corrupt the public mind. It is, therefore, I think, of no use to multiply instances, and to pile illustration upon illustration without strengthening your argument. In every work intended for medical purposes, or to give instruction in medical studies, it is necessary that these details should be given to enable medical men to treat the diseases of the various organs, but I question whether the same information given to the general public may be of advantage to them, or whether on the other hand it is not calculated to influence them in an opposite direction. That is the argument I think you have to grapple with.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Quite so, my lord. I agree that if it were possible for this proposition to be conceded in any way by the prosecution it would shorten the case very much —the proposition that there is no fact stated by Knowlton that is not stated in a variety of books, not only written especially for the medical profession, but that the whole of the details which I have given are in Carpenter's physiological school books in plain language, which is put into the hands of children, distributed by authority, and given away in the shape of prizes. If that proposition could be conceded to me it would relieve me from a considerable difficulty and the necessity of inflicting upon the Court and the jury a very long statement, though I trust that your lordship will not think that I have detained you too long.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: Oh no, not at all. That was not my meaning.

Mr. Bradlaugh: If it is even admitted that these details are not entered into with greater particularity than is necessary for the comprehension of the subject I shall gladly relieve the jury of much that I had intended to say. The contention of the learned Solicitor-General is that we have gone into certain facts only for corrupting the public mind, and my proposition is that it is necessary to advocate checks upon over-population, and that it is necessary, for these checks to be properly understood, to give information to poor people, among whom the evil largely exists—information upon sexual and physiological matters, and that in doing this the incriminated pamphlet does not contain one word which is not for that purpose legitimate and necessary, not one word which is not pure and fit for the instructing of the poor and ignorant in these matters. That is why I put this proposition at the outset of my argument, and not for the purpose of any special pleading. I only want to show that every statement is legitimate and necessary to the subject treated, and as I cannot give in evidence the books, I fear I must further, unless in some fashion that proposition is granted to me, pile authority upon authority, as your lordship has observed, to cover my defence and to prove the accuracy of my contention. If the jury think I have said enough upon the subject I would not open another book before them. There is, I contend, nothing indecent, nothing which is not warranted by the matters treated, and we who feel ourselves called upon to face the issue, as the advocates of checks to over-population, contend that, moral or immoral as the book may be thought by others, this pamphlet states neither more nor less than is necessary or legitimate for the purpose.

The Lord Chief Justice: I do not think that any one would say that if this were purely and simply a medical work there would be any redundancy of details, or anything more than it is necessary for a medical man to know, and he would be among the most ignorant of his profession if he did not know them; but then the argument is that this is not a medical book, and that is the point which I think you should meet.

The Court adjourned for half-an-hour.

After the adjournment, Mr. Bradlaugh proceeded: I have myself, with my co-defendant, gravely considered, as we naturally ought to do, any suggestion coming from

your lordship, and we feel the full force and weight of your lordship's suggestion. I am in this difficulty, that, having a little to plead this medical portion, not only for myself, but for the lady who has so ably defended herself, I feel that she relies a little—indeed, without presumption, I may say she relies entirely—upon any advice I may offer to her as to the conduct of these proceedings. I do not want to do anything which may in any way damage either her position or my own; and I think, therefore, I shall be consulting what is due to the Court, which has listened to us with very, very great patience, if I only make use of some of the books which I have here, and which, if I were to attempt to cite passages from them all, judging from the rate at which I have been able to deal with the two already mentioned, would take several days of the time of the Court, and add nothing to the force of what has been adduced. There are, however, one or two books which I think I ought to deal with.

The Lord Chief Justice: By all means.

Mr. Bradlaugh: If your lordship, then, will permit me, I will cite the works of Carpenter and Kirke as works which are being used in schools; and I think, if I take one of these works—namely, Carpenter's—it will suffice for the present, because what is found in the one is to a great extent found in the other. That is a book specially designed for young people. It is not issued for the professional use of students at a university or college, but, as I have said, it is intended for the instruction of young people generally. I also intend to make some comments on a book of Churchill's, which was partially alluded to by my co-defendant, and, with the exception of some references, without going into details, to Chavasse and Bull, I propose to make no further detailed quotations, thinking that we have at all events impressed the jury sufficiently, and feeling that we should not unduly take up their time, after the passages which I am sure your lordship will not think it impertinent in me to have read as I have from the medical works, to show that there had been nothing unfairly stated in the Knowlton pamphlet.

The Lord Chief Justice: No, you may take it that you have shown that what is in Knowlton, if it were a medical work, would not be so full as other medical works treating similar topics.

Mr. Bradlaugh: I feel that I should only be taking

advantage of the patience of the jury if, after that intimation from the Bench, I unduly pressed the other books. I will, therefore, only take Carpenter's "Human Physiology," a work by Burt Wilder, who was a professor in Cornell University, and also some small portions of Churchill's "Diseases of Women," for the reason partially referred to by my co-defendant. These are three large books in wide circulation, and there is no pretence whatever for saying that they are confined to medical men. Before I proceed to deal with them, you will permit me to say—and I hope I shall not unduly put it—that the pretence about the restriction of the circulation of medical books is as utterly hollow as it is possible to conceive. In addition to the works to which I have referred, there are some thirty or forty bulky works which I have very carefully compared with Knowlton's pamphlet. It was my intention to quote from those works, and to point out that they can be purchased with the greatest facility. They are published, some in Dublin by Hewitt, and some in London by Sampson Low and Co., Churchill, Macmillan, and Smith and Son themselves. One which is called "The Ladies' Manual of Homœopathic Treatment," is published by the Homœopathic Company in Moorgate Street—a highly respectable company. Certain details are contained on pages 15, 16, and 17 of that book. I have studied those details, and, while I do not want to characterise another book, I should say that they are almost grossly treated compared with the fashion in which Knowlton has treated them. But I quite agree with what has fallen from the Bench, that we should in no way strengthen our position here by simply going over book after book for several days, wearisomely to you and to myself. I will only put it to you that the richer can afford and do pay 5s., 10s., or even 21s. for a book; not that there is anything indecent in it, but simply because a woman does not like sometimes to mention to medical men things which this Ladies' Manual tells her, but which are matters of great delicacy. Now, look at the other side. Poor women—women whose claims I am here to advocate, and whose husbands and children are also my clients—they need the same information; but at the prices I have quoted it is beyond their reach. I cannot help thinking that if there were, as I believe there is not, any offence in the publication of such things as are published here—I cannot help thinking that it is a little hard in the City of London to single out for prosecution those whose

only desire is to teach the poor how to help themselves. The poor have their wants, the poor have their needs, the poor have their failings, the poor have their diseases, and the poor are the most numerous class of society. As a matter of fact, there is no restriction in the circulation of medical works at all. As a matter of fact, since this prosecution has been pending, Messrs. Churchill have issued special circulars, drawing attention to these works, and both they and Messrs. Smith and Son have circulated this book of Chavasse's, not simply as I have got it here, but divided into two parts and done up in paper covers, and scores of copies are to be found on every bookstall. I do not blame the publishers for utilising the notoriety given to the book. All I want to point out is the fact that, since these proceedings began, the publishers are issuing advertisements, and that there has been an increased sale of the work. There is no pretence whatever that it is meant for the medical profession exclusively. No fewer than eleven thousand of the last edition have been sold, and that is the eleventh edition of the book.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: What is the name of it?

MR. BRADLAUGH: It is Chavasse's "Advice to Wives," and deals particularly with menstruation, and the development of the fœtus, and it treats also on pregnancy and conception. I do not want to say anything against Chavasse; but I think he has written a book to sell, with more padding and jokes than can be found in Knowlton's pamphlet—a book, in short, which, though not in any way of an obscene tendency, yet occasionally gives details in a very broad style. He deals also with the question of sterility, and indicates the remedies necessary to prevent it. The book of Dr. Bull's is of the same character; but on the whole I should regard it as a much superior production, though you find in every page the same subjects discussed. These books are to be seen on every bookstall in the country, and are circulating by scores of thousands.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: Are you sure they are sold by Smith and Son?

Mr. BRADLAUGH: I am quite sure, my lord. At the same time I do not want to cover myself by imputations on other people.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: I am quite certain that the Messrs Smith would not sell a single copy of a work which they considered at all injurious to public morals.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: I fully admit that. Both in London

and elsewhere the name of Messrs. Smith can be vouched for as being of the highest standing. My contention is not because other people have done worse than I have, that, therefore, I should be let off. My contention is that the rich have certain useful information within their reach which they have no more right to have it at their disposal for 1s. 6d. than the poor have at 6d. Chavasse's book, which, on the branches on which it treats, gives fuller details than Knowlton's pamphlet, is divided into two parts, one giving hints to wives, and the other hints to mothers, and the object of the division is to make the work cheap. It is, as I have said, done up in paper covers, and published at eighteen pence. It will be forwarded to any one on the receipt of stamps at Churchill's, Smith's, or at any bookstall, so that the question of restricted circulation in reference to this class of works is at once got rid of. I purposely limit myself in this case to three books only, hoping the jury will believe that I am not over-stating the truth when I say that I have annotated for reference nearly forty volumes. They over and over again cover every page of Knowlton, and I refrain from reading the passages simply because I acknowledge the justice of his lordship's observation that by doing so I should be piling fact upon fact *ad nauseam* without strengthening my case. Therefore I shall not do anything which the jury, judging as between man and man, may have anything to complain of. I shall take Carpenter's "Human Physiology," reminding you that that is a book recommended by the Committee of Council on Education in their directory which regulates the establishing and conducting of science schools and classes. I feel bound to bring that book before you, because I cannot help regretting the point urged by the Solicitor-General—I will not say unfairly but strongly, and put by my lord, from the bench—that there is some difference between a work written, as my lord says, by medical men for medical men or students, or for people desiring to make themselves acquainted with the science of medicine, in which it may be necessary to use certain language for the sake of humanity, and to enter into a variety of details which are not pleasant reading for the general public. But, to use the analogy of my co-defendant, the details of the process of digestion and what takes place in that process, would not enable you to enjoy your dinner if you went into the study of them immediately before the dinner hour. Now,

Carpenter's "Human Physiology" is one of the books in which the young folks are to be examined, and of which many editions have been published. According to the directory of the Committee of Council on Education, this book is to be made one of the standard works for examination, and if the contention is to be made that the giving of the information contained in this book is obscenity, and that the tendency of giving that information is to corrupt and deprave the public mind, then you are landed in a difficulty as regards this case, because the whole of that information is given in the book which I shall bring before you. There is this to be said—and I hope I shall not neglect the view which his lordship put—that there is a distinction to be drawn. Carpenter's "Human Physiology," though given to young boys and girls in schools for the purpose of instructing them, among other things, as to what happens during sexual connection, and what happens after it, although it tells them how birth may be forwarded, and how it may be retarded, by giving illustrations in relation to it, the object simply is to instruct them so far, and there is no design in the book of inducing them to limit the number of their offspring. I hope I have fairly stated the point which his lordship put to me; but there is one thing which I ask you to consider in giving your verdict, namely—Is the advocacy of all checks lawful, except the advocacy of such checks as involve the destruction of the fœtus after conception or the destruction of the child after birth? I am not asking you to lay down the doctrine that Knowlton is altogether correct. A doctrine may be unscientific without being immoral; and I repeat that the point which I desire to put to you is this, Is the advocacy of all checks lawful, except such as involve the destruction of the fœtus after conception, or of the child after birth? I will take you first to page 11 of Knowlton's Pamphlet, beginning with the second small paragraph in the middle, where you will find a description of the female parts. In Carpenter's "Human Physiology," pages 1021, 1022, and 1023, you will find the same much more fully. I will not trouble to read a word of it to you, because the curious thing which struck me when I first commenced to compare Carpenter with Knowlton was that in nearly every respect the language was precisely identical, with the one exception that Knowlton was simply an epitome of Carpenter, cooled down. One reason perhaps was that Knowlton had to get all his facts

into a very limited space—I do not want to take more credit for the author than he deserves—and, therefore, he had to express them in very small compass indeed. To show that I am correct I will put to you an illustration about four lines down the paragraph, ending page 11. (Mr. Bradlaugh then read a long extract from Carpenter.) The author then goes into a description which covers several pages, and is as exact in accord with Knowlton as it possibly can be; and considering that Carpenter's book is used by children in schools, and has a number of plates and pictures of the organs described, it is remarkable that the same language is employed in both Carpenter and Knowlton, page by page, and step by step. Now, bearing in mind that one may overshoot one's mark by continually reading the same things, I will, although several other passages intervene, proceed to take illustration of puberty. It is given on page 15 of Knowlton. You will find that it says simply—"A girl acquires a more womanly appearance." On page 958 of Carpenter—and this is a book which is put into the hands of girls—you find the same thing thus stated. (Mr. Bradlaugh read a long extract.) Now, I put it to you, as a mere matter of fact, whether the few words "A girl acquires a more womanly appearance," is not the excess of delicacy compared with the other description contained in a book put into the hands of young boys and girls from 12 to 16, who are not only instructed in the book, but actually receive copies of it as prizes. The whole of the facts relative to menstruation are there stated with the excess of detail. Pardon me for a moment while I refer you to one passage in order to show how Carpenter deals with the sexual act itself, and I do so simply as an answer to the argument of the Solicitor-General as to the circulation of this book in girls' schools. It is on page 961 section 743, and refers specially to the function of the female which happens to be dealt with by Knowlton as you know. (Mr. Bradlaugh again read.) You find that Carpenter deals with such matters as are on pages 12 to 17 of the Knowlton pamphlet, and gives many pages of description with appropriate plates for the instruction of young girls, and I cannot help thinking that if such descriptions by Carpenter are considered advantageous to moral training, it is a little too hard to say that Knowlton's pamphlet is indecent. In Carpenter reference is also made to the changes which take place in the male. (Mr. Bradlaugh

here read from pages 952—953, section 734). In dealing with the sexual act, the particularity is much more extreme in Carpenter's than in Knowlton's work. I will not trouble you with reading one more word from Carpenter. I simply tell you that I have carefully marked page after page of his book, and I have selected passages which do not come within the range of ordinary medical works, but which are considered by the Science and Art Department of the Committee of Council on Education as fit subjects in which young men and young women are to be instructed and examined. The subjects, you will remember, I have already stated to you. I am unfortunately precluded, by the ruling of my lord, from putting this Government syllabus into your hands. I trust I am endeavouring as far as possible to save your time consistently with the merest approach to justice to my case. There is not a page of this pamphlet of Knowlton's relating to the female, her organs and functions, which is not over and over again covered by this volume of Carpenter's, and covered in such a way as to show that the latter writer wanted to make his book interesting. It is amply clear that Knowlton had no such object. He had no interest in making his pamphlet even approach indecency, and, on the whole, it is a dry book. Why, we have in court a cyclopædia of anatomy and physiology, published by Longmans, in which all the parts are given with a degree of particularity, and with plates to aid the comprehension, which was not limited in circulation solely among medical men. I will now refer—and not more than is absolutely necessary—to a book written by Burt G. Wilder, a professor of Cornell University, and published in London by Trübner, and in Boston by Estes and Lauriat. I have some knowledge of that Boston firm. It is as respectable as Trübner or Longman, and would not knowingly publish anything whatever of an improper character. The author says he wrote the book chiefly for students and unprofessional readers, and denies that the subject cannot be presented with safety to the minds of the young. On the contrary, he says it is a duty to enlighten the young on sexual physiology, in order that they may not be ignorant of matters of this kind. The book is not written by a quack. You may tell me that it is written by an American professor only. The Solicitor-General, eminent himself as a scientist, sneered at American doctors. I have been treated with great kindness in the United States, and feel bound to resent the slurs cast

upon American doctors. They are as highly educated, and possess as high characters in America as in London, and though, in this great city, from its population, antiquity, and wealth, there are special advantages offered, excelling most cities in the world, there are medical men of as much eminence and probity in New York and Boston, and in Paris and Vienna, as can be found in any city in England. It was my intention to refer to a large number of French and Italian books, and especially to the "Elementi de Igieni," by Dr. Paolo Mantegazza, one of the present deputies in the Italian Chamber, which defends, in the strongest terms, the checks on population advocated by Knowlton. I do not mention that fact by way of excusing myself; but if you put this case as a precedent, which I think you must, you must consider that in fairly dealing with it. Now, Wilder, who, in his work, gives the fullest physiological instruction, deals with the fact of celibacy, which is also dealt with at page 8 of Knowlton's pamphlet. In his book, written for the young, he says—[Here Mr. Bradlaugh read from pages 148 and 149.] Wilder's book, you will see, goes into far greater detail than the Knowlton pamphlet. Its motto is, "Honi soit qui mal y pense"—a motto which, if I may do so without impertinence, I would commend to the Solicitor-General and those who conduct this prosecution. On pages 30, 38, 40, and 49 of this book, which, bear in mind, is intended for young people, there are given the fullest descriptions, not only of the female organs, but of the male organs as well, with plates to explain them. The descriptions are very plain and explicit, and if they had been copied from some enlarged edition of Knowlton, they could not have been more completely in accord. I must repeat that Wilder's book has been sold in London by Trübner, and at Boston, by Estes and Lauriat, and that it is intended, not for medical men, but for young people. I think you will find there almost the exact words of pages 11, 12, 13, and 14 of Knowlton's pamphlet. I do not want to seem to savour of impertinence, and I do not want to read the extracts at all. But the passages are often word for word identical, except where Wilder is much more detailed, and there is, in addition to the letterpress, plates which it is impossible to mistake, and which are given in such a way that those who read the book could not help understanding the whole. And yet, I am told that particularity of detail is evidence of an intention to deprave and corrupt. What does Wilder

say? I will only give a brief summary. (Mr. Bradlaugh here read extracts covering much of pages 19 to 44 of the Knowlton pamphlet.) The Solicitor-General does not seem to know what Carpenter and Kirke have written, or that their lessons are taught in the Science and Art Schools of England, and yet we are sought to be prohibited from putting similar knowledge in the hands of the masses of the people at a cheap price. Now, for a moment, I will refer you to another work as to which there cannot be any pretence for saying that it is confined to medical men. It is a work on Anthropology, by Dr. Nichols, who says that it is such a book we would wish to see in the hands of every man and woman who is wise enough to profit by its pages. There is contained in that book exactly the same information as is contained in the works of Carpenter and Kirke, with pictures showing the different organs of the human body, so that there should be no mistake. One more topic I must allude to. In my allusions to Carpenter and Wilder, I have not done what I had sketched out in my brief, because if I had done so, there is not one line that would not have been as fully dealt with as in Marion Sims. But I think, in addressing the court and jury, I have no right to thrust upon them anything at unfair length. There now remains, not contention that we have highly coloured or coloured at all, but it is proved we have, or rather Knowlton has, softened down and chastened that with which he had to deal in the discharge of what he deemed to be his duty—if that were not practically conceded to us, I should have felt it necessary for my own sake and for the sake of the lady who is co-defendant with me, to have gone through every line at the risk of wearying you. But no such responsibility rests upon me. In this pamphlet there is no attempt at indecent statement. The only object is to teach people how to check population after marriage. Is it, then, I ask, such a book that you must give your verdict against it? I will refer you for an instant to a book by Dr. Fleetwood Churchill on "The Theory and Practice of Midwifery." There is also a book called "The Diseases of Women," by the same author, nearly to the same effect. The one portion I wish to allude to in each work is more as a measure of argument than as a measure of comparison. Dr. Churchill argues that it is lawful and morally right, in a case where you know that a woman is so diseased or deformed that she cannot on a future pregnancy bring into the world a healthy child,

so to operate upon her that future conception must be impossible. In addition to that, on pages 298 and 299, he argues that it is right, where you know that a pregnant woman is so much malformed, or is diseased to such an extent that she cannot bring into the world a healthy child at the full term, to procure what is sometimes called the premature delivery of the child by drugs or instruments, the object being to save the life of the mother or the child, or prevent the child being born alive so malformed that life would be a misery to it. Now, if that be right, I ask where is the iniquity of seeking to prevent the conception of children at all, whose life, if created, will be a misery to them and to others? I am inclined here—and I hope by so doing I shall not have done injustice to the cause—I am inclined to abandon the whole of the books I had intended to rely upon in addressing you. I am inclined to abandon them, because if I go through them, I must occupy you for several days, and I do think, with a jury and judge so patient and kind as you have been, I have no right to take up so much of your time. I ask you, then, to consider the issues which I have put to you already and which I put to you again, viz., Is over-population the cause of poverty? Is over-population the cause of misery? Is over-population the cause of crime? Is over-population the cause of disease? Is it moral or immoral to check poverty, ignorance, vice, crime, and disease? I can only think you will give one answer, that it is moral to check these evils. You may say: Try to restrain them, like Malthus, by late marriage. Ay, but even to get late marriage, you must teach poor men and women to comprehend the need for it, and, even then, if you get real celibacy, Acton and others will tell you what horrible diseases are the outcome of this state of things. Really, you never can get even celibacy. You know what takes place in London and Paris. I have passed through Naples and Rome, and I have been shocked at being stopped by lads at night. In Florence, in Berlin, in Paris, you all know what arises from this pretence of celibacy. Even in our own large centres of population, such as Dublin, Edinburgh, and Glasgow, you know what this false pretence of celibacy means. Take the case of Birmingham as an illustration. Walk through the streets of that city between nine and eleven in the evening, and as the gaslight shows the flaunting shame, tell me whether celibacy is a reality or a sham.

Tell me whether or not that terrible word "prostitution," written everywhere in letters of festering curse, is not a disfiguring scar upon the surface of society. It is said that this pamphlet tries to defend immorality. You must contradict every page of it—ignore every word in it—to warrant that assumption. You may say it is very unfair, for example, that the agricultural labourer should have children to burden the poor's-rate. But put yourself in the position of the agricultural labourers. They have not the training and education that you have, and sometimes mere sexual gratification is the only pleasure of their lives. They cannot read Virgil; they cannot read Dante. They cannot listen to Beethoven; they cannot listen to Handel. They cannot go to a musical réunion; and they cannot visit a sculpture gallery. They have no time occasionally to run across the Alps. They have no opportunity of finding recreation in the Pyrenees. They cannot yacht in the North Sea. They cannot fish for salmon at New Brunswick or St. John's. They are limited to their narrow parish bound, and their bound is only the work, the home, the beerhouse, the poorhouse, and the grave. We want to make them more comfortable; and you tell us we are immoral. We want to prevent them bringing into the world little children to suck death, instead of life, at the breasts of their mother; and you tell us we are immoral. I should not say that, perhaps, for you, gentlemen, may judge things differently from myself; but I know the poor. I belong to them. I was born amongst them. Among them are the earliest associations of my life. Such little ability as I possess to-day has come to me in the hard struggle of life. I have had no University to polish my tongue; no Alma Mater to give to me any eloquence by which to move you. I plead here simply for the class to which I belong, and for the right to tell them what may redeem their poverty and alleviate their misery. And I ask you to believe in your heart of hearts, even if you deliver a verdict against us here—I ask you, at least, to try and believe both for myself and the lady who sits beside me (I hope it for myself, and I earnestly wish it for her), that all through we have meant to do right, even if you think that we have done wrong. I have to put to you this proposition: you jurymen are to be convinced that we are guilty. If a shadow of doubt go through your minds you have no right to make a deliverance of guilty against us; and unless you

feel we are the fit associates of those horrible Holywell Street men, who circulate foul literature day by day, and that we are deserving even of being put in the scale with those who circulate obscene prints, your deliverance must be one of not guilty. It is not a question whether you agree with the methods of checking population; it is not a question whether you are Malthusians or anti-Malthusians. I put it to you, and I ask you to consider it carefully, that the question which you have to determine is this:—Is the advocacy of all checks to population lawful, except such as advocate the destruction of the fœtus after conception, or of the child after birth? Is it possible to preach abstinence and prudence to the poor without instructing them in the various matters of physiology which have been dealt with in this pamphlet? There is not one line in it which goes beyond what is legitimate or necessary. Is there any pretence whatever for saying that we have given any sort of colouring to it which would make it otherwise acceptable? My co-defendant referred, in earnest language, to the letters which she had received from women, and clergymen, and others, throughout the country. I, too, have received many warm words of sympathy from those who think that I am right. It is true many of them may be ignorant people, and therefore may be wrong; but they have written to encourage me with their kindly sympathy in my pleading before you. If we are branded with the offence of circulating an obscene book, many of these poor people will still think "No." They think such knowledge would prevent misery in their families, would check hunger in their families, and would hinder disease in their families. Do you know what poverty means in a poor man's house? It means that when you are reproaching a poor and ignorant man with brutality, you forget that he is merely struggling against that hardship of life which drives all chivalry and courtesy out of his existence. Do not blame poor men too much that they are rough and brutal. Think mercifully of a man such as a brick-maker, who, going home after his day's toil, finds six or seven little ones crying for bread, and clinging around his wife for the food which they cannot get. Think you such a scene as that is not sufficient to make both himself and her hungry and angry too? Gentlemen, it is for you, in your deliverance of guilty or not guilty, to say how we are to go from this court—whether, when we leave this place, if you mark us guilty, his lordship may feel it to be

his duty to sentence us, and put upon us the brand of a doom such as your verdict may warrant; or whether, by your verdict of not guilty—which I hope for myself and desire for my co-defendant—we may go out of this court absolved from that shame which this indictment has sought to put upon us. (There was applause in court at the conclusion of Mr. Bradlaugh's address.)

Mr. BRADLAUGH: I do not intend, my lord, after the intimation which your lordship has been good enough to give me, to offer any evidence that would really be in any way unnecessary. There are three or four witnesses only which I will call, with the permission of your lordship. If your lordship should think that I should briefly state the character of the evidence I am about to offer to the court and the jury, and you should think such evidence to be inadmissible, I would ask your lordship to make a note of the point, so that, if necessary, we may raise it afterwards. I intend, then, to call Miss Vickery, a medical student in London and Paris, for the purpose of proving a number of facts that have come within her own experience as a medical student. I shall also put in the box Dr. Drysdale, to give evidence of a similar character, because his experience is much wider, and perhaps I shall call the well-known publisher, Mr. Bohn, to give his experience in London and elsewhere regarding the publication of such works as those of Dr. Carpenter, or of this pamphlet by Dr. Knowlton.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: It is impossible to tell exactly beforehand what the evidence may be, and therefore I think you had better call the witnesses, and any objection that may be raised can be considered when it is made.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Very well, my lord; I will now call Miss Vickery.

Miss Alice Vickery was examined by Mrs. Besant.

Mrs. BESANT: I presume, my lord, I can put any question until some objection is raised. To witness: Your name is Alice Vickery?—It is.

And you reside at number 333, Albany Road?—Yes.

Are you a chemist by examination of the Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain?—I am.

And the first lady, I believe, who passed the regular examination of that Society?—Yes.

Did you study midwifery and diseases of women at any London hospital?—Yes; at the Women's Medical College.

For how long?—I have studied medicine for six years.

Are you at present a fourth-year student of l'École de Médicine at Paris?—I am.

Have you attended practical midwifery at the City of London Lying-in Hospital?—I have.

Have you received a certificate for this?—I have.

You have sent your certificates to Ireland, I believe, for a special purpose?—Yes, but I wrote for them, and have them with me.

It was intimated to me, my lord, that they had been sent to Ireland, as the witness intends to go up for the Dublin examination. To witness: Do you produce it?—I have it here.

Have you also the certificate for midwifery of the Obstetrical Society of London?—I have.

Do you produce it?—I can do so (producing papers).

Have you attended hospital practice for several years in London and Paris?—I have.

And attended the practice of Surgery, I believe, under the famous Professor Verneuil of Paris?—Yes.

And you have devoted some six years of your life, you say, to these studies?—I have studied at least six years.

Have you read the pamphlet which is the subject of the present charge?—I have.

With the means of judging derived from the experience of which you have told us, do you consider this pamphlet to have been written by one well-acquainted with medical science at the date of its publication?—Most decidedly I should say it had been written by one well acquainted with medical science nearly 40 years ago.

You consider that it is a work written by a competent medical man for general circulation?—I think it a most important work.

What I wish to ask you is this: Do you, from your own personal knowledge and experience, consider that, writing 40 years ago, his knowledge of physiology was accurate and real?—Certainly. He must have been a most competent and experienced man.

In your hospital experience have you any knowledge of the effects of large families?—I have seen a good deal of them.

You are speaking from the experience of which you have told us, when you say that?—I am speaking from my own experience and knowledge. I am not dealing with books,

but with facts. I am speaking of my knowledge of families and of the mothers who bear them.

Then your opinion of the evil effects of over large families is drawn from your own experience, and you know what the effects are upon mothers and children?—I have studied the question from that point, and there is no doubt, in my mind, from the experience I have gained in hospitals, that a very great deal of suffering is caused by over child-bearing to the mothers themselves; to the children, because of the insufficient nutriment which they are able to give them and to the children before birth from the condition of the mothers.

Have you found, in your experience, any bad result to the health of the mother from over-lactation of children amongst the poor?—Most certainly. There are many evils resulting from over-lactation. One thing is a falling of the uterus, and another the permanent weakening of the mother's health.

The next question I have to ask you is a most important one. It is: Is it within your own knowledge and experience that poor married women desire very often to check the increase of their families, and that they very frequently seriously injure themselves, by adopting detrimental means, such as deleterious drugs, from complete ignorance of those means which might be adopted without any injury to their health?

The Lord Chief Justice: That is a very complicated question, and if it is competent to put it at all, I think it should, if possible, be simplified.

Mrs. Besant: I am afraid, my lord, it is rather complicated, but I think I could, if you would allow me to do so, divide it. To witness: You have told us that, in your opinion, the health of married women is sometimes injured by over-childbearing. Are you aware whether they ever adopt any means to check the increase of their families?—Most certainly.

Do you say that from your own experience?—I am quite aware that they sometimes do so.

Do you mean apart from your own experience, or have any instances come within your own knowledge?—I have in my own experience instances where women have taken means to prevent conception, and after it has taken place to do away with the results.

Do you know if this is done by the advice of the husband? —Yes, by his advice to prevent conception.

Is it generally considered that over-lactation is one of those means?—It is; I have known many women who have continued to suckle their children as long as two years, and even longer than two years, because they believed that that would prevent them from conceiving again so rapidly.

How long is it usual to suckle a child?—It depends; in some cases a year. Nine months would be as much as could often be done in safety, but a child might in most cases, I think, be suckled a year without injury.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: Is that the usual time for suckling children among women generally, or among the poor?

The WITNESS: Twelve months is a reasonable time, but, as I have said, that may in some cases be excessive.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: And when it is double that time, is it very injurious in its effect?

The WITNESS: It is, my lord, on the mother as well as on the child.

Mrs. BESANT: And you say that that method of warding off an increase is fairly often adopted by poor women?—Yes, I should say so from my own experience.

You tell us only from your own experience. Have you had women under your care who have been suffering from the result of over-lactation?—I have.

What is the result?—The result is very great weakness and general debility, and these are the fruitful source of other diseases.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: That is if pregnancy occurs during the period of lactation?—Whether it does or not, my lord.

Mrs. BESANT: And you have found that pregnancy does occur in spite of over-lactation?—Certainly, over-lactation is no preventive whatever against pregnancy.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: But many people, you say, think that it is?—Many think it is, my lord, but it is not.

Mrs. BESANT: And is the result of that ignorance an injury to the mother as well as to the suckling child and to the child unborn?—Certainly; it results in weakness to the mother, very often excessive discharge, which is very weakening to the child in the womb, and is the cause of rickets in children, and that leads to numerous other disorders.

That is the direct result, in your opinion, of trying to

check an over-increase of family without the physiological knowledge of how to do so without dangerous results? —Certainly.

The Lord Chief Justice: You must draw the conclusion in your summing up.

Mrs. Besant: Certainly. I hope, my lord, that I have not asked any question which is illegal, and not according to the courtesies of the bar; if I have done so I hope your lordship will at once give me some intimation of it, so that I may know where I err.

The Lord Chief Justice: I have not stopped you so far, because I see a gentleman behind you (Mr. Douglas Straight) who will, if there is anything of that kind, put a stop to it with promptitude.

Mr. Douglas Straight: My lord, I have not interrupted hitherto because I am anxious that everything should be asked in this case which comes within the limits of the defence under the most liberal interpretation.

Mrs. Besant: I would not do an unfair thing under any circumstances, if I knew it, and I desire to keep within the four corners of the legal restrictions of the court if possible, but I might do so from lack of legal knowledge, so that I hope I shall be stopped so soon as I contravene them. To witness: Have you any experience on this head in Paris?—My experience there is only small; I have not much experience of that kind in Paris, because there, as a rule, families are very small indeed; I have known very few women there who have had more than two or three children.

Mrs. Besant: What, if any, is your experience on that point?—My experience on that point is not so large as to entitle me to offer a very decided opinion; I have been engaged in the study of medicine and surgery in Paris, and I have not had there any particular practical obstetrical experience. What obstetrical experience I have has been gained in London, and that will not enable me to give any opinion worthy of weight as to the circumstances obtaining in Paris.

You are aware, I suppose, from what experience you have had, that there are in Paris married women whose husbands consent to the use of mechanical means for the restriction of their families?—So far as my own knowledge goes, I cannot answer either one way or the other; but my patients have told me more than once that their husbands have suggested means for preventing conception.

They told you that it was so?—I have heard it in several cases.

I am going to ask you a rather curious question, but I mean no discourtesy. Is it your experience among your fellow-students that knowledge of physiological details tends to deprave and corrupt?—Most certainly not.

Have you found that women possessing such knowledge are less pure-minded than hte ignorant?—Oh, no.

The Lord Chief Justice: But those would be strong-minded ladies, Mrs. Besant.

Mrs. Besant: I hope, my lord, that all women are strong-minded enough not to use knowledge for an improper purpose. To the witness: Is it your opinion that such knowledge, where it exists, is used for improper purposes?—No.

Cross-examined by Mr. Bradlaugh: With the medical experience of which you have told us, are the statements of fact in relation to disease and the remedies for those diseases fairly stated in the pamphlet which you say you have read?—Most certainly.

Most certainly. Speaking solely from your experience of medical treatises, would you describe the physiological portions of this pamphlet as highly-coloured or over-stated?—Certainly they are not highly-coloured in comparison with other books that I have read both in Paris and in London. Compared with these, they are not highly-coloured, but very mildly and quietly put.

Mr. Douglas Straight: I have no question to put.

Dr. Drysdale was called and examined by Mr. Bradlaugh:

Mr. Bradlaugh: Your name is Charles Robert Drysdale?—Yes.

Are you a member of the Royal College of Physicians of London, and a Fellow of the Royal College of Surgeons?—Yes, I am.

Are you also Consulting Physician to the Farringdon General Dispensary of London, of which Alderman Figgins was recently chairman of Committee?—I was physician of that Society for many years, and I am now consulting physician to it.

You are also, I believe, Senior Physician to the Metropolitan Free Hospital of London, and Physician to the North London Consumption Hospital?—Yes.

And physician to the Rescue Society's Lock Hospital?—I am.

Now tell me, have you written several medical works?—Yes.

And you have been a long time in practice?—For many years.

May I ask you, have you read this pamphlet which is the subject of the present charge?—Yes, I read it many years ago; I cannot say how many, perhaps twenty. And so far as that goes I read it again only last night, because I thought I might be examined upon it to-day.

Well, to your knowledge, this book was published at least twenty years ago?—I have been in London some twenty-five years, and I know I read it shortly after I came, and that must have been a long time—at least twenty years ago.

Guided by the medical experience of which you have told us, do you consider it a fair work on the subject on which it professes to treat, and are its statements accurate?—I have always considered it an excellent treatise, and I have found among my professional brethren that they have had nothing to say against it.

As a medical man of position and experience, do you judge that it is written by a competent medical man?—It is certainly written by a physician, and an excellent man. Considering that it was written forty years ago, when it is thought that people did not know so much as we do—although I do not believe that we are so very far in advance of the men of those days—the writer must have been a profound student of physiology, and far advanced in the medical science of his time.

This is your professional opinion of the scientific merit of the book?—It is, and it is the opinion of many men in the profession?

The Lord Chief Justice: You can only speak from your own experience.—Certainly, my lord.

The Lord Chief Justice: Is there anything in the pamphlet calculated to raise libidinous feelings?—On the contrary; no one reading the book would be affected in that way.

Mr. Bradlaugh: If I might introduce my own personal experience, my lord, that is exactly what I have felt in reading these medical books.

The Lord Chief Justice: Is there, do you think, anything prurient about it?—Certainly not. It is a most excellent little book.

Mr. Bradlaugh: Have you, as a medical man, much

experience, or any experience, amongst the poor of London?—A great deal too much, unfortunately. I have seen nothing but poverty since I came to this great metropolis.

Have you any experience as to poverty being productive of sickness, especially among the poorer classes, by the production of large families?—As I have already told you, my professional life has been amongst the hospitals for many years, and that has led me into a situation of contact with the poor of this city. I have been obliged to see what a miserable condition there is of squalor, utter distress, and sickness, even in the great metropolis of the empire.

Has your experience connected this circumstance with the large families which the poor generally bear?—Yes, certainly.

Witness here referred to some papers in his hand; whereupon,

Mr. STRAIGHT asked: What are you looking at?

Dr. DRYSDALE: I am only referring to some notes. May I not look at them?

Mr. STRAIGHT: I am afraid you must put them away, and trust to your memory.

Dr. DRYSDALE: I am much obliged to you; but I do not know who you are. I would rather be guided by my lord than by you. (Laughter.)

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: I think you may take it from the learned counsel. I do not think there has been any desire as yet to act unfairly on either side.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: I am afraid you cannot refer to your notes, Dr. Drysdale. So, if you will kindly, from your own experience, answer my question——

Dr. DRYSDALE: Then I suppose I must put my notes away, my lord?

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: Unless they were put down fresh from memory.

Dr. DRYSDALE: That is just what I have done, my lord.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Can you say, from your own experience, that poverty and preventible sickness exist among the poorer classes in consequence of large families?

Dr. DRYSDALE: I have been continually obliged to lament the excessive rapidity with which the poorer classes bring unfortunate children into the world, who, in consequence, grow up weak and ricketty. You see such children suffering from the rickets and in a very unfortunate condition. Sir

William Jenner has written a great deal upon this subject, and he used to say, what my experience has continually confirmed since, that when a working man marries, the first child or two look very healthy, whilst the third will look ricketty because the mother is not able to give them that proper nourishment which she lacks herself. And so with both the fourth and fifth. They get more and more ricketty, and if you search the courts and alleys of London you will find great numbers of children whose life is simply a pain to them. If the mother had only had two children she could have supported them well enough, but when three or four are born they get that terrible disease—the rickets—which is a great cause of death in London, a much greater cause than is generally supposed. Many children supposed to die of measles, and other infantile diseases, really die of rickets. In the case of a healthy child such a disease as measles passes off without much damage, but when it attacks a weak and ricketty child the child dies, the death is ascribed to measles, instead of the more largely contributing rickets. Hence the death-rate is largest in large families.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Have you read the essay on population by Mr. Malthus?

Dr. DRYSDALE: I read it some thirty years ago; perhaps more.

Mr. BRADLAUGH was proceeding to ask whether it was a fair summary of Mr. Malthus's views to say that population was necessarily limited by the means of subsistence, and as to the operation of checks, when——

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE said he scarcely thought the question a fair one.

Dr. DRYSDALE said: One fact I will mention to draw the attention of yourself and jury to the very important point of infant mortality. That is a very interesting point indeed. With all our advances in science we have not been able to decrease the general death-rate in London. Twenty years ago it was 22·2 per thousand persons living. In 1876 it was almost exactly the same, being, in fact, 22·3. Instead of dying more slowly than we did twenty years ago, we die a little faster. That fact might seem to be a great disgrace to the medical profession, and to those who had to advise as to the public health. Indeed, it has been asked, what is the use of public health officers at all. The real reason of this increase in the death-rate is, that the children of the poor die three times as fast as the children

of the rich. If all the parents of the children were as well off as, say the gentlemen of the bar—(laughter)—or of the special jury, the consequence would be that the number of children that would die would be very small indeed. Mr. Hanson has pointed out that to every 100,000 children amongst the richer classes—which would, of course, include the barristers—(laughter).

The Lord Chief Justice: And solicitors, too, I should think—(laughter).

Dr. Drysdale: And solicitors, too, my lord, no doubt—in 100,000 children of the richer classes, it was found that there were only 8000 who died during the first year of life; whereas looking at the Registrar-General's returns we find that 15,000 out of every 100,000 of the general population die in their first year. If you take the children of the poor in the towns you will find the death-rate three times as large as among the rich—instead of 8000 there would be 24,000 among the children of the poor. So that you see, the children of the poor are simply brought into the world to be murdered. Hence, on the general average, we do not increase in longevity. The great number of poor people we have accounts for the rate of mortality being kept as high as it has been. If we were all brought up we should live to about an average of 80 years—(laughter)—except we died by accident—(laughter).

Mr. Bradlaugh: Have you any experience as to whether large or small families prevail in France?

Dr. Drysdale: I have lived there much, and I have been to France every year for the last fifteen years; and once took the case of 100 of the most famous gentlemen of l'Ecole de Médicine. Not one had more than three children. Most of them had not more than two; and I took this as a little index as to the rest of France. French statistics show that there are not more than two children to each family, on an average. They never think of having more than two or three children.

Mr. Bradlaugh: Do you happen to know, from your own experience, whether checks to population of the character referred to in this book are adopted by the peasant families in France?

Dr. Drysdale: I should like to know if I am allowed to say what I like? (Laughter.) Will it be safe? (Loud laughter.)

Mr. STRAIGHT: If it will re-assure the witness, I may say that it will be quite safe so far as I am concerned.

Dr. DRYSDALE: I do not know, I am sure. (Laughter.)

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: You can only state what are the facts.

Dr. DRYSDALE: I mean: is there any privilege in a witness from being prosecuted? (Loud laughter.) I should like to know I shall not be prosecuted by the Government.

Mr. STRAIGHT: If it is any satisfaction to Dr. Drysdale, I will not prosecute him. (Laughter.)

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: But we do not know who your clients are, Mr. Straight.

Mr. STRAIGHT: I think there is not much doubt about it.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: I have much doubt. (Laughter.) You have told us as to the number of children in French families. My question is now, whether your French experience, as a medical man, enables you to say whether or not checks of the description mentioned in this pamphlet are used by the French peasantry?

Dr. DRYSDALE: The first check mentioned in the pamphlet is used universally.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: It is, perhaps, not necessary to read out this check?

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: I think not.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: If the jury refer to page 38 of the book, they will find this check specified, and that will be sufficient. To the witness: You say that that check is largely practised in France?

Dr. DRYSDALE: It is practised by almost every male in Paris, and all over the country.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: I believe you are a Member of the London Dialectical Society?

Dr. DRYSDALE: I am.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Were you present on the 1st of July, 1868, at a meeting of that Society?—Witness (after referring to the minutes): I was.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Was Lord Amberley present?

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: I wouldn't go into that, Mr. Bradlaugh.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Very well; then I won't press one word more

Mrs. BESANT (to witness): You have stated that you have had a large English hospital experience, and a wide experience amongst the poorer classes: is it within your experience

that any attempts are made by mothers to check the increase of their families?

Dr. DRYSDALE: I hardly ever go to my hospital, where on a certain day of the week I usually see about 80 or 90 women, that there are not 5 in 6 cases of women who have suckled children for 18 months or two years in order to prevent conception.

Mrs. BESANT: That is the reason they give for suckling their children so long?

Dr. DRYSDALE: They will tell you so if you ask them quietly; but they would probably give some other reason if other people were present. I tell them it is not a good way to act, and advise them to find out a better.

Mrs. BESANT: And the effect of this over-lactation on the child at the breast?

Dr. DRYSDALE: It is robbing the child at the breast of its proper food, which ought to be more substantial than the milk of the breast.

Mrs. BESANT: And what is the effect on the unborn child, supposing the mother conceives during the time she is suckling?

Dr. DRYSDALE: It suffers from want of nourishment because it does not get enough blood, which should go to feed it before birth.

Mrs. BESANT: What is the effect of very rapid child-bearing upon the mother herself?

Dr. DRYSDALE: You very often see women worn to death by getting children too rapidly. They hardly seem fit to keep up their own lives, and very often fall into consumption.

Mrs. BESANT: Is one of the results of over-large families to gradually undermine the constitution?

Dr. DRYSDALE: I think so among town mothers, though a strong woman, with plenty of food, brought up in the country, might, without much injury, have a large number, say, twenty-one. (Laughter). Oh, I have known many women with twenty or twenty-one children, all living. (Loud laughter.) A strong countrywoman might, perhaps, have twenty-five—(laughter)—but among the majority of cultivated women, and women brought up in towns, that would be impossible.

Mrs. BESANT: When the father's wage is 13s. a-week, would twenty-one children be healthy?

Dr. DRYSDALE: To bring so many children into the world,

under such circumstances, I should think one of the greatest social crimes a man could commit. I should look upon it in the same light as habitual drunkenness and other social crimes.

Mrs. BESANT: Is not falling of the womb—to use the common expression—very common amongst poor women?

Dr. DRYSDALE: It is extremely common. Indeed, when I was obstetrical assistant at Edinburgh, it was one of the commonest diseases among women—the principal one, in fact. Women ought never to get up from confinement for some weeks after the child is born; but these poor women are so utterly unable to do without work that they are compelled to get up in a day or two. The womb, being full of blood, falls down and produces infirmity for life.

Mrs. BESANT: Have you any knowledge as to endeavours among women of the poorer classes to procure abortion?

Dr. DRYSDALE: It is not alone among the poor. I have known it, time after time, amongst educated ladies, who have taken most drastic medicines to try and get rid of the effects of conception.

Mrs. BESANT: Would it not be better to prevent conception than attempt to procure abortion?

Dr. DRYSDALE: To procure abortion, I consider, is almost as bad as murder. But I do not see any crime in preventing conception, otherwise those who remain unmarried should all be prosecuted. (Loud laughter.)

Mrs. BESANT: Leaving that point, and returning to another part of my opening address, where I dealt with over-crowding—have you, in your own experience, seen many cases of over-crowding?

Dr. DRYSDALE: Near to my dispensary in Holborn I have seen too much of it. In the neighbourhood of Gray's Inn, where these gentlemen of the bar abound (laughter)—and these gentlemen of the bar might see for themselves if they would (laughter)—I must confess to have been ashamed to find such an amount of misery existing there from over-crowding. I wish that two or three gentlemen would only take the trouble to go into the little courts and alleys off Chancery Lane and Gray's Inn Lane and see the frightful misery and crowding there as I have seen there. I have seen six children in one room all huddled up together, and all down with typhus fever, the same room being used by three adults; I have seen such things repeatedly, over and over again.

Mrs. BESANT: What is the largest number of human beings you have seen crowded into one room?

Dr. DRYSDALE: That is the largest—six children and three adults, with only one bed.

Mrs. BESANT: Is it your experience that typhus fever spreads most rapidly in crowded rooms?

Dr. DRYSDALE: The great reason that typhus fever is so terrible a disease is that people are crowded. In all zymotic diseases, if people are crowded together, when one gets it they all get it.

Mrs. BESANT: Then large families actually produce disease?

Dr. DRYSDALE: It is impossible to have health with large crowded families.

Mrs. BESANT: Does not over-crowding give rise to a terrible amount of sexual vice amongst the young of both sexes?

Dr. DRYSDALE: I do not know that of my own experience, but one can scarcely doubt that that would be the case. I am surgeon to the lock ward of a Hospital for fallen women, and I know from my own experience there that prostitution is very often brought about in consequence of over-crowding.

Mrs. BESANT: The associations of over-crowding corrupt the young mind, I suppose, and loss of modesty is followed by prostitution?

Dr. DRYSDALE: They do not know what modesty is.

Mrs. BESANT: Do you know anything of disease caused to young children by being compelled to work at a very early age?

Dr. DRYSDALE: You see, children in big families are taken out to work very early, and premature exertion often injures them for life. It seems to me I have had numbers of cases of that kind. Children are not fit to do very much work so long as they are half-developed, and early death is often the consequence.

Mrs. BESANT: But I suppose they must either work to death or starve to death?

Dr. DRYSDALE: There is no doubt hosts of children are worked to death.

The witness then stepped down.

Mr. H. G. BOHN was next called and sworn.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Your name is Henry George Bohn, I believe?

Mr. BOHN: Yes.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: And you were formerly, and until latterly, a publisher in a very large way of business?

Mr. BOHN: Yes, for about sixty years.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: And a series of works, called "Bohn's Scientific Series," was issued by you?

Mr. BOHN: It was.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Did you publish a book called "Animal Physiology," by W. B. Carpenter?

Mr. BOHN: I did.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Do you know that that book has been largely used as a text-book in schools?

Mr. BOHN: I do.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: How long were you a publisher?

Mr. BOHN: Always; for the last sixty years, and for forty-five years of that time entirely on my own account.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Had you large experience in the sale of works on physiology?

Mr. BOHN: I had one of the largest connections in our trade. It was a subject I cultivated in my early days, and nearly all works on the subject passed through my hands. Some of them were my own property.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Have you read the pamphlet which is the subject of the present indictment?

Mr. BOHN: I have.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Does your experience, extending over forty-five years, in works on physiology, enable you to say whether the statements in that book are statements which you have found in many of the standard works on physiology which you have published?

Mr. BOHN: One important book which was familiar to me years ago—De la Motte Ligniac's "Physical Essay on Man and Woman in a State of Marriage," published with plates—entirely covered your book, and gave a great deal more. Another similar book was Venette's "Tableau de l'Amour Conjugal," of which there have been more than forty editions.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: And are you able, from your own knowledge of this pamphlet, to say that the facts in "Carpenter's Physiology" and other books, and in the "Fruits of Philosophy," allowing for the necessary compression of the latter, are identical?

Mr. BOHN: Substantially so.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Having said there are a number of works on physiology which have been generally sold by you,

containing the same statements and facts as in the "Fruits of Philosophy," have you ever been prosecuted for obscenity?

Mr. BOHN: I am not aware that any of them have been molested.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: You communicated with me through your solicitor, so that you might give this evidence?

Mr. BOHN: I did. I felt very strongly on the subject, because many years ago one of my publications had been attacked by what I understood to be the action of the Society for the Supression of Vice, a society from which I am glad to find Mr. Beresford Hope, the vice-president, has just withdrawn his support. I subsequently discovered that the attack on my book was made at the instigation of some Roman Catholic priests, but after a resolute remonstrance on my part I heard no more of the matter. In consequence of the interference of this society, the Society for the Suppression of Vice, which I presume to be at the bottom of the present prosecution, my successors, Messrs. Bell and Sons, have been induced to suppress the "Memoirs of the Comte de Grammont," a very amusing book, "Boccaccio's Decameron," the works of "Rabelais," and all the other books forming my so-called extra volumes.

Mrs. BESANT: I will only put one question to you, Mr. Bohn; have you ever put any restriction on the sale of medical works?

Mr. BOHN: None whatever; on the contrary, I should willingly have halved the price had I thought this would double the circulation.

This concluded the examination of the witnesses for the defence, none of whom were cross-examined on behalf of the prosecution.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: We had intended, my lord, to call some clergymen to speak as to over-crowding, but as that would only lengthen the case, and is not necessary, I think I will make this the whole of the evidence. The over-crowding is so clear that further evidence on the point would not strengthen my case one whit.

Mrs. BESANT: I had intended to call Mr. Smith, of the firm of Messrs. Smith and Sons, to prove the general and unrestricted sale of Chevasse and Bull, but that will, perhaps, not be necessary, as I believe the fact will not be disputed.

Mr. STRAIGHT: Certainly not.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: I think, my lord, as a matter of right,

myself and co-defendant are entitled to say one or two words, in summing-up, to the jury.

The Lord Chief Justice: Certainly. Would you do that to-morrow?

Mr. Bradlaugh: That would be better, my lord, as we could then make it much more brief. Both our summings-up would be included in the hour in which the Court opens.

Mrs. Besant: I should not take more than half an hour to three-quarters.

Mr. Straight: The reply for the prosecution will be very short, my lord.

The Lord Chief Justice: Then we shall finish to-morrow.

Mr. Straight: Certainly, my lord, without doubt.

The Court then rose, and Mrs. Besant and Mr. Bradlaugh were again loudly cheered as they left the hall.

FOURTH DAY.

THE Lord Chief Justice took his seat at 10.30 a.m., and the Clerk having handed to him an intimation, in writing, from the jury,

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE, after reading it, said: It is not consistent with our procedure to put a question to a person who is on trial; it is not permitted by law.

Two jurymen stated that they were not aware of such a communication having been made.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: It is a very pertinent question to be put, but I cannot pass from the rules of procedure, which do not allow any question to be put to prisoners on their trial.

Mrs. BESANT: My lord and gentlemen of the jury, in summing up now the defence I have laid before you, I propose to do it very briefly, because, practically, one may say one has made the main part of one's defence, and I need do nothing more at the end of this long trial than remind you how much the case has become narrowed since its opening by the learned Solicitor-General. You will remember, gentlemen, without my going from point to point, or from argument to argument—I do not propose to press any of the points on you—you will remember that when the learned Solicitor-General opened the case he stated that we had to deal with a thoroughly obscene book, written with intent to deprave, using the cloak of philosophy to cover that intent, using the colouring of marriage in order to destroy marriage and to increase illicit intercourse, and that all this was done with such disgusting particularity of language as tended to deprave the minds of the young, making altogether a publication which he summarised as a whole by a word of one syllable which I will not repeat. The first point is as to the cloak of philosophy; I think the defence has proved that the philosophy, at least, is real; also that there is not one word which has been put into the philosophical part which is in any sense impure, and if you are to judge of the philosophy as being written with intent to deprave, it must be because there is some other portion of the book

which you read into the philosophy, making that which, in itself, is not there. As to the colouring of marriage, which is the next point raised by the learned Solicitor-General, I will put it to you that marriage is urged all through the book, and that profligacy is spoken against in the strongest terms the writer can use. Not only are profligacy and illicit intercourse spoken against, but the writer goes further, and warns the young of the great dangers resulting, not only from profligacy, but also from the intemperate use of the sexual functions. So that, I think, I may say, concerning the cloak of philosophy and the colourable use of marriage, that there is not one syllable in the book to warrant the argument of the Solicitor-General. You have, then, only to deal with the mere empty assertion of the learned counsel, unsupported by one shadow of evidence, which he has thought right to lay before you. As to the language having a disgusting particularity of detail, you will remember that it has been proved to be delicate and careful in comparison with ordinary medical literature; and I will put it that the extra delicacy of Knowlton is simply because Knowlton was writing a work for general circulation, and avoided, as much as possible, the use of terms which, on the general ear, would strike somewhat harshly. And I put it further, that Miss Vickery told us that the language of Dr. Knowlton, so far from being highly coloured, was, on the contrary, extremely mild and quiet compared with those books which her medical studies, during the last six years, had compelled her to peruse. You are aware, gentlemen, of the large number of medical books we have here, and you will remember an intimation from his lordship, yesterday, on the subject. My co-defendant, and myself, talked the matter over, and I felt strongly, that it being apparently put, that provided only the book were a medical book, no objection could be raised to the language in which the medical details were couched, it would be taking advantage of your patience, and of the consideration of your lordship, if we wearied you and ourselves—and it is even more wearying to those who speak than to those who have to listen—and so have unreasonably dragged on the trial for some five or six days, as would have been necessary had we gone through these books, and piled proof upon proof as to the delicate nature of the language used by Knowlton. I will only say, therefore, that we had begun with those most delicately worded; and if we had gone

through the whole of them some would have been found to be couched in language of so startling a character that I am only glad the course of justice has not compelled us to quote it in a court like this. The only reason why we felt it to be our duty to put these two books to you was that unless, gentlemen, you have some medical training, an idea of coarseness is inspired by the plainness of ordinary medical language, and that idea could only be destroyed by showing the language used in a standard medical work. We may take it that it is practically allowed that if Knowlton's is a medical work then the contention of the learned Solicitor-General as to a disgusting particularity of language falls to the ground, equally with his contention of the cloak of philosophy, or the colourable use of marriage. Thus the case is narrowed down to this: Is Knowlton a medical work? or is it, on the contrary, an utterly obscene book, written with intent to deprave? So far as its being a medical work is concerned, I think I may fairly urge that the defence has proved the accuracy of its details from the books read by my co-defendant. I may say also that there are medical notes right through the book referring to standard authors of eminence who teach the same facts. We find, in referring to Miss Vickery's evidence, that in answer to a question put by me whether with the means of judging derived from the experience she told us she possessed, she thought the pamphlet to have been written by one well acquainted with medical science at the time of its publication, she replied that she did so consider it; and when Dr. Drysdale was in the box—a man known equally in England, in America, and on the Continent as a physician of eminence and as an author of many scientific works—he said, in answer to a question put to him by Mr. Bradlaugh, that he considered the work a most excellent work, written by a scientific man, writing with a full knowledge of his subject, and writing with that care and accuracy characteristic of a scientific man. You will remember that you had the strongest testimony as to the thorough medical character of the work, and this is not surprising when you remember that Charles Knowlton held the diploma of Doctor of Medicine in Boston, and was the author of many scientific works; and I may point out to you that some of his hypotheses have lately been verified by experiment, showing him to have been a man of thought beyond the ordinary range of his time. We have the fact that 40 years ago he struck on some intricate physiological points,

on which his ideas have since been proved to be right, to put against the mere assertion of the learned counsel for the prosecution that the pamphlet is not a medical book written by a medical man — a scientific treatise for a scientific purpose. To succeed, then, in the contention of the prosecution, the prosecution must show an intent to deprave, and the first thing that is done to show the intent is to urge that the book was not written in learned language. I avow, gentlemen, that I do not see that obscenity couched in a learned language becomes any less obscene, nor do I understand the contention that as Knowlton is an obscene pamphlet we should have improved Knowlton by translating him either into Latin or into Greek. So far from that, I cannot help remembering that the great Italian Giordano Bruno was burned to death because he spread scientific heresies among the Italian people in the Italian tongue; agreeing, as he did, with one of his contemporaries, that the dead languages were too often used as a cloak put over science, to cover its real emptiness, and wishing to teach the people, he insisted on speaking in his mother tongue to the people whom he desired to influence. The next thing that is urged to show the desire to deprave is the "unrestricted circulation of the book." I and my co-defendant quite agree that society properly lays a restriction upon showing in shop-windows of streets where people pass, not only anatomical pictures, but also any pictures of a coarse or a disgusting description. I conceive that as you live in society you have no right to be a nuisance to your neighbours, or to annoy those who pass your shop-windows, by anything of a disgusting character: and the law has defined it to be an indictable misdemeanour to expose in a public place any disgusting object. I allow that to the fullest extent. There are plates in the medical books we have here which it would be most indecent to expose in the public thoroughfares, but so far as concerns anything short of that kind of forcing the thing upon the public notice, I must put it that every medical book is an unrestricted publication. The only restriction upon such books as that of Marion Sims is the restriction of price, and that restriction of price is not one that I think, with all submission, ought to be listened to in a court like this; it would be a most unfortunate thing if, from the highest court of justice in England, which knows no difference before the law between rich and poor, it should go

forth by verdict of the jury that an expensive medical book was a pure book, while a cheap medical book was an obscene publication, which puts its publishers in peril of their liberty. I must remind you of what Mr. Bohn said on this point, when he was dealing in the witness-box with his 60 years of a publisher's life, a life which I believe all will acknowledge to be one without blemish, and whose standard library is one of the credits of our modern English literature. Mr. Bohn distinctly stated that he had published books containing substantially the same as, and much more than, is contained in Knowlton's Pamphlet; that he thought he knew the book, published very many years ago, from which Knowlton, and Carpenter, and Kirke, had all equally been taken; that that book was out of print, but was now in the British Museum; that he had read a similar book before he was twenty-one years of age; and that during his whole publishing life of sixty years he had never known one case where a prosecution was brought against a physiological treatise on the ground that it was obscene. He told us he remembered about people being warned as to selling the tales of Rabelais, and the "Memoirs of the Comte de Grammont." But this has nothing to do with the selling a physiological treatise, and Mr. Bohn told us that if he had known any way of selling twice as many as he did he would have done so. As to the argument of restriction, I reminded you that we had these books here; I personally bought one of these medical treatises; I obtained another through the post; Mr. Parris bought some of them, and a young man of eighteen or nineteen years of age also bought some that might be characterised as strictly medical books; I only put that to you to show how much easier it is to talk of restriction than to practise it; nor is any effort made to keep them from the general public, else why are these books advertised in the columns of the daily papers, as well as where doctors would naturally look for them, in the *Lancet*, the medical journal? Then we are told, that though these details are necessary for doctors, they are not necessary for the public. I would urge upon you that poor women need to know the facts concerning menstruation and pregnancy quite as much as do the doctors, for they are often unable, from their poverty, to obtain the advice of medical men. It was acknowledged by the prosecution that no kind of accusation had been brought against Dr. Chavasse or Dr. Bull, and it would have been, indeed, rather awkward if a

principle had been laid down which would apply adversely in the case of books issued by one of the Government, of whom the learned Solicitor-General is the adviser. But if these details show an intent to deprave, I would ask you to carry your memories back, for one moment, to the terrible passage read by Mr. Bradlaugh, from Marion Sims, and ask whether it is not a much greater depravation to suggest putting a woman under chloroform for a certain purpose; whether that is not a suggestion whereby a wicked person might inflict a most cruel wrong on a helpless woman. Then we come to Carpenter, of whom the prosecution cannot pretend that it is written for medical men, for the instruction in Carpenter is not couched in the phraseology you generally find in books intended specially for medical students. That book, as well as Kirke's Handbook, are books circulated in schools for girls—the girls whose purity of mind the prosecution is so anxious to guard. In speaking of generally-circulated books, I drew your attention to a book, sold for a shilling by Longman & Co., in which the checks advocated by Knowlton for a good purpose are advocated for a bad purpose. The use of an injection is therein advocated for the purpose of keeping an unfortunate class of women in a state which will enable them to carry on their most unhappy trade. If you give a verdict against us, I cannot but think that it will be a most unfair verdict, for I cannot help remembering that it is not only in this country that such books are sold. We find the French Government authorising a book to be sold for one franc—and my lord, with his knowledge of France, will know that a book cannot be hawked by a colporteur without bearing the imprint of the Government—a book advocating such checks to prevent over-large families. I am the more encouraged to have faith in my case from the fact that one of the leading writers of the Paris press, Yves Guyot, one of the leading French writers on law, Professor Emile Acollas, as well as one of the champions of the people, General Garibaldi—all stand round us on our Defence Committee to show their feeling as to the struggle in which we are engaged. Gentlemen, not only is there no intent shown in the book to deprave, but, on the contrary, there is much to disprove that allegation of the Solicitor-General. I would repeat to you the answer which Dr. Drysdale made to the Lord Chief Justice, when the distinct question was put to him, as a medical man, "Is it your opinion that the book is calculated

to arouse prurient or immodest feelings?" To this the reply was, "No, my lord; certainly not." I put that opinion of a medical man against the allegation of the Solicitor-General, and I point also to the utter omittance by Knowlton of every unnecessary word of description; I remind you of his careful avoidance of any outside description, which might tend to arouse those feelings that might be aroused by the work of Dr. Carpenter. The prosecution is now driven to make its case rest on the advocacy of checks after marriage, which is the only point remaining to them. You have seen that Dr. Fleetwood Churchill advocates checks after marriage of a far more terrible character than any of those which Knowlton proposes. You will remember the proposition put by my co-defendant yesterday was that it is lawful to advocate checks after marriage, provided that those checks do not destroy life. I am quite content to rest my case upon that contention. There are but three checks after marriage—celibacy, the check advocated by Dr. Fleetwood Churchill after conception, and the check before conception advocated by Knowlton. The first—that of celibacy—is impossible, for you cannot teach people absolute celibacy after marriage, and unless celibacy is absolute it could be of no sort of use. To teach it would simply mean that men and women were to go through the ceremony of marriage as a mere empty mockery. This is a proposition which, if carried out, would be injurious to health even to the rich people, who would be able to live apart under the same roof. I ask you what it would be to the poor married couples, obliged to keep in the same room, on the same bed? I ask you if the poor man's life is to be one long and terrible temptation, lest he should commit the sin of bringing into the world children he cannot support? The check advocated by Churchill I look upon as almost a crime; from my point of view I cannot but think it wrong that, when a doctor has found that a woman cannot bring a living child into the world, he should counsel a check after conception, instead of before. This is a suggestion so horrible, so revolting, that most women would rather, by going the full time, run the risk of perishing in the birth-struggle than adopt such a check; I feel that to be a most immoral proposition; and if the learned Solicitor-General had turned his attention in that direction instead of in ours, he might have had some ground on which to base his prosecution. The only other check is a check which we advocate, a check

before conception; I am only contending for the principle that Knowlton lays down, and for the right of doctors to discuss this question. You have heard of the efforts of the poor to find some sort of check to prevent the rapid increase of their families. Miss Vickery, in answer to a question I put to her, told you that poor married women seriously injure their health by over-lactation, imagining that it will stop conception. Dr. Drysdale carried this further, and said it was injurious both to the mother, to the child at the breast, and to the unborn child, and that the most terrible diseases resulted from those women resorting to this check in their ignorance. He told us that not only do women strive in that fashion to meet the terrible evil with which we are trying to grapple, but that, in his own practice, he found cases of both rich and poor, who used the most deleterious drugs, all this being done with the same hope of warding off pregnancy, and injury to health is thus caused, instead of the moral means advocated by Knowlton being used. You have heard of the checks adopted by the French against over-large families, and yet you know the affection the French entertain for their children; parental and filial love is one of the distinguishing features of that nation. I ask you not to put on a great people the brand of immorality for practising that which is thoroughly moral, and I beg you that it should not be said that what is sanctioned throughout France, as a duty to society, is put down by the criminal law in England. Dr. Drysdale has told us of the evils of over-crowding; he told us how he saw mother, father, six children, and another relative, all down with typhus fever, in one room, and he told us that disease is the direct result of large families; you will remember how he said that too many women did not even know what modesty was because of the conditions of their youth. I ask you if we are to go to prison from this court because we try to make modesty something more than an unknown word? We have only called three witnesses, because the facts are so indisputable; but if we have injured our case by not calling more, it would, of course, be a great cause of regret to us; but I imagined that to call more would only be a repetition of the same thing over and over again. I said, in my opening speech, that it was my intention to call the Rev. Mr. Horsley and the Rev. Mr. Headlam into the box but the case closed sooner than I had anticipated, and I had released Mr. Horsley from attendance yesterday, as

his duties required his presence at the House of Detention. I did not ask, however, this morning, to be allowed to call any further witness, our case being really proved beyond possibility of reasonable dispute. I ask you now, gentlemen, what proof has been given by the prosecution of our intent to deprave, of our hatred of marriage, or of our intention to promote illicit intercourse? The intention of the writer of this book and of its publishers is the same; and whatever is Knowlton's, that intention is also that of myself and my co-defendant. The intention of one is the intention of the others. If Dr. Knowlton uses the word "marriage" in a colourable sense, we have used it in the same. If the author disguises his evil intent under the word "marriage," we have used the same guilty weapon in publishing his pamphlet. Whatever the one intended in writing the work, we have intended the same thing in publishing it and in distributing it broadcast throughout the land. I leave that question of intention upon perfectly intelligible grounds. But what proof of an evil intention has been brought before you? You must give a clear and definite answer to the question before you can convict us under this indictment; and upon this point, perhaps, you will allow me to remind you of the verdict that was returned in the case of the King *v.* Eaton, where the jury unanimously decided against the book, but as it was not published with a criminal intention, no verdict of guilty was recorded. The case was carried to the Court of King's Bench, and there a verdict, meant to exclude evil intent, was returned, and no sentence followed. That was all the more strange because the judge summed up evidently against the prisoner, and there the publisher was not fortunate enough to be tried, as we are, before a fair and upright judge, one who administers the law with the equity and impartiality seen in this court. That case of the King *v.* Eaton fell to the ground, after a double trial, and I ask you whether we can be seriously held to be open to be convicted of obscenity if we have no evil intention to set ourselves deliberately to debase and corrupt the youth of this country? When you are considering the question of intention, it will be well for you to contrast the course which has been followed by the prosecution right through, with the course which has been adopted by myself and by my co-defendant—the utter dissimilarity between the tactics of the two parties—the concealment which characterised the prose-

cution, and the straightforwardness and openness of the defence. Remember, I pray you, that up to this moment, the name of the prosecutor in this case has remained concealed. We do not know who our prosecutor is; and so far as we have any statements at all on the subject, those of the learned Solicitor-General and the junior counsel are directly contradictory to the letter of their own solicitor. It may be a prosecution by the Government, by the police, by a magistrate, or by some individual who is actuated in the matter by some private spite or malice. We have no knowledge how it has arisen, whence it comes, and I ask you not to leave this out of your consideration when dealing with this case. And what is our position? Why, from the first we have been perfectly open and frank. We told the prosecution what we were going to do. Weeks ago we sent them notice of every book we were going to use, the titles of all the works upon which we relied. And that frankness has been carried out from beginning to end of this prosecution. Do you think that if we had had the criminal intention imputed to us we should have proceeded in that way? And yet we stand charged with a criminal offence before his lordship. Will you, I ask you gentlemen, give a verdict of guilty against me? You do not know very much of my life, it is true, and you may not be able to judge from it how far such a criminal charge is well or ill founded. You are not able to judge how thoroughly absurd—if it were not fraught with such danger—how utterly ludicrous this charge of intent to deprave and corrupt is when levelled against me. I was not, as my co-defendant said he was, born among the poor—I have not the glory, I have not the honour of having risen from among them by sheer brain power and persistent labour, to stand here in right of the position I have made, I have not so won that right of speech which I take to-day. No, that honour is not mine; but do you think I should have put myself in this position, do you think I should have placed myself in this danger, merely from an intent to deprave and corrupt humanity? You do not know much of me, it is true, but surely you can judge something of me by my speech, by my argument before you. Am I one whom you dare convict of intent to deprave and to corrupt? You may convict me, you may send me to prison, you may bid me herd with those depraved and dissolute women whose very language would be agony to me, worse agony than I can

put into words—unless, indeed, that, even in that prison, I might even there find means of prosecuting my work among my degraded fellow-prisoners, among the wretched women with whom I should be obliged to consort, as I have for long years carried it on in the cottages and homes of the poor. You cannot give a verdict of guilty against me, guilty of intent to deprave—my whole life gives the lie to it. Think a moment what such a verdict means. It means destruction of all I have worked for in the past, humiliation in all the labours of the future. You cannot convict me, and so take from me whatever influence for good I may have won. Yet, no, not the loss of my influence among the poor I have worked for. I cannot believe that, whatever your verdict may be, that there will be any loss of influence among them, for they will know how hard I have worked for them even in this court. You cannot convict me. Think for one moment upon all those who are watching this trial with the keenest anxiety. Can you let it go forth from this court, and from you, gentlemen, that there is to be no word of consolation or of comfort for the downtrodden, no change in the brutality and the misery of those overcrowded hovels which we seek to purify—that you tell of no star of hope for those who are writhing under poverty, and racked by pain—no word, no remedy for their misery, no breaking of the chains that bind them, no deliverance from the despair into which they are fast settling down? You cannot convict me if you think of the past and look forward to the future. Think of the juries in this great country who have over and over again stood between tyrannical Governments and the oppressed and helpless brought before the power of a court. Think what juries in this country have done. They have stayed the march of power against liberty, have widened freedom, and have protected discussion. Juries, too, have also sometimes done irreparable harm, have bound faster the chain upon the slave, and have been assistants of wrong for the sake of a momentary applause. Think, I pray you, of those juries who declared in favour of Horne, Tooke, and Thelwall. Make them your examples, and set us free to-day. A verdict of guilty? You cannot give it if you speak for justice and for truth, if you believe in innocence and in purity. We cannot yield, for we are working for the cause of the poor and the right to speak. But if, by some misdirection, some mismanagement of justice, you give a verdict against us to-day, you will

be doing what John Stuart Mill spoke of, you will be committing one of those crimes by which the men of one generation surprise and amaze posterity. A verdict of guilty? If you do this thing, remember that it will be to brand innocence with the infamy of guilt. If you do commit this wrong, then, from your verdict of guilty, we appeal to the verdict to a wider court, of a grander jury. We appeal from you to the people of the civilised world, from this bar to the bar of public opinion, and whatever your verdict may be, that greater jury will bring in a verdict of Not Guilty against us. We appeal from you to the verdict of the history which shall judge us when we have all passed away—that history which shall bring us in not guilty, whatever the verdict may be to-day. History, that weighing us in the far-off to-morrow, shall say that this man and this woman who stood on their trial here, who, knowing the misery of their time, the sufferings of their fellows, the agony of the people of their day, joined their hands and their lives together to bring salvation to the homes of the poor, did good service in their day and in their generation—that history shall say to us, "Well done," whatever your verdict may be.

The address was received with applause in court.

Mr. BRADLAUGH said: Gentlemen, whatever may be your verdict, and I do not think you will give one which you do not think to be right, I and my co-defendant owe you thanks for the very great patience with which you have listened to what we have felt it to be our duty to urge; and as my co-defendant has done, I, too, will try to show those thanks by at least abridging as much as possible the few words I have now the right to address to you in summing up the arguments I have thought it necessary to submit to you. It is, I think, now fairly conceded that if it is lawful to advocate any checks upon over-population after marriage, we do not in this book say one word to advocate anything against the institution of marriage itself. There is no word here that is redundant, prurient, unjust, or unfair; and the real issue which you will have to decide, and in which you will have to give a verdict—and, after all, the ultimate decision in this case rests with you—is this: that men in England, in the nineteenth century, and the latter quarter of the century—that men in England, where scientific discussion is free and unfettered—free beyond what is allowed in any other country of the world—shall here stop, once and for all, at any rate so far as their verdict can stop it, the discus-

sion of the checks to over-population. I will not attempt to insult you by in any fashion going over again all that which in your kindness you permitted me to go over in the long address with which I am afraid I wearied you. I have now only one difficulty present upon my mind with regard to that address; and it is whether, where it was needful to go through those medical details, some of which I saw were so distinctly unpleasant to you—as I shall ask you to believe that they were to me, and have been during the last six or seven weeks that I have been obliged to study them—whether I in any fashion weakened the eloquent pleadings of my co-defendant, because in the school in which I have been trained—the rude school of experience in the world—in which I have studied and have been pushed about, I have learned that the want of tact is about as great a fault as any man can commit. Well, I felt that I was bound to show from some of those books that the book which was impeached in this court did not deal with the matter in hand either impertinently, with undue particularity, with immorality with prurience, or with redundancy; but thatl on the contrary, it proved in a just, a plain, a simple abridgment that which it intended, and gave to poor people the knowledge thought needful for them, written so that they might understand it, without one word to raise feelings that ought not to be raised. I will ask you to believe that in the oral evidence that we have called—and I do not think we have troubled you with more of that than was necessary—we have a repetition and corroboration of the same kind of evidence that I have drawn from the books. If you allow me, I just want to add one word to that which has fallen from my co-defendant regarding the justice and openness of our case. I gave to the prosecution, at very considerable trouble, the name of every book I was going to use, and in the two books I used yesterday, I gave the precise references to each page to be quoted and its bearing upon the corresponding page of Knowlton, where the same subject is dealt with. We did not, it is true, give every page and every reference throughout these books, because to annotate them was a work of great time and great labour, but we gave the references so far as we had gone, and a great many which we had not used at all. We called attention to every passage in the first books which we were going to use, in order that they might be able, accurately, to follow every line of our defence.

Was that the conduct of criminals? Was that the conduct of those actuated by intention to corrupt by the unfair use of the word marriage, or of those who would use the word merely to conceal their desires under the word to promote something worthy of punishment here? The books that I annotated are amongst the best of their kind, and you may judge from the rate at which I got through the two I used yesterday—though they were nothing like the thickness of several others—that my address, as originally intended, would have occupied some days. I felt the difficulty of doing as I intended even before the suggestion was given by his lordship. I felt the difficulty of keeping you, gentlemen, from your business advocations, taking up the time of the Court and of all connected with it, while I went over detail after detail; but, on the other hand, I also felt that it was necessary to do something, not, perhaps, so much for myself as to clear my co-defendant from the charge on which she was indicted before you. I also felt it necessary because of the words that were used by the learned counsel for the prosecution in opening this case, because if they had not been refuted they might have been taken as evidence, or, at any rate, as being incapable of refutation. However, I will say no more about that. Take now the oral evidence which we offered you. Remember that the witnesses did not come here predisposed in favour of a certain case or a certain theory. Miss Vickery, who, asked of one particular of which she was not certain, at once said so, and did not try to answer what she did not know. She did not come here to support persons guilty of possible crime, or of anything which in her view was a crime, but she came here to give testimony from the knowledge and experience which she has gained in her profession. She was not prepared to come here and support those whose views on this point, in her opinion, would have been a stigma upon her professional honour. She is a woman, and she read this book without seeing anything shocking, anything indecent, and you can judge of the value of her opinion by the character of her evidence, in which there was nothing audacious, either in the manner in which it is given or in the treatment of he subject. Dr. Drysdale from his wider experience, gained by his long association with hospital practice, was able to speak more fully and thoroughly of all this. Dr. Drysdale, I think, proved that within his own knowledge this book had circulated in London for twenty-five years, and during that

time had remained unchallenged by any prosecution until now. Again, upon this point, Mr. Bohn—a gentleman entirely unconnected with either of us, one of the most famous publishers of our times, one who has not only an English or a European, but a world-wide, reputation from his well-known series of classical and standard works, a gentleman retired from his business and living in privacy, who could feel no necessity upon him of mixing himself up with this case, or with a book which has been characterised as this has—Mr. Bohn came forward and told you that he had been a publisher on his own account for forty-five years, and that altogether he had been connected with the publishing business for a period of nearly sixty years. He has, therefore, great experience in publishing books, and full knowledge of the character of those that are sold openly. Indeed, he has himself published a great many physiological works containing discussion of the very same matters, only that they were discussed with more particularity of detail, and were more full in some cases. His works have been issued freely for many years, and he told you that he knew this work had been in circulation for a long time. He also told you that a work so rare that it could only be found in the library of the British Museum was the foundation work upon which those of Knowlton, Carpenter, and Kirke were mainly, if not entirely, founded. I am not now alluding to Carpenter's "Animal Physiology," but to his "Human Physiology," which I referred to at some length yesterday, and which I told you was used as a handbook and a school-book. There was no necessity on Mr. Bohn to come forward and give evidence. Now, I want to make this further remark, that all this evidence was unimpeached and unimpeachable, and that none of the counsel on the other side attempted to cross-examine any of the witnesses. I do not say that with any ulterior intention, or put it unfairly to you against the prosecution, for I wish, on the contrary, to give them every credit for having left it open to us to call any evidence we chose, and not to shut out any answer that might come from these witnesses; and when I say that, I do not mean to make it a matter of reproach to the prosecution that they did not cross-examine; I hope I may say that the evidence of the witnesses we called may help you in coming to a decision upon your verdict. I want to remind you, also, because it may weigh against me—although in common with my co-defendant, I may say that I have not

taken up this case in any spirit of bravado or defiance—that you should not pay any attention to the publicity, or, perhaps, notoriety, of my name, for a man's name may become notorious justly as well as unjustly, and one must not always listen to what the public impression regarding a man is. I may, therefore, state generally that this question is to me no new question; that for many years I have advocated this subject in public; that I have issued a journal declared to be Malthusian in its policy for nearly twenty years, and, as I told you before, Lord Amberley referred to it and to me in a speech which he made at a science assembly in 1868, and thanked me for having pressed this question upon the attention of the working-classes, and the same estimate of my labours in this direction has been left on record by that eminent thinker John Stuart Mill. Gentlemen, I should have been disloyal to my views enunciated long ago, to my programme in connection with the population question issued some twenty years ago, and thoroughly believed in by me ever since, if I had not defended this action. And, gentlemen, I ask you, I ask you confidently—do not think me too bold or too presumptuous when I use the word confidence—for your verdict of not guilty. Let me remind you again what the proposition is for which I contend—the proposition I have already put to you in my address, and stated again yesterday. It is this: Is it lawful or not to advocate the application of checks to the evils of population, provided that such checks do not destroy the fœtus after conception, nor the child after birth? If I needed to strengthen my case, which I don't think I do, I might show you by a reference to the extracts which have already been given to you from Churchill that he ventured to advocate abortion, and I think you will say it is far more moral to prevent, if possible, all conception, than to have recourse to such a check as that. My co-defendant has put that point before you very forcibly, and I refrained from characterising my sense of the inducement offered to procure abortion or to bring on premature labour, because, as I thought, my medical knowledge is not profound enough to enable me—for I doubt whether a man, unless he be trained and profoundly read in medicine, has a right to express a decided opinion on such a subject to enable me with confidence to dogmatize on the question. From our standpoint we believe that to touch human life in any way whatever, or in any fashion—whether overtly or otherwise—is the highest crime. When it comes to be a

question of saving the child or of losing the mother, and in that crisis a man who is responsible, a man who has been trained to the profession of medicine, and has had large experience in the practice of it, comes to a decision one way or the other, he has the right to act; but on such a solemn question it is not necessary for me, nor for my defence, that I should urge one way or the other here. What I do say is that to touch human life wantonly is one of the highest crimes. I leave myself then in your hands, asking you, when the learned Solicitor-General comes to address you, to remember that it is to you I leave the refutation of any matters in his speech which I cannot then deal with, and which, if I had the right, I would not urge myself. There is another speech to which you have to listen, and to which I for one shall listen with very great attention; there will be the address of his lordship, which will have the greatest weight with me, as doubtless it will deserve to be with you, and I will hear it, whether it be for or against me, with reverence and respect, believing that in either case it will be just, if it may be severe; but I will ask you, gentlemen, to remember that, after all, the ultimate deliverance is in your hands, and unless in your heart of hearts you feel that we intended to deprave and corrupt public morality by the publication of this book, I ask you to say that we are not guilty of the charge preferred against us. And after you have delivered your verdict, I leave myself to the greater verdict of enlightened public opinion, the verdict which carries weightier and remoter issues than any verdict here can do; and thus I leave myself in your hands.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: I do not, gentlemen, wish to add to the inordinate length of this discussion by any serious prolongation of it by many words, and so my remarks to you will be very brief. The question you have to try is a very simple one, though the broad one may be very intricate indeed. Let me say one word—and it shall be but one—as to the matters so ably urged upon you by the defendants in this case, and which do not properly arise out of the issue before you at all. You have heard it avowed by both the defendants that they challenged this inquiry, and tha they raised the question before you by giving notice to th police that at certain hours and in a certain place on e particular day they would sell this book to anybody tha might present themselves as purchasers. There is a police man, who is here as the prosecutor, in the ordinary sense o

the term; but it appears to me that whoever the prosecutor may be that is quite immaterial to the issue before you. Whether it is a policeman, or the authorities that are behind the policeman, it is quite certain that if the persons who challenged the prosecution had not been brought before you, the persons who have claimed the right to circulate this book to any persons who might present themselves and offer sixpence for it, they would have been entitled to say, and you will judge whether they would have availed themselves of that or not, that they were selling the book openly in the City of London, after having given notice to the authorities that they would do so. Then the authorities were placed in this dilemma: either they must institute proceedings against these persons—and a most unfortunate prosecution I admit it is, and, as I admitted to you at the first, and repeat to you now, a most mischievous prosecution in its character, and, probably, in its result—or they must have taken the other alternative, admit what they considered, and what they still consider, something more mischievous still—the admission by the proper authorities that this book might openly be published and circulated in the streets of London. That was the dilemma with which we had to deal, and the circumstances under which we felt bound to interfere. The prosecution is one which, I admitted to you at first, was likely to have the most serious effect; and I think I may now put it to you that it has, since, as the defendants have told you, the attention to the book has raised its circulation from, comparatively, a trifling to the enormous amount of 125,000 copies. It appears to me a most disastrous thing that it should have been so; but, from their point of view, it is not so, for they think the book should be circulated as widely as possible. But those who take the opposite view think that it is indeed indecent, and likely to deprave and corrupt the morals of the people. What were they to do? Were they to allow it to be circulated in that way, or to attempt to suppress it, as in future I hope it will be suppressed, by the strong hand of the law? That observation reminds me of another, and that is, that the circulation of this book is not an unimportant observation in relation to another question. It is unfair to suppose that if this had been a medical book, treating of the liver, or the brain, or the stomach, or any other organs but those which it did treat of, that it would have reached the circulation it had done. Why is it that

it has been circulated to that extent? Because, unfortunately, in a very great number of persons, particularly in the young, there is a prurient curiosity on subjects of this sort, books would reach a circulation of many thousands, while, if it had been a treatise on the other organs of the body it would, probably, not have been many hundreds. That is the sort of thing that this is. Let us go back to the question here. We must distinguish between the use of words (no persons are more able to use words in a more fallacious sense than the two defendants who have addressed you)—the motive and intention of the persons in circulating a book may be one thing, and the motive, intention, and effect of the book when circulated may be a totally different thing, and as I said to you originally, I did not care to inquire what the motives of the persons may have been. I would rather invite you—although some misrepresentations have been made on their behalf—I invite you to accept, for the purpose of this inquiry, the suggestion made that their conduct was actuated by the desire to benefit their species. Be it so. But there are some persons who take a reverse view of what is likely to be for the benefit of their species, and the question is, what this book will do when circulated? It is an entire misapprehension to suppose that a man's virtues, the desire of one's mind to benefit his fellow-creatures, will shield them from responsibility if the character of the book published is one which will corrupt and deprave the morals.

The Lord Chief Justice: But here they are distinctly charged with intending to vitiate and corrupt morals.

The Solicitor-General: Yes, my lord, because everybody in a criminal court must be taken to apprehend the natural consequences of his acts, and if the natural consequences of the act is that it will deprave and corrupt the morals of persons among whom that person's book is circulated, he must be taken to intend that.

The Lord Chief Justice: But you seem to me to acquit them of any such intent, while the indictment distinctly charges them with it. It is a strange state of things, although that may turn out to be a legal view of the case. It will certainly be a startling result if the person who is representing the prosecution in this case—the Solicitor-General of England—says that the defendants do not intend to corrupt the morals, and at the same time, notwithstanding, their indictment charges this, and they should be found guilty of having so intended and so done.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: I shall illustrate what I wish to show, my lord. Now, there is a sect in India, as all of us know, who advocate murder.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: Then their intent is to murder.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: So I say that this book is in effect to corrupt the morals. I care not what the intention was in the mind of the man not connected with the book itself. I shall put for your consideration that this sect of whom I speak hold it to be a holy sacrifice to their Deity whom they wish to worship, to sacrifice human life, and if they, in that sense, meaning to do right, should circulate a book which suggested the enforcement and necessity of the Thug practice, who could doubt that that was an indictable offence, and a misdemeanour in this country? I shall here (not that I admit the motives of these persons put forward as guiding them), but I say I rather invite you to accept that without inquiry for the purpose of the argument. Their notion is that the population ought to be limited, that it would be a desirable thing that conception should be prevented. I say that that is contrary both to the law of God and the law of man, and if they choose to circulate a document of that sort, which is intended to produce that result, and intended to produce that result in that way, I say that it is immoral, and under the circumstances of the case, an obscene book, and one which ought to be condemned by any jury before whom this question might come. I rather would protest against arguing, as some of the defendants have endeavoured to argue it, as if it had been necessary to go into some abstruse and recondite questions of political economy. I say that this is a dirty, filthy book, and the test of it is that no human being would allow that book to lie on his table; no decently educated English husband would allow even his wife to have it, and yet it is to be told to me, forsooth, that anybody may have this book in the City of London or elsewhere, who can pay sixpence for it! It does not require any abstruse or recondite arguments. The object of it is to enable persons to have sexual intercourse, and not to have that which in the order of Providence is the natural result of that sexual intercourse. That is the only purpose of the book, and all the instruction in the other parts of the book leads up to that proposition. Is not that so? Is not that calculated to deprave and destroy the morals of the persons

among whom it may be circulated? Look at the object of the proposition and the contents, that a man and woman may ["marry and yet limit their family," is a paraphrase of what was said here]. First of all, is that, or is it not, calculated to deprave the public morals? The recommendation, indeed, is that it may be done under the sanction of marriage. Do you limit your sanction, as the original book appears to have intended, as the private companion for young married couples? Now, gentlemen, I should also submit to you that it is an obscene book. Are we to argue it on that point? There is an unreality in the argument. If any boy and girl, of sixteen or seventeen, may go to Stonecutter Street, and buy it for sixpence, and when it is in their hands you are to suppose that the suggestion that this is to be done after marriage, will have a powerful effect upon the young inflamed passions of these young persons, and what they will consider themselves only to be done under the restraint of marriage. A young man and woman have this book put into their hands. They are unmarried; there are means in the shop of every chemist which can be obtained for one shilling, whereby ["they may give way to their passions without fear of results:" we again paraphrase for our readers' sakes]. I submit to you, that this is a matter to be dealt with, not on abstruse considerations, but with a little manly common sense. Let every man of common sense ask himself what is the inevitable result of disseminating such things among the common people? They are to study this, forsooth, to study these physiological details, which might do when we reverted to our original state of innocence, and entirely get rid of the ordinary state of decency which keeps certain subjects from common observation and conversation. But the common sense of mankind recognises the fact that we are not perfectly pure nor perfectly innocent. "Avoid temptation" is the Christian exhortation; is this, or is it not, temptation to circulate a pamphlet of this sort amongst the young? Ask yourselves what the inevitable result would be, and when we look at the third chapter, up to which all the rest of it leads . . . . [the learned Solicitor-General is here too coarse for "the common people" to read, and it is too much trouble to veil him in Latin, and impossible to paraphrase him]. What underlies all this means that you must have free discussion in everything, and that there must be an absolute free discussion to everybody. That seems

to be the suggestion made more than once by both the defendants. But that is a question, of course, which the tribunal which has to decide this question—the tribunal of the average English mind is the best that can be obtained. That is the question you have to determine. Is it, or is it not an obscene publication? It is suggested, Why you may collect from various books, from various medical works, equivalent passages to this? Be it so. What then? You may collect from Johnson's Dictionary the foulest and most obscene language in the world, by putting the words together. What is the difference? Who do you suppose would go and pay the two or three guineas for a medical work with plates for the express purpose of looking at the one plate which might represent the reproductive organs, and which treated of the diseases to which they are subject, and of the mode in which they are treated just to satisfy a prurient curiosity? Is that an equivalent publication to the one we have here? We will put that a medical book and the circulation of it under certain circumstances might be a most improper thing. The book itself might, being circulated in that particular way, be a most improper thing to do, and properly form the subject of an indictment. But we are not dealing with that question here. We are dealing with a book which does not profess to treat of diseases; what it professes to treat is the destruction of the conceptive power after the sexual act has taken place, and that is the thesis which is put forward before you. Gentlemen, of course it is for you to say whether this is a book which can properly be circulated in the way this book has claimed to be circulated; and let there be no mistake about it. This is the question which I invite you to consider. This is not a question of whether this matter might or might not be discussed with certain restrictions, and under certain circumstances. The claim is here put to you to affirm that that claim ought to be conceded to circulate this book in this manner. It is not necessary for me to do anything more than to ask you to read the book; and let me in one word—and I decline to go into their long discussions about the questions which might or might not arise—I ask you to treat it very shortly and very plainly. Is this book a book when circulated in this manner—is it calculated by the tendency of the work itself (never mind the motives of the persons who circulated it)—is the tendency of the book, which they admit they circulated, and which,

if they succeed in gaining your verdict, they will say that you have justified them in circulating—is that a book, or is it not a book, calculated to degrade and destroy public morals? If it is, then there are no circumstances which justify them in its publication. There are no circumstances which justify them by a supposed relief to human suffering, or anything of that sort; there is no such justification as may seem proper, though, probably, it is a medical work aimed at the cure or the prevention of disease. That which the work was supposed to do is, as I venture to submit to you, to recommend to the people a mode which is both contrary to the law, which is immoral, which is wicked in itself, and that by describing with minute particularity the organs comprised in the reproductive system; and, having described these details, proceeds with a degree of detail which I described before as filthy—and I do not retract my words — to describe the sexual act, and what follows thereon, with a degree of filthy detail, and all that because, they say, we are entitled to recommend to you the practice of checking conception and preventing life, and assume for themselves that, while they agree that if conception proceeds to a certain extent (I know not to what particular extent), it is wrong, they assume to themselves to discover at what moment the process of fecundity begins, and yet, after a certain time, it is not lawful, while before that time it is. I deny both principles. I say it is of itself immoral and wicked, and having submitted that to you, you will judge for yourselves whether it is true. If that is true, of course a minute description by which that principal object is to be effected does not become more lawful or more proper, or less obscene or less likely to deprave the public morals; because a minute particularity is given, not as a medical work, or that it is a work of science, but because it is a matter able to be discussed in public as a matter of national welfare, and, therefore, every boy and girl in the City of London may buy the book for 6d. I said before you were the guardians of the public morals, and the defendants seem to have fully adopted that, and recommended it to you. The case is, therefore, fairly before you. You are to say, on looking at this work, whether it is not an obscene work, and whether it may to-morrow—after your verdict is given, if in favour of it—be sold to anybody who applies for it, and the only reason I refer to the price is because it is that which enables anybody to circulate it, and

get it to be bought with the greatest facility. Everybody can, therefore, at that cost, go to Stonecutter Street to-morrow, after your verdict is returned, if your verdict should be in favour of the defendants, and buy this book, and scatter it broadcast over the country. I cannot believe that any English jury, having any reverence for the marriage state, for the chastity and purity of their own wives and daughters, can do any such thing, and, therefore, I do not think it necessary to do any more than invite your attention to what I have laid before you.

The Lord Chief Justice, in summing up, said: Gentlemen of the jury: There is one point on which I think every one who has attended to this trial will cordially concur with the Solicitor-General, who has just addressed you—that is as to the mischievous character and effect of this prosecution. A more ill-advised and more injudicious proceeding in the way of a prosecution was probably never brought into a court of justice. Here is a book which has been published now for more than forty years, which appears never to have got into general circulation to any practical extent, and which by this injudicious proceeding has been resucitated and sent into general circulation to the extent of thousands of copies. And when the learned Solicitor-General says that in consequence of the challenge sent forth by the defendants to the police authorities after the work had been given up at Bristol, that they were prepared to publish it and sell it with a view to challenge the question whether it was a work which might really be circulated, when the Solicitor-General says that left no alternative to the authorities but to meet that challenge, I must say that I do not agree with him; and when he talks of the authorities I should like to know who are the authorities and what are the authorities to whom he refers. He did not venture to tell us that anybody except the policeman who was put into the box on the part of the prosecution is, in fact, the prosecutor in this case. I should very much like to know who are the authorities who are prosecuting, because that has not yet transpired. The Solicitor-General tells us it may have been the magistracy. I do not believe it. I do not believe it. I, however, entirely concur with him that, however ill-advised may have been this prosecution, here it is. Every man has a right, even if he is only a detective policeman, to put the criminal law of the land into motion, if he thinks he has ground for so doing, so long as the Government of this

country thinks proper to have the administration of justice defective in that which, from this place I say, is an essential necessity with a view to its proper administration (I mean the office of a public prosecutor)—so long as every individual, however rash, however ill-advised, has the right to put the criminal law of the land in motion, if he does so he has the right to ask that the case shall be treated with due consideration, and shall be disposed of according to justice and to law. Therefore, we have the case here, and however much we may deplore the rashness which set this prosecution going, we must deal with it as though it had had the sanction of the Crown, which I do not think it has, although the Solicitor-General appears to conduct it. It is not a Government prosecution, nor have we any evidence that it is a prosecution set on foot by any authority which we should be disposed to treat with any great amount of consideration, but it is a case certainly deserving of your most serious attention. There is one thing in which I cordially agree with the Solicitor-General, and that is that no better tribunal can be found in the world to judge of such a question as this than the average sound sense and enlightened judgment which is to be found in English society, and I quite agree with what has been said on both sides that the decision in this case, when I have told you what the indictment is, and what the law is, rests solely and entirely and exclusively with you. If you are of opinion that this book in its details, or in its scope, or in its effects, deserves the character that the Solicitor-General says has set its stamp upon it, your verdict ought to be undoubtedly given for the prosecution. But before you arrive at that conclusion, you must carefully consider this work, both in its detail and in its general effect. The indictment charges the defendants that they "unlawfully and wickedly devising, contriving, and intending, as much as in them lay, to vitiate and corrupt the morals as well of youth as of divers other liege subjects of our said lady the Queen, and to incite and encourage the said liege subjects to indecent, obscene, unnatural, and immoral practices, and bring them to a state of wickedness, lewdness, and debauchery, therefore, to wit, on the 24th day of March, A.D. 1877, in the City of London and within the jurisdiction of the Central Criminal Court, unlawfully, wickedly, knowingly, wilfully, and designedly did print, publish, sell, and utter a certain indecent, lewd, filthy, and obscene libel, to wit, a

certain indecent, lewd, filthy, bawdy, and obscene book, called 'Fruits of Philosophy,' thereby contaminating, vitiating, and corrupting the morals." That is the charge, and here, again, I agree with the Solicitor-General that if the effect of the work is as the words here designate it, and the defendants did, as they openly avow, intentionally publish the work, and that be its character, they must abide by the result, however strange and anomalous that may seem; while it is admitted that they were acting under the belief that they were doing good in what they did, nevertheless they are to be held responsible to the extent of its being found against them that they published this work, which tends to deprave the morals of society. Now, gentlemen, as I have already said, you are the judges in this matter, and you have had this book before you, and you have had it in all its details and in its general effects commented on by both sides, and by this time you must be pretty familiar with it. I am bound to tell you what the law says about it. Although it is a law of modern times, and unknown, I believe, to the old common law of England, and forming a portion of that part of our law which is called "judge-made law," there it is—it is the law of the land, and we must all abide by it. It is not for the defendants to say that the law is a bad law, and inconsistent with that perfect freedom of discussion which is essential to the welfare of mankind. We are a law-abiding people, and no man has a right to set himself above the law and to defy the law. If the law is a bad law, an immoral law, or an impolitic law, and you have it in your power in any way to change it, to abrogate or reverse it, your duty, as a good citizen, would be to do so. But while the law exists it is your first and bounden duty as citizens to obey it; therefore, we must not listen to arguments upon moral obligations arising out of any motive or out of any desire to benefit humanity, or to do good to your species. You must not say, I will set the law at defiance, or, I will do what the law forbids. No matter what the motives of the defendants may have been, if the work is what the Solicitor-General for the prosecution alleges it, although we may think we see—and probably we shall be right in saying so—here, in this instance, are two enthusiasts, who have been actuated by the desire to do good in a particular department of society, nevertheless, if in this desire to do good they have done wrong, they must abide by the result.

Now, gentlemen, the law is this—that whatever outrages public decency and actually tends to corrupt the public morals is an offence. It is not necessary to load it with all the opprobrious epithets which have been applied to this work. It is enough to say that the work is a corrupt publication, that it tends to corrupt the morals of the population, and that it is, therefore, an offence against morality. But we must be careful in applying this general principle of law when we come to its practical application, so as not to abridge the full and free right of public discussion, and the expression of public and private opinion on matters which are interesting to all, and materially affect the welfare of society. There is a difficulty in a case of this kind in determining whether that which is put forward in the shape of a publication is matter tending to vitiate and corrupt public morals, or whether it is matter which it is of interest to mankind to have discussed, and which calls for an expression of opinion upon it. Now, the Solicitor-General, in opening this case—as he did also in replying to the case for the defence—has asserted not only that this publication is filthy and obscene, but also that the purpose of it—and all the details are intended to lead up to that purpose—is inconsistent with public morality, so that we have to divide the consideration of the subject into two parts. In the first place, are there in this publication details inconsistent with decency—details calculated to enkindle the passions and desires of lust, and excite libidinous thoughts in the minds of the readers? Even if that should not be the case, the second point is whether the purpose advocated in the work, and the purpose and effect of the details so elaborately given, is a purpose inconsistent with the morals of society? If so, the work is an illegal work, and the offence with which the defendants are charged is made out. If, on the other hand, that is not established, the defendants are entitled to a verdict of acquittal. It must not be forgotten that it is for the prosecution to prove its case, and it lies on them to make out that the defendants are guilty. Now, gentlemen, let us see what the work purports to be, and let us inquire whether it is published in the way of information or whether it is at all calculated to corrupt the mind of any one. I divide that into two parts. Is this publication in its scope and object a thing calculated to deprave and debase the morals of those who read it? That

is one part. Independently of that, are the details given, irrespective of the ultimate purpose of the work, calculated to inflame the passions and corrupt the morals of those readers? These are two separate and distinct things. Before I call your attention any further to the details, let me allude for a few moments to what, as it appears to me, is the scope and purpose of the work. The author, Dr. Knowlton, professes to deal with the subject of population. Now, a century ago a great and important question of political economy was brought to the attention of the scientific and thinking world by a man whose name everybody is acquainted with, namely, Malthus. He started for the first time a theory which astonished the world, though it is now accepted as an irrefragable truth, and has since been adopted by economist after economist. It is, that population has a strong and marked tendency to increase faster than the means of subsistence afforded by the earth, or that the skill and industry of man can produce for the support of life. The consequence is that the population of a country necessarily includes a vast number of persons upon whom poverty presses with a heavy and sad hand. It is true that the effects of over-population are checked to a certain extent by those powerful agencies which have been at work since the beginning of the world. Great pestilences, famines, and wars, have constantly swept away thousands from the face of the earth, who otherwise must have contributed to swell the numbers of mankind. The effect, however, of this tendency to increase faster than the means of subsistence, leads to still more serious evils amongst the poorer classes of society. It necessarily lowers the price of labour by reason of the supply exceeding the demand. It increases the dearth of provisions by making the demand greater than the supply, and produces direful consequences to a large class of persons who labour under the evils, physical and moral, of poverty. You find it, as described by a witness called yesterday, in the over-crowding of our cities and country villages, and the necessarily demoralising effects resulting from that over-crowding. You have heard of the way in which women—I mean child-bearing women—are destroyed by being obliged to submit to the necessities of their position before they are fully restored from the effects of child-birth, and the effects thus produced upon the children by disease and early death. That these are evils—evils which, if they could be prevented, it would be the first business of human charity

to prevent—there cannot be any doubt. That the evils of over-population are real, and not imaginary, no one acquainted with the state of society in the present day can possibly deny. Malthus suggested, years ago, and his suggestion has been supported by economists since his time, that the only possible way of keeping down population was by retarding marriage to as late a period as possible, the argument being that the fewer the marriages the fewer would be the people. But another class of theorists say that that remedy is bad, and possibly worse than the disease, because, although you might delay marriage, you cannot restrain those instincts which are implanted in human nature, and people will have the gratification and satisfaction of passions powerfully implanted, if not in one way, in some other way. So you have the evils of prostitution substituted for the evils of over-population. Now, what says Dr. Knowlton? There being this choice of evils—there being this unquestioned evil of over-population which exists in a great part of the civilised world—is the remedy proposed by Malthus so doubtful that probably it would lead to greater evils than the one which it is intended to remedy? Dr. Knowlton suggests—and here we come to the critical point of this inquiry—he suggests that, instead of marriage being postponed, it shall be hastened. He suggests that marriage shall take place in the hey-day of life, when the passions are at their highest, and that the evils of over-population shall be remedied by persons, after they have married, having recourse to artificial means to prevent the procreation of a numerous offspring, and the consequent evils, especially to the poorer classes, which the production of a too numerous offspring is certain to bring about. Now, gentlemen, that is the scope of the book. With a view to make those to whom these remedies are suggested understand, appreciate, and be capable of applying them, he enters into details as to the physiological circumstances connected with the procreation of the species. The Solicitor-General says—and that was the first proposition with which he started—that the whole of this is a delusion and a sham. When Knowlton says that he wishes that marriage should take place as early as possible—marriage being the most sacred and holy of all human relations—he means nothing of the kind, but means and suggests, in the sacred name of marriage, illicit intercourse between the sexes, or a kind of prostitution. Now, gentlemen, whatever may be

your opinion about the propositions contained in this work, when you come to weigh carefully the views of this undoubted physician and would-be philosopher, I think you will agree with me that to say that he meant to depreciate marriage for the sake of prostitution, and that all he says about marriage is only a disguise, and intended to impress upon the mind sentiments of an entirely different character for the gratification of passion, otherwise than by marriage, is a most unjust accusation. (Applause in court.) I must say, that I believe that every word he says about marriage being a desirable institution, and every word he says with reference to the enjoyments and happiness it engenders, is said as honestly and truly as anything probably ever uttered by any man. I can only believe that when the Solicitor-General made that statement he had not half studied the book. But I pass that by. I come to the plain issue before you. Knowlton goes into physiological details connected with the functions of the generation and procreation of children. The principles of this pamphlet, with its details, are to be found in greater abundance and distinctness in numerous works to which your attention has been directed, and, having these details before you, you must judge for yourselves whether there is anything in them which is calculated to excite the passions of man and debase the public morals. If so, every medical work is open to the same imputation. We know there are books which have, for their purpose, the exciting of libidinous thoughts, and are intended to give to persons who take pleasure in that sort of thing the impure gratification which the contemplation of such thoughts is calculated to give. If you think this book is of that character, and is therefore calculated to produce in the mind of any man thoughts of this description, then the work would be condemnable upon that point. Though the intention is not unduly to convey this knowledge, and gratify prurient and libidinous thoughts, still if its effect is to excite and create thoughts of so demoralising a character to the mind of the reader, the work is open to the condemnation asked for at your hands. I quite agree that a work of this kind sold at the corners of the streets—or capable of being sold at the corners of the streets and at bookstalls to everyone who has sixpence to spare—may be purchased by persons who think there is something in it that will gratify their prurient desires. But it may be contended—and it is per-

fectly true—that details of this kind are absolutely necessary in a medical or physiological work treating of the human organs, and which professes to give useful information to every person able to pay even sixpence. At the same time, you must consider whether the details given are calculated to do more than give you that fair information which every human being may be assumed to fairly desire to possess—a knowledge of his own organisation. But if you think that it has a tendency to excite unholy desires; if you think it deserves the character which the Solicitor-General has given to it, and that it outrages decency and tends to corrupt public morals, you are bound by your verdict to condemn the work. Now, let us suppose that you should be of opinion that there is nothing inconsistent with physiological details that may properly be given. I will not trouble you by reading extracts, because you have the book before you. Suppose you are of opinion that there is nothing in those details which should not be given. But here allow me to make one remark. We are not dealing with this work as a matter of taste or feeling. We may think it would be better that such details were not given, and so become liable to be placed in the hands of boys and girls. That is quite another matter. You must be satisfied that these details, even if not intended for that purpose, have the effect of corrupting the mind before you condemn the book. That is the charge or proposition which must be made out in order to bring the book within the reach of the law. Suppose now you are satisfied that the Solicitor-General was wrong when he said that, while Knowlton advocates marriage he advocates something else. Suppose you set aside that as groundless, and believe that the physiological details as to conception and procreation have not in themselves any corrupting tendency, you then cannot find the defendants guilty upon that ground. Now, we come to what, as it appears to me, is the very essence of this inquiry. We come to that part of the case on which your verdict must hinge. The argument with respect to marriage being hastened, instead of, according to the Malthusian theory, being delayed, having been disposed of by the author, we come to the point as to how the existence of over-population is to be dealt with, and the misery, disease, and immorality which it necessarily engenders in those classes upon whom over-population presses, and to whom it brings the most serious and fatal of diseases and con-

sequences. How are those consequences to be averted according to this book? It is by means to be taken, not to prevent intercourse between married people, but to present the consequences of that intercourse which naturally before place between the sexes in the married state, and therefore means are suggested which, having read the book, you are familiar with. The learned counsel for the prosecution, says, in emphatic terms, that these means are contrary to the law of God and the law of man; in other words, to prevent the natural fruits of matrimonial union is contrary to the law of God and man, and contrary to the sound morals which ought to prevail. The question is whether that is the view which you will take of the proposition contained in this book. Over-population, says Knowlton, is productive of abundant misery. How can we prevent the over-procreation of the species? If you check marriage, prostitution takes its place; and, therefore, the only possible way in which you can grapple with it is to allow legitimate intercourse between man and woman after marriage, but to prevent procreation by applying artificial checks after conjugal and connubial intercourse. Says the Solicitor-General, that is obscene, no matter in what form that is presented. There are three or four forms in which the preventive checks are proposed. One is specially recommended as efficacious, but it is open to the same objection as the others—that, it is said, it tends to destroy the morality of conjugal life. Now, there is one of these means which occurs to me in the first instance. Knowlton points out as a physiological fact established by long experience and consistent with the present scientific theory on the subject of procreation, that if conjugal intercourse is avoided at a particular period, and within a certain time of menstruation, conception cannot take place, in fact it becomes physically, or all but physically, impossible. Now, suppose a married man and woman, with limited means, and having as many children as they can maintain, were to come to the resolution to avoid conjugal intercourse at the particular period at which that conjugal intercourse mainly produces its natural result, would that be an immoral course of proceeding? If it would be an immoral course of proceeding, the man who recommends an immoral course of proceeding in an open publication is guilty of an offence against the law. Another artificial check suggested

[Knowlton, p. 39]. These are very unpleasant details in a public court, but we must deal with them. Is that inconsistent with morality? There may be a certain degree of indelicacy in such a suggestion, but the question for your decision—and for your decision only—is whether it could have the effect of corrupting the morals of those persons who resort to the practice. A man and woman may say, "We have more children than we can supply with the common necessaries of life; what are we to do? Let us have recourse to this contrivance." Then, gentlemen, you should consider whether that particular course of proceeding is inconsistent with morality, whether it would have a tendency to degrade and deprave the man or woman. The Solicitor-General, while doubtless admitting the evils and mischiefs of excessive population, argues that the checks proposed are demoralizing in their effects, and that it is better to bear the ills we have than have recourse to remedies having such demoralizing results. These are questions for you, twelve thinking men, probably husbands and fathers of families, to consider and determine. That the defendants honestly believe that the evils that this work would remedy, arising from over-population and poverty, are so great that these checks may be resorted to as a remedy for the evils, and as bettering the condition of humanity, although there might be things to be avoided, if it were possible to avoid them, and yet remedy the evils which they are to prevent—that such is the honest opinion of the defendants, we, who have read the book, and who have heard what they have said, must do them the justice of believing. I agree with the Solicitor-General if, with a view to what is admitted to be a great good, they propose something to the world, and circulate it especially among the poorer classes, if they propose something inconsistent with public morals, and tending to destroy the domestic purity of women, that it is not because they do not see the evils of the latter, the while they see the evils of the former, that they must escape; if so, they must abide the consequences of their actions, whatever may have been their motive. They say we are entitled to submit to the consideration of the thinking portion of mankind the remedies which we propose for these evils. We have come forward to challenge the inquiry whether this is a book which we are entitled to publish. They do it fairly, I must say, and in a very straightforward manner they come to demand the

judgment of the proper tribunal. You must decide that with a due regard and reference to the law, and with an honest and determined desire to maintain the morals of mankind. But, on the other hand, you must carefully consider what is due to public discussion, and with an anxious desire not, from any prejudiced view of this subject, to stifle what may be a subject of legitimate inquiry. But there is another view of this subject, that Knowlton intended to reconcile with marriage the prevention of over-population. Upon the perusal of this work, I cannot bring myself to doubt that he honestly believed that the remedies he proposed were less evils than even celibacy or over-population on the one hand, or the prevention of marriage on the other hand, in that honesty of intention I entirely concur. But whether in his desire to reconcile marriage with a check on over-population, he did not overlook one very important consideration connected with that part of society which should abuse it, is another and a very serious consideration. What the Solicitor-General has here put before you is, I think, very well deserving of your consideration. The Solicitor-General assumes, for the purposes of argument, that Knowlton is sincere in assuming that he desires to see marriage keeping its proper place in the institutions of mankind, that he desires, by early marriages, to prevent prostitution and the evils of celibacy, and that, even as regards married people, that which he recommends might be held to be consistent with a proper state of morals; yet some things that he recommends in marriage may also be made available by those who are not married, and every young man and young woman who may have a tendency to gratify their sexual instincts and desires without entering into matrimony have here a means suggested to them whereby they may gratify their instincts and desires without running the risk of having children. Say the defendants, in answer to that very obvious argument: "We have nothing to do with any abuse of what we recommend; we recommend it only to those who are married, with whom sexual intercourse is a perfectly rightful thing. We don't recommend it to those in whose case sexual intercourse is not a rightful thing, and if they choose to do that which is wrong and, in order to cover their wrongdoings and prevent evil result, they choose to have recourse to knowledge which is not intended for them we are not to blame, and we ought not to be prevented from recommend-

ing to the married that which could be useful to them because other persons abuse that which we recommend." Well, that is true to a certain extent, but, on the other hand, if that which is offered to the married, though in their case—and I say this only hypothetically—it might not be productive of immoral effects, yet if you extend it over the whole of society it may subvert the morals of a portion of society, and it becomes the question whether the thing proposed is not a thing which from its nature will corrupt the morals of the young. Therefore, it is open to the objection that brings it within the law. It is very true, it may be said in answer—an answer not altogether unworthy of consideration—that the reason why the law makes the publication of works of an improper description illegal is that their tendency is to corrupt the public morals; but in the case you suppose the persons are already corrupt, and are prepared to give way to passion and set aside the laws of virtue; therefore, their minds are already corrupt, and will not be corrupted by the remedies we recommend; they are already willing to go wrong, but for the dangers which they foresee from sexual intercourse. Well, that is very true. That argument may be presented in answer to the one founded upon the possible publication of this work to unmarried persons. It is very true that that answer may be given, but there is a reply to it. If the instincts of unmarried persons are restrained simply by the fear of the consequences of illicit intercourse, namely, the begetting of children, by suggesting these preventive checks you remove a salutary restraint. Therefore, it may be argued, not without foundation, that if the use of these preventive checks were consistent with morality among the married, you are offering to the unmarried a strong temptation by means of the removal of those restraints which keep many in the right course. These are the various forms in which this question may be put. I can only tell you what the general course of the law is. I can only repeat that if you are of opinion that this work of Knowlton's, although well intended, and although the publication of it by the defendants may be intended for the benefit of mankind, if you think they have taken an erroneous view as to the effect of the work, and that its entire scope is subversive of the morals of society, if that is your opinion, it is then your bounden duty to find the defendants liable. But whilst that is the case, it is for the prosecution to make out the charge they have undertaken to establish. If you think they have

failed—if you think these are matters which may fairly be discussed—that the proper answer to them is by refuting them by argument and not by prosecution, the defendants are entitled to your verdict. Or if you have any doubt as to the effect of this work you are bound to bring them in not guilty. I would only say in conclusion, that whatever outrages decency, whatever tends to corrupt the morals of society, and especially the morals and purity of women—whatever tends to have that result is, when published, an offence against the law. But that offence like every other must be made out. If you think it is made out, if there is a conviction in your minds that though they have acted from a desire to do good, yet in your opinion they have done wrong, they have then brought themselves within the definition of the statute.

The jury at a quarter to one asked for leave to retire to consider their verdict.

His Lordship directed that they should do so.

They returned into court at twenty minutes past two, having been absent an hour and thirty-five minutes.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE, to the clerk of the court: You had better call over the names.

The CLERK: My Lord, there are twelve gentlemen in the box.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: Very well.

The CLERK: Gentlemen, have you agreed upon your verdict?

The FOREMAN of the jury: We have.

The CLERK: Do you find the defendants guilty or not guilty of this charge?

The FOREMAN: We are unanimously of opinion that the book in question is calculated to deprave public morals, but at the same time we entirely exonerate the defendants from any corrupt motives in publishing it.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: I am afraid, gentlemen I must direct you, on that finding, to return a verdict of guilty under this indictment against the defendants. As I have already explained to you the motive and intention of the defendants cannot, in this case, be taken into account at all. If you find that the book is calculated to corrupt and deprave public morals, you must, although you did not think they had a motive to corrupt public morality, yet as their intention to publish was deliberate, you must find that as it is calculated to do so they had a corrupt motive in publishing it. Of

course your exoneration of them will be taken into account at the proper time, but I am afraid you must find a verdict for the Crown.

The foreman bowed, and turned to his fellow jurymen, some of whom also in that way signified their acquiescence in his lordship's ruling, while the majority neither assented nor dissented.

The CLERK: Gentlemen, you all say that the defendants are guilty upon this indictment?

The foreman again bowed, but did not speak, and a verdict of guilty was entered upon the records of the court.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE (addressing defendants): Under these circumstances I will not pronounce sentence against you at present, but I shall order you to come up this day week, when the Court will be sitting in banco; you will then be heard, as you have given notice upon a point as to the legality of the indictment, you will be heard in exception to it upon any legal grounds you may urge on that day, and if that objection should be over-ruled, the circumstances under which the verdict has been pronounced against you will be taken into consideration, and you can urge anything you desire in mitigation. Until this day week then.

His lordship then rose.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: My lord, do I understand that till this day week we are at liberty to go on the same recognisances as before?

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: Oh yes, certainly.

The Court then rose, and a large crowd which had gathered outside to learn the result, heartily cheered the defendants as they passed to their carriage.

FIFTH DAY.

SITTINGS IN BANCO.

JUNE 28TH.

MR. BRADLAUGH and Mrs. Besant attended the Court of Queen's Bench this morning to receive judgment on a verdict which was found by a special jury on Thursday last. The judges were Lord Chief Justice Cockburn and Mr. Justice Mellor.

When the Court met the Lord Chief Justice said: Mr. Solicitor-General, do you move?

The Solicitor-General bowed in assent.

After several unopposed motions had been made and disposed of,

The Solicitor-General rose, and said: I move the Court for judgment in the case of the Queen against Bradlaugh and another. I understand there is some difficulty about the *postea*.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: Where is the *postea?* It ought to have been made out and presented to the Court.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: My lord, there was some difficulty, as I understand, in regard to that matter, the Crown Office being unable to get it ready in time for the meeting of the Court.

The MASTER: The Crown Office has nothing to do with it; it is the duty of the Associate.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: Yes; of course it is the duty of the solicitor for the prosecution to instruct the Associate to prepare the *postea*.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: I do not understand, my lord, that that is the practice of the Court. I have always understood that it was the duty of the Associate and not of the prosecution to produce the *postea*.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: It is clearly the Solicitor's duty. I don't know how long it may be before you get it, and if you do not get it now it will be very inconvenient, as, after to-day, we do not sit in *banco*.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: I have not got the *postea* in court, but I understand it is being prepared.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: I don't understand why it has not been prepared.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: My lord, we have taken steps to get it prepared, and I believe that at this moment it is being prepared.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: Really, I must say that it is very careless on the part of the prosecution not to have had the *postea* in court.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: It is not the prosecutor's duty at all, it is the business of the Associate.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: It is the business of the Associate to make it up after it has been applied for.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: I don't know when it was applied for.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: Only this morning. It appears to me that that places us in a difficulty.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: My lord, I have never felt that difficulty, nor have I understood it to be the practice of the Court to demand it.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: That is not so. It is the commonest thing in the world to have the *postea* produced.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: According to the ordinary practices, both here and elsewhere, it is not usual to apply to have the *postea* made out. I am told the practice is equally the same on the Crown side.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: It is not so in criminal cases.

Mr. JUSTICE MELLOR: It is not so when there is an exchange to this Court.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: When a motion of this kind is made, after a removal by *certiorari*, it takes the usual course of a civil trial; and under these circumstances I should have understood that the *postea* would have been made up by the proper officers of the court.

Mr. JUSTICE MELLOR: It is not so made up.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: I would not contradict those who say so, but if anybody says that, I must confess it is an inconvenient practice. When once a case is moved by *certiorari* to this court, it becomes a civil trial, and I am

told by a solicitor of 40 years' experience that, in that case, the *postea* is made up by the Associate, as in a civil process, whether it is applied for or not.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: All the materials in a case of this kind should have been here, and, if they are not here, it is your duty to have applied for them.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: I have always understood that the Associate must send the *postea*.

Mr. Justice MELLOR: When was the application made in this motion?

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: It was made, at any rate, in time, but I do not know when.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: It ought to be ready in court.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: I think it is assumed to be ready.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: It is not assumed at all, Mr. Solicitor-General. The solicitors in this case should have asked the Master what was to be done.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: If that were so, there ought to have been no mistake about the thing, as a matter of course. According to practice, the Associate should have made up the record, and it is not at all usual for the prosecution to give notice for the requirement of such a record. The rule varies where there is no time fixed; but in this case it was perfectly well known when it would come on.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: The Associate cannot be supposed to make up the *postea* until he gets notice.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: My lord, that is not the practice, I am told.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: Do the defendants intend to move for a new trial or not?

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: I don't know whether they do or do not.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Yes; certainly we do. My lord, I have three propositions to submit to you. The first one is a motion to quash the indictment; the second is a motion for arresting judgment on the same ground; and the third is a motion for a new trial, which my co-defendant will make. I do not know, my lord, in what order these propositions should be taken, whether the first motion should be to quash the indictment, or whether I should make to your lordship a motion for arrest of judgment.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: I was not aware, at the time,

what course the trial would take, or what would be the issue which would eventually go to the jury—whether their attention was to be directed to particular parts of the work upon which the prosecution relied, or whether these points were set out in the indictment.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: I did not state my objection fully to your lordship; but I asked if I should state the grounds on which I moved, and your lordship said "No."

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: I beg your pardon, you did state the grounds. You objected that those parts were not set out. If the Solicitor-General had relied upon any particular parts of the work, I should have thought it worth notice, and have explained it to the jury. I should have asked them whether that was well founded. But the argument of the Solicitor-General was not that—it was whether the whole work was not an offence against the law.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: With all respect to your lordship, I understood your lordship to put it that I was not then moving at the time I should have moved; and I did not press upon your lordship the grounds upon which, if I had been in time, I should have moved. I stated to you simply that I moved to quash the iudictment.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: I declined to quash the indictment.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: I thought it was a refusal to hear the motion. If I had understood that you refused to quash the indictment, I should not have suggested to your lordship the grounds on which I felt entitled to move at *nisi prius*; but, on the contrary, I thought that your lordship said you could not hear the motion at all, and I understood your lordship to say that you would reserve the point to me.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: So I have; but if you move for a new trial you must state the grounds for saying that the indictment is illegal, and you have a perfect right to do so.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Quite so, my lord. Then I move to quash the indictment, or to arrest judgment on the ground that the indictment is for an obscene libel, and that the words supposed to be criminal in that libel ought to have been expressly specified in the indictment, and they are not specified in the indictment. In Archbold's "Criminal Practice," page 58 (18th edition), he says that "where words are the gist of the offence, they must be set forth with particularity in the indictment."

Mr. Justice MELLOR: That is, in a case of libel, it might be so.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Very well, my lord. And in the case of the Queen against Sacheverell, which is reported in the 15th Howell, page 466, the Lord Chancellor put this question to the judges: "Whether by the law of England and the constant practice in the courts in all prosecutions by indictment, or information for crimes or misdemeanours, either by writing or by speaking, the particular words supposed to be criminal must not be expressly specified in such indictment or information?" Baron Lovell replied: "I have always taken it to be so, and by constant experience we have practised it so, that all words or writings which are supposed to be criminal ought to be expressly mentioned in the information or indictment."

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: Yes, I understand that to be so.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Mr. Justice Dormer said, "I am of opinion that by the laws of England and constant practice in all prosecutions by indictment or information for crimes or misdemeanours in speaking or writing, the particular words supposed to be criminal ought to be specified in such indictment, or information in the Courts of Westminster." Baron Bury said, "I am of the same opinion with my brothers." Mr. Justice Tracy said, "I am of the same opinion." Mr. Justice Gould expresses precisely the same opinion, but he states it with a little more particularity. He says, "It is our practice in the Court of King's Bench, and we specify the words in the indictment, or it is cause of demurrer." Mr. Justice Blencove and Mr. Justice Powys express the same opinion.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: Well, we take it to be so from all.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: My lord, the whole of the judges, thirteen in all, delivered the same opinion, except that some put it more elaborately than others. There is only one case which I have been able to find which in any way goes against us, and that is the case of the King *v.* Christopher Layer for high treason, and which you will find reported in the sixteenth volume of Howell, page 317; but in the case of the King *v.* Goldstein, which is reported in the third Broderick and Bingham, page 210, in a judgment referring to another matter, it was then declared that the words in the original libel must be set out. The same thing was put in

the case of Zenobia *v.* Axtell, which is reported in vol. six of the Term Reports, page 162; and I submit to your lordship that the setting out of the words in the indictment has been the constant practice in the courts. Folkard, on "The Law of Slander and Libel," says that the libellous matter must be set out in the indictment, and that care should be taken to express it correctly. On page 773, he gives the form for publishing and selling an obscene libel and there directs the passage to be set out. In Mr. Prentice's recent edition of Russell on Crimes, page 219, he says, "The libellous matter must be set out in the indictment, and the libel proved must appear to correspond with the statement of it in the indictment." And on page 252, he gives another illustration of the same contention. Archbold, in his book, on pleading in criminal cases, on page 808, says pretty nearly the same. He says distinctly, "that the libel itself must be produced in evidence, and must correspond in substance with the indictment." On page 803, he gives the form of an indictment, and in that form he specifies that the words to be relied upon ought to be set out. On page 806, he says that the indictment must contain the libellous passages, and that these must be set out correctly, and on page 806, he says that besides setting out the words there must be averments to support the indictment on those libellous passages. What I would submit to you, my lords, is this—that the necessity for that procedure becomes very clear. Broom, in his "Commentaries," says (vol. 4, page 408) that the indictment must have precise and sufficient certainty in order that the defendant may know what it is that he is called upon to answer. Our difficulty, my lord, is this, that it does not appear from the indictment under which we are charged, what we are precisely called upon to answer.

The Lord Chief Justice: The whole book is complained of, and you are called upon to answer that complaint.

Mr. Bradlaugh: Quite so, my lord; but we did not know when this prosecution commenced whether we had to answer for the argument of the whole or for the language of a part.

The Lord Chief Justice: Suppose that they had set out the whole of the book.

Mr. Bradlaugh: Then, my lord, I should have had nothing to say.

The Lord Chief Justice: But if that had been so, you would still have been in the same difficulty. It is a book

and you must assume that that means the whole of the book.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: No, my lord, because the difficulty here is that I did not know, at the commencement of these proceedings, and I do not know now after having been tried, and having listened to the address of the learned Solicitor-General, whether the point which makes this book criminal is the advocacy of particular checks to over-population, or whether it consists in the alleged obscenity of some language in which those particular checks are advocated.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: Just so; that is a perfectly valid argument.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: My lord, supposing the advocacy to have been obscene in some points, or the language used to have been obscene, that would have been an issue definite and clear; but, even then, I should argue that the book as a whole, or the parts specified, ought to have been set out in the indictment at length.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: Suppose it to be so, then you have a twofold objection. First, that the book is not obscene in its language, and, secondly, that if it is obscene at all, the thing that makes it so is the advocacy of practices that are obscene. In the argument the whole book, it is said, is open to the charge of obscenity.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Then, my lord, I say that if that is the offence, it should appear on the face of the indictment I have to answer.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: No doubt; so it is if the whole book is charged, and, if the whole ought to be set out.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: I submit, my lord, that the setting out of the title of the book is not setting out the obscene words which it is said constitute our offence, and which we have to answer here. I submit, my lord, that the whole of the cases, so far as I have from reports been able to gather them, either put the libel on the ground of obscenity of parts, or of the obscenity of whole books. My lord, in the case of the King against Curll, reported in the 17th of Howell, which is the first case of this character which was ever tried and decided, the libellous passages are set out at length on the face of the indictment. There was one other case prior to Curll which was partially tried, but for some reason or other it dropped through. The first case, however, of an obscene libel which was ever punished by the

Court was the case of Curll, and there, as I have said, the libellous parts of the book were set out. And, my lord, in almost every case that I can find since reported in the books, the parts of the books which have been considered libellous have been set out. The difficulty we are in, my lord, is this: that, as the indictment stands, we do not know whether our offence is for publishing obscene words or for propounding a theory which the jury now find to be within the penalty of the common law. There have been, undoubtedly, cases in which the statute has very much limited the practice as to setting out documents; and I shall put it to your lordship that where the statutory limitation in some cases has been made it is ample for the support of my contention that there is a strictness to be observed in all cases in which the statutory limitation has not been made, and that this must be so defined in this case. Our difficulty, my lord, is that a new kind of offence is manufactured here, and that deals with the second point which I will put before you, that through the quashing of the indictment, or the arresting of judgment, you will say whether there is any offence against the law made out against us. If our offence be the advocacy of checks to over-population, we say that that is an offence which has not hitherto been known to the common laws of England.

The Lord Chief Justice: That is matter for a new trial, but not for quashing the indictment.

M. Bradlaugh: It is, my lord, matter for a new trial, and on that point my co-defendant will address you.

The Lord Chief Justice: Do you move for a new trial or not?

Mr. Bradlaugh: Well, I will.

The Lord Chief Justice: You are here two defendants; unless you now ask for a new trial on the ground you have stated, you cannot afterwards do so.

Mr. Bradlaugh: Then, my lord, I ask for a new trial on the ground that the advocacy of checks to over-population does not constitute a libel within the common law. I do think, my lord, from the dictum of my Lord Mansfield in the case of Woodfall, that it would have been also a fair matter for the arrest of judgment, but I do not want to put it improperly to your lordship. I say that the common law on this matter is the common usage, and this common usage commenced with the case of the King against Curll, before which no offence of this character was known to the

common law at all. But at the same time, to be perfectly fair, I admit that it was before that time known to the ecclesiastical law. Since that period, however, the common usage for at least 100 years has been to discuss checks to over-population, without any sort of limitation against such discussion, nor has it been even hinted to be an offence against the law.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: The difference is obvious. The offence clearly is in the suggestion itself. There are checks consistent with morality, and on the other hand there are checks inconsistent with morality, and the question here was, whether the proposal contained in this book for the use of certain checks to over-population was culpable or not. That was the matter for the jury to consider and determine, and they have done it.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: But they have not determined it; they had not even the power to determine it, so as to create a new offence.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: It is not a new offence. It is an offence against law to publish anything inconsistent with public morality. Before the case of the King *v.* Curl there was no decision on this matter, but judges have held from that time to the present—and we must take it to be settled law—that you cannot publish a book which is inconsistent with public morals.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: With all submission, my lord, I will put it to you that Sir James Stephen, in his work of criminal law, page 505, in a note suggests that "A man may write with perfect decency of expression, and in complete good faith maintain doctrines as to marriage, the relation of the sexes, &c., which would be considered highly immoral by most people, and yet I think he would commit no crime." The obscene and the immoral are, in this wide sense, distinct from each other, and I understood the contention of the learned Solicitor-General to be that those checks were immoral because they might imply, and, in fact, did imply incitements to unchastity amongst unmarried people, and I submit that even if this were so, you could not convict us under this indictment.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: As I understood the learned Solicitor-General, his contention was that the practice of such things amongst married people would have a demoralising effect, and would have a yet more demoralising effect amongst unmarried people by one of the restraints which now exist being removed.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Even then, my lord, I should submit that this would not be an indictable misdemeanour.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: What you argue, then, is that promiscuous intercourse might be lawfully advocated?

Mr. BRADLAUGH: I do not go so far as that, nor does it arise under the circumstances; but according to the case of the King *v.* Pearson, which is reported in Salkeld, page 382, —which goes to a length which this pamphlet does not— even supposing it had contained solicitations to unchastity, that would not have been an indictable offence.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: Then, Mr. Bradlaugh, would you say that it is lawful to advocate promiscuous intercourse, or do you say that if a man publish a book recommending illicit intercourse that would not be an indictable offence?

Mr. BRADLAUGH: I do not go so far as that, and the case of the King *v.* Pearson is much stronger than I would be disposed to contend before your lordship. That case is reported in Salkeld, page 382. I should be personally inclined to regard the illustration which your lordship has just been kind enough to give to me as a fair illustration of a libellous writing. But here I contend that there is no such solicitation to unchastity, no violation of public morality, no outrage of good manners in the mere discussion of such a subject as this, or in the advocacy of checks to over-population, which the jury have found to be depraving and tending to corrupt public morals; and I say, my lord, that this verdict has so been found, condemning the advocacy of checks, against the common usage, for works advocating such checks have been allowed to be freely printed and openly circulated for nearly one hundred years, and moreover it seems to me that such advocacy is peculiarly moral and reasonable at the present time in this country. I think I shall be within your lordship's remembrance if I put it to the Court that so far as the mere language of the pamphlet is concerned, no fault can be found with it, if it is once conceded to me that the advocacy of checks is anywhere permissible, and if there is nothing immoral in the checks themselves. If that is so, I need not trouble to contend that the pamphlet is not in its language immoral, and so far I think I have said all that is necessary for the sake of meeting the argument which has been used against me here. I would ask simply, may the jury construe this book, because it advocates checks to the population, as coming within a con-

travention of those unwritten laws which are specially against the depraving of public morals? An advocacy of a particular class of check being, as I think, permissible, I am entitled to advocate such checks here, because clearly there would not be the slightest pretext, if Malthus may advocate the delay of marriage in order to check the overgrowth of population, for saying that I may not advocate scientific prudential checks for the same purpose; and therefore it cannot come within the scope of juries to judge and condemn a book on that ground. If the argument is fair in the mouth of the Solicitor-General that this case is to be raised into a precedent for condemning that for which there has up to this time been no precedent, I think I am entitled to say that we should look with very great disfavour upon such a mode of extending the law of the land, and I say further that, if your lordship allows this verdict of the jury to be permitted to stand, a new offence will be created—an offence which has hitherto been completely unknown to our law. In the case of the King *v.* Hicklin, we see that which I am contending for—*i.e.*, that if it is a subject which may be discussed at all, it cannot be discussed without to a certain extent producing authorities and quoting necessary facts. Now, I contend that the right to discuss checks is permissible, and that there is nothing in the pamphlet which is not necessary and legitimate to that discussion.

Mr. Justice MELLOR: Is it your contention that if the subject is one which may be discussed at all, it can be discussed without violating the law, if the manner in which you discuss it is found to have the tendency to corrupt the public morals?

Mr. BRADLAUGH: My lord, I am contending that the Population Question is one which may be fairly discussed, and for my right to produce scientific and medical authority in the discussion of that subject, and for the right to advocate checks which in themselves are not immoral, and to urge upon people the adoption of such checks to over-population; and even if we should have made a mistake by publishing a book containing a particular character of check which a jury declares to have an immoral tendency, unless we have done that which we have done with a wicked and corrupt motive, and with a bad intention, there is no pretence for saying that we have done anything to violate the law. Nor can it be said that in this book there is anything obscene arising from an exaggeration, indelicate allusion, or highly-coloured

statement of fact, and, therefore, I contend that you ought to pause before accepting this verdict at the hands of the jury and thus create a new offence for which your lordships might lawfully punish us. If there is any word regarding such an offence in the statutes of the country, we might be concluded under this indictment, but if there is no such word we can only be concluded by the common usage of the country.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: There you are wrong—the common law of the country.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: An eminent judge, my lord, has put it that the common law of the country was made by the common usage of the country.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: We have got a proposition of law to deal with here, and not that it is understood that we are to allow a usage, however common, to override the law.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: My lord, I bow, of course, to your lordship's doctrines. Some references were made to the work of Churchill, who in the case of some diseases thought it was permissible to advocate the procuring of premature delivery. Suppose that the jury were asked to construe its illegality, although there is no violation of good manners, the book of Churchill would be indictable in the same fashion.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: We cannot suppose that any jury would be so foolish as to find that what a medical man may professionally recommend, in dealing with certain cases amongst his patients in the exercise of his judgment, in order to save life, might be construed into an offence against the law.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: I do not think, especially with the evidence of scientists on our side, that the jury should have come to the conclusion that the check which we advocate for the hindrance of our population is illegal, and yet they have so held. There are other grounds upon which I might urge upon your lordship, that we are entitled to a new trial, with which I shall not trouble the Court, because they are to be argued by my co-defendant, and I have no wish to take up the time of the Court unnecessarily. I have now stated the different points upon which I rely. It would have been easy for me to have gone into the matter at greater length. I would just add that I specially rely upon the first point which I submitted to your lordship.

Mrs. BESANT: I move, my lord, as my co-defendant has just done, to quash the indictment: in the first place, on the very ground put by the Lord Chief Justice—viz., that the

whole of the book is supposed to be in the indictment, and, therefore, that the whole of the book must be taken to be obscene.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: No, no. You put it wrongly. Not the whole of the book, but the book as a whole, is obscene.

Mrs. BESANT: The book, as a whole, is to be taken as obscene. But your lordship drew the distinction between the checks that are advocated and those parts of the book which are not obscene, and I put it to your lordships that the jury in their verdict did not draw that distinction, and that from the verdict of the jury we have no means of knowing what parts of the book they condemn.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: They condemn the whole of it.

Mrs. BESANT: They condemn the whole of it; and if I publish another pamphlet in which I should leave out those parts containing the advocacy of checks to population, that pamphlet would also be condemned, because the advocacy of the law of population is condemned by that verdict.

Mr. JUSTICE MELLOR: No.

Mrs. BESANT: My lord, should we not, by that verdict of the jury, know what it is that constitutes our offence?

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: Your offence is that of publishing such a book as has been declared to be obscene.

Mrs. BESANT: But, my lord, is it for advocating the checks to population that we are condemned?

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: I am bound to say that is the gist of the inquiry.

Mrs. BESANT: My lord, I feel that it is, but the jury did not say so.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: I agree that the language of the book is not open to any particular objection, and if it had been a medical book it would have been still less objectionable. The question is, are you entitled to say that it is a medical work? When we come to the checks proposed, that was a question for the jury, and it was for them to say whether the proposals were such as ought to be practised at all, and without considering whether your motive was this or that, or that you published the book with this or that object, whether the book was one consistent with public morality or not. That was the issue, and it was determined against you.

Mrs. BESANT: When I come to the arguments for a new

trial I shall put it to you that a jury ought not to be permitted, without grave hesitation, to lay down the law on a question of ethics which has never yet been decided, and to decide that the practices recommended by Churchill were right as a recommendation to be made by a medical man, and that another recommendation which is made by another medical man — Dr. Knowlton — was wrong. Besides, there is this difference between the two recommendations, that in the first it is advocated under certain circumstances to destroy life, and in the second the recommendation is that there should be no necessity for destroying life at all. I will therefore move that the verdict entered on behalf of the Crown should really and truly have been entered for the defendants, on the ground that the verdict was a special verdict, and was really a verdict of not guilty. And I move for a new trial on the ground that the form of words used in the delivery of the verdict was self-contradictory, was utterly against the weight of evidence, and that when the verdict was brought in, it was recorded as a verdict of guilty by misdirection. I feel there might be a difficulty here in speaking of misdirection, were it not that I am practically appealing from the decision of the Lord Chief Justice at *Nisi Prius* to the Lord Chief Justice in *Banco*, and I am therefore sure of a patient hearing. The verdict as given, was: "We are of opinion that the book is calculated to deprave the public morals, but we entirely exonerate the defendants from any corrupt motive in publishing the book;" and in the indictment, one copy of which has been handed up to the Bench, we were charged with a wicked and corrupt motive.

The Lord Chief Justice: I did not so regard it.

Mrs. Besant: We are distinctly charged with having a corrupt intention, and with the object in the publication of the book of corrupting public morals. We are charged with having intended to have caused a corruption of public morals by having published an obscene book. However, my lord, I contend that the special verdict is a verdict of not guilty, because a corrupt intention is distinctly charged in the indictment, and the jury have specifically acquitted us of the corrupt intention. If the jury had returned a verdict of guilty, of course I should not have had the right to make this motion, for a verdict of guilty on the indictment would necessarily imply, or at least it would presuppose, a corrupt intention, and such a corrupt intention

must have been found to bring us in guilty. Where the jury, however, brought in a special verdict and particularly put the negative on the intention, in that case I contend that they have negatived a vital part of the indictment, and cannot bring us in guilty on the whole, the special verdict having specifically declared that we are not guilty of such a corrupt intention. I find that Lord Mansfield laid it down in the case of the King *v.* Woodfall, which is reported in Howell's State Trials, vol. 20, column 919, that this must be so. The verdict there was in the nature of a special verdict, although the phraseology used in favour of the accused was not so strong as that on which I am addressing your lordship. I find Lord Mansfield laid it down there: "That where an act in itself indifferent, if done with a particular intent, becomes criminal, there the intent must be proved and found; but where the act is in itself unlawful, as in this case, the proof of justification, or excuse, lies on the defendants, and in failure thereof, the law implies a criminal intent." I urge upon your lordships that we have not failed in proving our intention to be good, because the jury expressly exonerated us of any criminal intention, and I quote Lord Mansfield to show that where there is such an exoneration by the jury the verdict should be one of not guilty. I will urge further upon your lordships that where the act charged is indifferent—and in this case it surely is indifferent, because unless the intention is corrupt the book is not corrupt—the intent to corrupt must be proved: that on that ground also the verdict should be one of not guilty.

The Lord Chief Justice: I beg your pardon. It is found that the book is calculated to deprave public morals——

Mrs. Besant: Yes, my lord, to deprave public morals.

The Lord Chief Justice: And that being so I shall be obliged to hold that the publication of the book is contrary to law.

Mrs. Besant: When the indictment was drawn up there was no reason to suppose that a physiological treatise was illegal, and therefore the act was presumably an indifferent act.

The Lord Chief Justice: The person who publishes a work of the kind we are dealing with, and which is open to the objection found against it, must, whatever his intention, abide by the results of his act.

Mrs. BESANT: Where the act charged is not known to be unlawful, the defendant surely has the right to show that in the act itself there was a good intention; and I affirm that in this case we have succeeded in proving that good intention.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: There is where you are mistaken in your law. You do an unlawful act, and you are bound to abide by the consequences. You cannot say, "I disobeyed the law, but I did so with a good intention." Your business is loyally to obey the law, and not to do something which violates it.

Mrs. BESANT: My lord, I should not have argued as I am doing if the jury had brought in a verdict of guilty. In that case I would have loyally acknowledged your lordship's proposition, and felt myself constrained to submit to the decision; but where they go out of their way to find a special verdict, I plead that it is not a verdict of guilty.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: The answer to that is that on the part of this indictment which charges you with an unlawful offence, the jury have found you guilty. And if the part had never been written which charges the intention, I should have held that the indictment was good without it. It was not necessary to the validity of the verdict that the superfluous part should be found, and the indictment would have been good without it. If you publish a book which is calculated to deprave public morals, that is an offence against the law; and although, in the unnecessary and superfluous part of the indictment, there is no judgment against you, the primary matters not being objected to and being found guilty here, the verdict is a perfectly valid one.

Mrs. BESANT: Then, my lord, I must urge upon you that if the indictment is badly drawn——

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: It is not badly drawn if something is put in that might have been left out altogether. If it is useful enough for the purpose, the useful part is not corrupted by the useless part.

Mrs. BESANT: My lord, I argue that the corrupt intention is a vital part of the indictment.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: Oh, if that is so, you can argue it.

Mrs. BESANT: I argue that it is so, my lord; and that being so, that vital part has been negatived by the jury, and, therefore, the verdict must fall to the ground. I say

that a good verdict required that the vital part should be found, and that the part which really is vital is shut out by the special verdict given ; and I will put it to you on the authority of Broom, who lays it down on page 41, vol. iv., that in an act which is criminal, the act must be such as affects and prejudices the public ; and, secondly, that the act must have proceeded from a guilty mind, and must have been done with criminal intent. And I urge upon your lordships that throughout the whole course of English law it has invariably been held to be so. Your lordship pointed out to the learned Solicitor-General that it would be a most strange anomaly if a defendant charged with the intention to vitiate and corrupt public morality was, notwithstanding being so charged, acquitted of such intent by the prosecution, and yet found guilty on the indictment. My lord, there is no such anomaly in English law, as I shall hope to show you. Right through the authorities I think your lordships will find that a malicious intent is necessary to the crime. If you take the case of homicide, the offence, whether it be murder or manslaughter, lies in the intention ; and if there was not such intention found or supposed, the charge could not be sustained. If the charge were one of murder, the negativing of the bad intention would make that verdict for murder fall to the ground. The man could be prosecuted after for manslaughter, I suppose, but not convicted of it there and then if the indictment were only one for murder.

The Lord Chief Justice : Oh, yes, he could.

Mrs. Besant : If there was a count for manslaughter in the indictment, my lord.

The Lord Chief Justice : Not necessarily An indictment for murder would include manslaughter, because the greater includes the less.

Mrs. Besant : Mr. Erskine, arguing in the case of the King *v.* John Cuthell, which is reported in Howell, vol. 27, cols. 661 and 662, puts it there that the indictment charging the bookseller with publishing a seditious libel must say that he did so with a malignant intention, and argues that if the bookseller had no such malignant intention he should not be brought in guilty. He puts the very point I have just urged : " Let it, for argument's sake, be taken that such an indictment [for malignantly publishing] may, even as the law stands, be properly maintained ; but, if this be so, why should not the indictment, in conformity with the universal

rules of pleading, charge such negligence by a distinct count? Upon what principle is a man who is guilty of one crime to be convicted, without a shadow of evidence, or in the teeth of all evidence, of another crime, greatly more heinous and totally different?" That is our own case; we are brought in by direction of the judge guilty on an indictment which charges us with a crime from which the jury expressly exonerated us. Erskine might have been pleading our case as he goes on; he says: "The Libel Act lies before me, which expressly and in terms directs that the trial of a libel shall be conducted like every other trial for any other crime; and that the jury shall decide, not upon the mere fact of printing or publishing, but upon the whole matter put in issue—*i.e.*, the publication of the libel with the intentions charged by the indictment. This is the rule by the Libel Act, and you, the jury, as well as the Court, are bound by it. What, then, does the present indictment charge? Does it charge merely that Mr. Cuthell published, or negligently published, the 'Reply to the Bishop of Llandaff'? No; it charges, 'that the defendant being a wicked and seditious person, and malignantly and traitorously intending to secure the invasion of Great Britain by the French, and to induce the people not to defend the country, had published,' &c., setting forth the book. This is the charge, and you must believe the whole complex proposition before the defendant can be legally convicted. No man can stand up to deny this in the teeth of the Libel Act, which reduces the question wholly to the intention, which ought to be a foundation for their verdict. Is your belief of negligence sufficient to condemn Mr. Cuthell upon this indictment, though you may discredit the criminal motive which is averred? The best way of trying that question is to find the negligence by a special verdict, and negative the motives as alleged by the indictment; do that and I am satisfied." He asks, in fact, for the very verdict which was given to us. He goes on to urge that a publisher, whose whole life disproves the charge, cannot, "by virtue of an abstract legal proposition," be brought in guilty of wicked intent. "I positively deny," he says, "such a doctrine, and I am sure that no judge ever risked his character with the public by delivering it as law from the Bench. The judges may have been bound at Nisi Prius, as I admit they are, to decide according to the current decisions. I will meet my learned friend, the Attorney-General, in the

Lords' House of Parliament on that question, if you, the jury, will assist me with the fact to raise it by finding as a special verdict—'That the book, if you please, was a libel —that Mr. Cuthell, the defendant, published it; but that he published it from negligence and inadvertency, without the motives charged by the indictment.'" My lords, Lord Erskine did not even ask for a verdict such as ours, a verdict exonerating us from all fault; and he goes on: "If you, gentlemen of the jury, will find such a verdict, I will consent never to re-enter Westminster Hall again, if one judge out of the twelve will, upon a writ of error, pronounce judgment for the Crown." That contention, my lord, has been sustained in many cases. In the case of the King *v.* W. Owen, which you will find reported in the 18th vol. of Howell, it was argued that you must find the intention before you can find a verdict of guilty. Mr. Pratt, afterwards Lord Camden, says (column 1227): —"To show you how necessary it is to prove the intention; if there is an indictment preferred against a man for an assault, with an intention to ravish, the intention must be proved, or else the jury cannot find him guilty. The same of an assault, with an intention to kill, if the intention is not proved he must be acquitted. If he kills, and the intention is not proved—that is, if it is not proved that he killed premeditatedly, and of forethought—it is but manslaughter. Therefore, in the case before us, if that part of the information is not proved, that he published maliciously, &c., you must acquit him." Erskine, in another trial, pointed out that he had argued against Lord Mansfield on this ground, and that the legislature, by statute, had maintained his contention. You will also find that, in the case of the King *v.* James Lambert, Perry, and Gray, which is reported in the 22nd vol. of Howell, column 1019, that the verdict there given was "Guilty of publishing, but with no malicious intent." In the case of the King *v.* Daniel Isaac Eaton the same kind of verdict was returned. In Howell, vol. 22, column 780, the verdict is given :—"We find the defendant guilty of publishing, but not with a criminal intention." In that case the counsel for the defendant said that was a verdict of not guilty, and that the verdict must be entered so. The Recorder said that the verdict must be entered as the jury gave it, and when he was going to explain to the jury, the counsel said :—"I contend that the verdict of the jury is given, and that it is complete and irrevocable;" and he

urged that it was in fact a verdict of acquittal in the form of a special verdict. The prisoner was let out on bail, and the question as to the meaning of the verdict was referred to the twelve judges, and appears never to have been decided. The man was taken up on another indictment to the Court of King's Bench, where he was tried for practically the same offence. There the verdict given was one of "Guilty of publishing." The Attorney-General, who afterwards became Lord Eldon, moved the Court of Queen's Bench that the verdict should be entered as one of guilty, but he never took any further action, and the whole trial dropped to the ground. The verdict given in the case of Eaton was given against a hostile summing-up, instead of, as in our case, one which was perfectly fair and impartial right through. In spite, however, of that the verdict was not accepted as one of guilty. It stood on the record as a special verdict, and on its first delivery there was a new trial.

Mr. JUSTICE MELLOR: What do you say the precise terms were which the jury delivered in this case.

Mrs. BESANT: "We are of opinion that the book is calculated to deprave public morality, but we entirely exonerate the defendants from any corrupt motive in publishing the book."

Mr. JUSTICE MELLOR: Well, what happened then?

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: I told the jury it being found that the publication before them was a publication of the defendants, if they were of opinion that the publication was contrary to public morals, and if its tendency was to deprave, then the question of intention was not one of which they might take into account. The want of evil intention might be considered in the question of punishment. But a person that has been intentionally the publisher of a work which the jury found was contrary to public morals was guilty of the offence charged. Therefore the jury found a verdict of guilty.

Mrs. BESANT: I urge, with all possible submission to this Court and with every respect to the judge who gave the direction, that the special verdict of the jury, by all precedent, ought to have been put on record.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: You cannot argue so. It must either be a verdict of guilty or not guilty. It is open to you to argue that I ought to have directed the jury otherwise, but you must have, in criminal cases, a verdict of guilty or not guilty.

Mrs. BESANT: Such a verdict as this has been entered, my lord, as these cases show.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: If there was nothing in the verdict which was favourable to the book, then I must put it to you that there could not, in the end, be a verdict of anything else but guilty.

Mr. Justice MELLOR: If the verdict of the jury acquitted the defendants of matter essential to the offence, the verdict should be one of not guilty, but that depends upon the previous question, "What did constitute the elements of the offence?"

Mrs. BESANT: Quite so, my lord.

Mr. Justice MELLOR: I also think that the direction of the judge was perfectly unimpeachable. The intention was the publication of the book, and the part of the indictment which laid the intention was not proved; and, on the other hand, the intention to publish was not disproved. But the intention was to publish the book, and if the book itself be a book having the tendency to corrupt public morals, although the defendants have no corrupt intention, the publication itself is an offence, and, as such, punishable, and whatever the intention was, the publishing is no less an offence, the book being of the character found. Besides you intended to circulate, and in circulating the book you are doing an overt act, and the judge directed very rightly, I think. That is really the essence of the matter.

Mrs. BESANT: I am afraid I shall be obliged to press upon your lordships that, as the indictment stands, we have been found guilty of an intention to corrupt, in the words of the indictment itself, and it is not quite fair when that is distinctly done away with that the verdict should stand as a verdict of guilty on that indictment, although no such intention as is alleged is found.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: That is as far as you are morally concerned. The jury have acquitted you of any corrupt intention.

Mrs. BESANT: And, my lords, having done so, can there be a verdict of guilty? The verdict of guilty will be recorded on that indictment, and there will be no record of the acquittal of evil motive.

Mr. JUSTICE MELLOR: You are found guilty of an offence against the law.

Mrs. BESANT: In the cases of Lambert and Eaton, in both of which there was the same verdict as that returned

here, and in all the cases, without one exception, so far as I know, when it was moved that the verdicts be set aside, a new trial was granted. There was one case where the verdict was one of "guilty of publishing only." That was the case of Woodfall, and there, by an appeal to the House of Lords, a decision for a new trial was given. Lord Chief Justice Mansfield delivered the judgment, and he said that the word "only" entirely vitiated the verdict: "It is impossible to say with certainty what the jury really did mean; probably they had different meanings. If they could possibly mean that which is expressed would acquit the defendant, he ought not to be concluded by this verdict. It is possible some of them might mean not to find the whole sense and explanation put upon the paper by the inuendoes in the information. If a doubt arises from an ambiguous and unusual word in the verdict, the Court ought to lean in favour of a *venire de novo.* We are under the less difficulty, because, in favour of a defendant, though the verdict be full, the Court may grant a new trial. And we are all of opinion, upon the whole of the case, that there should be a *venire de novo.*"

Mr. Justice Mellor: There is no doubt as to what the jury intended in your case. They intended to find that the book was one which had a tendency to corrupt public morals.

Mrs. Besant: And yet they found that we had no such intention to corrupt, which, I venture to say, is a contradiction of terms.

Mr. Justice Mellor: You must not confound corrupt intention with intentions of a moral quality.

Mrs. Besant: It was presumably a case of malicious and corrupt intent when a book was alleged to be dangerous to the State, and yet, as I have shown, where the verdict was of this character, the Court granted a new trial on the ground of the ambiguity of the verdict returned. I have, I think, therefore, the right to ask your lordships, seeing that the jury were undecided for an hour and thirty-five minutes, and that, at last, they brought in a verdict acquitting us of all intention to corrupt, to grant us a new trial. It is not contended that the book contains language not proper in a medical book; and it is altogether a case of such difficulty that I think we ought to have a new trial, and so have the opportunity of arguing the case once more. Especially is that reasonable when so many cases are found where special

verdicts have resulted in new trials, and I trust that this Court will not make the new precedent of pressing against a defendant, where a verdict such as this has been given. If it is maintained by this Court that our demand for a new trial should not be allowed, a new law will have been made by the verdict of the jury, because the offence of advocating checks upon over-population was not known to the law until that verdict was given; and I will venture to urge that, if the verdict be sustained as a verdict of guilty, it will be maintaining a verdict of guilt of opinion, and not a verdict of guilt of act; and, however confident the jury may be that their verdict is right, it should not be allowed that they are a competent tribunal to judge of the character of opinions; they should have no power to bring the holders of such opinions, whether the opinions be right or wrong, within the reach of the criminal law. If you do that you will be acting in a most high-handed way, and introducing a precedent of a most dangerous character. You will be giving the right to a jury of stopping the discussion of any question on which they disagree with the prisoner, and to maintain that verdict in this Court will be to bring a large number of people within the reach of the law, because they come before a jury whose opinions happen to disagree with those which they hold.

The Lord Chief Justice: If you put that as a matter of law, I agree that it would be very unfair to create such a precedent, but I doubt whether this verdict does so.

Mrs. Besant: I contend that it does, my lord.

The Lord Chief Justice: You both concurred with the remark of the Solicitor-General, that this was a matter entirely for the jury.

Mrs. Besant: That is very true, my lord.

The Lord Chief Justice: It is not a question for the judge, but eminently for the jury; but now you say, although on the trial it was entirely for the jury, that because the verdict happens to be against you it should not be allowed to stand.

Mrs. Besant: No, my lord, I do not say that. I say that the verdict ought to be set aside because it is self-contradictory, and also because the decision of the jury was given, your lordship says, not against the language of the book, which they might fairly judge, but against the advocacy of preventive checks to population—a question of ethics which, I submit, they are not competent to decide. I

acknowledge that their verdict was supreme in the court below, but many verdicts have been set aside, and there is a right of appeal against verdicts given by juries.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: No doubt; but it was a matter entirely and eminently for the jury, entirely within their cognizance, and the Court cannot say that the jury have gone wrong. Why are we to take upon ourselves to say, then, that their verdict should be set aside?

Mrs. BESANT: They did not bring in a verdict of guilty, my lord.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: They did, indeed. They brought in the verdict they intended. They said, our opinion is that the book is corrupt, but we do not think the intention of the defendants in publishing the book is corrupt, direct us what to do. And I directed them that if they found the book to be of that character the intention was not for them, and that the verdict was one of guilty.

Mrs. BESANT: My lord, I will leave it, then, upon that point.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: They did not know how the law would affect the case under the special circumstances.

Mrs. BESANT: This verdict, I think, is of so doubtful a character that it ought to be taken as ground for a new trial.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: Suppose another jury had sat upon the case, and that they said the book is not one that ought to be published, but we think the defendants published it with the motive that they thought they were acting for the good of the people, or that they published it in ignorance.

Mrs. BESANT: My lord, that happened in the case of the prosecution of the publisher of Paine, and after the second expression of opinion the prosecution dropped, and the right to publish the works became admitted, and they are now openly sold. A verdict of this kind has, many times, been made the ground of a new trial before, and I trust you will think it a ground for ordering a new trial now. I simply leave that for your lordships' decision.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: Do you wish to add anything on the subject of the indictment now, Mr. Solicitor-General?

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: I would not have been sorry if the defendant had not quoted the case of Dr. Sacheverell. The decision of the House of Lords was, that it was not necessary to set out the particular words upon the face of an indictment, after the opinion of the judges was known.

In a note appended to the case there is a reference to the case of Layer, where the whole matter was brought up and discussed. It is to be found reported in Howell's State Trials, volume xvi., where it was contended that the matter that was charged was treason, and the act of publishing ought to have been set out in the indictment. It was decided that the opinions given in the case of Sacheverell were wrong. That is stated in the note to the passage in the report which was quoted by the defendant.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: The difficulty I have, and my learned brother concurs, it may well be said that the matter relied upon by the prosecution as libellous should be set out in the indictment in order to enable the defendant to demur. He might say we admit the facts; we admit the publication; but we deny that it is libellous matter, and we challenge the decision of the Court upon that. He may raise it when this matter is brought before the Court, and say that it is not libellous.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: I submit that he could not do so in this particular case. I am anxious to call your attention to the fact that the words said to be libellous are used in two different senses, and where it consists of obscene language, it is a nuisance and an offence against public morality. One distinction which will strike you is, that in an indictment for an obscene libel, which is a nuisance, he may urge that it is truthfully and plainly uttered; that was the defence made at the Sessions, and it is the observation and arguments that are made now.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: I do not know that.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: What we say is, that all libellous matter is calculated to injure public morality—and in this particular case it consists of printed words—and that it would be equally obscene if it had consisted in a representation by a picture.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: So we might have a form of line in the shape of figures instead of words.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: No doubt; but observe what we would come to if the contention were carried out. Could it be said that an indictment for an obscene libel consisting of a picture, the picture itself should be described, and not only the figures themselves, but the particular indecency which the figures suggest, should be fully set out. I am not aware that the question has ever been before the Courts in England, but it has been twice before the Courts

in America. But I argue that this matter should be decided by common sense. Whether the illustration is contrary to public morals, or whether it is described as a printed book, it is sufficient notice to the defendant to give its title, and, whether the indictment charges the whole of the book or not, to call attention to matters which will be proved on the hearing of the charge.

The Lord Chief Justice: What you rely upon was not the particular tendency of the work, but upon particular passages charged as obscene and indecent. Is a man to go through the whole book to ascertain what passages you may mean?

The Solicitor-General: If the whole book treated of is not indicted, but if the book as a whole is charged, one of two things would happen—either the whole of it would have to appear upon the records, or it would be sufficient to simply call it an obscene book. It cannot be contended that the whole of a book should be so set out—in this case the book we are dealing with consists of 47 pages, but it might be 447, then it would seem to be bringing the administration of that part of the practice of our law to ridicule—to say that the Court must have the whole of the matter which may be complained of, and which might be of the most offensive character, perpetuated upon its records. There are books which one knows to be of the most indecent possible character, and will it be said that all these books should become public, by being placed upon the official records of this court?

The Lord Chief Justice: I remember that in the indictment against Wilkes which I recently had occasion to look up, and which was for publishing and circulating indecent matter, that the notice of the book was not considered enough, but the whole of the indecent lines are fully set out.

The Solicitor-General: Yes, my lord, but that was before the passing of Fox's Libel Act, and up to that time that might have been the recognized practice. At that time it was held that libel or no libel was the question for the Court to decide. Then it was not a question for the jury—the only question of fact being that of publication. At that time it was intelligible enough that upon the records should appear that which constituted the subject of the offence, for the Court had to say whether it was libellous or not.

The Lord Chief Justice: This course might take away

from the defendant the right to demur. The defendant might say: I admit I published the book, but it is not a libel. You may say that it is a nuisance against public morals. I do not agree to that, and I want to see the matter which is to be brought to the knowledge of the Court for its decision, because I deny that it amounts to a libel.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: That is a question which, in the present state of the law, the Court could never determine. It is a question entirely for the jury. That, in my opinion, is one reason why the matter in contest need not be set forth in length upon the indictment. The Courts now have no right to say what is libel, or what is not.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: That is for the prosecution, not for the defendant, to contend. Suppose the defendant were to say, I do not desire to have the verdict of the jury. I take my stand upon the law, and say that upon the face of the thing it is no libel.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: I submit to your lordship that the Court could not decide that question; it would be exclusively a question for the jury to decide.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: If once the case comes to the hearing, then it becomes a matter for a jury, and a jury only. But if he takes the preliminary objection, you cannot avoid meeting it.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: The answer to that, my lord, would be, if it was a question of demurrer, that it is not a matter for the Court to decide.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: If the defendant says so, and I do not see why he should not, the difficulty would then arise.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: At the time I am referring to my lord, the judges had all held, as a matter of law and practice, that it was for the Court and the Legislature combined to declare what was the issue that should go to the jury.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: I do not care who has asserted these opinions: I venture to say, in my humble judgment, that it was a most preposterous and tyrannical law.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: This precise question has come before the Courts in America, and they have held that the indecent matter in the case of "The Commonwealth *against* Peter Holmes," which you will find in the 17th

Massachusetts Reports, the defendant was prosecuted for an obscene libel, and was indicted at the Circuit Court charged with circulating the "Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure," and publishing the same book, the same objection was made there that is made here. It was contended that the obscene matter ought to have been set out in the indictment. Chief Justice Parker says that where the charge is for publishing an obscene book, it never can be required that the whole of the obscene book or picture should be displayed upon the records of the Court, This would be to require that the public records should give prominence and notoriety to the obscene libels in order to punish the defendant. This was the state of the law up to the time that the prosecution of the Queen *v.* O'Connell reversed it.

Mr. Justice Mellor: Are you aware of any case in England where there is a conviction for libel contained in any book or newspaper in which the libel has not been fully set out?

The Solicitor-General: This book was indicted at Bristol, but I am not aware that any book has been indicted in this particular form till then. That is very recent, and that it has been indicted in this form is certain, and the person who drew up this indictment drew it up from that precedent. Both here and at the Old Bailey that has been done.

The Lord Chief Justice: What is the other case to which you refer? You say there is another case?

The Solicitor-General: The first is the Commonwealth *against* Sharples and Others, and the case reported in vol. 2 of Sargerton and Rawle in the Pennsylvania Court. There the indictment was for exhibiting an indecent picture, and the particular objection taken was that it was not obscene. That was the very form of the objection which your lordship put to me just now. It was said by the defendant that it must set out distinctly, so that he might prepare his defence, and that the Court might know precisely the charge it had to try. Then follows the argument upon that subject. Chief Justice Tilman delivers the judgment of the Court. The second reason urged, he says, "is that the picture is not sufficiently described. The indictment describes the position of the figures; if necessary the jury will judge from the description whether it is sufficient or not. I am of opinion that it is sufficient." That was stated when the Court was sitting *in banco*. Mr. Justice Yates

and Mr. Justice Brackenbridge were of a similar opinion. These are the only cases which I can find bearing upon the point. There is no authority in our own courts where a precedent of the same kind is to be found. In Dearsley, page 64, Queen *v.* Dugdale, is reported, and that is the only English case that bears in any way on this particular point of law. In that case the defendant was indicted for having these works in his possession for the purpose of distributing, and in his business libels had been printed for the purposes of circulation, but the parts held by the whole Court to be libels had not been set out on the indictment, the only allegation being that, in printing, he had done so with the intention of publishing obscene libels.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: The exception taken there was that the libels were not set out.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: I cannot find that that point appears to have been suggested.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: Then it is not a precedent.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: All that one can say was that it was a discussion upon a point of error, and that it was before Lord Campbell that the case was originally tried at the Middlesex Sessions, and brought here upon a writ of error. The case was argued before Lords Campbell, Cole, and Crompton, and they gave judgment upon the question, whether this nuisance disclosed an offence in point of law.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: Well?

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: That appears to be the objection urged, and coming as the case did before such a Court, it seems strange that the objection raised in this case was not urged by the counsel that were engaged in it.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: On a point of error you can only deal with the objection raised.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: And I say, my lord, that it is too late to raise any objection now, for I take it that the defendants are in the same position now as they were before the trial, for it would have been too late to have raised it even then. It should have been raised by demurrer. I say it was not competent for him to have raised the question as to demurrer at the beginning of the trial, though if the contention was good then, it is good now. Issue was joined, and the pleadings proceeded, and even if he had applied in time to quash the indictment, the universal usage is that the Court will not quash an indictment for defects, but requires that that shall be taken by demurrer.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: It may be taken on a motion of arrest of judgment.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: But if the Court had held that the intent was proved, and if it was an averment improperly made, your lordship must have directed the jury to find the defendants guilty, unless the allegation which was improperly made, was protested against at the trial. It is upon the Queen *v.* Robert Goldsmith, where the indictment charged overt acts and false pretence, without setting out the false pretence, that the motion in arrest of judgment was too late. You cannot make a motion of that kind on trial which ought to have been taken on demurrer. It is an indecent book, and the jury have found it to be so. If this is so, then the case of the Queen *v.* Dugdale becomes a distinct authority, especially as the specific objection was not in the higher court. If there was error upon the face of it, the Court could then have taken notice of it, although I think, however, as I have said, that coming before such a Court as that, the question would have been raised. It would produce great scandal to set out the words in an indictment, and would be putting upon public record such obscene books as those that are sold in Holywell Street, and yet that must be done if the objection is valid.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: Where do you find authority for saying that? The law applicable to offences by libel seems to act in this way.

Mr. Justice MELLOR: I cannot find any reference to setting out words. It was a question whether it was an offence to have such works for publication, and I cannot find anything in the case upon the point you are arguing.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: In the case of Dugdale, the point was not decided.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: Nor does it appear to be present in the minds of the counsel.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: It was argued by able counsel, and the point is not raised. It was raised in the American courts.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: Whose decisions are always to be highly respected by us.

Mr. Justice MELLOR: The offence was that it was a libel affecting the public, and not individuals.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: Just so, and that is the very question that is raised here, and the Courts both gave judgment that the books and picture were against public morality.

It was held that it was not necessary that these should be set out on the face of the indictment or the records of the court.

Mr. MEAD: I should like to add a word or two to what has been said by the Solicitor-General. I contend that this is not a libel in the technical sense of the word; and if it is so at all, it is so only in common parlance. If your lordship takes a dictionary, you will find that two meanings are given. The first, its corrupt sense, as something in the nature of a defamatory statement; secondly, it is described as a small book. Its primary meaning is taken from the Latin word *libellus*, and in that sense it is taken in the Ecclesiastical Courts of Scotland. It is used here in its primary sense, and it is not necessary, in framing an indictment, to use the word libel at all; and it is so understood by Archibald.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: They are charged with selling a libel.

Mr. MEAD: It is used here merely in its primary sense.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: What do you mean by its primary sense?

Mr. MEAD: That it is merely a small book.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: That is not the sense of libel in English law. It may be a very big book. The bigger the book, the bigger the libel. (Laughter.)

Mr. MEAD: It comes from the word *libellus*.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: We all know that; but in English law a libel is not a little book.

Mr. MEAD: In Archibald the word "published" is not used, nor is the word "libel."

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: Here it is used, and in our Courts, and has always been treated so.

Mr. MEAD: I contend that it is not a libel; and in the case of The King *against* Sedley, it is so put expressly, and the argument that it is a libel is not applicable to the present case. In the 14th and 15th Vic., cap. 100, sec. 29, certain principles are made applicable, as in common law misdemeanours; and one of the words is that the book should be obscene, and I contend that the word libel need not be used.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: I regret that the learned Solicitor-General thought right to represent me as having omitted to refer your lordships to the case of Christopher Layer,

because the decision was hostile to me. I thought that I have stated precisely where it could be found, and that it was a case of high treason.

Mr. Justice Mellor: You referred to it in general terms.

Mr. Bradlaugh: I am afraid that the Solicitor-General and myself must have different reports both of the case of Layer and that of Sacheverell, for it is impossible to imagine that any one in his high position would misrepresent, and it is almost as difficult to comprehend how a gentleman of his ability can have misunderstood. The Solicitor-General stated that the decisions of the judges upon which I relied for a favourable answer to my motion had all been over-ruled by the House of Lords. This is utterly the reverse of the case. The trial of Sacheverell was an impeachment by Parliament, and the decision of the Lords in no sense over-ruled or even questioned the dicta of the judges who were all agreed "that by the laws of England and constant practice in all prosecutions by indictment or information for crimes or misdemeanors in writing or speaking, the particular words supposed to be criminal ought to be specified in the indictment or information;" after hearing the judges the House of Lords resolved that the practice in indictments did not apply to parliamentary procedure. The words are, 15 Howell, p. 467: "It is resolved by the Lords, spiritual and temporal, in Parliament assembled, that by the law and usage of Parliament in prosecutions by impeachments for high crimes and misdemeanours, by writing or speaking, the particular words supposed to be criminal are not necessary to be expressly specified in such impeachment." The words of the House of Lords' decision are expressly limited to their own parliamentary practice, and do not in the most remote degree overrule the solemn opinions of the judges; indeed the Lord Chancellor told Sacheverell, p. 473, "the answer of the judges which related only to the course used in indictments and information does not in the least affect the case." In the case, too, of Layer, my reading of it is very different from that of the Solicitor-General. I have read the case with special care, and, with the exception of the judgment of Mr. Justice Eyre, I cannot find a single word to justify the view of the case given by the learned Solicitor-General; so far from all the judges agreeing to reverse the opinions in Sacheverell's case, Mr. Justice Powys shows that there was a clear distinguishment in the case of treason. No doubt Justice

Eyre is strong against me, but Layer was tried when party feeling ran high as to the rights of the House of Hanover as against the Stuarts, and he is only one judge against all the others. I quite admit that the note in Sacheverell's case is as represented by the Solicitor-General, but the note is utterly incorrect, as notes very often are, if made by those who have no special responsibility. The difficulty in regard to the American cases is that I have not had the advantage of reading them, and can hardly judge whether the Solicitor-General has fairly gathered their effect. I ask your lordships to dismiss from your minds one of the American cases that has been quoted, because it refers to a print, and not to a book. I do not and will not contend that the same argument should be applied to paintings or prints as I seek to apply here. I contend that the decision and practice of the court is specific as to the words spoken or written being set out. I ask your lordships to dismiss from your minds one of the two cases which have been referred to. In the first case my difficulty is that, according to the learned Solicitor-General—and I have no doubt that he has given the fullest information—there are two counts—the first count for publishing prints and the second count for publishing books. Well, without examination of the case, I cannot tell how much of the decision related to the print, how much to the book, or whether it may be correctly apprehended by the learned Solicitor-General, or with what correctness he has represented it, or whether he may be as mistaken in this case as I have found he has been mistaken in his views on the Sacheverell case. With reference to the Queen *against* Dugdale, allow me to say that it has nothing whatever to do with this case. There one count was objected to that it was no offence to have obscene works in defendant's possession with intent to utter. The errors specially assigned do not raise the point I now make; surely it is not because the learned counsel for the defendant in that case might have overlooked the point, that I am to be damnified by some decision which was not given. This is really putting the case a little too much against me. I assume the learned Solicitor-General only brought in the case of the Queen *against* Dugdale because the other English decisions were so much in my favour that it was necessary to do something. Again, the learned Solicitor-General suggests that my motion is too late. Now, I will quote to you the 14th and 15th Victoria, chap. 100

sec. 25, which says that every objection by demurrer to quash the indictment shall be taken before the jury shall be sworn. Then the learned Solicitor-General comes to the case of the Queen *v.* Goldsmith ; and here again I was utterly surprised that my apprehension of the case should have been so entirely different from that of the learned Solicitor-General. I rely for making out the right to ask you to quash the conviction upon the decision of Lord Chief Justice Bovill in that case, who, in deciding against the application, says : " If the judge thought the objection clearly a good one he might have quashed the indictment, and that would have left the prisoner open to another indictment. He was, however, not bound to quash the indictment, bad as it might be ; and further, he might think the point a doubtful one, and, if doubtful, he might leave the party to his writ of error or reserve the point. In this case the Deputy Recorder did not quash the indictment, but reserved the point not as to whether he ought to quash, but as to whether the count was a good one or not." I submit, my lord, that the Queen *v.* Goldsmith is distinctly in my favour, and I seek to have this point put before you as clearly as possible. I avow that, probably, though from my utter unacquaintance with the exigencies of special pleading, I utterly failed to understand how Fox's Act could be any impediment to me, and the 33rd George III., chapter 60, does not deprive me of any rights in this Court to ask whether there is, in law, any libel. I understand that the express wording of the statute is : " it shall be lawful for the defendant to move in arrest of judgment :" and that there is no sort of restriction put upon the defendant. It is an additional privilege or right given to the defendants by statute, and not in any sort of fashion a restriction of any rights they may have had before. I submit, my lord, that we are in this position. Instead of putting your lordships to a long trial and a *nisi prius* argument, as has been the case, if we had got the reports in the record, we might have demurred. There was a doubt in our minds as to whether there was any offence in law. If we had had the material on the face of the indictment, we should have taken the easiest and quickest steps to settle the matter. In no sense have I delayed the procedure, for the very moment I got the writ of *certiorari* I proceeded at once to give notice and get a day named. The practical effect of this would be that the Solicitor-General says the Crown may shut out of the record

what is material for the Court to know, for I will not condescend to discuss whether your lordships would have the right on a demurrer to say whether the indictment raised the offence at all or not. I should not have thought that a gentleman with so long an experience at the bar would have been capable of maintaining a proposition so outrageous. Surely the Court is the supreme judge as to whether the record puts any difficulty in the way of the defence ; and if the difficulty which he has raised with regard to the demurrer be well-founded, my difficulty would be this, that in demurring to the indictment without knowing the point, I should be laying myself open to a wild fight in the dark.

The Lord Chief Justice : No, that was not it. The Solicitor-General suggests that you might have demurred on this point—on the ground that the indictment did not set out the words.

Mr. Bradlaugh : I suppose I still have a right to move for the quashing of the indictment on the same ground?

The Lord Chief Justice : No, no.

Mr. Bradlaugh : Well, in that alternative I shall move for an arrest of judgment. If I am not right in my motion to quash the indictment I am right in a motion for an arrest of judgment ; if the argument on the one ground fails, that on the other must go. I do not know that I need trouble your lordship with the sort of appeal made to the feelings of the Court as to whether or not good sense required that the words of the indictment should be set out. I submit that it is admitted to be a distinct matter of law and practice that we are entitled to have the offence with which we are charged clearly brought to our knowledge. Really, my lord, until entering this Court we did not know—and the language of the learned counsel before the magistrates aggravated the inconvenience—whether it was that the advocacy of checks was unlawful, or whether the language of the advocacy was obscene. And we were left in that difficulty until we came into the Court here, and I submit that your lordships will not put the defendants in that position. I submit, further, that when the learned Solicitor-General pleads that on some other indictment, in some other place of which I know nothing, and of which I can have no knowledge, the same blunder was made, that your lordships will not entertain the argument for a moment to cover a similar blunder here. In Folkard, where the form of indictment is given, it states clearly that the passages are to be set out. I am

told that in Archbold you will find an indictment for publishing a print, in which the exact reproduction of the print is not set out. I do not pretend that in the case of a picture my argument would hold good, but I do maintain that the words complained of must be specifically set out, so that the defendant may see what is the charge he has to meet. It is clearly put on page 803. I submit that, bearing in mind the real verdict of the jury, this is a case in which your lordships would be disposed to give me and my co-defendant the fullest advantage of every objection that could be urged by us, and which would keep us from the additional stigma that would otherwise be cast upon us.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: No more than in any other case. If you can take objection to the procedure upon which the verdict has been arrived at, you are entitled to take it, but as far as I am concerned there is no difference between one case and another.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: I submit that the learned Solicitor-General has said nothing which would induce your lordships to say that the point has not been decided in my favour by the whole of the authorities I have quoted.

Mrs. BESANT: I do not think I need trouble your lordships with more than a word after the remarks of my co-defendant. The learned Solicitor-General seemed to be under some difficulty in regard to the English cases, for he was obliged to quote American. He was unable, apparently, to find a single one which supported his contention in the practice of our own courts to set against the number in our favour, and he was therefore obliged to go to the practice of the courts in foreign countries. I argue, on the contrary, that we are not bound by the decisions of the courts in any other country, however friendly that country may be to us.

Mr. JUSTICE MELLOR: We do not say that we are bound by such cases, but we say that we pay great respect to them, because in America they administer to a large extent the same law.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: I have to state that I have studied the law of Massachusetts, and that the common law of Massachusetts is not on all fours with the common law of England.

Mrs. BESANT: It is evident that the case of the learned Solicitor-General is so extremely weak that he could not find a single English case to help his contention, but is

obliged to fall back upon cases cited from a foreign country. As to spoiling the records of the Court, if the learned Solicitor-General will look through them, he will find that the invariable practice of the Court has been to set out the libels. I do not know why a sudden change should be made simply to injure the present defendants. In the case of the Queen *v.* Curll you will find that the libel was set out, and that it is the invariable practice right through. The effect on us of the contrary is most unfair. We thought from the indictment that the whole book was attacked, and we thought we had covered everything, and it was not until after the verdict of the jury was given that we discovered the crime alleged. Had we known that there was an objection to the whole theory of preventive checks we should have acted differently; but we considered, I say, that we had covered the whole of the book, and we were not aware that one special point upon which we had no information was the point upon which a verdict was to be given by the jury.

The Lord Chief Justice: I am clearly of opinion that there should be no new trial. In this case the question was eminently one for the decision of a jury. There can be no better tribunal than twelve men taken, as the Solicitor-General, I thought, happily expressed it, from an average of the intelligence of society, or one better competent to dispose of a question of this kind, namely, whether this publication was calculated to be subversive of public morals or not; and lest any feelings of sentiment, prejudice, or passion might interfere with the deliberate judgment of the jury, I thought it right—especially after the powerful address of the learned Solicitor-General in reply, when he appeared to me to address himself to the sentiment as well as to the judgment of the jury—I thought it ought to bring the case finally before them in all the various aspects in which it has been presented for discussion, and without the slightest desire in one way or the other to bias or influence the judgment of the jury, who, I thought, ought to proceed from their own spontaneous sense of what was right. All parties, at that time, seemed to be agreed that the question was one for a jury, and exclusively for a jury, and I left it to the jury. I presented to them the case from all the different points of view, and, finally, repeated to them what had been said on one side and on the other, and the various views of the case

which had been advocated by the prosecution and by the defendants. The jury were a most patient and attentive jury, and listened in uninterrupted attention and care to all that was said. They took time to deliberate, and they pronounced a verdict that this book is a book which ought not to have been published, and that it is a book calculated to deprave public morals. Now, that being so, there is nothing brought before us that, in my opinion, turns on the question of fact as to whether this book was a proper or improper one, or that calls for a review of the judgment and decision of the jury. But it is said that it is open for the defendants to contend that the verdict of the jury was not a verdict of guilty. Now I think that the contention is wrong. The jury were evidently in doubt as to the effect of the facts upon which their minds were agreed. They were agreed that the tendency and effect of the book was to corrupt public morals; but, on the other hand, they were satisfied that, under the influence of a strong belief that the evils of over-population were so great that it was desirable to have recourse to means of preventive checks, and that, impelled by this opinion and desire, the defendants had published this work, but not with the intention to corrupt the morals of young or old. The jury specially found upon these facts, and it was my duty to tell the jury and I believe so now, that where persons publish a word which is contrary to the morals of mankind, and they do that with their eyes open, it is not for them afterwards to say, "I did that either with the view of doing something in itself so good as to warrant the infraction of the law," or to say, "I did it in ignorance of the law." Nobody can allege either of these two things as an excuse for a breach of the law; no one can put himself above the law, no one can refuse obedience to the law. I think, therefore, that upon the facts found by the jury I was right to tell the jury that it amounted to a verdict of guilty. In that direction they acquiesced, and returned a verdict of guilty, evidently taking the view that I had done. The foreman turned round and took the opinion of the jury, and they acquiesced. I think, therefore, there can be no question as to a new trial, either upon the ground that the verdict was in the first instance a special one, or that the verdict was not in accordance with the facts which were before them. It is said that although there could be no new trial, as the verdict of the jury was conclusive on the facts, nevertheless the

indictment cannot be sustained and that we ought now to arrest the judgment upon the verdict by reason of the legal insufficiency of the indictment. Well, that is founded upon this proposition, that in an indictment for libel where the libellous matter consists of words, the words must be set out in order, so that the defendant may know what it is that he is called upon to answer, and that if he chooses to take the legal objections, which he may do on demurrer, on the sufficiency of the indictment, he may have the opportunity of doing so. We agree with that proposition. It is said that it would be highly inconvenient that obscene matters should be set out upon the records of the court, and that the same argument and the same rule would apply to the case of an indecent print which applied to the case of indecent words, and that it would be impossible, or at all events in the highest degree objectionable, to exhibit an indecent print upon an indictment which would afterwards form part of the records of this court. We have had pressed upon us two decisions of the American courts in banco, which we treat with the utmost respect. These decisions are not so conclusive upon us as if they were decisions of courts having equal jurisdiction in this country, but we look to the decisions of the American courts with very great respect, and take advantage of them in the solution of questions of law. Putting these decisions on one side, the question of convenience presses upon us strongly. I agree that where particular passages in the work, as contradistinguished from the work itself, are made the subject-matter of an indictment, it would be highly expedient that the attention of those against whom the publication of such matters is made the subject-matter of an indictment and a prosecution, should have the opportunity of knowing what it is that they are to direct their defence upon, and what the attention of the jury will be afterwards directed to. I admit that; but on the other hand if not particular portions of the work, but the work itself in its entirety and as a whole is made the subject-matter of a prosecution, one cannot but see that it would lead to the greatest inconvenience to have the whole of the work, set out from beginning to end. We were told the other day that a prosecution has recently been instituted, or was about to be instituted, in respect of the publication of the "Memoirs of the Comte de Grammont," on the ground that that was an indecent and obscene publication, because it

describes with a great deal of particularity the licentious habits of the court of Charles II. While I don't express any opinion with reference to a prosecution founded upon the publication of a work which has existed for a great many years, and which has gone through many editions and been translated into several languages, I merely mention that as an instance of what would be the monstrous inconvenience of setting out *in extenso* the whole of the publication, which might consist of two or three volumes. With regard to many other works which could be mentioned which are more or less of an indecent and indelicate character, and more or less inconsistent with good morals, and which may therefore be made the subject matter of an indictment, where the objection to the work is not that it contains particular passages which are objectionable, but that it is objectionable *in toto*, it would lead to a degree of inconvenience that we cannot help taking notice of. At the same time there is a good deal to be said on both sides, but I do not think it was competent that I could proceed upon that to quash the indictment. The Solicitor-General said the defendants should have applied earlier if they desired to have the indictment quashed. For that reason it appears to me that I went too far, and that I was not called upon to give leave to move upon it. I do not think I was competent to do it. I do not think the defendants could have an advantage of that sort. With reference to this objection the difficulty I feel is that that objection must have been taken by demurrer. If the omission be set out in the indictment, the specific matter upon which the offence is alleged to rest—if that be the objection, and it be a valid one, it is an objection that must have been taken by demurrer, and, therefore, not without some sense of the exigencies of the case as put in the arguments used by the defendants. I cannot help thinking that, upon the balance of convenience of the authorities we shall do more wisely to say that the judgment pronounced upon this indictment ought not to be set aside by making the motion absolute to arrest the judgment; but if there be any valid foundation for the contention the defendants have raised upon the indictment it should be taken by demurrer. As far as we are concerned, it will not be necessary to act upon it, the more so because the balance of convenience or inconvenience, looking to the particular nature of this form of libel—it is not specifically within the law of libel, but in

saying that it does not come within the category of a libel, it, to a certain extent, arises out of the law of libel generally, as it is *commune documentum*—which renders it not a matter for the Crown on the one hand or a particular individual on the other, but a matter complaint as to which arises as to its being subversive of the public morals and therefore a matter of public nuisance. Therefore, I cannot feel that the authorities which have been cited for the purpose of showing that in an indictment for libel the words must be specially set forth, applies to this case. There are the inconveniences under which the defendant may labour, so that he may be put to the inconvenience and expense of a further trial, when judgment should be given in his favour at once. You will find that advantage is not in this form of indictment, and I think it is an advantage of which it is very hard that the defendants should be deprived. There is that inconvenience on the one side. We shall, therefore, shelter ourselves under the decisions of the American courts, but we leave this matter to be carefully gone into by the Court of Error. I do not think that there should be any new trial nor any rule for an arrest of judgment.

Mr. Justice Mellor: I am of the same opinion; I quite think there is no ground urged for a new trial, and that some of the points raised for a new trial are more properly points for an arrest of judgment. One point was raised by Mrs. Besent, which had considerable *primâ facie* ingenuity, that on the question as to the intention of the parties to publish this book, the jury had found there was no corrupt intention, and, therefore, the jury had not found on an essential part of the indictment. I have already expressed the opinion in regard to that, that the jury have found that the book was calculated to corrupt the morals, and that was not denied, although the corrupt intention was denied. It appears to me that, upon the finding of the jury, and upon the facts of the case, there could be no objection to the verdict upon that ground. I say if a person publishes a book calculated to deprave, although his own intention may not be malicious, wicked, or immoral, still the very fact of the intention to publish a book which is calculated, and which the jury have found is calculated, to produce great damage to the morals of the community, makes it, therefore, a book which comes within the rule which applies to this prosecution in so far as the public is concerned; and it appears to me that no objection can be taken on that

ground. I also think the course taken with regard to the finding of the jury was rightly taken by the Lord Chief Justice. If he had said just before the conclusion of his summing-up : " If you find that so and so, if they did not do so in meaning, yet did so in substance, you must find the defendants guilty," there could be no possible form of objection urged to it. But it is said that because the jury has found what Mrs. Besant calls a special verdict as to the essential fact, coupled with the expression that they were not guilty of the offence stated in the indictment, the Lord Chief Justice ought to have directed the jury to return a verdict of not guilty. The Lord Chief Justice took the right course. The jury were asked if they understood that they were finding a verdict of guilty and they said they did. You cannot say, therefore, that anything arises by way of error or arrest of judgment; with regard to the other point, there is nothing which renders it undesirable that an objection of this character should be taken by demurrer upon the indictment. It is a point of demurrer. If it is taken on demurrer, judgment is at once given for the defendant if the demurrer succeeds. It was not taken upon demurrer, which I think would have been the wisest, best, and easiest course when dealing with this case to see that it contained the offence. There are the gravest doubts whether the point would have been successful on demurrer, but the jury have now interpreted and applied the general description to the book in the indictment as obscene. But if it be an essential and most material part of the indictment to set forth the terms in which the libel was published, that is still a question that may be taken on error, but it cannot be made available for arrest of judgment. We do not arrest judgment unless we are satisfied that there has been some error. My contention is that there has been none; whether that be so or not I am clear now that the only remedy which is open to the defendants is by bringing error on the indictment, so as to obtain the opinion of the highest tribunal to see whether it is so essential a part of the procedure that it vitiates utterly and entirely the whole proceedings. Therefore I can see no ground for either setting aside the verdict or for arrest of judgment.

Mr. BRADLAUGH : Might I ask your lordship to stay execution until the error is determined? There are cases of misdemeanour in which that has been done.

Here the Court adjourned for luncheon. On re-assembling,

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL said: I now pray the judgment of the Court, the record being now in Court. My lord, I have two affidavits, and I have to say that no notice of them has been given to the defendants as the persons who have made the affidavits could only be found last night, and consequently they have only been made this morning.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: Have you any affidavits?

Mr. BRADLAUGH: None at all, my lord.

Master Cockburn then read the following affidavit:—

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE.

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION.

THE QUEEN *against* CHARLES BRADLAUGH AND ANNIE BESANT.

JOHN RIVETT makes oath and saith as follows:—

1. I reside at Number 15, Devonshire Street, Bishopsgate, in the City of London, and am a news-agent.
2. In the beginning of the month of May, 1877 (the exact date I do not recollect), I saw the two above-named defendants in their shop at Number 28, Stonecutter Street, in the City of London.
3. I then asked the defendant, Charles Bradlaugh, for some copies of the book called "Fruits of Philosophy," when he told me that they could not sell any more copies there, as copies had been stopped going through the post.
4. The said Charles Bradlaugh then gave me a card, which had printed thereon the name of Mr. Ramsey, Number 10, Shacklewell Street, Bethnal Green Road, but which said card I have since destroyed.
5. The said Charles Bradlaugh told me at the time he handed to me the said card that I could obtain thousands of copies of the said book called "Fruits of Philosophy" at the address indicated on the said card.
6. I immediately went to the said address, and purchased several copies of the said book, which were

similar to that which is now shown to me, and marked "A."

7. At the end of the said month of May (the exact date I do not recollect), the person who sold me the said copies of the said book at the said Number 10, Shacklewell Street aforesaid, and who, to the best of my belief, is W. J. Ramsey, and manager in the employment of the said defendants, Charles Bradlaugh and Annie Besant, told me he could in future supply me with copies of the said book at Number 9 in Shacklewell Street aforesaid.

8. Since the day I received the said card I have from time to time on several occasions—that is to say, twenty or thirty times—been to the said 9 and 10, Shacklewell Street, and purchased large quantities of copies of the said book.

9. On Saturday morning last, the 23rd day of June, 1877, I went to the said house, Number 9, Shacklewell Street, and purchased of the said W. J. Ramsey one dozen copies of the said book called "Fruits of Philosophy," one copy of which is the copy now shown to me and marked "A."

10. On the same day my partner, Frederick Fennell, obtained, as he has informed me, and as I verily believe, two dozen copies of the said book at the same address.

11. I believe the said Mr. W. J. Ramsey referred to in the said book now shown to me, and described therein as the manager to the Freethought Publishing Company, to be the person who sold to me the said copies of the said book.

Sworn at my Office, No. 10, Basinghall Street, in the City of London, this 27th day of June, 1877.
Before me,
M. Downing,
A Commissioner to administer oaths in the Supreme Court of Judicature.

JOHN RIVETT.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE,
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION.

THE QUEEN *against* CHARLES BRADLAUGH AND ANNIE BESANT.

DANIEL THOMAS LYSAGHT, makes oath and saith as follows :—

1. I am a reporter and shorthand writer, residing at 66, Doddington Grove, Kennington Park.
2. On Sunday last, the 24th day of June, A.D. 1877, I was present at a meeting held at the Hall of Science, Old Street.
3. The meeting was convened for the purpose of discussing the Population Question.
4. Both the defendants were present on the platform, and addressed the meeting. The defendant, Annie Besant, acted as President.
5. Numerous copies of the book, "The Fruits of Philosophy," the subject of this indictment, were sold in the room for the price of sixpence each, many of the purchasers being young persons of both sexes.
6. There were about 600 persons present at the meeting, and there was a crowd outside of those who were unable to obtain admission. The said book was freely sold to many of the said persons outside.
7. I purchased the book now shown to me, and marked "A," at the said meeting.
8. The report in the newspaper, the *Morning Advertiser*, now shown to me, and marked "B," was written by me, and is a correct report of the said meeting.

Sworn at the Westminster Hall, in the County of Middlesex, the 28th day of June, 1877.
Before me,
W. J. CLEAVE,
A Commissioner, &c.

DANIEL THOMAS LYSAGHT.

Filed on the part of the Prosecution.

A newspaper report was attached to Lysaght's affidavit, and the Master asked if he should read it.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: The paper has been sent to me, and, I must say, that a most unjustifiable use of my name has been made—most unwarranted.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Allow me to say that the report in the *Morning Advertiser* is totally incorrect.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: All I know is, that in my summing-up, I endeavoured, and I feel satisfied that I did, hold the scales of justice evenly.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: We never said what is imputed to us.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: You say that I summed up in your favour. I did nothing of the kind.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: The report is simply stupidly incorrect from beginning to end.

Mrs. BESANT: I have not seen the report, and if it is to be used against me, I must ask that it be read. I spoke with the most extreme respect of your lordship.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: I mean that to represent me as stating views different from the jury is wholly incorrect. All that I endeavoured to do, as I said before, was to take care that the verdict should not be given in a storm, but that it should be the result of mature deliberation of the case in all its bearings. That is all I endeavoured to do, and I am quite sure it is all I did.

Mrs. BESANT: All I said in my speech was that the summing-up was absolutely impartial. And I rejoiced that there had gone forth from the Bench an endorsement of Malthusianism which it had never before received.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: I have seen the report, which is ridiculously inaccurate. If anything is to turn upon it, I must ask to be allowed to answer it.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: The part of the report which is most material is the part which represents you and Mrs. Besant as saying that you would go on with the publication, let what would happen.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: That is the only reason why I use the report.

Mrs. BESANT: I ask as a matter of justice that the report should be read.

The CLERK here read the paragraph in question from the *Morning Advertiser*.

Mrs. BESANT: Well, my lord, I have one or two points to

put to your lordship, as to the accuracy of the report. Am I permitted to say anything?

The Lord Chief Justice: Oh, certainly.

Mrs. Besant: Only in answer to the report.

The Lord Chief Justice: Strictly speaking, it should be by affidavit.

The Solicitor-General: I have no objection.

Mrs. Besant: I must remark, my lord, that the report is utterly and grossly inaccurate. The meeting was not called for the discussion of the Population Question, and no discussion of any kind took place. The value of the oath of the reporter, as a matter of accuracy, may be judged by the fact that he stated that there were 600 persons, whereas 1418 paid for admission, as shown by the books. I do not put that as a matter of importance, but merely to show that he is not a man whose judgment should be brought here as reliable on a matter of fact. Then he says that numerous copies of the book were sold in the hall. If that is urged against us, the sale must be proved, for neither I nor my co-defendant have anything to do with selling on Sunday night. That we have the hall for lecturing cannot make us responsible criminally for what occurs there. When I said that the jury did not all assent to the direction of the judge, I alluded to a letter that I had received, in which it was stated that he did not assent to the verdict, and that it was by the action of the foreman, and not of the jury, that the verdict of guilty was given.

The Lord Chief Justice: He should have objected at the time.

Mrs. Besant: No doubt, my lord, he ought to have had the manliness to object there and then. It was no good to talk to his friend about it afterwards. I mentioned it in the hall as a moral justification at the time, and I did not presume to mention it here until now, knowing that it had no legal value. The report says that I said that one of the most highly-trained brains in England had declared in favour of our views. It is true that I spoke of one of the "most highly-trained brains in England"; and if that be any discourtesy to the Court, I can only apologise for it. (Much laughter.) I said what I believed, my lord, in simple honesty, but it is what I should not have had the impertinence to say in this presence if it had not been alluded to. I did not say that that brain had declared in favour of the whole of our views,

but I did say that it declared in favour of Malthusianism, as a law which could not be disputed.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: You must take it with reference to the only proposition I had in my mind, namely that the tendency of population is to increase in a greater ratio than the production of food, and that that was a law which could not be disputed.

Mrs. BESANT: Yes; the law which is ordinarily spoken of as the law of Malthus; but unless people are trained in these works they do not know what that refers to. I said that from the Bench we had had a declaration in favour of the law of Malthus, and this, whether we went to gaol or not, was a sufficient recompense for having gone before a jury.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: You would have done much better if you had left such propositions alone.

Mrs. BESANT: I was only repeating what has been said by the whole press of the country, that the trial had spread the principles for which we pleaded. With regard to the question of stopping the circulation, I can only say that if the law desires to stop the circulation of the book it must be stopped legally, and no amount of prejudice that is tried to be raised can be allowed to govern. As to the man who swears that Mr. Bradlaugh gave him a card with Mr. Ramsey's address on it and sent him there, I can only say that I am one of the two partners of the "Freethought Publishing Company," and that no card has been printed by us with the name and address of Mr. Ramsey upon it. Such a card has never been printed, and it seems a pity to bring forward an affidavit sworn to by a man whose statement is so utterly false from beginning to end. We stopped the sale at Stonecutter Street for a reason of our own, but never gave any kind of card or direction as here stated.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: The man says he was sent from Stonecutter Street to another address.

Mrs. BESANT: He says so, and he swears falsely.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: We must have this upon affidavit.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: There is no doubt, and no pretence on our part to the contrary, my lord, that we have circulated, and are continuing to circulate, the book. The witness, for some reason or other, has been extremely stupid; but whether we gave a card or not is a matter of no importance, although, as a matter of fact, we did nothing of

the kind. There is no doubt that up to this time we have circulated the book.

The Lord Chief Justice: I gave you fair warning that you ran a risk in so doing.

Mr. Bradlaugh: Your lordship did. I do not wish it to be thought that I say this out of bravado, but simply as a matter of fact, so that we should not represent anything incorrectly.

Mrs. Besant: It is not well to put too much stress upon two affidavits so utterly inaccurate on these small points.

The Lord Chief Justice: The statement in that affidavit which is not denied is, that since the verdict of the jury the circulation of the book is still going on.

Mrs. Besant: That is so, my lord.

Mr. Bradlaugh: While I have no personal knowledge of it, I have no doubt that that is so.

The Lord Chief Justice: The matter assumes, then, a very serious aspect, because I gather from that fact, as well as from the language used at the meeting, taking it with the qualification that Mrs. Besant has put upon it, that it does imply a determination, notwithstanding the verdict of the jury that this book is unfit for publication, that you will persist in publishing it. The case, therefore, assumes a very serious aspect indeed.

Mr. Bradlaugh: My lord, I do not wish, in any way, to take up the time of the Court unfairly. I have nothing whatever to say, except that the ultimate decision of the Court had not then been given; we thought we had not got that ultimate decision of the Court.

The Lord Chief Justice: The ultimate decision of the Court has now been given, and the question is, what is to be the future course of your conduct? The jury have acquitted you of any intention to deliberately violate the law; and that, although you did publish this book, which was a book that ought not to have been published, you were not conscious of the effect it might have, and had no intention to violate the law. That would induce the Court, if it saw a ready submission on your part, to deal with the case in a very lenient way. The jury having found that it was a violation of the law, but with a good motive or through ignorance, the Court, in awarding punishment, upon such a state of things, would, of course, be disposed to take a most indulgent view of the matter. But if the law has been openly set at defiance, the matter assumes a very different

aspect, and it must be dealt with as a very grave and aggravated case.

Mrs. BESANT: If an extra charge is to be brought against me, I ask that some kind of proof be offered.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: If your lordships thought it right to take into consideration the application I made to you before the adjournment, both I and my co-defendant would in the fullest manner undertake that during the pendency of the appeal no sort of advantage will be taken of the indulgence of the Court.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: What do you mean?

Mr. BRADLAUGH: I mean if you stayed proceedings until the writ of error was argued.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: I think we must pass sentence. Have you anything to say in mitigation?

Mr. BRADLAUGH: I respectfully submit myself to the sentence of the Court.

Mrs. BESANT: I have nothing to say in mitigation of punishment.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: The two persons before your lordships are the publishers of the book. Their names are to the preface, in which they state that they intend to publish this book. This shows the importance of the evidence as to their intention of continuing the circulation.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE, after having conferred for some minutes with Mr. Justice Mellor, said: The case has now assumed a character of very, very grave importance. We were prepared, if the defendants had announced openly in this Court that having acted in error as the jury found—of which finding I think they are entitled to the benefit—but still having been, after a fair and impartial trial, found by the jury guilty of doing of that which was an offence against the law, they were ready to submit to the law and to do everything in their power to prevent the further publication and circulation of a work which has been declared by the jury to be a work calculated to deprave public morals, we should have been prepared to discharge them on their own recognisances to be of good behaviour in the future. But we cannot help seeing in what has been said and done pendingthis trial, and since the verdict of the jury was pronounced, that the defendants instead of submitting themselves to the law, have set it at defiance by continuing to circulate this book. That being so I must say that that which before was an offence of a comparatively slight

character—looking to what the jury have found in reference to the contention of the defendants—now assumes the form of a most grave and aggravated offence, and as such we must deal with it. The sentence is that you, Charles Bradlaugh, and you, Annie Besant, be imprisoned for the term of six calendar months; that you each pay a fine of £200 to the Queen; and that you enter further into your own recognizances in a sum of £500 each to be of good behaviour for the term of two years, and I tell you at the same time that you will not be of "good behaviour" and will be liable to forfeit that sum if you continue to publish this book. No persuasion or conviction on your part that you are doing that which is morally justifiable can possibly warrant you in violating the law or excuse you in doing so. No one is above the law; all owe obedience to the law from the highest to the lowest, and if you choose to set yourself at defiance against the law—to break it and defy it—you must expect to be dealt with accordingly. I am very sorry indeed that such should be the result, but it is owing to your being thus contumacious, notwithstanding that you have had a fair trial, and the verdict of a competent jury, which ought to have satisfied you that you ought to abstain from doing what has been clearly demonstrated and shown to be wrong.

Mr. Bradlaugh: Would your lordship entertain an application to stay execution of the sentence?

The Lord Chief Justice: Certainly not. On consideration, if you will pledge yourselves unreservedly that there shall be no repetition of the publication of the book, at all events, until the Court of Appeal shall have decided contrary to the verdict of the jury and our judgment; if we can have that positive pledge, and you will enter into your recognizances that you will not avail yourselves of the liberty we extend to continue the publication of this book, which it is our bounden duty to suppress, or do our utmost to suppress, we may stay execution; but we can show no indulgence without such a pledge.

Mr. Bradlaugh: My lord, I meant to offer that pledge in the fullest and most unreserved sense, because, although I have my own view as to what is right, I also recognise that the law having pronounced sentence, that is quite another matter so far as I, as a citizen, am concerned. I do not wish to ask your lordship for a favour without

yielding to the Court during the time that I take advantage of its indulgence.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: I wish you had taken this position sooner.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: If the sentence goes against us, it is another matter; but if you should consent to give us time for the argument of this writ of error, we would bind ourselves during that time. I should not like your lordship to be induced to grant this request on the understanding that in the event of the ultimate decision being against me I should feel bound by that pledge.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: I must do you the justice to say that throughout the whole of this battle your conduct has been straightforward since you took it up.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: I would not like your lordship to think that, in the event of the ultimate decision being against us, there was any sort of pledge. I simply meant that the law having pronounced against us, if your lordship gives us the indulgence of fighting it in the higher Court, no sort of direct or indirect advantage shall be taken of the indulgence.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: You will not continue the publication?

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Not only will I stop the circulation of the book myself, but I will do all in my power to prevent other people circulating it.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: Then you can be discharged on your own recognisances for £100, "to be of good behaviour," which you will understand to mean, that you will desist from the publication of this work until your appeal shall have been heard, and will engage to prosecute the appeal without delay.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Certainly; until the present, I have undoubtedly circulated the book. Although there is a blunder in the affidavits I do not disguise the matter of fact. I shall immediately put the thing under my own control, and I will at once lock up every copy in existence, and will not circulate another copy until the appeal is decided.

Mr. JUSTICE MELLOR: It must be that you will really, to the best of your ability, prevent the circulation of this book until this matter has been determined.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: And what Mr. Bradlaugh says, I understand that you, Mrs. Besant, also assent to?

Mrs. BESANT: Yes; that is my pledge until the writ of

error has been decided. I do not want to give a pledge which you may think was not given honestly until the appeal is decided. I will give my pledge, but it must be understood that the promise goes no further than that.

Mr. JUSTICE MELLOR: You will abstain yourself from circulating the book, and, so far as you can, suppress its circulation?

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Every copy that is unsold shall be at once put under lock and key until the decision of the case.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL: My lord, I think there should be no misunderstanding upon this; I understand that the defendants have undertaken that during the pendency of the appeal this book shall not be circulated at all. But if the decision should be against them they are under no pledge not to publish.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: I hope your lordship will not ask us what we shall do in future.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE: We have meted out the amount of punishment upon the assumption—there being no assertion to the contrary, but rather an admission—that they do intend to set the law at defiance. If we had understood that they were prepared to submit themselves to the law, we should have been disposed to deal with them in the most indulgent manner; but as we understood that they did not intend this, we have meted out to them such a punishment as we hope, when undergone, will have a deterrent effect upon them, and may prevent other people offending in like manner. We have nothing to do with what may happen after the defendants obtain a judgment in their favour, if they do so, or after the sentence is carried out, if they do not. Our sentence is passed, and it will stand, subject only to this, that we stay execution until a writ of error may be disposed of, the defendants giving the most unqualified and unreserved pledge that they will not allow another copy of the book to be sold.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Quite so, my lord; quite so.

The defendants were then taken into the judges' clerks' room, in custody of the tipstaff, and were thence taken to the Crown Office, to get the form for the required recognizance drafted and engrossed. They were then brought back to Westminster, where they remained for an hour and a-half, until the Court was at leisure, and they were delivered over to it by the tipstaff. The recognisance was then read over

to them by Master Mellor, and formally taken by Mr. Justice Mellor, and the defendants were once more set at liberty.

THE INDICTMENT.

Central Criminal Court.—To wit.

THE Jurors for our Lady the Queen, upon their oath present that Charles Bradlaugh and Annie Besant unlawfully and wickedly devising and contriving and intending, as much as in them lay, to vitiate and corrupt the morals as well of youth as of divers other liege subjects of our said Lady the Queen, and to incite and encourage the said liege subjects to indecent, obscene, unnatural, and immoral practices, and bring them to a state of wickedness, lewdness, and debauchery, therefore, to wit, on the 24th day of March, A.D. 1877, in the City of London, and within the jurisdiction of the Central Criminal Court, unlawfully, wickedly, knowingly, wilfully, and designedly did print, publish, sell, and utter a certain indecent, lewd, filthy, and obscene libel, to wit, a certain indecent, lewd, filthy, bawdy, and obscene book, called "Fruits of Philosophy," thereby contaminating, vitiating, and corrupting the morals as well of youth as of other liege subjects of our said Lady the Queen, and bringing the said liege subjects to a state of wickedness, lewdness, debauchery, and immorality, in contempt of our said Lady the Queen and her laws, to the evil and pernicious example of all others in the like case offending, and against the peace of our said Lady the Queen, her crown, and dignity.

Second Count:—And the Jurors aforesaid, upon their oath aforesaid, do further present that the said Charles Bradlaugh and Annie Besant unlawfully and wickedly devising, contriving, and intending as much as in them lay, to vitiate and corrupt the morals as well of youth as of divers other liege subjects of our said Lady the Queen, and to incite and encourage the said liege subjects to indecent, obscene, unnatural, and immoral practices, and bring them to a state of wickedness, lewdness, and debauchery, heretofore, to wit, on the 29th day of March, A.D. 1877, in the City of London, and within the jurisdiction of the said Central Criminal Court, unlawfully, wickedly, and knowingly, wilfully, and

designedly did print, publish, sell, and utter a certain indecent, lewd, filthy, bawdy, and obscene libel, to wit, a certain indecent, lewd, filthy, bawdy, and obscene book, called "Fruits of Philosophy," thereby contaminating, vitiating, and corrupting the morals as well of youth as of other liege subjects of our said Lady the Queen, and bringing the said liege subjects to a state of wickedness, lewdness, debauchery, and immorality, in contempt of our said Lady the Queen, and the laws, to the evil and pernicious example of all others in the like case offending, and against the peace of our said Lady the Queen, her crown, and dignity.

THE SENTENCE AS OFFICIALLY RECORDED.

Thursday, the Twenty-eighth Day of June, in the Forty-first Year of the Reign of Queen Victoria,

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE,

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION.

Central Criminal Court, Middlesex. The Queen *v.* Charles Bradlaugh and Annie Besant. } The Defendants, Charles Bradlaugh and Annie Besant, being present here in Court, and being, by a jury of the country, convicted of certain misdemeanours, whereof they are indicted in this prosecution: Upon reading the several affidavits of John Rivett and the exhibit therein referred to, and Thomas Lysaght and the exhibit therein referred to: And upon hearing the said Defendants in person and Mr. Solicitor-General of Counsel for the Crown: It is considered and adjudged and ordered by the Court here upon each of the said counts of the said indictment severally and respectively that for the offence and offences charged upon the said Defendants in and by each and every of the said counts of the said indictment severally and respectively whereof they are so convicted as aforesaid, they, the said Defendants, be severally imprisoned in Her Majesty's gaol at Holloway for the space of six calendar months each, to commence and be computed from the day on which they shall severally be first taken to the said gaol in execution of this sentence, and severally pay a fine to our Sovereign Lady the Queen of £200 each of lawful money of Great Britain: And that they, the said Defendants, do severally

give security by their own recognisances in the sum of £500 each, with two sufficient sureties in the sum of £200 each, for their good behaviour for the space of two years, to be computed from and after the end and expiration of the said six calendar months:

And it is further ordered that execution be stayed until after judgment shall have been delivered upon any Writ of Error which may hereafter be issued to reverse this judgment or the proceedings upon such Writ shall have failed for want of prosecution or otherwise, upon the said Defendants giving security by their own recognisances in the sum of £100 each to prosecute such Writ of Error, and to be of good behaviour in the meantime.

The Defendants to be placed in the First Class of Misdemeanants. } By the Court.

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1874.

AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF CHARLES BRADLAUGH.

A PAGE OF HIS LIFE.

At the request of many friends, and by way of farewell address on leaving for America, I, for the first time in my life, pen a partial autobiographical sketch. I do not pretend that the narrative will be a complete picture of my life, I only vouch the accuracy of the facts so far as I state them. I have not the right in some cases to state political occurrences in which others now living are involved, nor have I the courage of Jean Jacques Rousseau, to photograph my inner life. I shall therefore state little the public may not already know. I was born on the 26th September, 1833, in a small house in Bacchus Walk, Hoxton. My father was a solicitor's clerk with a very poor salary, which he supplemented by law writing. He was an extremely industrious man, and a splendid penman. I never had the opportunity of judging his tastes or thoughts, outside his daily labors, except in one respect, in which I have followed in his footsteps. He was passionately fond of angling. Until 1848 my life needs little relation. My schooling, like that of most poor men's children, was small in quantity, and, except as to the three R's, indifferent in quality. I remember at seven years of age being at a national school in Abbey Street, Bethnel Green; between seven and nine I was at another small private school in the same neighborhood, and my "education" was completed before I was eleven years of age at a boys' school in Coalharbor Street, Hackney Road. When about twelve years of age I was first employed as errand lad in the solicitor's office where my father remained his whole life through. After a little more than two years in this occupation, I became wharf clerk and cashier to a firm of coal merchants in Britannia Fields, City Road. While in their employment the excitement of the Chartist movement was at its height in England, and the authorities, frightened by the then huge continental revolution wave, were preparing for the prosecution of some of the leaders among the Chartists. Meetings used to be held almost continuously all day on Sunday, and every week-night in the open air on Bonner's

Fields, near where the Consumption Hospital now stands. These meetings were in knots from fifty to five hundred, sometimes many more, and were occupied chiefly in discussions on theological, social, and political questions, any bystander taking part. The curiosity of a lad took me occasionally in the week evenings to the Bonner's Fields gatherings. On the Sunday I, as a member of the Church of England, was fully occupied as a Sunday-school teacher. This last-named fashion of passing Sunday was broken suddenly. The Bishop of London was announced to hold a confirmation in Bethnal Green. The incumbent of St. Peter's, Hackney Road, the district in which I resided, was one John Graham Packer, and he, desiring to make a good figure when the Bishop came, pressed me to prepare for confirmation, so as to answer any question the Bishop might put. I studied a little the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England, and the four Gospels, and came to the conclusion that they differed. I ventured to write the Rev. Mr. Packer a respectful letter, asking him for aid and explanation. All he did was to denounce my letter to my parents as Atheistical, although at that time I should have shuddered at the very notion of becoming an Atheist, and he suspended me for three months from my office of Sunday-school teacher. This left me my Sundays free, for I did not like to go to church while suspended from my teacher's duty, and I, instead, went to Bonner's Fields, at first to listen, but soon to take part in some of the discussions which were then always pending there.

At the commencement I spoke on the orthodox Christian side, but after a debate with Mr. J. Savage, in the Warner Place Hall, in 1849, on the "Inspiration of the bible," I found that my views were getting very much tinged with Freethought, and in the winter of that year, at the instigation of Mr. Packer, to whom I had submitted the "Diegesis" of Robert Taylor, I—having become a teetotaler, which in his view brought out my infidel tendencies still more vigorously—had three days given me by my employers, after consultation with my father, to "change my opinions or lose my situation." I am inclined to think now that the threat was never intended to have been enforced, but was used to terrify me into submission. At that time I hardly knew what, if any, opinions I had, but the result was that sooner than make a show of recanting, I left home and situation on the third day, and never returned to either.

I was always a very fluent speaker, and now lectured frequently at the Temperance Hall, Warner Place, Hackney Road, at the small Hall in Philpot Street, and in the open air in Bonner's Fields, where at last on Sunday afternoons scores of hundreds congregated to hear me. My views were then Deistical, but rapidly tending to the more extreme phase in which they ultimately settled. I now took part in all the gatherings held in London on behalf of the Poles and Hungarians, and actually fancied that I could write poetry on Kossuth and Mazzini.

It was at this time I made the acquaintance of my friend and co-worker, Mr. Austin Holyoake, at his printing office in Queen's Head Passage, and I remember him taking me to John Street

Institution, where, at one of the pleasant Saturday evening gatherings, I met the late Mrs. Emma Martin. At Mr. Austin Holyoake's request, Mr. George Jacob Holyoake, to my great delight, presided at one of my lectures in Philpot Street, and I felt special interest in the number of theReasonerwhich contained a brief reference to myself and that lecture.

I wrote my first pamphlet, "A Few Words on the Christian's Creed," about the middle of 1850, and was honored by Dr. Campbell of theBritish Bannerwith a leading article vigorously assailing me for the lectures I had then delivered. After leaving home I was chiefly sheltered by Mrs. Sharpies Carlile, with whose children, Hypatia, Theophila, and Julian, I shared such comforts as were at her disposal. Here I studied hard everything which came in my way, picking up a little Hebrew and an imperfect smattering of other tongues. I tried to earn my living as a coal merchant, but at sixteen, and without one farthing in my pocket, the business was not extensive enough to be profitable. I got very poor, and at that time was also very proud. A subscription offered me by a few Freethinkers shocked me, and awakened me to a sense of my poverty; so telling no one where I was going, I went away, and on the 17th of December, 1850, was, after some difficulty, enlisted in the Seventh Dragoon Guards. With this corps I remained until October, 1853, being ultimately appointed orderly-room clerk; the regiment, during the whole of the time I remained in it, being quartered in Ireland. While I was in the regiment I was a teetotaler, and used often to lecture to the men in the barrack-room at night, and I have more than once broken out of Portobello barracks to deliver teetotal speeches in the small French Street Hall, Dublin. Many times have I spoken there in my scarlet jacket, between James Haughton and the good old father, the Rev. Dr. Spratt, a Roman Catholic priest, then very active in the cause of temperance. While I was in the regiment my father died, and in the summer of 1853 an aunt's death left me a small sum, out of which I purchased my discharge, and returned to England, to aid in the maintenance of my mother and family.

I have now no time for the full story of my army life, which, however, I may tell some day. Before I left the regiment I had won the esteem of most of the privates, and of some of the officers. I quitted the regiment with a "very good character" from the Colonel, but I am bound to add, that the Captain would not have concurred in this character had he had any voice in the matter. The Lieutenant-Colonel, C. P. Ainslie, earned an eternal right to grateful mention at my hands by his gentlemanly and considerate treatment. I can not say the same for my Captain, who did his best to send me to jail, and whom I have not yet quite forgiven.

On returning to civilian life I obtained employment in the daytime with a solicitor named Rogers, and in the evening as clerk to a Building Society; and soon after entering this employ I began again to write and speak, and it was then I, to in some degree avoid the efforts which were afterward made to ruin me, took the name "Iconoclast," under which all my anti-theological work

down to 1868 was done. I give Mr. Rogers' name now for he is dead, and malice can not injure him. Many anonymous letters were sent to him to warn him of my irreligious opinions; he treated them all with contempt, only asking me not to let my propaganda become an injury to his business.

Soon after my discharge from the army I had a curious adventure. While I was away a number of poor men had subscribed their funds together and had erected a Working Man's Hall, in Goldsmith's Row, Hackney Road. Not having any legal advice, it turned out that they had been entrapped into erecting their building on freehold ground without any lease or conveyance from the freeholder, who asserted his legal right to the building. The men consulted me, and finding that under the Statute of Frauds they had no remedy, I recommended them to offer a penalty rent of £20 a year. This being refused, I constituted myself into a law court, and without any riot or breach of the peace, I, with the assistance of a hundred stout men, took every brick of the building bodily away, and divided the materials, so far as was possible, among the proper owners. I think I can see now the disappointed rascal of a freeholder when he only had his bare soil left once more. He did not escape unpunished, for to encourage the others to contribute, he had invested some few pounds in the building. He had been too clever; he had relied on the letter of the law, and I beat him with a version of common-sense justice.

I lectured once or twice a week in the small Philpot Street Hall, very often then in the Hall of Science, City Road, and then in the old John Street Institution, until I won myself a name in the party throughout the country. In 1855 had my first notable adventure with the authorities in reference to the right of meeting in Hyde Park, and subsequently gave evidence before the Royal Commission ordered by the House of Commons, presided over by the Right Hon. Stuart Wortley. I was very proud that day at Westminster, when, at the conclusion of my testimony against the authorities, the Commissioner publicly thanked me, and the people who crowded the Court of Exchequer cheered me, for the manner in which I denied the right of Sir Richard Mayne, the then Chief Commissioner of Police, to issue the notices forbidding the people to meet in the Park. This was the first step in a course in which I have never flinched or wavered.

In 1855 I undertook, with others, the publication of a series of papers, entitled "Half-Hours with Freethinkers," the late John Watts being one of my co-workers. I also by myself commenced the publication of my "Commentary on the Pentateuch," which has since been entirely re-written and now forms my "Bible: what it is."

During the autumn of 18571 paid my first lecture visit to Northampton. Early in 1858, when Mr. Edward Truelove was suddenly arrested for publishing the pamphlet, "Is Tyrannicide Justifiable?" I became Honorary Secretary to the Defense, and was at the same time associated with the

conduct of the defense of Simon Bernard, who was arrested at the instigation of the French Government for alleged complicity in the Orsini tragedy. It was at this period I gained the friendship of poor Bernard, which, without diminution, retained until he died; and also the valued frendship of Thomas Allsop, which I still preserve. My associations were from thenceforward such as to encourage in me a strong and bitter feeling against the late Emperor Napoleon. While he was in power I hated him, and never lost an opportunity of working against him until thedecheancecame. I am not sure now that I always judged him fairly; but nothing, I think, could have tempted me to either write or speak of him with friendliness during his life.Le sang de mes amis etait sur son ame. Now that the tomb covers his remains, my hatred has ceased; but no other feeling has arisen in its place. Should any of his family seek to resume the Imperial purple, I should remain true to my political declarations of sixteen years since, and should exert myself to the uttermost to prevent France falling under another Empire. I write this with much sadness, as 1870 to 1873 have dispelled some of my illusions held firmly during the fifteen years which preceded. I had believed in such men as Louis Blanc, Lodru Rollin, Victor Hugo, as possible statesmen of France. I was mistaken. They were writers, talkers, and poets; good men to ride on the stream, or to drown in honest protest, but lacking force to swim against, or turn back, the tide by the might of their will. I had believed too in a Republican France, which is yet only in the womb of time, to be born after many pangs and sore travailing.

In 1859 I saw Joseph Mazzini for the first time, and remained on terms of communication with the great Italian patriot until the year 1869, from time to time bringing him correspondence from Italy, where my business sometimes took me. After 1869 we found ourselves holding diverse opinions on the Franco-Prussian question—Mazzini went for Prussia, I for France—and I never saw him again.

In June, 1858, I held my first public formal theological debate with the Rev. Brewin Grant, B.A., at that time a Dissenting Minister at Sheffield. Mr. Grant was then a man of some ability, and if he could have forgotten his aptitudes as a circus jester, would have been a redoubtable antagonist. During this year I was elected President of the London Secular Society, in lieu of Mr. George Jacob Holyoake, who had theretofore led the English Free-thought party, but who has of late years devoted himself more completely to general journalistic work.

In November, 1858, I commenced editorial duties with theInvestigator, formerly conducted by the late Robert Cooper, which I continued until August, 1859. It had but a small circulation, and was financially a very great failure. For the encouragement of young propagandists, I may here insert a little anecdote of my early lecturing experience. I had lectured in Edinburgh in mid-winter, the audience was small, the profits microscopical. I, alter paying my bill at the Temperance Hotel, where I then stayed, had only a few shillings more than my Parliamentary fare to Bolton, where I

was next to lecture. I was out of bed at five on a freezing morning, and could have no breakfast, as the people were not up. I carried my luggage (a big tin box, corded round, which then held books and clothes, and a small black bag), for I could not spare any of my scanty cash for a conveyance or porter. The train from Edinburgh being delayed by a severe snow-storm, the corresponding Parliamentary had left Carlisle long before our arrival. In order to reach Bolton in time for my lecture, I had to book by a quick train, starting in about three-quarters of an hour, but could only book to Preston, as the increased fare took all my money, except 4 1/2d. With this small sum I could get no refreshment in the station, but in a little shop in the street outside I got a mug of tea and a little hot meat pie. From Preston, I got with great difficulty on to Bolton, handing my black bag to the station-master there as security for my fare from Preston, until the morning. I arrived in Bolton about quarter to eight; the lecture commenced at eight, and I, having barely time to run to my lodgings, and wash and change, went onto the platform cold and hungry. I shall never forget that lecture; it was in an old Unitarian Chapel. We had no gas, the building seemed full of a foggy mist, and was imperfectly lit with candles. Everything appeared cold, cheerless, and gloomy. The most amusing feature was that an opponent, endowed with extra piety and forbearance, chose that evening to specially attack me for the money-making and easy life I was leading. Peace to that opponent's memory, I have never seen him since. It was while in Scotland on this journey I made the acquaintance, and ultimately won the frendship, of the late Alexander Campbell, of Glasgow—a generous, kindly-hearted old Socialist Missionary, who, at a time when others were hostile, spoke encouragingly to me, and who afterward worked with me for a long period on this journal [The National Reformer]. Occasionally the lectures were interfered with by the authorities, but this happened oftener in the provinces than in London. In March, 1859, I was to have lectured in Saint Martin's Hall on "Louis Napoleon," but the Government—on a remonstrance by Count Walewski, as to language used at a previous meeting, at which I had presided for Dr. Bernard—interfered; the hall was garrisoned by police, and the lecture prevented. Mr. Hullah, the then proprietor, being indemnified by the authorities, paid damages for his breach of contract, to avoid a suit which I at once commenced against him. Later in the same month I held a debate in Northampton with Mr. John Bowes, a rather heavy, but well-meaning, old gentleman, utterly unfitted for platform controversy. The press now began to deal with me tolerably freely, and I find "boy," "young man," and "juvenile appearance" very frequent in the comments. My want of education was an especial matter for hostile criticism, the more particularly so when the writer had neither heard nor seen me.

Discussions now grew on me so thick and fast that even some of the most important debates may perhaps escape notice in this imperfect chronicling. At Sheffield I debated with a Reverend Dr. Mensor, who styled himself a Jewish Rabbi. He was then in the process of gaining admission to the Church of England, and had been put forward to show my want of scholarship. We both scrawled Hebrew characters for four nights on a black board, to the delight and mystification of

the audience, who gave me credit for erudition, because I chalked the square letter characters with tolerable rapidity and clearness. At Glasgow I debated with a Mr. Court, representing the Glasgow Protestant Association, a glib-tongued missionary, who has since gone to the bad; at Paisley with a Mr. Smart, a very gentlemanly antagonist; and at Halifax with the Rev. T. D. Matthias, a Welsh Baptist Minister, unquestionably very sincere. All these were formal debates, and were reported with tolerable fullness in the various journals. In the early part of 1860 I, aided by my friends at Sheffield, Halifax, and other parts of England, projected theNational Reformerin small shares. Unfortunately just after the issue of its prospectus, Joseph Barker returned from America, and was associated with me in the editorship. The arrangement was peculiar, Mr. Barker editing the first half of the paper and I the second. It was not precisely a happy union, and the unnatural alliance came to an end in a very brief period. In August.1861, I officially parted company with Joseph Barker as editor. We had been practically divorced for months before: the first part of the paper usually contained abuse of those who wrote in the second half. He came to me originally at Sheffield, pretending to be an Atheist and a Republican, and soon after pretended to be a Christian, and spoke in favor of slavery. I am sometimes doubtful as to how far Mr. Barker deluded himself, as well as others, in his various changes of theological and political opinions. If he had had the slightest thoroughness in his character, he would have been a great man; as it is, he is only a great turn-coat.

In June, 1860, I debated again with the Reverend Brewin Grant, every Monday for four weeks, at Bradford, and during this debate had a narrow escape of my life. In one of my journeys to London, the great Northern train ran through the station at King's Cross, and many persons were seriously injured. I got off with some trifling bruises and a severe shaking.

Garibaldi having at this time made his famous Marsala effort, I delivered a series of lectures in his aid, and am happy to be able to record that, though at that time very poor, I sent him one hundred guineas as my contribution by my tongue. This money was chiefly sent through W. H. Ashurst, Esq., now Solicitor to the General Post Office, and among the letters I preserve I have one of thanks from "G. Garibaldi," for what I was then doing for Italy.

In this year I debated for four nights with Dr. Brindley, an old antagonist of the Socialists, at Oldham; for two nights with the Rev. Dr. Baylee, the President of St. Aidan's College, at Birkenhead, where a Church of England curate manufactory was for some time carried on; and for two nights with the Rev. Dr. Rutherford, of Newcastle. Dr. Rutherford has since so identified himself with the cause of the Tyneside workers, that I read with regret any harsh words that escaped me in that debate. Although during late years I have managed to keep all my meetings free from violence or disorder, this was not always so. In October, 1860, I paid my first visit to Wigan, and certainly lectured there under considerable difficulty, and incurred personal clanger,

the resident clergy actually inciting the populace to physical violence, and part destruction of the building I lectured in. I, however, supported by one courageous woman and her husband, persevered, and despite bricks and kicks, visited Wigan again and again, until I had,bon gre malgreimproved the manners and customs of the people, so that now 1 am a welcome speaker there. I could not improve the morals of the clergy, as the public journals have recently shown, but that was their misfortune not my fault. In the winter of 1860, I held two formal debates in Wigan, all of which were fully reported in the local journals; one with Mr. Hutchings, a respectable Nonconformist layman, and the other with the Rev. Woodville Woodman, a Swedenborgian divine.

Early in 1861 I visited Guernsey in consequence of an attempt made by the Law Courts of the Island to enforce the blasphemy laws against a Mr. Stephen Bendall, who had distributed some or my pamphlets to the Guernseyites, and had been condemned to imprisonment in default of finding sureties not to repeat the offense. Not daring to prosecute me, although challenged in writing, the authorities permitted drink and leave of absence to be given to soldiers in the garrison on condition they would try to prevent the lecture, and the house in which I lectured was broken into by a drunken and pious mob, shouting "Kill the Infidel." My antagonists were fortunately as cowardly as they were intolerant, and I succeeded in quelling the riot, delivering my lecture in spite of all opposition, although considerable damage was done to the building.

Shortly after this I visited Plymouth, where the Young Men's Christian Association arranged to prosecute me. They were, however, a little too hasty, and had me arrested at an open air meeting when I had scarcely commenced my speech, having only uttered the words: "Friends, I am about to address you on the bible." Having locked me up all night, and refused bail, it was found by their legal adviser that a blunder had been committed, and a charge of "exciting a breach of the peace, and assaulting the constable in the execution of his duty," was manufactured. It was tolerably amusing to see the number of dinners, suppers, and breakfasts, all accompanied with pots or cups of Devonshire cream, sent in to the Devonport Lock-up, where I was confined, by various friends who wanted to show their sympathy. The invented charge, though well sworn to, broke down after two days' hearing, under the severe cross-examination to which I subjected the witnesses. I defended myself, two lawyers appeared against me, and seven magistrates sat on the bench, predetermined to convict me. Finding that the evidence of the whole of the witnesses whom I wished to call was to be objected to, because un-believers in hell were then incompetent as witnesses according to English law, I am pleased to say that several Nonconformists, disgusted with the bigotry and pious perjury of my prosecutors, came forward. The result was a triumphant victory, and a certificate of dismissal, which I wrung from the reluctant bench of great unpaid. I was not yet satisfied; some of the magistrates had tried to browbeat me, and I announced in court that I would deliver the lecture I

had been prevented from delivering to an audience assembled in the borough, and that I should sue at law the Superintendent of Police who had arrested me. The first portion of my defiance was the most difficult to give effect to; not a hall could be hired in Devonport, and nearly all the convenient open land being under military jurisdiction, it was impossible to procure the tenancy of a field for an open-air meeting. I, however, fulfilled my promise, and despite the police and military authorities combined, delivered my lecture to an audience assembled in their very teeth. Devonport, Stonehouse, and Plymouth form one garrisoned and fortified town, divided by the River Tamar. All the water to the sea is under the separate jurisdiction of Saltash, some miles distant. I obtained a large boat on which a temporary platform was built, and this boat was quietly moored in the River Tamar on the Devonport side, about two fathoms from the shore. Placards were issued stating that, acting under legal advice, I should address the meeting and deliver the prevented lecture "near to the Devonport Park Gates." Overwhelming force was prepared by the Devonport authorities, and having already erred by too great haste, this time they determined to let me fairly commence my lecture before they arrested me. To their horror I quietly walked past the Park Gates where the crowd was waiting, and passing down a by-lane to the river side, stepped into a little boat, was rowed to the large one, and then delivered my lecture, the audience who had followed me standing on an open wharf, all within the jurisdiction of the Borough of Devonport, and I being about 9 feet outside the borough. The face of the Mayor ready to read the riot act, the superintendent with twenty-eight picked policemen to make sure or my arrest, and a military force in readiness to overawe any popular demonstration —all these were sights to remember. I am afraid the Devonport Young Men's Christian Association did not limit themselves to prayers and blessings on that famous Sunday.

As I had promised, the authorities refusing any apology for the wrongful arrest, I commenced an action against Superintendent Edwards, by whom I had been taken into custody. The borough magistrates indemnified their officer and found funds to resist me. I fought with very little help save from one tried, though anonymous friend, for Joseph Barker, my co-editor, but not co-worker, in our own paper, discouraged any pecuniary support. The cause was made a special jury one, and came on for trial at Exeter Assizes. Unfortunately I was persuaded to brief counsel, and Sir Robert Collier, my leader, commenced his speech with an expression of sorrow for my opinions. This damaged me very much, although I won the case easily after a long trial. The jury, composed of Devonshire landowners, only gave me a farthing damages, and Mr. Baron Channell refused to certify for costs. I was determined not to let the matter rest here, and myself carried it to the Courtin Banco, where I argued it in person for two whole days, before Lord Chief Justice Erie and a full bench of Judges. Although I did not succeed in improving my own position, I raised public opinion in favor of free speech, and the enormous costs incurred by the borough authorities, and which they had to bear, have deterred them from ever again interfering either with my lectures or those of any other speaker, and I now have crowded audiences in the finest

hall whenever I visit the three towns. These proceedings cost me several hundred pounds, and burdened me with a debt which took long clearing off.

In 1802, I held a four nights' discussion with a Dissenting clergyman, the Rev. W. Barker. My opponent was probably one of the most able and straightforward among my numerous antagonists. About this time a severe attack of acute rheumatism prostrated me, and having soon after to visit Italy, I, at first under medical advice, adopted the habit of drinking the light Continental wines, and although continuing an advocate of sobriety, I naturally ceased to take part in any teetotal gatherings.

In the struggle between the Northern and Southern States of America, my advocacy and sympathies went with what I am glad to say was the feeling of the great mass of the English people—in favor of the North; and my esteemed friend, and then contributor, W. E. Adams, furnished most valuable aid with his pen in the enlightenment of public opinion, at a time when many of our aristocracy were openly exulting in what they conceived to be the probable break-up of the United States Republic. During the Lancashire cotton famine I lectured several times in aid of the fund.

I began now also to assume a much more prominent position in the various English political movements, and especially to speak on the Irish Church and Irish Land questions. On the Irish questions, I owe much to my late co-worker and contributor, poor Peter Fox Andre, a thoroughly honest and whole-souled man, whose pen was always on the side of struggling nationalities.

One of the disadvantages connected with a public career is, that every vile scoundrel who is too cowardly to face you openly can libel you anonymously. I have had, I think, my full share of this kind of annoyance. Most of the slanders I have treated with utter contempt, and if I had alone consulted my own feelings, should probably never have pursued any other course. Twice, however, I have had recourse to the judgment of the law—once in the case of a clergyman of the Church of England, who indulged in a foul libel affecting my wife and children. This fellow I compelled to retract every word he had uttered, and to pay £100, which, after deducting the costs, was divided among various charitable institutions. The reverend libeler wrote me an abject letter, begging me not to ruin his prospects in the Church by publishing his name; I consented, and he has since repaid my mercy by losing no opportunity of being offensive. He is a prominent contributor to theRock, and a fierce ultra-Protestant. He must have greater confidence in my honor than in his own, or fear of exposure would compel him to greater reticence. The other case arose during the election, and will be dealt with in its proper order.

It was my fortune to be associated with the Reform League from its earliest moments until its dissolution. It is hardly worth while to repeat the almost stereotyped story of the successful struggle made by the League for Parliamentary Reform. E. Beales, Esq., was the President of the League, and I was one of its Vice-Presidents, and continued nearly the whole time of its existence a member of its executive. The whole of my services and journeys were given to the League without the slightest remuneration, and I repeatedly, and according to my means, contributed to its funds. When I resigned my position on the executive I received from Mr. George Howell, the Secretary, and from Mr. Beales, the President, the most touching and flattering letters as to what Mr. Beales was pleased to describe as the loyalty and utility of my services to the League. Mr. George Howell concluded a long letter as follows: "Be pleased to accept my assurance of sincere regards for your manly courage, consistent and honorable conduct in our cause, and for your kindly consideration for myself as Secretary of this great movement on all occasions." These letters have additional value from the fact that Mr. Beales, whom I sincerely respect, differs widely from me in matters of faith, and Mr. Howell is, fortunately, far from having any friendly feeling toward me. It was while on the Executive of this League that I first became intimately acquainted with Mr. George Odger, and had reason to be pleased with the straightforward course he pursued, and the honest work he did as one of the Executive Committee. Mr. John Baxter Langley and Mr. R. A. Cooper were also among my most prominent co-workers.

My sympathy with Ireland, and open advocacy of justice for the Irish, nearly brought me into serious trouble. Some who were afterward indicted as the chiefs of the so-called Fenian movement, came to me for advice. So much I see others have written, and the rest of this portion of my autobiography I may write some day. At present there are men not out of danger whom careless words might imperil, and as regards myself I shall not be guilty of the folly of printing language which a government might use against me. My pamphlet on the Irish Question, published in 1866, won a voluntary letter of warm approval from Mr. Gladstone, the only friendly writing I ever received from him in my life.

At Huddersfield, the Philosophical Hall having been duly hired for my lectures, pious influence was brought to bear on the lessee to induce him to break the contract. Fortunately what in law amounted to possession had been given, and on the doors being locked against me, I broke them open, and delivered my lecture to a crowded and most orderly audience. I was arrested, and an attempt was made to prosecute me before the Huddersfield magistrates; but I defended myself with success, and defeated with ease the Conservative solicitor, N. Learoyd, who had been specially retained to insure my committal to jail.

In 1868 I entered into a contest with the Conservative Government which, having been continued by the Gladstone Government, finished in 1869 with a complete victory for myself. According to the then law every newspaper was required to give sureties to the extent of £800 against blasphemous or seditious libel. I had never offered to give these sureties, as they would have probably been liable to forfeiture about once a month. In March, 1868, the Disraeli Government insisted on my compliance with the law. I refused. The Government then required me to stop my paper. I printed on the next issue, "Printed in Defiance of Her Majesty's Government." I was then served with an Attorney-General's information, containing numerous counts, and seeking to recover enormous penalties. I determined to be my own barrister, and while availing myself in consultation of the best legal advice, I always argued my own case. The interlocutory hearings before the Judges in Chambers were numerous, for I took objection to nearly every step made by the government, and I nearly always succeeded. I also brought the matter before Parliament, being specially backed in this by Mr. Milner Gibson, Mr. John Stuart Mill, and Mr. E. H. J. Crawford. When the information was called on for trial in a crowded court before Mr. Baron Martin, the Government backed out, and declined to make a jury; so the prosecution fell to the ground. Strange to say, it was renewed by the Gladstone Government, who had the coolness to offer me, by the mouth of Attorney-General Collier, that they would not enforce any penalties if I would stop the paper, and admit that I was in the wrong. This I declined, and the prosecution now came on for trial before Baron Bramwell and a special jury. Against me were the Attorney-General, Sir R. Collier, the Solicitor-General, Sir J. D. Coleridge, and Mr. Crompton Hutton. I found that these legal worthies were blundering in their conduct of the trial, and atnisi priusl let them obtain a verdict, which however, I reversed on purely technical grounds, after a long argument, which I sustained before Lord Chief Baron Kelly and a full court sitting in Banco. Having miserably failed to enforce the law against me, the Government repealed the statute, and I can boast that I got rid of the last shackle of the obnoxious English press laws. Mr. J. S. Mill wrote me: "You have gained a very honorable success in obtaining a repeal of the mischievous Act by your persevering resistance." The Government, although beaten, refused to reimburse me any portion of the large outlay incurred in fighting them.

It has always been my ambition to enter Parliament, and at the General Election for 1808 I, for the first time, entered the arena as a candidate. I was beaten; but this is scarcely wonderful. I had all the journals in England except three against me. Every idle or virulent tale which folly could distort or calumny invent was used against me. Despite all, I polled nearly 1,100 votes, and I obtained unasked, but not ungratefully listened to, the public acknowledgments from the Mayor of the borough, also from one of my competitors, Mr. Charles Gilpin, as to the loyal manner in which I had fought the contest through.

During the election struggle libels rained from all sides. One by the late Mr Capper, M. P., seeking reelection at Sandwich, was the monstrous story, that in the open square at Northampton I had taken out my watch and defied God to show his power by striking me dead in five minutes. Challenged for his authority Mr. Capper pretended to have heard the story from Mr. C. Gilpin, M. P., who indignantly denied being any party to the falsehood. I insisted on an apology from Mr. Capper, which being refused I sued him, but he died soon after the writ was served. The story was not an original invention by Mr. Capper; it had been reported of Abner Kneeland thirty years before, and is still a favorite one with pious missionaries at street corners. A still more outrageous slander was inserted in theRazor, a pseudo-comic weekly. I compelled this journal to give a full apology, but not until after two years' litigation, and a new trial had been ordered. When obliged to recant, the Christian proprietor became insolvent, to avoid payment of the costs. Unfortunately born poor, my life had been one continued struggle, and the burden of my indebtedness was sorely swollen in this and similar contests.

Probably the most severe, and to me certainly the most costly, struggle has been on the oath question. Formerly it was a fatal objection against the competency of a witness who did not believe in a Deity and in a future state of rewards and punishments. Several attempts had been made to alter the law, but they had all failed; and indeed Sir J. Trevelyan's measures only provided for affirmation, and did not seek to abolish the incompetency. In a case in which I was plaintiff in the Court of Common Pleas, my evidence was objected to, and I determined to fight the matter through every possible court, and to get the law changed if possible.

I personally argued the case before Lord Chief Justice Bovill and a full Bench, in the Court of Common Pleas, and with the aid of the present Mr. Justice Denman and the late Lord Chancellor Hatherly, the law was twice altered in Parliament. Before victory was ultimately obtained I had to carry the case into the Court of Error, and I prepared and sent out at my own cost more than two hundred petitions to Parliament. Ultimately the Evidence Amendment Act, 1869, and the Evidence Further Amendment Act, 1870, gave Freethinkers the right to enter the witness box, and I won my suit. The Christian defendant finished by becoming bankrupt, and I lost a terribly large sum in debt and costs. The original debt and interest were over £300, and the costs of the various proceedings were very heavy.

In the winter of 1870 the Mirfield Town Hall, which had been properly taken and paid for for two nights' lectures, was refused by the proprietors, who barricaded the hall, and obtained a great force of police from the neighborhood. In order that the law might be clearly settled on this matter, I brought an action to try the question, and although the late Mr. Justice Willis expressed himself strongly in my favor, it was held by Mr. Justice Mellor atnisi priusthat nothing, except a deed under seal or an actual demise, would avail. A mere agreement for a user of a hall was a

license revocable at will, even when for a valuable consideration. This convinced me that when hall proprietors break their contracts, I must enforce my rights as I did at Huddersfield, and have done in other places.

During the Franco-Prussian struggle I remained neutral until the 4th of September. I was against Bismark and his blood-and-iron theory, but I was also against the Empire and the Emperor; so I took no part with either. I was lecturing at Plymouth the day thedecheancewas proclaimed, and immediately after wrote my first article in favor of Republican France. I now set to work and organized a series of meetings in London and the provinces, some of which were cooperated in by Dr. Congreve, Professor Beesly, and other prominent members of the Positivist party. These meetings exercised some little effect on the public opinion in this country, but unfortunately the collapse on the part of France was so complete, and the resources commanded by Bismark and Moltke so vast, that, except as expressing sympathy, the results were barren. In October, 1870, I, without any previous communication from myself to them, received from the Republican Government at Tours a long and flattering letter, signed by Leon Gambetta, Adolphe Cremieux, Al Glais Bizoin, and Admiral Fourichon, declaring that they, as members of the "Gouvernement de la Defense Nationale, reunis en delegation a Tours," "tiennent a honneur de vous remercier chalereusement du noble concours que vous apportez a la cause de la France." On the 2d of February, 1871, M. Tissot, the Charge d'Affaires of France in England, wrote me: "Quant a moi, mon cher ami, le ne puis que constater ici, comme je l'ai deja fait, comme je le feraien toute occasion, la dette que nous avons contracted envers vous. Vous nous avez donne votre temps, votre activite, votre eloquence, votre ame, la meilleure partie de vous meme, en un mot; la France que vous avez ete seule a defendre ne l'oubliera jamais." This is probably a too flattering estimate of my services to France, but coming from the official representative of the French Republic, I feel entitled to insert it. In September, 1871, Monsieur Emmanuel Arago, member of the Provisional Government of the 4th of September, wrote the following words upon the letter which had been sent me, as above mentioned, in October, 1870, by the Delegate Government of Tours: "En lisant cette lettre, j'eprouve tres vivement le regret de n'avoir pu, en-ferme dans Paris, joindre ma signature a celles de mes collegues de la delegation de Tours. Mr. Bradlaugh est et sera toujours dans la Republique notre concitoyen."

During 1870, 1871, and 1872, 1 held several debates with the Rev. A. J. Harrison, formerly of Huddersfield. The first at Newcastle, in the splendid Town Hall of that place, was attended by about 5,000 persons. The second debate at Bristol, was notable from being presided over by Professor Newman. The third discussion was at Birmingham, and was an attempt at the Socratic method, and the last platform encounter, was in the New Hall of Science, London. Of the Rev. Mr. Harrison it is enough I should say that, a few weeks since, when rumor put my life in danger, he was one of the first to write a kindly and unaffected letter of sympathy to Mrs. Bradlaugh.

When the great cry of thanksgiving was raised for the recovery of the Prince of Wales, I could not let it pass without protest. While he lay dangerously ill I had ceased to make any attack on himself or family, but I made no pretense of a grief I did not feel. When the thanksgiving day was fixed, and tickets for St. Paul's were sent by the Lord Chamberlain to working men representatives, I felt it right to hold a meeting of protest, which was attended by a crowded audience in the New Hall of Science.

The "right of meeting" has given me three important occasions of measuring swords with the Government during the last few years, and each time defeat has attended the Government. The first, the Hyde Park meeting, where I acted in accord with Mr. Beales, to whom as chief, let the honor go of this conflict. The second was on the 31st July, 1871, under the following circumstances. A meeting had been held by Mr. G. Odger and some of his friends in Hyde Park, on Sunday the 30th of July, to protest against the grant to Prince Arthur; this meeting was adjourned until the following evening. Late on the Sunday afternoon, the adjourned meeting was forbidden by the Government. Early on Monday morning Mr. Odger applied to me to give the friends the benefit of my legal knowledge and personal influence. I consented, and the Government persevering, I took my share of the responsibility of the gathering, and signed with Mr. Odger a new notice convening the meeting. The Home Office not only served us also with a written prohibition, but threatened and prepared to use force. I immediately gave Mr. Bruce notice that the force would be illegal, and that it would be resisted. At the last moment, and in fact only some half hour before the meeting commenced, the Government abandoned its prohibition, and an enormous meeting of a most orderly character was held in absolute defiance of the authorities.

The more recent case was in December, 1872, when finding that Mr. Odger, Mr. Bailey, and others, had been prosecuted under some monstrous and ridiculous regulations invented by Mr. Ayrton, I, on my own responsibility, determined to throw down the gauntlet to the Government. I did this most successfully, and soon after the opening of Parliament the obnoxious regulations were annulled.

It is at present too early to speak of the Republican movement in England, which I have sought, and not entirely without success, to organize on a thoroughly legal basis. It is a fair matter for observation that my lectures on "The Impeachment of the House of Brunswick," have been delivered to crowded audiences assembled in some of the finest halls in England and Scotland, notably the Free Trade Hall, Manchester, the Town Hall, Birmingham, the Town Hall, Northampton, and the City Hall, Glasgow. It is, as far as I am aware, the first time any English citizen has, without tumult or disorder and in buildings belonging to various Municipalities, directly challenged the hereditary right of the reigning family.

In penning the foregoing sketch I had purposely to omit many facts connected with branches of Italian, Irish, and French politics. I have also entirely omitted my own struggles for existence. The political parts are left out because there are secrets which are not my own alone, and which may not bear full telling for many years to come. The second, because I hope that another year or two of hard work may enable me to free myself from the debt load which for some time has hung heavily round me.

A FEW WORDS ABOUT THE DEVIL

To have written under this head in the reign of James Rex, of pious memory, would have, probably, procured for me, without even the perusal of my pamphlet, the reputation of Dr. Faustus, and a too intimate acquaintance with some of the pleasant plans of torturing to death practiced by the clever witch-finders of that day. I profess, however, no knowledge of the black art, and am entirely unskilled indiablerie, and feel quite convinced that the few words I shall say about his Satanic Majesty will not be cause of any unholy compacts in which bodies or souls are signed away in ink suspiciously red.

In many countries, dealing with the Devil has been a perilous experiment. In 1790, an unfortunate named Andre Dubuisson was confined in the Bastile, charged with raising the Devil. To prevent even the slightest apprehension on the part of my reader that I have any desire or intent toward placing him unpleasantly near a black-visaged, sulphureous-constitutioned individual, horned like an old goat, with satyr-like legs, a tail of unpleasant length, and a disposition to buy a body from any unfortunate wight ready to dispose of it, I have only to assert my intention of treating the subject entirely from a biblical point of view. Doubtless I ought to do this; the Christian Devil is a bible institution. I say, \ advisedly, the Christian Devil, because other religions have boasted their Devil, and it is well to prevent confusion. But I frankly admit that none of these religions have the honor of a Devil so devilish as our own. Indeed our Devil ought to be the best: it costs the most. No other religion besides our own can boast the array of Popes, Bishops, Conferences, Rectors, Incumbents, and paid preachers of various titles. And all these to preach against the Devil!

It is necessary, before entering upon my subject, that I should confess my little ability to do it justice. I am unable to say, certainly, whether I am writing about a singular Devil or a plurality of Devils. In one text "Devils" are mentioned,* recognizing a plurality; in another, "the Devil,"** as if there was but one. We may, however, fairly assume that either there is one Devil, more than one, or less than one; and, having thus cleared our path from mere numerical difficulties, we will proceed to give the Devil his due. Satan appears either to have been a child of God, or, at any rate, a most intimate acquaintance of the family; for we find that on "a day when the children of

God came to present themselves before the Lord, that Satan came also among them;"*** and no surprise or disapprobation is manifested at his presence. The conversation narrated in the Book of Job as occurring between God and the Devil has, for us, a value proportioned to the rarity of the scene, and to the high character of the personages concerned.

* Leviticus xvii, 7.** Luke iv, 2.*** Job i, 6

We are, therefore, despite the infidel criticism of Martin Luther, who condemns the Book of Job as "a sheerargumentum fabulæ" determined to examine carefully the whole particulars for ourselves; and, in so doing, we are naturally surprised to find God, the omniscient, putting to Satan the query, Whence comest thou? We cannot suppose God, the all-wise, ignorant upon the subject, and we can not avoid a feeling of astonishment that such an interrogatory should have been made. Satan's reply, assuming its correctness—and this the text leaves us no reason to doubt—increases our surprise and augments our astonishment. The answer given is, "From going to and fro in the earth, and from going up and down it," In remarking on this answer, I do not address myself to those wretched persons who, relying on their reason and common sense, ignore the divine truth. I address myself to the true believer, and I ask, is he not astonished to find, from his bible, that Satan could have gone to and fro in the earth, and walked up and down, and yet not have met God, the omnipresent, occasionally during his journeying? The Lord makes no comment on Satan's reply, but says, "Hast thou not considered my servant Job, that there is none like him in the earth, a perfect and an upright man, one that feareth God and escheweth evil?" It is rather extraordinary that God should wish to have the Devil's opinion on the only good man recorded as then living in the world: the more extraordinary when we know that God is all-wise, and knew Satan's opinion without asking it, and that God is immutable, and, therefore, would not be influenced by the expression of the Devil's opinion when uttered. Satan's answer is, "Doth Job fear God for naught? Hast thou not made an hedge about him, and about all that he hath on every side? Thou hast blest the work of his hand, and his substance is increased in the land; but put forth thine hand now and touch all that he hath, and he will curse thee to thy face." What is God's reply to this audacious assertion? Does he express his determination to protect the righteous Job? Does he use his power to rebuke the evil tempter? No. "The Lord said unto Satan, Behold all that he hath is in thy power; only upon himself put forth not thine hand." And this was Job's reward for being a perfect and upright man, one that feared God and eschewed evil. He was not sent to the Devil, but the Devil was sent to all that he had. And he lost all without repining—sons, daughters, oxen, asses, camels and sheep, all destroyed, and yet Job sinned not. Some divines have urged that we here get a beautiful picture of patience and contentment under wrong and misfortune. But I reply that it is not good to submit patiently to wrong, or to rest contented under misfortune. I urge that it is manlier far to resist wrong, nobler far to wage war against wrong, better far to carefully investigate the causes of wrong and misfortune, with a

view to their removal. Contentment under wrong is a crime, voluntary submission under oppression is not the virtue some would have it to be.

"Again there was a day when the sons of God came to present themselves before the Lord [as if God's children could ever be absent from him], and Satan came also among them to present himself before the Lord. And the Lord said unto Satan, From whence comest thou? And Satan answered the Lord and said, From going to and fro in the earth, and from walking up and down in it. And the Lord said unto Satan, Hast thou considered my servant Job, that there is none like him in the earth? a perfect and an upright man, one that feareth God and escheweth evil? and still he holdeth fast his integrity, although thou movedst me against HIM TO DESTROY HIM WITHOUT CAUSE."

Can God be moved against a man to destroy him without a cause? If so, God is neither immutable nor all-wise. Yet the bible puts into God's mouth the terrible admission that the Devil had moved God against Job to destroy him without cause. If true, it destroys God's goodness; if false, then the bible is no revelation.

But Satan answered the Lord and said, "Skin for skin, yea, all that a man hath will he give for his life; put forth thine hand now and touch his bone and his flesh, and he will curse thee to thy face."

Does the Lord now drive the Devil from his presence? Is there any expression of wrath or indignation against his tempter? Not so. "The Lord said unto Satan, Behold, he is in thine hand, but save his life." And Job, being better than everybody else, finds himself smitten in consequence with sore boils from the sole of his foot unto his crown. The ways of the Lord are not as our ways, or this would seem the reverse of an encouragement to virtue.

We turn over the pages of our bible for further information on this diabolic theme.

After reading the account of the numbering by David attentively, one is puzzled by the apparent contradiction, that in one place "God" and in another "Satan" occurs.*

* 1 Chron. xxi, 1; 2 Sam. xxiv, 1

But it may be that there is more harmony between God and the Devil than ordinary men are aware. Unfortunately, we have not the advantage of great scholarship, but one erudite commentator on the bible tells us, in speaking of the Hebrew word Azazel: "This terrible and venerable name of God, through the pens of biblical glossers, has beena Devil, a mountain, a wilderness, and a he-goat."* Well may incomprehensibility be an attribute of Deity, when, even to

holy and reverend fathers, God has been sometimes undistinguishable from a he-goat or a Devil. Goats and Devils are alike represented with horns and tails. We trust that profanity will not enlarge on this sad confusion of ideas. Not possessing great lingual acquirements, we adhere to the English bible, believing that religion can never be improved by mere common sense, or human effort. We admire, without understanding, the skill of the Missionary, who makes the word "Mooigniazimoongo" an equivalent for God in the Sooahelee dialect, and who represents "original sin" to the Ottomi Indian by the word "Teacatzintiliztlatlacolli," and who recommends the Delaware to repentance as "Schiwelendamowitchewagan."

We do not wonder that in these translating thaumaturgic exploits God and Devil get mistaken for each other.

God is a spirit. Jesus was led up of the Spirit to be tempted of the Devil; and it is also true that spirits are very likely to lead men to the Devil. Too intimate acquaintance with whisky toddy overnight is often followed by thedelirium tremensand blue-devils on the morrow. We advise our readers to eschew alike spirituous and spiritual mixtures. They interfere sadly with sober thinking, and play the Devil with your brains.

The history of the temptation of Jesus by the Devil has been dealt with in another essay.** Yet it may be well to add the opinion of a Church of England divine in this place: "That the Devil should appear personallytothe Son of Godis certainly not more wonderfulthan that he should, in a more remote age, have appearedamongthe sons of God, in the presence of God himself, to tempt and torment the righteous Job."

* G. R. Gliddon's extract from "Land's Sagra Scritura,"chap. iii, sec. 1.** "Who was Jesus Christ?" p. 8.

But that Satan should carry Jesus, bodily and literally, through the air—first to the top of a high mountain, and then to the topmost pinnacle of the temple—is wholly inadmissible, it is an insult to our understanding.* It is pleasant to be able to find so many clergymen, in these days, zealously repudiating their own creeds. I am not prepared to speak strongly as to the color of the Devil; white men paint him black, black men white; but, allowing for the prejudices of dark-colored and fair-skinned believers, an invisible green would not be an unreasonable tint. We presume that he is not colorless, as otherwise the Evangelists or the persons present would have labored under considerable difficulties in witnessing the casting out of the Devil from the man in the synagogue.** This Devil is described as an unclean Devil, and it is, therefore, a fair inference that there are some clean Devils as well as dirty Devils. Printer's Devils are mostly unclean Devils, but then they are only little Devils, and we must not make too much of them.

Nearly all the Devils seem to talk, and it has therefore been conjectured by some bachelor metaphysicians that they are of the feminine gender, but I see no reason to agree in this, and my wife is of a contrary opinion. The Devils are probably good Christians—one text tells us that they believe and tremble. It is a fact with some poor Devils that the more they believe the more they tremble. We are told in another text that the Devil goeth about like a roaring lion, seeking whom he may devour. He will have extremely bad taste, however, if he eat up the lean and bony working-classes, while so many fat bishops and stout archdeacons remain unconsumed.

*"Christian Records," by the Rev. Dr. Giles, p. 144.** Luke iv, 35, 36.

Devils should be a sort of eternal salamander, for we are told there is everlasting fire prepared for the Devil and his angels,* and that there is a lake of brimstone and fire, into which the Devil was cast.** Perhaps instead of being salamander they will, while in the fire, be rather of the 'otter tribe; but this is a question which Mr. C. H. Spurgeon, who is a far better judge of brimstone than myself, would be more competent to settle. The Devil has, at least upon one occasion, figured as a controversialist. He disputed with the archangel Michael, contending about the body of Moses;*** and in these degenerate days of personality in debate it is pleasant to know that the religious champion, unlike the Grants, Coopers, and Brindleys of the present period, was very civil toward his Satanic opponent. The Devil was once imprisoned for 1,000 years in a bottomless pit.**** If a pit has no bottom, it seems but little confinement to shut the top; but with faith and prayer, even a good foundation may be obtained for a bottomless pit.

It is urged by some that the Devil was the serpent of Genesis—that is, that it was really Satan who, in this guise, tempted Eve. There is this difficulty in the matter: the Devil is a liar,***** but in the interview with Eve the serpent seems to have confined himself to the strict truth.****** There is, in fact, no point of resemblance—no horns, no hoof, nothing except the tail—which can be in any way identified.

* Matt, xxv, 41.** Jude, 9.*** John viii, 44.**** Rev. xxi, 10.***** Rev. xxi, 2.****** Genesis iii, 4, 5, 22.

The Old Testament speaks a little of the Devils, sometimes of Satan, but never of "The Devil," and it seems almost too much, in Matthew, to usher him in, in the temptation scene, without introduction, and as if he were an old acquaintance. I do not remember reading, in the Old Testament, anything about the lake of brimstone and fire; this feature of faith was reserved for the warmth of Christian love to inspire; the Pentateuch makes no reference to it. Zechariah, in a vision, saw "Joshua, the High-Priest, standing before the angel of the Lord, and Satan standing at his right hand to resist him."* Why the Devil wanted to resist Joshua is not clear; but as Joshua's

garments were in a very filthy state, it may be that he was preaching to the Priest the virtues of cleanliness. It is often said that cleanliness is next to godliness; I honestly confess that I should prefer a clean sinner to a dirty saint. Jesus said that one of the twelve disciples was a Devil,** but I am not prepared to say whether he meant the unfaithful and cowardly Peter, to whom he intrusted the keys of Heaven, or Judas who sold him for money, just as would nearly any bishop of the present day. The bishops preach that it is as difficult for a rich man to get into Heaven as for a camel to go through the eye of a needle; yet they enrich themselves, and their families, as greedily and carelessly as if they, at any rate, never expected to smell brimstone as a consequence. You are told to resist the Devil, and he will flee from you;*** if this be true, he is a cowardly Devil, and thus does not agree quite with Milton's picture of his grand, defiant, almost heroism. But then Milton was a poet, and true religion has but little poetry in it.

* Zechariah iii, 1.**John vi, 70.***James iv, 7.

Jeroboam, one of the Jewish monarchs, ordained priests for the Devils,* and this may be the reason why, at the present day, all the orthodox clergy are gentlemen in black. In the time of Jesus, Satan must, when not in the body of some mad, deaf, dumb, blind, or paralytic person, have been in Heaven; for Jesus, on one occasion, told his disciples that he saw Satan, as lightning, fall from Heaven.** Of course, this would betoken a rapid descent, but although a light affair, it is no laughing matter, and we reverently leave it to the clergy to explain the text. Jesus told Simon Peter that Satan desired to have him, that he might sift him as wheat;*** in this text it may be urged that Jesus was chaffing his disciple. Paul, the apostle, seems to have looked on the Devil much as the magistrates of Guernsey, Devonport, and Yarmouth look on the police, for Paul delivered Hymeneus and Alexander unto Satan, that they may learn not to blaspheme.****

Revivalists are much indebted for their evanescent successes to Hell and the Devil, if the following extract from the experience of a Christian preacher be reliable:

"Thomas English was one of those very noisy and active preachers who do so much in promoting revivals." he would tell his hearers of "dwelling with devouring fire, bearing everlasting burning, roasting on the Devil's spit, broiling on his gridiron, being pitched about with his fork, drinking the liquid fire, breathing the brimstone fumes, drowning in a red-hot sea, lying on fiery beds,"***** etc.

* 2 Chron: xi, 15.** Luke x, 18.*** Luke xxii, 31.**** 1 Tim. i, 20.***** "Pilgrim's Progress from Methodism to Christianity."

In the present year the vulgar tirades of Reginald Radcliffe, Richard Weaver, and C. H. Spurgeon (some of them delivered in Exeter Hall) will serve to evidence that the above quotation is not the exaggeration which some might think. In London, before crowded audiences, Mr. Weaver, without originality, and with only the merit of copied coarseness, has called upon the Lord to "shake the ungodly for five minutes over the mouth of Hell." Mr. Spurgeon has drawn pictures of Hell which, if true and revealed to him by God, are most disgustingly frightful, and which being, as we believe, false, and but the creation of his own vulgar, morbid fancies, induce, on our part, a feeling of contempt as well as disgust.

The Wesleyans, some years since, made the Devil a prominent feature in the famous "Fly-Sheet" controversy, so much so that a Wesleyan, speaking and writing on the subject, suggested that the authors of the "Fly-Sheets" were Devils, and another once-Wesleyan writer says: "The first thing which made me inquire about the Devil was that I thought him abused. I thought him bad enough, but could not help fearing that people told lies about him. R. S———, a very zealous prayer-leader, stole some oats, and imputed the blame to the Devil. T. C——— got drunk, and complained in the love-feast that the Devil had been very busy with him for some time, and then took him in an unguarded moment. B. S——- was detected in lying, and complained that Satan had gained the advantage over him. Old George White burned his fingers in lighting his pipe, and declared that it was the Devil that caused him to do it; and Farmer Duffy horsewhipped his wife, and said that he did it to beat the Devil out of her. This make me desirous to know what influence the Devil really had, and I was stimulated to this inquiry by my friend, Mr. Trelevan, who assured mo that the Devil was as necessary as the Almighty to the orthodox faith."* The fashionable preachers in the neighborhood of Belgravia mostly eschew the Devil, and avoid the taint of brimstone; treacle is the commodity they dispense.

* "Pilgrim's Progress from Methodism to Christianity."

For myself, the only Devil I know is that black Devil ignorance, fostered by knavery and tyranny; a Devil personified by the credulous many, and kept up in the past by the learned but treacherous few, who preferred to rule the masses by their fears, rather than to guide them through their love. This devil has, indeed, not been a roaring lion, but a cowardly and treacherous boa constrictor; it has enveloped in its massive folds glorious truths, and in the fierceness of its brute power has crushed them in its writhings. But oh! a glorious day is coming: amid the heretofore gloom of night the bright rays of the rising sun are piercing, the light of truth dispels the mists of ignorance. Bright facts drive out dark delusions; mighty truths triumph over pious frauds, and no longer need men be affrighted by the notion of an omnipotent fiend, wandering through the earth, ever seeking their damnation.

Yes—to partially adopt the phraseology of a writer in "Macmillan's Magazine"—I do refuse to see in God a being omniscient as omnipotent, who puts us into this world without our volition, leaves us to struggle through it as we can, unequally pitted against an almost omnipotent and supersubtile Devil, and then, if we fail, finally drops us out of this world into Hell-fire, where a legion of inferior Devils find constant and never-ending employment in inventing fresh tortures for us; our crime being that we have not succeeded where success was rendered impossible. No high, no manly, no humane thinkings are developed in the doctrine of Devils and damnation. If a potent faith, it degrades alike the teacher and the taught, by its abhorrent mercilessness; and if a form, instead of a faith, then is the Devil doctrine a misleading sham, which frightens weak minds and never developes strong men.

NEW LIFE OF DAVID.

In compiling a biographical account of any ancient personage, impediments mostly arise from the uncertainty of the various traditions out of which we gather our biography, and from the party bias and coloring which often pervade and detract from their value. In the present case no such obstacle is met with, no such bias can be imagined, for, in giving the life of David, we extract it from an all-wise God's perfect and infallible revelation to man, and thus are enabled to present it to our readers free from any doubt, uncertainty, or difficulty. The father of David was Jesse, an Ephrathite of Bethlehem-judah. Jesse had either eight sons (1 Samuel xvi, 10, 11, and xvii, 12) or only seven (1 Chron. ii, 13 to 15), and David was either the eighth son or the seventh. Some may think this a difficulty to commence with, but such persons will only be those who rely on their own intellectual faculties, or who have been misled by Colenso's arithmetic. If you, my dear reader, are in any doubt, at once consult some qualified divine, and he will explain to you that there is really no difference between eight and seven when rightly understood with prayer and faith, by the help of the spirit. Arithmetic is an utterly infidel acquirement, and one which all true believers should eschew. In proof of this, I may observe that the proposition three times one are one is a fundamental article of the Christian faith. David's great grandmother was the holy harlot Rahab, and his grandmother was a lady who when unmarried went in the night and lay at the feet of Boaz, and left in the morning before it was light enough for any one to recognize her like her grandson she was "prudent in matters." When young, David tended his father's sheep, and apparently while so doing he obtained the reputation for being cunning in playing, a mighty valiant man, and a man of war and prudent in matters. He obtained his reputation as a soldier early and wonderfully, for he was "but a youth," and God's most holy word asserts that when going to fight with Goliath he tried to walk in armor, and could not, for he was not accustomed to it (1 Samuel xvii, 39, Douay version). Samuel shortly prior to this anointed David, and the spirit of the Lord came upon him from that day forward. If a man takes to spirits his life will probably be one of vice, misery, and misfortune, and if spirits take to him the result in the end is nearly the

same. Saul being King of Israel, an evil spirit from the Lord troubled him. The devil has no ear for music, and Saul was recommended to have David to play on a harp in order that harmony might drive this evil spirit back to the Lord who sent it. The Jews' harp was played successfully, and Saul was often relieved from the evil spirit by the aid of David's ministrations. There is nothing miraculous in this; at the people's concerts many a working man has been released from the "blue devils" by a stirring chorus, a merry song, or patriotic anthem. David was appointed armor-bearer to the king, but curiously enough this office does not appear to have interfered with his duties as a shepherd; indeed the care of his father's sheep took precedence over the care of the king's armor, and in the time of war he "went and returned to feed his father's sheep." Perhaps his "prudence in matters" induced him thus to take care of himself.

A Philistine, one Goliath of Gath (whose hight was six cubits and a span, or about nine feet six inches, at a low computation) had defied the armies of Israel. This Goliath was (to use the vocabulary of the reverend sporting correspondent of a certain religious newspaper) a veritable champion of the heavy weights. He carried in all two cwt. of armor, offensive and defensive, upon his person, and his challenge had great weight. None dared accept it among the soldiers of Saul until the arrival of David with some food for his brethren. David volunteered to fight the giant, but Saul objecting that he was not competent to take part in a conflict so dangerous, David related how he pursued alion and a bear, how he caughthimby his beard and slewhim. David's offer was accepted, he was permitted to fight the giant. In one verse David slew the Philistine with a stone, in another verse he slew him with the giant's own sword, while in 2 Samuel, c. xxi, v. 19, we are told that Goliath the Gittite was slain by Elhanan. Our transalators, who have great regard for our faiths and more for their pulpits, have kindly inserted the words "the brother of" before Goliath. This saves the true believer from the difficulty of understanding how Goliath of Gath could have been killed by different men at different times. David was previously well known to Saul, and was much loved and favored by that monarch. He was also seen by the king before he went forth to do battle with the gigantic Philistine. Yet Saul had forgotten his own armor-bearer and much-loved harpist, and was obliged to ask Abner who David was. Abner, captain of the king's host, familiar with the person of the armor-bearer to the king, of course knew David well; he therefore answered, "As thy soul liveth, O king, I can not tell." One day the evil spirit from the Lord came upon Saul and he prophesied. Men who are spiritually inclined often talk great nonsense under the influence of spirits, which they sometimes regret when sober. It is, however, an interesting fact in ancient spiritualism to know that Saul prophesied with a devil in him. Under the joint influence of the devil and prophecy, he tried to kill David, and when this was repeated, even after David had married the king's daughter (for whose wedding trousseau he had procured an interesting and delicate offering by the slaughter of two hundred men), then to save his own life David fled to Naioth, and Saul sent there messengers to arrest him, but the king's messengers having all become prophets, in the end Saul went himself,

and this time the spirit of the Lord came upon him, and he stripped off his clothes and prophesied as hard as the rest. What he phrophesied about we do not know. In fact, the priests have made so great deduction from the profits during the plenitude of their power, that there has been little which is profitable in connection with religion left for the people.

David lived in exile for some time, having collected around him every one that was in distress, and every one that was in debt, and every one that was discontented. Saul made several fruitless attempts to effect his capture, with no better result than that he twice placed himself in the power of David, who twice showed the mercy to a cruel king which he never conceded to an unoffending people. David having obtruded himself upon Achish, King of Gath, and doubtful of his safety, feigned madness to cover his retreat. He then lived a precarious life, sometimes levying a species of blackmail upon defenseless farmers. Having applied to one farmer to make him some compensation for permitting the farm to go unrobbed, and his demand not having been complied with, David, who is a man after the heart of the God of mercy, immediately determined to murder the farmer and all his household for their wicked reluctance in submitting to his extortions. The wife of farmer Nabal compromised the matter. David "accepted her person" and ten days afterward Nabal was found dead in his bed. David afterward went with six hundred men and lived under the protection of Achish, king of Gath; and while thus residing (being the anointed one of a God who says "Thou shalt not steal,") he robbed the inhabitants of the surrounding places; being also obedient to the statute "Thou 1 shalt do no murder," he slaughtered, and left neither man nor woman alive to report his robberies to King Achish; and as he "always walked in the ways" of a God to whom "lying lips are an abomination," he made false reports to Achish in relation to his actions. Of course this was all for the glory of God, whose ways are not as our ways. Soon the Philistines were engaged in another of the constantly recurring conflicts with the Israelites. Who offered them the help of himself and band? Who offered to make war on his own countrymen? David, the man after God's own heart, who obeyed his statutes and who walked in his ways to do only that which was right in the sight of God. The Philistines rejected the traitor's aid, and saved David from the consummation of this baseness. While David was making this unpatriotic proffer of his services to the Philistines, his own city of Ziglag was captured by the Amalekites, who were doubtless endeavoring to avenge some of the most unjustifiable robberies and murders perpetrated by David and his followers in their country. David's own friends evidently thought that this misfortune was a retribution for David's crimes, for they spoke of stoning him. The Amalekites had captured and carried off every thing, but they do not seem to have maltreated or killed any of their enemies. David was less merciful. He pursued them, recaptured the spoil, and spared not a man of them, save 400 who escaped on camels. In consequence of the death of Saul, David soon after was elevated to the throne of Judah, while Ishbosheth, son of Saul, was made King of Israel. But Ishbosheth, having

been assassinated, David slew the assassins, when they, hoping for reward, brought him the news, and he reigned ultimately over Israel also.

As my religious readers are doubtless aware, the Lord God of Israel, after the time of Moses, usually dwelt on the top of an ark or box, between two figures of gold, and on one occasion David made a journey with his followers to Baal, to bring thence the ark of God. They placed it on a new cart drawn by oxen. On their journey the oxen stumbled and consequently shook the cart, and one of the drivers, whose name was Uzzah, fearing that God might be tumbled to the ground, took hold of the ark, apparently in order to steady it, and prevent it from overturning. God, who is a God of love, was much displeased that any one should presume to do any such act of kindness, and killed Uzzah on the spot as a punishment for his error. This shows that if a man sees the Church of God tumbling down, he should never try to prop it up; if it be not strong enough to save itself the sooner it falls the better for human kind—that is, if they keep away from it while it is falling. David was much displeased that the Lord had killed Uzzah; in fact, David seems to have wished for a monopoly of slaughter, and always manifested displeasure when killing was done unauthorized by himself. Being displeased, David would not take the ark to Jerusalem; he left it in the house of Obed Edom, but as the Lord proved more kind to Obed Edom than he had done to Uzzah, David determined to bring it away, and he did so, and David danced before the ark in a state of semi-nudity, for which he was reproached by Michal. The story is one which, by itself, would be as entertaining to a depraved mind as any Holywell-Street pamphlet, if Lord Campbell's act did not prevent the publication of indecencies. The pages of God's most holy word, we believe, do not come within the scope of the act, and lovers of obscene language may therefore have legal gratification so long as the bible shall exist. The God of Israel, who had been leading a wandering life for many years, and who had "walked in a tent and in a tabernacle," and "from tent to tent," and "from one tabernacle to another," and who "had not dwelt in any house" since the time that he brought the Isrealites out of Egypt, was offered "an house for him to dwell in," but he declined to accept it during the lifetime of David, although he promised to permit the son of David to erect him such an abode. David being now a powerful monarch, and having many wives and concubines, saw one day the beautiful wife of one of his soldiers. To see, with this licentious monarch, was to crave for the gratification of his lust. The husband, Uriah, was fighting for the king, yet David was base enough to steal his wife's virtue during Uriah's absence in the field of battle. "Thou shalt not commit adultery," was one of the commandments, yet we are told by God of this David, "who kept my commandments, and who followed me with all his heart to do only that which was right in mine eyes" (1 Kings, c. xiv, v. 8). David having seduced the wife, sent for her husband, wishing to make him condone his wife's dishonor, as many a man has done in other lands, when a king or prince has been the seducer. Some hold that virtue in rags is less worth than vice when coroneted. Uriah would not be thus tricked, and David, the pious David, coolly planned, and without mercy caused to be executed,

the treacherous murder of Uriah. God is all just; and David having committed adultery and murder, God punished and killed an innocent child, which had no part or share in David's crime, and never chose that it should be born from the womb of Bathsheba. After this the king David was even more cruel and merciless than before. Previously he had systematically slaughtered the inhabitants of Moab, now he sawed people with saws, cut them with harrows and axes, and made them pass through brick-kilns. Yet of this man God said he "did that which was right in mine eyes." So bad a king, so treacherous a man, a lover so inconstant, a husband so adulterous, of course was a bad father, having bad children. We are little surprised, therefore, to read that his son Ammon robbed his sister, David's daughter Tamar, of her virtue; and that Ammon was afterward slain by his own brother, David's son Absalom, and are scarcely astonished that Absalom himself, on the house-top, in the sight of all Israel, should complete his father's shame by an act worthy a child of God's selected people. Yet these are God's chosen race, and this is the family of the man "who walked in God's ways all the days of his life."

God, who is all-wise and all-just, and who is not a man that he should repent, had repented that he, had made Saul king because Saul spared one man. In the reign of David the same good God sent a famine for three years on the decendants of Abraham, and upon being asked his reason for thus starving his chosen ones, the reply of the Deity was that he sent the famine on the subjects of David because Saul slew the Gibeonites. Satisfactory reason!—because Oliver Cromwell slew the Royalists, God will punish the subjects of Charles the Second. One reason is to profane eyes equivalent to the other, but a bishop or even a rural dean would show how remarkably God's justice was manifested. David was not behindhand in justice. He had sworn to Saul that he would not cut off his seed—i.e. that he would not destroy Saul's family. He therefore took two of Saul's sons, and five of Saul's grandsons, and gave them up to the Gibeonites, who hung them. Strangely wonderful are the ways of the Lord! Saul slew the Gibeonites, therefore years afterward God starves Judah. The Gibeonites hang men who had nothing to do with the crime of Saul, except that they are his decendants, and then we are told "the Lord was intreated for the land." Perhaps David wanted to get rid of the royal family of Saul. The anger of the Lord being kindled against Israel, and he wanting some excuse for punishing the decendants of Jacob, moved David to number his people. The Chronicles say that it was Satan, and pious people may thus learn that there is little difference between God and the Devil when rightly understood. Both are personifications founded in the ignorance of the masses, and their continuance will cease with their credulousness. David caused a census to be taken of the tribes of Israel and Judah. There is a trivial disagreement to the extent of about 270,000 soldiers between Samuel and Chronicles, but the readers must not allow so slight an inaccuracy as this to stand between them and heaven. What are 270,000 men when looked at prayerfully? The idea that any doubt should arise is to a devout mind at the same time profane and preposterous. Infidels suggest that 1,570,000 soldiers form a larger army than the Jews are likely to have

possessed. I can only add that as God is omnipotent, there is no reason to limit his power of increasing or decreasing miraculously the armament of the Jewish nation. David, it seems, did wrong in numbering his people, although we are never told that he did wrong in robbing or murdering their neighbors, or in pillaging peaceful agriculturists. David said, "I have sinned." The king having done wrong, an all-merciful God brought a pestilence on the people, and murdered 70,000 Israelites for an offense which their ruler had committed. The angel who was engaged in this terrible slaughter stood somewhere between heaven and earth, and stretched forth his hand with a drawn sword in it to destroy Jerusalem itself, but even the blood-thirsty Deity of the bible "repented him of the evil," and said to the angel, "It is enough." Many volumes might be written to answer the inquiries—Where did the angel stand, and on what? Of what metal was the sword, and where was it made? As it was a drawn one, where was the scabbard? and did the angel wear a sword belt? Examined in a pious frame of mind, much holy instruction may be derived from the attempt at solution of these problems.

David now grows old and weak, and at last, notwithstanding that he has the advantage of a pretty maiden to cherish him, he wears out, and his death hour comes. Oh! for the dying words of the Psalmist! What pious instruction shall we derive from the deathbed scene of the man after God's own heart! Listen to the last words of Judah's expiring monarch. You who have been content with the pious frauds and forgeries perpetrated with reference to the deathbeds and dying words of the great, the generous, the witty Voltaire, the manly, the self-denying, the incorruptible Thomas Paine, the humane, simple, child-like man, yet mighty poet, Shelley—you who have turned away from these with horror, unfounded if real, come with me to the death couch of the special favorite of God. Bathsheba's child stands by his side. Does any thought of the murdered Uriah rack old David's brain, or has a tardy repentance effaced the bloody stain from the pages of his memory? What does the dying David say? Does he talk of cherubs, angels, and heavenly choirs? Nay, none of these things pass his lips. Does he make a confession of his crime-stained life, and beg his son to be a better king, a truer man, a more honest citizen, a wiser father? Nay, not so—no word or sigh of regret, no expression of remorse or repentance escaped his lips. What does the dying David say? This foul adulterer, whom God has made king; this red-handed robber, whose life has been guarded by "our Father which art in Heaven;" this perjured king, whose lying lips have found favor in the sight of God, and who when he dies is safe for Heaven. Does David repent? Nay—like the ravenous tiger or wolf, which once tasting blood is made more eager for the prey, he yearns for blood; he dies, and with his dying breath begs his son to bring the grey hairs of two old men down to the grave with blood. Yet this is the life of God's anointed king, the chief one of God's chosen people.

David is alleged to have written several Psalms. In one of these he addresses God in the phraseology of a member of the P. R. praising Deity that he had smitten all of his enemies on the

cheek bone and broken the teeth of the ungodly. In these days, when "muscular Christianity" is not without advocates, the metaphor which presents God as a sort of magnificent Benicia Boy may find many admirers. In the eighteenth Psalm, David describes God as with "smoke coming out of his nostrils and fire out of his mouth," by which "coals were kindled." He represents God as coming down from heaven, and says "he rode upon a cherub." The learned Parkhurst gives a likeness of a one-legged, four-winged, four-faced animal, part lion, part bull, part eagle, part man, and if a cloven foot be any criterion, part devil also. This description, if correct, will give some idea to the faithful of the wonderful character of the equestrian feats of Deity.

In the twenty-sixth Psalm, the writer, if David, exposes his own hypocrisy in addition to his other vices. He has the impudence to tell God that he has been a man of integrity and truth; that he has avoided evildoers, although if we are to believe the thirty-eighth Psalm, the vile hypocrite must have already been subject to a loathsome disease—a penalty consequent on his licentiousness and criminality. In another Psalm, David the liar tells God that "he that telleth lies shall not tarry in my sight." To understand his malevolent nature we can not do better than quote his prayer to God against an enemy (Psalm cix, 6-14):

"6. Set thou a wicked man over him: and let Satan stand at his right hand.

"7. When he shall be judged, let him be condemned: and let his prayer become sin.

"8. Let his days be few: and let another take his office.

"9. Let his children be fatherless, and his wife a widow.

"10. Let his children be continually vagabonds, and beg: let them seek their bread also out of their desolate places.

"11. Let the extortioner catch all that he hath: and let the strangers spoil his labor.

"12. Let there be none to extend mercy unto him: neither let there be any to favor his fatherless children.

"13. Let his posterity be cut off: and in the generation following let their name be blotted out.

"14. Let the iniquity of his fathers be remembered with the Lord: and let not the sin of his mother be blotted out."

A full consideration of the life of David must give great help to each orthodox reader in promoting and sustaining his faith. While he is spoken of by Deity as obeying all the statutes and keeping all the commandments, we are astonished to find that murder, theft, lying, adultery, licentiousness, and treachery are among the crimes which may be laid to his charge. David was a liar, God is a God of truth; David was merciless, God is merciful, and of long suffering; David was a thief, God says "Thou shalt not steal;" David was a murderer, God says "Thou shalt do no murder;" David took the wife of Uriah, and "accepted" the wife of Nabal, God says "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife;" Yet, notwithstanding all these things, David was a man after God's own heart.

Had this Jewish monarch any redeeming traits in his character? Was he a good citizen? If so, the bible has carefully concealed every action which would entitle him to such an appellation, and in lieu has given us the record of his attempted extortion in the case of Nabal, and furnished us with a notice of his horde of followers—outlawed, discontented, and in debt. Was he a kind and constant husband? Was he grateful to those who aided him in his hour of need? Nay; like the wounded serpent which, half frozen by the wayside, is warmed into new life in the traveler's breast, and then treacherously stabs him with his poisoned fangs, so David robbed and murdered the friends and allies of the King of Gath, who had afforded him refuge against the pursuit of Saul. Does his patriotism outshine his many vices? Does his love of country efface his many misdoings? Not even this. David was a heartless traitor who volunteered to serve against his own countrymen, and would have done so had not the Philistines rejected his treacherous help. Was he a good king? So say the priesthood now; but where is the evidence of his virtue? His crimes brought a plague and pestilence on his subjects, and his reign is a continued succession of wars, revolts, and assassinations, plottings and counterplots.

The life of David is a dark blot on the page of human history, and our best hope is that if a spirit from God inspired the writer, then that it was a lying spirit, and that he has given us fiction instead of truth.

NEW LIFE OF JACOB.

It is pleasant work to present to the reader sketches of God's chosen people. More especially is it an agreeable task to recapitulate the interesting events occurring during the life of a man whom God has loved. Jacob was the son of Isaac; the grandson of Abraham. These three men were so free from fault, their lives so unobjectionable, that the God of the bible delighted to be called the "God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob." It is true, Abraham owned slaves, was not exact as to the truth, and, on one occasion, turned his wife and child out to the mercies of a sandy desert. That Isaac in some sort followed his father's example and

disingenuous practices, and that Jacob was without manly feeling, a sordid, selfish, unfraternal cozener, a cowardly trickster, a cunning knave, but they must nevertheless have been good men, for God was "the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob." The name Jacob is not inappropriate. Kalisch says: "This appellation, if taken in its obvious etymological meaning, implies a deep ignominy; for the root from which it is derived signifiesto deceive, to defraud,and in such a despicable meaning the same form of the word is indeed used elsewhere (Jeremiah ix, 3). Jacob would, therefore, be nothing else but the craftyimpostor; in this sense Esau, in the heat of his animosity, in fact clearly explains the word, justly is his name called Jacob (cheat) because he has cheated me twice" (Genesis xxvii, 30). According to the ordinary orthodox bible chronology, Jacob was born about 1836 or 1837 B. C, that is, about 2,168 years from "in the beginning," his father Isaac being then sixty years of age. There is a difficulty connected with Holy Scripture chronology which would be insuperable were it not that we have the advantage of spiritual aids in elucidation of the text. This difficulty arises from the fact that the chronology of the bible, in this respect, like the major portion of bible history, is utterly unreliable. But we do not look to the Old or New Testament for mere commonplace, everyday facts; or if we do, severe will be the disappointment of the truthseeker; we look there for mysteries, miracles, paradoxes, and perplexities, and have no difficulties in finding the objects of our search. Jacob was born, together with his twin brother, Esau, in consequence of special entreaty addressed by Isaac to the Lord on behalf of Rebekah, to whom he had been married about nineteen years, and who was yet childless. Infidel physiologists (and it is a strange, though not unaccountable, fact that all who are physiologists are also in so far infidel) assert that prayer would do little to repair the consequence of such disease, or such abnormal organic structure, as would compel sterility. But our able clergy are agreed that the bible was not intended to teach us science; or, at any rate, we have learned that its attempts in that direction are most miserable failures. Its mission is to teach the unteachable; to enable us to comprehend the incomprehensible. Before Jacob was born God decreed that he and his descendants should obtain the mastery over Esau and his descendants—"the elder shall serve the younger."* The God of the bible is a just God, but it is hard for weak flesh to discover the justice of this proemial decree, which so sentenced to servitude the children of Esau before their father's birth.

* Gen. xxv, 23.

Jacob came into the world holding by his brother's heel, like some cowardly knave in the battle of life, who, not daring to break a gap in the hedge of conventional prejudice, which bars his path, is yet ready enough to follow some bolder warrior, and to gather the fruits of his courage. "And the boys grew: and Esau was a cunning hunter, a man of the field: and Jacob was a plain man, dwelling in tents." One day Esau returned from his hunting faint and wearied to the very point of death. He was hungry, and came to Jacob, his twin and only brother, saying, "Feed me, I

pray thee,"* "for I am exceedingly faint."** In a like case would not any man so entreated immediately offer to the other the best at his command, the more especially when that other is his only brother, born at the same time, from the same womb, suckled at the same breast, fed under the same roof? But Jacob was not a man and a brother, he was one of God's chosen people, and one who had been honored by God's prenatal selection. "If a man come unto me and hate not his brother, he can not be my disciple." So taught Jesus the Jew, in after time, but in this earlier age Jacob the Jew, in practice, anticipated the later doctrine. It is one of the misfortunes of theology, if not its crime, that profession of love to God is often accompanied with bitter and active hate of man. Jacob was one of the founders of the Jewish race, and even in this their pre-historic age, the instinct for driving a hard bargain seems strongly developed. "Jacob said" to Esau, "Sell me this day thy birthright." The famished man vainly expostulated, and the birthright was sold for a mess of pottage.

* Gen. xxv, 30** Douay version.

If to-day one man should so meanly and cruelly take advantage of his brother's necessities to rob him of his birthright, all good and honest men would shun him as an unbrotherly scoundrel and most contemptible knave; yet, less than 4,000 years ago, a very different standard of morality must have prevailed. Indeed, if God is unchangeable, divine notions of honor and honesty must to-day be widely different from those of our highest men. God approved and endorsed Jacob's conduct. His approval is shown by his love afterward expressed for Jacob, his endorsement by his subsequent attention to Jacob's welfare. We may learn from this tale, so pregnant with instruction, that any deed which to the worldly and sensible man appears like knavery while understood literally, becomes to the devout and prayerful man an act of piety when understood spiritually. Much faith is required to thoroughly understand this;for example, it looks like swindling to collect poor children's halfpence and farthings in the Sunday schools for missionary purposes abroad, and to spend thereout two or three hundred pounds in an annual jubilatory dinner for well-fed pauper parsons at home; and so thought the noble lord who wrote to theTimesunder the initials S. G. O. If he had possessed more faith and less sense, he would have seen the piety and completely overlooked the knavery of the transaction. Pious preachers and clever commentators declare that Esau despised his birthright. I do not deny that they might back their declaration by scripture quotations, but I do deny that the narrative ought to convey any such impression. Esau's words were, "Behold I am at the point to die: and what profit shall this birthright be to me?"

Isaac growing old, and fearing from his physical infirmities the near approach of death, was anxious to bless Esau before he died, and directed him to take quiver and bow and go out in the field to hunt some venison for a savory meat, such as old Isaac loved. Esau departed, but when

he had left his father's presence in order to fulfill his request, Jacob appeared on the scene. Instigated by his mother, he, by an abject stratagem, passed himself off as Esau. With a savory meat prepared by Rebekah, he came into his father's presence, and Isaac said, "Who art thou, my son?" Lying lips are an abomination to the Lord. The Lord loved Jacob, yet Jacob lied to his old blind father, saying, "I am Esau, thy first-born." Isaac had some doubts: these are manifested by his inquiring how it was that the game was killed so quickly. Jacob, whom God loved, in a spirit of shameless blasphemy replied, "Because the Lord thy God brought it to me." Isaac still hesitated, fancying that he recognized the voice to be the voice of Jacob, and again questioned him, saying, "Art thou my very son Esau?" God is the God of truth and loved Jacob, yet Jacob said, "I am." Then Isaac blessed Jacob, believing that he was blessing Esau: and God permitted the fraud to be successful, and himself also blessed Jacob. In that extraordinary composition known as the Epistle to the Hebrews, we are told that by faith Isaac blessed Jacob. But what faith had Isaac? Faith that Jacob was Esau? His belief was produced by deceptive appearances. His faith resulted from false representations. And there are very many men in the world who have no better foundation for their religious faith than had Isaac when he blessed Jacob, believing him to be Esau. In the Douay bible I find the following note on this remarkable narrative: "St. Augustine (X. contra mendacium c. 10), treating at large upon this place, excuseth Jacob from a lie, because thi's whole passage was mysterious, as relating to the preference which was afterward to be given to the Gentiles before the carnal Jews, which Jacob, by prophetic light, might understand. So far it is certain that the first birthright, both by divine election and by Esau's free cession, belonged to Jacob; so that if there were any lie in the case, it would be no more than an officious and venial one." How glorious to be a pa triarch, and to have a real saint laboring years after your death to twist your lies into truth by aid of prophetic light. Lying is at all times most disreputable, but at the deathbed the crime is rendered more heinous. The death hour would have awed many men into speaking the truth, but it had little effect on Jacob. Although Isaac was about to die, this greedy knave cared not, so that he got from the dying man the sought-for prize. God is said to love righteousness and hate iniquity, yet he loved the iniquitous Jacob, and hated the honest Esau. All knaves are tinged more or less with cowardice. Jacob was no exception to the rule. His brother enraged at the deception practiced upon Isaac, threatened to kill Jacob. Jacob was warned by his mother and fled. Induced by Rebekah, Isaac charged Jacob to marry one of Laban's daughters. On the way to Haran, where Laban dwell, Jacob rested and slept. While sleeping he dreamed; ordinarily dreams have little significance, but in the bible they are more important. Some of the most weighty and vital facts (?) of the bible are communicated in dreams, and rightly so; if the men had been wide awake, they would have probably rejected the revelation as absurd. So much does that prince of darkness, the devil, influence mankind against the bible in the daytime, that it is when all is dark, and our eyes are closed, and the senses dormant, that God's mysteries are most clearly seen and understood. Jacob "saw in his sleep a ladder standing upon the earth, and the top thereof touching heaven;

the angels of God ascending and descending by it, andthe Lord leaning upon the ladder." In the ancient temples of India, and in the mysteries of Mithra, the seven-stepped ladder by which the spirits ascended to heaven is a prominent feature, and one of probably far higher antiquity than the age of Jacob. Did paganism furnish the groundwork for the patriarch's dream? "No man hath seen God at any time." God is "invisible." Yet Jacob saw the invisible God, whom no man hath seen or can see, either standing above a ladder or leaning upon it. True, it was all a dream. Yet God spoke to Jacob; but perhaps that was a delusion too. We find by scripture that God threatens to send to some "strong delusions, that they might believe a lie and be damned." Poor Jacob was much frightened, as any one might be, to dream of God leaning on so long a ladder. What if it had broken and the dreamer underneath it? Jacob's fears were not so powerful but that his shrewdness and avarice had full scope in a sort of half-vow, half-contract, made in the morning. Jacob said, "If God will be with me and will keep me in this way that I go, and will give me bread to eat, and raiment to put on, so that I shall come again to my father's house in peace, then shall the Lord be my God." The inference deducible from this conditional statement is, that if God failed to complete the items enumerated by Jacob, then the latter would have nothing to do with him. Jacob was a shrewd Jew, who would have laughed to scorn the preaching, "Take no thought, saying, what shall we eat? or, what shall we drink? or, wherewithal shall we be clothed?"

After this contract, Jacob went on his journey, and reached the house of his mother's brother, Laban, into whose service he entered. "Diamond cut diamond" would be an appropriate heading to the tale which gives the transactions between Jacob the Jew and Laban the son of Nahor. Laban had two daughters. Rachel, the youngest, was "beautiful and well-favored;" Leah, the elder, was "blear-eyed." Jacob served for the pretty one; but on the wedding-day Laban made a feast, and gave Jacob the ugly Leah instead of the pretty Rachel. Jacob being (according to Josephs) both in drink and in the dark, it was morning ere he discovered his error. After this Jacob served for Rachel also, and then the remainder of the chapter of Jacob's servitude to Laban is but the recital of a series of frauds and trickeries. Jacob embezzled Laban's property, and Laban misappropriated and changed Jacob's wages. In fact, if Jacob had not possessed the advantage of divine aid, he would probably have failed in the endeavor to cheat his master; but God, who says "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's house, nor anything that is thy neighbor's," encouraged Jacob in his career of criminality. At last, Jacob, having amassed a large quantity of property, determined to abscond from his employment, and taking advantage of his uncle's absence at sheepshearing, "he stole away unawares," taking with him his wives, his children, flocks, herds, and goods. To crown the whole, Rachel, worthy wife of a husband so fraudulent, stole her father's gods. In the present day the next phase would be the employment of Mr. Sergeant Vericute, of the special detective department, and the issue of bills as follows:

"ONE HUNDRED SHEKELS REWARD,Absconded, with a large amount of property,JACOB, THE JEW.Information to be given to Laban, the Syrian, at Haran, in theEast, or to Mr. Serjeant Vericute, Scotland Yard."

But in those days God's ways were not as our ways. God came to Laban in a dream and compounded the felony, saying, "Take heed thou speak not anything harshly against Jacob."* This would probably prevent Laban giving evidence in a police court against Jacob, and thus save him from transportation or penal servitude. After a reconciliation and treaty had been effected between Jacob and Laban, the former went on his way "and the angel of God met him." Angels are not included in the circle with which I have at present made acquaintance, and I hesitate, therefore, to comment on the meeting between Jacob and the angels. Balaam's ass, at a later period, shared the good fortune which was the lot of Jacob, for that animal also had a meeting with an angel. Jacob was the grandson of the faithful Abraham to whom angels also appeared. Perhaps angelic apparitions are limited to asses and the faithful. On this point I do not venture to assert, and but timidly suggest. It is somewhat extraordinary that Jacob should have manifested no surprise at meeting a host of angels. Still more worthy of note is it that our good translators elevate the same words into "angels" in verse 1, which they degrade into "messengers" in verse 3. John Bellamy, in his translation, says the "angels were not immortal angels," and it is very probable John Bellamy was right.

* Genesis xxxi, 24, Douay version.

Jacob sent messengers before him to Esau, and heard that the latter was coming to meet him followed by 400 men. Jacob, a timorous knave at best, became terribly afraid. He, doubtless, remembered the wrongs inflicted upon Esau, the cruel extortion of the birthright, and the fraudulent obtainment of the dying Isaac's blessing. He, therefore, sent forward to his brother Esau a large present as a peace offering. He also divided the remainder of his flocks, herds, and goods, into two divisions, that if one were smitten, the other might escape; sending these on, he was left alone. While alone he wrestled with either a man, or an angel, or God. The text says "a man," the heading to the chapter says "an angel," and Jacob himself says that he has "seen God face to face." Whether God, angel, or man, it was not a fair wrestle, and were the present editor ofBell's Lifereferee, he would, unquestionably, declare it to be most unfair to touch "the hollow of Jacob's thigh" so as to put it "out of joint," and, consequently, award the result of the match to Jacob. Jacob, notwithstanding the injury, still kept his grip, and the apocryphal wrestler, finding himself no match at fair struggling, and that foul play was unavailing, now tried entreaty, and said, "Let me go, for the day breaketh." Spirits never appear in the daytime, when, if they did appear, they could be seen and examined; they are more often visible in the twilight, in the darkness, and in dreams. Jacob would not let go, his life's instinct for bargaining prevailed, and

probably, because he could get nothing else, he insisted on his opponent's blessing before he let him go. In the Roman Catholic version of the bible there is the following note: Chap, xxxii, 24.A man, etc.

"This was an angel in human shape, as we learn fromOsee(xii, 4). He is calledGod(xv, 28 and 30), because he represented the son of God. This wrestling in which Jacob, assisted by God, was a match for an angel, was so ordered (v. 28) that he might learn by this experiment of the divine assistance, that neither Esau nor any other man should have power to hurt him." How elevating it must be to the true believer to conceive God helping Jacob to wrestle with his own representative. Read prayerfully, doubtless, the spiritual and inner meaning of the text (if it have one) is most transcendental. Read sensibly, the literal and only meaning the text conveys is that of an absurd tradition of an ignorant age. On the morrow Jacob met Esau:

"And Esau ran to meet him, and embraced him, and fell on his neck, and kissed him; and they wept.

"And he said, What meanest thou by all this drove which I met? And he said these are to find grace in the sight of my lord.

"And Esau said, I have enough, my brother; keep that thou hast unto thyself."

The following expressive comment, from the able pen of Mr. Holyoake, deserves transcription: "The last portion of the history of Jacob and Esau is very instructive. The coward fear of Jacob to meet his brother is well delineated. He is subdued by a sense of his treacherous guilt. The noble forgiveness of Esau invests his memory with more respect than all the wealth Jacob won, and all the blessings of the Lord he received. Could I change my name from Jacob to Esau, I would do it in honor of him. The whole incident has a dramatic interest. There is nothing in the Old or New Testament equal to it. The simple magnanimity of Esau is scarcely surpassed by anything in Plutarch. In the conduct of Esau we see the triumph of time, of filial affection, and generosity over a deep sense of execrable treachery, unprovoked and irrevocable injury." Was not Esau a merciful, generous man? Yet God hated him, and shut him out of all share in the promised land. Was not Jacob a mean, prevaricating knave, a crafty, abject cheat? Yet God loved and rewarded him. How great are the mysteries in this bible representation of an all-good and all-loving God thus hating good and loving evil. At the time of the wrestling, a promise was made, which is afterward repeated by God to Jacob, that the latter should not be any more called Jacob, but Israel. This promise was not strictly kept; the name "Jacob" being used repeatedly, mingled with that of Israel in the after part of Jacob's history. Jacob had a large family; his sons are reputedly the heads of the twelve Jewish tribes. We have not much space to

notice them: suffice it to say that one Joseph, who was much loved by his father, was sold by his brethren into slavery. This transaction does not seem to have called for any special reproval from God. Joseph, who from early life was skilled in dreams, succeeded by interpreting the visions of Pharaoh in obtaining a sort of premiership in Egypt; while filling this office he managed to act like the Russells and the Greys of our own time. We are told that he "placedhis father and his brethren, and gave them a possession in the land of Egypt, in the best of the land." Joseph made the parallel still stronger between himself and a more modern head of the Treasury Bench; he not only gave his own family the best place in the land, but he also, by a trick of statecraft, obtained the land for the king, made slaves of the people, and made it a law over the land of Egypt that the king should be entitled to one-fifth of the produce, always, of course, excepting and saving the rights of the priest. Judah, another brother, sought to have burned a woman by whom he had a child. A third, named Reuben, was guilty of the grossest vice, equaled only by that of Absalon the son of David; of Simeon and Levi, two more of Jacob's sons, it is said that "Instruments of cruelty were in their habitations;" their conduct, as detailed in the 34th chapter of Genesis, alike shocks by its treachery and its mercilessness. After Jacob had heard that his son Joseph was governor in Egypt, but before he had journeyed farther than Beer-sheba, God spake unto him in the visions of the night, and probably forgetting that he had given him a new name, or being more accustomed to the old one, said, "Jacob, Jacob," and then told him to go down into Egypt, where Jacob died after a residence of about seventeen years, when 147 years of age. Before Jacob died he blessed, first the sons of Joseph, and then his own children, and at the termination of his blessing to Ephraim and Manasseh we find the following speech addressed to Joseph: "Moreover, I have given to thee one portion above thy brethren, which I took out of the hand of the Amorite with my sword and with my bow." This speech implies warlike pursuit on the part of Jacob, of which the bible gives no record, and which seems incompatible with his recorded life. The sword of craft and the bow of cunning are the only weapons in the use of which he was skilled. When his sons murdered and robbed the Hivites, fear seems to have been Jacob's most prominent characteristic. It is not my duty, nor have I space here, to advocate any theory of interpretation, but it may be well to mention that many learned men contend that the whole history of Jacob is but an allegory. That the twelve patriarchs but typify the twelve signs of the zodiac, as do the twelve great gods of the Pagans, and twelve apostles of the gospels.

From the history of Jacob it is hard to draw any conclusions favorable to the man whose life is narrated. To heap additional epithets on his memory would be but waste of time and space. I conclude by regretting that if God loved one brother and hated another, he should have so unfortunately selected for his love the one whose whole career shows him in a most despicable light.

NEW LIFE OF ABRAHAM.

Most undoubtedly father Abraham is a personage whose history should command our attention, if only because he figures as the founder of the Jewish race—a race which, having been promised protection and favor by Deity, appear to have experienced little else besides the infliction, or sufferance of misfortune and misery. Men are taught to believe that God, following out a solemn covenant made with Abraham, suspended the operations of Nature to aggrandize the Jews; that he promised always to bless and favor them if they adhered to his worship and obeyed the priests. The promised blessings were, usually, political authority, individual happiness and sexual power, long life, and great wealth; the threatened curses for idolatry or disobedience: disease, loss of property and children, mutilation, death. Among the blessings: the right to kill, plunder, and ravish their enemies, with protection, while pious, against any subjection to retaliatory measures. And all this because they were Abraham's children!

Abraham is an important personage. Without Abraham, no Jesus, no Christianity, no Church of England, no bishops, no tithes, no church rates. But for Abraham England would have lost all these blessings. Abraham was the great-grandfather of Judah, the head of the tribe to which God's father, Joseph, belonged.

In gathering materials for a short biographical sketch, we are at the same time comforted and dismayed by the fact that the only reliable account of Abraham's career is that furnished by the book of Genesis, supplemented by a few brief references in other parts of the bible, and that, outside "God's perfect and infallible revelation to man," there is no reliable account of Abraham's existence at all. We are comforted by the thought that Genesis is unquestioned by the faithful, and is at present protected by Church and State against heretic assaults; but we are dismayed when we think that, if Infidelity, encouraged by Colenso and Kalisch, upsets Genesis, Abraham will have little historical claim on our attention Some philologists have asserted that Brama and Abraham are alike corruptions of Abba Rama, or Abrama, and that Sarah is identical with Sarasvati. Abram, is a Chaldean compound, meaning father of the elevated, or exalted father [————] is a compound of Chaldee and Arabic, signifying father of a multitude. In part V of his work Colenso mentions that Adonis was formerly identified with Abram, "high father," Adonis being the personified sun.

Leaving incomprehensible philology for the ordinary authorized version of our bibles, we find that Abraham was the son of Terah. The text does not expressly state where Abraham was born, and I can not therefore describe his birthplace with that accuracy of detail which a true believer might desire, but I may add that he "dwelt in old time on the other side of the flood." (Joshua xxiv, 2, 3.) The situation of such dwelling involves a geographical problem most unlikely to be solved unless the inquirer is "half seas over." Abraham was born when Terah, his father, was seventy years of age; and, accord-ing to Genesis, Terah and his family came forth out of Ur of the

Chaldees, and went to Haran and dwelt there. We turn to the map to look for Ur of the Chaldees, anxious to discover it as possibly Abraham's place of nativity, but find that the translators of God's inspired word have taken a slight liberty with the text by substituting "Ur of the Chaldees" for "Aur Kasdim," the latter being, in plain English,the light of the magi, or conjurers, or astrologers. [————] is stated by Kalisch to have been made the basis for many extraordinary legends, as to Abraham's rescue from the flames.

Abraham, being born—according to Hebrew chronology, 2,083 years after the creation, and according to the Septuagint 3,549 years after the event—when his father was seventy, grew so slowly that when his father reached the good old age of 205 years, Abraham had only arrived at 75 years, having, apparently, lost no less than 60 year's growth during his father's lifetime. St. Augustine and St Jerome gave this up as a difficulty inexplicable. Calmet endeavors to explain it, and makes it worse. But what real difficulty is there? Do you mean, dear reader, that it is impossible Abraham could have lived 135 years, and yet be only 75 years of age? Is this your objection? It is a sensible one, I admit, but it is an Infidel one. Eschew sense, and, retaining only religion, ever remember that with God all things are possible. Indeed, I have read myself that gin given to young children stunts their growth; and who shall say what influence of the spirit prevented the full development of Abraham's years? It is a slight question whether Abraham and his two brothers were not born the same year; if this be so, he might have been a small child, and not grown so quickly as he would have otherwise done. "The Lord" spoke to Abraham, and promised to make of him a great nation, to bless those who blessed Abraham, and to curse those who cursed him. I do not know precisely which Lord it was that spake unto Abraham. In the Hebrew it says it was [————] Jeue, or, as our translators call it, Jehovah; but as God said (Exodus vi, 2) that by the name "Jehovah was I not known" to either Abraham, Isaac, or Jacob, we must conclude either that the omniscient Deity had forgotten the matter, or that a counterfeit Lord had assumed a title to which he had no right. The word Jehovah, which the book of Exodus says Abraham did not know, is nearly always the name by which Abraham addresses or speaks of the Jewish Deity.

Abraham having been promised protection by the God of Truth, initiated his public career with a diplomacy of statement worthy of Talleyrand, Thiers, or Gladstone. He represented his wife Sarah as his sister, which, if true, is a sad reproach to the marriage. The ruling Pharaoh, hearing the beauty of Sarah commended, took her into his house, she being at that time a fair Jewish dame, between 60 and 70 years of age, and he entreated Abraham well for her sake, and he had sheep and oxen, asses and servants, and camels. We do not read that Abraham objected in any way to the loss of his wife. The Lord, who is all-just, finding out that Pharaoh had done wrong, not only punished the king, but also punished the king's household, who could hardly have interfered with his misdoings. Abraham got his wife back, and went away much richer by the

transaction. Whether the conduct of father Abraham in pocketing quietly the price of the insult—or honor—offered to his wife is worthy of modern imitation, is a question I leave to be discussed by Convocation when it has finished with the Athanasian Creed. After this transaction we are not surprised to hear that Abraham was very rich in "silver and gold." So was the Duke of Marlborough after the King had taken his sister in similar manner into his house. In verse 19 of chapter xii, there is a curious mistranslation in our version. The text is: "It is for that I had taken her for my wife," our version has: "I might have takenher." The Douay so translates as to take a middle phrase, leaving it doubtful whether or not Pharaoh actually took Sarah as his wife. In any case, the Egyptian king acted well throughout. Abraham plays the part of a timorous, contemptible hypocrite. Strong enough to have fought for his wife, he sold her. Yet Abraham was blessed for his faith, and his conduct is our pattern!

Despite his timorousness in the matter of his wife, Abraham was a man of wonderful courage and warlike ability. To rescue his relative, Lot:—with whom he could not live on the same land without quarreling, both being religious—he armed 318 servants, and fought with four powerful kings, defeating them and recovering the spoil. Abraham's victory was so decisive that the king of Sodom, who fled and fell (xiv, 10) in a previous encounter, now met Abraham alive (see v, 17), to congratulate him on his victory. Abraham was also offered bread and wine by Melchisedek, King of Salem, priest of the Most High God. Where was Salem? Some identify it with Jerusalem, which it can not be, as Jebus was not so named until after the time of the Judges (Judges xix, 10). How does this King, of this unknown Salem, never heard of before or after, come to be priest of the Most High God? These are queries for divines—orthodox disciples believe without inquiring. Melchisedek was most unfortunate as far as genealogy is concerned. He had no father. I do not mean by this that any bar sinister defaced his escutcheon. He not only was without a father, but without mother also; he had no beginning of days or end of life, and is therefore probably at the present time an extremely old gentleman, who would be an invaluable acquisition to any antiquarian association fortunate enough to cultivate his acquaintance. God having promised Abraham a numerous family, and the promise not having been in any part fulfilled, the patriarch grew uneasy and remonstrated with the Lord, who explained the matter thoroughly to Abraham when the latter was in a deep sleep, and a dense darkness prevailed. Religions explanations come with greater force under these or similar conditions. Natural or artificial light and clear-sightedness are always detrimental to spiritual manifestations.

Abraham's wife had a maid named Hagar, and she bore to Abraham a child named Ishmael; at the time Ishmael was born, Abraham was 86 years of age. Just before Ishmael's birth Hagar was so badly treated that she ran away. As she was only a slave, God persuaded Hagar to return, and humble herself to her mistress.

Thirteen years afterward God appeared to Abraham, and instituted the rite of circumcision—which rite had been practiced long before by other nations—and again renewed the promise. The rite of circumcision was not only practiced by nations long anterior to that of the Jews, but appears, in many cases, not even to have been pretended as a religious rite. (See Kalisch, Genesis, p. 386; Cahen, Genese, p. 43) After God had "left off talking with him, God went up from Abraham." As God is infinite, he did not, of course, go up; but still the bible says God went up, and it is the duty of the people to believe that he did so, especially as the infinite Deity then and now resides habitually in "heaven," wherever that may be. Again the Lord appeared to Abraham, either as three men or angels, or as one of the three; and Abraham, who seemed hospitably inclined, invited the three to wash their feet, and to rest under the tree, and gave butter and milk and dressed calf, tender and good, to them, and they did eat; and after the inquiry as to where Sarah then was, the promise of a son is repeated. Sarah—then by her own admission an old woman, stricken in years—laughed when she heard this, and the Lord said, "Wherefore did Sarah laugh?" and Sarah denied it, but the Lord said, "Nay, but thou didst laugh." The three then went toward Sodom, and Abraham went with them as a guide; and the Lord explained to Abraham that some sad reports had reached him about Sodom and Gomorrah, and that he was then going to find out whether the report was reliable. God is infinite, and was always therefore at Sodom and Gomorrah, but had apparently been temporarily absent; he is omniscient, and therefore knew everything which was happening at Sodom and Gomorrah, but he did not know whether or not the people were as wicked as they had been represented to him. God, Job tells us, "put no trust in his servants, and his angels he charged with folly." Between the rogues and the fools, therefore, the all-wise and all-powerful God seems to be as liable to be mistaken in the reports made to him as any monarch might be in reports made by his ministers. Two of the three men, or angels, went on to Sodom, and left the Lord with Abraham, who began to remonstrate with Deity on the wholesale destruction contemplated, and asked him to spare the city if fifty righteous should be found within it. God said, "If I find fifty righteous within the city, then will I spare the place for their sakes." God being all-wise, he knew there were not fifty in Sodom, and was deceiving Abraham. By dint of hard bargaining, in thorough Hebrew fashion, Abraham, whose faith seemed tempered by distrust, got the stipulated number reduced to ten, and then "the Lord went his way."

Jacob Ben Chajim, in his introduction to the Rabbinical bible, p. 28, tells us that the Hebrew text used to read in verse 22: "And Jehovah still stood before Abraham;" but the scribes altered it, and made Abraham stand before the Lord, thinking the original text offensive to Deity.

The 18th chapter of Genesis has given plenty of work to the divines. Augustin contended that God can take food, though he does not require it. Justin compared "the eating of God with the

devouring power of the fire." Kalisch sorrows over the holy fathers "who have taxed all their ingenuity to make the act of eating compatible with the attributes of Deity."

In the Epistle to the Romans, Abraham's faith is greatly praised. We are told, iv, 19, 20, that:

"Being not weak in faith, he considered not his own body now dead, when he was about an hundred years old, neither yet the deadness of Sarah's womb."

"He staggered not at the promise of God through unbelief; but was strong in faith, giving glory to God."

Yet, so far from Abraham giving God glory, we are told in Genesis, xvii, 17, that:

"Abraham fell upon his face, and laughed, and said in his heart, shall a child be born unto him that is an hundred years old, and shall Sarah, that is ninety years old, bear?"

The Rev. Mr. Boutell says that "the declaration which caused Sarah to 'laugh,' shows the wonderful familiarity which was then permitted to Abraham in his communications with God."

After the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, Abraham journeyed south and sojourned in Gerar, and either untaught or too well taught by his previous experience, again represented his wife as his sister, and Abimelech, king of Gerar, sent and took Sarah. As before, we find neither remonstrance nor resistance recorded on the part of Abraham. This time God punished,a laMalthus, the women in Abimelech's house for an offense they did not commit, and Sarah was again restored to her husband, with sheep, oxen, men-servants, and women-servants, and money. Infidels object that the bible says Sarah "was old and well stricken in age;" that "it had ceased to be with her after the manner of women;" that she was more than ninety years of age; and that it is not likely King Abimelech would fall in love with an ugly old woman. We reply, "chacun a son gout?" It is clear that Sarah had not ceased to be attractive, as God resorted to especial means to protect her virtue from Abimelech. At length Isaac is born, and his mother Sarah now urges Abraham to expel Hagar and her son, "and the thing was very grievous in Abraham's sight because of his son;" the mother being only a bondwoman does not seem to have troubled him. God, however, approving Sarah's notion, Hagar is expelled, "and she departed and wandered in the wilderness, and the water was spent in the bottle, and she cast the child under one of the shrubs." She had apparently carried the child, who being at least more than fourteen, and according to some calculations as much as seventeen years of age, must have been a heavy child to carry in a warm climate.

God never did tempt any man at any time, but he "did tempt Abraham" to kill Isaac by offering him as a burnt offering. The doctrine of human sacrifice is one of the holy mysteries of Christianity, as taught in the Old and New Testament. Of course, judged from a religious or biblical standpoint, it can not be wrong, as, if it were, God would not have permitted Jephtha to sacrifice his daughter by offering her as a burnt offering, nor have tempted Abraham to sacrifice his son, nor have said in Leviticus, "None devoted, which shall be devoted of men, shall be redeemed; but shall surely be put to death" (xxvii, 29), nor have in the New Testament worked out the monstrous sacrifice of his only son Jesus, at the same time son and begetting father.

Abraham did not seem to be entirely satisfied with his own conduct when about to kill Isaac, for he not only concealed from his servants his intent, but positively stated that which was not true, saying, "I and the lad will go yonder and worship, and come again to you." If he meant that he and Isaac would come again to them, then he knew that the sacrifice would not take place. Nay, Abraham even deceived his own son, who asked him where was the lamb for the burnt offering? But we learn from the New Testament that Abraham acted in this and other matters "by faith," so his falsehoods and evasions, being results and aids of faith, must be dealt with in an entirely different manner from transactions of every-day life. Just as Abraham stretched forth his hand to slay his son, the angel of the Lord called to him from heaven, and prevented the murder, saying, "Now I know that thou fearest God, seeing thou hast not withheld thy son." This would convey the impression that up to that moment the angel of the Lord was not certain upon the subject.

In Genesis xiii, God says to Abraham, "Lift up now thine eyes, and look from the place where thou art northward, and southward, and eastward and westward. For all the land which thou seest, to thee will I give it, and to thy seed for ever. Arise, walk through the land, in the length of it, and in the breadth of it, for I will give it unto thee." Yet, as is admitted by the Rev. Charles Boutell, in his "Bible Dictionary," "The only portion of territory in that land of promise, of which Abraham became possessed" was a graveyard, which he had bought and paid for. Although Abraham was too old to have childrenbeforethe birth of Isaac, he had many childrenafterIsaac is born. He lived to "a good old age," and died "full of years," but was yet younger than any of those who preceded him, and whose ages are given in the bible history, except Nahor.

Abraham gave "all that he had to Isaac," but appears to have distributed the rest of the property among his other children, who were sent to enjoy it somewhere down East.

According to the New Testament, Abraham is now in Paradise, but Abraham in heaven is scarcely an improvement upon Abraham on-earth. When he was entreated by an unfortunate in hell for a drop of water to cool his tongue, father Abraham replied, "Son, remember that in thy

life-time thou receivedst thy good things, and now thou art tormented," as if the reminiscence of past good would alleviate present and future continuity of evil.

NEW LIFE OF MOSES.

The "Life of Abraham" was presented to our readers, because, as the nominal founder of the Jewish race, his position entitled him to that honor. The "Life of David," because, as one of the worst men and worst kings ever known, his history might afford matter for reflection to admirers of monarchical institutions and matter for comment to the advocates of a republican form of government. The "Life of Jacob" served to show how basely mean and contemptibly deceitful a man might become, and yet enjoy God's love. Having given thus a brief outline of the career of the patriarch, the king, and the knave, the life of a priest naturally presents itself as the most fitting to complement the present quadrifid series.

Moses, the great grandson of Levi, was born in Egypt, not far distant from the banks of the Nile, a river world-famous for its inundations, made familiar to ordinary readers by the travelers who have journeyed to discover its source, and held in bad repute by strangers, especially on account of the carnivorous Saurians who infest its waters. The mother and father of our hero were both of the tribe of Levi, and were named Jochebed and Amram. The infant Moses was, at the age of three months, placed in an ark of bulrushes by the river's brink. This was done in order to avoid the decree of extermination propounded by the reigning Pharaoh against the male Jewish children. The daughter of Pharaoh, coming down to the river to bathe, found the child and took compassion upon him, adopting him as her son. Of the early life of Moses we have but scanty record. We are told in the New Testament that he was learned in the wisdom of the Egyptians,* and that, "when he was come to years he refused by faith** to be called the son of Pharaoh's daughter." Perhaps the record from which the New Testament writers quoted has been lost; it is certain that the present version of the Old Testament does not contain those statements. The record which is lostmayhave been God's original revelation to man, and of which our biblemaybe an incomplete version. I am little grieved by the supposition that a revelation may have been lost, being, for my own part, more inclined to think that no revelation has ever been made. Josephus says that, when quite a baby, Moses trod contemptuously on the crown of Egypt. The Egyptian monuments and Exodus are both silent on this point. Josephus also tells us that Moses led the Egyptians in war against the Ethiopians, and married Tharbis, the daughter of the Ethiopian monarch. This also is omitted both in Egyptian history and in the sacred record. When Moses was grown, according to the Old Testament, or when he was 40 years of age according to the New, "it came into his heart to visit his brethren the children of Israel." "And he spied an Egyptian smiting a Hebrew." "And he looked this way and that way, and when he saw that there was no man, he slew the Egyptian, and hid him in the sand." The New Testament says that he did it, "for

he supposed that his brethren would understand how that God, by his hand, would deliver them."***

* Acts, vii, 21.** Hebrews, xi, 24.*** Acts, vii, 25.

But this is open to the following objections: The Old Testament says nothing of the kind; there was no man to see the homicide, and as Moses hid the body, it is hard to conceive how he could expect the Israelites to understand a matter of which they not only had no knowledge whatever, but which he himself did not think was known to them; if there were really no man present, the story of the after accusation against Moses needs explanation: it might be further objected that it does not appear that Moses at that time did even himself conceive that he had any mission from God to deliver his people. Moses fled from the wrath of Pharaoh, and dwelt in Midian, where he married the daughter of one Reuel, or Jethro. This name is not of much importance, but it is strange that if Moses wrote the books of the Pentateuch he was not more exact in designating so near a relation. While acting as shepherd to his father-in-law, "he led the flock to the back side of the desert," and "the angel of the Lord appeared to him in a flame of fire:" that is, the angel was either a flame, or was the object which was burning, for this angel appeared in the midst of a bush which burned with fire, but was not consumed. This flame appears to have been a luminous one, for it was a "great sight," and attracted Moses, who turned aside to see it. But the luminosity would depend on substance ignited and rendered inacandescent. Is the angel of the Lord a substance susceptible of ignition and incandescence? Who knoweth? If so, will the fallen angels ignite and burn in hell! God called unto Moses out of the midst of the bush. It is hard to conceive an infinite God in the middle of a bush; yet as the law of England says that we must not "deny the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments to be of divine authority," in order not to break the law, I advise all to believe that, in addition to being in the middle of a bush, the infinite and all-powerful God also sat on the top of a box, dwelt sometimes in a tent, afterward in a temple; although invisible, appeared occasionally; and being a spirit without body or parts, was hypostatically incarnate as a man. Moses, when spoken to by God, "hid his face, for he was afraid to look upon God." If Moses had known that God wasinvisiblehe would have escaped this fear.

God told Moses that the cry of the children of Israel had reached him, and that he hadcome downto deliver them, and that Moses was to lead them out of Egypt. Moses does not seem to have placed entire confidence in the phlegmonic divine communication, and asked, when the Jews should question him on the name of the Deity, what answer should he make? It does not appear from this that the Jews, if they had so completely forgotten God's name, had much preserved the recollection of the promise comparatively so recently made to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob. The answer given according to our version is "I am that I am;" according to the

Douay, "I am who am." God, in addition, told Moses that the Jews should spoil the Egyptians of their wealth; but even this promise of plunder so congenial to the nature of a bill-discounting Jew of the bible type, did not avail to overcome the scruples of Moses. God therefore taught him to throw his rod on the ground, and thus transform it into a serpent, from which pseudo-serpent Moses at first fled in fear, but on his taking it by the tail it resumed its original shape, Moses, with even other wonders at command, still hesitated; he had an impediment in his speech. God cured this by the appointment of Aaron, who was eloquent, to aid his brother. God directed Moses to return to Egypt, but his parting words must somewhat have damped the future legislator's hope of any speedy or successful ending to his mission. God said, "I will harden Pharaoh's heart that he shall not let the people go." On the journey back to Egypt God met Moses "by the way in the inn, and sought to kill him." I am ignorant as to the causes which prevented the omnipotent Deity from carrying out his intention; the text does not explain the matter, and I am not a bishop or a D. D., and I do not therefore feel justified in putting my assumptions in place of God's revelation. Moses and Aaron went to Pharaoh, and asked that the Jews might be permitted to go three days' journey in the wilderness; but the King of Egypt not only refused their request, but gave them additional tasks, and in consequence Moses and Aaron went again to the Lord, who told them, "I appeared unto Abraham, unto Isaac, and unto Jacob by the name of God Almighty; but by my name Jehovah was I not known unto them." Whether God had forgotten that the name of Jehovah was known to Abraham, or whether he was here deceiving Moses and Aaron, are points the solution of which I leave to the faithful, referring them to the fact that Abraham called a place* Jehovah-Jireh.

* Genesis xxii, 14

After this Moses and Aaron again went to Pharaoh and worked wonderfully in his presence. Thaumaturgy is coming into fashion again, but the exploits of Moses far exceeded any of those performed by Mr. Home or the Davenport brothers. Aaron flung down his rod, and it became a serpent; the Egyptian magicians flung down their rods, which became serpents also; but the rod of Aaron, as though it had been a Jew money-lender or a tithe collecting parson, swallowed up these miraculous competitors, and the Jewish leaders could afford to laugh at their defeated rival conjurors. Moses and Aaron carried on the miracle-working for some time. All the water of the land of Egypt was turned by them into blood, but the magicians did so with their enchantments, and it had no effect on Pharaoh. Then showers of frogs, at the instance of Aaron, covered the land of Egypt; but the Egyptians did so with their enchantments, and frogs abounded still more plentifully. The Jews next tried their hands at the production of lice, and here —to the glory of God be it said—the infidel Egyptians failed to imitate them. It is written that "cleanliness is next to godliness," but we can not help thinking that godliness must have been far from cleanliness when the former so soon resulted in lice. The magicians were now entirely

discomfited. The preceding wonders seem to have affected all the land of Egypt; but in the next miracle the swarms of flies sent were confined to Egyptians only, and were not extended to Goshen, in which the Israelites dwelt.

The next plague in connection with the ministration of Moses and Aaron was that "all the cattle of Egypt died." After "all the cattle" were dead, a boil was sent, breaking forth with blains upon man and beast. This failing in effect, Moses afterward stretched forth his hand and smote "both man and beast" with hail, then covered the land with locusts, and followed this with a thick darkness throughout the land—a darkness whichmighthave been felt. Whether it was felt is a matter on which I am unable to pass an opinion. After this, the Egyptians being terrified by the destruction of their first-born children, the Jews, at the instance of Moses, borrowed of the Egyptians jewels of silver, jewels of gold, and raiment; and they spoiled the Egyptians. The fact is, that the Egyptians were in the same position as the payers of church rates, tithes, vicars' rates, and Easter dues: they lent to the Lord's people, who are good borrowers, but slow when repayment is required. They prefer promising you a crown of glory to paying you at once five shillings in silver. Moses led the Jews through the Red Sea, which proved a ready means of escape, as may be easily read in Exodus, which says that the Lord "made the sea dry land" for the Israelites, and afterward not only overwhelmed in it the Egyptians who sought to follow them, but, as Josephus tells us, the current of the sea actually carried to the camp of the Hebrews the arms of the Egyptians, so that the wandering Jews might not be destitute of weapons. After this the Israelities were led by Moses into Shur, where they were without water for three days, and the water they afterward found was too bitter to drink until a tree had been cast into the well. The Israelites were then fed with manna, which, when gathered on Friday, kept for the Sabbath, but rotted if kept from one week day to another. The people grew tired of eating manna, and complained, and God sent fire among them and burned them up in the uttermost parts of the camp; and after this the people wept and said, "Who shall give us flesh to eat? We remember the fish we did eat in Egypt freely; the cucumbers and the melons and the leeks and the onions and the garlic; but now there is nothing at all beside this manna before our eyes." This angered the Lord, and he gave them a feast of quails, and while the flesh was yet between their teeth, ere it was chewed, the anger of the Lord was kindled, and he smote the Jewish people with a very great plague.*

* Numbers xi.

The people again in Rephidim were without water, and Moses therefore smote the Rock of Horeb with his rod, and water came out of the rock. At Rephidim the Amalekites and the Jews fought together, and while they fought, Moses, like a prudent general, went to the top of a hill, accompanied by Aaron and Hur, and it came to pass that when Moses held up his hands Israel

prevailed, and when he let down his hands Amalek prevailed. But Moses' hands were heavy, and they took a stone and put it under him, and he sat thereon, and Aaron and Hur stayed up his hands, the one on the one side and the other on the other side, and his hands were steady until the going down of the sun, and Joshua discomfited Amalek, and his people with the edge of the sword. How the true believer ought to rejoice that the stone was so convenient, as otherwise the Jews might have been slaughtered, and there might have been no royal line of David, no Jesus, no Christianity. That stone should be more valued than the precious black stone of the Moslem; it is the corner-stone of the system, the stone which supported the Mosaic rule. God is everywhere, but Moses wentupunto him, and the Lord called to himoutof a mountain and came to himina thick cloud, and descended on Mount Sinaiina fire, in consequence of which the mountain smoked, and the Lordcame down upon the topof the mountain and called Mosesupto him; and then the Lord gave Moses the Ten Commandments, and also those precepts which follow, in which Jews are permitted to buy their fellow-countrymen for six years, and in which it is provided that, if the slave-master shall give his six-year slave a wife, and she bear him sons or daughters, that the wife and the children shall be the property of her master. In these precepts it is also permitted that a man may sell his own daughter for the most base purposes. Also that a master may beat his slave so that if he do not die until a few days after the ill-treatment, the master shall escape justice because the slave is his money. Also that Jews may buy strangers and keep them as slaves for ever. While Moses was up in the mount the people clamored for Aaron to make them gods. Moses had stopped away so long that the people gave him up for lost. Aaron, whose duty it was to have pacified and restrained them, and to have kept them in the right faith, did nothing of the kind. He induced them to bring all their gold, and then made it into a calf, before which he built an altar, and then proclaimed a feast. Manners and customs change. In those days the Jews did see the God that Aaron took their gold for, but now the priests take the people's gold, and the poor contributors do not even see a calf for their pains, unless indeed they are near a mirror at the time when they are making their voluntary contributions. And the Lord told Moses what happened, and said, "I have seen this people, and behold it is a stiff-necked people. Now, therefore, let me alone that my wrath may wax hot against them, and that I may consume them." Moses would not comply with God's request, but remonstrated, and expostulated, and begged him not to afford the Egyptians an opportunity of speaking against him. Moses succeeded in changing the unchangeable, and the Lord repented of the evil which he thought to do unto his people.

Although Moses would not let God's "wrath wax hot" his own "anger waxed hot," and he broke, in his rage, the two tables of stone which God had given him, and on which the Lord had graven and written with his own finger. We have now no means of knowing in what language God wrote, or whether Moses afterward took any pains to rivet together the broken pieces. It is almost to be wondered at that the Christian Evidence Societies have not sent missionaries to

search for these pieces of the tables, which may even yet remain beneath the mount. Moses took the calf which they had made and burned it with fire and ground it to powder and strewed it upon water and made the children of Israel drink of it. After this Moses armed the priests and killed 3,000 Jews, "and the Lord plagued the people because they had made the calf which Aaron had made."* Moses afterward pitched the tabernacle without the camp; and the cloudy pillar in which the Lord went, descended and stood at the door of the tabernacle; and the Lord talked to Moses "face to face, as a man would to his friend."** And the Lord then told Moses, "Thou canst not see my face, for there shall no man see me and live."*** Before this Moses and Aaron and Nadab and Abihu, and seventy of the elders of Israel, "saw the God of Israel, and there was under his feet, as it were, a paved work of sapphire stone,... and upon the nobles of the children of Israel he laid not his hand; also they saw God, and did eat and drink."****

* Exodus xxxii, 35.** Ib. xxxiii, 11.*** Ib. xxxiii, 20.**** Ib. xxiv,9.

Aaron, the brother of Moses, died under very strange circumstances. The Lord said unto Moses, "Strip Aaron of his garments and put them upon Eleazar, his son, and Aaron shall be gathered unto his people and shall die there." And Moses did as the Lord commanded, and Aaron died there on the top of the mount, where Moses had taken him. There does not appear to have been any coroner's inquest in the time of Aaron, and the suspicious circumstances of the death of the brother of Moses have been passed over by the faithful.

When Moses was leading the Israelites over Moab, Balak the King of the Moabites sent to Balaam in order to get Balaam to curse the Jews. When Balak's messengers were with Balaam, God came to Balaam also, and asked what men they were. Of course God knew, but he inquired for his own wise purposes, and Balaam told him truthfully. God ordered Balaam not to curse the Jews, and therefore the latter refused, and sent the Moabitish messengers away. Then Balak sent again high and mighty princes under whose influence Balaam went mounted on an ass, and God's anger was kindled against Balaam, and he sent an angel to stop him by the way; but the angel did not understand his business well, and the ass first ran into a field, and then close against the wall, and it was not until the angel removed to a narrower place that he succeeded in stopping the donkey; and when the ass saw the angel she fell down. Balaam did not see the angel at first; and, indeed we may take it as a fact of history that asses have always been the most ready to perceive angels.

Moses may have been a great author, but we have little means of ascertaining what he wrote in the present day. Divines talk of Genesis to Deuteronomy as the five books of Moses, but Eusebius, in the fourth century, attributed them to Ezra, and Saint Chrysostom says that the name of Moses has been affixed to the books without authority, by persons living long after him.

It is quite certain that if Moses lived 3,300 years ago, he did not write in square letter Hebrew, and this because the character has not existed so long. It is indeed doubtful if it can be carried back 2,000 years. The ancient Hebrew character, though probably older than this, yet is comparatively modern among the ancient languages of the earth.

It is urged by orthodox chronologists that Moses was born about 1450 B. C., and that the Exodus took place about 1401 B. C. Unfortunately "there are no recorded dates in the Jewish Scriptures that are trustworthy." Moses, or the Hebrews, not being mentioned upon Egyptian monuments from the twelfth to the seventeenth century B. C. inclusive, and never being alluded to by any extant writer who lived prior to the Septuagint translation at Alexandria (commencing in the third century B. C.), there are no extraneous aids, from sources alien to the Jewish Books through which any information, worthy of historical acceptance, can be gathered elsewhere about him or them.*

Moses died in the land of Moab when he was 120 years of age. The Lord buried Moses in a valley of Moab, over against Bethpeor, but no man knoweth of his sepulcher unto this day. Josephus says that "a cloud came over him on the sudden and he disappeared in a certain valley." The devil disputed about the body of Moses, contending with the Archangel Michael;** but whether the devil or the angel had the best of the discussion, the bible does not tell us.

De Beauvoir Priaulx,*** looking at Moses as a counselor, leader, and legislator, says: "Invested with this high authority, he announced to the Jews their future religion, and announced it to them as a state religion, and as framed for a particular state, and that state only.

* Gliddon's Types of Mankind: Mankind's Chronology, p. 711.** Jude, v. 9.*** Questiones Mosaicæ, p. 488.

He gave this religion, moreover, a creed so narrow and negative—he limited it to objects so purely temporal, he crowded it with observances so entirely ceremonial or national—that we find it difficult to determine whether Moses merely established this religion in order that by a community of worship he might induce in the tribe-divided Israelites that community of sentiment which would constitute them a nation; or, whether he only roused them to a sense of their national dignity, in the hope that they might then more faithfully perform the duties of priests and servants of Jehovah. In other words, we hesitate to decide whether in the mind of Moses the state was subservient to the purposes of religion, or religion to the purposes of state."

The same writer observes* that, according to the Jewish writings, Moses "is the friend and favorite of the Deity. He is one whose prayers and wishes the Deity hastens to fulfill, one to

whom the Deity makes known his designs. The relations between God and the prophet are most intimate. God does not disdain to answer the questions of Moses, to remove his doubts, and even occasionally to receive his suggestions, and to act upon them even in opposition to his own predetermined decrees."

* Questiones Mosaicæ p. 418.

NEW LIFE OF JONAH

Jonah was the son of Amittai of Gath-hepher, which place divines identify with Gittah-hepher of the Children of Zebulun. Dr. Iuman says that Gath-hepher means "the Heifer's trough." Gesenius translates it "the wine-press of the well." Bible dictionaries say that Gath-hepher is the same as el-Meshhad, and affirm that the tomb of Jonah was "long shown on a rocky hill near the town." The blood of Saint Januarius is shown in Naples to this day. Nothing is known of the sex or life of Amittai, except that Jonah was his or her son, and that Gath-hepher was her or his place of residence; but to a true believer these two facts, even though standing utterly alone, will be pregnant with instruction. To the skeptic and railer, Amittai is as an unknown quantity in an algebraic problem. Jonah was not a very common proper name, [————] means a dove, and some derive it from the Arabic root—to be weak, gentle; so that one meaning of Jonah, according to Gesenius, would be feeble, gentle bird. The prophet Jonah was by no means a feeble, gentle bird; he was rather a bird of prey. Certainly it was his intention to become a bird of passage. The date of the birth of Jonah is not given; the margin of my bible dates the book of Jonah B. C. cir. 862, and my bible dictionary fixes the date of the matter to which the book relates at "about B. C. 830." If from any reason either of these dates should be disagreeable to the reader, he can choose any other date without fear of anachronism. Jonah was a prophet; so is Dr. Cumming, so is Brigham Young; there is no evidence that Jonah followed any other profession. Jonah's profit probably hardly equaled that realized by the Archbishop of Canterbury, but he had money enough to pay his fare "from the presence of the Lord" to Tarshish. The exact distance of this voyage may be easily calculated by remembering that the Lord is omnipresent, and then measuring from his boundary to Tarshish. The fare may be worked out by the differential calculus after evening prayer.

The word of the Lord came to Jonah; when or how the word came the text does not record, and to any devout mind it is enough to know that it came. The first time in the world's history that the word of the Lord ever came to anybody, may be taken to be when Adam and Eve "heard the voice of the Lord" "walking in the Garden" of Eden "in the cool of the day." Between the time of Adam and Jonah a long period had elapsed; but human nature, having had many prophets, was very wicked. The Lord wanted Jonah to go with a message to Nineveh. Nineveh was apparently

a city of three days' journey in size. Allowing twenty miles for each day, this would make the city about 60 miles across, or about 180 miles in circumference. Some faint idea may be formed of this vast city, by adding together London, Paris, and New York, and then throwing in Liverpool, Manchester, Glasgow, Edinburgh, Marseilles, Naples, Spurgeon's Tabernacle. Jonah knowing that the Lord did not always carry out his threats or perform his promises, did not wish to go to Nineveh, and "rose up to flee to Tarshish from the presence of the Lord," The Tarshish for which Jonah intended his flight was either in Spain or India or elsewhere. I am inclined, after deep reflection and examination of the best authorities, to give the preference to the third-named locality. When Cain went "out of the presence of the Lord," he went into the Land of Nod, but whether Tarshish is in that or some other country there is no evidence to determine. To get to Tarshish, Jonah—instead of going to the port of Tyre, which was the nearest to his reputed dwelling, and by far the most commodious—went to the more distant and less convenient port of Joppa, where he found a ship going to Tarshish; "so he paid the fare thereof, and went down into it, to go with them into Tarshish, from the presence of the Lord." Jonah was, however, very short-sighted. Just as in the old Greek mythology, winds and waves are made warriors for the gods, so the God of the Hebrews "sent out a great wind into the sea, and there was a mighty tempest in the sea, so that the ship was like to be broken." Luckily she was not an old leaky vessel, over-laden and heavily insured; one which the sanctimonious owners desired to see at the bottom, and which the captain did not care to save. Christianity and civilization were yet to bring forth that glorious resultant, a pious English ship-owner, with a newly-painted, but, under the paint, a worn and rusty iron vessel, long abandoned as unfit, but now fresh named, and so insured that Davy Jones' locker becomes the most welcome haven of refuge. "The mariners were afraid.... and cast forth the wares" into the sea to lighten the ship. But where was Jonah during this noise? Men trampling on deck, hoarse and harsh words of command, and the fury of the storm troubled not our prophet. Sea-sickness, which spares not the most pious, had no effect upon him. "Jonah was gone down into the sides of the ship, and he lay and was fast asleep." The battering of the waves against the sides disturbed not his devout slumbers; the creaking of the vessel's timbers spoiled not his repose. Despite the pitching and rolling of the vessel Jonah "was fast asleep." Had he been in the comfortable berth of a Cunarder, it would not have been easy to sleep through such a storm. Had he been in the hold of a smaller vessel on the Bay of Biscay, finding himself now with his head lower than his heels, and now with his body playing hide and seek among loose articles of cargo, it would have required great absence of mind to prevent waking. Had he only been on an Irish steamer carrying cattle on deck, between Bristol and Cork, with a portion of the bulwarks washed away, and a squad of recruits "who cried every man to his God," he would have found the calmness of undisturbed slumber difficult. But Jonah was on board the Joppa and Tarshish boat, and he "was fast asleep." As the crew understood the theory of storms, they of course knew that when there is a tempest at sea it is sent by God, because he is offended by some one on board the vessel. Modern scientists scout

this notion, and pretend to track storm waves across the world, and to affix storm signals in order to warn mariners. They actually profess to predict atmospheric changes, and to explain how such changes take place. Church clergymen know how futile science is, and how potent prayers are, for vessels at sea. The men on the Joppa vessel said, "every one to his fellow, Come, and let us cast lots, that we may know for whose cause this evil is upon us. So they cast lots, and the lot fell upon Jonah." It was always a grave question in sacred metaphysics as to whether God directed Jonah's lot, and, if yes, whether the casting of lots is analogous to playing with loaded dice. The Bishop of Lincoln, who understands how far cremation may render resurrection awkward, is the only divine capable of thoroughly resolving this problem. For ordinary Christians it is enough to know that the lot fell upon Jonah.

Before the crew commenced casting lots to find out, they had cast lots of their wares overboard, so that when the lot fell on Jonah it was much lighter than it would have been had the lot fallen upon him during his sleep. Still, if not stunned by the lot which fell upon him, he stood convicted as the cause of the tempest and the crews. "Then said they unto him, Tell us, we pray thee, for whose cause this evil is upon us; What is thine occupation? and whence comest thou? what is thy country? and of what people art thou? And he said unto them, I am an Hebrew; and I fear the Lord, the God of heaven, which hath made the sea and the dry land. Then were the men exceedingly afraid, and said unto him, Why hast thou done this? For the men-knew that he fled from the presence of the Lord, because he had told them. Then said they unto him, What shall we do unto thee, that the sea may be calm unto us? for the sea wrought, and was tempestuous. And he said unto them, Take me up, and cast me forth into the sea; so shall the sea be calm unto you; for I know that for my sake this great tempest is upon you. Nevertheless the men rowed hard to bring it to the land; but they could not; for the sea wrought, and was tempestuous against them. Wherefore they cried unto the Lord, and said, We beseech thee, O Lord, we beseech thee, let us not perish for this man's life, and lay not upon us innocent blood: for thou, O Lord, hast done as it pleased thee. So they took up Jonah, and cast him forth into the sea: and the sea ceased from her raging." No pen can improve this story; it is so simple, so natural, so child-like. Every one has heard of casting oil on troubled waters. It stands to reason that a fat prophet would produce the same effect. What a striking illustration of the power of faith it will be when bishops leave their own sees in order to be in readiness to calm an ocean storm. Or if not a bishop, at least a curate; and even a lean curate, for with sea air, a ravenous appetite, and a White Star Line cabin bill of fare of breakfast, lunch, dinner, tea, and supper, fatness would soon be arrived at. In the interests of science I should like to see an episcopal prophet occasionally thrown overboard during a storm. The experiment must in any case be advantageous to humanity; should the tempest be stilled, then the ocean would be indeed the broad way, not leading to destruction; should the storm not be conquered, there would even then be promotion in the Church, and happiness to many at the mere cost of one bishop. "Now the Lord had

prepared a great fish to swallow up Jonah." Jesus says the fish was a whale. A whale would have needed preparation, and the statement has an air ofvraisemblance. The fish did swallow Jonah. "Jonah was in the belly of the fish three days and three nights." Poor Jonah! and poor fish! Poor Jonah, for it can scarcely be pleasant, even if you escape suffocation, to be in a fish's belly with too much to drink, and no room to swallow, and your solids either raw or too much done. Poor fish! for even after preparation it must be disagreeable to have one's poor stomach turned into a sort of prayer meeting. Jonah was taken in; but the fish found that taking in a parson was a feat neither easy nor healthy. After Jonah had uttered guttural sounds from inside the fish's belly for three days and three nights, the Lord spake unto the fish, and the fish was sick of Jonah, "and it vomited out Jonah upon the dry land." Some skeptics urged that a whale could not have swallowed Jonah; but once, at Todmorden, a Church of England clergyman, who had been curate to the Reverend Charles Kingsley, got rid of this as an objection by assuring us that he should have equally believed the story had it stated that Jonah had swallowed the whale. And then the word of the Lord came to Jonah once more, and this time Jonah obeyed. He was to take God's message to the citizens of Nineveh. "And Jonah began to enter into the city a day's journey, and he cried, and said, Yet forty days, and Nineveh shall be overthrown." Should Jonah come to London in the present day with a similar message, he would meet scant courtesy from our clergy. A foreigner and using a strange tongue, he would probably find himself in Colney Hatch or Hanwell. To come to England in the name of Mahomet or Buddha, or Osiris or Jupiter, would have little effect. But the Ninevites do not seem even to have raised the question that the God of the Hebrews was not their God. They listened to Jonah, and "the people of Nineveh believed God, and proclaimed a fast, and put on sackcloth, from the greatest of them even to the least of them. For word came unto the king of Nineveh, and he arose from his throne, and he laid his robe from him, and covered him with sackcloth and sat in ashes. And he caused it to be proclaimed and published through Nineveh by the decree of the king and his nobles, saying, Let neither man nor beast, herd nor flock, taste anything; let them not feed, nor drink water: but let man and beast be covered with sackcloth, and cry mightily unto God: yea, let them turn every one from his evil way, and from the violence that is in their hands." The consumption of sackcloth for covering every man and beast must have been rather large, and the Nineveh sackcloth manufacturers must have had enormous stocks on hand to supply the sudden demand. The city article of theNineveh Times, if such a paper existed, would probably have described "sackcloth firm, with a tendency to rise." Man and beast, all dressed in or covered with sackcloth! It would be sometimes difficult to distinguish a Ninevite man from a Ninevite beast, the dress being similar for all. This is a difficulty, however, other nations have shared with the Ninevites. Men and women may sometimes be seen in London dressed in broadcloth and satins, and, though their clothing is distinguishable enough, their conduct is sometimes so beastly that the naked beasts are the more respectable.

Nineveh was frightened, and Nineveh moaned, and Nineveh determined to do wrong: no more. "And God saw their works, that they turned from their evil way; and God repented of the evil that he had said that he would do unto them; and he did it not." God, the unchangeable, changed his purpose, and spared the city, which in his infinite wisdom he had doomed. "But it displeased Jonah exceedingly, and he was very angry." It was enough to vex a saint to be sent to prophesy the destruction of the city in six weeks, and then nothing at all to happen. "And he prayed unto the Lord, and said, I pray thee, O Lord, was not this my saying, when I was yet in my country? Therefore I fled before unto Tarshish." Jonah did not like to be a discredited prophet and cried, "Therefore now, O Lord, take, I beseech thee, my life from me; for it is better for me to die than to live. Then said the Lord, Doest thou well to be angry?" Jonah, knowing the Lord, was still curious and uncertain as well as angry. He was a prophet and a skeptic. "So Jonah went out of the city, and sat on the east side of the city, and there made him a booth, and sat under it in the shadow, till he might see what would become of the city. And the Lord God prepared a gourd, and made it to come up over Jonah, that it might be a shadow over his head, to deliver him from his grief. So Jonah was exceeding glad of the gourd. But God prepared a worm when the morning rose the next day, and it smote the gourd that it withered. And it came to pass, when the sun did arise, that God prepared a vehement east wind; and the sun beat upon the head of Jonah, that he fainted, and wished in himself to die, and said, It is better for me to die than to live. And God said to Jonah, Doest thou well to be angry for the gourd? And he said, I do well to be angry, even unto death. Then said the Lord, Thou hast had pity on the gourd, for the which thou hast not labored, neither madest it grow; which came up in a night, and perished in a night: And should not I spare Nineveh, that great city, wherein are more than sixscore thousand persons that can not discern between their right hand and their left hand; and also much cattle?" The Lord seems to have overlooked that Jonah had more pity on himself than the gourd, whose only value to him was as a shade from the sun. Jonah, too, might have reminded the Lord that there were more than 120,000 persons similarly situated at the deluge and at the slaughter of the Midianites, and that the "much cattle" had never theretofore been reckoned in the divine decrees of mercy.

Here ends the new life of Jonah. Of the prophet's childhood we know nothing; of his middle age no more than we have here related; of his old age and death we have nothing to say. It is enough for good Christians to know that "Jonas was three days and three nights in the whale's belly; so shall the Son of Man be three days and three nights in the heart of the earth." According to Jesus the story of Jonah is as true as Gospel.

WHO WAS JESUS CHRIST?

Many persons will consider the question heading this pamphlet as one to which the Gospels have given a sufficient answer, and that no further inquiry is necessary. We, in reply, point out

that while the general Christian body affirm that Jesus was God incarnate on earth, the Unitarian Christians, less in numerical strength, but numbering a large proportion of the more intelligent and humane, absolutely deny this divinity; and even in the earliest ages of the Christian Church heretics were found who scrupled not to deny that Jesus had ever existed in the flesh. Under these circumstances, it is well to prosecute the inquiry to the uttermost, that our faith may rest on sure foundations.

The history of Jesus Christ is contained in four books, or gospels. We know not with any degree of certainty, and have now no means of knowing, when these gospels were written, we know not where they were written, and we know not by whom they were written. Until after the year A. D. 200, no author, except Irenæus, professes to mention any gospels by Matthew, Mark, Luke, or John, and there is no sufficient evidence to identify the gospels we have with the writings to which Irenseus refers. The Church has, however, kindly provided us with an author for each gospel, and the early Fathers have proved there ought to be four gospels, because there are four seasons, four principal points to the compass, etc. Our duty is simply to believe. With regard to the gospel first in order, it is true that divines themselves disagree as to the language in which it was written. Some allege that the original was in Hebrew, others deny that our Greek version has any of the characters of a translation. This increases our difficulty, but if we wish for temporal welfare we must believe with the party which is most fashionable, and if we simply wish for truth, we had better disregard all parties and avoid their creeds. Our authorized English translation of the four gospels is made from the received Greek version; this version was made at Alcala in Spain, and the MSS. from which it was obtained were afterward sold by the pious Christians and manufactured into sky-rockets by one Torjo, a firework maker. So that the same Christians who threaten us with the pains of hell if we reject the gospels, actually condemned their own books to brimstone and fire. The only variation in the mode of burning is this—the holy MSS., when made into sky-rockets, were shot upward and burnt in their ascent to the heavenly regions, and we are to burn in our descent into the lower regions of the bottomless pit.

We do not know the hour, the day, the month, or the year, in which Jesus was born. The only point on which divines generally agree is, that he was not born on Christmas Day. The Oxford chronology places the matter in no clearer light, and more than thirty learned authorities give us a period of over seven years difference in their reckoning. The place of his birth is also uncertain, as may be ascertained by careful reference to the text. For instance, the Jews in the very presence of Jesus reproached him that he ought to have been born at Bethlehem, and he never ventured to say, "I was born there." (John vii, 41, 42, 52.)

Jesus was the son of David the son of Abraham (Matthew i), and his descent from Abraham is traced through Isaac, who was born of Sarai (whom the writer of the Epistle to Galatians, chap,

iv, v. 24, says was a covenant and not a woman), and ultimately through Joseph, who was not only not his father, but is not shown to have had any relationship to Jesus at all, and through whom the genealogy should not be traced. There are two genealogies in the four gospels which have the merit of contradicting each other, and these in part may be collated with the Old Testament genealogy, which has the advantage of agreeing with neither. Much prayer and faith will be required in this introduction to the history of Jesus. The genealogy of Matthew possesses peculiar points of interest to a would-be believer. It is self-contradictory, counts thirteen names as fourteen without explanation, and omits the names of three kings without apology. Matthew (i, 13), says Abiud was the son of Zorobabel. Luke says Zorobabel's son was Rhesa. The Old Testament contradicts both, and gives Meshullam and Hananiah and Shelomith, their sister (1 Chron. iii, 19), as the names of Zorobabel's children. Some Greek MSS. insert "Joram" into Luke iii, 33. I do not know whether we shall be damned for omitting or for inserting Joram: those who believe had better look to this. Jesus was born without a father after his mother had been visited by the angel Gabriel, who "came in unto her" with a message from God. His reputed father, Joseph, had two fathers, one named Jacob, the other named Heli. The divines feeling this to be a difficulty, have kindly invented a statement that Heli was the father of Mary. The birth of Jesus was miraculously announced to Mary and to Joseph by visits of an angel, but they so little regarded the miraculous annunciation that they marveled soon after at things spoken by Simeon, which were much less wonderful in character. Jesus was the Son of God, or God manifest in the flesh, and his birth was first discovered by some wise men or astrologers. The God of the bible, who is a spirit, had previously said that these men were an abomination in his sight, and he therefore, doubtless, preferred them to be his first visitors in the flesh to keep up his character for incomprehensibility. These men sawhisstar in the East, but it did not tell them much, for they were obliged to come and ask information from Herod the king. Herod inquired of the chief priests and scribes; and it is evident Jeremiah was right, if he said, "The prophets prophecy falsely and the priests bear rule by their means," for these chief priests, like the Brewin Grants and the Brindleys of the present day, misquoted to suit their purposes, and invented a false prophecy by omitting a few words from, and adding a few words to, a text until it suited their purpose. The star, after they knew where to go, and no longer required its aid, led the wise men and went before them, until it came and stood over where the young child was. The story will be better understood if the reader will walk out at night and notice some star, and then see how many houses it will be over. The writer of the third gospel does not appear to have been aware of the star story, and he therefore invents an angel who tells some shepherds; but as this last named adventure does not appear to have happened in the reign of Herod at all, perhaps Jesus was born twice. After the wise men had left Jesus, an angel warned Joseph to flee with him and Mary into Egypt, and Joseph did fly and remained there with the young child and his mother until the death of Herod; and this was done to fulfill a prophecy. On referring to Hosea (xi, 1), we find the words have no reference whatever to Jesus, and that, therefore, either the tale of

the flight is invented as a fulfillment of the prophecy, or the prophecy manufactured to support the tale of the flight. The Jesus of the third gospel never went into Egypt at all in his childhood; perhaps there were two Jesus Christs?

When Jesus began to be about thirty years of age he was baptized by John in the river Jordan. John, who knew him, according to the writer of the first gospel, forbade him directly he saw him; but, according to the writer of the fourth gospel, he knew him not, and had, therefore, no occasion to forbid him. God is an "invisible" "spirit," whom no man hath seen (John i, 18), or can see. (Exodus xxxiii, 20); but John, who was a man, saw the spirit of God descending like a dove. God is everywhere, but at that time was in heaven, from whence he said, "This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased." Although John heard this from God's own mouth, he did not always believe it, but sometime after sent two of his disciples to Jesus to inquire if he were really the Christ (Matthew xi, 2, 3).

Immediately after the baptism, Jesus was led up of the spirit into the wilderness to be tempted of the devil. I do not know anything about either "the spirit" or "the devil" here mentioned, and the writer does not explain anything about them; he speaks of them familiarly, as old acquaintances. Jesus fasted forty days and forty nights, and in those days he did eat nothing. Of course it would be difficult to find a more severe fast—forty days and nights is a long period to abstain from food. Moses fasted twice that period. Such fasts take place in religious books, but they are seldom found in every-day life. Such fasts are nearly miraculous. Miraculous events are events which never happened in the past, do not take place in the present, and never will occur in the future. Jesus was God, and by his power as God fasted. This all must believe. The only difficulty is, to understand on the hypothesis of his divinity, what made him hungry. When Jesus was hungry the devil tempted him by offering him stones, and asking him to make them bread. We have heard of men having hard nuts to crack, but that stones should be offered to a hungry man for extempore bread-making hardly seems a probable temptation. Which temptation came next is a matter of doubt. The Holy Ghost, which the clergy assert inspired Matthew and Luke, does not appear to have inspired them both alike, and they relate the story of the temptation in different order. According to one, the devil next taketh Jesus to the pinnacle of the temple and tempts him to throw himself to the bottom, by quoting Scripture that angels should bear him in their arms. Jesus was, however, either a disbeliever in Scripture, or remembered that the devil, like other gentlemen in black, grossly misquoted to suit his purpose, and the temptation failed. The devil then took Jesus to an exceedingly high mountain, from whence he showeth him all the kingdoms of the world, and the glory thereof, in a moment of time, which was very quick. It is urged that this did not include a view of the antipodes, but only referred to the kingdoms then known. If this be true, it must have been a long look from Judea to China, which was then a known kingdom. The eye of faith will, however, see things afar off and sometimes will also see

things which are not. The mountain must have been very high—much higher than the diameter of the earth; it must have been solid in proportion, therefore would have capsized the earth in its revolutions, if even temporarily placed upon it. The devil then offered Jesus, who was the same as God, and therefore omnipotent, all the kingdoms of the world, if he, Jesus the omnipotent God, would fall down and worship his own creature, the devil. Some object that if God is the creator and omnipotent ruler of the world, then the devil would have no control over the kingdoms of the world, and that the offer could be no temptation as it was made to Jesus, who was both God omnipotent and all-wise, as well as man. These objectors may easily be answered by asserting that it requires a proper submission of the intellect, and an abhorrence of worldly reason, in order properly to understand these books. After this Jesus taught the multitudes. His teachings will form the subject of a separate tract. We are here only endeavoring to answer our preliminary question by a narration of his history.

After the temptation, Jesus is alleged to have worked many miracles, casting out devils, and otherwise creating marvels among the inhabitants of Judea. Bedevilment is now at a sad discount, and if a second Jesus of Nazareth were in this heretical age to boast that he possessed the power of casting out devils, he would stand a fair chance of expiating his offense by a three months' penance with hard labor in the highly polished interior of some borough jail. Now if men be sick and they have a little wisdom, the physician is resorted to, who administers medicine to cure the disease. If men have much wisdom they study physiology, while they have health, in order to prevent sickness altogether. In the time of the early Christians prayer and faith (James v, 14, 15) occupied the position of utility since usurped by rhubarb, jalap,et similibus. Men who had lost their sight in the time of Christ were attacked not by disease but by the devil; we have heard of men seeing double who have allowed spirits to get into their heads. In the days of Jesus one spirit would make a man blind, or deaf, or dumb; occasionally a number of devils would get into a man and drive him mad. We do not doubt this, nor do we ask our readers to doubt. We are grieved to be obliged to add that although we do not doubt the story of devils, neither do we believe them. Our state of mind is neither that of doubt, nor of absolute conviction of their correctness. On one occasion, Jesus met either one man (Mark v, 2) or two men (Matthew viii, 28) possessed with devils. I am not in a position to advance greater reasons for believing that it was one man who was possessed than for believing there were two in the clutches of the devils. The probabilities are equal—that is, the amount of probability is not greater upon the one side than upon the other—that is, there is no probability on either side. The devils knew Jesus and addressed him by name. Jesus was not so familiar with the imp, or imps, and we find inquired the name of the particular devil he was addressing. The answer given in Latin would induce a belief that the devils usually spoke in that tongue. This may be an error, but, of course, it is well to give consideration to every particular when we know we are to be eternally damned if we happen to believe the wrong statement. Jesus wanted to cast out the devils, this

they do not seem to have cared about, but they appear to have had a decided objection to being cast out of the country. Whether Palestine was the native country of the devils, and that therefore they were loth to quit it, I know not, but it is likely enough, as Christianity is alleged to have had its rise there. A compromise was agreed to, and at their own request the devils were transferred to a herd of swine. People who believe this may be said to "go the whole hog." The Jesus of the four gospels is also alleged to have fed large multitudes of people under circumstances of a most ultra-thaumaturgic character. To the first book of Euclid is, prefixed an axiom that "the whole is greater than its part." John Wesley is alleged to have eschewed mathematics lest it should lead him to Infidelity. John Wesley was wise, for if any man be foolish enough to accept Euclid's axiom, he will be compelled to reject the miraculous feeding of 5,000 people with five loaves and two small fishes. It is difficult under any circumstances to perform a miracle. The original difficulty is rather increased than diminished by the assertion that after the multitude had been fed, twelve baskets full of fragments remained. Perhaps the loaves were very large or the baskets very small.

Jesus is related to have walked on the sea at a time when it was very stormy, and when, to use the words of the text, "the sea arose by reason of a great wind that blew." Walking on the water is a great feat if it be calm, but when the waves run high it is still more wonderful. Perhaps it was because Jesus must have been often engulfed by the angry waves, that one sect prefers baptism by complete immersion. We admire this miracle; we know how difficult it is for a man to keep his head above water in the affairs of life.

The miracle of turning water into wine at Cana, in Galilee, is worthy of considerable attention, in the endeavor to answer the question, Who was Jesus Christ? Jesus and his disciples had been called to a marriage feast, and when there the company fell short of wine. The mother of Jesus to whom the Catholics offer worship, and pay great adoration, informed Jesus of the deficiency. Jesus, who was very meek and gentle, answered her in the somewhat uncourteous and unmeaning phrase, "Woman, what have I to do with thee? mine hour is not yet come." His mother seemed to have expected a miracle by her conduct, yet if the fourth gospel speak the truth, that was the beginning of miracle working on the part of Jesus. Perhaps something had previously happened which is not recorded, and which would explain this apparent inconsistency. We must exert our faith to fill up any little gap which may be in the way of salvation. Jesus having obtained six waterpots full of water, turned them into wine. Teetotalers who reject spirits in bottles, but accept spiritual teachings, and who can not believe God would specially provide means of drunkenness, urge that this wine was not of intoxicating quality. We will hope their hypothesis is a correct one, but there is nothing to justify it in our text. In fact, the curious connection between the phrase "well drunk" and the time at which the miracle was performed, would almost warrant the allegation that the guests were already in such a state as

to render unnecessary the administration of further intoxicants. The moral effects of this miracle are not easily conceivable by carnal minds.

Shortly after this Jesus went to the temple, and in a meek and quiet manner, with a scourge of small curds drove thereout the cattle dealers and money changers who had assembled there in the ordinary course of their business. It is hardly probable that the Jews would have permitted this without violent resistance to so rough a course of procedure. The writer of the fourth gospel placed this event very early in the public life of Jesus. The writer of the third gospel fixes the occurrence much later. Perhaps it happened twice, or perhaps they have both made a mistake in the time.

The Jesus of the four gospels is alleged to have been God all-wise; being hungry, he went to a fig-tree, when the season of figs was not yet come. Of course there were no figs upon the tree, and Jesus then caused the tree to wither away. This is an interesting account to a true orthodox trinitarian. Such a one will believe: first, that Jesus was God, who made the tree, and prevented it from bearing figs; second, that God the all-wise, who is not subject to human passions, being hungry, went to the fig-tree, on which he knew there would be no figs, expecting to find some there; third, that God the all-just then punished the tree because it did not bear figs in opposition to God's eternal ordination. This account is a profound mystery to a truly religious man. He bow's his head, flings his carnal reason away, and looks at the matter in a prayerful spirit, with an eye of faith. Faith as a grain of mustard seed will remove a mountain. The only difficulty is to get the grain of faith; all is easy when that is done. The "eye of faith" is a great help, it sometimes enables men to see that which does not exist. Jesus had a disciple named Peter, who, having much faith, was a great rascal and denied his leader in his hour of need. Jesus was previously aware that Peter would be a rascal, and he gave him the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and told him that whatsoever be bound on earth should be bound in heaven. Many an honest man has been immured in a dungeon, and has had the key turned on him by a rascally jailor. It is to be regretted that the like should be promised for all eternity. Peter was to have denied Jesus three times before the cock should crow (Matt. 26, 34). The cock was doubtless an infidel cock, and would not wait. He crowed before Peter's second denial (Mark xiv, 68).

Commentators urge that the words used do not refer to the crowing of any particular cock, but to a special hour of the morning called "cockcrow." The commentators have but one difficulty to get over, and that is, that if the gospel be true, their explanation is false.

Peter's denial becomes the more extraordinary when we remember that he had seen Moses, Jesus, and Elias talking together, and had heard a voice from a cloud say, "This is my beloved son, in whom I am well pleased." If Peter could thus deny Jesus after having heard God vouch his

divinity, and if Peter not only escapes punishment but gets the office of gatekeeper to heaven, how much should we escape punishment and obtain reward, who only deny because we can not help it, and who have no corroborative evidence of sight or hearing to compel our faith?

The Jesus of the first gospel promised that, as Jonas was three days and three nights in the whale's belly, so he (Jesus) would be three days and three nights in the heart of the earth. Yet he was buried on Friday evening, and was out of the grave before Saturday was over. Of course this is susceptible of explanation; you must have faith and believe that in some other language something else was said which ought to be translated differently. Or, if you can not believe thus, then you must have faith until you stretch the one day and part of another day, and one night and part of another night, into three days and three nights.

Our orthodox translators have made Jesus perform a curious equestrian feat on his entry into Jerusalem. The text says, they "brought the ass and the colt and put on them their clothes and set him thereon." Perhaps this does not mean that he rode on both at one time.

On the cross, the Jesus of the four gospels, who was God, cried out, "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" God can not forsake himself. Jesus was God himself. Yet God forsook Jesus, and the latter cried out to know why he was forsaken. This is one of the mysteries of the holy Christian religion which, "unless a man rightly believe without doubt he shall perish everlastingly."

At the crucifixion of Jesus wonderful miracles took place. "The graves were opened, and many bodies of the saints which slept arose and came out of the grave after his resurrection and appeared unto many." We do not know which saints these were. Whether they numbered among them St. Abraham, who permitted his wife to incur the risk of dishonor, and who accepted riches to gild his shame; who turned his wife into the desert with one bottle of water and some bread. Saint Lot, of whom the less said the purer our pages; Saint Judah, who wanted to burn alive a woman he had gotten with child; Saint Jacob, the liar and cheat; Saint Joseph, the model prime minister, who bought the people's rights with their own corn; Saint Moses, the conjuror, who killed 3,000 Jews because his own brother Aaron had persuaded them to make a golden calf; Saint Jael, the blessed above all women, because she drove most treacherously a nail into the skull of a sleeping guest; Saint Samson, who slew one thousand men with the jawbone of an ass; Saint Gideon, who frightened a large body of Midianites, with trumpets, pitchers, and lanterns. Poor Midianites, they had all been exterminated long before Gideon's time; it must have been an extraordinary providence to bring them into life in order to frighten them; but God's ways are not as our ways. This is a digression—in plain language, we do not know who "the saints" were. They "appeared unto many," but there is not the slightest evidence

that any one ever saw them. Their "bodies" came out of the graves, so we suppose that the bodies of the saints do not decompose like those of ordinary human beings. As the saints rose, so did Jesus. As they had their bodies, so had he. He must have much changed in the grave, for his disciples did not know him when he stood on the shore (John xxi, 4).

According to the first gospel Jesus appeared to two women after his resurrection, and afterward met eleven of his disciples by appointment on a mountain in Galilee. We do not know when the appointment was made; the only verse on which divines rely as being capable of bearing this construction is Matt, xxxi, 32, and that voice is silent both as to place and time—in fact, gives no promise of any meeting whatever. According to the second gospel, he appeared first to one women, and when she told the disciples they did not believe it. Yet we are bound to unhesitatingly accept that which the disciples of Jesus rejected. We have an advantage which perhaps the disciples lacked. We have several different stories of the same event, and we can select that which appears to us the most probable. The disciples might have been so unfortunate as to have only one account. By the second gospel we learn that instead of the eleven going to Galilee after Jesus, he came to them as they sat at meat. In the third gospel, wo are told that he first appeared to two of his disciples at Emmaus, and they did not know him until they had been a long time in his company—in fact, according to the text, it was evening before they recognized him, so we suppose the light of faith supplied the want of the light of day. Unfortunately directly they saw him they did not see him, for as soon as they knew him he vanished out of their sight. He immediately afterward appeared to the eleven at Jerusalem, and not at Galilee, as stated in the first Gospel. Jesus asked for some meat, and the disciples gave him a portion of a broiled fish and of a honeycomb, and he did eat. In these degenerate days it is hard to believe in a ghost eating fried fish, yet we must try to do it for our soul's sake, which otherwise may be burned for ever in the fire that is never quenched. There is certainly nothing more improbable in God the Son eating broiled fish after he was dead, than there is in believing God the Father ate dressed calf, tender and good, prepared for him by Abraham (videGenesis xviii). A truly pious and devout mind will not look at the letter which killeth, but for the spirit which maketh alive. Jesus was afterward taken up into heaven, a cloud received him, and he was missed. God of course is everywhere, and heaven is not more above than below, but it is necessary we should believe that Jesus has ascended into heaven to sit on the right hand of God, who is infinite and has no right hand. Our question at the commencement was, "Who was Jesus Christ?" Was he a man?—surely not. Born without a father, in the lifetime of Herod, according to Luke. Residing in Egypt, according to Matthew, at a period in which, if Luke be true, he never could have visited Egypt at all. His whole career is, not simply a series of improbabilities, not simply a series of absurdities, but, in truth, a series of fables destitute of foundation in fact.

Who was Christ? born of a virgin. So was Chrishna, the Hindoo god incarnate. The story of Chrishna is identical in many respects with that of Jesus. The story of Chrishna was current long prior to the birth of Jesus. The story of Chrishna is believed by the inhabitants of Hindostan and disbelieved by the English, who say it is a myth, a fable. We add that both are equally true, and that both are equally false.

Who was Jesus Christ? A man or a myth? His history being a fable, is the hero a reality? Do you allege that it was impossible to forge books so large as the gospels? then the answer is that Christians were skilled in the art of forging epistles, gospels, acts, decrees of councils, etc. Will you urge that this only applies to the Romish Church? Then you will admit that your stream runs from a polluted fountain? Who was Jesus Christ? Who was Saint Patrick, who excelled the reptiles from Ireland? Who was Fin ma coul? Who was Odin? Perhaps there was a man who really lived and performed some special actions attracting popular attention, but beyond this Jesus Christ is a fiction.

WHAT DID JESUS TEACH?

The doctrines of Jesus may be sought for and found in a small compass. Four thin gospels are alleged to contain nearly the entirety of his sayings, and as most Englishmen are professedly Christians, it might be fairly supposed that the general public were conversant with Christ's teachings. This, however, is not the case. The bulk of professors believe from custom rather than from reading. They profess a faith as they follow a fashion—because others have done so before them. What did Jesus teach? Manly self-reliant resistance of wrong, and practice of right? No; the key-stone of his whole teaching may be found in the text, "Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven."*

* Matthew v, 3.

Is poverty of spirit the chief among virtues, that Jesus gives it the prime place in his teaching? Is poverty of spirit a virtue at all? Surely not. Manliness of spirit, honesty of spirit, fullness of rightful purpose, these are virtues; but poverty of spirit is a crime. When men are poor in spirit, then do the proud and haughty in spirit oppress and trample upon them, but when men are true in spirit and determined (as true men should be) to resist and prevent evil, wrong, and injustice whenever they can, then is their greater opportunity for happiness here, and no lesser fitness for the enjoyment of further happiness, in some may-be heaven, hereafter. Are you poor in spirit, and are you smitten; in such case what did Jesus teach? "Unto whom that smiteth thee on the one cheek, offer also the other."* 'Twere better far to teach that "he who courts oppression shares the crime." Rather say, if smitten once, take careful measure to prevent a future smiting. I

have heard men preach passive resistance, but this teaches actual invitation of injury, a course degrading in the extreme.

Shelley breathed higher humanity in his noble advice:

"Stand ye calm and resolute,Like a forest close and mute,With folded arms and looks, which areWeapons of an unvanquished war."

There is a wide distinction between the passive resistance to wrong and the courting of further injury at the hands of the wrongdoer. I have in no case seen this better illustrated than in Mr. George Jacob Holyoake's history of his imprisonment in Gloucester Jail,** where passive resistance saved him from the indignity of a prison dress, and also from compulsory attendance at morning prayer in the prison chapel, which in his case would have been to him an additional insult. But the teaching of Jesus goes much beyond this kind of conduct; the poverty of spirit principle is enforced to the fullest extent—"Him that taketh away thy cloak, forbid not to take thy coat also. Give to every man that asketh of thee, and from him that taketh away thy goods, ask them not again."*** Poverty of person is the only possible sequence to this extraordinary manifestation of poverty of spirit.

* Luke vi, 29.** "Last trail by Jury for Atheism."*** Luke vi, 29, 30.

Poverty of person is attended with many unpleasantnesses; and if Jesus knew that poverty of goods would result from his teaching, we might expect some notice of this. And so there is—as if he wished to keep the poor content through their lives with poverty, he says, "Blessed be ye poor for yours is the kingdom of God."* "But woe unto you that are rich, for you have received your consolation."** He pictures one in hell, whose only related vice is that in life he was rich; and another in heaven, whose only related virtue is that in life he was poor.*** He at another time tells his hearers that it is as difficult for a rich man to get into heaven as for a camel to go through the eye of a needle.**** The only intent of such teaching could be to induce the poor to remain content with the want and misery attendant on their wretched state in this life, in the hope of a higher recompense in some future life. Is it good to be content with poverty? Nay, 'tis better far to investigate the cause of such poverty, with a view to its cure and prevention. The doctrine is a most horrid one which declares that the poor shall not cease from the face of the earth. Poor in spirit and poor in pocket. With no courage to work for food, or money to purchase it! We might well expect to find the man who held these doctrines with empty stomach also; and what does Jesus teach?—"Blessed are ye that hunger now, for ye shall be filled."***** He does not say when the filling shall take place, but the date is evidently postponed until the time when you will have no stomachs to replenish. It is not in this life that the hunger is to be sated. Do you doubt

me, turn again to your Testament and read, "Woe unto you that are full, for ye shall hunger."****** This must surely settle the point.

* Luke vi, 20.** Luke vi, 24.*** Luke xvi, 19—81.**** Luke xviii, 25.***** Luke vi, 21.****** Luke vi, 25.

It would be but little vantage to the hungry man to bless him by filling him, if, when he had satisfied his appetite, he were met by a curse which had awaited the completion of his repast. Craven in spirit, with an empty purse and hungry mouth—what next? The man who has not manliness enough to prevent wrong will probably bemoan his hard fate, and cry bitterly that so sore are the misfortunes he endures. And what does Jesus teach?—"Blessed are ye that weep now, for ye shall laugh."* Is this true, and if true, when? "Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted."** Aye, but when? Not while they mourn and weep. Weeping for the past is vain; 'tis past, and a deluge of tears will never wash away its history. Weeping for the present is worse than vain—it obstructs your sight. In each minute of your life the aforetime future is present-born, and you need dry and keen eyes to give it and yourself a safe and happy deliverance. When shall they that mourn be comforted? Are slaves that weep salt teardrops on their steel shackles comforted in their weeping? Nay, but each pearly overflow, as it falls, rusts mind as well as fetter. Ye who are slaves and weep, will never be comforted until ye dry your eyes and nerve your arms, and, in the plenitude of your manliness,

"Shake your chains to earth like dew,Which in sleep have fallen on you."

Jesus teaches that the poor, the hungry and the wretched shall be blessed? This is not so. The blessing only comes when they have ceased to be poor, hungry and wretched. Contentment under poverty, hunger and misery is high treason, not to yourself alone, but to your fellows. These three, like foul diseases, spread quickly wherever humanity is stagnant and content with wrong.

* Luke vi, 31.** Matthew v, 4.

What did Jesus teach? "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself."* So far well, but how if thy neighbor will not hear thy doctrine when thou preacheth the "glad tidings of great joy" to him? Then forgetting all thy love, and with bitter hatred that a theological disputant alone can manifest, thou "shalt shake off the dust from your feet," and by so doing make it more tolerable in the day of judgment for the land of Sodom and Gomorrah than for your unfortunate neighbor who has ventured to maintain an opinion of his own, and who will not let you be his priest.** It is, indeed, a mockery to speak of love, as if love to one another could result from the dehumanizing

and isolating faith required from the disciple of Jesus. Ignatius Loyola in this, at least, was more consistent than his Protestant brethren. "If any man come unto me, and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, yea, and his own life also, he can not be my disciple."*** "Think not that I am come to send peace on earth. I came not to send peace, but a sword. For I am come to set men at variance against his father, and the daughter against her mother, and the daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law, and a man's foes they shall be of his own household.****" "Every one that hath forsaken houses, or brethren, or sisters, or father or mother, or wife or children, or lands for my sake, shall receive an hundred fold, and shall inherit everlasting life."***** The teaching of Jesus is, in fact, save yourself by yourself. The teaching of humanity should be, to save yourself save your fellow.

* Matthew xix, 19.** Matthew x, 14,15.*** Luke xiv, 26.**** Matthew x, 84—86.***** Matthew xix, 29.

The human family is a vast chain, each man and woman a link. There is no snapping off one link and preserving for it an entirety of happiness; our joy depends on our brother's also. But what does Jesus teach? That "many are called, but few are chosen;" that the majority will inherit an eternity of misery, while it is but the minority who obtain eternal happiness. And on what is the eternity of bliss to depend? On a truthful course of life? Not so. Jesus puts Father Abraham in Heaven, whose reputation for faith outstrips his character for veracity. The passport througli Heaven's portals is faith. "He that believeth and baptized shall be saved, and he that believeth not, shall be damned."* Are you married? Have you a wife you love? She dies and you. You from your first speech to your last had ever said, "I believe," much as a clever parrot might say it, if well taught. You had never examined your reasons for your faith for, like a true believer should, you distrusted the efficacy of your carnal reason. You said, therefore, "I believe in God and Jesus Christ," because you had been taught to say it, and you would have as glibly said, "I believe in Allah, and in Mahomet his prophet," had your birthplace been a few degrees more eastward, and your parents and instructors Turks. You believed in this life and awake in Heaven. Your much-loved wife did not think as you did—she could not. Her organization, education and temperament were all different from your own. She disbelieved because she could not believe. She was a good wife, but she disbelieved, A good and affectionate mother, but she disbelieved. A virtuous and kindly woman, but she disbelieved. And you are to be happy for an eternity in Heaven, while she is writhing in agony in Hell.

* Mark xvi,16.

If true, I could say with Shelley, of this Christianity, that it

"Peoples earth with demons, hell with men,And heaven with slaves."

It is often urged that Jesus is the Savior of the world, that he brought redemption without let or stint to the whole human race. But what did Jesus teach? "Go not into any way of the Gentiles, and into any city of the Samaritan enter ye not."* These were his injunctions to those whom he first sent out to preach. "I am not sent but unto the lost sheep of the house of Israel," is his hard answer to the poor Syrophenician woman who is entreating succor for her child. Christianity, as first taught by Jesus, was for the Jews alone, and it is only upon his rejection by them that the world at large has the opportunity of salvation afforded it. "He came unto his own and his own received him not,"** Why should the Jews be more God's own than the Gentiles? Is God the creator of all? and did he create the descendant of Abraham with greater right and privilege than all other men? Then, indeed, is great and grievous injustice done. You and I had no choice whether we would be born Jews or Gentiles; yet to the accident of such a birth is attached the first offer of a salvation which if accepted, shuts out all beside. The Kingdom of Heaven is a prominent feature in the teachings of Jesus, and it may be well to ascertain, as precisely as we can, the picture drawn by God incarnate of his own special domain. 'Tis likened to a wedding feast, to which the invited guests coming not, servants are sent out into the highways to gather all they can find—both good and bad. The King comes in to see his motley array of guests, and findeth one without a wedding garment.

* Matt. x, 5.** John i, 11.

The King inquired why he came into the feast without one, and the man, whoso attendance has been compulsorily enforced, is speechless. And who can wonder? he is a guest from necessity, not choice, he neither chose the fashion of his coming or his attiring. Then comes the King's decree, the command of the all-merciful and loving King of Heaven: "Bind him hand and foot, and cast him into outer darkness; there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth." Commentators urge that it was the custom to provide wedding garments for all guests, and that this man is punished for his nonacceptance of the customary and ready robe. The text does not warrant this position, but assigns, as an explanation of the parable, that an invitation to the heavenly feast will not insure its partakal, for that many are called, but few are chosen. What more of the Kingdom of Heaven? "There shall be joy in Heaven over one sinner that repenteth, more than over ninety and nine just persons which need no repentance."* Nay, it is urged that the greater sinner one has been, the better saint he makes, and the more he has sinned, so much the more he loves God. "To whom little is forgiven, the same loveth little."** Is not this indeed asserting that a life of vice, with its stains washed away by a death-bed repentance, is better than a life of consistent and virtuous conduct? Why should the fatted calf be killed for the prodigal son?*** Why should men be taught to make to themselves friends of the mammon of unrighteousness?

These ambiguities, these assertions of punishment and forgiveness of crime, instead of directions for its prevention and cure, are serious detractions from a system alleged to have been inculcated by one for whom his followers claim divinity.

* Luke xv, 7.** Luke 7, 47.*** Luke xv, 27.

Will you again turn back to the love of Jesus as the redeeming feature of the whole? Then, I ask you, read the story of the fig-tree* withered by the hungry Jesus. The fig-tree, if he were all-powerful God, was made by him, he limited its growth and regulated its development. He prevented it from bearing figs, expected fruit where he had rendered fruit impossible, and in hisinfinite lovewas angry that the tree had not upon it that which it could not have. Tell me the love expressed in that remarkable speech which follows one of his parables, and in which he says: "For, I say unto you, that unto every one which hath shall be given, and from him that hath not, even that which he hath shall be taken away from him. But those, mine enemies, which would not that I should reign over them, bring them hither, and slay them before me."** What love is expressed by that Jesus who, if he were God, represents himself as saying to the majority of his unfortunate creatures (for it is the few who are chosen): 'Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels.'***

* Matt xxi, 18-22; Mark xi, 12-24.** Luke xix, 26,17.*** Matt, xxv, 41.

Far from love is this horrid notion of eternal torment. And yet the popular preachers of to-day talk first of love and then of

"Hell, a red gulf of everlasting fire,Where poisonous and undying worms prolongEternal misery to those hapless slaves,Whose life has been a penance for its crimes."

In reading the sayings attributed to Jesus, all must be struck by the passage which so extraordinarily influenced the famous Origen.* If he understood it aright, its teachings are most terrible. If he understood it wrongly, what are we to say for the wisdom of teaching which expresses so vaguely the meaning which it rather hides than discovers by its words? The general intent of Christ's teaching seems to be an inculcation of neglect of this life, in the search for another. "Labor not for the meat which perisheth, but for that meat which en-dureth unto everlasting life."** "Take no thought for your life, what ye shall eat, or what ye shall drink; nor yet for your body, what ye shall put on.... take no thought, saying, what shall we eat? or what shall we drink? or wherewithal shall we be clothed?.... But seek ye first the Kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all these things shall be added unto you." The effect of these texts, if fully carried out, would be most disastrous; they would stay all scientific discoveries, prevent all

development of man's energies. It is in the struggle for existence here that men are compelled to become acquainted with the conditions which compel happiness or misery. It is only by the practical application of that knowledge, that the wants of society are understood and satisfied, and disease, poverty, hunger, and wretchedness, prevented. Jesus substitutes "I believe," for "I think," and puts "watch and pray," instead of "think and act." Belief is made the most prominent feature, and is, indeed, the doctrine which pervades, permeates, and governs all Christianity. It is represented that, at the judgment, the world will be reproved "Of sin because they believe not." This teaching is most disastrous; man should be incited to active thought: belief is a cord which would bind him to the teachings of an uneducated past.

* Matt. xix, 12.** Matt, xxiv, 41.

Thought, mighty thought, mighty in making men most manly, will burst this now rotting cord, and then—shaking off the cobwebbed and dust-covered traditions of dark old times, humanity shall stand crowned with a most glorious diadem of facts, which, like gems worn on a bright summer's day, shall grow more resplendent as they reflect back the rays of truth's meridian sun. Fit companion to blind belief in slave-like prayer. Men pray as though God needed most abject entreaty ere he would grant them justice. What does Jesus teach on this? What is his direction on prayer? "After this manner pray ye: Our Father, which art in heaven." Do you think that God is the Father of all, when you pray that he will enable you to defeat some other of his children, with whom your nation is at war? And why "which art in Heaven?" Where is Heaven? you look upward, and if you were at the antipodes, would look upward still. But that upward would be downward to us. Do you know where Heaven is, if not, why say "which art in Heaven?" Is God infinite, then he is in earth also, why limit him to Heaven? "Hallowed be thy name." What is God's name? and if you know it not, how can you hallow it? How can God's name be hallowed even if you know it? "Thy kingdom come." What is God's kingdom, and will your praying bring it quicker? Is it the Judgment day, and do you say "Love one another," pray for the more speedy arrival of that day on which God may say to your fellow, "depart ye cursed into everlasting fire?" "Thy will be done on earth, as it is in heaven." How is God's will done in heaven? If the devil be a fallen angel, there must have been rebellion even there. "Give us this day our daily bread," Will the prayer get it without work? No. Will work get it without the prayer? Yes? Why pray then for bread to God, who says, "Blessed be ye that hunger.... woe unto you that are full?" "And forgive us our debts, as we forgive our debtors." What debts have you to God? Sins? Samuel Taylor Coleridge says, "A sin is an evil which has its ground or origin in the agent, and not in the compulsion of circumstances. Circumstances are compulsory, from the absence of a power to resist or control them: and if the absence likewise be the effect of circumstances.... the evil derives from the circumstances.... and such evil is not sin."* Do you say that you are independent of all circumstances, that you can control them, that you have a free will? Mr. Buckle says that the

assertion of a free will "involves two assumptions, of which the first, though possibly true, has never been proved, and the second is unquestionably false. These assumptions are that there is an independent faculty, called consciousness, and that the dictates of that faculty are infallible."** "And lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil." Do you think God will possibly lead you into temptation? if so, you can not think him all-good, if not all-good he is not God, if God, the prayer is a blasphemy.

* "Aids to Reflection," 1843, p. 200.** "History of Civilization," vol. i, p. 14.

I close this paper with the last scene in Jesus' life, not meaning that I have—in these few pages—fully examined his teachings; but hoping that enough is even here done to provoke inquiry and necessitate debate, Jesus, according to the general declaration of Christian divines, came to die, and what does he teach by his death? The Rev. F. D. Maurice it is, I think, who well says, "That he who kills for a faith must be weak, that he who dies for a faith must be strong." How did Jesus die? Giordano Bruno, and Julius Caesar Vanini, were burned for Atheism. They died calm, heroic defiant of wrong. Jesus, who could not die, courted death, that he, as God, might accept his own atonement, and might pardon man for a sin which he had not committed, and in which he had no share. The death he courted came, and when it came he could not face it, but prayed to himself that he might not die. And then, when on the cross, if two of the gospels do him no injustice, his last words—as there recorded—were a bitter cry of deep despair, "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" The Rev. Enoch Mellor, in his work on the Atonement, says, "I seek not to fathom the profound mystery of these words. To understand their full import would require one to experience the agony of desertion they express." Do the words, "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" express an "agony" caused by a consciousness of "desertion?" Doubtless they do; in fact, if this be not the meaning conveyed by the despairing death-cry, then there is in it no meaning whatever. And if those words do express a "bitter agony of desertion," then they emphatically contradict the teachings of Jesus. "Before Abraham was, I am." "I and my father are one." "Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God." These were the words of Jesus, words conveying (together with many other such texts) to the reader an impression that divinity was claimed by the man who uttered them. If Jesus had indeed been God, the words "My God, my God," would have been a mockery most extreme. God could not have deemed himself forsaken by himself. The dying Jesus, in that cry, confessed himself either the dupe of some other teaching, a self-deluded enthusiast, or an arch-imposter, who, in the bitter cry, with the wide-opening of the flood-gates through which life's stream ran out, confessed aloud that he, at least, was no deity, and deemed himself a God-forsaken man. The garden scene of agony is fitting prelude to this most terrible act. Jesus, who is God, prays to himself, in "agony he prayed most earnestly."* He refuses to hear his own prayers, and he, the omnipotent, is forearmed against his coming trial by an angel from heaven, who "strengthened" the great Creator. Was Jesus the son of God?

Praying, he said, "Father, the hour is come, glorify thy Son, that thy Son also may glorify thee."** And was he glorified? His death and resurrection most strongly disbelieved in the very city where they happened, if, indeed, they ever happened at all. His doctrines rejected by the only people to whom he preached them. His miracles denied by the only nation where they are alleged to have been performed; and he himself thus on the cross, crying out, "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" Surely no further comment is needed on this head, to point more distinctly to the most monstrous mockery the text reveals.

* Luke, xxii, 44.** John, xvii, 2.

To those who urge that the course I take is too bold, or that the problems I deal with are two deep or sacred, I will reply in Herschel's version of Schiller,

Wouldst thou reach perfection's goal,Stay not! rest not!Forward strain,Hold not hand, and draw not rein.Perseverance strikes the mark,Expansion clears whatever is dark,Truth in the abyss doth dwell,My say is said—now fare the well.

THE TWELVE APOSTLES.

All, good Christians, indeed all Christians—for are there any who are not models of goodness?—will desire that their fellow-creatures who are unbelievers should have the fullest possible information, biographical or otherwise, as to the twelve persons specially chosen by Jesus to be his immediate followers. It is not for the instruction of the believer that I pen this brief essay; he would be equally content with his faith in the absence of all historic vouchers. Indeed a pious worshiper would cling to his creed not only without testimony in its favor, but despite direct testimony against it. It is to those not within the pale of the church that I shall seek to demonstrate the credibility of the history of the twelve apostles. The short biographical sketch here presented is extracted from the first five books of the New Testament, two of which at least are attributed to two of the twelve. It is objected by heretical men who go as far in their criticisms on the Gospels as Colenso does with the Pentateuch, that not one of the gospels is original or written by any of the apostles; that, on the contrary, they were preceded by numerous writings, since lost or rejected, these in their turn having for their basis the oral tradition which preceded them. It is alleged that the four gospels are utterly anonymous, and that the fourth gospel is subject to strong suspicions of spuriousness. It would be useless to combat, and I therefore boldly ignore these attacks on the authenticity of the text, and proceed with my history. The names of the twelve are as follows: Simon, surnamed Peter; Andrew, his brother; James and John, the sons of Zebedee; Andrew; Philip; Bartholomew; Matthew; James, the son of Alphaeus; Simon, the Canaanite; Judas Iscariot; and a twelfth, as to whose name there is some

uncertainty; it was either Lebbaeus, Thaddaeus, or Judas. It is in Matthew alone (x, 3) that the name of Lebbaeus is mentioned thus: "Lebbaeus, whose surname was Thaddaeus." We are told, on this point, by able biblicists, that the early MSS. have not the words "whose surname was Thaddaeus," and that these words have probably been inserted to reconcile the gospel according to Matthew with that attributed to Mark. How good must have been the old fathers who sought to improve upon the Holy Ghost by making clear that which inspiration had left doubtful! In the English version of the Rheims Testament used in this country by our Roman Catholic brethren, the reconciliation between Matthew and Mark is completed by omitting the words "Lebbaeus whose surname was," leaving only the name "Thaddaeus" in Matthew's text. This omission must be correct, being by the authority of an infallible church. If Matthew x, 3, and Mark iii, 18, be passed as reconciled, although the first calls the twelfth disciple Lebbaeus, and the second gives him the name Thaddaeus, there is yet the difficulty that in Luke vi, 16, corroborated by John xiv, 22, there is a disciple spoken of as "Judas, not Iscariot." "Judas, the brother of James." Commentators have endeavored to clear away this last difficulty by declaring that Thaddaeus is a Syriac word, having much the same meaning as Judas. This has been answered by the objection that if Matthew's Gospel uses Thaddæus in lieu of Judas, then he ought to speak of Thaddaeus Iscariot, which he does not; and it is further objected also that while there are some grounds for suggesting a Hebrew original for the gospel attributed to Matthew, there is not the slightest pretense for alleging that Matthew wrote in Syriac. It is to be hoped that the unbelieving reader will not stumble on the threshold of his study because of a little uncertainty as to a name. What is in a name? The Jewish name which we read as Jesus is really Joshua, but the name to which we are most accustomed seems the one we should adhere to.

Simon Peter being the first named among the disciples of Jesus, deserves the first place in this notice. The word "Simon" may be rendered, if taken as a Greek name,flatnoseorugly. Some of the ancient Greek and Hebrew names are characteristic of peculiarities in the individual, but no one knows whether Peter's nose had anything to do with his name. Simon is rather a Hebrew name, but Peter is Greek, signifying arockorstone. Peter is supposed to have the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and his second name may express his stony insensibility to all appeals by infidels for admittance to the celestial regions. Lord Byron's "Vision of Judgment" is the highest known authority as to Saint Peter's celestial duties, but this nobleman's poems are only fit for very pious readers. Peter, ere he became a parson, was by trade a fisher, and when Jesus first saw Peter, the latter was in a vessel fishing with his brother Andrew, casting a net into the sea of Galilee, Jesus walking by the sea said to them, "Follow me, and I will make you fishers of men."* The two brothers did so, and they became Christ's disciples. The successors of Peter have since reversed the apostles' early practice: instead of now casting their nets into the sea, the modern representatives of the disciples of Jesus draw the sees into their nets, and, it is believed, find the

result much more profitable. When Jesus called Peter no one was with him but his brother Andrew; a little further on, the two sons of Zebedee were in a ship with their father mending nets. This is the account of Peter's call given in the gospel according to Matthew, and as Matthew was inspired by the Holy Ghost, who is identical with God the Father, who is one with God the Son, who is Jesus, the account is doubtless free from error. In the Gospel according to John, which is likewise inspired in the same manner, from the same source, and with similar infallibility, we learn that Andrew was originally a disciple of John the Baptist, and that when Andrew first saw Jesus, Peter was not present, but Andrew went and found Peter who, if fishing, must have been angling on land, telling him "we have found the Messiah," and that Andrew then brought Peter to Jesus, who said, "Thou art Simon, the son of Jonas; thou shalt be called Cephas." There is no mention in this gospel narrative of the sons of Zebedee being a little further on, or of any fishing in the sea of Galilee. This call is clearly on land, whether or not near the sea of Galilee does not appear. In the Gospel according to Luke, which is as much inspired as either of the two before-mentioned gospels, and, therefore equally authentic with each of them, we are told** that when the call took place, Jesus and Peter were both at sea. Jesus had been preaching to the people, who, pressing upon him, he got into Simon's ship, from which he preached.

* Matthew iv, 18-22.** Luke v, 1-11.

After this he directed Simon to put out into the deep and let down the nets. Simon answered, "Master, we have toiled all night and taken nothing; nevertheless, at thy word I will let down the net." No sooner was this done than the net was filled to breaking, and Simon's partners, the two sons of Zebedee, came to help, when, at the call of Jesus, they brought their ships to land, and followed him. From these accounts the unbeliever may learn that when Jesus called Peter, either both Jesus and Peter were on the land, or one was on land and the other on sea, or both of them were at sea. He may also learn that the sons of Zebedee were present at the time, having come to help to get in the great catch, and were called with Peter; or that they were further on, sitting mending nets with their father, and were called afterward; or that they were neither present nor near at hand. He may also be assured that Simon was in his ship when Jesus came to call him, and that Jesus was on land when Andrew, Simon's brother, found Simon and brought him to Jesus to be called. The unbeliever must not hesitate because of any apparent incoherence or contradiction in the narrative. With faith it is easy to harmonize the three narratives above quoted, especially when you know that Jesus had visited Simon's house before the call of Simon,* but did not go to Simon's house until after Simon had been called.** Jesus went to Simon's house and cured his wife's mother of a fever. Robert Taylor,*** commenting on the fever-curing miracle, says: "St. Luke tells us that this fever had taken the woman, not that the woman had taken the fever, and not that the fever was a very bad fever, or a yellow fever, or a

scarlet fever, but that it was a great fever—that is, I suppose, a fever six feet high at least; a personal fever, a rational and intelligent fever, that would yield to the power of Jesus' argument, but would never have given way to James' powder. So we are expressly told that Jesus rebuked the fever—that is, he gave it a good scolding; asked it, I dare say, how it could be so unreasonable as to plague the poor old woman so cruelly, and whether it wasn't ashamed of itself; and said, perhaps,Get out you naughty, wicked fever, you; and such like objurgatory language, which the fever, not used to being rebuked in such a manner, and being a very sensible sort of fever, would not stand, but immediately left the old woman in high dudgeon." This Robert Taylor, although a clergyman of the Church of England, has been convicted of blasphemy and imprisoned for writing in such wicked language about the bible. Simon Peter, as a disciple, performed many miracles, some when in company with Jesus, and more when separately by himself. These miracles, though themselves un-vouched by any reliable testimony, and disbelieved by the people among whom they worked, are strong evidence in favor of the apostolic character claimed for Peter.

* Luke iv, 88.** Matthew viii, 14.*** Devil's Pulpit, vol. i., p. 148.

On one occasion the whole of the disciples were sent away by Jesus in a ship, the Savior remaining behind to pray. About the fourth watch of the night, when the ship was in the midst of the sea, Jesus went unto his disciples, walking on the sea. Though Jesus went unto his disciples, and as an expeditious way, I suppose, of arriving with them, he would have passed by them, but they saw him, and supposing him to be a spirit, cried out. Jesus bid them be of good cheer, to which Peter answered, "Lord, if it be thou, bid me come unto thee."* Jesus said, "Come," and Peter walked on the water to go to Jesus. But the sea being wet and the wind boisterous, Peter became afraid, and instead of walking on the water began to sink into it, and cried out "Lord save me," and immediately Jesus stretched out his hand and caught Peter.

Some object that the two gospels according to John and Mark, which both record the feat of water-walking by Jesus, omit all mention of Peter's attempt. Probably the Holy Ghost had good reasons for omitting it. A profane mind might make a jest of an Apostle "half seas over," and ridicule an apostolic gatekeeper who could not keep his head above water.

Peter's partial failure in this instance should drive away all unbelief, as the text will show that it was only for lack of faith that Peter lost his buoyancy. Simon is called Bar-Jonah, that is, son of Jonah; but I am not aware if he is any relation to the Jonah who lived under water in the belly of a fish three days and three nights.

It was Simon Peter who, having told Jesus he was the Son of God, was answered, "Blessed art thou Simon Bar-Jonah, flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee."** We find a number of disciples shortly before this, and in Peter's presence, telling Jesus that he was the Son of God,*** but there is no real contradiction between the two texts. It was on this occasion that Jesus said to Simon, "Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it, and I will give thee the keys of the kingdom of Heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in Heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in Heaven."

* Matt, xiv, 23; Mark vi, 45.** Matt. xvi, 17.*** Matt, xiv, 33.

Under these extraordinary declarations from the mouth of God the Son, the Bishops of Rome have claimed, as successors of Peter, the same privileges, and their pretensions have been, acceded to by some of the most powerful monarchs of Europe.

Under this claim the Bishops, or Popes of Rome, have at various times issued Papal Bulls, by which they have sought to bind the entire world. Many of these have been very successful, but in 1302, Philip the Fair, of France, publicly burned the Pope Boniface's Bull after an address in which the States-General had denounced, in words more expressive than polite, the right of the Popes of Rome to Saint Peter's keys on earth. Some deny that the occupiers of the episcopal seat in the seven-hilled city are really of the Church of Christ, and they point to the bloody quarrels which have raged between men contending for the Papal dignity. They declare that those Vicars of Christ have more than once resorted to fraud, treachery, and murder, to secure the Papal dignity. They point to Stephen VII, the son of an unmarried priest, who cut off the head of his predecessor's corpse; to Sergius III, convicted of assassination; to John X, who was strangled in the bed of his paramour Theodora; to John XI, son of Pope Sergius III, famous only for his drunken debauchery; to John XII, found assassinated in the apartments of his mistress; to Benedict IX, who both purchased and sold the Pontificate; to Gregory VII,pseudolover of the Countess Matilda, and the author of centuries of war carried on by his successors. And if these suffice not, they point to Alexander Borgia, whose name is but the echo of crime, and whose infamy will be as lasting as history.

It is answered, "by the fruit ye shall judge of the tree." It is useless to deny the vine's existence because the grapes are sour. Peter, the favored disciple, it is declared was a rascal, and why not his successors? They have only to repent, and there is more joy in heaven over one sinner that repenteth, than over ninety and nine righteous men. Such language is very terrible, and arises from allowing the carnal reason too much freedom.

All true believers will be familiar with the story of Peter's sudden readiness to deny his Lord and teacher in the hour of danger, and will easily draw the right moral from the mysterious lesson here taught, but unbelievers may be a little puzzled by the common infidel objections on this point. These objections, therefore, shall be first stated, and then refuted in the most orthodox fashion. It is objected that all the denials were to take place before the cock should crow,* but that only one denial actually took place before the cock crew.** That the first denial by Peter that he knew Jesus, or was one of his disciples, was at the door to the damsel,*** but was inside while sitting by the fire,**** that the second denial was to a man, and apparently still sitting by the fire,***** but was to a maid when he was gone out into the porch. That these denials, or, at any rate, the last denial, were all in the presence of Jesus,****** who turned and looked at Peter, but that the first denial was at the door, Jesus being inside the palace, the second denial out in the porch, Jesus being still inside,******* and the third denial also outside.

* Matt. xxvi, 34.** Luke xxii, 34.*** John xiii, 38.**** Mark xiv, 68.***** John xviii, 17.****** Luke xxii, 57., Luke xxii, 58., Luke xxii, 61.******* Mark xiv, 69.

The refutation of these paltry objections is simple, but as none but an infidel would need to hear it, we refrain from penning it. None but a disciple of Paine, or follower of Voltaire, would permit himself to be drawn to the risk of damnation on the mere question of when some cock happened to crow, or the particular spot on which a recreant apostle denied his master.

Two of the twelve apostles, whose names are not, given, saw Jesus after he was dead, on the road to Emmaus, but they did not know him; toward evening they knew him, and he vanished out of their sight. In broad daylight they did not know him; at evening time they knew him. While they did not know him they could see him; when they did know him they could not see him. Well may true believers declare that the ways of the Lord are wonderful. One of the apostles, Thomas called Didymus, set the world an example of unbelief. He disbelieved the other disciples when they said to him "we have seen the Lord," and required to see Jesus, though dead, alive in the flesh, and touch the body of his crucified master. Thomas the apostle had his requirements complied with—he saw, he touched, and he believed. The great merit is to believe without any evidence— "He that believeth and is baptized, shall be saved, he that believeth not shall be damned." How it was that Thomas the Apostle did not know Jesus when he saw him shortly after near the sea of Tiberias, is another of the mysteries of the Holy Christian religion. The acts of the apostles after the death of Jesus deserve treatment in a separate paper; the present essay is issued in the meantime to aid the Bishop of London in his labors to stem the rising tide of infidelity.

THE ATONEMENT.

"Quel est donc ce Dieu qui fait mourir Dieu pour apaiserDieu?"

Adam's sin is the corner-stone of Christianity; the keystone of the arch. Without the fall there is no redeemer, for there is no fallen one to be redeemed. It is, then, to the history of Adam that the examinant of the atonement theory should first direct his attention. To try the doctrine of the atonement by the aid of science would be fatal to Christianity. As for the man, Adam, 6,000 years ago the first of the human race, his existence is not only unvouched for by science, but is actually questioned by the timid, and challenged by the bolder exponents of modern ethnology. The human race is traced back far beyond the period fixed for Adam's sin. Egypt and India speak for humanity busy with wars, cities and monuments, prior to the date given for the garden scene in Eden. The fall of Adam could not have brought sin upon mankind, and death by sin, if hosts of men and women had lived and died ages before the words "thou shalt surely die" were spoken by God to man. Nor could all men inherit Adam's misfortune, if it be true that it is not to one center, but to many centers of origin that we ought to trace back the various races of mankind. The theologian who finds no evidence of death prior to the offense shared by Adam and Eve is laughed to scorn by the geologist who point to the innumerable petrifactions on the earth's bosom, which with a million tongues declare more potently than loudest speech thai organic life in myriads of myriads was destroyed incalculable ages before man's era on our world.

Science, however, has so little to offer in support of any religious doctrine, and so much to advance against all purely theologic tenets, that we turn to a point giving the Christian greater vantage ground; and, accepting for the moment his premises, we deny that he can maintain the possibility of Adam's sin, and yet consistently affirm the existence of an All-wise, All-powerful, and All-good God. Did Adam sin? We will take the Christian's bible in our hands to answer the question, first defining the word sin. What is sin? Samuel Taylor Coleridge says, "A sin is an evil which has its ground or origin in the agent, and not in the compulsion of circumstances...." An act to be sin must be original, and a state or act that has not its origin in the will may be calamity, deformity, or disease, but sin it can not be. It is not enough that the act appears voluntary, or that it has the most hateful passions or debasing appetite for its proximate cause and accompaniment. All these may be found in a madhouse, where neither law nor humanity permit us to condemn the actor of sin. The reason of law declared the maniac not a free agent, and the verdict follows, of courseNot guilty?Did Adam sin?

The bible story is that a Deity created one man and one woman; that he placed them in a garden wherein he had also placed a tree which was good for food, pleasant to the eyes, and a tree to be desired to make one wise. That although he had expressly given the fruit of every tree bearing seed for food, he, nevertheless, commanded them not to eat of the fruit of this attractive tree, under penalty of death. Supposing Adam to have at once disobeyed this injunction, would it have

been sin? The fact that God had made the tree good for food, pleasant to the eyes, and a tree to be desired to make one wise, would have surely been sufficient circumstance of justification on the God-created inducement to partake of its fruit. The inhibition lost its value as against the enticement. If the All-wise had intended the tree to be avoided, would he have made its allurements so overpowering to the senses? But the case does not rest here. In addition to all the attractions of the tree, and as though there were not enough, there is a subtle serpent, gifted with suasive speech, who, either wiser or more truthful than the All-perfect Deity, says that although God has threatened immediate death as the consequence of disobedience to his command, yet they "shall not die; for God doth know that in the day ye eat thereof your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil." The tempter is stronger than the tempted, the witchery of the serpent is too great for the spellbound woman, the decoy tree is too potent in its temptations; overpersuaded herself by the honey-tongued voice of the seducer, she plucks the fruit and gives to her husband also. And for this their offspring are to suffer! The yet unborn children are to be the victims of God's vengeance on their parents' weakness—though he had made them weak; though, indeed, he had created the tempter sufficiently strong to practice upon this weakness, and had arranged the causes predisposing man and woman to commit the offense—if, indeed, it be an offense to pluck the fruit of a tree which gives knowledge to the eater. It is for this fall that Jesus is to atone. He is sacrificed to redeem the world's inhabitants from the penalties for a weakness (for sin it was not) they had no share in. It was not sin, for the man was influenced by circumstances pre-arranged by Deity, and which man was powerless to resist or control. But if man was so influenced by such circumstances, then it was God who influenced man—God who punished the human race for an action to the commission of which he impelled their progenitor.

Adam did not sin. He ate of the fruit of a tree which God had made good to be eaten. He was induced to this through the indirect persuasion of a serpent God had made purposely to persuade him. But even if Adam did sin, and even he and Eve, his wife, were the first parents of the whole human family, what have we to do with their sin? We, unborn when the act was committed and without choice as to coming into the world. Does Jesus atone for Adam's sin? Adam suffered for his own offense; he, according to the curse, was to eat in sorrow of the fruit of the earth all his life as punishment for his offense. Atonement, after punishment, is surely a superfluity. Did the sacrifice of Jesus serve as atonement for the whole world, and, if yes, for all sin, or for Adam's sin only? If the atonement is for the whole world, does it extend to unbelievers as well as to believers in the efficacy? If it only includes believers, then what has become of those generations who, according to the bible, for 4,000 years succeeded each other in the world without faith in Christ because without knowledge of his mission? Should not Jesus have come 4,000 years earlier, or, at least, should he not have come when the ark on Ararat served as monument of God's merciless vengeance, which had made the whole earth a battle-field,

whereon the omnipotent had crushed the feeble, and had marked his prowess by the innumerable myriads of decayed dead? If it be declared that, though the atonement by Jesus only applies to believers in his mission so far as regards human beings born since his coming, yet that it is wider in its retrospective effect, then the answer is that it is unfair to those born after Jesus to make faith the condition precedent to the saving efficacy of atonement, especially if belief be required from all mankind posterior to the Christian era, whether they have heard of Jesus or not. Japanese, Chinese, savage Indians, Kaffirs, and others, have surely a right to complain of this atonement scheme, which insures them eternal damnation by making it requisite to believe in a Gospel of which they have no knowledge. If it be contended that belief shall only be required from those to whom the gospel of Jesus has been preached, and who have had afforded to them the opportunity of its acceptance, then how great a cause of complaint against Christian missionaries have those peoples who, without such missions, might have escaped damnation for unbelief. The gates of hell are opened to them by the earnest propagandist, who professes to show the road to heaven.

But does this atonement serve only to redeem the human family from the curse inflicted by Deity in Eden's garden for Adam's sin, or does it operate as satisfaction for all sin? If the salvation is from the punishment for Adam's sin alone, and if belief and baptism are, as Jesus himself affirms, to be the sole conditions precedent to any saving efficacy in the much-lauded atonement by the Son of God, then what becomes of a child that only lives a few hours, is never baptized, and, never having any mind, consequently never has any belief? Or what becomes of one idiot born who, throughout his dreary life, never has mental capacity for the acceptance, or examination of, or credence in, any religious dogmas whatever? Is the idiot saved who can not believe? Is the infant saved that can not believe? I, with some mental faculties tolerably developed, can not believe. Must I be damned? If so, fortunate short-lived babe! lucky idiot! That the atonement should not be effective until the person to be saved has been baptized is at least worthy of comment; that the sprinkling a few drops of water should quench the flames of hell is a remarkable feature in the Christian's creed.

"One can't but think it somewhat drollPump-water thus should cleanse a soul."

How many fierce quarrels have raged on the formula of baptism among those loving brothers in Christ who believe he died for them! How strange an idea that, though God has been crucified to redeem mankind, it yet needs the font of water to wash away the lingering stain of Adam's crime.

One minister of the Church of England, occupying the presidential chair of a well-known training college for church clergymen in the north of England, seriously declared, in the presence of a

large auditory and of several church dignitaries, that the sin of Adam was so potent in its effect that if a manhad never been born, he would yet have been damned for sin!That is, he declared that man existed before birth, and that he committed sin before he was born; and if never born, would, notwithstanding, deserve to suffer eternal torment for that sin!

It is almost impossible to discuss seriously a doctrine so monstrously absurd, and yet it is not one whit more ridiculous than the ordinary orthodox and terrible doctrine that God, the undying, in his infinite love, killed himself under the form of his son to appease the cruel vengeance of God, the just and merciful, who, without this, would have been ever vengeful, unjust and merciless. The atonement theory, as presented to us by the bible, is in effect as follows: God creates man, surrounded by such circumstances as the divine mind chose, in the selection of which man had no voice, and the effects of which on man were all foreknown and predestined by Deity. The result is man's fall on the very first temptation, so frail the nature with which he was endowed, or so powerful the temptation to which he was subjected. For this fall not only does the All-merciful punish Adam, but also his posterity; and this punishment went on for many centuries, until God, the immutable, changed his purpose of continual condemnation of men for sins they had no share in, and was wearied with his long series of unjust judgments on those whom he created in order that he might judge them. That, then, God sent his son, who was himself and was also his own father, and who was immortal, to die upon the cross, and, by this sacrifice, to atone for the sin which God himself had caused Adam to commit, and thus to appease the merciless vengeance of the All-merciful, which would otherwise have been continued against men yet unborn for an offense they could not have been concerned in or accessory to. Whether those who had died before Christ's coming are redeemed the bible does not clearly tell us. Those born after are redeemed only on condition of their faith in the efficacy of the sacrifice offered, and in the truth of the history of Jesus's life. The doctrine of salvation by sacrifice of human life is the doctrine of a barbarous and superstitous age; the outgrowth of a brutal and depraved era. The God who accepts the bloody offering of an innocent victim in lieu of punishing the guilty culprit shows no mercy in sparing the offender: he has already satiated his lust for vengeance on the first object presented to him.

Yet sacrifice is an early and prominent, and, with slight exception, an abiding feature in the Hebrew record—sacrifice of life finds appreciative acceptance from the Jewish Deity. Cain's offering of fruits is ineffective but Abel's altar, bearing the firstlings of his flock, and the fat thereof, finds respect in the sight of the Lord. While the face of the earth was disfigured by the rotting dead, after God in his infinite mercy had deluged the world, then it was that the ascending smoke from Noah's burnt sacrifice of bird and beast produced pleasure in heaven, and God himself smelled a sweet savor from the roasted meats. To reach atonement for the past by sacrifice is worse than folly—it is crime. The past can never be recalled, and the only

reference to it should be that, by marking its events, we may avoid its evil deeds and improve upon its good ones. For Jesus himself—can man believe in him? —in his history contained in anonymous pamphlets uncorroborated by contemporary testimony?—this history, in which, in order to fulfill a prophecy which does not relate to him, his descent from David is demonstrated by tracing through two self-contradictory genealogies the descent of Joseph who was not his father—this history, in which the infinite God grows, from babyhood and hus cradle through childhood to manhood, as though he were not God at all—this history, full of absurd wonders, devils, magicians, and evil spirits, rather fit for an Arabian Night's legend than the word of God to his people—this history, with its miraculous raisings of the dead to life, disbelieved and contradicted by the people among whom they are alleged to have been performed; but, nevertheless, to be accepted by us to-day with all humility—this history, with the Man-God subject to human passions and infirmities, who comes to die, and who prays to his heavenly father (that is, to himself) that he will spare him the bitter cup of death—who is betrayed, having himself, ere he laid the foundations of the world, predestined Judas to betray him, and who dies, being God immortal crying with his almost dying breath, "My God! my God! why hast thou forsaken me?"

WERE ADAM AND EVE OUR FIRST PARENTS?

This question, Were Adam and Eve our first parents? is indeed one of most grave importance. If the answer be a negative one, it is, in fact, a denial of the whole scheme of Christianity. The Christian theory is that Adam, the common father of the whole human race, sinned, and that by his sin he dragged down all his posterity to a state from which redemption was needed; and that Jesus is, and was, the Redeemer, by whom all mankind are and were saved from the consequences of the fall of Adam. If Adam, therefore, be proved not to be the first man—if it be shown that it is not to Adam the various races of mankind are indebted for their origin, then the whole hypothesis of fall and redemption is dissipated.

In a pamphlet like the present it is impossible to give any statement and analysis of the various hypotheses as to the origin of the human race. I frankly admit that my only wish and intent is, to compel people to examine the bible record for themselves, instead of making it their fetich, bowing down before it without thought. I am inclined to the opinion that the doctrine of a plurality of sources for the various types of the human race is a correct one; that wherever the conditions for life have been found, there also has been the degree of life resultant on those conditions. My purpose in this essay is not to demonstrate the correctness of my own thinking, but rather to illustrate the incorrectness of the Geneiacal teaching. Were Adam and Eve our first parents? On the one hand an answer in the affirmative to this question can be obtained from the bible, which asserts Adam and Eve to be the first man and woman made by God, and fixes the

date of their making about 6,000 years, little more or less, from the present time. On the other hand, it seems to me that science emphatically declares man to have existed on the earth for a far more extended period; affirms that, as far as we can trace man, we find him in isolated groups, diverse in type, till we lose him in the ante-historic period; and, with nearly equal distinctness, denies that the various existing races find their common parentage in one pair. It is only on the first point that I attack the bible chronology of man's existence. I am aware that compilations based upon the authorized version of the Old Testament Scriptures are open to objection, and that while from the Hebrew 1,656 years represent the period from Adam to the Deluge generally acknowledged, the Samaritan Pentateuch only yields for the same period 1,307 years, while the Septuagint version furnishes 2,242 years; there is, I am also informed, on the authority of a most erudite Egyptologist, a fatal objection to the Septuagint chronology—i. e., that it makes Methusaleh outlive the flood.*

The deluge occurred, according to the Septuagint, in the year of the world 2,242, and, by adding up the generations previous to Methusaleh's—

Adam.....230Seth.....205Enos.....190Cainan.....170Malaleel.....165Jared.....162Enoch.....165.....1287*

Sharpe's History of Egypt, page 196.

—we shall find that he was born in the year of the world 1,287. He lived 969 years, and therefore died in 2,256. But this is fourteen years after the deluge.

The Rev. Dr. Lightfoot, who wrote about 1,644, fixes the month of the creation at September, 5,572 years preceding the date of his book, and says that Adam was expelled from Eden on the day in which he was created.* In the LondonEthnological Journal, for which I am indebted to the kindness of its Editor, an able ethnologist and careful thinker, the reader will find a chronology of Genesis ably and elaborately examined. At present, for our immediate purpose, we will take the ordinary. English bible, which gives the following result:

From Adam to Abraham (Gen. v and xi)..... 2008From Abraham to Isaac (Gen. xxi, 5)..... 100From Isaac to Jacob (Gen. xxv, 26)..... 60From Jacob going into Egypt (Gen. xlvii, 9)..... 130Sojourn in Egypt (Exod. xii, 41)..... 480Duration of Moses* leadership (Exod. vii, 7; xxxi, 2). 40Thence to David, about..... 400From David to Captivity, fourteen generations (27),about twenty-two reigns.....478Captivity to Jesus, fourteen generations, about..... 5934234 Less disputed 230 years of sojourn in Egypt.....230

4004 From Adam to Abraham the dates are certain, if we take the bible statement, and there is certainly no portion of the orthodox text, except the period of the Judges, which will admit any considerable extension of the ordinary Oxford chronology.

* Harmony of the Four Evangelists, and Harmony of the OldTestament.

The book of Judges is not a book of history. Everything in it is recounted without chronological order. It will suffice to say, that the ciphers which we find in the book of Judges, and in the first book of Samuel, yield us, from the death of Joshua to the commencement of the reign of Saul, the sum total of 500 years, which would make, since the exode from Egypt, 565 years; whereas the first book of Kings counts but 480 years, from the going out of Egypt down to the foundation of the temple under Solomon. According to this we must suppose that several of the Judges governed simultaneously.*

* Munk's Palestine, p. 231.

In reading Alfred Maury's profound essay on the classification of tongues, I was much struck with the fact that he, in his philological researches, traces back some of the ancient Greek mythologies to a Sanscrit source. He has the following remark, worthy of earnest attention: "The God of Heaven, or the sky, is called by the GreeksZeus Pater; and let us here notice that the pronunciation of Z resembles very much that of D, inasmuch as the word Zeus becomes in the genitiveDios. The Latins termed the same GodDies-piter, or Jupiter Now in the Veda the God of Heaven is called Dyash-pitai." What is this but the original of our own Christian God, the father, the [———] (Jeue) pater of the Old Testament? I introduce this remark for the purpose of shaking a very commonly entertained opinion that the Hebrew Records, whether or not God-inspired, are at any rate the most antique, and are written in a primitive tongue. Neither is it true that Hebrew mythology is the most ancient, nor the Hebrew language the most primitive; on the contrary, the mythology is clearly derived, and the language in a secondary or tertiary state.

What is the value of this book of Genesis, which is the sole authority for the hypothesis that Adam and Eve, about 5,865 years ago, were the sole founders of the peoples now living on the face of the earth? Written we know not by whom, we know not when, and we know not in what language. If we respect the book, it must be from its internal merits; its author is to us unknown. Eusebius, Chrysostom, and Clemens Alexandrinus alike agree that the name of Moses should not stand at the head of Genesis as the author of the book. As to its internal merit Origen did not hesitate to declare the contents of the first and second chapters of Genesis to be purely figurative. Our translation of it has been severely criticised by the learned and pious Bellamy, and by the more learned and less pious Sir William Drummond. Errors almost innumerable have been

pointed out, the correctness of the Hebrew text itself questioned, and yet this book is an unerring guide to the students of ethnology. They may do anything, everything, except stray out of the beaten track. We have, therefore, on the one hand, an anonymous book, which indeed does not take you back so much as 6,000 years, for at least 1,600 years must be deducted for the Noachian deluge, when the world's inhabitants were again reduced to one family, one race, one type. On the other hand, we have now existing Eskimo men, of the Arctic realm; Chinamen, of the Asiatic realm; Englishmen, of the European realm; Sahara negroes, of the African realm; Fuegians, of the American realm; New Zealanders, of the Polynesian realm; the Malay, representative of the realm which bears his name; the Tasmanian, of the Australian realm, with other families of each realm too numerous for mention here; dark and fair, black-skinned and white-skinned, woolly-haired and straight-haired; low forehead, high forehead; Hottentot limb, Negro limb, Caucasian limb. Do all these different and differing structures and colors trace their origin to one pair? To Adam and Eve, or rather to Noah and his family? Or are they (the various races) indigenous to their nature, soils, and climates? And are these various types naturally resultant, with all their differences, from the differing conditions for life persistent to and consistent with them?

The question, then, really is this: Have the different races of men all found their common parent in Noah, about 4,300 years ago? Assuming the unity of the races or species of men now existing, there are but three suppositions on which the diversity now seen can be accounted for:

"1. A miracle, or direct act of the Almighty, in changing one type into another.

"2. The gradual action of physical causes, such as climate, food, mode of life, etc.

"3. Congenital or accidental varieties."*

We may fairly dismiss entirely from our minds the question of miracle. Such a miracle is nowhere recorded in the bible, and it lies upon any one hardy enough to assert that the present diversity has a miraculous origin to show some kind of reasons for his faith, some kind of evidence for our conviction, and until this is done we have no reason to dwell on the first hypothesis.

Of the permanence of type under its own climatic conditions—that is, in the country to which it is indigenous—we have overwhelming proof in the statue of an ancient Egyptian scribe, taken from a tomb of the fifth dynasty, 5,000 years old, and precisely corresponding to the Fellah of the present day.**

* "Types of Mankind," Dr. Nott, p. 57.** M. Pulzsky on Iconography—"Indigenous Races," p. 111.

The sand had preserved the color of the statuette, which, from its portrait-like beauty, marks a long era of art-progress preceding its production. It antedates the orthodox era of the flood, carries us back to a time when, if the bible were true, Adam was yet alive, and still we find before it kings reigning and ruling in mighty Egypt. Can the reader wonder that these facts are held to impeach the orthodox faith?

On the second point Dr. Nott writes: "It is a commonly received error that the influence of a hot climate is gradually exerted on successive generations, until one species of mankind is completely changed into another.... This idea is proven to be false.... A sunburnt cheek is never handed down to succeeding generations. The exposed parts of the body are alone tanned by the sun, and the children of the white-skinned Europeans in New Orleans, Mobile, and the West Indies are born as fair as their ancestors, and would remain so if carried back to a colder climate."*

Pure negroes and negresses, transported from Central Africa to England, and marrying among themselves, would never acquire the characteristics of the Caucasian races; nor would pure Englishmen and Englishwomen, emigrating to Central Africa, and in like manner intermarrying, ever become negroes or negresses. The fact is, that while you don't bleach the color of the dark-skinned African by placing him in London, you bleach the life out of him; andvice versawith the Englishman.**

* "Types of Mankind," p. 58.** "Indigenous Races of the Earth," p. 458. The allegeddiscovery of white-skinned negroes in Western Africa doesnot affect this question: it is not only to the color of theskin, but also the general negro characteristics that theabove remarks apply.

For a long time there has been ascribed to man the faculty of adapting himself to every climate. The following facts will show the ascription a most erroneous one: "In Egypt the austral negroes are, and the Caucasian Memlooks were, unable to raise up even a third generation; in Corsica French families vanish beneath Italian summers. Where are the descendants of the Romans, the Vandals, or the Greeks in Africa? In Modern Arabia, 1830 years after Mahomed Ali had got clear of the Morea war, 18,000 Arnaots (Albanians) were soon reduced to some 400 men. At Gibraltar, in 1817, a negro regiment was almost annihilated by consumption. In 1841, during the three weeks on the Niger, 130 Europeans out of 145 caught African fever, and 40 died; out of 158 negro sailors only eleven were affected, and not one died. In 1809 the British Expedition to Walchereen failed in the Netherlands through marsh fever. About the same time, in St. Domingo, about 15,000 French soldiers died from malaria. Of 30,000 Frenchmen, only 8,000 survived exposure to that Antillian island; while the Dominicanized African negro, Tous-saint L'Overture, retransported to Europe, was perishing from the chill of his prison in France."

On the third point we again quote Dr. Nott: "The only argument left, then, is that of congenital varieties or peculiarities, which are said to spring up and be transmitted from parent to child, so as to form new races. Let us pause for a moment to illustrate this fanciful idea. The negroes of Africa, for example, are admitted not to be offsets from some other race which have been gradually blackened and changed in a moral and physical type by the action of climate, but it is asserted that 'once, in the flight of ages,' some genuine little negro, or rather many such, were born of Caucasian, Mongol, or other light-skinned parents, and then have turned about and changed the type of the inhabitants of a whole continent. So, in America, the countless aborigines found on this continent, which we have reason to believe were building mounds before the time of Abraham, are the offspring of a race changed by accidental or congenital varieties. Thus, too, old China, India, Australia, Oceana, etc., all owe their types, physical and mental, to congenital and accidental varieties, and are descended from Adam and Eve! Can human credulity go further, or human ingenuity invent any argument more absurd?"

But even supposing these objections to the second and third suppositions set aside, there are two other propositions which, if affirmed, as I believe they may be, entirely overthrow the orthodox assertion "that Adam and Eve, six thousand years ago, were the first pair; and that all diversities now existing must find their common source in Noah—less than four thousand three hundred years from the present time." These two are as follows.

1. That man may be traced back on the earth long prior to the alleged Adamic era.

2. That there are diversities traceable as existing among the human race four thousand five hundred years ago as marked as in the present day.

To illustrate the position that man may be traced back to a period long prior to the Adamic era, we refer our readers to the chronology of the late Baron Bunsen, who, while allowing about 22,000 years for man's existence on earth, fixes the following dates, after a patient examination of the Nilotic antiquities:

Egyptians under a republican form..... 10,000 B. C.Ascension of Bytis, the Theban, first Priest King. 9,085Elective Kings in Egypt..... 7,280Hereditary Kings in Upper and Lower Egypt (adouble empire) form..... 5,143*

* Nott and Gliddon, "Indigenous Races," page 687.

The assertion of such an antiquity for Egypt is no modern hypothesis. Plato puts language into the mouth of an Egyptian first claiming in that day an antecedent 10,000 years for painting and

sculpture in Egypt. This has long been regarded as fabulous because it was contrary to the Hebrew chronology.

If this be the result of the researches into Egyptian archæology, the reader will scarcely be surprised to find me endeavoring from other sources to get corroborative evidence of a still more astonishing character.

There are few who now pretend that the wholecreation (?)took place 6,000 years ago, although if it be true that God made all in six days, and man on the sixth, then the universe would only be more ancient than Adam by some five days. To state the age of the earth at 6,000 years is simply preposterous, when we ascertain that it would require about 4,000,000 of years for the formation of the fossiliferous rocks alone, and that 15,000,000 of years have been stated as a moderate estimate for the antiquity of our globe. The deltas of the great rivers afford corroboration to our position as to man's duration. The delta of the Nile, formed by immense quantities of sedimentary matter, which in like manner is still carried down and deposited, has not perceptibly increased during the last 3,000 years. "In the days of the earliest Pharaohs, the delta, as it now exists, was covered with ancient cities and filled with a dense population, whose civilization must have required a period going back far beyond any date that has yet been assigned to the deluge of Noah, or even to the creation of the world."*

From borings which have been made at New Orleans to the depth of 600 feet, from excavations for public works, and from examinations in parts of Louisiana, where the range between high and low water is much greater than it is at New Orleans, no less than ten distinct cypress forests divided from each other by eras of aquatic plants, etc., have been traced, arranged vertically above each other; and from these and other data it is estimated by Dr. Benet Dowler that the age of the delta is at least 158,000 years; and in the excavations above referred to human remains have been found below the further forest level, making it appear that the human race existed in the delta of the Mississippi more than 57,000 years ago.**

It is further urged, by the same competent writer, that human bones discovered on the coast of Brazil near Santas, and on the borders of a lake called Lagoa Santa, by Captain Elliott and Dr. Lund, thoroughly incorporated with a very hard breccia, every one in a fossil state, demonstrate that aboriginal man in America antedates the Mississippi alluvia, and that he can even boast a geological antiquity, because numerous species of animals have become extinct since American humanity's first appearance.***

* Gliddon's "Types of Mankind," page 335.** "Types," pages 336 to 369.*** "Types," pages 350 and 357.

With reference to the second point, as to the possibility of tracing back the diversities of the Human Race to an antediluvian date, it is simply sufficient to point on the one side to the remains of the American Indian disentombed from the Mississippi forests, and on the other to the Egyptian monuments, tombs, pyramids, and stuccoes, revealing to us Caucasian men, and Negro men, their diversities as marked as in the present day. Sir William Jones, in his day, claimed for Sanscrit literature a vast antiquity, and asserted the existence of the religions of Egypt, Greece, India, and Italy, prior to the Mosaic era. So far as Egypt is concerned the researches of Lepsius, Bunsen, Champollion, Lenormant, Gliddon, and others, have fully verified the position of the learned president of the Asiatic Society.

We have Egyptian statues of the third dynasty, going back far beyond the 4,300 years, which would give the orthodox era of the deluge, and taking us over the 4,500 years fixed by our second proposition. The fourth dynasty is rich in pyramids, tombs, and statues; and, according to Lepsius, this dynasty commenced 3,426 B. C, or about 5,287 years from the present date.

In reading a modern work on the orthodox side,* I have been much pained by the constant assumption that the long chronologists must be in error, because their views do not coincide with orthodox teachings. Orthodox authors treat their heterodox brethren as unworthy of credit, because of their heterodoxy. The writer asserts** that the earliest reference to the Negro tribes is in the era of the 12th dynasty. Supposing for a moment this to be correct, I ask what even then will be the state of the argument? The 12th dynasty, according to Lepsius, ends about 4,000 years ago. The orthodox chronology fixes the deluge about 300 years earlier. Will any sane man argue that there was sufficient lapse of time in three centuries for the development of Caucasian and Negro man from one family?

* "Archaia," by Dr. Dawson.** "Archaia," page 306.

The fact is that we trace back the various types of man now known, not to one center, not to one country, not to one family, not to one pair, but we trace them to different centers, to distinct countries, to separate families, probably to many pairs. Wherever the conditions for life are found, there are living beings also. The conditions of climate, soil, etc., of Central Africa, differ from those of Europe. The indigenous races of Central Africa differ from those of Europe.

Without pretending, in the present limited essay, to do more than index some of the most prominent features of the case, I yet hope that enough is here stated to interest my readers in the prosecution of future inquiry upon the important question which serves as the title to these pages. I put forward no knowledge from myself, but am ready to listen to the teachings of wiser men; and while I shrink from the ordinary orthodox assertion of Adamic unity of origin,

accompanied as it is by threats of pains and penalties if rejected, I am yet ready to receive it, if it can be presented to me associated with facts, and divested of those future hell-fire torments and present societarian persecutions which now form its chief, if not sole, supports.

The rejection of the bible account of the peopling of the world involves also the rejection, as has been already remarked, of the entire scheme of Christianity. According to the orthodox rendering of both New and Old Testament teaching, all men are involved in the curse which followed Adam's sin. But if the account of the Fall be mythical, not historical; if Adam and Eve—supposing them to have ever existed—were preceded on the earth by many nations and empires, what becomes of the doctrine that Jesus came to redeem mankind from a sin committed by one who was not the common father of all humanity?

Reject Adam, and you can not accept Jesus. Refuse to believe Genesis, and you can not give credence to Matthew, Mark, Luke, John and Paul. The Old and New Testaments are so connected together that to dissolve the union is to destroy the system. The account of the Creation and Fall of Man is the foundation-stone of the Christian Church. If this stone be rotten, the superstructure can not be stable. It is therefore most important that those who profess a faith in Christianity should consider facts which so vitally and materially affect the creed they hold.

A PLEA FOR ATHEISM.

Gillespie says that "an Atheist propagandist seems a nondescript monster created by Nature in a moment of madness." Despite this opinion, it is as the propagandist of Atheism that I pen the following lines, in the hope that I may succeed in removing some few of the many prejudices which have been created against not only the actual holders of Atheistic opinions, but also against those wrongfully suspected of entertaining such ideas. Men who have been famous for depth of thought, for excellent wit, or great genius, have been recklessly assailed as Atheists by those who lacked the high qualifications against which the spleen of the calumniators was directed. Thus, not only has Voltaire been without ground accused of Atheism, but Bacon, Locke, and Bishop Berkeley himself, have, among others, been denounced by thoughtless or unscrupulous pietists as inclining to Atheism, the ground for the accusation being that they manifested an inclination to improve human thought.

It is too often the fashion with persons of pious reputation to speak in unmeasured language of Atheism as favoring immorality, and of Atheists as men whose conduct is necessarily vicious, and who have adopted atheistic views as a disparate defiance against a Deity justly offended by the badness of their lives. Such persons urge that among the proximate causes of Atheism are

vicious training, immoral and profligate companions, licentious living, and the like. Dr. John Pye Smith, in his "Instructions on Christian Theology," goes so far as to declare that "nearly all the Atheists upon record have been men of extremely debauched and vile conduct." Such language from the Christian advocate is not surprising, but there are others who, professing great desire for the spread of Freethought, and with pretensions to rank among acute and liberal thinkers, declare Atheism impracticable, and its teachings cold, barren, and negative. In this brief essay I shall except to each of the above allegations, and shall endeavor to demonstrate that Atheism affords greater possibility for human happiness than any system yet based on Theism, or possible to be founded thereon, and that the lives of true Atheists must be more virtuous, because more human, than those of the believers in Deity, the humanity of the devout believer often finding itself neutralized by a faith with which it is necessarily in constant collision. The devotee piling the faggots at theauto de feof a heretic, and that heretic his son, might, notwithstanding, be a good father in every respect but this. Heresy, in the eyes of the believer, is highest criminality, and outweighs all claims of family or affection.

Atheism, properly understood, is in nowise a cold, barren negative; it is, on the contrary, a hearty, fruitful affirmation of all truth, and involves the positive assertion and action of highest humanity.

Let Atheism be fairly examined, and neither condemned—its defense unheard—on theex parteslanders of the professional preachers of fashionable orthodoxy, whose courage is bold enough while the pulpit protects the sermon, but whose valor becomes tempered with discretion when a free platform is afforded and discussion claimed; nor misjudged because it has been the custom to regard Atheism as so unpopular as to render its advocacy impolitic. The best policy against all prejudice is to assert firmly the verity. The Atheist does not say "There is no God," but he says, "I know not what you mean by God: I am without idea of God; the word 'God' is to me a sound conveying no clear or distinct affirmation. I do not deny God, because I can not deny that of which I have no conception, and the conception of which by its affirmer is so imperfect that he is unable to define it to me." If you speak to the Atheist of God as a creator, he answers that the conception of creation is impossible. We are utterly unable to construe it in thought as possible that the complement of existence has been either increased or diminished, much less can we conceive an absolute origination of substance. We can not conceive either, on the one hand, nothing becoming something, or on the other, something becoming nothing. The Theist who speaks of God creating the universe, must either suppose that Deity evolved it out of himself, or that he produced it from nothing. But the Theist can not regard the universe as evolution of Deity, because this would identify Universe and Deity, and be Pantheism rather than Theism. There would be no distinction of substance—in fact, no creation. Nor can the Theist regard the universe as created out of nothing, because Deity is, according to him, necessarily eternal and infinite. His existence being eternal and infinite, precludes the possibility of the

conception of vacuum to be filled by the universe if created. No one can even think of any point of existence in extent or duration and say here is the point of separation between the creator and the created. Indeed, it is not possible for the Theist to imagine a beginning to the universe. It is not possible to conceive either an absolute commencement, or an absolute termination of existence; that is, it is impossible to conceive a beginning before which you have a period when the universe has yet to be: or to conceive an end, after which the universe, having been, no longer exists. It is impossible in thought to originate or annihilate the universe. The Atheist affirms that he cognizes to-day effects, that these are at the same time causes and effects—causes to the effects they precede, effects to the causes they follow. Cause is simply everything without which the effect would not result, and with which it must result. Cause is the means to an end, consummating itself in that end. The Theist who argues for creation must assert a point of time, that is, of duration, when the created did not yet exist. At this point of time either something existed or nothing; but something must have existed, for out of nothing nothing can come. Something must have existed, because the point fixed upon is that of the duration of something. This something must have been either finite or infinite; if finite, it could not have been God; and if the something were infinite, then creation was impossible, as it is impossible to add to infinite existence.

If you leave the question of creation and deal with the government of the universe, the difficulties of Theism are by no means lessened. The existence of evil is then a terrible stumbling-block to the Theist. Pain, misery, crime, poverty, confront the advocate of eternal goodness, and challenge with unanswerable potency his declaration of Deity as all-good, all-wise, and all-powerful. Evil is either caused by God, or exists independently; but it can not be caused by God, as in that case he would not be all-good; nor can it exist independently, as in that case he would not be all-powerful. Evil must either have had a beginning, or it must be eternal; but, according to the Theist, it can not be eternal, because God alone is eternal. Nor can it have had a beginning, for if it had it must either have originated in God, or outside of God; but, according to the Theist, it can not have originated in God, for he is all-good, and out of all-goodness evil can not originate; nor can evil have originated outside of God, for, according to the Theist, God is infinite, and it is impossible to go outside of or beyond infinity.

To the Atheist this question of evil assumes an entirely different aspect. He declares that evil is a result, but not a result from God or Devil. He affirms that by conduct founded on knowledge of the laws of existence it is possible to ameliorate and avoid present evil, and, as our knowledge increases, to prevent its future recurrence.

Some declare that the belief in God is necessary as a check to crime. They allege that the Atheist may commit murder, lie, or steal, without fear of any consequences. To try the actual

value of this argument, it is not unfair to ask, Do Theists ever steal? If yes, then in each such theft, the belief in God and his power to punish has been inefficient as a preventive of the crime. Do Theists ever lie or murder? If yes, the same remark has farther force—hell-fire failing against the lesser as against the greater crime. The fact is that these who use such an argument overlook a great truth—i.e., that all men seek happiness, though in very diverse fashions. Ignorant and miseducated men often mistake the true path to happiness, and commit crime in the endeavor to obtain it. Atheists hold that by teaching mankind the real road to human happiness, it is possible to keep them from the by-ways of criminality and error. Atheists would teach men to be moral now, not because God offers as an inducement reward by and by, but because in the virtuous act itself immediate good is insured to the doer and the circle surrounding him. Atheism would preserve man from lying, stealing, murdering now, not from fear of an eternal agony after death, but because these crimes make this life itself a course of misery.

While Theism, asserting God as the creator and governor of the universe, hinders and checks man's efforts by declaring God's will to be the sole directing and controlling power, Atheism, by declaring all events to be in accordance with natural laws—that is, happening in certain ascertainable sequences—stimulates man to discover the best conditions of life, and offers him the most powerful inducements to morality. While the Theist provides future happiness for a scoundrel repentant on his death bed, Atheism affirms present and certain happiness for the man who does his best to live here so well as to have little cause for repenting hereafter.

Theism declares that God dispenses health and inflicts disease, and sickness and illness are regarded by the Theist as visitations from an angered Deity, to be borne with meekness and content. Atheism declares that physiological knowledge may preserve us from disease by preventing our infringing the law of health, and that sickness results not as the ordinance of offended Deity, but from ill-ventilated dwellings and workshops, bad and insufficient food, excessive toil, mental suffering, exposure to inclement weather, and the like—all these finding root in poverty, the chief source of crime and disease; that prayers and piety afford no protection against fever, and that if the human being be kept without food he will starve as quickly whether he be Theist or Atheist, theology being no substitute for bread.

When the Theist ventures to affirm that his God is an existence other than and separate from the so-called material universe, and when he invests this separate, hypothetical existence with the several attributes of omniscence, omnipresence, omnipotence, eternity, infinity, immutability, and perfect goodness, then the Atheist, in reply says, "I deny the existence of such a being."

It becomes very important, in order that injustice may not be done to the Theistic argument, that we should have—in lieu of a clear definition, which it seems useless to ask for—the best possible

clue to the meaning intended to be conveyed by the word God. If it were not that the word is an arbitrary term, invented for the ignorant, and the notions suggested by which are vague and entirely contingent upon individual fancies, such a clue could be probably most easily and satisfactorily obtained by tracing back the word "God," and ascertaining the sense in which it was used by the uneducated worshipers who have gone before us; collating this with the more modern Theism, qualified as it is by the superior knowledge of to-day. Dupuis says: "The word God appears intended to express the force universal, and eternally active, which endows all nature with motion according to the laws of a constant and admirable harmony; which develops itself in the diverse forms of organized matter, which mingles with all, gives life to all; which seems to be one through all its infinitely varied modifications, and inheres in itself alone."

In the "Bon Sens" of Cure Meslier, it is asked, "Qu'est ce que Dieu?" and the answer is: "It is an abstract word coined to designate the hidden force of Nature, or rather it is a mathematical point having neither length, breadth, nor thickness."

The orthodox fringe of the Theism of to-day is Hebraistic in its origion—that is, it finds its root in the superstition and ignorance of a petty and barbarous people nearly destitute of literature, poor in language, and almost entirely wanting in high conceptions of humanity. It might, as Judaism is the foundation of Christianity, be fairly expected that the ancient Jewish Records would aid us in our search after the meaning to be attached to the word "God." the most prominent words in Hebrew rendered God or Lord in English are [————]Jeue, and [————]Aleim. The first word, Jeue, called by our orthodox Jehovah, is equivalent to "that which exists," and indeed embodies in itself the only possible trinity in unity—i. e. past, present, and future. There is nothing in this Hebrew word to help you to any such definition as is required for the sustenance of modern Theism. The most you can make of it by any stretch of imagination is equivalent to the declaration "I am, I have been, I shall be." The word [——] is hardly ever spoken by religious Jews, who actually in reading substitute for it, Adonai, an entirely different word. Dr. Wall notices the close resemblance in sound between the wordYehowaorYeue, or Jehovah, and Jove. In fact [————], Jupiter and Jeue, pater, (God the father) present still closer resemblance in sound. Jove is also [——] or [——] or [——], whence the word Deus and our Deity. The Greek mythology, far more ancient than that of the Hebrews, has probably found for Christianity many other and more important features of coincidence than that of a similarly sounding name. The word [——] traced back affords us no help beyond that it identifies Deity with the universe. Plato says that the early Greeks thought that the only Gods were the sun, moon, earth, stars and heaven. The word Aleim, assists us still less in defining the word God, for Parkhurst translates it as a plural noun signifying "the curser," deriving it from the verbto curse. Finding that philology aids us but little, we must endeavor to arrive at the meaning of the word "God" by another rule. It is utterly impossible to fix the period of the rise of Theism among any

particular people, but it is, notwithstanding, comparatively easy, if not to trace out the development of Theistic ideas, at any rate to point to their probable course of growth among all peoples.

Keightley, in his "Origin of Mythology," says: "Supposing, for the sake of hypothesis, a race of men in a state of total or partial ignorance of Deity, their belief in many gods may have thus commenced. They saw around them various changes brought about by human agency, and hence they knew the power of intelligence to produce effects. When they beheld other and greater effects, they ascribed them to some unseen being, similar but superior to man." They associated particular events with special unknown beings (gods), to each of whom they ascribed either a peculiarity of power, or a sphere of action not common to other gods. Thus one was god of the sea, anothor god of war, another god of love, another ruled the thunder and lightning; and thus through the various elements of the universe and passions of humankind, so far as they were then known.

This mythology became modified with the advancement of human knowledge. The ability to think has proved itself oppugnant to and destructive of the desire to worship. Science has razed altar after altar heretofore erected to the unknown gods, and pulled down deity after deity from the pedestals on which ignorance and superstition had erected them. The priest who had formerly spoken as the oracle of God lost his sway, just in proportion as the scientific teacher succeeded in impressing mankind with a knowledge of the facts around them. The ignorant who had hitherto listened unquestioning during centuries of abject submission to their spiritual preceptors, at last commenced to search and examine for themselves, and were guided by experience rather than by church doctrine. To-day it is that advancing intellect which challenges the reserve guard of the old armies of superstition, and compels a conflict which humankind, must in the end have great gain by the forced enunciation of the truth.

From the word "God" the Theist derives no argument in his favor; it teaches nothing, defines nothing, demonstrates nothing, explains nothing. The Theist answers that this is no sufficient objection, that there are many words which are in common use to which the same objection applies. Even admitting that this were true, it does not answer the Atheist's objection. Alleging a difficulty on the one side is not a removal of the obstacle already pointed out on the other.

The Theist declares his God to be not only immutable, but also infinitely intelligent, and says: "Matter is either essentially intelligent, or essentially non-intelligent; if matter were essentially intelligent, no matter could be without intelligence; but matter can not be essentially intelligent, because some matter is not intelligent, therefore matter is essentially non-intelligent: but there is intelligence, therefore there must be a cause for the intelligence, independent of matter; this

must be an intelligent being—i.e.., God." The Atheist answers, I do not know what is meant, in the mouth of the Atheist, by "matter." "Matter," "substance," "existence," are three words having the same signification in the Atheist's vocabulary. It is not certain that the Theist expresses any very clear idea when he uses the words "matter" and "intelligence." Reason and understanding are sometimes treated as separate faculties, yet it is not unfair to presume that the Theist would include them both under the word intelligence. Perception is the foundation of the intellect. The perceptive faculty, or perceptive faculties, differs or differ in each animal, yet in speaking of matter that Theist uses the word "intelligence" as though the same meaning were to be understood in every case. The recollection of the perceptions is the exercise of a different faculty from the perceptive faculty, and occasionally varies disproportionately; thus an individual may have great perceptive faculties, and very little memory, or the reverse, yet memory, as well as perception, is included in intelligence. So also the faculty of comparing between two or more perceptions; the faculty of judging and the faculty of reflecting—all these are subject to the same remarks, and all these and other faculties are included in the word intelligence. We answer, then, that "God" (whatever that word may mean) can not be intelligent. He can never perceive; the act of perception results in the obtaining a new idea, but if God be omniscient his ideas have been eternally the same. He has either been always and always will be perceiving, or he has never perceived at all. But God can not have been always perceiving, because if he had he would always have been obtaining fresh knowledge, in which case he must have some time had less knowledge than now; that is he would have been less perfect; that is, he would not have been God: he can never recollect or forget, he can never compare, reflect nor judge. There can not be perfect intelligence without understanding; but following Coleridge, "understanding is the faculty of judging according to sense." The faculty of whom? Of some person, judging according to that person's senses? But has "God" senses? Is there anything beyond "God" for "God" to sensate? There can not be perfect intelligence without reason. By reason we mean that faculty or aggregation of faculties which avails itself of past experience to predetermine, more or less accurately, experience in the future, and to affirm truths which sense perceives, experiment verifies, and experience confirms. To God there can be neither past nor future, therefore to him reason is impossible. There can not be perfect intelligence without will, but has God will? If God wills, the will of the all-powerful must be irresistible; the will of the infinite must exclude all other wills.

God can never perceive. Perception and sensation are identical. Every sensation is accompanied by pleasure or pain. But God, if immutable, can neither be pleased nor pained. Every fresh sensation involves a change in mental and perhaps in physical condition. God, if immutable, can not change. Sensation is the source of all ideas, but it is only objects external to the mind which can be sensated. If God be infinite there can be no objects external to him, and therefore sensation must be to him impossible. Yet without perception where is intelligence?

God can not have memory or reason—memory is of the past, reason for the future, but to God immutable there can be no past, no future. The words past, present, and future, imply change; they assert progression of duration. If God be immutable, to him change is impossible. Can you have intelligence destitute of perception, memory, and reason? God can not have the faculty of judgment—judgment implies in the act of judging a conjoining or disjoining of two or more thoughts, but this involves change of mental condition. To God, the immutable, change is impossible. Can you have intelligence, yet no perception, no memory, no reason, no judgment? God can not think. The law of the thinkable is that the thing thought must be separated from the thing which is not thought. To think otherwise would be to think of nothing—to have an impression with no distinguishing mark, would be to have no impression. Yet this separation implies change, and to God, immutable, change is impossible. Can you have intelligence without thought? If the Theist replies to this that he does not mean by infinite intelligence as an attribute of Deity an infinity of the intelligence found in a finite degree of humankind, then he is bound to explain, clearly and distinctly, what other "intelligence" he means, and until this be done the foregoing statements require answer.

The Atheist does not regard "substance" as either essentially intelligent or the reverse. Intelligence is the result of certain conditions of existence. Burnished steel is bright—that is, brightness is the necessity of a certain condition of existence. Alter the condition, and the characteristic of the condition no longer exists. The only essential of substance is its existence. Alter the wording of the Theist's objection. Matter is either essentially bright, or essentially non-bright. If matter were essentially bright, brightness should be the essence of all matter; but matter can not be essentially bright, because some matter is not bright, therefore matter is essentially non-bright; but there is brightness, therefore there must be a cause for this brightness independent of matter; that is, there must be an essentially bright being—i.e., God.

Another Theistic proposition is thus stated: "Every effect must have a cause; the first cause universal must be eternal:ergo, the first cause universal must be God." This is equivalent to saying that "God" is "first cause." But what is to be understood by cause? Defined in the absolute, the word has no real value. "Cause," therefore, cannot be eternal. What can be understood by "first cause?" To us the two words convey no meaning greater than would be conveyed by the phrase "round triangle." Cause and effect are correlative terms—each cause is the effect of some precedent; each effect the cause of its consequent. It is impossible to conceive existence terminated by a primal or initial cause. The "beginning," as it is phrased, of the universe, is not thought out by the Theist, but conceded without thought. To adopt the language of Montaigne, "Men make themselves believe that they believe." The so-called belief inCreationis nothing more than the prostration of the intellect on the threshold of the unknown. We can only cognize the ever-succeeding phenomena of existence as a line in continuous and eternal evolution. This line

has to us no beginning; we trace it back into the misty regions of the past but a little way; and however far we may be able to journey, there is still the great beyond Then what is meant by "universal cause?" Spinoza gives the following definition of cause, as used in its absolute signification: "By cause of itself I understand that, the essence of which involves existence, or that, the nature of which can only be considered as existent." That is, Spinoza treats "cause" absolute and "existence" as two words having the same meaning. If his mode of defining the word be contested, then it has no meaning other than its relative signification, of a means to an end. "Every effect must have a cause." Every effect implies the plurality of effects, and necessarily that each effect must be finite; but how is it possible from a finite effect to logically deduce a universal, i.e., infinite, cause?

There are two modes of argument presented by Theists, and by which, separately or combined, they seek to demonstrate the being of a God. These are familiarly known as the argumentsa priorianda posteriori.

The a posteriori argument has been popularized in England by Paley, who has ably endeavored to bide the weakness of his demonstration under an abundance of irrelevant illustration. The reasoning of Paley is very deficient in the essential points where it most needed strength. It is utterly impossible to prove by it the eternity or infinity of Deity. As an argument founded on analogy, the design argument, at the best, could only entitle its propounder to infer the existence of a finite cause, or, rather, of a multitude of finite causes. It ought not to be forgotten that the illustrations of the eye, the watch, and the man, even if admitted as instances of design, or, rather, of adaptation, are instances of eyes, watches, and men, designed or adapted out of pre-existing substance, by a being of the same kind of substance, and afford, therefore, no demonstration in favor of a designer, alleged to have actually created substance out of nothing, and also alleged to have created a substance entirely different from himself. Thea posterioriargument can never demonstrate infinity for Deity. Arguing from an effect finite in extent, the most it could afford would be a cause sufficient for that effect, such cause being possibly finite in extent and duration. And as the argument does not demonstrate God's infinity, neither can it, for the same reason, make out his omniscience, as it is clearly impossible to logically claim infinite wisdom for a God possibly only finite. God's omnipotence remains unproved for the same reason, and because it is clearly absurd to argue that God exercises power where he may not be. Nor can thea posterioriargument show God's absolute freedom, for, as it does nothing more than seek to prove a finite God, it is quite consistent with the argument that God's existence is limited and controlled in a thousand ways. Nor does this argument show that God always existed; at the best the proof is only that some cause, enough for the effect, existed before it, but there is no evidence that this cause differs from any other causes, which are often as transient as the effect itself. And as it does not demonstrate that God

has always existed, neither does it demonstrate that he will always exist, or even that he now exists. It is perfectly in accordance with the arguement, and with the analagy of cause and effect that the effect may remain after the cause has ceased to exist. Nor does the argument from design demonstrate one God. It is quite consistent with this argument that a separate cause existed for each effect, or mark of design, discovered, or that several causes contributed to some or one of such effects. So that if the argument be true, it might result in a multitude of petty deities, limited in knowledge, extent, duration, and power; and, still worse, each one of this multitude of gods may have had a cause which would also be finite in extent and duration, and would require another, and so on, until the design argument loses the reasoner among an innumerable crowd of deities, none of whom can have the attributes claimed for God.

The design argument is defective as an argument from analogy, because it seeks to prove a Creator God who designed, but does not explain whether this God has been eternally designing, which would be absurd; or, if he at some time commenced to design, what then induced him so to commence. It is illogical, for it seeks to prove an immutable Deity by demonstrating a mutation on the part of Deity.

It is unnecessary to deal specially with each of the many writers who have used from different standpoints thea posterioriform of argument in order to prove the existence of Deity. The objections already stated apply to the whole class; and, although probably each illustration used by the theistic advocate is capable of an elucidation entirely at variance with his argument, the main features of objection are the same. The argumenta posterioriis a method of proof in which the premises are composed of some position of existing facts, and the conclusion asserts a position antecedent to those facts. The argument is from given effects to their causes. It is one form of this argument which asserts that man has a moral nature, and from this seeks to deduce the existence of a moral governor. This form has the disadvantage that its premises are illusory. In alleging a moral nature for man, the Theist overlooks the fact that the moral nature of man differs somewhat in each individual, differs considerably in each nation, and differs entirely in some peoples. It is dependent on organization and education: these are influenced by climate, food, and mode of life. If the argument from man's nature could demonstrate anything, it would prove a murdering God for the murderer, a lascivious God for the licentious man, a dishonest God for the thief, and so through the various phases of human inclination. Thea prioriarguments are methods of proof in which the matter of the premises exists in the order of conception antecedently to that of the conclusion. The argument is from cause to effect. Among the prominent Theistic advocates relying upon thea prioriargument in England are Dr. Samuel Clarke, the Rev. Moses Lowman, and William Gillespie. As this last gentleman condemns his predecessors for having utterly failed to demonstrate God's existence, and as his own treatise

on the "Necessary Existence of God" comes to us certified by the praise of Lord Brougham and the approval of Sir William Hamilton, it is to Mr. William Gillespie that the reader shall be directed.

The propositions are first stated entirely, so that Mr. Gillespie may not complain of misrepresentation:

1. Infinity of extension is necessarily existing.

2. Infinity of extension is necessarily indivisible. Corollary.—Infinity of extension is necessarily immovable.

3. There is necessarily a being of infinity of extension.

4. The being of infinity of extension is necessarily of unity and simplicity.

Sub-proposition.—The material universe is finite in extension.

5. There is necessarily but one being of infinity of expansion.

Part 2, Proposition 1.—Infinity of duration is necessarily existing.

2. Infinity of duration is necessarily indivisible. Corollary.—Infinity of duration is necessarily immovable.

3. There is necessarily a being of infinity of duration.

4. The being of infinity of duration is necessarily of unity and simplicity.

Sub-proposition.—The material universe is finite in duration.

Corollary.—Every succession of substances is finite in duration.

5. There is necessarily but one being of infinity of duration.

Part 3, Proposition 1.—There is necessarily a being of infinity of expansion and infinity of duration.

2. The being of infinity of expansion and infinity of duration is necessarily of unity and simplicity.

Division 2, Part 1.—The simple sole being of infinity of expansion and of duration is necessarily intelligent and all-knowing.

Part 2.—The simple sole being of infinity of expansion and of duration, who is all-knowing, is necessarily all-powerful.

Part 3.—The simple sole being of infinity of expansion and of duration, who is all-knowing and all-powerful, is necessarily entirely free.

Division 3.—The simple sole being of infinity of expansion and of duration, who is all-knowing, all-powerful, and entirely free, is necessarily completely happy.

Sub-proposition.—The simple sole being of infinity of expansion and of duration, who is all-knowing, all-powerful, entirely free, and completely happy, is necessarily perfectly good.

The first objection against the foregoing arguments is that it seeks to prove too much. It affirms one existence (God) infinite in extent and duration, and another entirely different and distinct existence (the material universe) finite in extent and duration. It therefore seeks to substantiate everything and something more. The first proposition is curiously worded, and the argument to demonstrate it is undoubtedly open to more than one objection.

Mr. Gillespie has not defined infinity, and it is possible therefore his argument may be misapprehended in this paper. Infinite signifies nothing more than indefinite. When a person speaks of infinite extension he can only mean to refer to the extension of something to which he has been unable to set limits. The mind can not conceive extensionper se, either absolute or finite. It can only conceive something extended. It might be impossible mentally to define the extension of some substance. In such a case its extension would be indefinite; or, as Mr. Gillespie uses the word, infinite. No one can therefore possibly have any idea of infinity of extension. Yet it is upon the existence of such an idea, and on the impossibility of getting rid of it, that Mr. Gillespie grounds his first proposition. If the idea does not exist, the argument is destroyed at the first step.

Mr. Gillespie argues that it is utterly beyond the power of the human mind to conceive infinity of extension non-existent. He would have been more correct in asserting that it is utterly beyond the power of the human mind to conceive infinity of extension at all, either existent or non-existent. Extension can only be conceived as quality of substance. It is possible to conceive

substance extended. It is impossible in thought to limit the possible extension of substance. Mr. Gillespie having asserted that we can not but believe that infinity of extension exists, proceeds to declare that it exists necessarily. For, he says, everything the existence of which we can not but believe, exists necessarily. It is not necessary at present to examine what Mr. Gillespie means by existing necessarily; it is sufficient to have shown that we do not believe in the existence of infinity of extension, although we may and do believe in the existence of substance, to the extension of which we may be unable to set limits. But, says Mr. Gillespie, "everything the existence of which we can not but believe is necessarily existing." Then as we can not but believe in the existence of the universe (or, to adopt Mr. Gillespie's phrase, the material universe), the material universe exists necessarily. If by "anything necessarily existing," he means anything the essence of which involves existence, or the nature of which can only be considered as existent, then Mr. Gillespie, by demonstrating the necessary existence of the universe, refutes his own later argument, that God is its creator. Mr. Gillespie's argument, as before remarked, is open to misconception, because he has left us without any definition of some of the most important words he uses. To avoid the same objection, it is necessary to state that by substance or existence I mean that which is in itself and is conceived per se—that is, the conception of which does not involve the conception of anything else as antecedent to it. By quality, that by which I cognize any mode of existence. By mode, each cognized condition of existence. Regarding extension as quality of mode of substance, and not as substance itself, it appears absurd to argue that the quality exists otherwise than as quality of mode.

The whole of the propositions following the first are so built upon it, that if it fails they are baseless. The second proposition is, that infinity of extension is necessarily indivisible. In dealing with this proposition, Mr. Gillespie talks of thepartsof infinity of extension, and winds up by saying that he means parts in the sense of partial consideration only. Now not only is it denied that you can have any idea of infinity of extension, but it is also denied that infinity can be the subject of partial consideration. Mr. Gillespie's whole proof of this proposition is intended to affirm that the parts of infinity of extension are necessarily indivisible from each other.

I have already denied the possibility of conceiving infinity in parts; and, indeed, if it were possible to conceive infinity in parts, then that infinity could not be indivisible, for Mr. Gillespie says that, by indivisible, he means indivisible, either really or mentally. Now each part of anything conceived is, in the act of conceiving, mentally separated from, either other parts of, or from the remainder of, the whole of which it is part. It is clearly impossible to have a partial consideration of infinity, because the part considered must be mentally distinguished from the unconsidered remainder, and, in that case, you have, in thought, the part considered finite, and the residue certainly limited, at least, by the extent of the part under consideration.

If any of the foregoing objections are well-founded, they are fatal to Mr. Gillespie's argument.

The argument in favor of the corollary to the second proposition is that the parts of infinity of extension are necessarily immovable among themselves; but if there be no such thing as infinity of extension—that is, if extension be only a quality and not necessarily infinite; if infinite mean only indefiniteness or illimitability, and if infinity can not have parts—this argument goes for very little. The acceptance of the argument that the parts of infinity of extension are immovable is rendered difficult when the reader considers Mr. Gillespie's sub-proposition (4) that the parts of the material universe are movable and divisible from each other. He urges that a part of the infinity of extension or of its substratum must penetrate the material universe and every atom of it. But if infinity can have no parts, no part of it can penetrate the material universe. If infinity have parts (which is absurd), and if some part penetrate every atom of the material universe, and if the part so penetrating be immovable, how can the material universe be considered as movable, and yet as penetrated in every atom by immovability? If penetrated be a proper phrase, then, at the moment when the part of infinity was penetrating the material universe, the part of infinity so penetrating must have been in motion. Mr. Gillespie's logic is faulty. Use his own language, and there is either no penetration, or there is no immovability.

In his argument for the fourth proposition, Mr. Gillespie—having by his previous proposition demonstrated (?) what he calls a substratum for the before demonstrated (?) infinity of extension—says, "it is intuitively evident that the substratum of infinity of extension can be no more divisible than infinity of extension." Is this so? Might not a complex and divisible substratum be conceived by us as possible to underlie a (to us) simple and indivisible indefinite extension, if the conception of the latter were possible to us? There can not be any intuition. It is mere assumption, as, indeed, is the assumption of extension at all, other than as the extension of substance. In his argument for proposition 5, Gillespie says that "any one who asserts that he can suppose two or more necessarily existing beings, each of infinity of expansion, is no more to be argued with than one who denies, Whatever is, is." Why is it more difficult to suppose this than to suppose one being of infinity, and, in addition to this infinity, a material universe? Is it impossible to suppose a necessary being of heat, one of light, and one of electricity, all occupying the same indefinite expansion? If it be replied that you can not conceive two distinct and different beings occupying the same point at the same moment, then it must be equally impossible to conceive the material universe and God existing together.

The second division of Mr. Gillespie's argument is also open to grave objection. Having demonstrated to his own satisfaction an infinite substance, and also having assumed in addition a finite substance, and having called the first an infinite "being"—perhaps from a devout objection to speak of God as substance—Mr. Gillespie seeks to prove that the infinite being is

intelligent. He says: "Intelligence either began to be, or it never began to be. That is never began to be is evident in this, that if it began to be, it must have had a cause; for whatever begins to be must have a cause. And the cause of intelligence must be of intelligence; for what is not of intelligence can not make intelligence begin to be. Now intelligence being before intelligence began to be is a contradiction. And this absurdity following from the supposition that intelligence began to be, it is proved that intelligence never began to be: to wit, is of infinity of duration." Mr. Gillespie does not condescend to tell us why "what is not of intelligence cannot make intelligence begin to be;" but it is not unfair to suppose that he means that of things which have nothing in common one can not be the cause of the other. Let us apply Mr. Gillespie's argument to the material universe, the existence of which is to him so certain that he has treated it as a self-evident proposition.

The material universe—that is, matter—either began to be, or it never began to be. That it never began to be is evident in this, that if it began to be, it must have had a cause; for whatever begins to be must have a cause. And the cause of matter must be of matter; for what is not of matter can not make matter begin to be. Now matter being before matter began to be is contradiction. And this absurdity following from the supposition that matter—i. e., the material universe—began to be, it is proved that the material universe never began to be—to wit, is of indefinite duration.

The argument as to the eternity of matter is at least as logical as the argument for the eternity of intelligence. Mr. Gillespie may reply that he affirms the material universe to be finite in duration, and that by the argument for his proposition, part 2, he proves that the one infinite being (God) is the creator of matter. His words are:

"As the material universe is finite in duration, or began to be, it must have had a cause; for whatever begins to be must have a cause. And this cause must be [Mr. Gillespie does not explain why], in one respect or other, the simple sole being of infinity of expansion and duration, who is all-knowing [the all-knowing or intelligence rests on the argument which has just been shown to be equally applicable to matter], inasmuch as what being, or cause independent of that being, could there be? And, therefore, that being made matter begin to be." Taking Mr. Gillespie's own argument, that which made matter begin to be must be of matter, for what is not matter can not make matter begin to be, then Mr. Gillespie's infinite being (God) must be matter. But there is yet another exception to the preposition, which is that the infinite being (God) is all-powerful. Having, as above, argued that the being made matter, he proceeds, "and this being shown, it must be granted that the being is, necessarily, all-powerful." Nothing of the kind need be granted. If it were true that it was demonstrated that the infinite being (God) made matter, it would not prove him able to make anything else; it might show the being cause enough for that

effect, but does not demonstrate him cause for all effects. So that if no better argument can be found to prove God all-powerful, his omnipotence remains unproved.

Mr. Gillespie's last proposition is that the being (God) whose existence he has so satisfactorily (?) made out is necessarily completely happy. In dealing with this proposition, Mr. Gillespie talks of unhappiness as existing in various kinds and degrees. But, to adopt his own style of argument, unhappiness either began to be, or it never began to be. That it never began to be is evident in this, that whatever began to be must have had a cause, for whatever begins to be must have a cause. And the cause of unhappiness must be of unhappiness, for what is not of unhappiness can not make unhappiness begin to be. But unhappiness being before unhappiness began to be is a contradiction; therefore unhappiness is of infinity of duration. But proposition 5, part 2, says there is but one being of infinity of duration. The one being of infinity of duration is therefore necessarily unhappy. Mr. Gillespie's arguments recoil on himself, and are destructive of his own affirmations.

In his argument for the sub-proposition, Mr. Gillespie says that God's motive, or one of his motives, to create, must be believed to have been a desire to make happiness, besides his own consummate happiness, begin to be. That is, God, who is consummate happiness everywhere forever,desiredsomething. That is, he wanted more than then existed. That is, his happiness was not complete. That is, Mr. Gillespie refutes himself. But what did infinite and eternal complete happiness desire? It desired (says Mr. Gillespie) to make more happiness—that is, to make more than an infinity of complete happiness. Mr. Gillespie's proof, on the whole, is at most that there exists necessarily substance, the extension and duration which we can not limit. Part of his argument involves of the use of the verya posteriorireasoning just considered, regarded by himself as utterly worthless for the demonstration of the existence of a being with such attributes as orthodox Theism tries to assert.

If Sir William Hamilton meant no flattery in writing that Mr. Gillespie's works was one of the "very ablest" on the Theistic side, how wretched indeed must, in his opinion, have been the logic of the less able advocates for Theism. Every Theist must admit that if a God exists, he could have so convinced all men of the fact of his existence that doubt, disagreement, or disbelief would be impossible. If he could not do this, he would not be omnipotent, or he would not be omniscient—that is, he would not be God. Every Theist must also agree that if a God exists, he would wish all men to have such a clear consciousness of his existence and attributes that doubt, disagreement, or belief on this subject would be impossible. And this, if for no other reason, because that out of doubts and disagreements on religion have too often resulted centuries of persecution, strife, and misery, which a good God would desire to prevent. If God would not desire this, then he is not all-good—that is he is not God. But as many men have doubts, a large

majority of mankind have disagreements, and some men have disbeliefs as to God's existence and attributes, it follows either that God does not exist, or that he is not all-wise, or that he is not all-powerful, or that he is not all-good.

Every child is born into the world an Atheist; and if he grows into a Theist, his Deity differs with the country in which the believer may happen to be born, or the people among whom he may happen to be educated. The belief is the result of education or organization. Religious belief is powerful in proportion to the want of scientific knowledge on the part of the believer. The more ignorant, the more credulous. In the mind of the Theist "God" is equivalent to the sphere of the unknown; by the use of the Word he answers without thought problems which might otherwise obtain scientific solution. The more ignorant the Theist, the greater his God. Belief in God is not a faith founded on reason, but a prostration of the reasoning faculties on the threshold of the unknown. Theism is worse than illogical; its teachings are not only without utility; but of itself it has nothing to teach. Separated from Christianity with its almost innumerable sects, from Maliometanism with its numerous divisions, and separated also from every other preached system, Theism is a Will-o'-the-wisp, without reality. Apart from orthodoxy, Theism is a boneless skeleton; the various mythologies give it alike flesh and bone, otherwise coherence it hath none. What does Christian Theism teach? That the first man made perfect by the all-powerful, all-wise, all-good God, was nevertheless imperfect, and by his imperfection brought misery into the world, when the all-good God must have intended misery should never come. That this God made men to share this misery—men whose fault was their being what he made them. That this God begets a son, who is nevertheless his unbegotten self, and that by belief in the birth of God's eternal son, and in the death of the undying who died to satisfy God's vengeance, man may escape the consequences of the first man's error. Christian Theism declares that belief alone can save man, and yet recognizes the fact that man's belief results from teaching, by establishing missionary societies to spread the faith. Christian Theism teaches that God, though no respecter of persons, selected as his favorites one nation in preference to all others: that man can do no good of himself or without God's aid, but yet that each man has a free will; that God is all-powerful, but that few go to heaven and the majority to hell; that all are to love God, who has predestined from eternity that by far the largest number of human beings are to be burning in hell for ever. Yet the advocates for Theism venture to upbraid those who argue against such a faith.

Either Theism is true or false. If true, discussion must help to spread its influence; if false, the sooner it ceases to influence human conduct the better for human kind. It will be useless for the clergy to urge that such a pamphlet deserves no reply. It is true the writer is unimportant, and the language in which his thoughts find expression lacks the polish of a Macaulay, and the fervor of a Burke; but they are nevertheless his thoughts, uttered because it is not only his right, but his

duty, to give them utterance. And this Plea for Atheism is put forth challenging the Theists to battle for their cause, and in the hope that the strugglers being sincere, truth may give laurels to the victor and the vanquished; laurels to the victor in that he has upheld the truth; laurels still welcome to the vanquished, whose defeat crowns him with a truth he knew not of before.

IS THERE A GOD?

Some of those who have heard me venture to examine the question of the existence of Deityviva voce, have desired to have my reasons for holding the Atheistic position briefly stated, and while I do not pretend to exhaust the subject in these few pages, I trust to say enough to provoke thought and inquiry. I do not say, "There is no God," and the scarcely polite rejoinder of those who quote the Psalmist can not, therefore, be applied with justice toward myself. I have never yet heard living man give me a clear, coherent definition of the word "God," and I have never read any definition from either dead or living man expressing a definite and comprehensible idea of Deity. In fact, it has always appeared to me that men use that word rather to hide their ignorance than to express their knowledge.*

* In Sir William Hamilton's Essay on Cousin, I find a notequoting Mr. Piesse on Kant, in which the word God standsas the equivalent for a phase of the unknowable.

Climatic conditions often, and diversity of human race always, govern and modify the meaning conveyed by the word. By "God" one nation or sect expresses love; another, vengeance; another, good; another, wisdom; another, fire; another, water; another, air; another, earth; and some even confound their notion of Deity with that of devil. Elihu Palmer well observes: "The Christian world worships three infinite gods, and one omniscient devil." I do not deny "God," because that word conveys to me no idea, and I can not deny that which presents to me no distinct affirmation, and of which the would-be affirmer has no conception. I can not war with a nonentity. If, however, God is affirmed to represent an existence which is distinct from the existence of which I am a mode, and which it is alleged is not thenoumenon, of which the word "I" represents only a specialty ofphenomena, then I deny "God," and affirm that it is impossible "God" can be. That is, I affirm that there is one existence, and deny that there can be more than one. Atheists are sometimes content to say to their opponents, your "proofs" are no proofs, your "evidences" are failures, you do not and can not prove the existence of Deity. This ground may be safe, but the conduct of its occupier is not daring. The swordsman who always guarded and parried, but never ventured cut or thrust, might himself escape unwounded, but he would thus make but little progress toward victory over his opponent.

It is well to show that the position of your antagonist is weak, but it is better to prove that you are strong.

In a paper as limited as the present, it is necessary to be brief both in answer to opponents and in the statements of my own opinions. This is rather intended as the challenging speech of a debate, not as a complete essay on the existence of Deity.

There are two modes in which Theists endeavor to prove the existence of God, and each of these modes is in its turn denounced by Theistic writers—1st, thea priori; 2d, thea posteriori. Of the former, Pearson, in his "Prize Essay on Infidelity," says: "Thea priorimode of reasoning is the exclusive idol of many of the German logicians.... But in their hands this kind of reasoning has completely failed. It conducts the mind to no firm resting place; it bewilders instead of elucidating our notions of God, of man, and the universe. It gives us no divine personal existence, and leaves us floating in a region of mere vague abstractions. Such reasonings are either altogether vain or are not really what they profess to be. In our country the name of Dr. Clarke is chiefly associated with thea prioriargument.... Clarke himself found it necessary to stoop to the argumenta posteriori, and thereby acknowledged the fallacy of attempting to reason exclusivelya priori.... The fate of Dr. Clarke's pretended demonstration, and the result, in so far as theology is concerned, of the transcendental reasoning of the continental philosophers, show the futility of attempting to rise up to the height of the great argument of the existence of God by thea priorimethod alone."

Of the latter, William Gillespie, in his "Treatise on the Necessary Existence of Deity," writes that it "can never make it appear that infinity belongs in any way to God." It "can only entitle us to infer the existence of a being of finite extension, for, by what rule in philosophy can we deduce from the existence of an object finite in extent (and nothing is plainer than that the marks of design which we can discover must be finite in their extent) the existence of a cause of infinity of extension? What, then, becomes of the omnipresence of the Deity, according to those who are content to rest satisfied from the reasoning of experience?... It will be vain to talk of the Deity being present by his energy? although he may not be present by his substance, to the whole universe. For, 'tis natural to ask not so much how it is proved that God is virtually present, though not substantially present, in every part of nature, as what can be meant by being everywhere present by mere energy?" This reasoning can no more make out that the Deity is omnipresent by his virtue, than that he is omnipresent as to his substance.... And, from the inaptitude of the reasoning under consideration to show that immensity, or omnipresence, belongs to God, it will be found to follow, directly and immediately, that his wisdom and power can not be shown to be more than finite, and that he can never be proved to be a free agent.... Omnipresence (let it be only by energy) is absolutely necessary in a being of infinity of wisdom. And therefore, 'the

design argument' is unable to evince that the Deity is in possession of this attribute. It likewise plainly follows, from the inaptitude of this argument to show that God is omnipresent, that thereby we can not prove infinity of power to belong to him. For, if the argument can not make out that the being it discovers is everywhere present, how can it ever make out that he is everywhere powerful? By careful reflection, too, we may perceive that omnipotence of another kind than power, winch can exert itself in all places, requires the existence of immensity. "The design argument" can never evince that God is a free agent....

If we can not prove the immensity or omnipresence of the Deity, we can for that reason never show that he is omniscient, that he is omnipotent, that he is entirely free.... If the Deity can not be proved to be of infinity in any given respect, it would be nothing less than absurd to suppose that he could be proved to be of infinity in any other respect. It "can do no more than prove that at the commencement of the phenomena which pass under its review, there existed a cause exactly sufficient to make the effects begin to be. That this cause existed from eternity, the reasonings from experience by no means show. Nay, for aught they make known, the designer himself may not have existed long before those marks of design which betoken his workmanship." This reasoning "can not prove that the God whom it reveals has existed from all eternity, therefore, for anything it intimates, God may at some time cease to be, and the workmanship may have an existence when the workman hath fallen into annihilation.... Such reasonings can never assure us of the unity of the Deity." Whether there be one God or not, the argument from experience doth by no means make clear. It discovers marks of design in the phenomena of nature, and infers the existence of at least one intelligent substance sufficient to produce them. Further, however, it advances not our knowledge. Whether the cause of the phenomena be one God or many Gods, it pretends not to determine past all doubt.... But did this designer create the matter in which the design appeared? Of this the argument can not convince us, for it does no more than infer a designing cause from certain appearances, in the same way we would infer from finding some well-contrived machine in a desert that a human being had left it there.... Now, because this reasoning can not convince us of such a creation, it can not convince us there is not a plurality of deities, or of the causes of things.... If we can not prove the eternity of God, it is not possible we can prove the unity of God. To say that, for anything we know to the contrary, he may have existed from all eternity, being much the same as saying that, for anything we know to the contrary, there may be another God or many Gods beside." Sir W. Hamilton considered that the only valid arguments for the existence of a God, and for the immortality of the human soul, rest on the ground of man's moral nature.

Dr. Lyman Beecher issued, some few years since, a series of lectures on Atheism, without merit or fairness, and which are here only alluded to as fairly illustrating a certain class of orthodox opposition. His statements of Atheistic opinions are monstrous perversions, and his answers are

directed against the straw man built together by himself. The doctrine of "almighty chance" which Dr. Beecher attacks, is one which I never heard an educated Atheist teach, and the misrepresentation of Freethought objects is so obvious that it can only be effectual with those who have never freed themselves from the trammels which habit and fashion-faith bound upon them in their infancy, and which have strengthened with their growth. The Rev. J. Orr, in his "Treatise on Theism," says, "All inquiry about chance is, however, impertinent in the present day. The idea is an infantine one, possible of entertainment only in the initial state of human knowledge. Chance isnotthe position relied upon by modern Atheism. And when, therefore, the Theist expends the artillery of his argument upon this broken down and obsolete notion, he is intermeddling with the dead, and after accomplishing the destruction of the venerable fallacy, the modern Atheist will likely ask him to come down to the nineteenths century and meet him there."

The only attempt at argument in Dr. Beecher's book is founded on the assumption:

1st. That there is an existence called matter.

2d. That there are certain effects perceivable which can not result from matter.

3d. That therefore there is a God the cause for these effects. Where are there any Materialists who accept Dr. Beecher's limitation of matter? It is a word I do not use myself.

On the question of evil, Coleridge, in his "Aids to Reflection," says: "1st. That evil must have had a beginning, since otherwise it must either be God or a co-eternal and co-equal rival with God. 2d. That it could not originate in God; for if so, it would at once be evil and not evil, or God would be at once God—that is, infinite goodness—and not God." If God be infinite goodness, can evil exist at all? It is necessary above all that we should understand the meaning of each word we use. Some men talk as if their words were intended rather to conceal than to express their ideas. So far as this essay is concerned I will endeavor to avoid this difficulty by explicitly defining each special word I use. Dugald Stewart, indeed, says, "That there are many words used in philosophical discourse which do not admit of logical definition, is abundantly manifest. This is the case with all those words that signify things un-compounded, and consequently unsusceptible of analysis—a proposition, one should think, almost self-evident; and yet it is surprising how very generally it has been overlooked by philosophers."

The advantages, however, accruing from frequent definitions are very great; at the least they serve to explain what was meant by the persons using the word, whereas sometimes two men confuse each word by using words to which each attaches an opposite or a dissimilar value.

Men will talk of "First Cause," and "Intelligent First Cause." Do they know what they mean? I confess I do not, and from the manner in which they use the words, the most charitable conclusion is that they use them because others have done so, and for no worse or better reason. They talk of the "Beauties of Creation," and "Works of the Great Creator." If by creation is meant the origin of existence, then each utterance of the phrase is an absurdity. The human mind is utterly incapable of construing it in thought as possible that the complement of existence has either been increased or diminished. Man can neither conceive nothing becoming something nor something becoming nothing.

Definitions.—1. By existence, or substance, I mean that which is in itself and is conceivedper se—that is, the conception of which does not require the conception of anything else as antecedent to it. Whenever I use the words universe or matter, I use them in the same sense as representing the totality of existence. Existence can only be known in its modes, and these by their attributes. 2. By attribute, I understand that by which I cognize any mode of existence. Hardness, brightness, color, life, form, etc., are attributes of conditional existence. 3. By mode, I understand each cognized condition or accident of existence. 4. By eternity I mean indefinite duration; that is duration which is to me illimitable. 5. By infinity, I mean indefinite extension. The axioms, so far as I shall give them, are in the precise language of Spinoza. "1. Everything which is, is in itself, or in some other thing.. 2. That which cannot be conceived through anotherper aliud, must be conceivedper se. 3. From a given determinate cause, the effect necessarily follows; and,vice versa, if no determinate cause be given, no effect can follow. 4. The knowledge of an effect depends on a knowledge of the cause, and includes it. 5. Things that have nothing in common with each other, can not be understood by means of each other—that is, the conception of one does not involve the conception of the other."

Propositions.—Existence is prior to its modes. This follows from definitions 1 and 3, because modes of existence are conceived relatively and in dependence on existence, which is absolutely precedent in such conception. Existences having different attributes have nothing in common with each other. This is founded on definition 1. Existences have nothing in common with each other, can not be the cause of, or affect one another. If they have nothing in common, they can not be conceived by means of each other (per axiom 5), and they can not be conceived as relating to each other, but must be conceivedper se(per definition 1); and as (per axiom 4) the knowledge of an effect depends on the knowledge of the cause and includes it, it is impossible to conceive any existence as an effect, so long as you can not conceive it in relation to any other existence. By "cause" in the absolute, I mean "existence." In its popular or relative sense, I use "cause" as an effect of some precedent causative influence, itself the cause of some consequent effect, as the means toward an end, in the accomplishment of which end it completes itself.

What fact is there so certain that I may base all my reasonings upon it? My existence is this primary fact; this, to me, indubitable certainty. I am. This logic can neither prove nor disprove. The very nature of proof is to make a proposition more clear to the mind than it was before, and no amount of evidence can in-crease my conviction of the certainty of my own existence. I do not affirm that I am in existence, but I affirm that there is existence. This existence is either eternal, that is, unlimited in duration, that is, indefinite in duration; or else it had a beginning, that is, it has been created. If created, then such creation must be by some existence the same as itself, or by some existence differing from itself. But it can not have been created by any existence the same as itself, because to imagine such, would be to conceive no more than a continuance of the same existence—there would be no discontinuity. "But," says S. T. Coleridge, "where there is no discontinuity, there can be no origination." And it can not have been created by any existence differing from itself, because things which have nothing in common with one another can not be the cause of, or affect, one another. Therefore, this existence has not been created, that is, its duration is indefinite—that is, you can not conceive a beginning—that is, it is eternal. This eternal existence is either infinite in extent, that is, is unlimited in extent, or it is finite, that is, limited. If limited, it must be limited by an existence the same as itself, or by an existence differing from itself. But the same arguments which applied to a limitation of duration, also apply to a limitation of extension. Therefore, this existence is unlimited in extent; that is, is infinite and eternal—that is, there is only one existence. It is at this point that Atheism separates from Pantheism. Pantheism demonstrates one existence, but affirms for it infinite attributes. Atheism denies that attributes can be infinite. Attributes are but the distinguishing characteristics of modes, and how can that be infinite which is only the quality of finity? Men do not talk of infinite hardness or of infinite softness; yet they talk of infinite intelligence. Intelligence is not an existence, and the word is without value unless it strictly comprehend, and is included in, that which is intelligent. The hardness of the diamond, the brilliancy of the burnished steel, have no existence apart from the diamond or the steel. I, in fact, affirm that there is only one existence, and that all we take cognizance of is mode, or attribute of mode, of that existence.

I have carefully abstained from using the words "matter" and "spirit." Dr. Priestly says: "It has generally been supposed that there aretwo distinct kinds of substancein human nature, and they have been distinguished by the termsmatter, andspirit, ormind. The former of these has been said to be possessed of the property ofextension, viz., of length, breadth and thickness, and also ofsolidityor impenetrability, and consequently of avis inertiæ; but it is said to be naturally destitute of all other powers whatever. The latter has of late been defined to be a substance entirely destitute of all extension, or relation to space, so as to have no property in common with matter; and therefore to be properlyimmaterial, but to be possessed of the powers of perception, intelligence, and self-motion. Matter is alleged to be that kind of substance of which our bodies are composed, whereas the principle of perception and thought belonging to us is

said to reside in a spirit, or immaterial principle, intimately united to the body; while higher orders of intelligent beings, and especially the Divine Being, are said to be purely immaterial. It is maintained that neither matter nor spirit (meaning by the latter the subject of sense and thought) correspond to the definitions above mentioned. For that matter is not thatinertsubstance that it has been supposed to be; that powers ofattraction or repulsionare necessary to its very being, and that no part of it appears to beimpenetrableto other parts; I therefore define it to be a substance possessed of the property of extension, and powers of attraction or repulsion; and since it has never yet been asserted that the powers ofsensationandthoughtare incompatible with these (solidity or impenetrability, and, consequently, avis inertiæ, only having been thought to be repugnent to them), I therefore maintain that we have no reason to suppose that there are in man two substances so distinct from each other as have been represented. It is likewise maintained that the notion of two substances that have no common property, and yet are capable of intimate connection and mutual action, is absurd."

I do not conceivespirit or mindas an existence. By the wordmind, I simply express the totality of perception, observation, collection, and recollection of perceptions, reflection and various other mental processes. Dugald Stewart, in his "Essay on Locke," says: "We are conscious of sensation, thought, desire, volition, but we are not conscious of the existence of the mind itself."

It is urged that the idea of God is universal. This is not only not true, but I, in fact, deny that any coherent idea exists in connection with the word "God." The chief object to which the emotions of any people were directed in ancient times became their God. When these emotions were combined with vague traditions, and a priesthood became interested in handing down the traditions, and increasing the emotions, then the object becoming sacred was hallowed and adored, and uncertain opinions formed the basis of a creed. Any prominent phenomenon in the universe, which was not understood, was personified, as were also the various passions and phases of humanity. These, in time, were preached as religious truths, and thus diverted the people from inquiry into the natural causes of phenomena, which they accounted for as ordained by God, and when famine or pestilence occurred, instead of endeavoring to remove its cause or using preventive measures against a recurrence of the evil, they sought to discover why the supernatural power was offended, and how it might be appeased, and ascribing to it their own passions and emotions, they offered prayers and sacrifices. These errors becoming institutions of the country, the people, prompted by their priests, regarded all those who endeavored to overturn them by free and scientific thought and speech as blasphemers, and the Religion of each State has, therefore, always been opposed to the education of the people.

Archbishop Whately, in his "Elements of Rhetoric," part 1, chap, ii, sec. 5, urges that "those who represent God or Gods as malevolent, capricious, or subject to human passions and vices, are invariably to be found among those who are brutal and uncivilized." We admit this, but ask is it not the fact that both the Old and New Testament teachings do represent God as malevolent, capricious, and subject to human passions and vices—that is, are not these bible views of God relics of a brutal and uncivilized people?

There is, of course, not room in a short essay like the present to say much upon the morality of Atheism, and it should therefore suffice to say, that truth and morality go hand in hand. That that is moral which tends to the permanent happiness of all. The continuance of falsehood never can result in permanent happiness; and therefore if Atheism be truthful, it must be moral, if it be against falsehood, it must tend to human happiness.

Yet if quoting great names will have effect, Lord Bacon, who is often quoted against Atheism, also says: "Atheism leaves a man to sense, to philosophy, to natural piety, to laws, to reputation, all of which may be guides to an outward moral virtue,though religion were not; but superstition dismounts all these, and erecteth an absolute monarchy in the mind of men; therefore Atheism never did perturb states, for it makes men wary of themselves as looking no further; and we see the times inclined to Atheism, as the times of Augustus Caesar were civil times; but superstition has been the confusion of many states." George Combe says: "I have known men in whom the reasoning organs were amply developed and well cultivated, who assured me that they could not reach the conviction of the being of a God. I have known such men equal in point of integrity and practical benevolence to the most orthodox believers." In the West Riding of Yorkshire, among the men themselves, a wealthy employer bore favorable testimony to the conduct and intelligence of Atheistic working men. Nay, even the fanatical Dr. Lyman Beecher is obliged to concede that Atheism made converts among "females of education and refinement—females of respectable standing in society."

HAS MAN A SOUL?

[This lecture was originally delivered to the SheffieldSecular Society, and was printed from the reporter's noteswithout efficient correction from myself, I, at that time,suffering under a severe attack of acute rheumatism. Thelecture has since been often re-delivered; and threeeditions having been exhausted, I have again corrected andrevised the present edition. It is not intended as an answerto the question which forms the title, but it is intended toprovoke thought upon this important subject.]

What do you mean by soul? What is the soul? Is it I? Is it the body? Is it apart from the body? Is it an attribute of the body? Has it a separate and distinct existence from the body? What is the soul? If I ask one of those who claim to be considered orthodox men, they will tell me that the soul is a spirit—that the soul lives after the body is dead. They will tell me that the soul is immortal, and that the body is mortal; that the soul has nothing whatever in common with the body; that it has an existence entirely independent of the body. They will tell me that after the body has decayed—after the body has become re-absorbed in the universe, of which it is but a part, that the soul still exists. Is there any proof of the existence of the same individual soul apart from all material conditions? I have endeavored to examine this subject, and, up to the present time, I have not found one iota of proof in support of the positions thus put forward. I have no idea of any existence except that of which I am part. I am. Of my own existence I am certain I think. I am. But what is it that thinks? Is it my soul? Is it "me," and yet distinct from me? I am but a mode of existence. I am only part of the great universe. The elements of which I am composed are indissolubly connected with that great existence which is around me and within me, and which I help to make up. If men tell me I am a compound, and not a compound—a mixture, and not a mixture—a joining together, and not a joining together—of two entirely different existences, which they call "matter" and "spirit," I am compelled to doubt those men. The ability to think is but an attribute of a certain modification of existence. Intelligence is a word by which we express the sum of certain abilities, always attending a certain mode of existence. I find intelligence manifested so far as organization is developed. I never find intelligence without animal organization. I find intelligence manifested in degree, only so far as I find a higher or lower type of organization—that is, I find man's intellectual faculties limited by his organization. But the orthodox tell me that my soul has an immaterial existence, independent of all organization—independent of all climatic conditions—independent of all education. Is that so? When does the soul come into man? When does it go out of man? If the soul is immortal, why is it that standing here, in the prime of health and strength, if part of that roof should fall fracturing my skull, and pressing upon my brain—how is it, if my soul is not subject to material conditions, that it then ceases to act? Is the plaster roof more powerful than my immortal soul? Or is it that intelligence is the necessary result of a certain condition of existence, and that the moment you destroy that condition—the moment you destroy the organization—the result ceases to be realizable? By the course of reasoning you adopt (says the orthodox objector) you reduce man to the same level as the beasts. And why not? I stand on the river's bank, I see there a man full grown, possessed of the physical figure of man, but an idiot—an idiot from his birth upward—one who could not, even if he would, think and act as other men. A little child is there playing on the bank, and the idiot, having large destructive propensities, has thrust the child into the water, and he stands there jabbering and gesticulating while the little child is drowning in the river. And see how half-vacantly, half-triumphantly, he points to the helpless child. A Newfoundland dog has come to the bank; it jumps in and brings the child out and saves its life. Yet theologians tell me that the idiot

has a soul, and that the Newfoundland dog has not one. I can not understand these nice distinctions, which make the man so superior to the beast in matters in which he is positively inferior. Man has doubtless an organization on the whole far superior intellectually to that of any other animal, but he is only superior by virtue of his superior organization and its consequent susceptibility for development or education. Many brutes can see more clearly than man; but they possess not the capability for the manufacture of telescopes to aid their vision. Many brutes can run more swiftly, but they manifest no capacity for the subjugation of a steam power which far outstrips their speed. But man himself, a well-organized, thoughtful, intelligent, well-educated man, by a fall from a horse, by a tile from a roof, may receive an injury to his nervous encephalic apparatus, and may be, even while a man in shape, as low as the brute in the imbecility of his reason, and inferior to the brute in physical strength. There is as much difference between different races of men, there is, in fact, more difference between a pure Caucasian and a Sahara negro, than between the Sahara negro and the infant chimpanzee.

When did the soul come into the body? Has it been waiting from all eternity to occupy each body the moment of birth? Is this the theory that is put forward to man—that there are many millions of souls still waiting, perhaps, in mid air, 'twixt heaven and earth, to occupy the still unborn babes? Is that the theory? Or do you allege that God specially creates souls for each little child at the moment it is born or conceived? Which is the theory put forward? Is it that the soul being immortal—being destined to exist for ever, has existed from all eternity? If not, how do you know that the soul is to exist for ever; when it only comes into existence with the child? May not that which has recently begun to be, soon cease to be? In what manner does the soul come into the child? Is it a baby's soul, and does it grow with the child? or, does it possess its full power the moment the child is born? When does it come into the child? Does it come in the moment the child begins to form, or is it the moment the child is born into the world? Whence is it this soul comes? Dr. Cooper, quoting Lawrence on the "Functions of the Brain," says: "Sir Everard Home, with the assistance of Mr. Bauer and his microscope, has shown us a man eight days old from the time of conception, about as broad and a little longer than a pin's head. He satisfied himself that the brain of this homunculus was discernible. Could the immaterial mind have been connected with it at this time? Or was the tenement too small even for so etherial a lodger? Even at the full period of uterogestation, it is still difficult to trace any vestiges of mind: and the believers in its separate existence have left us quite in the dark on the precise time when they suppose this union of soul and body to take place." Many of those who tell me that man has a soul, and that it is immortal—that man has a soul, and that the beast has not one—forget or ignore the fact that at a very early stage in the formation of the brain the state of the brain corresponds to that of the avertebrated animal, or animal that is without vertebra. If the brain had stopped in its first month's course of formation, would the child have had a soul? If it would have had a soul, then have avertebrated animals souls also? If you tell me it would not have had a

soul, then I ask, How do you know it? and I ask you what ground you have for assuming that the soul did not begin to form with the formation of the brain? I ask you whether it was pre-existing, or at what stage it came? In the second month this brain corresponds then to the brain of an osseous fish. Supposing the development of the child had been then stopped, had it a soul at that time? If so, have fishes souls? Again, if you tell me that the child had not a soul, then, I ask, why not? How do you know it had not? What ground have you for alleging that the soul did not exist in the child? We go on still further, and in the third month we find that brain corresponds then to that of a turtle, and in the fourth to that of a bird; and in the fifth month, to an order termedrodentia; sixth, to that of theruminantia; seventh, to that of thedugitigrada; eighth, to that of thequadrumana; and not till the ninth month does the brain of the child attain a full human character. I, of course, here mean to allege no more than Dr. Fletcher, who says, in his "Rudiments of Physiology," quoted by the author of the "Vestiges of Creation": "This is only an approximation to the truth; since neither is the brain of all osseous fishes, of all turtles, of all birds, nor of all the species of any of the above order of mammals, by any means precisely the same; nor does the brain of the human fetus at any time precisely resemble, perhaps, that of any individual whatever among the lower animals. Nevertheless it may be said to represent, at each of the above-named periods, the aggregate, as it were, of the brains of each of the tribes stated."

Now, should a birth have taken place at any of the eight stages, would the child thus prematurely born have had a soul? That is the question I propose to you. You who affirm that man has a soul, it lies upon you, here, without charging me with blasphemy—without charging me with ignorance—without charging me with presumption—it lies upon you who affirm, to state the grounds for your belief. At which stage, if at any, did the soul come into the child? At the moment of the birth? Why when a child is born into the world it can scarcely see—it can not speak—it can not think—but after a short time I jingle my keys, and it begins to give faint smiles; and after a few weeks, it is pleased with the jingling of my keys. Is it the soul which is learning to appreciate the sound of the jingling keys, and pleased with them? Is it the immaterial and immortal soul amused and pleased with my bundle of keys? Where is the soul? How is it that the soul can not speak the moment the child is born—can not even think? How is it, that if I keep that child without telling it any thing of its soul until it become fourteen or fifteen years of age, it would then speak and think as I had taught it to speak and think; and if I kept it without the knowledge of a soul, it would have no knowledge of a soul at that age? How is that? Rajah Brooke, at a missionary meeting in Liverpool, told his hearers there that the Dyaks, a people with whom he was connected, had no knowledge of God, of a soul, or of any future state. How is it that the Dyaks have got this soul and yet live knowing nothing whatever about it? And the Dyaks are by no means the only people who live and die knowing nothing of any immortal and immaterial soul. Again you tell me that this soul is immortal. Do you mean that it has eternally existed—has never been created? If so, you deny a God who is the creator of all things. If the

soul began at some time to exist, where is the evidence that it will not also at some time cease to exist? It it came into existence with the body's birth, why not cease with the body's death? You say the soul is immaterial; do you mean that it is susceptible to material conditions or do you not? If susceptible to material conditions, what do you mean by its being immortal and immaterial? If not susceptible to material conditions, then explain to me how it is that under good conditions it prospers and advances, and under bad conditions deteriorates and recedes. If a child is born in some of the back streets of our city, and lives on bad food in a wretched cellar, it grows up a weak and puny pale-faced child. If allowed to crawl into existence on the edge of a gutter, imperfectly educated, in fact mis-educated, it steals—steals, perhaps, to live—and it becomes an outcast from society. Is this immortal soul affected by the bodily conditions? or is the soul originally naturally depraved? And if the soul is primarily naturally depraved, why is God so unjust as to give a naturally depraved soul to any body? If not, how is it that this immortal soul, when the body is kept without food, permits the man who has no money to buy food, to steel to satisfy his hunger? You allege that the soul moves my body. You assert that matter is inert, unintelligent; that it is my active, intelligent soul that moves and impels my inert and non-intelligent body. Is my immortal soul hindered and controlled by the state of my body's general health? Does my soul feel hungry and compel my body to steal? Some theologians declare that my soul is immaterial—that there is no means by which I can take any cognizance whatever of it. What does that mean, except that they know nothing whatever about it? Sir W. Hamilton admits that we are entirely ignorant as to the connection between soul and body. Yet many who in so many words admit that they have no knowledge, but only faith in the soul's existence, are most presumptuous in affirming it, and in denouncing those who dispute their affirmation. It is an easy method to hide ignorance, by denouncing your opponent as an ignorant blasphemer.

Joseph Priestley, in his book upon matter and spirit, quotes from Hallet's discourses, as follows; "I see a man move and hear him speak for some years. From his speech I certainly infer that he thinks, as I do. I then see that man is a being who thinks and acts. After some time the man falls down in my sight, grows cold and stiff, and speaks and acts no more. Is it not then natural to conclude that he thinks no more; as the only reason I had to believe that he did think was his motion and his speech. And now that his motion and speech have ceased, I have lost the only way of proving that he had the power of thought. Upon this sudden death, one visible thing, the one man, has greatly changed. Whence could I infer that the same being consisted of two parts, and that the inward part continues to live and think, and flies away from the body? When the outward part ceases to live and move, it looks as if the wholemanwas gone, and that he, with all his powers, ceases at the same time. His motion and thought both die together, as far as I can discern. The powers of thought, of speech and motion, equally depend upon the body, and run the same fate in case of declining age. When a man dies through old age, I perceive his powers of speech, motion, and thought decay and die together, and by the same degrees. That moment

he ceases to move and breathe he appears to cease to think, too. When I am left to my reason it seems to me that my power of thought depends as much upon the body as my sight and hearing. I could not think in infancy; my power of thought, of sight, and of feeling are equally liable to be obstructed by the body. A blow on the head has deprived a man of thought, who could yet see, and feel and move; so naturally the power of thinking seems as much to belong to the body as any power of man whatsoever. Naturally there appears no more reason to suppose that a man can think out of the body than he can hear sounds and feel cold out of the body."

What do those mean who say that man is made up of two parts—matter and mind? I know of only one existence. I find that existence manifested variously, each mode having certain variations of attributes by which it is cognized. One of these attributes, or a collection of certain attributes, I find in, or with, certain modifications of that existence, that is, in or with animal life—this attribute, or these attributes, we call intelligence. In the same way that I find upon the blade of a knife brightness, consequent upon a certain state of the metal, so do I find in man, in the beast, different degrees, not of brightness, but of intelligence, according to their different states of organization. I am told that the mind and the body are separate from one another. Are the brightness and steel of the knife separate? Is not brightness the quality attaching to a certain modification of existence—steel? Is not intelligence a quality attaching to a certain modification of existence—man? The word brightness has no meaning, except as relating to some bright thing. The word intelligence, no meaning, except as relating to some intelligent thing. I take some water and drop it upon the steel, in due course the process of oxidation takes place and the brightness is gone. I drop into man's brain a bullet; the process of destruction of life takes place, and his intelligence is gone. By changing the state of the steel we destroy its brightness, and by disorganizing the man destroy his intelligence. Is mind an entity or result? an existence or a condition? Surely it is but the result of organic activity, a phenomenon of animal life. Dr. Engledue says: "In the same way as organism generally has the power of manifesting, when the necessary stimuli are applied, the phenomena which are designated life; so one individual portion—brain, having peculiar and distinct properties, manifests on the application of its appropriate stimuli a peculiar and distinct species of action. If the sum of all bodily function—life, be not an entity, how can the product of the action of one portion of the body—brain, be an entity? Feeling and intelligence are but fractional portions of life." I ask those who are here to prove that man has a soul, to do so apart from revelation. If the soul is a part of ourselves, we require no supernatural revelation to demonstrate its existence to us. D'Holbach says: "The doctrine of spirituality, such as it now exists, affords nothing but vague ideas; it is rather a poisoner of all ideas. Let me draw your attention to this: The advocates of spirituality do not tell you anything, but in fact prevent you from knowing anything. They say that spirit and matter have nothing in common, and that mortal man can not take cognizance of immortality. An ignorant man may set himself up as an orator upon such a matter. He says you have a soul—an immortal soul. Take care you don't lose

your soul. When you ask him what is my soul, he says he does not know—nobody knows—nobody can tell you. This is really that which they do. What is this doctrine of spirituality? What does it present to the mind? A substance unsubstantial that possesses nothing of which our senses enable us to take cognizance." Theologians urge that each of us has a soul superior to all material conditions, and yet a man who speaks can not communicate by his speaking soul so freely with that man who is deaf and dumb; the conditions cramp that which is said to be uncontrolled by any conditions. If you cut out a man's tongue, the soul no longer speaks. If you put a gag in his mouth, and tie it with a handkerchief, so that he can not get it out, his soul ceases to speak. The immaterial soul is conquered by a gag, it can not utter itself, the gag is in the way. The orthodox say that the soul is made by God; and what do you know about God? Why just as much as we know about the soul. And what do you know about the soul? Nothing whatever. How is it that if the soul is immaterial, having nothing in common with matter, that it is only manifest by material means? and how is it that it is incased and inclosed in my material frame? They affirm that my soul is a spirit—that I receive the same spirit from God. How is it that my spirit is now by myself, and by my mortal body, denying its own existence? Is my mortal soul acting the hypocrite, or is it ignorant of its own existence, and can not help itself to better knowledge? And if it can not help itself, why not, if it is superior to the body? and if you think it a hypocrite, tell me why.

What is meant by the declaration that man is a compound of matter and spirit?—things which the orthodox assert have nothing in common with one another. Of the existence of what you call matter you are certain, because you and I, material beings, are here. Are you equally certain of the existence of mind, as an existence independent and separate from matter? and if you are, tell me why. Have you ever found it apart from matter? If so, when and where? Have you found that the mind has a separate and distinct existence? if so, under what circumstances? and tell me—you who define matter as unintelligent, passive, inert, and motionless—who talk of thevis inertiæof matter—tell me what you mean when you give these definitions to it? You find the universe, and this small portion of it on which we are, ceaselessly active. Why do you call it passive, except it be that you want courage to search for true knowledge as to the vast capabilities of existence, and, therefore, invent such names as God and Soul to account for all difficulties, and to hide your ignorance? What do you mean by passive and inert matter? You tell me of this world—part of a system—that system part of another—that of another—and point out to me the innumerable planets, the countless millions of worlds, in the universe. You, who tell me of the vast forces of the universe, what do you mean by telling me that that is motionless? What do you mean by yet pointing to the immeasurable universe and its incalculably mighty forces and affirming that they are incapable of every perceptible effect? You, without one fact on which to base your theory, strive to call into existence another existence which must be more vast, and which you allege produces this existence and gives its powers to it. Sir Isaac Newton

says: "We are to admit no more causes of things than are sufficient to explain appearances." What effect is there which the forces of existence are incapable of producing?

Why do you come to the conclusion that the forces of the universe are incapable of producing every effect of which I take cognizance? Why do you come to the conclusion that intelligence is not an attribute—why? What is there which enables you to convert it into a separate and distinct existence? Is there anything? Is it spirit? What is spirit? That of which the mortal man can know nothing, you tell me—that it is nothing which his senses can grasp—that is, no man, but one who disregards his senses, can believe in it, and that it is that which no man's senses can take cognizance of. If a man who uses his senses can never by their aid take cognizance of spirit, then as it is through the senses alone man knows that which is around him, you can know nothing about spirit until you go out of your senses. When I speak of the senses, I do not limit myself to what are ordinarily termed man's five senses—I include all man's sensitive faculties, and admit that I do not know the extent of, and am not prepared to set a limit to, the sensitive capabilities of man. I have had personal experience in connection with psycho-magnetic phenomena of faculties in man and woman not ordinarily recognized, and am inclined to the opinion that many men have been made converts to the theories of spiritualism because their previous education had induced them to set certain arbitrary limits to the domains of the natural. When they have been startled by phenomena outside these conventional limitations they at once ascribed them to supernatural influences rather than reverse their previous rules of thinking.

Some urge that the soul is life. What is life? Is it not the word by which we express the aggregate normal functional activity of vegetable and animal organisms necessarily differing in degree, if not in kind, with each different organization? To talk of immortal life and yet to admit the decay and destruction of the organization, is much the same as to talk of a square circle. You link together two words which contradict each other. The solution of the soul problem is not so difficult as many imagine. The greatest difficulty is, that we have been trained to use certain words as "God," "matter," "mind," "spirit," "soul," "intelligence," and we have been further trained to take these words as representatives of realities, which, in fact, they do not represent. We have to unlearn much of our school lore. We have specially to carefully examine the meaning of each word we use. The question, lies in a small compass. Is there one existence or more? Of one existence I am conscious, because I am a mode of it. I know of no other existence. I know of no existence but that existence of which I am a mode. I hold it to be capable of producing every effect. It is for the man who alleges that there is another, to prove it. I know of one existence. I do not endeavor to demonstrate to you my existence, it needs no demonstration—I am My existence is undeniable. I am speaking to you You are conscious of my existence. You and I are not separate entities, but modes of the same existence. We take cognizance of the existence

which is around us and in us, and which is the existence of which we are modes. Of the one existence we are certain. It is for those who affirm that the universe is "matter," and who affirm that there also exists "spirit," to remember that they admit the one existence I seek to prove, and that the onus lies on them to demonstrate a second existence—in fact, to prove there is the other existence which they term spiritual. There can not exist two different substances or existences having the same attributes, or qualities. There can not be two existences of the same essence, having different attributes, because it is by the attributes alone that we can distinguish the existences. We can only judge of the substance by its modes. We may find a variety of modes of the same substance, and we shall find points of union which help to identify them, the one with the other—the link which connects them with the great whole. We can only judge of the existence of which we are a part (in consequence of our peculiar organization) under the form of a continuous chain of causes and effects—each effect a cause to the effect it precedes, each cause an effect of the causative influence which heralded its advent. The remote links of that line are concealed by the darkness of the far off past. Nay, more than this, the mightiest effort of mind can never say,This is the first cause. Weakness and ignorance have said it—but why? To cloak their weakness, to hide their ignorance. Knaves have said it—but why? To give scope to their cunning, and to enable them to say to the credulous, "Thus far shalt thou go and no farther." The termination is in the as yet unknowable future; and I ask you, presumptuous men, who dare to tell me of God and soul, of matter and creation—when possessed you the power to sunder links of that great chain and write, "In the beginning?" I deny that by the mightiest effort of the strongest intellect man can ever say of any period, at this point substance began to be—before this existence was not.

Has man a soul? You who tell me he has a soul, a soul independent of material conditions, I ask you how it is that these immortal souls strive with one another to get mortal benefits? Has man a soul? If man's soul is not subject to material conditions, why do I find knavish souls?—Why slavish souls?—tyrannous souls? Your doctrine that man has a soul prevents him from rising. When you tell him that his soul is not improvable by material conditions, you prevent him from making himself better than he is. Man's intelligence is a consequence of his organization. Organization is improvable, the intelligence becomes more powerful as the organization is fully developed, and the conditions which surround man are made more pure. And the man will become higher, truer, and better when he knows that his intelligence is an attribute, like other attributes, capable of development, susceptible of deterioration, he will strive to effect the first and to guard against the latter.

Look at the number of people putting power into the hands of one man, because he is a lord—surely they have no souls. See the mass cringing to a wretched idol—surely these have no souls. See men forming a pyramid of which the base is a crushed and worn-out people, and the apex a

church, a throne, a priest, a king, and the frippery of a creed—have those men souls? Society should not be such a pyramid, it should be one brotherly circle, in which men should be linked together by a consciousness that they are only happy so linked, conscious that when the chain is broken, then the society and her peace is destroyed. What we teach is not that man has a soul apart and independent of the body, but that he has an ability, an intelligence, an attribute of his body, capable of development, improvable, more useful, according as he elevates himself and his fellows. Give up blind adhesion to creeds and priests, strive to think and follow out in action the result of your thoughts. Each mental struggle is an enlargement of your mind, an addition to your brain power, an increase of your soul—the only soul you have.

LABOR'S PRAYER.

"Give us this day our daily bread" is the entreaty addressed by the tiller of the soil to the "Our Father," who has promised to answer prayer. And what answer cometh from heaven to this the bread winner's petition? Walk among the cotton workers of Lancashire, the cloth-weavers of Yorkshire, the Durham pitmen, the Staffordshire puddlers, the Cornish miners, the London dock laborers, go anywhere where hands are roughened with toil, where foreheads are bedewed with sweat of work, and see the Lord's response to the prayer, the father's answer to his children! The only bread they get is the bread they take; in their hard struggle for life-sustenance the loaves come but slowly, and heaven adds not a crust, even though the worker be hungry, when he rises from his toil-won meal. Not even the sight of pale-faced wife, and thin forms of half-starved infants can move to generosity the Ruler of the world. The laborer may pray, but, if work be scant and wages low, he pines to death while praying. His prayer gives no relief, and misery's answer is the mocking echo to his demand.

It is said by many a pious tongue that God helps the poor; the wretchedness of some of their hovel houses, found alas! too often, in the suburbs of our wealthiest cities, grimy black, squalid, and miserable; the threadbare raggedness of their garments; the unwholesomeness of the food they eat; the poisoned air they breathe in their narrow wynds and filthy alleys; all these tell how much God helps the poor. Do you want to see how God helps the poor? go into any police court when some little child-thief is brought up for hearing; see him shoeless, with ragged trousers, threadbare, grimy, vest hardly hanging to his poor body, shirt that seems as though it never could have been white, skin dull brown with dirt, hair innocent of comb or brush, eye ignorantly, sullenly-defiant, yet downcast; born poor, born wretched, born in ignorance, educated among criminals, crime the atmosphere in which he moved; and society his nurse and creator, is now virtuously aghast at the depravity of this its own neglected nursling, and a poor creature whom God alone hath helped. Go where the weakly wife in a narrow room huddles herself and little children day after day; and where the husband crowds in to lie down at night; they are poor and

honest, but their honesty bars not the approach of disease, fever, sorrow, death—God helps not the line of health to their poor wan cheeks. Go to the county workhouse in which is temporarily housed the wornout farm laborer, who, while, strength enough remained, starved through weary years with wife and several children on eight shillings per week—it is thus God helps the poor. And the poor are taught to pray for a continuance of this help, and to be thankful and content to pray that to-morrow may be like to-day, thankful that yesterday was no worse than it was, and content that to-day is as good as it is. Are there many repining at their miseries, the preacher, with gracious intonation, answers rebukingly that God, in his wisdom, has sent these troubles upon them as chastisement for their sins. So, says the church, all are sinners, rich its well as poor; but rich sinners feel that the chastising rod is laid more lightly on their backs than it is upon those of their meaner brethren. Weekday and Sunday it is the same contrast; one wears fustian, the other broadcloth; one prepares for heaven in the velvet cushioned pew, the other on the wooden benches of the free seats. In heaven it will be different—all there above are to wear crowns of gold and fine linen, and, therefore, here below the poor man is to be satisfied with the state of life into which it has pleased God to call him. The pastor, who tells him this, looks upon the laborer as an inferior animal, and the laborer by force of habit regards the landowner and peer, who patronizes his endeavors, as a being of a superior order. Is there no new form of prayer that labor might be taught to utter, no other power to which his petition might be addressed? Prayer to the unknown for aid gives no strength to the prayer. In each beseeching he loses dignity and self-reliance, he trusts to he knows not what, for an answer which cometh he knows not when, and mayhap may never come at all. Let labor pray in the future in another fashion and at another altar. Let laborer pray to laborer that each may know labor's rights, and be able to fulfill labor's duties. The size of the loaf of daily bread must depend on the amount of the daily wages, and the laborer must pray for better wages. But his prayer must take the form of earnest, educated endeavor to obtain the result desired. Let workmen, instead of praying to God in their distress, ask one another why are wages low? how can wages be raised? can we raise our own wages? having raised them, can we keep them fixed at the sum desired? What causes produce a rise and fall in wages? are high wages beneficial to the laborer? These are questions the pulpit has no concern with. The reverend pastor will tell you that the "wages of sin is death," and will rail against "filthy lucre;" but he has no inclination for answering the queries here propounded. Why are wages low? Wages are low because the wage-winners crowd too closely. Wages are low because too many seek to share one fund. Wages are lower still because the laborer fights against unfair odds; the laws of the country, overriding the laws of humanity, have been enacted without the laborer's consent, although his obedience to them is enforced. The fund is unfairly distributed as well as too widely divided. Statutes are gradually being modified, and the working man may hope for ampler justice from the employer in the immediate future than was possible in the past, but high and healthy wages depend on the working man himself. Wages can be raised by the work-ing classes exercising a moderate degree of caution in

increasing their numbers. Wages must increase when capital increases more rapidly than population, and it is the duty of the working man, therefore, to take every reasonable precaution to check the increase of population and to accelerate the augmentation of capital.

Can working-men, by combination, permanently raise the rate of wages? One gentleman presiding at a meeting of the National Association for the Promotion of Social Science for the discussion of the labor question, very fairly said, "It is not in the power of the men alone, or of the masters alone, or of both combined, to say what shall be the amount of wages at any particular time in any trade or country. The men and the masters are, at most, competitors for the division, at a certain rate, of a certain fund, provided by [themselves and] others—that is, by the consumers. If that fund is small, no device can make the rate of profit or rate of wages higher." This is in theory quite correct, if it means that no device can make the total divisible greater than it is, but not if it refers to the increase of profit or wages by partial distribution. In practice, although it is true that if the fund be small and the seekers to share it be many, the quotient to each must be necessarily very small, yet it is also true that a few of the competitors—i.e.the capitalists, may and do absorb for their portions of profits an improper and unfairly large amount, thus still further reducing the wretchedly small pittance in any case receivable by the mass of laborers. It is warmly contended that the capitalist and laborer contend for division of the fund appropriable in fair and open field; that the capitalist has his money to employ, the man his labor to sell; that if workmen are in excess of the capitalist's requirements, so that the laborer has to supplicate for employment, wages can not rise, and will probably fall; but that if, on the contrary, capital has need to invite additional laborers, then wages must rise. That is the law of supply and demand brought prominently forward. In great part this is true, but it is not true that capital and labor compete in fair and open field, any more than it is true that an iron-clad war vessel, with heavy ordnance, would compete in fair field with a wooden frigate, equipped with the material in use thirty years ago. Capital is gold-plated, and carries too many guns for unprotected labor.

The intelligent capitalist makes the laws affecting master and servant, which the uneducated laborer must obey, but has no effective voice to alter. The capitalist forms the government of the country, which in turn protects capital against labor; this government the laborer must sustain, and dares not modify. The capitalist does combine, and has combined, and the result of this combination has been an unfair appropriation of the divisible fund. Why should not the laborer combine also? The answer is truly that no combination of workmen can increase the rate of wages, if at the same time the number of laborers increases more rapidly than the capital out of which their wages must be paid. But the men may combine to instruct one another in the laws of political economy; they may combine to apply their knowledge of those laws to the contracts between employer and employed. They may combine to compel the repeal of unjust enactments under which an unfair distribution of the labor fund is not only possible but certain.

Organizations of laborers are, therefore, wise and necessary; the object of such organizations should be the permanent elevation and enfranchisement of the members. No combination of workmen, which merely dictates a temporary cessation from labor, can ultimately and permanently benefit the laborer; while it certainly immediately injures him and deteriorates his condition, making his home wretched, his family paupers. Nor can even co-operative combination, praiseworthy as it certainly is, to procure for the laborer a larger share of the profits of his labor permanently benefit him, except in so far that temporarily alleviating his condition, and giving him leisure for study, it enables him to educate himself; unless, at the same time, the co-operator is conscious that the increase or reduction in the amount of wages depends entirely on the ratio of relation preserved between population and its means of subsistence, the former always having a tendency to increase more rapidly than the latter. It is with the problem of too many mouths for too little bread that the laborer has really to deal: if he must pray, it should be for more bread and for fewer mouths. The answer often given by the workman himself to the advocate of Malthusian views is, that the world is wide enough for all, that there are fields yet unplowed broad enough to bear more corn than man at present could eat, and that there is neither too little food nor are there too many mouths; that there is, in fact, none of that over-population with which it is sought to affright the working man. Over-population in the sense that the whole world is too full to contain its habitants, or that it will ever become too full to contain them, is certainly a fallacy, but overpopulation is a lamentable truth in its relative sense. We find evidences of over-population in every old country of the world. The pest of over-population is the existence of poverty, squalor, wretchedness, disease, ignorance, misery, and crime. Low rate of wages, and food dear, here you have two certain indices of relative over-population. Wages depending on the demand for and supply of laborers, wherever wages are low it is a certain sign that there are too many candidates for employment in that phase of the labor market. The increased cost of production of food, and its consequent higher price, also mark that the cultivation has been forced, by the numbers of the people to descend to less productive soils. Poverty is the test and result of over-population.

It is not against some possible increase of their numbers, which may produce possibly greater affliction, that the working men are entreated to agitate. It is against the existing evils which afflict their ranks, evils alleged by sound students of political economy to have already resulted from inattention to the population question, that the energies of the people are sought to be directed, The operation of the law of population has been for centuries entirely ignored by those who have felt its adverse influence most severely. It is only during the last thirty years that any of the working classes have turned their attention to the question; and only during the last few years that it has to any extent been discussed among them. Yet all the prayers that labor ever uttered since the first breath of human life, have not availed so much for human happiness as will the earnest examination by one generation of this, the greatest of all social questions, the root of

all political problems, the foundation of all civil progress. Poor, man must be wretched. Poor, he must be ignorant. Poor, he must be criminal; and poor he must be till the cause of poverty has been ascertained by the poor man himself and its cure planned by the poor man's brain, and effected by the poor man's hand.

Outside his own rank none can save the poor. Others may show him the abyss, but he must avoid its dangerous brink himself. Others may point out to him the chasm, but he must build his own bridge over. Labor's prayer must be to labor's head for help from labor's hand to strike the blow that severs labor's chain, and terminates the too long era of labor's suffering.

During the last few years our daily papers, and various periodicals, magazines, and reviews have been more frequently, and much less partially, devoted than of old to the discussion of questions relating to the laborer's condition, and the means of ameliorating it. In the Legislative Assembly debates have taken place which would have been impossible fifty years since. Works on political economy are now more easily within the reach of the working man than they were some years ago. People's editions are now published of treatises on political economy which half a century back the people were unable to read. It is now possible for the laborer, and it is the laborer's duty, to make himself master of the laws which govern the production and distribution of wealth. Undoubtedly there is much grievous wrong in the mode of distribution of wealth, by which the evils that afflict the poorest stragglers are often specially and tenfold aggravated. The monopoly of land, the serf state of the laborer, are points requiring energetic agitation. The grave and real question is, however, that which lies at the root of all, the increase of wealth as against the increase of those whom it subsists. The leaders of the great trades unions of the country, if they really desire to permanently increase the happiness of the classes among whom they exercise influence, can speedily promote this object by encouraging their members to discuss freely the relations of labor to capital; not moving in one groove, as if labor and capital were necessarily antagonistic, and that therefore labor must always have rough-armed hand to protect itself from the attacks of capital; but, taking new ground, to inquire if labor and capital are bound to each other by any and what ties, ascertaining if the share of the laborer in the capital fund depends, except so far as affected by inequality in distribution, on the proportion between the number of laborers and the amount of the fund. The discussing, examining, and dealing generally with these topics, would necessarily compel the working man to a more correct appreciation of his position.

Any such doctrine as that "the poor shall never cease out of the land;" or that we are to be content with the station in life into which it has pleased God to call us; or that we are to ask and we shall receive, must no longer avail. Schiller most effectively answers the advocates of prayer:

"Help, Lord, help!Look with pity down!A paternoster pray;What God does, that is justly done,His grace endures for aye.""Oh, mother! empty mockery,God hath not justly dealt by me:Have I not begged and prayed in vain;What boots it now to pray again?"

Labor's only and effective prayer must be in life action for its own redemption; action founded on thought, crude thought, and sometimes erring at first, but ultimately developed into useful thinking, by much patient experimenting for the right and true.

POVERTY: ITS EFFECTS ON THE POLITICAL CONDITION OF THE PEOPLE.

"Political Economy does not itself instruct how to make a nation rich, but whoever would be qualified to judge of the means of making a nation rich must first be a political economist."—John Stuart Mill.

"The object of political economy is to secure the means of subsistence of all the inhabitants, to obviate every circumstance which might render this precarious, to provide everything necessary for supplying the wants of society, and to employ the inhabitants so as to make the interests accord with their supplying each other's wants."—Sir James Stewart.

On one occasion in the world's history, a people rose searching for upright life, who had previously, for several generations, depressed by poverty and its attendant hand-maidens of misery, prowled hunger-striken and disconsolate, stooping and stumbling through the byways of existence. A mighty revolution resulted in much rough justice and some brutal vengeance, much rude right, and some terrific wrong. Among the writers who have since narrated the history of this people's struggle, some penmen have been assiduous and hasty to search for, and chronicle the errors, and have even not hesitated to magnify the crimes of the rebels; while they have been slow to recognize the previous demoralizing tendency of the system rebelled against. In this pamphlet it is proposed to very briefly deal with the state of the people in France immediately prior to the grand convulsion which destroyed the Bastile Monarchy, and set a glorious example of the vindication of the rights of man against opposition the most formidable that can be conceived; believing that even in this slight illustration of the condition of the masses in France who sought to erect on the ruins of arbitrary power the glorious edifice of civil and religious liberty, an answer may be found to the question: "What is the effect of poverty on the political condition of the people."

In taking the instance of France, it is not that the writer for one moment imagines that poverty is a word without meaning in our own lands. The clamming factory hands in the Lancanshire valleys, the distressed ribbon weavers of Conventry, and the impoverished laborers in various

parts of Ireland and Scotland would be able to give us a definition of the word fearful in its distinctness. But in England poverty is happily partial, while in France in the eighteenth century poverty was universal outside the palaces of the nobles and the mansions of the church, where luxury, voluptuousness, and effeminacy were regnant. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries travelers in France could learn from "the sadness, the solitude, the miserable poverty, the dismal nakedness of the empty cottages, and the starving, ragged population, how much men could endure without dying." On the one side a discontented, wretched, hungry mass of tax-providing slaves, and on the other a rapacious, pampered, licentious, spendthrift monarchy. This culminated in the refusal of the laborers to cultivate the fertile soil because, the tax-gatherer's rapacity left an insufficient remnant to provide the cultivator with the merest necessaries of life. Then followed "uncultivated fields, unpeopled villages, and houses dropping to decay;" the great cities—as Paris, Lyons, and Bordeaux—crowded with begging skeletons, frightful in their squallid disease and loathsome aspect.

Even after the National Assembly had passed some measures of temporary alleviation, the distress in Paris itself was so great that at the gratuitious distributions of bread "old people have been seen to expire with their hand stretched out to receive the loaf, and women waiting in their turn in front of the baker's shop were prematurely delivered of dead children in the open streets." The great mass of the people were as ignorant as they were poor; were ignorant indeed because they were poor. Ignorance is the pauper's inalienable heritage. When the struggle is for the means of subsistence, and these are only partially obtained, there is little hope for the luxury of a leisure hour in which other emotions can be cultivated than those of the mere desires for food and rest—sole results of the laborious monotonousness of machine work; a round of toil and sleep closing in death—the only certain refuge for the worn out laborer. Without the opportunity afforded by the possession of more than will satisfy the immediate wants, there can be little or no culture of the mental faculties. The toiler badly paid and ill-fed, is separated from the thinker. Nobly-gifted, highly-cultured though the poet may be, his poesy has no charms for the father to whom one hour's leisure means short food for his hungry children clamoring for bread. The picture gallery, replete with the finest works of our greatest masters, is forbidden ground to the pitman, the plowman, the poor pariahs to whom the conceptions of the highest art-treasures are impossible. The beauties of nature are almost equally inaccessible to the dwellers in the narrow lanes of great cities. Out of your narrow wynds in Edinburgh and Glasgow, and on to the moor and mountain-side, ye poor, and breathe the pure life-renewing breezes. Not so; the moors are for the sportsmen and peers, not peasants; and a Scotch Duke—emblem of the worst vices of a corrupt and selfish, but fast-decaying House of Lords—closes miles of heather against the pedestrian's foot. But even this paltry oppression is unneeded. Duke Despicable is in unholy alliance with King Poverty, who mocks at the poor mother and her wretched, ragged family, when from the garret or cellar in a great Babylon wilderness they set

out to find green fields and new life. Work days are sacred to bread, and clothes, and rent; hunger, inclement weather, and pressing landlord forbid the study of nature 'twixt Monday morn and Saturday night, and on Sunday God's ministers require to teach a weary people how to die, as if the lesson were not unceasingly inculcated in their incessant toil. Oh! horrid mockery; men need teaching how to live. According to religionists, this world's bitter misery is a dark and certain preface, "just published," to a volume of eternal happiness, which for 2,000 years has been advertised as in the press and ready for publication, but which after all may never appear. And notwithstanding that every-day misery is so very potent, mankind seem to heed it but very little. The second edition of a paper containing the account of a battle in which some 5,000 were killed and 10,000 wounded, is eagerly perused, but the battle in which poverty kills and maims hundreds of thousands, is allowed to rage without the uplifting of a weapon against the common enemy.

The poor in France were awakened by Rousseau's startling declaration that property was spoliation, they knew they had been spoiled, the logic of the stomach was conclusive, empty bellies and aching brains were the predecessors of a revolution which sought vengeance when justice was denied, but which full-stomached and empty-headed Tories of later days have calumniated and denounced.

Warned by the past, ought we not to-day to give battle to that curse of all old countries—poverty? The fearful miseries of the want of food and leisure which the poor have to endure are such as to seriously hinder their political enfranchisement. Those who desire that men and women shall have their rights of citizens, should be conscious how low the poor are trampled down, and how incapable poverty renders them for the performance of the duties of citizenship. So that the question of political freedom is really determined by the wealth or poverty of the masses; to this extent, at any rate, that a poverty-stricken people must necessarily, after that state of pauperism has existed for several generations, be an ignorant and enslaved people.

The problem is, how to remove poverty, as it is only by the removal of poverty that the political emancipation of the nation can be rendered possible. It has been ascertained that the average food of the agricultural laborer in England is about half that alloted by the jail dietary to sustain criminal life. So that the peasant who builds and guards his master's haystack gets worse fed and worse lodged than the incendiary convicted for burning it down.

How can this poverty be removed and prevented?

I quote the reply from one who has written most elaborately in elucidation of the views of Malthus and Mill: "There is but one possible mode of preventing any evil—namely, to seek for

and remove its cause. The cause of low wages, or in other words of Poverty, is overpopulation; that is, the existence of too many people in proportion to the food, of too many laborers in proportion to the capital. It is of the very first importance that the attention of all who seek to remove poverty should never be diverted from this great truth. The disproportion between the numbers and the food is theonly real causeof social poverty. Individual cases of poverty may be produced by individual misconduct, such as drunknness, ignorance, laziness, or disease; but these and all other accidental influences must be wholly thrown out of the question in considering the permanent cause, and aiming at the prevention of poverty. Drunknness and ignorance, moreover, are far more frequently theeffectthan the cause of poverty. Population and food, like two runners of unequal swiftness chained together, advance side by side; but the ratio of increase of the former is so immensely superior to that of the latter, that it is necessarily greatlychecked; and the checks are of course either more deaths or fewer births—that is, either positive or preventive."

Unless thenecessityof the preventive or positive checks to population be perceived; unless it be clearly seen, that they must operate in one form, if not in another; and thatthough individuals may escape them, the race can not; human society is a hopeless and insoluble riddle.

Quoting John Stuart Mill, the writer from whom the foregoing extracts have been made, proceeds:

"The great object of statesmanship should be to raise the habitual standard of comfort among the working classes, and to bring them into such a position as shows them most clearly that their welfare depends upon themselves. For this purpose he advises that there should be, first, an extended scheme of national emigration, so as to produce a striking and sudden improvement in the condition of the laborers left at home, and raise their standard of comfort; also that the population truths should be disseminated as widely as possible, so that a powerful public feeling should be awakened among the working classes against undue procreation on the part of any individual among them—a feeling which could not fail greatly to influence individual conduct; and also that we should use every endeavor to get rid of the present system of labor—namely, that of employers, and employed, and adopt to a great extent that of independent or associated industry. His reason for this is, that a hired laborer, who has no personal interest in the work he is engaged in, is generally reckless and without foresight, living from hand to mouth, and exerting little control over his powers of procreation; whereas the laborer who has a personal stake in his work, and the feeling of independence and self-reliance which the possession of property gives, as, for instance, the peasant proprietor, or member of a copartnership, has far stronger motives for self-restraint, and can see much more clearly the evil effects of having a large family."

The end in view in all this is the attainment of a greater amount of happiness for humankind. The rendering life more worth the living, by distributing more equally than at present its love, its beauties, and its charms. In one of his most recent publications, Mr. John Stuart Mill observes:

"In a world in which there is so much to interest, so much to enjoy, and so much also to correct and improve, every one who has a moderate amount of moral and intellectual requisites is capable of an existence which may be called enviable; and unless such a person, through bad laws, or subjection to the will of others, is denied the liberty to use the sources of happiness within his reach, he will not fail to find tins enviable existence, if he escape the positive evils of life, the great sources of physical and mental suffering, such as indigence, disease, and the unkindness, worthlessness, or premature loss of objects of affection. Yet no one whose opinion deserves a moment's consideration, can doubt that most of the great positive evils of the world are in themselves removable, and will, if human affairs continue to improve, be in the end reduced within narrow limits. Poverty, in any sense implying suffering, may be completely extinguished by the wisdom of society, combined with the good sense and providence of individuals. Even that most intractable of enemies, disease, may be indefinitely reduced in dimensions by good physical and moral education and proper control of noxious influences, while the progress of science holds out a promise for the future of still more direct conquests over this detestable foe."

In a former pamphlet, "Jesus, Shelly, and Malthus," the reader's attention was entreated to this grave question. In a few pages it is impossible to do more than erect a fingerpost to point out a possible road to a given end. To attempt in a narrow compass to give complete details, would be as unwise as it would be unavailing. My desire is rather to provoke discussion among the masses than to obtain willing auditors among the few, and I affirm it, therefore, as a proposition which I am prepared to support, "That the political conditions of the people can never be permanently reformed until the cause of poverty has been discovered and the evil itself prevented and removed."

WHY DO MEN STARVE?

Why is it that human beings are starved to death, in a wealthy country like England, with its palaces, its cathedrals, and its abbeys; with its grand mansions, and luxurious dwellings, with its fine inclosed parks, and strictly guarded preserves; with its mills, mines, and factories; with its enormous profits to the capitalist; and with its broad acres and great rent rolls to the landholder? The feet that men, old, young, and in the prime of life; that women, and that children, do so die, is indisputable. The paragraph in the daily journals, headed "Death from Starvation," or "Another Death from Destitution," is no uncommon one to the eyes of the careful reader.

In a newspaper of one day, December 24, 1864, may be read the verdict of a London jury that "the deceased, Robert Bloom, died from the mortal effects of effusion on the brain and disease of the lungs, arising from natural causes, but the said death was accelerated by destitution, and by living in an ill-ventilated room, and in a court wanting in sanitary requirements;" and the verdict of another jury, presided over by the very Coroner who sat on the last case, "that the deceased, Mary Hale, was found dead in a certain room from the mortal effects of cold and starvation;" as also the history of a poor wanderer from the Glasgow City Poor House found dead in the snow.

In London, the hive of the world, with its merchant millionaires, even under the shadow of the wealth pile, starvation is as busy as if in the most wretched and impoverished village; busy, indeed, not always striking the victim so obtrusively that the coroner's inquest shall preserve a record of the fact, but more often busy quietly, in the wretched court and narrow lane, up in the garret, and down in the cellar, stealing by slow degrees the life of the poor.

Why does it happen that Christian London, with its magnificent houses for God, has so many squalid holes for the poor? Christianity from its thousand pulpits teaches, "Ask and it shall be given to you," "who if his son ask bread, will he give him a stone?" yet with much prayer the bread is too frequently not enough, and it is, alas! not seldom that the prayer for bread gets the answer in the stone of the paved street, where he lays him down to die. The prayer of the poor outcast is answered by hunger, misery, disease, crime and death, and yet the Bible says, "Blessed be ye poor."' Ask the orthodox clergyman why men starve, why men are poor and miserable; he will tell you that it is God's will; that it is a punishment for man's sins. And so long as men are content to believe that it is God's will that the majority of humankind should have too little happiness, so long will it be impossible effectually to get them to listen to the answer to this great question.

Men starve because the great bulk of them are ignorant of the great law of population, the operation of which controls their existence and determines its happiness or misery. They starve because pulpit teachers have taught them for centuries to be content with the state of life in which it has pleased God to call them, instead of teaching them how to extricate themselves from the misery, degradation, and ignorance which a continuance of poverty entails.

Men starve because the teachers have taught heaven instead of earth, the next world instead of this. It is now generally admitted by those who have investigated the subject that there is a tendency in all animated life to increase beyond the nourishment nature produces. In the human race, there is a constant endeavor on the part of its members to increase beyond the means of subsistence within their reach. The want of food to support this increase operates, in the end, as a positive obstacle to the further spread of population, and men are starved because the great

mass of them have neglected to listen to one of nature's clearest teachings. The unchecked increase of population is in a geometrical ratio, the increase of food for their subsistence is in an arithmetical ratio. That is, while humankind would increase in proportion as 1, 2, 4, 8,16, 32, 64, 128, 256, food would only increase as 1, 2, 3,4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9. The more the mouths the less the proportion of food. While the restraint to an increase of population is thus a want of food, and starvation is the successful antagonist of struggling human life, it is seldom that this obstacle operates immediately—its dealing is more often indirectly against its victims. Those who die of actual famine are few indeed compared with those who die from various forms of disease, induced by scarcity of the means of subsistence. If any of my readers doubt this, their doubts may be removed by a very short series of visits to the wretched homes of the paupers of our great cities. Suicide is the refuge mainly of those who are worn out in a bitter, and, to them, a hopeless struggle against accumulated ills. Disease, suffering, and misery are the chief causes of the prevalence of suicide in our country, and suicide is therefore one form, although comparatively minute, in which the operation of the law of population may be traced.

From dread of the pangs of poverty, men, women, and children are driven to unwholesome occupations, which destroy not only the health of the man and woman actually employed, but implant the germs of physical disease in their offspring. A starving woman seeking food mixes white lead with oil and turpentine for a paltry pittance, which provides bare existence for her and those who share it; in a few weeks, she is so diseased she can work no longer, and the hospital and grave in turn receive her. Men and women are driven to procure bread by work in lead mines; they rapidly dig their own graves, and not alone themselves, but their wretched offspring, are death-stricken as the penalty; the lead poisons the blood of parent and child alike. Young women and children work at artificial flower-making, and soon their occupation teaches that Scheele's and Schweenfurth green, bright and pleasing colors to the eye, are death's darts too often fatally aimed.

The occupation may be objected to as unhealthy; but the need for food is great, and the woman's or child's wages, wretchedly little though they are, yet help to fill the mouths at home: so the wage is taken till the worker dies. Here, again, the checks to an increase of population all stop short of starvation—the victims are poisoned instead of starved. So where some forty or fifty young girls are crowded into a badly ventilated work-room, not large enough for half the number, from early in the morning till even near midnight, when orders press; or in some work-room where slop clothes are made, and twenty-five tailors are huddled together in a little parlor scarce wide enough for three—they work to live, and die slowly while they work. They are not starved, but is this sort of asphyxiation much better? The poor, are not only driven to unhealthy, but also to noisome, dwellings. There are in London, Liverpool, Glasgow, Edinburgh, Manchester, and other large cities, fearful alleys, with wretched houses, and small ill-ventilated rooms, each

room containing a family, the individuals of which are crowded together under conditions so wretched that disease, and often speedy death, is the only possible result. In the East of London, ten, eleven, and, in some cases, fourteen persons have been found sleeping in one wretched little room. Is it wonderful that some of these misery-stricken ones die before they have time to starve? From poverty the mother, obliged to constantly work that the miserable pittance she gets may yield enough to sustain bare life, is unable properly to nurse and care for baby-child, and often quick death, or slow but certain disease, ending ultimately in the grave, is the result.

The poor live by wages. Wages popularly signify the amount of money earned by the laborer in a given time; but the real value of the money-wages is the amount in quantity and quality of the means of subsistence which the laborer can purchase with that money. Wages may be nominally high, but really low, if the food and commodities to be purchased are, at the same time, dear in price. An undue increase of population reduces wages in more than one way; it reduces them in effect, if not in nominal amount, by increasing the price of the food to be purchased; and it also reduces the nominal amount, because the nominal amount depends on the amount of capital at disposal for employ, and the number of laborers seeking employment. No remedies for low wages, no scheme for the prevention and removal of poverty, can ever be efficacious until they operate on and through the minds and habits of the masses.

It is not from rich men that the poor must hope for deliverance from starvation. It is not to charitable associations the wretched must appeal. Temporary alleviation of the permanent evil is the best that can be hoped for from such aids. It is by the people that the people must be saved. Measures which increase the dependence of the poor on charitable aid can only temporarily benefit one portion of the laboring class while injuring another in the same proportion; and charity, if carried far, must inevitably involve the recipients in ultimate ruin and degradation by destroying their mutual self-reliance. The true way to improve the worker, in all cases short of actual want of the necessaries of life, is to throw him entirely on his own resources, but at the same time to teach him how he may augment those resources to the utmost. It is only by educating the ignorant poor to a consciousness of the happiness possible to them, as a result of their own exertions, that you can induce them effectually to strive for it. But, alas! as Mr. Mill justly observes, "Education is not compatible with extreme poverty. It is impossible effectually to teach an indigent population." The time occupied in the bare struggle to exist leaves but few moments and fewer opportunities for mental cultivation to the very poor.

The question of wages and their relation to capital and population, a question which interests a poor man so much, is one on which he formerly hardly ever thought at all, and on which even now he thinks much too seldom. It is necessary to impress on the laborer that the rate of wages depends on the proportion between population and capital. If population increases without an

increase of capital, wages fall; the number or competitors in the labor market being greater, and the fund to provide for them not having increased proportionately, and, if capital increases without an increase of population, wages rise. Many efforts have been made to increase wages, but none of them can be permanently successful which do not include some plan for preventing a too rapid increase of laborers. Population has a tendency to increase, and has increased faster than capital; this is evidenced by the poor and miserable condition of the great body of the people in most of the old countries of the world, a condition which can only be accounted for upon one of two suppositions, either that there is a natural tendency in population to increase faster than capital, or that capital has, by some means, been prevented from increasing as rapidly as it might have done. That population has such a tendency to increase that, unchecked, it would double itself in a small number of years—say twenty-five—is a proposition which most writers of any merit concur in, and which may be easily proven. In some instances, the increase has been even still more rapid. That capital has not increased sufficiently is evident from the existing state of society. But that it could increase under any circumstances with the same rapidity as is possible to population is denied. The increase of capital is retarded by an obstacle which does not exist in the case of population.. The augmentation of capital is painful. It can only be effected by abstaining from immediate enjoyment. In the case of augmentation of population precisely the reverse obtains. There the temporary and immediate pleasure is succeeded by the permanent pain. The only possible mode of raising wages permanently, and effectually benefiting the poor, is by so educating them that they shall be conscious that their welfare depends upon the exercise of a greater control over their passions.

In penning this brief paper, my desire has been to provoke among the working classes a discussion and careful examination of the teachings of political economy, as propounded by Mr. J. S. Mill and those other able men who, of late, have devoted themselves to elaborating and popularizing the doctrines enunciated by Malthus. While I am glad to find that there are some among the masses who are inclined to preach and put in practice the teachings of the Malthusian School of political economists, I know that they are yet few in comparison with the great body of the working classes who have been taught to look upon the political economist as the poor man's foe. It is nevertheless among the working men alone, and, in the very ranks of the starvers, that the effort must be made to check starvation. The question is again before us: How are men to be prevented from starving? Not by strikes, during the continuance of which food is scarcer than before. No combinations of workmen can obtain high wages if the number of workers is too great. It is not by a mere struggle of class against class that the poor man's ills can be cured. The working classes can alleviate their own sufferings. They can, by co-operative schemes, which have the advantage of being educational in their operation, temporarily and partially remedy some of the evils, if not by increasing the means of subsistence, at any rate by securing a larger portion of the result of labor to the proper sustenance of the laborer. Systems

of associated industry are of immense benefit to the working classes, not alone or so much from the pecuniary improvement they result in, but because they develop in each individual a sense of dignity and independence which he lacks as a mere hired laborer. They can permanently improve their condition by taking such steps as shall prevent too rapid an increase of their numbers, and, by thus checking the supply of laborers, they will, as capital augments, increase the rate of wages paid to the laborer. The steady object of each working man should be to impress on his fellow-worker the importance of this subject. Let each point out to his neighbor not only the frightful struggle in which a poor man must engage who brings up a large family, but also that the result is to place in the labor market more claimants tor a share of the fund which has hitherto been found insufficient to keep the working classes from death by starvation.

The object of this pamphlet will be amply attained if it serve as the means of inducing some of the working classes to examine for themselves the teachings of Political Economy. All that is at present needed is that laboring men and women should be accustomed, both publicly and at home, to the consideration and discussion of the views and principles first openly propounded by Mr. Malthus, and since elaborated by Mr. Mill and other writers. The mere investigation of the subject will of itself serve to bring to the notice of the masses many facts hitherto entirely ignored by them. All must acknowledge the terrible ills resulting from poverty, and all therefore are bound to use their faculties to discover if possible its cause and cure. It is more than folly for the working man to permit himself to be turned away from the subject by the cry that the Political Economists have no sympathy with the poor. If the allegation were true, which it is not, it would only afford an additional reason why this important science should find students among those who most need aid from its teachings.

THE LAND QUESTION.

LARGE ESTATES INIMICAL TO THE WELFARE OF THE PEOPLE

Property in land differs from ordinary property. Wealth, which is the accumulated result of labor, is sometimes, but not often, accumulated in the hands of the laborer, and is more frequently accumulated in the hands of some person who has purchased the result of the laborers toil. Such personal wealth is capable of indefinite increase; and the exclusive right to its disposal is protected in the hands of its possessor, so long as he does not avail himself of this legal protection to use the wealth mischievously to his fellows. There would be no incentive in the laborer to economy, or to increased exertion, unless the State gave him reasonable protection in the enjoyment of his savings. Unfortunately, to obtain the protection of the authorities, he has in this country to give up an unreasonably large portion of his earnings to defray the cost of local and imperial Government. During the reign of her present Majesty, imperial taxation alone has

increased from about £48,000,000 to £73,833,000. The State has no right to interfere with a man's daily disposition of his personal wealth, merely on the ground that he might have used it more advantageously for his fellows. With land it is quite different; it is limited in extent, and the portions of it capable of producing food with ease to the cultivator are still more limited. Every individual member of the commonwealth has an indefeasible interest in the totality of the land, and no man ought to assert an absolute freehold in land hostile to the interest of his fellow. The land is part of the general soil of the State, and should be held subject to the general welfare of the citizens. No man has a right so to hold land that his tenure is detrimental to the happiness of the dwellers upon it or around it. This principle is already recognized in much of our legislation. A man can not say to a railway company—which has obtained the usual compulsory powers of taking land—"You shall not cross my private estate;" the law would answer, if he did, by saying, "The railway is for the good of the State; you as an individual must give way to the general good, and must lose your land, receiving a fair and reasonable money value for it." This principle should be applied more widely: and if it be for the good of the commonwealth that some of the enormous land monopolies of this country should be broken up, no statesman ought to be deterred by the mere dread of interfering with the so-called rights of private property.

Mr. Mill says: "When the 'sacredness of property' is talked of, it should always be remembered that any such sacredness does not belong in the same degree to landed property. No man made the land. It is the original inheritance of the whole species. Its appropriation is wholly a question of general expediency. When private property in land is not expedient it is unjust." The possession of land involves and carries with it the duty of cultivating that land, and, in fact, individual proprietorship of soil is only defensible so long as the possessor can show improvement and cultivation of the land he holds. To quote again from Mr. John Stuart Mill: "The essential principle of property being to assure to all persons what they have produced by their labor, and accumulated by their abstinence, this principle can not apply to that which is not the produce of labor, the raw material of the earth." Mr. Mill urges that property in land "is only valid in so far as the proprietor of the land is its improver." "In no sound theory of private property was it ever contemplated that the proprietor of land should be merely a sinecurist quartered upon it." Yet, in England and Wales alone, the landlords who received for rent, in the year 1800, £22,500,000, now receive about £67,000,000, and for this have no obligation on them to cultivate. The holding cultivable land in an uncultivated condition in this overcrowded country ought to be made a statutory misdemeanor, the penalty for which should be the forfeiture to the State of the land so left uncultivated, at, say, a twenty years' purchase of its annual return in the neglected or misapplied state in which it was found at the time of conviction. The true theory of landholding should be that the State should be the only freeholder, all other tenures being limited in character; and cultivation ought to be a special condition of tenancy.... The holder of land should either cultivate it with his own hands, or, as would be most frequently the case, by the

hands of others; but in the latter case, the landed proprietor is bound to allow the agricultural laborer to live by his labor. By living I mean that the laborer should have healthy food, shelter, and clothing, and sufficient leisure in which to educate himself and his family, besides the necessary leisure for rest from his labors. At present agricultural laborers do not live; they only drag wearily through a career but little higher in any respect than—and often not half so comfortable as—that of many of the other animals on the estate....

Little boys and girls, in the Midland, Eastern, Southern, and Southwestern counties of England, go into the fields to work, in some instances, soon after six years of age; in very many cases before they are seven years old, and in nearly all cases before they have attained eight. It is true, that the work at first may be the comparatively idle work of scaring birds or tending sheep, but it involves exposure of the child's yet delicate frame in the cold and damp of spring, and then to the heat of the summer sun, from day-dawn to evening. This too often results in the stunted growth and diseased frame found so frequently among the English poor. I say nothing of the demoralization of children consequent on their employment, without regard to sex, in the field gangs. I pass by the fact that work at this early age utterly incapacitates them, as a body, for mental effort. It is enough to declare that no child ought to have to work on the land until he is ten years of age, and if I am told that the fathers—only earning, in the majority of instances, from nine to thirteen shillings per week—need the additional petty wage these wretched babes may bring home, then again I answer, that it is to the landholder's enormous income that the State ought to look for the means of educating the too often worse than savages who are reared on his estate, and who by their labors swell his rent-roll.

That a few landed proprietors should have gigantic incomes, while the mass of the people are so poor—that in Gloucester, the Rev. Mr. Frazer describes "type after type of social life almost degraded to the level of barbarism"—that near Lavenham, "the cottages are unfit for human habitation"—that in Norfolk the Parliamentary returns speak of their dwellings in one as "miserable," in a second as "deplorable," in a third as "detestable," in a fourth as "a disgrace to a Christian community;" while near Docking, we are told, in consequence of the overcrowding of the wretched poor, "the whole atmosphere is sensual, and human nature is degraded into something below the level of the swine." This is a state of things that if the landholders will not redress willingly they must be made to remedy before it is too late.

A few men have vast estates and excessive incomes; the millions have seldom an inch of land until they inherit the grave, and have a starvation wage out of which a proportion is taken back for rent. Take the vast property of the Marquis of Westminster, whose income is credibly stated at something near a million a year; or that of the Duke of Devonshire, amounting to 96,000 acres in the county of Derby alone, without regarding his Irish or other estates; or that of the Duke of

Norfolk, whose Sussex estate is fifteen miles in circuit; or that of the Duke of Sutherland, which stretches across and contains the whole of Sutherlandshire from sea to sea; or that of the Marquis of Bute, on which £2,000,-000 sterling were spent by his trustees during his minority; or that of the Marquis of Breadalbane, who is said to be able to ride from his own door one hundred miles straight to the sea on his own freehold land; or those of the Duke of Richmond and Lord Leconfield, who between them own nearly the whole of the eastern portion of the county of Sussex, containing nearly 800 square miles. And such estates have a tendency to increase rather than to diminish. In Northumberland, the Ducal proprietor, whose titular rank is derived from the county, is a constant purchaser of any lands put up for sale. Mr. Bright, in 1864, spoke of one nobleman who devoted £80,000 a year of his income to the purchase of additional land.

These large properties must all be broken up; they paralyze the people, and they corrupt their possessors. We prefer that the breaking up shall be voluntary and gradual, but it must begin at once, for hungry bellies are multiplying daily.

The State ought to put the peasantry in possession of the land, and this might be done in several ways at the same time.

1. There is the Prussian Land System, a modification of which might be made to work well here, and which since 1850 has enabled the smallest occupiers of peasants' land to acquire the proprietorship at twenty years' purchase; the amount of which is paid to the landlord, not in money, but in rent debentures issued by authority of the State, and bearing four per cent, interest, and gradually redeemable by means of the one per cent, difference, which at compound interest extinguishes the principal in a little over forty-one years. The Prussian peasant has, however, two other options: he may pay less by one-tenth to the State bank than the rent he formerly paid to his landlord, in which case the purchase debentures take fifty-six years to redeem; or he may, if he can raise the cash, compel his landlord to accept eighteen years' purchase money of the annual rent. By this means nearly 100,000 peasant proprietors have been created in Prussia. Kent debentures to the extent of many millions have been issued to the landholders, and in less than nineteen years more than one-eighth of the debentures issued have been entirely redeemed and extinguished.

2. The Legislature should declare that leaving cultivable land uncultivated gave the Government the right to take possession of such land, assessing it by its actual return for the last live years, and not by its real value, and handing to the proprietor the amount of, say, twenty years' purchase in Consolidated Stock, redeemable in a limited term of years. The land so taken should not be sold at all, but should be let out to persons willing to become cultivators, on sufficiently

long terms of tenancy to fairly recoup his labor and capital to the cultivator, who should yearly pay into the National Treasury, in lieu of all other imperial taxes, a certain proportion of the value of the annual produce.

3. The game laws should be abolished. Game preserving in England is not only injurious, in that it diverts land capable of corn-bearing from the purpose it should fulfill, of growing corn to feed the starving, but it is injurious in that it prevents proper cultivation of surrounding farms, and demoralizes and makes criminals of the neighboring agriculturial laborers, creating for them a kind and degree of crime which would be otherwise unknown. Poaching, which is so severely punished, is actually fostered and encouraged by the very landholders who punish it. Pheasants and partridges' eggs are bought to stock preserves; the gamekeepers who buy these eggs shut their eyes to the mode in which they have been procured. The lad who was encouraged to procure the eggs finds himself in jail when he learns that shooting or trapping pheasants gains a higher pecuniary reward than leading the plow horse, or trimming the hedge, or grubbing the plantation. Poaching is the natural consequence of rearing a large number of rabbits, hares, partridges, and pheasants, in the midst of an underpaid, underfed, badly-housed, and deplorably ignorant body of people. The brutal outrages of gamekeepers of which we read so much are the regretable but easily-traceable measure of retaliation for a system which takes a baby child to work in the fields soon after six years of age, which trains all his worst propensities and deadens and degrades his better faculties, which keeps him in constant wretchedness, and tantalizes him with the sight of hundreds of acres on which game runs and flies well-fed, under his very nose, while he limps ill-fed along the muddy lane which skirts the preserve—game, which is at liberty to come out of its covert and eat and destroy the farmer's crop, but which is even then made sacred by the law, and fenced round by covenants, as in a Leitrim lease. The game laws must go; they starve our population by using land which might be golden to the autumn sun with the waving crop of wheat, barley, and rye; they feed our prisons, and rear a criminal class in our midst, who have to be prosecuted and guarded at great cost, and all because hares and pheasants are higher in the landowners' eyes than human beings.

5. Any person holding more than, say, 5,000 acres of land, should be taxed at a far heavier rate than those having smaller holdings. That is, presuming, in order to take a figure as basis, the land-tax on 5,000 acres to be at the rate of 1s. per acre, then on every acre above that quantity it should be 2s. per acre up to 10,000 acres, and from thence 5s. per acre up to 15,000 acres, and from thence 10s. per acre up to 20,000 acres, so as to discourage all extravagantly large holdings.

6. The law of primogeniture should be repealed; the settlement of property, except for a widow and her children, be entirely prohibited and some limitation should be put on the power of devise,

so as to prevent, say, the Marquis of Westminster from leaving the bulk of his property to his eldest son, while the younger ones are left as noble paupers, to be provided with places and pensions by the nation. Land should be made as easily and as cheaply transferable as any personal chattel.

The present land monopoly must be broken by legislation, or it will be destroyed by revolution.

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THE

AUTOBIOGRAPHY

OF

MR. BRADLAUGH.

A Page of his Life.

[ENTERED AT STATIONERS' HALL.]

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MR. BRADLAUGH'S AUTOBIOGRAPHY.

At the request of many friends, and by way of farewell address on leaving for America, I, for the first time in my life, pen a partial autobiographical sketch. I do not pretend that the narrative will be a complete picture of my life, I only vouch the accuracy of the facts so far as I state them. I have not the right in some cases to state political occurrences in which others now living are involved, nor have I the courage of Jean Jacques Rousseau, to photograph my inner life. I shall therefore state little the public may not already know. I was born on the 26th September, 1833, in a small house in Bacchus Walk, Hoxton. My father was a solicitor's clerk with a very poor salary, which he supplemented by law writing. He was an extremely industrious man, and a splendid penman. I never had the opportunity of judging his tastes or thoughts, outside his daily labours, except in one respect, in which I have followed in his footsteps. He was passionately fond of angling. Until 1848 my life needs little relation. My schooling, like that of most poor men's children, was small in quantity, and, except as to the three R's, indifferent in quality. I remember at seven years of age being at a national school in Abbey Street, Bethnal Green; between seven and nine I was at another small private school in the same neighbourhood, and my "education" was completed before I was eleven years of age at a boys' school in Coalharbour Street, Hackney Road. When about twelve years of age I was first employed as errand lad in the solicitor's office where my father remained his whole life through. After a little more than two years in this occupation, I became wharf clerk and cashier to a firm of coal merchants in Britannia Fields, City Road. While in their employment the excitement of the Chartist movement was at its height in England, and the authorities, frightened by the then huge continental revolution wave, were preparing for the prosecution of some of the leaders amongst the Chartists. Meetings used to be held almost

continuously all day on Sunday, and every week-night in the open air on Bonner's Fields, near where the Consumption Hospital now stands. These meetings were in knots from fifty to five hundred, sometimes many more, and were occupied chiefly in discussions on theological, social, and political questions, any bystander taking part. The curiosity of a lad took me occasionally in the week evenings to the Bonner's Fields gatherings. On the Sunday I, as a member of the Church of England, was fully occupied as a Sunday-school teacher. This last-named fashion of passing Sunday was broken suddenly. The Bishop of London was announced to hold a confirmation in Bethnal Green. The incumbent of St. Peter's, Hackney Road, the district in which I resided, was one John Graham Packer, and he, desiring to make a good figure when the Bishop came, pressed me to prepare for confirmation, so as to answer any questions the Bishop might put. I studied a little the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England, and the four Gospels, and came to the conclusion that they differed. I ventured to write the Rev. Mr. Packer a respectful letter, asking him for aid and explanation. All he did was to denounce my letter to my parents as Atheistical, although at that time I should have shuddered at the very notion of becoming an Atheist, and he suspended me for three months from my office of Sunday-school teacher. This left me my Sundays free, for I did not like to go to church while suspended from my teacher's duty, and I, instead, went to Bonner's Fields, at first to listen, but soon to take part in some of the discussions which were then always pending there.

At the commencement I spoke on the orthodox Christian side, but after a debate with Mr. J. Savage, in the Warner Place Hall, in 1849, on the "Inspiration of the Bible," I found that my views were getting very much tinged with Freethought, and in the winter of that year, at the instigation of Mr. Packer, to whom I had submitted the "Diegesis" of Robert Taylor, I—having become a teetotaler, which in his view brought out my infidel tendencies still more vigorously—had three days given me by my employers, after consultation with my father, to "change my opinions or lose my situation." I am inclined to think now that the threat was never intended to have been enforced, but was used to terrify me into submission. At that time I hardly knew what, if any,

opinions I had, but the result was that sooner than make a show of recanting, I left home and situation on the third day, and never returned to either.

I was always a very fluent speaker, and now lectured frequently at the Temperance Hall, Warner Place, Hackney Road, at the small Hall in Philpot Street, and in the open air in Bonner's Fields, where at last on Sunday afternoons scores of hundreds congregated to hear me. My views were then Deistical, but rapidly tending to the more extreme phase into which they ultimately settled. I now took part in all the gatherings held in London on behalf of the Poles and Hungarians, and actually fancied that I could write poetry on Kossuth and Mazzini.

It was at this time I made the acquaintance of my friend and co-worker, Mr. Austin Holyoake, at his printing office in Queen's Head Passage, and I remember him taking me to John Street Institution, where, at one of the pleasant Saturday evening gatherings, I met the late Mrs. Emma Martin. At Mr. Austin Holyoake's request, Mr. George Jacob Holyoake, to my great delight, presided at one of my lectures in Philpot Street, and I felt special interest in the number of the *Reasoner* which contained a brief reference to myself and that lecture.

I wrote my first pamphlet, "A Few Words on the Christian's Creed," about the middle of 1850, and was honoured by Dr. Campbell of the *British Banner* with a leading article vigorously assailing me for the lectures I had then delivered. After leaving home I was chiefly sheltered by Mrs. Sharples Carlile, with whose children, Hypatia, Theophila, and Julian, I shared such comforts as were at her disposal. Here I studied hard everything which came in my way, picking up a little Hebrew and an imperfect smattering of other tongues. I tried to earn my living as a coal merchant, but at sixteen, and without one farthing in my pocket, the business was not extensive enough to be profitable. I got very poor, and at that time was also very proud. A subscription offered me by a few Freethinkers shocked me, and awakened me to a sense of my poverty; so telling no one where I was going, I went away, and on the 17th of December, 1850, was, after some difficulty, enlisted in the Seventh Dragoon Guards. With this corps I remained until October, 1853, being ultimately appointed orderly-room clerk; the regiment, during the whole of the

time I remained in it, being quartered in Ireland. While I was in the regiment I was a teetotaler, and used often to lecture to the men in the barrack-room at night, and I have more than once broken out of Portobello barracks to deliver teetotal speeches in the small French Street Hall, Dublin. Many times have I spoken there in my scarlet jacket, between James Haughton and the good old father, the Rev. Dr. Spratt, a Roman Catholic priest, then very active in the cause of temperance. While I was in the regiment my father died, and in the summer of 1853 an aunt's death left me a small sum, out of which I purchased my discharge, and returned to England, to aid in the maintenance of my mother and family.

I have now no time for the full story of my army life, which, however, I may tell some day. Before I left the regiment I had won the esteem of most of the privates, and of some of the officers. I quitted the regiment with a "very good character" from the Colonel, but I am bound to add, that the Captain of my troop would not have concurred in this character had he had any voice in the matter. The Lieutenant-Colonel, C. P. Ainslie, earned an eternal right to grateful mention at my hands by his gentlemanly and considerate treatment. I cannot say the same for my Captain, who did his best to send me to gaol, and whom I have not yet quite forgiven.

On returning to civilian life, I obtained employment in the daytime with a solicitor named Rogers, and in the evening as clerk to a Building Society; and soon after entering this employ I began again to write and speak, and it was then I, to in some degree avoid the efforts which were afterwards made to ruin me, took the name "Iconoclast," under which all my anti-theological work down to 1868 was done. I give Mr. Rogers' name now for he is dead, and malice cannot injure him. Many anonymous letters were sent to him to warn him of my irreligious opinions; he treated them all with contempt, only asking me not to let my propaganda become an injury to his business.

Soon after my discharge from the army I had a curious adventure. While I was away a number of poor men had subscribed their funds together and had erected a Working Man's Hall, in Goldsmiths' Row, Hackney Road. Not having any legal advice, it turned out that they had been entrapped into erecting their building on freehold ground

without any lease or conveyance from the freeholder, who asserted his legal right to the building. The men consulted me, and finding that under the Statute of Frauds they had no remedy, I recommended them to offer a penalty rent of £20 a year. This being refused, I constituted myself into a law court, and without any riot or breach of the peace, I, with the assistance of a hundred stout men, took every brick of the building bodily away, and divided the materials, so far as was possible, amongst the proper owners. I think I can see now the disappointed rascal of a freeholder when he only had his bare soil left once more. He did not escape unpunished, for to encourage the others to contribute, he had invested some few pounds in the building. He had been too clever: he had relied on the letter of the law, and I beat him with a version of common-sense justice.

I lectured once or twice a week in the small Philpot Street Hall, very often then in the Hall of Science, City Road, and then in the old John Street Institution, until I won myself a name in the party and through the country. In 1855 I had my first notable adventure with the authorities in reference to the right of meeting in Hyde Park, and subsequently gave evidence before the Royal Commission ordered by the House of Commons, presided over by the Right Hon. Stuart Wortley. I was very proud that day at Westminster, when, at the conclusion of my testimony against the authorities, the Commissioner publicly thanked me, and the people who crowded the Court of Exchequer cheered me, for the manner in which I denied the right of Sir Richard Mayne, the then Chief Commissioner of Police, to issue the notices forbidding the people to meet in the Park. This was a first step in a course in which I have never flinched or wavered.

In 1856 I undertook, with others, the publication of a series of papers, entitled "Half-Hours with Freethinkers," the late John Watts being one of my co-workers. I also by myself commenced the publication of my "Commentary on the Pentateuch," which has since been entirely re-written, and now forms my "Bible: what it is."

During the autumn of 1857 I paid my first lecturing visit to Northampton.

Early in 1858, when Mr. Edward Truelove was suddenly arrested for publishing the pamphlet, "Is Tyrannicide Justifiable?" I became Honorary Secretary to the Defence, and

was at the same time associated with the conduct of the defence of Simon Bernard, who was arrested at the instigation of the French Government for alleged complicity in the Orsini tragedy. It was at this period I gained the friendship of poor Bernard, which, without diminution, I retained until he died; and also the valued friendship of Thomas Allsop, which I still preserve. My associations were from thenceforward such as to encourage in me a strong and bitter feeling against the late Emperor Napoleon. Whilst he was in power I hated him, and never lost an opportunity of working against him until the *decheance* came. I am not sure now that I always judged him fairly; but nothing, I think, could have tempted me to either write or speak of him with friendliness or kindliness during his life. *Le sang de mes amis etait sur son âme.* Now that the tomb covers his remains, my hatred has ceased; but no other feeling has arisen in its place. Should any of his family seek to resume the Imperial purple, I should remain true to my political declarations of sixteen years since, and should exert myself to the uttermost to prevent France falling under another Empire. I write this with much sadness, as 1870 to 1873 have dispelled some of my illusions held firmly during the fifteen years which preceded. I had believed in such men as Louis Blanc, Ledru Rollin, Victor Hugo, as possible statesmen for France. I was mistaken. They were writers, talkers, and poets; good men to ride on the stream, or to drown in honest protest, but lacking force to swim against, or turn back, the tide by the might of their will. I had believed too in a Republican France, which is yet only in the womb of time, to be born after many pangs and sore travailing.

In 1859 I saw Joseph Mazzini for the first time, and remained on terms of communication with the great Italian patriot until the year 1869, from time to time bringing him correspondence from Italy, where my business sometimes took me. After 1869 we found ourselves holding diverse opinions on the Franco-Prussian question—Mazzini went for Prussia, I for France—and I never saw him again.

In June, 1858, I held my first public formal theological debate with the Rev. Brewin Grant, B.A., at that time a Dissenting Minister at Sheffield. Mr. Grant was then a man of some ability, and if he could have forgotten his aptitudes as a circus jester, would have been a redoubtable

antagonist. During this year I was elected President of the London Secular Society, in lieu of Mr. George Jacob Holyoake, who had theretofore led the English Freethought party, but who has of late years devoted himself more completely to general journalistic work.

In November, 1858, I commenced editorial duties with the *Investigator*, formerly conducted by the late Robert Cooper, which I continued until August, 1859. It had but a small circulation, and was financially a very great failure. For the encouragement of young propagandists, I may here insert a little anecdote of my early lecturing experience. I had lectured in Edinburgh in mid-winter; the audience was small, the profits microscopical. I, after paying my bill at the Temperance Hotel, where I then stayed, had only a few shillings more than my Parliamentary fare to Bolton, where I was next to lecture. I was out of bed at five on a freezing morning, and could have no breakfast, as the people were not up. I carried my luggage (a big tin box, corded round, which then held books and clothes, and a small black bag), for I could not spare any of my scanty cash for a conveyance or porter. The train from Edinburgh being delayed by a severe snow-storm, the corresponding Parliamentary had left Carlisle long before our arrival. In order to reach Bolton in time for my lecture, I had to book by a quick train, starting in about three-quarters of an hour, but could only book to Preston, as the increased fare took all my money, except 4½d. With this small sum I could get no refreshment in the station, but in a little shop in the street outside I got a mug of hot tea and a little hot meat pie. From Preston, I got with great difficulty on to Bolton, handing my black bag to the station-master there, as security for my fare from Preston, until the morning. I arrived in Bolton about quarter to eight; the lecture commenced at eight, and I, having barely time to run to my dgings, and wash and change, went onto the platform cold nd hungry. I shall never forget that lecture; it was in an ld Unitarian Chapel. We had no gas, the building seemed full of a foggy mist, and was imperfectly lit with candles. Everything appeared cold, cheerless, and gloomy. The most amusing feature was that an opponent, endowed with extra piety and forbearance, chose that evening to specially attack me for the money-making and easy life I was leading. Peace to that opponent's memory, I have never seen him

since. It was while in Scotland on this journey I made the acquaintance, and ultimately won the friendship, of the late Alexander Campbell, of Glasgow—a generous, kindly-hearted old Socialist Missionary, who, at a time when others were hostile, spoke encouragingly to me, and who afterwards worked with me for a long period on this journal.

Occasionally, the lectures were interfered with by the authorities, but this happened oftener in the provinces than in London. In March, 1859, I was to have lectured in the Saint Martin's Hall on "Louis Napoleon," but the Government—on a remonstrance by Count Walewski, as to language used at a previous meeting, at which I had presided for Dr. Bernard—interfered; the hall was garrisoned by police, and the lecture prevented. Mr. Hullah, the then proprietor, being indemnified by the authorities, paid damages for his breach of contract, to avoid a suit which I at once commenced against him. Later in the same month I held a debate in Northampton with Mr. John Bowes, a rather heavy, but well-meaning, old gentleman, utterly unfitted for platform controversy. The press now began to deal with me tolerably freely, and I find "boy," "young man," and "juvenile appearance" very frequent in the comments. My want of education was an especial matter for hostile criticism, the more particularly so when the writer had neither heard nor seen me.

Discussions now grew on me so thick and fast that even some of the most important debates may perhaps escape notice in this imperfect chronicling. At Sheffield I debated with a Reverend Dr. Mensor, who styled himself a Jewish Rabbi. He was then in the process of gaining admission to the Church of England, and had been put forward to show my want of scholarship. We both scrawled Hebrew characters for four nights on a black board, to the delight and mystification of the audience, who gave me credit for erudition, because I chalked the square letter characters with tolerable rapidity and clearness. At Glasgow I debated with a Mr. Court, representing the Glasgow Protestant Association, a glib-tongued missionary, who has since gone to the bad; at Paisley with a Mr. Smart, a very gentlemanly antagonist; and at Halifax with the Rev. T. D. Matthias, a Welsh Baptist Minister, unquestionably very sincere. All these were formal debates, and were reported with tolerable fulness in the various local journals.

In the early part of 1860 I, aided by my friends at Sheffield, Halifax, and other parts of England, projected the *National Reformer* in small shares. Unfortunately, just after the issue of its prospectus, Joseph Barker returned from America, and was associated with me in the editorship. The arrangement was peculiar, Mr. Barker editing the first half of the paper and I the second. It was not precisely a happy union, and the unnatural alliance came to an end in a very brief period. In August, 1861, I officially parted company with Joseph Barker as editor. We had been practically divorced for months before: the first part of the paper usually contained abuse of those who wrote in the second half. He came to me originally at Sheffield, pretending to be an Atheist and a Republican, and soon after pretended to be a Christian, and spoke in favour of slavery. I am sometimes doubtful as to how far Mr. Barker deluded himself, as well as others, in his various changes of theological and political opinions. If he had had the slightest thoroughness in his character, he would have been a great man; as it is, he is only a great turn-coat.

In June, 1860, I debated again with the Reverend Brewin Grant, every Monday for four weeks, at Bradford, and during this debate had a narrow escape of my life. In one of my journeys to London, the Great Northern train ran through the station at King's Cross, and many persons were seriously injured. I got off with some trifling bruises and a severe shaking.

Garibaldi having at this time made his famous Marsala effort, I delivered a series of lectures in his aid, and am happy to be able to record that, though at that time very poor, I sent him one hundred guineas as my contribution by my tongue. This money was chiefly sent through W. H. Ashurst, Esq., now Solicitor to the General Post Office, and amongst the few letters I preserve, I have one of thanks from "G. Garibaldi," for what I was then doing for Italy.

In this year I debated for four nights with Dr. Brindley, an old antagonist of the Socialists, at Oldham; for two nights with the Rev. Dr. Baylee, the President of St. Aidan's College, at Birkenhead, where a Church of England curate manufactory was for some time carried on; and for two nights with the Rev. Dr. Rutherford, of Newcastle. Dr. Rutherford has since so identified himself with the cause of

the Tyneside workers, that I read with regret any harsh words that escaped me in that debate. Although during late years I have managed to keep all my meetings free from violence or disorder, this was not always so. In October, 1860, I paid my first visit to Wigan, and certainly lectured there under considerable difficulty, and incurred personal danger, the resident clergy actually inciting the populace to physical violence, and part destruction of the building I lectured in. I, however, supported by one courageous woman and her husband, persevered, and, despite bricks and kicks, visited Wigan again and again, until I had, *bon gré mal gré*, improved the manners and customs of the people, so that I am now a welcome speaker there. I could not improve the morals of the clergy, as the public journals have recently shown, but that was their misfortune not my fault. In the winter of 1860, I held two formal debates in Wigan, all of which were fully reported in the local journals; one with Mr. Hutchings, a respectable Nonconformist layman, and the other with the Rev. Woodville Woodman, a Swedenborgian divine.

Early in 1861 I visited Guernsey in consequence of an attempt made by the Law Courts of the Island to enforce the blasphemy laws against a Mr. Stephen Bendall, who had distributed some of my pamphlets to the Guernseyites, and had been condemned to imprisonment in default of finding sureties not to repeat the offence. Not daring to prosecute me, although challenged in writing, the authorities permitted drink and leave of absence to be given to soldiers in the garrison, on condition they should try to prevent the lecture, and the house in which I lectured was broken into by a drunken and pious mob, shouting "Kill the Infidel." My antagonists were fortunately as cowardly as they were intolerant, and I succeeded in quelling the riot, delivering my lecture in spite of all opposition, although considerable damage was done to the building.

Shortly after this I visited Plymouth, where the Young Men's Christian Association arranged to prosecute me. They were, however, a little too hasty, and had me arrested at an open air meeting when I had scarcely commenced my speech, having only uttered the words—"Friends, I am about to address you on the Bible." Having locked me up all night, and refused bail, it was found by their legal adviser that a blunder had been committed, and a charge of "ex-

citing a breach of the peace, and assaulting the constable in the execution of his duty," was manufactured. It was tolerably amusing to see the number of dinners, suppers, and breakfasts, all accompanied with pots or cups of Devonshire cream, sent in to the Devonport Lock-up, where I was confined, by various friends who wanted to show their sympathy. The invented charge, though well sworn to, broke down after two days' hearing, under the severe cross-examination to which I subjected the witnesses. I defended myself, two lawyers appeared against me, and seven magistrates sat on the bench, predetermined to convict me. Finding that the evidence of the whole of the witnesses whom I wished to call was to be objected to because unbelievers in hell were then incompetent as witnesses according to English law, I am pleased to say that several Nonconformists, disgusted with the bigotry and pious perjury of my prosecutors, came forward. The result was a triumphant victory, and a certificate of dismissal which I wrung from the reluctant bench of great unpaid. I was not yet satisfied; some of the magistrates had tried to browbeat me, and I announced in court that I would deliver the lecture I had been prevented from delivering to an audience assembled in the borough, and that I should sue at law the Superintendent of Police who had arrested me. The first portion of my defiance was the most difficult to give effect to; not a hall could be hired in Devonport, and nearly all the convenient open land being under military jurisdiction, it was impossible to procure the tenancy of a field for an open-air meeting. I, however, fulfilled my promise, and despite the police and military authorities combined, I delivered my lecture to an audience assembled in their very teeth. Devonport, Stonehouse, and Plymouth form one garrisoned and fortified town, divided by the River Tamar. All the water to the sea is under the separate jurisdiction of Saltash, some miles distant. I obtained a large boat on which a temporary platform was built, and this boat was quietly moored in the River Tamar on the Devonport side, about two fathoms from the shore. Placards were issued stating that, acting under legal advice, I should address the meeting and deliver the prevented lecture "near to the Devonport Park Gates." Overwhelming force was prepared by the Devonport authorities, and having already erred by too great haste, this time they determined to let

me fairly commence my lecture before they arrested me. To their horror I quietly walked past the Park Gates where the crowd was waiting, and passing down a bye-lane to the river side, stepped into a little boat, was rowed to the large one, and then delivered my lecture, the audience who had followed me, standing on an open wharf, all within the jurisdiction of the Borough of Devonport, and I being about 9 feet outside the borough. The face of the Mayor ready to read the riot act, the superintendent with twenty-eight picked policemen to make sure of my arrest, and a military force in readiness to overawe any popular demonstration—all these were sights to remember. I am afraid the Devonport Young Men's Christian Association did not limit themselves to prayers and blessings on that famous Sunday.

As I had promised, the authorities refusing any apology for the wrongful arrest, I commenced an action against Superintendent Edwards, by whom I had been taken into custody. The borough magistrates indemnified their officer and found funds to resist me. I fought with very little help save from one tried, though anonymous friend, for Joseph Barker, my co-editor, but not co-worker, in our own paper, discouraged any pecuniary support. The cause was made a special jury one, and came on for trial at Exeter Assizes. Unfortunately I was persuaded to brief counsel, and Sir Robert Collier, my leader, commenced his speech with an expression of sorrow for my opinions. This damaged me very much, although I won the case easily after a long trial. The jury, composed of Devonshire landowners, only gave me a farthing damages, and Mr. Baron Channell refused to certify for costs. I was determined not to let the matter rest here, and myself carried it to the Court *in Banco*, where I argued it in person for two whole days, before Lord Chief Justice Erle and a full bench of Judges. Although I did not succeed in improving my own position, I raised public opinion in favour of free speech, and the enormous costs incurred by the borough authorities, and which they had to bear, have deterred them from ever again interfering either with my lectures, or those of any other speaker, and I now have crowded audiences in the finest hall whenever I visit the three towns. These proceedings cost me several hundred pounds, and burthened me with a debt which took long clearing off.

In 1862 I held a four nights' discussion with a Dissenting

clergyman, the Rev. W. Barker. My opponent was probably one of the most able and straightforward amongst my numerous antagonists. About this time a severe attack of acute rheumatism prostrated me, and having soon after to visit Italy, I, at first under medical advice, adopted the habit of drinking the light Continental wines, and although continuing an advocate of sobriety, I naturally ceased to take part in any teetotal gatherings.

In the struggle between the Northern and Southern States of America, my advocacy and sympathies went with what I am glad to say was the feeling of the great mass of the English people—in favour of the North; and my esteemed friend, and then contributor, W. E. Adams, furnished most valuable aid with his pen in the enlightenment of public opinion, at a time when many of our aristocracy were openly exulting in what they conceived to be the probable break-up of the United States Republic. During the Lancashire cotton famine I lectured several times in aid of the fund.

I began now also to assume a much more prominent position in the various English political movements, and especially to speak on the Irish Church and Irish Land questions. On the Irish question, I owe much to my late co-worker and contributor, poor Peter Fox André, a thoroughly honest and whole-souled man, whose pen was always on the side of struggling nationalities.

One of the disadvantages connected with a public career is, that every vile scoundrel who is too cowardly to face you openly can libel you anonymously. I have had, I think, my full share of this kind of annoyance. Most of the slanders I have treated with utter contempt, and if I had alone consulted my own feelings, should probably never have pursued any other course. Twice, however, I have had recourse to the judgment of the law—once in the case of a clergyman of the Church of England, who indulged in a foul libel affecting my wife and children. This fellow I compelled to retract every word he had uttered, and to pay £100, which, after deducting the costs, was divided amongst various charitable institutions. The reverend libeller wrote me an abject letter, begging me not to ruin his prospects in the Church by publishing his name; I consented, and he has since repaid my mercy by losing no opportunity of being offensive. He is a prominent contributor to the

Rock, and a fierce ultra-Protestant. He must have greater confidence in my honour than in his own, or fear of exposure would compel him to greater reticence. The other case arose during the election, and will be dealt with in its proper order.

It was my fortune to be associated with the Reform League from its earliest moments until its dissolution. It is hardly worth while to repeat here the almost stereotyped story of the successful struggle made by the League for Parliamentary Reform. E. Beales, Esq., was the President of the League, and I was one of its Vice-Presidents, and continued nearly the whole time of its existence a member of its executive. The whole of my services and journeys were given to the League without the slightest remuneration, and I repeatedly, and according to my means, contributed to its funds. When I resigned my position on the executive I received from Mr. George Howell, the Secretary, and from Mr. Beales, the President, the most touching and flattering letters as to what Mr. Beales was pleased to describe as the loyalty and utility of my services to the League. Mr. George Howell concluded a long letter as follows :— "Be pleased to accept my assurance of sincere regards for your manly courage, consistent and honourable conduct in our cause, and for your kindly consideration for myself as Secretary of this great movement on all occasions." These letters have additional value from the fact that Mr. Beales, whom I sincerely respect, differs widely from me in matters of faith, and Mr. Howell is, fortunately, far from having any friendly feeling towards me. It was while on the Executive of this League that I first became intimately acquainted with Mr. George Odger, and had reason to be pleased with the straightforward course he pursued, and the honest work he did as one of the Executive Committee. Mr. John Baxter Langley and Mr. R. A. Cooper were also amongst my most prominent co-workers.

My sympathy with Ireland, and open advocacy of justice for the Irish, nearly brought me into serious trouble. Some who were afterwards indicted as the chiefs of the so-called Fenian movement, came to me for advice. So much I see others have written, and the rest of this portion of my autobiography I may write some day. At present there are men not out of danger whom careless words might imperil, and as regards myself I shall not be guilty of the folly of printing language

which a government might use against me. My pamphlet on the Irish Question, published in 1866, won a voluntary letter of warm approval from Mr. Gladstone, the only friendly writing I ever received from him in my life.

At Huddersfield, the Philosophical Hall having been duly hired for my lectures, pious influence was brought to bear on the lessee to induce him to break his contract. Fortunately, what in law amounted to possession had been given, and on the doors being locked against me, I broke them open, and delivered my lecture to a crowded and most orderly audience. I was arrested, and an attempt was made to prosecute me before the Huddersfield magistrates; but I defended myself with success, and defeated with ease the Conservative solicitor, N. Learoyd, who had been specially retained to ensure my committal to gaol.

In 1868 I entered into a contest with the Conservative Government which, having been continued by the Gladstone Government, finished in 1869 with a complete victory for myself. According to the then law every newspaper was required to give sureties to the extent of £800 against blasphemous or seditious libel. I had never offered to give these sureties, as they would have probably been liable to forfeiture about once a month. In March, 1868, the Disraeli Government insisted on my compliance with the law. I refused. The Government then required me to stop my paper. I printed on the next issue, "Printed in Defiance of Her Majesty's Government." I was then served with an Attorney-General's information, containing numerous counts, and seeking to recover enormous penalties. I determined to be my own barrister, and while availing myself in consultation of the best legal advice, I always argued my own case. The interlocutory hearings before the Judges in Chambers were numerous, for I took objection to nearly every step made by the Government, and I nearly always succeeded. I also brought the matter before Parliament, being specially backed in this by Mr. Milner Gibson, Mr. John Stuart Mill, and Mr. E. H. J. Craufurd. When the information was called on for trial in a crowded court before Mr. Baron Martin, the Government backed out, and declined to make a jury; so the prosecution fell to the ground. Strange to say, it was renewed by the Gladstone Government, who had the coolness to offer me, by the mouth of Attorney-General Collier, that they would not enforce any penalties if I would

stop the paper, and admit that I was in the wrong. This I declined, and the prosecution now came on for trial before Baron Bramwell and a special jury. Against me were the Attorney-Ceneral, Sir R. Collier, the Solicitor-General, Sir J. D. Coleridge, and Mr. Crompton Hutton. I found that these legal worthies were blundering in their conduct of the trial, and at *nisi prius* I let them obtain a verdict, which, however, I reversed on purely technical grounds, after a long argument, which I sustained before Lord Chief Baron Kelly and a full court sitting in Banco. Having miserably failed to enforce the law against me, the Government repealed the statute, and I can boast that I got rid of the last shackle of the obnoxious English press laws. Mr. J. S. Mill wrote me: "You have gained a very honourable success in obtaining a repeal of the mischievous Act by your persevering resistance." The Government, although beaten, refused to reimburse me any portion of the large outlay incurred in fighting them.

It has always been my ambition to enter Parliament, and at the General Election for 1868 I, for the first time, entered the arena as a candidate. I was beaten; but this is scarcely wonderful. I had all the journals in England except three against me. Every idle or virulent tale which folly could distort or calumny invent was used against me. Despite all, I polled nearly 1,100 votes, and I obtained unasked, but not ungratefully listened to, the public acknowledgments from the Mayor of the borough, also from one of my competitors, Mr. Charles Gilpin, as to the loyal manner in which I had fought the contest through.

During the election struggle libels rained from all sides. One by the late Mr. Capper, M.P., seeking re-election at Sandwich, was the monstrous story, that in the open square at Northampton I had taken out my watch, and defied God to show his power by striking me dead in five minutes. Challenged for his authority, Mr. Capper pretended to have heard the story from Mr. C. Gilpin, M.P., who indignantly denied being any party to the falsehood. I insisted on an apology from Mr. Capper, which being refused, I sued him, but he died soon after the writ was served. The story was not an original invention by Mr. Capper; it had been reported of Abner Kneeland thirty years before, and is still a favourite one with pious missionaries at street corners. A still more outrageous slander was inserted in the *Razor*, a

pseudo-comic weekly. I compelled this journal to give a full apology, but not until after two years' litigation, and a new trial had been ordered. When obliged to recant, the Christian proprietor became insolvent, to avoid payment of the costs. Unfortunately born poor, my life had been one continued struggle, and the burden of my indebtedness was sorely swollen in this and similar contests.

Probably the most severe, and to me certainly the most costly, struggle has been that on the oath question. Formerly it was a fatal objection against the competency of a witness who did not believe in a Deity and in a future state of rewards and punishments. Several attempts had been made to alter the law, but they had all failed; and indeed Sir J. Trevelyan's measures only provided for affirmation, and did not even seek to abolish the incompetency. In a case in which I was plaintiff in the Court of Common Pleas, my evidence was objected to, and I determined to fight the matter through every possible court, and to get the law changed if possible. I personally argued the case before Lord Chief Justice Bovill and a full Bench, in the Court of Common Pleas, and with the aid of the present Mr. Justice Denman and the late Lord Chancellor Hatherly, the law was twice altered in Parliament. Before victory was ultimately obtained I had to carry the case into the Court of Error, and I prepared and sent out at my own cost more than two hundred petitions to Parliament. Ultimately the Evidence Amendment Act, 1869, and the Evidence Further Amendment Act, 1870, gave Freethinkers the right to enter the witness box, and I won my suit. The Christian defendant finished by becoming bankrupt, and I lost a terribly large sum in debt and costs. The original debt and interest were over £300, and the costs of the various proceedings were very heavy.

In the winter of 1870 the Mirfield Town Hall, which had been properly taken and paid for for two nights' lectures, was refused by the proprietors, who barricaded the hall, and obtained a great force of police from the neighbourhood. In order that the law might be clearly settled on this matter, I brought an action to try the question, and although the late Mr. Justice Willes expressed himself strongly in my favour, it was held by Mr. Justice Mellor at *Nisi Prius* that nothing, except a deed under seal or an actual demise, would avail. A mere agreement for a user of a hall was a license revo-

cable at will, even when for a valuable consideration. This convinced me that when hall proprietors break their contracts, I must myself enforce my rights as I did at Huddersfield, and have done in other places.

During the Franco-Prussian struggle I remained neutral until the 4th of September. I was against Bismarck and his blood-and-iron theory, but I was also utterly against the Empire and the Emperor; so I took no part with either. I was lecturing at Plymouth the day the *decheance* was proclaimed, and immediately after wrote my first article in favour of Republican France. I now set to work, and organised a series of meetings in London and the provinces, some of which were co-operated in by Dr. Congreve, Professor Beesly, and other prominent members of the Positivist party. These meetings exercised some little effect on the public opinion in this country, but unfortunately the collapse on the part of France was so complete, and the resources commanded by Bismarck and Moltke so vast, that, except as expressing sympathy, the results were barren. In October, 1870, I, without any previous communication from myself to them, received from the Republican Government at Tours a long and flattering letter, signed by Leon Gambetta, Adolphe Cremieux, Al Glais Bizoin, and Admiral Fourichon, declaring that they, as members of the "Gouvernement de la Defense Nationale, réunis en délégation à Tours," "tiennent à honneur de vous remercier chalereusement du noble concours que vous apportez à la cause de la France." On the 2nd of February, 1871, M. Tissot, the Chargé d'Affaires of France in England, wrote me: "Quant à moi, mon cher ami, je ne puis que constater ici, comme je l'ai deja fait, comme je le ferai en toute occasion, la dette que nous avons contractée envers vous. Vous nous avez donné votre temps, votre activité, votre eloquence, votre âme, la meilleure partie de vous même, en un mot; la France que vous avez été seule à defendre ne l'oubliera jamais." This is probably a too flattering estimate of my services to France, but coming from the official representative of the French Republic, I feel entitled to insert it. In September, 1871, Monsieur Emmanuel Arago, member of the Provisional Government of the 4th of September, wrote the following words upon the letter which had been sent me, as above mentioned, in October, 1870, by the Delegate Government of Tours: "En lisant cette lettre, j'eprouve tres

vivement le regret de n'avoir pu, enfermé dans Paris, joindre ma signature à celles de mes collègues de la délégation de Tours. Mr. Bradlaugh est et sera toujours dans la République notre concitoyen."

During 1870, 1871, and 1872, I held several debates with the Rev. A. J. Harrison, formerly of Huddersfield. The first at Newcastle, in the splendid Town Hall of that place, was attended by about 5,000 persons. The second debate at Bristol, was notable from being presided over by Professor Newman. The third discussion was at Birmingham, and was an attempt at the Socratic method, and the last platform encounter was in the New Hall of Science, London. Of the Rev. Mr. Harrison it is enough I should say that, a few weeks since, when rumour put my life in danger, he was one of the first to write a kindly and unaffected letter of sympathy to Mrs. Bradlaugh.

When the great cry of thanksgiving was raised for the recovery of the Prince of Wales, I could not let it pass without protest. While he lay dangerously ill I had ceased to make any attack on himself or family, but I made no pretence of a grief I did not feel. When the thanksgiving day was fixed, and tickets for St. Paul's were sent by the Lord Chamberlain to working men representatives, I felt it right to hold a meeting of protest, which was attended by a crowded audience in the New Hall of Science.

The "right of meeting" has given me three important occasions of measuring swords with the Government during the last few years, and each time defeat has attended the Government. The first, the Hyde Park meeting, where I acted in accord with Mr. Beales, to whom as chief, let the honour go of this conflict. The second was on the 31st July, 1871, under the following circumstances. A meeting had been held by Mr. G. Odger and some of his friends in Hyde Park, on Sunday, the 30th of July, to protest against the grant to Prince Arthur; this meeting was adjourned until the following evening. Late on the Sunday afternoon, the adjourned meeting was forbidden by the Government. Early on Monday morning Mr. Odger applied to me to give the friends the benefit of my legal knowledge and personal influence. I consented, and the Government persevering, I took my share of the responsibility of the gathering, and signed with Mr. Odger a new notice convening the meeting. The Home Office not

only served us also with a written prohibition, but threatened and prepared to use force. I immediately gave Mr. Bruce notice that the force would be illegal, and that it would be resisted. At the last moment, and in fact only some half hour before the meeting commenced, the Government abandoned its prohibition, and an enormous meeting of a most orderly character was held in absolute defiance of the authorities.

The more recent case was in December, 1872, when finding that Mr. Odger, Mr. Bailey, and others, had been prosecuted under some monstrous and ridiculous regulations invented by Mr. Ayrton, I, on my own responsibility, determined to throw down the gauntlet to the Government. I did this most successfully, and soon after the opening of Parliament the obnoxious regulations were annulled.

It is at present too early to speak of the Republican movement in England, which I have sought, and not entirely without success, to organise on a thoroughly legal basis. It is a fair matter for observation that my lectures on "The Impeachment of the House of Brunswick," have been delivered to crowded audiences assembled in some of the finest halls in England and Scotland, notably the Free Trade Hall, Manchester, the Town Hall, Birmingham, the Town Hall, Northampton, and the City Hall, Glasgow. It is, as far as I am aware, the first time any English citizen has, without tumult or disorder and in buildings belonging to various Municipalities, directly challenged the hereditary right of the reigning family.

In penning the foregoing sketch I had purposely to omit many facts connected with branches of Italian, Irish, and French politics. I have also entirely omitted my own struggles for existence. The political parts are left out because there are secrets which are not my own alone, and which may not bear full telling for many years to come. The second, because I hope that another year or two of hard work may enable me to free myself from the debt load which for some time has hung heavily round me.

THE

REAL REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE.

By C. BRADLAUGH.

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REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE.

BY C. BRADLAUGH.

La multitude qui ne se reduit pas à l'unité est confusion. L'unité qui n'est pas multitude est tyrannie.—PASCAL.

La multitude, c'est la société: l'unité, c'est la verité—c'est l'ensemble des lois de justice et de raison qui doivent gouverner la société.—GUIZOT.

Government is a contrivance of human wisdom to provide for human wants. Men have a right that these wants should be provided for by this wisdom.—BUCKLE.

ANY one reading the parliamentary debates of 1793 to 1798, and again those immediately preceding the passing of the Reform Bill in 1832, will at once perceive how much of political power has been conceded by the governing classes to the governed on a pressure from without, and how little concession has been obtained by the people from their rulers from a sense of justice, when the demand has been unaccompanied by a powerful popular agitation. Enlargements of political privileges have been granted not cheerfully, but with fear and murmuring, and after a long and angry resistance. In the late debates on the reform question in the House of Commons, the working classes were, with some justice, upbraided for their apathy, yet when formerly active in their own interest they were not unfrequently the victims of state prosecutions for treasons and misdemeanours. I desire to see renewed political activity, believing that the present enormous and wasteful expenditure of the English Government calls for interference on the part of the people, who are the contributors of the great bulk of the revenue. Such an interference is only usefully practicable when a wide extension of political power has been obtained by the masses, and an alteration of the suffrage has rendered the House of Commons something nearer an assembly of the people's representatives. The unenfranchised are at the present time politically at the mercy of their more favoured brethren, and this subjection of one class to another is most disastrous in its effects on

both. That men educated as are the English people should be controlled without the right to express an effective opinion as to the direction of such control, is a wrong demanding speedy remedy.

Believing it to be impossible that the masses can in the future rest satisfied for a period of any considerable duration without the enactment of some measure of parliamentary reform, and knowing that the attainment of a successful issue on the part of the people to any reform agitation must depend on the justice of the measure agitated for, and on the ability of the agitators to enforce their demands by sound argument, I deem it my duty to bring specially before the working classes, who are most interested in the renewal of a movement for reform, certain views which appear to me of vital importance to them, and which are promulgated by a writer who declares that "the problem of constitutional organism is, in what manner the individuals composing the entire community are to be classed, so that no opinions or interests shall be unheard, or extinguished in representation;" and who quotes with approval the statement of Guizot, that "the object of representative government is to examine publicly the great interests and diverse opinions which, while dividing society, seek to overcome each other, in the just confidence that out of their debates will grow the knowledge and adoption of those laws and measures which best conduce to the interests of the country. This object is only attained by the triumph of a true majority, the minority constantly being present and heard. If the majority is displaced by artifice, the result is falsehood. If the minority is excluded from the discussion, it is an oppression. In either case the principle of representative government is corrupted." The writer to whom I refer is Mr. Thomas Hare, of whom John Stuart Mill, in the supplement to his treatise on Parliamentary Reform, says that "he has raised the principle of the Representation of Minorities to an importance and dignity which no previous thinker had ascribed to it."

Holding, as I do, the opinion that every sane human being unconvicted of crime should have the means of

exercising, through the electoral suffrage, an influence on the management of the public affairs of the state in which he or she is resident, I have been rejoiced to find in Mr. Hare's book an unfailing reply to one of the most vital objections made by those who contend against any considerable extension of the franchise to the masses. This objection was embodied by Mr. Burke in his expression of fear of a democratic majority, and is thus stated by Mr. Mill, who asks, "Why is nearly the whole educated class united in uncompromising hostility to a purely democratic suffrage? Not so much because it would make the most numerous class, that of manual labourers, the *strongest* power; *that* many of the educated classes would think only just. It is because it would make them the *sole* power, because in every constituency the votes of that class would swamp and politically annihilate all other members of the community taken together." That is, the minority who at present govern by the unjust exclusion of the masses from the exercise of the suffrage, claim to perpetuate this injustice, and to retain to themselves the usurped dominance, because they anticipate, at the hands of the people, the same kind of wrong which the masses suffer from them—namely, political annihilation. This political death (which occurring to any body of citizens is a most grievous injury to the state) has terror for the upper 10,000, notwithstanding which, they appear to deem it the rightful fate of the lower 10,000,000. John Stuart Mill says, "A person who is excluded from all participation in political business is not a citizen He has not the feelings of a citizen. To take an active interest in politics is, in modern times, the first thing which elevates the mind to large interests and contemplations; the first step out of the narrow bounds of individual and family selfishness, the first opening in the contracted round of daily occupations. The person who in a free country takes no interest in politics unless from having been taught that he ought not to do so, must be too ill informed, too stupid, or too selfish, to be interested in them; and we may rely on it that he cares as little for anything else which does not

directly concern himself or his personal connections. Whoever is capable of feeling any common interest in his kind, or with his country, is interested in politics; and to be interested in them and not wish for a voice in them is an impossibility. The possession and the exercise of political, and among others of electoral rights, is one of the chief instruments both of moral and intellectual training for the popular mind; and all governments must be regarded as extremely imperfect until every one who is required to obey the laws, has a voice, or the prospect of a voice, in their enactment and administration" At present a fraction only of the community have a right to vote, the user of this right is far from complete, and a majority of the so-called representatives of the people are returned to the House of Commons by a minority of that fraction; so that, in fact, the minority of a minority rule the nation. This is clearly wrong, and the apology by the governing classes that theirs is the educated minority is deprived of much of its force on examination. Educated are the governors? Not so much in the wants of the poor as in the pauper toiler, not so fully in the needs of labour, as is the factory *employé;* in each phase of the labourer's existence various wrongs need remedy, and it is only in the living through these poor men's miseries that men can be educated to their full comprehension. There are many questions in the discussion of which the working classes are most fittingly educated to entitle them to a voice, and on which they have need as well as right to be heard by representatives from their own ranks. The pretence of education on the part of the politician is sometimes a tinsel, covering the most complete ignorance of the political requirements of the nation. An educated minority so misgoverned the uneducated majority of France that at last more than half a century of bitter wretchedness and starvation culminated in the decapitation of a king and a bloody convulsion of the nation. An educated minority in Austria at the present day rule by force against the will of the Hungarian, Venetian, and Gallician peasantry, and revolts and repressions result.

In our own country it has been the educated classes who

have impeded the education of their poorer brethren by the imposition of taxes on knowledge, and a variety of restrictions on the liberty of the press. To use the language of Mr. Buckle, "they could hardly have done worse if they had been the sworn advocates of popular ignorance." Especially have they hindered the diffusion of political information, and the pillory, prison, and transportation were the arguments used against the early instructors of the masses in their duties as citizens. The right to diffuse political knowledge amongst the crowd has been won by slow and painful processes, and in defiance of state trials, government-favouring judges, and county jails. No wonder that the masses have rested ignorant so long.

In England, even now, an educated minority waste in extravagant state expenditure million after million, coined by the hand labour of the political nonentities, who pay the taxes, and are deemed sufficiently educated to obey laws they have no share in making. Amongst the governing classes are some who from mean and selfish motives sustain a state of things which finds sinecures for younger sons; but there are many even in pure Belgravia who would willingly accord to the working man some share in the government, but who fear that if the right of suffrage be attained by the people, it will be used to destroy politically the whole of those in whom political power is at present vested. These urge that in every country, city, and borough the artizans and labourers outnumber the men of property and birth, and they declare their conviction that in a House of Commons returned by universal suffrage, there would be no justice done to the rights of property. If this argument were true to its fullest extent, it would only serve to show that those who have possessed the fullest opportunities for developing the national will, have not used their opportunities for the good of the nation. It can hardly be denied that the governing classes of the country have had to a great extent the power of controlling the education of the people, nor can it be contended that this power has been so advantageously used as it might have been if the real elevation of the masses had been sought.

So that in effect I reply, that even if the result of conceding to the working classes their political rights were as disastrous to the aristocracy as the most timid contemplate, yet even then there is no valid excuse for the withholding such political power from the people. Mr. Hare's proposal, which I desire to have discussed by my readers, meets this objection; and while he does not contend for such an extension of the suffrage as I should consider just, he proposes a scheme under which I conceive it possible to obtain the real representation of the people in the English House of Commons. Mr. Hare looks upon the Parliament House as a place where minorities, heresies, and protests of all sorts should be represented and entitled to a hearing; and in order to attain this he has in a most masterly manner framed a measure which should be fully examined by the people; for so long as the working classes are denied justice, and are not admitted to the suffrage in so ample a manner as to outnumber the upper class electors, it is to the working men that Mr. Hare's bill is peculiarly beneficial; and I trust that even if universal suffrage were obtained to-morrow the people would know that a permanent and progressive democracy can only subsist usefully by permitting its opponents to be heard in the national deliberative assembly. Guizot says that "an electoral system which in the formation of the deliberative assembly annuls in advance the influence and participation of the minorities, destroys the representative government, and would be as fatal to the majority as a law which in a deliberative assembly compelled the minority to remain silent."

At present elections are purely local, and the minority of electors in a particular borough are not only unrepresented, but are misrepresented. Of late several modes have been suggested for giving an effective voice to a minority; by limiting each elector to fewer votes than the number of members to be elected, or allowing him to concentrate all his votes on the same candidate. These various schemes are praiseworthy so far as they go, but they attain the object very imperfectly.

All plans for dividing a merely local representation in

unequal ratios, are limited by the small number of members which can be, and the still smaller which ought to be, assigned to any one constituency. There are considerable objections to the election even of so many as three by every constituent body. This, however, under present arrangements, is the smallest number which would admit of any representation of a minority, and in this case the minority must amount to at least a third of the whole. All smaller minorities would continue, as at present, to be disfranchised; and in a minority of a third, the whole number must unite in voting for the same candidate. There may, therefore, be a minority within the minority who have sacrificed their individual preference, and from whose vote nothing can with certainty be concluded but that they dislike less the candidate they voted for, than they do the rival candidate."* Mr. Hare would have principles represented rather than places, and he would not confine the voters to a local candidate, but would widen their sphere of choice, and permit the vote to be given to any one who was a candidate for election anywhere in the kingdom. That is, supposing there to be in all 658 members of parliament, and a total of 1,316,000 electors throughout the kingdom voting at a particular election, he would divide the latter by the former, thus leaving a quotient of 2000, and he would allow any candidate who obtained 2000 votes throughout the whole kingdom to be returned to parliament. This would much modify the constitution of the House, even without any extension of the suffrage. For example, there are the various Trades' Unions unrepresented in parliament, and although numerically strong, they are spread over a wide surface, and are so weak in suffrage power in any given town or borough, that there is probably no locality where the Trades' Unions would have the ghost of a chance to carry a candidate; but given all Great

* These semi-dissentients might even amount to a majority of the minority; for (as Mr. Hare remarks) if fifty persons agree to combine their strength, who, left to themselves, would have divided their votes among ten candidates, six of the fifty may impose their candidate on all the rest, though perhaps only relatively preferred by them.

Britain, and a hundred votes in one city, and twenty in that borough, and ten in this town, and five in that village, and so on, and the quotient may be attained, and the Trades' Union may pick their best man, and compel parliament to receive him. So with the Co-operative societies, the Odd-Fellows, and other large friendly societies. All these with their wide influences, might gather the necessary number of votes from different corners of the realm. This portion of Mr. Hare's scheme provides for the representation of every minority of not less than 2000 electors and the representation is more nearly equalised than is otherwise possible. Every candidate who is elected can boast that he is the representative of a constituency unanimous in their desire for his return, and no voter can complain that he is misrepresented by a man he has voted against. Some candidates of great popularity will probably get more than the quota of votes required, and if all these were counted for him, the House would be deficient of members, as none are to be returned who do not obtain the quota. To obviate this, Mr. Hare proposes that no more than the necessary quota of votes shall be counted to any candidate, and that whoever obtains that number shall be declared duly elected; all surplus votes being transferred to some one else. For this purpose the elector is to put on his voting paper more than one name, so that if the first named have elsewhere the necessary suffrages, then the vote passes to the second, or in case he shall already have sufficient, then to the third, or fourth, or fifth, or sixth, or seventh, and so on. Thus while the vote would in any case only be counted for one candidate, it would be sure to be counted for some candidate, and would not be thrown away as many votes are at present. John Stuart Mill regards it as certain that this scheme would, if carried out, prodigiously improve the *personnel* of the national representation. "At present, were they ever so desirous, a great majority of the most distinguished men in the country have little or no chance of being elected anywhere as members of the House of Commons. The admirers, and those who would be the supporters, of a person whose claims rest on acknowledged

personal merit, are generally dispersed throughout the country, while there is no place in which his influence would not be far outweighed by that of some local grandee, or *notabilité de clocher*, who neither has, nor deserves to have, the smallest influence anywhere else. If a man of talents and virtue could count as votes for his return all electors in any part of the kingdom, who would like to be represented by him, every such person who is well known to the public would have a probable chance; and under this encouragement nearly all of them, whose position and circumstances were compatible with parliamentary duties, might be willing to offer themselves to the electors. Those voters who did not like either of the local candidates, or who believed that one whom they did not like was sure to prevail against them, would have all the available intellectual strength of the country from whom to select the recipient of their otherwise wasted vote. An assembly thus chosen would contain the élite of the nation."

The improvement anticipated would not be confined to representatives of minorities, better men would be chosen on either side. "A member who had already served in parliament with any distinction, would under this system be almost sure of his re-election. At present the first man in the House may be thrown out of parliament precisely when most wanted, and may be kept out for several years, from no fault of his own, but because a change has taken place in the local balance of parties, or because he has voted against the prejudices or local interests of some influential portion of his constituents." Instances of this have occurred, and will be familiar to the reader. "Under Mr. Hare's system, if he has not deserved to be thrown out, he will be nearly certain to obtain votes from other places, sufficient, with his local strength, to make up the quota of 2000 (or whatever the number may be) necessary for his return to Parliament. Consider next the check which would be given to bribery and intimidation in the return of members to Parliament. Who by bribery and intimidation, could get together 2000 electors from a hundred different parts of the country? Intimidation would have no means

of acting over so large a surface; and bribery requires secresy, and an organised machinery, which can only be brought into play within narrow local limits. Where would then be the advantage of bribing or coercing the 200 or 300 electors of a small borough? They could not of themselves make up the quota, and nobody could know what part of the country the remaining 1700 or 1800 suffrages might come from. In places so large as to afford the number of 2000 electors, bribery or intimidation would have the same chances as at present. But it is not in such places that, even now, these malpractices are successful. As regards bribery (Mr. Hare truly remarks), the chief cause of it is, that in a closely contested election where certain votes are indispensable, the side which cannot secure those particular votes is sure to be defeated. But under Mr. Hare's plan no vote would be indispensable. A vote from any other part of the country would serve the purpose as well: and a candidate might be in a minority at the particular place and yet be returned."

In each election the votes are necessarily given by voting papers, bearing the name and address of the speaker, which are preserved, each quota being kept distinct, and in case of a vacancy occurring by death, or otherwise, the returning officer in direction from the voter is to send a circular letter to each of the electors forming the constituency of the member who had filled the vacant seat with a list of the new candidates, and the candidate obtaining the largest number of suffrages out of such constituency will be returned as duly elected to the vacant seat.

In the event of a member accepting office under government, a circular letter is to be sent to the constituency represented by that member, informing them thereof, and unless in reply at least one fourth express their dissent, the representative who has so accepted office under government will not vacate his seat.

While Mr. Hare's plan does not propose to equalise the electoral districts in any of the modes heretofore suggested, it of course fulfils the whole object of those who desire this equalisation; and, unlike all other schemes, is self-adjusting, the quota being declared at each election as before stated.

There are other points as to the ballot, the suffrage, disqualification of members, &c., upon which some differences of opinion may be expected. Mr. Hare objects to the ballot, and in another pamphlet this shall be fully discussed. The subject is of too much interest to dismiss here in a few lines only. Mr. Hare evidently hopes that undue influence will be so guarded against and checked by the heightened standard of electoral morals induced in the working out of the scheme of personal representation of which he is the author, that he provides for open voting by voting papers, signed by the elector, and these are to be delivered by the voter personally at the polling booth, save under special circumstances.

Mr. Hare's views on the suffrage are that the qualification should be accessible to every man when he acquires a home and settles to an occupation in life. He says with reference to woman, that given the same qualification as the man, there is no sound reason for excluding her from the parliamentary franchise. He would not disqualify judicial officers, clergymen, or officials from becoming representatives. Numerous readers will doubtless agree in thinking that too many probable causes of mischief abound in the adoption of this item. The Judge on the Bench who may have to try a political prisoner should be kept as free as possible from party bias. The system of government in England will most certainly have to undergo a thorough purification before civil service appointments can cease to be regarded as possible wages for ministerial support. He condemns the payment of members, but would limit each candidate's election expenses to £50. This sum would be a sort of guarantee against crowding the lists with sham candidates.

All the present machinery of elections would be thrown out of gear by the successful introduction of Mr. Hare's views. We should no longer have the inhabitants of each place divided into parties seeking to return their candidate against the desire of the political opponent. Instead of the elections being, as now, a contest for power in which some get their representative elected, and some vote and see all

their labours fruitless, and their political effort entirely wasted, we should have the election an endeavour to select the ablest representative, each voter knowing that if he had anywhere in the country a quota of sympathising electors, he was sure of being represented in Parliament by the man of his choice. At present our electoral system divides the voters into adverse parties arrayed under formal names, and prevents the expression of the true and individual opinions of the members of either party. "It lowers the force of thought and conscience, reduces the most valuable electoral elements to inaction, and converts the better motives of those who act into an effort for success, and a mere calculation of the means of accomplishing it." Mr Hare's plan would enable the individual expression of opinion to become a reality, not a sham; it would develop a more self-reliant tone in those electors who at present are crushed out of vigour by the consciousness of their numerical helplessness. It would enable them to enter the House of Commons gathering their votes from east, west, north, and south, who under the present system could never get a majority in any one place, and who yet perhaps are better entitled to rank themselves as representative men in the country than are half the elected members of the Commons House of Parliament.

Those people who have not yet the suffrage right should submit Mr. Hare's views to careful investigation, in order to ascertain whether the bill he proposes would, if enacted, result, as I firmly believe it would, in increasing their opportunities of acquiring the franchise, by placing in Parliament various men having knowledge of and trusted by the people, to whom parliamentary action is at present impossible. Those who hold the reins of government entirely in their own grasp should seriously consider whether it would not be far wiser to carry such a measure now they have the ability, and while there is no hostile popular pressure, than to wait until a stormy reformation has swept them from power, and a manhood suffrage, conceded to the agitated masses to prevent a continuance of riot and revolt, has politically annihilated the classes who have hitherto usurped the

entire government of the state. The governing minority might in a time of political repose, such as the present, gracefully enact Mr. Hare's measure on the ground that it was just and beneficial to the people; although, notwithstanding that it will be equally just in the next generation, its future benefits will be special to themselves. It would, however, be difficult for the minority of high birth and great estates to obtain the enactment for themselves from an irritated and overwhelming majority of a measure which, when themselves powerful, they had refused.

It is desirable that both sides should regard the question of the political enfranchisement of the people as of equal interest and common benefit. To adopt a phrase of Burke's, politics ought to be adjusted to human nature, and the proper business of the government ought to be to ascertain the general wish and requirements of the nation, legislating in accordance therewith. In one of his speeches the eloquent calumniator of the French Revolution said, "The people will have it so, and it is not for their representatives to say nay;" yet either of the members now sitting for Manchester may hear that the non-electors, inhabitants of that city, have assembled to the number of 40,000 in front of the Infirmary, declaring in favour of some measure, and he may, under present circumstances, altogether disregard their united voice, because politically they are dumb. Each individual of the 40,000 may be a tax-paying, law-observing machine, but he is destitute of any rights as a citizen: he has no vote, no voice in the government of his country. The Imperial Parliament is elected without his sanction, he contributes no choice, has no part in its selection; all his duty is to obey its edicts, his privilege to pay and pine.

That a great political struggle is impending, must be evident to every student of history. In every nation of the world, each period of assault by the governed on their governors for the obtainment of some share in the right to manage the business of the nation, has been preceded by a strong expression of heretical views. This is natural, for what is the latter but the manifestation of an education incon-

sistent with political slavery? While the masses are ignorant they believe everything and remain without the suffrage, but as they are gradually educated to confute the delusions of their ancient teachers, the superstitionists who frightened their children with bogey, so they are also educated enough to dispute the dictum of the great landed aristocracy who treat the nation as in its babyhood, and declare it incapable of self-government. At the present moment the nation, by its wide and fast increasing out-uttered heresy, manifests a rapid extension of education, and I therefore do not believe that it will wait for a very long time before its attention is turned to the achievement of some such result as the real representation of the people in Parliament.

No conclusion can be fitter for this brief pamphlet than the renewed recommendation to our readers to obtain for themselves Mr. Hare's volume, of which Mr. Mill says that —"it deserves a high rank among manuals of political thought," and that "the system it embodies will be recognised as alone just in principle, as one of the greatest of all practical improvements, and as the most efficient safeguard of further parliamentary reform."

GEORGE

PRINCE OF WALES;

WITH RECENT CONTRASTS AND COINCIDENCES.

BY

CHARLES BRADLAUGH.

LONDON:
FREETHOUGHT PUBLISHING COMPANY,
28, Stonecutter Street, E.C.

PRICE TWOPENCE.

THE LIFE OF GEORGE PRINCE OF WALES,

WITH RECENT CONTRASTS AND COINCIDENCES.

"'God save the King!' It is a large economy
In God to save the like; but if he will
Be saving all the better: for not one am I
Of those who think damnation better still."—BYRON.

GEORGE AUGUSTUS FREDERICK PRINCE OF WALES, was born on August 12th, 1762. He was the son of George III. by the Queen Sophia Charlotte. George III. was thrice married, once privately in 1759, at Curzon Street Chapel, May Fair, to Hannah Lightfoot, a Quakeress, and afterwards on September 18th, 1761, publicly to the Princess Sophia Charlotte of Mecklenberg Strelitz. As Hannah Lightfoot was living at the time of the second marriage, the offspring of that bigamous union would have been illegitimate if George III. had not been King of England. Fortunately it is one of the maxims of our glorious constitution, that the King can do no wrong; besides which, the marriage with Hannah Lightfoot has been positively denied, although it is said that the Earl of Abercorn and Lord Harcourt, amongst others, informed Queen Charlotte of the actuality of the first marriage. I accept the denial, even in the teeth of the fact, for a royal denial, as was shown in the case of the Fitzherbert marriage, of the Duke of York scandal, and of the Mordaunt divorce, is of greater value than any evidence; and in this case I accept the denial of the Lightfoot marriage the more readily, as if the story of that union were true it would cast grave doubts on the right of Her Most Gracious Majesty to reign over us. The only title English monarchs have to their crowns—and it must be admitted that this title is an all-sufficient one—is that of hereditary right. The monarchs of some countries have been selected by their peoples: our kings and queens are bred from special foreign stocks, and inherit the right to reign just as other persons inherit entailed estates, and any blot on the legitimacy would weaken the right. It is some comfort to know that George III. married Queen Charlotte

twice, the second marriage being solemnised at Kew, in 1765; but whether Hannah Lightfoot was then dead or alive is a matter on which it is difficult to express an opinion. At any rate, if there had ever been any doubt as to the legitimacy of George Prince of Wales, the second solemnisation of the marriage with Sophia Charlotte may give all loyal subjects more ease of mind as to the title of the later born members of the Royal Family. Those who argue that Hannah Lightfoot died in 1765, make strange suggestions as to a severe attack of mental disease, which, commencing at this time, although partially repressed, ultimately reappeared, and many years after terminated in the absolute idiocy of George III.

There is a great contrast between the parents of Prince George and those of the present Prince of Wales. The late Prince Consort is known as Albert the Good, and the statues erected through the country testify more strikingly than his many less known grand deeds, to the great esteem in which his memory is held by all loyal Englishmen; but George III. was described by Lord Brougham in the following fashion:—"Of a narrow understanding, which no culture had enlarged; of an obstinate disposition, which no education perhaps could have humanised; of strong feelings in ordinary things, and a resolute attachment to all his own opinions and predilections, George III. possessed much of the firmness of purpose which, being exhibited by men of contracted mind without any discrimination, and as pertinaciously when they are in the wrong as when they are in the right, lends to their characters an appearance of inflexible consistency, which is often mistaken for greatness of mind, and not seldom received as a substitute for honesty. In all that related to his kingly office he was the slave of deep-rooted selfishness; and no feeling of a kindly nature ever was allowed access to his bosom whenever his power was concerned." So one who had a fair opportunity of judging writes of the father, and the criticism may aid us to understand his son. It is said that on some rare occasions, George III. could be privately and munificently generous; the name of the father of our present Prince of Wales figured in many public lists of charitable subscriptions, but

it has never been suggested that he in any way concealed the natural liberality of his disposition. George IV. was by letters patent created Prince of Wales and Earl of Chester; as first born, he was Duke of Cornwall and of Rothesay, Earl of Carrick and Baron of Renfrew. The present Prince of Wales was also created Earl of Dublin, a title afterwards deserved by his praiseworthy exertions at Punchestown Races for the amelioration of the condition of the Irish people. When George Prince of Wales was only nineteen, he became with his brother Frederick, who was not only Duke of York, but was elected Bishop of Osnaburgh when eleven months old, the subject of much hostile comment. One writer says, "at this period the Prince and his eldest brother were associated in dissipation of every species: their love of gaming was proverbial, and their excess of indulgence in voluptuousness was sufficient to drain the resources of the country."

How great the contrast between the conduct of these two royal princes and that of the present Prince of Wales and his brother the Duke of Edinburgh. Omitting the Continental papers, some of which have dared to print suggestions as to the habits of the first, and the Colonial papers, some of which have been wicked enough to charge the second with open and notorious licentiousness, and leaving as unworthy notice Sir Charles Mordaunt's reference to "the previous bad character" of the present heir-apparent, we defy the finger of slander to touch in any of our respectable journals the slightest remark of a depreciatory character against either of our well-beloved royal princes; except some provincial journal like the *Royal Leamington Chronicle*, or cheap paper like *Reynolds's*, all our free and independent press writers agreeing in testifying to the purity of the living scions of the House of Brunswick. George Prince of Wales called himself Florizel, and his *liaison* with Mary Robinson as Perdita was one of the most notorious amongst the escapades of his early life. Mrs. Baddeley states that it commenced when the Prince was little more than fourteen. "But," asks Thackeray, "shall we take the Leporello part, flourish a catalogue of the conquests of this royal Don Juan, and tell the names of the favourites to

whom one after the other Prince George flung his pocket-handkerchief? What purpose would it answer to say how Perdita was pursued, won, deserted, and by whom succeeded?" As Thackeray refrained with George, so we refrain with Albert Edward, and from Broadwood downwards draw a discreet veil of reticence which only hides from those who cannot see:—

> "Who has a thing to bring
> For a gift to our lord the King,
> Our King all Kings above?
> A young girl brought him love;
> And he dowered her with shame,
> With a sort of infamous fame,
> And then with lonely years
> Of penance and bitter tears.
> Love is scarcely the thing
> To bring as a gift for our King."

The marriage of Prince George, in 1786, to Mrs. Fitzherbert, gained additional *éclat* from the fact that George is said to have written a letter to Charles James Fox, authorising him to deny in Parliament that the formal solemnity had ever taken place. Thackeray's answer ought to have been given to Mr. Rolle, in the House of Commons, in lieu of that spoken by C. J. Fox, who is alleged to have been present at the marriage, and yet asserted to the Legislature, if Hansard be reliable, that "it never did happen." The author of "Vanity Fair" says that George "did actually marry Mrs. Fitzherbert according to the rites of the Roman Catholic Church; that her marriage settlements have been seen in London, and that the names of the witnesses to her marriage are known." Yet, of what avail is an author's word against the denial of a Prince? When George attained his majority he had an allowance of £50,000 per annum, together with a grant of £60,000 for furnishing Carlton House. When Albert Edward attained his majority he had £40,000 a year voted him by Parliament, he had the income of the Duchy of Cornwall, exceeding net £60,000 per annum, and he had the enormous accumulations of his minority, amounting to something like a million sterling. Neither George

Prince nor Albert Edward Prince limited his expenditure to the amount of his income. The debts of George came before the Parliament; the pecuniary embarrassments of Albert Edward, although matter of common talk in some circles, are at present better concealed. The House of Commons in 1787, voted about £160,000 for the payment of the Prince of Wales's debts, solemn pledges of economy for the future being given by, and on behalf of, the royal insolvent. It is a question whether the present Parliament would vote, and whether the country would submit to a repetition of such a payment. In 1788, George III. was mad, and no greater proof can be advanced of the perfect and unimpeachable character of our monarchy than the fact that, with an insane head, the Government went on quite as well as when he was in possession of all his faculties. The mere fact that Jamaica had mutinied, that the American Colonies had broken our oppressive yoke, and that Ireland was held by force and fraud, must not be allowed to militate against our approval of George's reign. That war cost during it more than £1,200 000,000, renders the memory of George III. as dear to us, as the King was in life to the members of the London Corresponding Society. I know that one furious Radical, Earl Grey, speaks as if the monarchy were always better without the King than with him, for he declares that "the highly beneficial custom of holding Cabinet Councils without the presence of the Sovereign arose from George I. not knowing English." And Earl Grey had the audacity to publish this in the reign of her present Majesty, whose constant help and aid in the government of the nation is known to be so highly valuable. I once heard a public lecturer, describing the crowned head of this great empire, say—"What is the position which England's monarch occupies in the great vessel of the State? He is not the paddle-wheel nor the screw, neither the mast, the sails, the rigging, the bulwarks, nor the keel; he is the highly decorated figure-head, always costly, not always handsome, and never useful."

In consequence of the state of mind of George III., debates took place in the House of Commons as to the Regency. The friends of the Prince claimed it for him as

a right; Pitt, on the contrary, maintained the terribly revolutionary doctrine, that in the event of incapacity on the part of the reigning monarch, the right to nominate the Regent rested with the Parliament. Everyone will see that this is a most dangerous doctrine, for it is equivalent to declaring that the nation has the legal right to select its own ruler on any vacancy occurring in the occupancy of the throne. Fortunately, the King temporarily recovered his reason. When sane, George III. bitterly disliked his eldest son, and showed that dislike in various fashions—the King and heir apparent were seldom or never seen together. To-day no such division can be shown between the reigning monarch and Crown Prince; and although it is true that on the recent royal visit to the City the Prince of Wales was unavoidably absent, it must not be forgotten that immediately his royal mother had left London for Windsor, Albert Edward delighted all loyal citizens by his attendance the same evening at one of the new theatres. George Prince of Wales was called the first gentleman in Europe; that is, he was so styled while he was alive, although posthumous critics have disputed his claim to the title; no such dispute is, however, likely to arise in any case with reference to the present Prince of Wales. His royal thoughtfulness for his guests, the sons of the Viceroy of Egypt, when a careless coachman had overturned them in the mud, will remain an ineffaceable testimony of his sensitive and well-trained nature. George is said to have been praised, and not unduly, for his highly cultivated mind, his elegant accomplishments, and his personal graces. Albert Edward has been honoured in the cartoon of the *Tomahawk* with a pictorial epitome of *his* elegant accomplishments.

In 1788, 1789, and 1790, in order to raise money, George Prince of Wales, Frederick Duke of York, and William Henry Duke of Clarence, issued joint and several bonds, bearing interest, and payable within six months after either of them should ascend the throne. These bonds were issued to an extent in all of nearly one million sterling nominal, but were of course placed at heavy discount. The holders, who were mostly foreigners, were prevented from being importunate creditors by deportation under the Alien Act

from this country, and by accusations of treason in their own land. In 1794, the Prince of Wales owing then about £650,000, a bargain was made that George should marry his cousin Princess Caroline Louisa of Brunswick, and that the nation should not only pay all his debts, but also increase his annual allowance. George wanted his debts paid, but did not want to marry, and the copy of a letter is preserved, from him to his proposed spouse, in which he asks her to refuse to marry him, tells her that he loves another woman, and finally winds up: "You would find in me a husband who places all his affections upon another. If this secret which I name to you in confidence does not cause you to reject me; if ambition, or any other motive of which I am ignorant, cause you to condescend to the arrangements of my family, learn that, as soon as you shall have given an heir to the throne, I will abandon you, never to meet you more in public." It is wonderful how any woman could have married a man writing her such a letter. George said, "You cannot accuse me of having deceived you." Not only were the £650,000 debts paid, and the Prince's allowance increased from £60,000 to £100,000 per annum, but £71,000 additional was voted for plate, jewels, and marriage sundries, at Carlton House. Six months after the marriage the starving poor cried, "Give us bread," "No famine." King George III. was pelted on his way to open Parliament, and, when he arrived at Westminster, was so frightened "that," says a Parliamentary writer, "his face was flushed and swollen, his eyes were momentarily turned from side to side, and his manner evinced the utmost perturbation." In great fear the Treason and Sedition Acts were hurried through Parliament.

It is alleged that George asked for a glass of brandy after his first interview with his bride elect, and that when he was married, on April 8th, 1795, he did not even remain sober on the wedding-day. No such disgraceful charge could be repeated against Albert Edward, whose constant sobriety, at home and abroad, might serve as an example for loyal temperance lecturers. That *La Cigale* should pretend against our prince, habits more like those of his princely predecessor, is an illustration of the licence of the foreign

press, and that rumour should suggest an instance of public insobriety on the Boulevard des Italiens, shows how far mud may be thrown at royal ermine of the most spotless purity. Thackeray speaks of how George "reeled into chapel to be married; how he hiccupped out his vows of fidelity."

A daughter was born to Prince George on January 7th, 1796. She was named Charlotte Augusta, and immediately after her birth, Prince George, as he threatened, separated himself from his wife.

In 1803, the excesses of Prince George caused him further embarrassment, and £60,000 a-year extra were for three years and a half devoted to the liquidation of his liabilities. Who dare write at length the names of the women—some titled and fashionable—who helped to spend this money? In the Duke of Buckingham's letters, vague references at a later date to one titled dame might be explained in regard to the expenditure of this period:—

"Who has a thing to bring
For a gift to our lord the King?
A harlot brought him her flesh,
Her lusts, and the manifold mesh
Of her wiles intervolved with caprice;
And he gave her his realm to fleece,
To corrupt, to ruin, and gave
Himself for her toy and her slave.
Harlotry's just the thing
To bring as a gift for our king."

The Marchioness of Conyngham, one of the many temporary wives of this modern Solomon, amongst other gifts, had jewels value £80,000. Lady Jersey, another favourite, shared in the work of spoiling the Egyptians. Thackeray says, that the Prince of Wales' turf experiences were unlucky as well as discreditable. He was accused of cheating with his horse Escape, and although of course acquitted, left the Jockey Club in consequence. The Prince living separate from the Princess of Wales, all kinds of rumours were circulated, one allegation being that since the living apart, another and illegitimate child had been born to her, and a Royal Commission, including the Lord Chancellor and Lord Chief Jus-

tice of England, was issued to investigate these slanderous allegations; the official report made is supposed to have thoroughly cleared Princess Caroline's character, and to have demonstrated the most wicked conduct on the part of Queen Sophia Charlotte and Prince George, but King George III. "directed it should be destroyed, and every trace of the proceedings on the affair buried in oblivion." William Cobbett, however, obtained a copy of all the depositions, either from the Princess of Wales, or from Mr. Perceval, and printed them in a special number of his *Political Register*. In a letter printed some time after her acquittal, the Princess of Wales describes the evidence offered against her before the Royal Commissioners, as "the perjuries of my suborned traducers." In 1809, another royal scandal rang through Europe. His Royal Highness the Duke of York was Commander-in-Chief of his Majesty's forces, and it was proved before Parliament, by one of his many repudiated mistresses, a Mrs. Mary Ann Clark, that several sums of money had been paid to that lady by officers desirous of procuring promotion. One sum received by Mrs. Clark was shown, by corroborative testimony, to have been applied in part payment of a jeweller's bill, for which the Duke of York was liable. A note was produced which several witnesses, some of them of most unassailable character, declared to be in the Duke's handwriting, and the contents of which referred to the case. The Duke, however, declared the note to be a forgery, and the House of Commons, by a large majority, acquitted him of any participation in the scandalous corruption which undoubtedly took place.

The Duke of York declared, on "the honour of a Prince," that he knew nothing of the corruption proved at the bar of the House. One member of the House of Commons, Mr. Tierney, replied that "It was easy to conceive that His Royal Highness would have been prompt to declare his innocence upon a vital point; but why declare it upon 'the honour of a Prince?' for the thing had no meaning." Mr. Lyttleton, another member of the Parliamentary Committee, said, "If it were in the power of the House to send down to posterity the character of the Duke of York unsullied—if their proceedings did not extend beyond their journals, he should

almost be inclined to concur in the vote of acquittal, even in opposition to his sense of duty. But though the House should acquit his Royal Highness, the proofs would still remain, and public opinion would be guided by them, and not by the decision of the House. It was in the power of the House to save its own character, but not that of the Commander-in-Chief." Mr. Wilberforce demanded the Duke of York's removal from office as "a reparation to the wounded morality of the country." Lord Temple urged that "His Royal Highness cannot be prudently continued a servant of the public." "Wherever he went the deep murmurs of public indignation would strike his ear." Lord Milton said, "His Royal Highness had given in a letter in which he declared on the honour of a Prince that he was innocent," "to his other guilt his Royal Highness had added that of falsehood." Fortunately for lovers of monarchy, a majority of 364 members against 123 brought in, in effect, a verdict of not guilty, and although the Duke of York resigned his high office, his character was freed from all stain. Now, his Royal Highness George William Frederick Charles Guelph Duke of Cambridge, son of the seventh son of George III., happens to be the present Commander-in-Chief. The nation pays to H.R.H. £12,000 per annum, as a slight mark of gratitude for having been born of Royal blood. It pays him also £4,432 for being Field Marshal Commander-in-Chief, and permits him also to receive another £5,000 a year for performing the task—so distasteful to his honourable nature—of holding four sinecure colonelcies. He has the full character of Brunswick bravery and—inheriting courage from his princely father, whose gallant conduct in leaving his command in Hanover, in 1803, covered his name with glory—has gathered enough of laurels in the Crimea to keep his reputation as a warrior green for ever. Of course, in the pure hands of H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge, all suspicion of anything like improper influences in the administration of army patronage is out of the question, and any repetition of the Duke of York scandal simply impossible. Nevertheless, the *Belfast News Letter*, in a paragraph which went round the press about twelve months since, said—

"The whisper of a grave scandal has become so loud in circles where reliable information is generally to be found, that it is no longer possible to leave it unnoticed. It relates to a very high personage, whose position ought to place him high above the breath of suspicion, but whose private life is sullied by excesses which threaten to bring disgrace upon the order to which he belongs, and even to sully the ermine of Royalty itself. Had the causes of complaint or of reprobation been confined to private history alone, the probability is that the veil might not have been raised; but it is asserted that a flagrant abuse of patronage has long prevailed in the department over which the person in question holds imperial sway, and that the storm of dissatisfaction is attaining a strength which will probably lead the House of Commons, in the interests of the public, to direct an inquiry into the circumstances of the case. The subject is one of extreme delicacy, but, in a reforming age like the present, if suspicion justly attaches, it would seem but right that those who are responsible for the honour of the administration, whether it be military, naval, or civil, should interfere, ere it be too late, to prevent a great scandal, if not national reproach. It is rumoured that certain facts in connection with the matter have been laid before the chief adviser of the Crown."

His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, ought to regret that neither Colonel Wardle, nor Lord Folkestone, nor Sir Francis Burdett is now in the House of Commons, to move for a parliamentary inquiry into the foundation of the above scandalous statement, for there can be no doubt that the Duke would be thoroughly cleared from all imputation, despite the allegation of the *Queen's Messenger*, that "his department is such an Augean stable of corruption, that it can never be cleansed unless the Serpentine is made to flow through it." Just as His Royal Highness the Duke of York was cleared by the vote of the House of Commons, and as His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales was freed from suspicion by the recent decision in the Mordaunt case, so would the Duke of Cambridge emerge unsullied from the ordeal of a parliamentary inquiry into the present distribution of army patronage. It is no light question; the money value of the preferment distributed in the department over which the Duke presides has already exceeded £2,000,000 sterling, and the central administration of the English army costs nearly three times as much as that of the French

whose forces are at least five times as numerous. In 1810, a tragedy took place in connection with the Royal Family of an almost unparalleled character. His Royal Highness Ernest Augustus Guelph Duke of Cumberland, fifth son of George III.—whom Daniel O'Connell described as "the mighty great liar," and of whom another said that "sensibility and virtue were strangers to his breast"—was wounded in his own room on the night of the 31st May. The wounds are said to have been inflicted by the Duke's valet, Sellis, who was found dead in bed. Sir Everard Home, the physician, says that Sellis clearly killed himself; another account says that Sellis's "head was nearly severed from the body." An inquest was held on Sellis, but the jury not being permitted to see the body, refused to give any verdict, and a second jury was got together who returned a verdict of *felo de se* against Sellis. While it is not possible now to say one word which can clear this mystery, it must not be forgotten as an illustration of the general virtues popularly attributed to the Royal Family, that it was repeatedly alleged that Sellis did not commit suicide; that no evidence was offered showing that he had any reasons for destroying himself, nor was it proved that he had shown any disposition towards such a course. On the contrary, it was urged that "the motive for getting rid of Sellis was the Duke's fear lest the man should reveal a secret inculpating his royal master in a crime of the most horrible description." While there is no reason for even supposing Sellis to have been murdered, it must be admitted that the Duke of Cumberland was extremely unfortunate in the matter of suicides. Twenty years later, Lord Graves committed suicide at a time when his existence interfered with the Duke's intimacy with Lady Graves, and Englishmen may rejoice that, bad as are some of the living Royal Princes, there is not one amongst them whose career can be regarded as coincident with that of the Duke of Cumberland.

In 1811, Prince George was appointed Regent, £100,000 extra being voted to him to enable him to bear the cost of the assumption of regal authority, and public opinion may be not unfairly judged by the following extract from a letter printed by the famous Junius, reproaching him for non-

performance of his duties as ruler, and contrasting the Prince Regent with his father, the poor mad King :—

"It is true we had gained little by the private virtues of a sovereign, since they had neither benefited his people nor taught his children morality; but if not publicly useful, they were a barrier to reproach. He did not stain the throne with vice, nor drown the clamours of the people in the midnight revel. Content himself to walk soberly through his part, he left the busy action of the scene to others, but never shrunk his share in the performance. We did not call him from the stews to the Council-board; from the bed of adultery to the seat of honour. Sir, it is said you plume yourself upon that princely qualification called honour, but is it in the abandonment of every sacred tie or moral obligation? Is it in the open disregard of the world's reproof, and the stoical indifference to the calls of nature and humanity? Is it honour which prompts you to quit the arms of a wife for the endearments of a wanton; or with unblushing effrontery to introduce that wanton before the chaste eye of your Royal Mother? Is it a proof of princely honour to toy away the night in debauchery, the day in lascivious enjoyment, and bid the business of the world stand still? While your country groans in distress, and your people are sinking under their privations, is it a sense of princely honour which bids you revel in profusion, and mock their sorrows with your ostentatious prodigality? It is said you have so far outstripped the boundaries of enjoyment, that luxury and sensuality toil after you in vain; would you be redeemed from a state so calamitously despicable, go visit the abode of your wretched subjects, and take a lesson from patient indigence." "If this afford not an antidote to the listless apathy of your disposition, deign but to hearken to the grievances and wrongs which overwhelm your people, and the sense of apprehension must woo you back to reason."

No Junius lives to-day with fiery pen to scorch the princely vices of another George.

On May 3, 1816, Princess Charlotte of Wales was married to Prince Leopold, of Saxe Coburg. Prince Leopold had been previously married on January 2, 1815, to the Countess of Cohaky, who was alive at the time of the marriage with Princess Charlotte of Wales. That this was another instance of bigamy is an addition to our story so trifling that we pass it by without further comment. The Princess of Wales died in child-bed on the 6th November, 1817; Prince George never communicated the death to her mother, "the most

brutal omission," says Mr. Wynn, in his letter to the Duke of Buckingham, "I ever remember, and one which would attach disgrace in private life."

On the 23rd January, 1820, the Duke of Kent died. On the evening of Friday, the 28th January, 1820, died officially King George III.

> "He died!—his death made no great stir on earth,
> His burial made some pomp; there was profusion
> Of velvet gilding, brass, and no great dearth
> Of aught but tears.
> The new world shook him off; the old yet groans
> Beneath what he and his prepared, if not
> Completed: he leaves heirs on many thrones
> To all his vices, without what begot
> Compassion for him—his tame virtues."

For some time the old King had been blind, deaf, and incurably mad, and yet his Grace of Buckingham and Sir William Knighton, tell us that the news of his death was received by George IV. "with a burst of grief which was very affecting." Living, the son had hated the father; for ten years that father had suffered chronic lunacy, but his good son finds affectionate grief for the dead as recompense for lack of filial love for the living.

In the succeeding month came the Thistlewood conspiracy, chiefly promoted, if not originally concocted, by an infamous scoundrel in the employ of the Castlereagh Government, who used the weaknesses of foolish and desperate men in order to terrify the timid by fear of treason and outrage from pursuing real political reform. Some coincidences quite as fearful, and even more thoroughly the result of police fabrication, might be found in Ireland and England in the present reign. Trials for sedition abounded. Henry Hunt, Sir Francis Burdett, Sir Charles Wolseley, Mr. Joseph Harrison, were all convicted and sentenced during the months of March and April. Colonel McMahon, who had been pimp and pander-general to the vicious appetite of George Prince of Wales, having died, and his private papers having passed into the hands of Mr. William Knighton, a physician, discreet reticence made Sir William Knighton the confidential adviser of the now worn-out and irritable debauchee. Next came the trial of the Queen, before the

House of Lords, for alleged adultery with Bartollomeo Bergami, of which Thackeray says, "As I read her trial in history I vote she is not guilty. I don't say it is an impartial verdict; but as one reads her story, the heart bleeds for the kindly, generous, outraged creature. If wrong there be, let it be at his door who wickedly thrust her from it." In August, 1820, one of Fremantle's letters to the Duke of Buckingham speaks of the treason, sedition, and blasphemy permeating the press, and a few weeks later Lord Cassilis writes, arguing against any reduction of the army, "a soldier less, and we shall have revolution and civil war." In July, 1821, King George IV. was crowned, his Queen, Caroline, whose name had been previously erased from the Liturgy, being refused admittance even to the Coronation ceremony. It was with George as Prince, not George as King that we desired here to deal. Some other time we may take the ten years of his reign from Coronation to death, and try to wade through the intrigues at the Cottage, the influence of Lady —, &c., of which the Buckingham letters say so much and tell so little. It is too much to try to sketch, in a few words, a concluding portrait of the rapidly-corrupting mass of foulness which seldom sat on the throne, or did kingly duty, but which Englishmen prayed for every Sunday, and honoured in their National Anthem,

"God save our gracious King."

"Here," says Thackeray, "was one who never resisted any temptation; never had a desire, but he coddled it and pampered it; if he ever had any nerve, frittered it away among cooks, and tailors, and barbers, and furniture-mongers, and opera dancers," "all fiddling, and flowers, and feasting, and flattery, and folly," "a monstrous image of pride, vanity, and weakness." From the accession of George III. in 1760, to the death of George IV., in 1830, the Royal Family of England received from the national treasury no less than £92,090,807.

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A LETTER FROM A FREEMASON

TO GENERAL H.R.H. ALBERT EDWARD,

PRINCE OF WALES,

Duke of Saxony, Cornwall, and Rothesay; Earl of Dublin, Colonel 10th Hussars, Colonel-in-Chief of the Rifle Brigade, Captain-General and Colonel of the Hon. Artillery Company, K.G., G.C.S.I., K.T., G.C.B., K.P., etc., etc., etc.

TO BR.·. H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF WALES.

DEAR BR.·.—I do not ask you to pardon this, to the profane, perhaps an apparently too familiar style of address, although I do pray pardon if I have unintentionally omitted many of your numerous titles in the formal superscription to this letter. I have never written before to a Prince, and may lack good manners in thus inditing; but to my brother Masons I have often written, and know they love best a plain, fraternal greeting, if the purpose of the epistle be honest.

You have voluntarily on your part, and unsought on my side, commenced by accepting me as a brother, and you have cemented this fraternity by specially swearing to protect me on appeal in my hour of danger; and though history teaches me that sworn promises are less well kept than steadfast, manly pledges, and that Princes' oaths are specially rotten reeds to lean upon; yet in the warmth of newly created brother, I am inclined to believe you brother—for we are brethren, you and I—not brothers perhaps as we should be of the same common humanity—for in this land I know that Princes are no fair mates for those who are pauper born; but we are brothers by your own choice, members of the same fraternity by your own joining; men self-associated in the same grand Masonic brotherhood, and it is for that reason I write you this letter. You, though now a Past Grand Master, are but recently a free and accepted Master

Mason, and probably yet know but little of the grand traditions of the mighty organisation whose temple doors have opened to your appeal. My knowledge of the mystic branch gained amongst the Republicans of all nations is of some years' older date. You are now, as a Freemason, excommunicate by the Pope—so am I. It is fair to hope that the curse of the Church of Rome may have a purifying and chastening effect on your future life, at least as efficacious as the blessing of the Church of England has had on your past career. You have entered into that illustrious fraternity which has numbered in its ranks Swedenborg, Voltaire, and Garibaldi. These are the three who personify grand Idealism and Poetic Madness; Wit and Genius, and true Humanity; manly Energy, sterling Honesty, and hearty Republicanism. My sponsor was Simon Bernard—yours, I hear, was the King of Sweden.

In writing, dear brother, I do not address you as a Prince of Wales, for some of our Princes of Wales have been drunken, riotous spendthrifts, covered in debt, and deep in dishonour; but you, dear brother, instead of being such an one, figure more reputably as the erudite member of a Royal Geographical Society, or as a steady fellow of the Worshipful Company of Fishmongers. Happily there is no fear that in your case a second Doctor Doran may have to pen the narrative of a delicate investigation. If Junius were alive to-day, his pen would not dare to repeat its fierce attack on another Prince of Wales. Junius charged George, Prince of Wales, with quitting the arms of his wife for the endearments of a wanton, with toying away the night in debauchery, and with mocking the sorrows of the people with an ostentatious prodigality. But your pure career, your sober and virtuous life, would win laudations even from Junius's ghost. You are an English gentleman, as well as Prince of Wales; a good and kind husband in spite of being Prince of Wales; with you woman's honour is safe from attack, and sure of protection. The draggled and vice-stained plumes on your predecessors' escutcheons have been well cleaned and straightened by modern journalism, and the Prince of Wales' feathers are no longer (like the Bourbon fleur de lis) the heraldic ornament of a race of princes *sans foi, sans mœurs.* Fit were you as profane to make the journeys to the Altar, for fame writes you as sober and chaste,

as high-minded and generous, as kind-hearted and truthful. These are the qualities, oh Albert Edward, which hid your disability as Prince, when you knelt bare-kneed in our audience chamber. The brethren who opened your eyes to the light, overlooked your title as Prince of Wales in favour of your already famous manhood. Your career is a pleasant contrast to that of George Prince of Wales. Yet because you are as different from the princes whose bodies are dust, while their memories still remain to the historian as visible monuments of shame, I write to you, not as English Prince, but as brother Master Mason. Nor do I address you in your right as one of Saxony's princes, for amongst my memories of other men's readings, I have thoughts of some in Saxony's electoral roll, who were lustful, lecherous, and vile; who were vicious sots and extravagant wasters of their peoples' earnings, who have lured for their seraglios each fresh face that came within their reach: while you, though Duke of Saxony, have joined a brotherhood whose main intent is the promotion of the highest morality. I do not indeed regard your title of Duke at all in writing you, for when we find a Duke of Newcastle's property in the hands of Sheriffs' Officers, his title a jest for bankruptcy messengers, and the Duke of Hamilton's name an European byeword, it is pleasant to be able to think that the Duke of Cornwall and Rothesay is not as these Dukes are; that this Duke is not a runner after painted donzels, that he has not written cuckold on the forehead of a dozen husbands, that he is not deep in debt, has not, like these Dukes, scattered gold in filthy gutters, while deaf to the honest claims of justice. We know, brother, that you would never have voluntarily enrolled yourself in the world's grandest organisation, if you had been as these. It would have been perjury if you had done so—perjury which, though imperially honoured at the Tuileries, would be scouted with contempt by a Lancashire workman.

I do not write to you as Earl of Dublin, for Ireland's English-given earls have been as plagues to her vitals and curses to her peoples. For 700 years, like locusts, they have devoured the verdure of her fields, and harassed the tillers of her soil. From the Earl of Chepstow to the Earl of Dublin, is the mere journeying from iron gauntlet to greedy glove—take and hold; and Irish peasantry, in deep

despair, unable to struggle, have learned to hate the Earls with whom English rule has blessed them. Nor even is this letter sent to you as Knight of the Garter, for when I read "*Honi soit qui mal y pense*," I shrink from calculating the amount of evil that might fall upon some people in the world who occupy their thoughts with princes who are Gartered Knights. Nor do I pen this to you as Colonel either of Cavalry, Infantry, or Artillery, for I can but wonder at and admire the glorious military feats which, though your modesty has hidden them, have nevertheless entitled you to command your seniors, one at least with a Waterloo medal on his breast. Our history tells us of a warrior "Black Prince," who killed many foes; it can also in the future write of you as a gallant soldier before whom pheasant, plover, and pigeon could make no stand.

I write to you as a fellow Master Mason, as to one on an equality with myself, so long as you are true to your Masonic pledge, less than myself whenever you forget it. I address this epistle to you as fellow-member of a body which teaches that man is higher than king; that humanity is beyond church and creed; that true thought is nobler than blind faith, and that virile, earnest effort is better far than dead or submissive serfdom.

The Grand Lodge of England has just conferred upon you a dignity you have done nothing to earn; but you saw light in Sweden, and that initiation should have revealed to you that the highest honour will be won by manly effort, not squeezed from slavish, fawning sycophancy. Freemasonry is democracy, are you a Democrat? Freemasonry is Freethought, are you a Freethinker? Freemasonry is work for human deliverance, are you a worker? I know you may tell me in England of wine-bibbing, song-singing, meat-eating, and white kid glove-wearing fashionables who say "Shibboleth," make "royal salutes," and call this Freemasonry; but these are mere badge-wearers, who lift their legs awkwardly over the coffin in which truth lies buried, and who never either know the grand secret, or even work for its discovery. Come with me to-day, and I will show you, even in this country, lodges where the brethren work day and night to break through conventional fetters, where they toil hourly to break down imperial and princely shams, where as a prince they would scorn you, and where as

a man they would give you a brother's grip, and die with you or for you in the fight for human redemption and deliverance. Go to Joseph Mazzini, and he will tell you of lodges where, for fifty years, Poles and Italians have kept the sparks of liberty alive whilst Russian and Austrian tyranny was striving to trample and crush them out. Go into France, and the imperial tottering Lie—which has stood too long in the shadow of the first Desolator's bloody reputation—will, if it can (now it is near its grave), forget its daily life-practice, and speak truth by way of change—tell you that the Masonic Lodges of France have been the only temples in which for twenty years it has been possible to preach the gospel of civil and religious liberty. Read Br.·. Adolph Cremieux's recent declaration : "La Maçonnerie n'est pas la religion, n'est pas la foi, elle ne cherche pas dans le Maçon, le croyant, mais l'homme." Get Odo Russell to ask Mastai Ferrati, or some old woman, to inquire of Monseigneur l'Eveque d'Orleans, and each will tell you that in the lodges are the greatest enemies of the falling churches, the bravest preachers of heretic thought, and the most earnest inculcators of Republican earnestness. Or instead of going, with some noble German glutton, to a paltry casino, read, if only once or twice, a page of Europe's history for forty years before '93, and then Germany's and Sweden's Master Masons, speaking from their graves, shall tell you how their teachings helped to pulverise crowns and coronets, and build up living citizens out of theretofore dead slaves.

You have joined yourself to the Freemasons at a right moment, for true Freemasonry is about to be more powerful than Royalty. In Spain, at this moment, they have a government without a king; nay, more, in that land disgraced by many an *auto da fé*, there is hope of the growth of a people not in the hands of priests. The Revolution which trampled on the Crown, has raised the brain, and heresy has been spoken boldly in the legislative chamber. Freemasonry has in Iberia a grand mission, an arduous task. The Revolution has exiled the weak and wicked Queen. Freemasonry, to prevent the return of such royalty, has to strive for the development of a strong and useful people. In Italy, where the Honorary G.·. M.·. is our brother, Joseph Garibaldi, to-day they dream of a Government without a monarch. Turin, Florence, Naples, Rome, forgetting

petty dissensions and local differences, no longer misled by royally-tinselled vice, are striving and hoping for the time when an Italian Republic, with a Roman Senate, may once more claim the right to be in the vanguard of civilising peoples. Read, Brother, how at the recent Masonic Banquet at Florence, Frederic Campanella was greeted with *vivas* for the union "di tutti i Galantuomini" for the salvation of Italy. In England, even at this hour, we are—if the organs of blood and culture speak truly—very near forgetting the use of a Queen. The least learned in politics amongst our peoples now know that kings and queens here are only the costly gilded figureheads of the ship of State, its helm being in the hands of the nominees of our territorial aristocracy. Some begin to wonder whether the State might not be better served by sign less gaudy, and more in accordance with the material of which the bulk of the vessel is built. Others grumble downright that a sort of base Dutch metal should be imported in large quantities, as if we had no good British oak out of which to carve a king without disfiguring German silver or Dutch leaf. In France, men are working, with prospect of near success, to overthrow the fear-stricken, *soi-disant* nephew of the great Emperor; and in Europe, the Republic of United Germany is not so far away but that the grandchildren of living Prussian and Austrian subjects may read with wonderment of the value that foolish Englishmen set upon petty German princes. *Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité*, form the Masonic trinity in unity. Do you believe in this trinity? Which will you be, prince or man? You give me the right to ask, for, cradled a prince, you have to-day (in the time which ought to be your manhood) sought admission to the ranks of men. In Freemasonry there are no princes; the only nobles in its true peerage muster-rolls must be noble men—men noble in thought, noble in effort, noble in endurance—men whose peerage is not of a parchment patent, but foot-trodden on the world's weary-to-climb life's ladder. In our Masonry there are no kings save in the kingship of manhood, "*Tous les hommes sont rois.*" Kings with pens for sceptres, king poets who make burning verse, and grand music to give life to the half-dead nation. Kings of prose, who pen history as impeachment of the few cruelly strong in the past, and who pen it that the many may learn neither to be cowardly nor weak in the grand struggle of the future.

You are a prince, but dare you be a man: for the sake of the Danish flower, whose bloom should gladden your life; for the sake of the toiling millions who are loyal from habit, and who will revolt reluctantly, but for peace will pay taxes readily; for the sake of the halo that history will show round your head in its pages? If you dare, let us see it. Go to Ireland—not to Punchestown races, at a cost to the people of more than two thousand pounds—but secretly amongst its poor, and learn their deep griefs. Walk in London, not in parade at its horse shows, where snobs bow and stumble, but in plain dress and unattended; in its Spitalfields, Bethnal Green, Isle of Dogs, and Seven Dials; go where the unemployed commence to cry in vain for bread, where hunger begins to leave its dead in the open streets, and try to find out why so many starve. Don corduroy and fustian, and ramble through the ploughed fields of Norfolk, Suffolk, Northamptonshire, Wiltshire, and other counties, where thirteen shillings per week are high wages, out of which the earner has to feed and clothe man, wife, and family, and pay rent.

Brother, before you die you will hear cries for a Republic in England, cries that will require the brains of a grand man to answer, cries which are gathering now, cries from the overtaxed, who pay, without thought and without inquiry, many more pounds in unearned pensions, for yourself and brother princes, than they will by-and-bye pay shillings, unless indeed you all work miracles, and make yourselves worth your money to the nation. Yet even this you might do; you might—you and your fellow princes in Europe—if you would disband your standing armies, get rid of the tinselled drones and gaudy court caterpillars, the State Church leeches, and hereditary cormorant tax-eaters, and then there would be a renewed lease of power for you, and higher happiness for the people. But whatever you determine to do, do quickly, or it will be too late. The *Vive la Rëpublique* now heard from some lips in Paris, Lyons, Marseilles, Bordeaux, will soon be the voice of France, and there is an electric force in the echo of that cry—a force which evokes the lightning-like flash of popular indignation with such directness against princes who mock peoples, against kings who rule for themselves, and against peers who govern for their own class, that as in a moment the oak

which has stood for centuries, is stripped of its brown bark, and left bleached and blasted to wither, so is royalty stripped of its tinselled gilding and left naked and defenceless to the cold scorn of a justly indignant nation. As a Freemason you are bound to promote peace, but peace makes the strength of peoples, and discovers the weakness of princes. As a Freemason you are bound to succour the oppressed of the world, but then it will be against your fellow-princes. As a Freemason you are bound to aid in educating the ignorant, but if you do this you teach them that the sole authority kings can wield they derive from the people; that a nation may elect a chief magistrate to administer its laws, but cannot give away their liberties to a master who shall have the right to bequeath his authority over their children to his child. As a Freemason you are bound to encourage the development of Freethought, but Freethought is at war with the Church, and between Church and Crown there has ever been most unholy alliance against peoples. You were a prince by birth, it was your misfortune. Your have enrolled yourself a Freemason by choice, it shall either be your virtue or your crime—your virtue if you are true to its manly dutifulness; your crime if you dream that your blood royalty is of richer quality than the poorest drop in the veins of

A Free and Accepted Mason.

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FIVE DEAD MEN

Whom I Knew when Living:

ROBERT OWEN, JOSEPH MAZZINI, CHARLES SUMNER, J. S. MILL, & LEDRU ROLLIN.

BY

CHARLES BRADLAUGH.

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FIVE DEAD MEN WHOM I KNEW WHEN LIVING.

In selecting as the subject for a lecture "Five Dead Men Whom I Knew when They were Living"—Robert Owen, Joseph Mazzini, John Stuart Mill, Charles Sumner, and Alexandre Auguste Ledru Rollin—I do not mean more than that the accidents of my chequered life, having thrown me into contact with these men, I take their lives for the lessons such lives give, without either pretending to maintain their several views, or to imply that all, or either of, the five are, or is, in any fashion identified with my own advanced opinions, except where such identity shall be expressly stated. Naturally, the compass of a lecture is prohibitive of any biographic detail, or of any completeness of statement of the respective teachings of the men I briefly deal with.

I.—ROBERT OWEN.

Robert Owen, the great advocate of English Socialism, was born at Newtown, a Montgomeryshire village, on the 14th May, 1771. His early life-struggles—his rapid, but sober and business-like, conquest of that wealth which the world worships so much, but to which he seems to have attached little value, except as it gave him facilities for spreading his views—are familiar enough. It is at New Lanark, in 1797, and thenceforth for twenty years, that one would wish to show Robert Owen, for if he had never done

aught outside New Lanark, he did enough there alone to win grateful recollection. Surrounding the factory workers in his employment with humanising conditions, ameliorating their position, he made the wage-winners something more than mere human machines. Recognising that it was easier to bend and mould the tendencies of the child than to break the long-acquired habit of the grown man or woman, Robert Owen set an example to all Britain by introducing infant schools in his New Lanark village. It was Robert Owen who practically demonstrated that the child's mind is a sheet of paper, varying in colour, quality, and size, but which cannot be left blank; it must be ornamented or disfigured, fact or falsehood must be written on it. It was Robert Owen who gave an example which might be followed with advantage by teetotal advocates. He made New Lanark a sober village, not so much by denouncing drink, as by providing home inducements and evening amusements which outrivaled the beer-shop or whisky store. Many an unfortunate man, returning to his overcrowded unwholesome dwelling, wearied with his toil, finds that it is foul with the breath of so many huddled together, and he consequently escapes to the glare of the gin palace or the gathering at the beerhouse to fly from the misery he finds at home. It is true that he thus aggravates the ill, but we cannot make men sober unless we purify their lives, unless the domestic hearth has its charms and enticements for them; what we want is, that the workers shall have a dwelling to go to from their work which has in it the real tokens of comfort, purity, and health of life. No four-leaved shamrock, nor magician's wand, could have even been supposed to effect so great a transformation as the persistent Humanitarianism of this earnest Robert Owen effected at New Lanark. His doctrines on the formation of character have found practical and authoritative expression more recently in the law-established reformatory schools. Instead of trampling juvenile criminals still lower into the earth, society now adopts the view which Robert Owen was the first to popularise—although not the first to enunciate—that man is better or worse according to the conditions surrounding the parent previous to the birth of the child, and those which surround the infant itself during its childhood, and accompany the boy or girl during youth. Young criminals are now sought to be made less criminal by being placed for lengthy periods under conditions which shall modify and improve their characters.

In 1817 Robert Owen—who had up to this time been regarded by fashionable society as an amiable but eccentric philanthropist, whose whims were to be pardoned on account of his wealth—startled all England by his famous declaration at the London Tavern. Impeaching the religions of the world, he aroused against him all the clergy, and frightened away most of his titled admirers. It has been the custom of late years for street-corner tub-thumpers—utterly incapable of imitating Owen's unselfish devotion to human improvement—to malign Robert Owen's name, and to cast all kinds of opprobrious epithets against his life. Undoubtedly Robert Owen furnished some cause to his foes, when he declared in his London Tavern speech that all the religions of the world were founded in error. And yet every religious man will contend that all the religions of the world save one, and that one his own, are false. It is said, too, that the doctrine that man is the creature of circumstances involves a theory of fatalism demoralising to the human character. Those who take ground against Mr. Owen overlook the fact that it is better to teach the truth, whatever that truth may be, so that the knowledge may furnish the motive for the selection of improving conditions. Nor is man a merely passive figure to be acted on; he re-acts and modifies his surroundings, improving or aggravating them and their effects. As each drop of water is to the ocean, so is each human unit to the world—part of the great whole, from which it cannot escape, and from which it cannot be eliminated. Freewill theorists delude themselves with empty words when they claim for the phenomena of volition that they are outside all law. The formula that man's character is formed for him, and not by him, does not express all the truth, but it expresses much more than is taught by those whose dogma it is that man may will, uninfluenced by events. Robert Owen has been too fiercely assailed for his views on marriage, those who are his assailants, forgetting how much the laws affecting woman's position and property, and regarding divorce, have been modified during the last fifty years. The marriage question is one hedged round with huge difficulties. In Roman Catholic countries extreme harshness forbids all divorce. In some States of the American Republic great facilities are given for determining a contract, which holds by force of law only, against the desire of each. Human passion enters too much with some into the consideration of this question, and is too utterly excluded by

others. It is chiefly as the inaugurator of the English Socialist Propaganda that Robert Owen will be remembered. No Socialist myself, I yet cannot but concede that the movement had an enormous value, if only as a protest against that terrible and inhuman competitive struggle, in which the strong were rewarded for their strength, and no mercy was shown to the weakest. I am probably too much of an individualist to judge a system fairly which seems to me to neutralise individual effort; but it is only necessary to look to the enormously beneficial results of co-operative effort in the North of England, in order to affirm that the Socialist Missionaries, with good old Robert Owen at their head, have left proud monuments of the effect of their teachings. If any early reconcilement is possible, as I believe it is, between the owners of accumulated capital and the vendors of labour, it must come by the enlightenment which efforts at co-operative manufacturing give to all those who take part in them. The war between capitalists and workers is an insane and suicidal war, aggravated because the rights of life are too often made secondary to the privileges of wealth. Robert Owen's Socialism was the utterance of one of the many efforts to give life and dignity to labour. Honour, then, his human effort, even if you deny his dogma. I first saw Robert Owen as a Sunday evening lecturer on the platform of the old John-street Institution, about 1848, and it was from the same platform, ten years later, that it became my duty, in consequence of the ill-health of Robert Cooper, to read for Mr. Owen the last speech he ever prepared for delivery at a Freethought meeting. No one, friend or foe, could come in contact with Robert Owen without being most thoroughly convinced of the old man's complete conviction of the accuracy of his views on society, and of his full certainty to the very last that those views would all be realised at no distant date. He was a good, pure, one-idead man, whose long life, from its prime to its close, was one never-ceasing struggle to soften the world's harsh conflict, and to create a new moral world for after-livers.

II.—JOSEPH MAZZINI.

GUISEPPE MAZZINI, the untiring preacher of Italian Republican unity, was born at Genoa on June 22nd, 1805; and he tells us it was in April, 1821, just after the unsuccessful Piedmontese insurrection, that he was first impressed with the idea "that we Italians could, and therefore ought to, struggle for the liberty of our country." When about twenty-two years of age Mazzini commenced his literary career by writing brief book notices for a mercantile journal at Genoa, which journal he made sufficiently political to at length bring down upon it a Government decree of suspension. Vetoed in Genoa by the Sardinian authorities, Mazzini, in a second journal, braved more openly the Tuscan Government at Leghorn; but, after about twelve months, the *Indicatore Livornese*, as the new journal was called, was also suppressed. Induced by his new political associates, Mazzini joined the Carbonari, a secret association, in which the police had usually—as is commonly the case in secret political organisations—sufficient members to betray the whole of the plans of the Society. Betrayed and arrested in 1830, Mazzini was confined for some months in the Fortress of Savona, whence he was ultimately released—the formal evidence against him failing—but was exiled, because the Government were only too sure of his Republican tendencies.

It was while a solitary prisoner in Savona that Joseph Mazzini conceived the plan of *La Giovina Italia* (Society of Young Italy). Intensely national, Mazzini believed that "regenerated Italy was destined to arise the *initiatrix* of a new life, and a new and powerful unity to all the nations of Europe." It is doubtful whether the movements of the Southern and Northern races in Europe have not a distinctness of character which must always be fatal to Mazzini's conception of the *rôle* of Italy. Mazzini rightfully asserted the unity of Italy; but Italian intellect is too poetic and too subtle to be the guide of some of the less musical, but not less thorough, politics of the Teutonic races. From

Italy Mazzini went to Lyons, and in 1831 he joined a forlorn expedition into Corsica, intending to cross thence into the Romagna, where an insurrectionary rising was planned. This expedition failing, Mazzini took up his residence at Marseilles, where he formally founded the Society of Young Italy, to create "an Italy, one, free, and powerful; independent of all foreign supremacy, and morally worthy of her great mission." The statutes declared "Young Italy is Republican and Unitarian. Republican, because theoretically every nation is destined, by the law of God and humanity, to form a free and equal community of brothers; and the Republican is the only form of government that ensures this future. Because all true sovereignty resides essentially in the nation, the sole progressive and continuous interpreter of the supreme moral law. Because, whatever be the form of privilege that constitutes the apex of the social edifice, its tendency is to spread among the other classes, and, by undermining the equality of the citizens, to endanger the liberty of the country. Because, when the sovereignty is recognised as existing, not in the whole body, but in several distinct powers, the path to usurpation is laid open, and the struggle for supremacy between these powers is inevitable; distrust and organised hostility take the place of harmony, which is society's law of life. Because the Monarchical element, being incapable of sustaining itself alone by the side of the popular element, it necessarily involves the existence of the intermediate element of an aristocracy—the source of inequality and corruption to the whole nation. Because both history and the nature of things teach us that Elective Monarchy tends to generate anarchy, and Hereditary Monarchy tends to generate despotism. Because when Monarchy is not, as in the Middle Ages, based upon the belief now extinct in right divine, it becomes too weak to be a bond of unity and authority in the State.....Young Italy is Unitarian, because without unity there is no true nation; because without unity there is no real strength.....The means," say the statutes, "by which Young Italy proposes to reach its aim are—education and insurrection, to be adopted simultaneously, and made to harmonise with each other. Education must ever be directed to teach by example, word, and pen, the necessity of insurrection. Insurrection, whenever it can be realised, must be so conducted as to render it a means of national education."

It is a little difficult, when Mazzini teaches that "insurrection, by means of guerilla bands, is the true method of warfare," to understand how guerilla warfare and educational progress can be consistent. Guerilla warfare is so nearly allied to—and so often results in—mere brigandage that the certain evil seems greater than any possible advantage; and, as a matter of fact, history has most clearly shown that these guerilla bands are more effective for mischief on the enemy than for good to the cause on behalf of which they are arrayed. Mazzini himself teaches that "Great revolutions are the work rather of principles than of bayonets, and are achieved first in the moral, and then in the material sphere." In the programme of Young Italy Joseph Mazzini, who was bitterly opposed to what he called Materialism, affirmed that "the reformation of a people rests upon no sure foundation, unless based upon agreement in religious belief." He declared that "the doctrines of Materialism disinherit man of every noble aim, and abandon him to the arbitrary rule of chance or blind force." Joseph Mazzini was, at the same time, devotedly Republican and religious. He blended his piety with his politics, and regarded Republicanism as God-ordained.

Exile, and some sorrow beyond—a sorrow which he alludes to, but does not state—had given a tone of sadness to his life. Tenacious of purpose, he was fit to be the mainspring of a secret society, but hardly so fitted to be the conductor of any open movement where his views would be subject to contradiction or criticism from his co-workers. He was grandly thorough in his Republicanism, but he dreamed it for the working men of Italy before he knew what those working men were; and although he made great efforts to educate the people, he never seems to have recognised the fact that the proclamation of a Republic to a people of whom the majority are not prepared for it, is but a small step towards real Republicanism. In Rome he was —when invested with authority—so roughly brought face to face with the bitter truth, that he says "it was put to the vote whether we should not resign our charge the day following. The population, in consequence of the long corruption of slavery, was ignorant and idle; distrustful and suspicious of all things and of all men."

The extension of the propaganda of the Young Italy became rapidly so formidable, that on the representation of the Italian Government, the French authorities, in August,

1832, ordered Mazzini to quit Marseilles, but the order was rendered inoperative by the extraordinary ability with which Mazzini eluded the police, and yet continued most actively his revolutionary work, so that, by the middle of 1833, the Society of Young Italy had become widely extended, if not powerful, through Lombardy, the Genoese territory, Tuscany, and the Roman States. Treason from some, and incaution on the part of others, giving the Government a clue as to the members of the society, many were arrested and put to death.

Mazzini could not help feeling deeply his own share, as the founder of the Association, in the deaths of his co-workers. Four years afterwards he says: "I feel myself a criminal—conscious of guilt, yet incapable of expiation. The forms of those shot at Alessandria and Chambery rose up before me like the phantoms of a crime, and its unavailing remorse. I could not recall them to life. How many mothers had I caused to weep? How many more must learn to weep should I persist in the attempt to arouse the youth of Italy to noble action, to awaken in them the yearning for a common country? And if that country were indeed an illusion, whence had I derived the right of judging for the future, and urging hundreds, thousands of men, to the sacrifice of themselves, and of all that they held most dear?"

Early in February, 1834, an abortive attempt was made to take a column of insurgents, under the command of General Ramorino, into Italy from Geneva. In this column Joseph Mazzini, although the contriver of the expedition, marched as a private soldier. Treachery on the part of the General, and inefficient means of action, caused the failure of the plan; and the defeat almost made Mazzini despair of his whole mission.

The Swiss authorities—compelled by the representations of the European Powers—seized the war stores of the Italian exiles, and menaced themselves with expulsion.

In Berne, where he then took refuge, Mazzini projected the formation of the Society of Young Europe, a combination of Young Italy with two kindred associations, called Young Poland and Young Germany. The ideal of the Association of Young Europe was the federal association of European Democracy under one sole direction; so that any nation rising in insurrection should at once find the others ready to assist it. To this organisation, later in 1834, was

added the new Society of Young Switzerland. Writing of Switzerland, Mazzini says: "Since January 1st, 1338, that little people has had neither king nor master. It presents the spectacle—unique in Europe—of a Republican flag floating for five centuries above the Alps, although surrounded by jealous and invading Monarchies, as if to be an incitement and a presage to us all. Charles V., Louis XIV., Napoleon, passed away, but that banner remained sacred and immoveable." The Constitution of the Swiss Republic was regarded by Mazzini as specially defective, in that its Diet, or Central Government, is composed of delegates from each Canton, chosen in each case by the grand *conseil* of the Canton, instead of being directly elected by the people. Mazzini also objected that in the Swiss Diet each Canton has but one vote, irrespective of size, or population, or taxation contribution; and he further objected to the *mandat impératif*, or special instruction to the delegate, as nullifying all spontaneity of thought and conscience. Mazzini justified the Association of Young Europe by affirming that "Liberty is an European right. Arbitrary power, tyranny, and inequality cannot exist in one nation without injury to others." In the middle of 1835 "Young Switzerland" had its journal, *La Jeune Suisse*, and a printing press at Bienne, in the Canton of Berne. The European Governments used considerable pressure to prevent the little Swiss Republic from being continued as the centre for this Republican work, and ultimately a *conclusum* of the Swiss Diet, in 1836, condemned Mazzini to perpetual exile from Switzerland.

In January, 1837, the great Italian conspirator arrived in London. This was a gloomy period in Mazzini's life; exiled, poor, doubting, and doubted, it seemed to himself almost as if his young life had been an utter failure. England gives the shelter of its land to the political exile, but it is a cold shelter if he be a poor or an unknown man; and, until Mazzini's pen had won for him a position amongst English writers, he often knew the extremest bitterness of want. Joseph Mazzini found, too, that although the English nation gave nominal protection to his person, the English Government nevertheless was guilty of the baseness of opening his correspondence, and communicating the contents to foreign powers. That Austria utilised the information communicated to her by Lord Aberdeen's Government, which had tampered with letters addressed to Mazzini by

the unfortunate Brothers Bandiera, is now a matter of history. Writing eighteen years later, Mazzini said: "The secret of correspondence is violated in the English Post Office at the present day, precisely as it was in 1844, though perhaps somewhat more rarely." It is certain that in the Irish Post Office letters have been opened by authority during the last few years; and it is also certain that secret police reports have, within the last five years, been furnished in writing by the London Detective Department to the Paris Police. Whether letters are still opened at St. Martin's-le-Grand I have no sufficient means of determining.

The political volcano of 1847-8, shook severely several of the Italian princedoms, and Joseph Mazzini returned to Italy to take part in the struggle which overturned, at any rate temporarily, more than one ducal throne.

On February 9th, 1849—the Pope having fled, and Rome being without any Government—a constituent assembly, chosen by a very large popular vote, and of which Mazzini had been elected member, proclaimed a Republic in Rome. On March 29th, Mazzini, Saffi, and Armellini, were chosen Triumvirs; and on April 25th, the French Republic disgraced itself by landing an army, under General Oudinot, at Civita Vecchia. The story of the siege of Rome, of its heroic defence by Joseph Garibaldi, of its fall at last in July, is too well known to need repeating at length, and is too grand to be pressed into one or two lines. Rome fell, and in July Mazzini was once more a fugitive from his loved Italy.

In 1857 Mazzini endeavoured to organise a general Italian insurrection, and went to Genoa himself to take his part; but although detached risings took place in various parts of Italy, the differences of opinion between the leaders, such as Mazzini, Manin, and Garibaldi, were so great, and the people were so unprepared, that another failure had to be chronicled. Mazzini opposed himself bitterly to the diplomacy of Cavour, who was then endeavouring, chiefly through Prince Jerome Napoleon, to obtain the alliance of France against Austria.

In 1858 Mazzini penned the following words on woman, worthy reproduction, alike from their great merit, and as chronicling this phase of his faith: "Love and respect woman. Seek in her, not merely a comfort, but a force, an inspiration, the redoubling of your intellectual and moral faculties. Cancel from your minds every idea of superiority over her. You have none whatever.....Long prejudice, an

inferior education, and a perennial legal inequality and injustice, have created that apparent intellectual inferiority which has been converted into an argument of continued oppression. But does not the history of oppression teach us how the oppressor ever seeks his justification and support by appealing to a fact of his own creation? The feudal castes that withheld education from the sons of the people, excluded them on the ground of that very want of education from the rights of the citizen, from the sanctuary wherein laws are framed, and from that right of vote which is the initiation of the social mission.....Consider woman as the partner and companion, not merely of your joys and sorrows, but of your thoughts, your aspirations, your studies, and your endeavours after social amelioration. Consider her your equal in your civil and political life."

Mazzini and Mill were alike eloquent pleaders for womanhood, and each deserve woman's tribute of grateful memory.

In 1859 the brain of Mazzini and the arm of Garibaldi effectually moved the peoples of Sicily and Naples, and rousing even the lazzaroni from their lethargy, frightened away Bomba from his Neapolitan Palace. Mazzini and Garibaldi then took entirely different ground, and bitterness arose, which was never cleared away. Mazzini desired Garibaldi to hold the Two Sicilies as Republican, and to strike a blow at Rome for the unity of Italy, while Joseph Garibaldi consented to the annexation of Naples and Sicily to Piedmont, under the rule of Victor Emanuel, and returned to his island home at Caprera, satisfied that his country had advanced one step to the unity, which he, equally with Mazzini, so ardently desired.

It was shortly before this date that I first saw Joseph Mazzini, at his modest lodgings, in Onslow Terrace, Brompton, where he then lived under the name of Signor Ernesti. He was one of the few men who impress you first, and always, with the thorough truthfulness and incorruptibility of their natures. Simple in his manners, with only one luxury, his cigar, he had that fulness of faith in his cause which is so contagious, and by the sheer force of personal contact he made believers in the possibility of Italian Unity even among those who were utter strangers to his thought and hope.

In 1865 the city of Messina elected Mazzini as Deputy to the Italian Parliament; but he refused to take his seat in an Assembly where he would have had to take the oath of allegiance to Victor Emanuel. He said, "Monarchy will

never number me amongst its servants or followers. I dedicate myself wholly, and for ever, to constitute Italy one free, independent, Republican nation. I have lived, I live, and I shall die a Republican, bearing witness to my faith to the last."

When in 1870 Mazzini set foot in Sicily, the Government arrested him, and sent him to Gaeta. A general protest went out through Europe, and the imprisonment was not of long duration, but it was yet enough to weaken the already diminished vitality of the oft-disappointed conspirator for Italian Republican Unity.

On the 10th March, 1872, at Pisa, where, under an assumed English name, he had passed five months in almost complete solitude, Joseph Mazzini died; worn out in body and spirit by the forty years' never-ceasing toil for the liberty and unity of his much-loved native land. At his funeral 80,000 men and women met to testify to his truth, to mourn his death. Sentences of death and exile stood unrevoked against him while living. Italy, from that Rome which Mazzini had defended, could not enforce these penal sentences, but it was only her dead son she honoured. Living, she let his broken heart bear undiminished the sorrows of his intense struggle. Dead, a whole population witnessed that the liberty-lesson his life had taught would bear its fruits now the white-haired teacher could no longer use his pen. In seven-hilled Rome a laurel crown was placed by Italy's hand on the head which had bowed to earth in the mighty effort to teach Italia's children how to compass the freedom of their birth-land.

III.—JOHN STUART MILL.

To record the mere life of John Stuart Mill would present little of lasting interest, especially as Mr. Mill never seems to have sought to use his official knowledge of Indian affairs to govern his conduct as a practical politician, after his connection with the East India Company had been

determined. It is not so much how he lived as what he thought, not so much what he did as what he taught, that is worth remembering. Born May 20th, 1806, and dying May, 1873, he probably, during the last twenty-five years of his life, influenced, more than any other man, the various thinkers in England and America. As a political economist, a logician, a politician, a metaphysician, the exponent of Utilitarianism, and advocate of woman's rights, he stands in all phases remarkable, in some without superior. In political economy it is his merit to have popularised amongst the people a science which had been generally regarded by artisans as cold and hard, only to be used by the rich against the poor; and it is noteworthy that Mr. Mill won his popularity despite his steadfast maintenance of the Malthusian theory of the law of population.

Mr. Mill clearly distinguished between the laws of production of wealth, which are real "laws of nature," dependent on the properties of objects, and the modes of the distribution of wealth, which, subject to certain conditions, depend on the human will. In this he differed from those who pretend that the distribution of wealth is determined by economic laws, which are incapable of being temporarily defeated or modified by human effort.

As a politician, Mr. Mill affirmed that women were entitled to representation on the same terms with men. He supported Mr. Thomas Hare's scheme for obtaining a more perfect representation of minorities; and, whether or not Mr. Hare's proposal shall ever be embodied in a statutory form, Republicans should remember that thorough respect can never be shown to the decisions of the majority unless the minority are afforded a fair occasion to be heard on all important questions. It is right that the majority should decide, but only on condition that the voice of the minority has full utterance prior to the delivery of the final award. Mr. Mill opposed the ballot, and I avow that I should be pleased if voters could be true and self-reliant enough to dispense with the protection it affords.

Admitting "the irresistible claim of every man and woman to be consulted, and to be allowed a voice in the regulation of the affairs which vitally concern them," Mr. Mill desired to give a plurality of votes to "proved superiority of education," in order to secure "the superiority of weight justly due to opinions grounded on superiority of knowledge."

In his Political Economy Mr. Mill had taught that the

right of freehold proprietorship in land could only be maintained subject to the duty of cultivation; and late in life, as the President of the Land Tenure Reform Association, he propounded a scheme by which the unearned augmentation of rent was to be applied otherwise than to the private aggrandisement of the landlord. The land question in England is yet to become a battle question, serious in character, and uncertain as to its method of solution. Only one thing is certain—viz., that thousands must not be allowed to continue to grow poor and wretched, in order that a few dozen persons may become unfairly, as well as enormously, rich.

In the great American struggle Mr. Mill regarded the course of the Southerners, in all its stages, as "an aggressive enterprise of the slave-owners to extend the territory of slavery, under the combined influences of pecuniary interest, domineering temper, and the fanaticism of a class for its class privileges;" and, therefore, when the upper and middle classes in England expressed pro-Southern views, Mr. Mill arrayed himself with the artisan classes of England on the side of the North.

In philosophy, Mr. Mill affirmed that "the prevailing tendency to regard all the marked distinctions of the human character as innate, and in the main indelible, and to ignore the irresistible proofs that by far the greater part of those differences, whether between individuals, races, or sexes, are such as not only might, but naturally would, be produced by differences in circumstances, is one of the chief hindrances to the rational treatment of great social questions, and one of the greatest stumbling-blocks to human improvement." While describing himself, in the Autobiography published since his death, as one who never had a religious belief, John Stuart Mill was, unfortunately, taught that his heretical opinions "could not prudently be avowed to the world." Now, it is true, he affirms that the time appears to have come in religious matters "when it is the duty of all who, being qualified in point of knowledge, have, on mature consideration, satisfied themselves that the current opinions are not only false, but hurtful," to make their dissent known; "and," he adds, "the world would be astonished if it knew how great a proportion of its brightest ornaments—of those most distinguished even in popular estimation for wisdom and virtue—are complete sceptics in religion."

The effect of Mr. Mill's early teaching is manifested by

a reticence which pervades his writings; a reticence often liable to be utterly misunderstood. Three essays, published since his death—in which the subjects he specially refrained from discussing are treated at some length—make us more completely regret that his silence during life leaves his posthumous utterances, if not contradictory, at any rate deficient in that clearness for which his ordinary writings are so remarkable. Perhaps the most distinct declarations from Mr. Mill's pen, published during his lifetime, were: first, the one in which, in his review of Hamilton, he declared it to be profoundly immoral to teach, with Dean Mansel, that it is man's duty to worship "a being whose moral attributes are affirmed to be unknowable by us, and to be, perhaps, extremely different from those which, when we are speaking of our fellow creatures, we call by the same names." Mill says: "If, instead of the 'glad tidings' that there exists a being in whom all the excellences which the highest human mind can conceive, exist in a degree inconceivable to us, I am informed that the world is ruled by a being whose attributes are infinite, but what they are we cannot learn, nor what are the principles of his government, except that 'the highest human morality which we are capable of conceiving,' does not sanction them; convince me of it, and I will bear my fate as I may. But when I am told that I must believe this, and at the same time call this being by the names which express and affirm the highest human morality, I say in plain terms that I will not. Whatever power such a being may have over me, there is one thing which he shall not do—he shall not compel me to worship him. I will call no being good, who is not what I mean when I apply that epithet to my fellow creatures; and if such a being can sentence me to hell for not so calling him, to hell I will go." The other is in the review of Comte: "Candid persons of all creeds may be willing to admit, that if a person has an ideal object, his attachment and sense of duty towards which are able to control and discipline all his other sentiments and propensities, and prescribe to him a rule of life, that person has a religion; and though every one naturally prefers his own religion to any other, all must admit that if the object of this attachment, and of this feeling of duty, is the aggregate of our fellow-creatures, this Religion of the Infidel cannot, in honesty and conscience, be called an intrinsically bad one."

Occasionally, as in the essay on Utilitarianism, there are

passages in Mr. Mill's writings which a Christian would probably read as meaning more than Mr. Mill intended to convey; and in the two last essays of the latest volume there are several positions conflicting seriously with the ground taken in the first essay.

In 1861, when I fought the authorities at Devonport on the question of the right of meeting, Mr. John Stuart Mill, with whom I had up to that time held no communication, sent me a cheque for £25 towards the heavy costs I then incurred; and in 1868, for reasons which he has himself stated towards the close of his Autobiography, he also subscribed towards the expenses of my election struggle at Northampton.

To show how even his opponents can speak of him, I give the following extract from an official lecturer of the Christian Evidence Society, Mr. W. R. Browne, M.A., Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge :—"John Stuart Mill was one of the keenest, the clearest, the most influential thinkers of his day. He was also a man much beloved by his friends (Heaven forbid that I should stint a word that can be uttered in praise of the dead!), devoted to the welfare of his fellow-men, regular and temperate in his life, honest, upright, sincere; and he was an utter unbeliever in any form of religion whatsoever. This fault, which was tolerably well known in his lifetime, is made perfectly clear and certain by the volume before us. He was all that I have described, morally and intellectually, either in consequence of, or in spite of, his rejection of all that Christians hold true and sacred. Which of these is the case? There can be no denying that, at first sight, his life makes against the party of religion. I know that it has been felt to be so by many; I have felt it to some extent myself. Can that be true which a thinker so careful and so brilliant—the greatest master, in this age at least, of the science of logic and the laws of evidence—pronounced unhesitatingly to be false?"

Mr. Mill's almost sudden death at Avignon was mourned as a national bereavement. As an able writer in the *Daily News* wrote in the obituary notice, "the full measure of his political influence will not be known until the next generation, when the younger men, who of late, at Oxford and the other seats of learning, have drunk in his doctrines, come in their turn to the front, and assume the task of shaping the nation's destinies."

IV.—CHARLES SUMNER.

ENGLISHMEN need to be reminded that slavery was a vice instituted and fostered in the American colonies by aristocratic and monarchical England. Efforts made by various colonies to check the slave trade were rebuked by the English Government. The barbarism of slavery was the enduring legacy to the West from civilised and Christian England. In the Federation of the United States the right of holding slaves was retained, amongst other State rights, by the Southern States.

As the Republic grew, two hostile elements were distinctly manifested—the one for the abolition, the other for the extension, of the slave power. In 1844 Texas was annexed to the United States by the influence of the Southern members of Congress, and the vast extent of Texan territory promised the Slave States the command of the Gulf of Mexico, and their preponderance as a political party. It was on this occasion that Charles Sumner—known theretofore as a cultivated, eloquent, and rapidly-rising Massachusetts barrister—made his first distinct stand on the side of freedom against slavery. In November, 1845, in a speech in Faneuil Hall against the admission to the Union of Texas as a Slave State, Sumner said: "God forbid that the votes and voices of the freemen of the North should help to bind anew the fetter of the slave." From thenceforward, until the day of his death, Charles Sumner never wavered in the course he had chosen.

Dealing with the matter with the reverence for law, natural to one trained as he had been, Charles Sumner challenged the slaveholders on constitutional grounds; urging that the provisions of the United States constitution, in favour of slaveholding, were merely temporary, and were framed in the expectation that the slave traffic would be abandoned at no distant period. He affirmed that the Congress could, even then, by express legislation, abolish slavery in the district of Columbia, and in any territories; that it could abolish the slave trade on the high seas between the States; and that it could refuse to admit to the Union any new State with a constitution sanctioning slavery;

further, that the people of the United States might, by regular amendment to the constitution, destroy slavery.

In 1851 Mr. Sumner, who was then forty years of age, having been born January 6th, 1811, was elected United States Senator for Massachusetts; and at first he stood at Washington almost alone in his direct pleading for abolition. In 1854, by the Kansas and Nebraska Act, a large extent of fine territory was practically thrown open for competition between free and servile labourers.

Streams of Northern men advocating free soil, and bodies of Southern men, eager to extend slave power, pressed on to the new lands. The Southerners were not, however, content to fight fairly; organised bodies of armed men entered Kansas from Missouri, and controlled the elections with bowie knife and pistol. At the first election of the Kansas Legislature, March 30th, 1855, the revolver and knife were freely used, several unoffending citizens were shot, and the abolitionists, finding themselves overpowered by force, appealed to the Government for protection. Mr. Seward presented to Congress "A Bill for the Admission of Kansas into the Union." During the debate Mr. Sumner delivered, on the 19th and 20th May, 1855, his celebrated speech, "The crime against Kansas," described by the poet Whittier as "a grand and terrible philippic." He said: "The wickedness which I now begin to expose is immeasurably aggravated by the motive which prompted it. Not in any common lust for power did this uncommon tragedy have its origin. It is the rape of a virgin territory, compelling it to the hateful embrace of slavery: and it may be clearly traced to a depraved longing for a new Slave State, the hideous offspring of such a crime, in the hope of adding to the power of slavery in the national government." With almost prophetic voice he added: "The fury of the propagandists of slavery, and the calm determination of their opponents, are now diffused from the distant territory over widespread communities, and the whole country in all its extent; marshalling hostile divisions, and foreshadowing a strife, which, unless happily averted by the triumph of freedom, will become war-fatal, fratricidal, parricidal, war—with an accumulated wickedness beyond the wickedness of any war in human annals."

The speech caused a tremendous sensation through the whole of the South. Previous to its delivery there had been many threats of personal violence against Mr. Sumner; two

days after it had been delivered Preston S. Brooks, member of the House from South Carolina, with a gold-headed gutta-percha cane in his hand, came to the seat in the Senate where Charles Sumner sat writing, and, with scarce a word of warning, struck the abolitionist orator a fearful blow, inflicting a severe wound upon the back of the head, repeating the blows until the cane was shivered to pieces, and Mr. Sumner lay bleeding and insensible on the floor of the Senate. The spirit of Southern slave-holding chivalry was well shown. Richmond and Charleston journals praised Brooks for his dastardly blow. Southern clergymen preached in his favour. South Carolina re-elected him as the representative of the State. Southern ladies bought for him a new cane, in lieu of the one which he had destroyed in his murderous onslaught on Charles Sumner. It was nearly five years before the effects of the attack had sufficiently passed away to enable the Massachusetts Senator to plead again for freedom. Perfect recovery was impossible; the shock to the nervous system had been too severe; and Mr. Sumner never ceased to feel the effect of the cowardly attack.

While travelling in Europe to recruit his health, Mr. Sumner, on the introduction of the Duchess of Argyll, had an interview with Lord Palmerston as to the repression of slavery in Cuba, the particulars of which I will give as nearly as possible in Mr. Sumner's own words: "Prompted to it by nearly the last words John Adams used to me before he died, I reminded his Lordship that his own Circular as Foreign Secretary had, in express terms, pledged any Government, in which he was influential, to an abolition policy; and urged on him that Great Britain could, if it would, at any time put an end to slavery in the island of Cuba." "How?" asked Viscount Palmerston. "By simply enforcing the treaty between Great Britain and Spain, which absolutely prohibited all importation of slaves after a fixed date, and provided that any slaves landed in Cuba in contravention of this convention, should be declared free." I added to this that "more than seven-eighths of the slave population of Cuba were under this provision entitled to their freedom." Lord Palmerston was very courteous, but did nothing.

It was in June, 1860, he spoke of "that better day, near at hand, when freedom shall be restored everywhere under the national government; when the national flag, wherever

it floats, on sea or on land, within the national jurisdiction, will not cover a single slave; and when the declaration of independence, now reviled in the name of slavery, will once again be reverenced as the American Magna Charta of human rights. Nor is this all. Such an act will be the first stage in those triumphs by which the Republic—lifted in character so as to become an example to mankind—will enter at last upon its noble prerogative of teaching the nations how to live." The story of the election of Abraham Lincoln, the huge war convulsion, the emancipation proclamation, the amendments to the constitution giving the coloured man political equality—this cannot be told here in fitting words.

Sumner is one of the few great warriors for a principle who have lived, not only to witness its emergence from unpopularity and obscurity, but have actually seen victory crown the apparently hopeless effort of their lives.

Charles Sumner, whom I first saw in the autumn of 1873, seemed to feel deeply the charge that he had acted unfairly to England in the matter of the claims arising out of the damage done to United States' commerce by the vessels built for the Southern Confederacy by Messrs. Laird. He said: "I distinguish between the English people, whom I have always regarded with the utmost friendliness, and the English Government. But put yourself in my place. Suppose civil war between Ireland and England; suppose a Member of Congress to build war steamers at Portland under orders from those whom you called the Irish Rebels; suppose the Government at Washington, duly warned, taking no real steps to stop the vessels; suppose these vessels coming direct from the American port—and without ever entering an Irish port at all—being fitted with munitions of war, and burning and destroying your merchant vessels; suppose the builder to sit in Congress, not only without censure, but receiving there constant friendly greeting, and to be treated as a friend by members of the Cabinet—what would be your feelings, Mr. Bradlaugh, as an Englishman, against the America which permitted such a wrong?"

Charles Sumner died on March 11th, 1874; all America felt his loss, and Massachusetts mourned for him as though her dearest son had been taken. At his grave Curtis and Schurz vied with each other in laudations on his life. Amongst those who delivered funeral orations over Sumner

was Robert B. Elliott, Senator for South Carolina, who said: "I am a negro, one of the victim race;" and from this oration I take the following: "Fellow citizens, the life of Charles Sumner needs no interpreter. It is an open, illumined page. The ends he aimed at were always high; the means he used were always direct. Neither deception nor indirection, neither concealment nor disguise of any kind or degree, had place in his nature or his methods. By open means he sought open ends. He walked in the sunlight, and wrote his heart's inmost purpose on his forehead. His activity and capacity of intellectual labour were almost unequalled. Confined somewhat by the overshadowing nature of the anti-slavery cause in the range of his topics, he multiplied his blows, and re-doubled the energy of his assaults upon that great enemy of his country's peace. Here his vigour knew no bounds. He laid all ages and lands under contribution. Scholarship in all its walks—history, art, literature, science—all these he made his aids and servitors. But who does not see that *these* are not his glory? He was a scholar amongst scholars; an orator of consummate power; a statesman familiar with the structure of governments and the social forces of the world. But he was greater and better than one or all of these; he was a man of absolute moral rectitude of purpose and of life. His personal purity was perfect, and unquestioned everywhere. He carried morals into politics. And this is the greatness of Charles Sumner: that by the power of his moral enthusiasm, he rescued the nation from its shameful subservience to the demands of material and commercial interests, and guided it up to the high plane of justice and right. Above his other great qualities towers that moral greatness to which scholarship, oratory, and statesmanship are but secondary and insignificant. He was just, because he loved justice; he was right, because he loved right. Let this be his record and epitaph."

V.—LEDRU ROLLIN.

ALEXANDRE AUGUSTE LEDRU ROLLIN was born February 2nd, 1808, when Napoleon I. was in the height of his power. Louis Philippe—after whose flight Ledru Rollin sought from the popular suffrage the post of chief magistrate—was then thirty-five years of age. Louis Philippe at that time an exile, afterwards to be King, and then an exile once more. Poor France! a line of Bourbon Kings ruling for centuries over starved peoples, and ending in a revolt of despair—an attempt for liberty, rendered impossible by bayonets, hired by England from every corner of Europe, and ending in centralised authority and military mania; a one-man rule, without heart or conscience, save such as the lust for power creates, ending in a ruined France, and a Divine-right King restored to his loving people by Uhlans and Cossacks; 1830, and the fallen successor of Louis XVIII. escorted to Cherbourg with much ceremony, Divine-right Monarchy having collapsed by its own feebleness; then, for a little more than seventeen years, Louis Philippe Citizen King. Louis Blanc says: "Charles X. était tombé, parceque son trône reposait sur un principe faux: Louis Philippe est tombé parceque son trône ne reposait sur aucun principe."

Ledru Rollin, who in 1830 became a barrister, won considerable popularity as an *avocat* by his defence of various persons charged with political offences. In 1834 we find his name amongst a muster-roll of the most brilliant names of France, as one of *les défenseurs choisis par les accusés d'Avril*, and the signature of Ledru Rollin appears to a memoir, telling, in terrible language, the horrible story of the slaughterings by Monarchical authority done in the City of Paris, under the Citizen King, on April 14th, 1834.

During the period of O'Connell's great Repeal gatherings in Ireland, Ledru Rollin, who had married an Irish lady, visited his wife's native country, and, being present at one of the monster assemblages, was cheered by the Irish

peasantry as a delegate from the Republican party in France.

As Louis Philippe's power diminished, the voice of the Republican advocate made itself heard more distinctly, and his influence was felt over a larger area. At Lille, shortly prior to the end of 1847, he pictured the coming revolution, which, "like the waters of the Nile inundating the land, should sweep away the corruptions and impurities, and deposit the germs of a new and rich life." When the first of the Reform banquets was held at the Château Rouge on July 9th, 1847, Ledru Rollin refused to attend, because—although the toast of the King's health was to be omitted—he apprehended there might still be equally obnoxious toasts. On the morning of February 24th, 1848, Louis Philippe was pressed to abdicate by Emile de Girardin—always the consulting physician to dying governments; in the evening the Monarchy had ceased with the King's flight, and a Provisional Government was chosen, of which M. Alphonse de Lamartine was the nominal head, and in which Ledru Rollin became Minister of the Interior. This Government was in name Republican; but at that date no Republic was possible in France. France was not a country with innumerable municipal centres of political vitality; it was rather a huge watch, with Paris for its main-spring. Whoever controlled Paris, the army, and the telegraphs, controlled France. M. Louis Blanc, in the fourth chapter of his "Histoire de la Révolution de 1848," tells the story how the Republic was proclaimed. Unfortunately, Lamartine, in his own account of his acceptance of the conduct of the Provisional Government on February 24th, shows how easily a few active, earnest men in Paris named the Government which was for a brief space to replace that of Louis XV. The new Minister of the Interior is thus described by his fellow-Republican: "He was well suited to his mission, one entirely of revolutionary propaganda. Quick-witted and penetrating, a political energy tempered by frank and engaging manners, an ardent will, integrity, a vehement desire to assure the success of the Republic, and an oratorical talent of the first class. These were the qualities which Ledru Rollin brought to the accomplishment of his functions, and they were heightened in him by a handsome figure, an imposing stature, and an indescribable magnetism, which, when he spoke seemed to pervade each of his

gestures." Lord Normanby, an English ambassador, in his "A Year of Revolution in Paris," thought it right to libel Ledru Rollin, just as former English ambassadors had libelled the men of 1789. Unfortunately for Lord Normanby, and happily for the truth, he published his libels to the world, and there were more newspapers to criticise, and more readers to judge, in 1848 than in the period when Louis XVI. reigned.

On March 5th, by a decree of the Provisional Government, universal suffrage was declared to be the law of France. The law was right; but it should have been demanded by the nation, and voted by the national representatives; the men to whom it was freely given were, in the majority of instances, unable to properly value the right they gained unsought.

Ledru Rollin has been severely assailed on account of an official circular issued just prior to the elections, and addressed to the Commissioners, who acted as his provincial subordinates, directing them to replace the various préfets, sous préfets, and other officials, with persons avowing Republican opinions, and declaring that "all political functions ought to be allotted to men of sure and of Republican principles." Undoubtedly, both Ledru Rollin and Louis Blanc felt justified in using on behalf of Republicanism the centralised authority which had been so long used against it. As a Republican, the exercise of any pressure on the voters was unjustifiable; especially was it unjustifiable when, on April 15th, Ledru Rollin permitted his bulletin newspaper to suggest that, if the result of the elections should prove adverse to Republicanism, a second appeal to the barricades would be necessary on the part of the Parisian populace. A Republican is bound to submit to the vote of a majority, even if that vote annihilates the Republic. An appeal to force is an appeal to the past; it justifies the conduct of the strongest. When some of the regiments of the National Guards were permitted, if not encouraged, to exact from the officers they were electing a pledge, "that in the event of the new Assembly declaring against a Republic, they would march against the Assembly, and put it down," every teaching of Republicanism was outraged.

A few weeks later, Ledru Rollin, as a member of the Executive Commission, found himself obliged to submit to his colleagues, who gave authorisation to Gen. Cavaignac to

use force when the people at the barricades appealed against the decision of the Assembly hostile to the further existence of the Ateliers Nationaux. The bloody days of June were the result of this appeal, and all hope of present Republic was dead. After Ledru Rollin's retirement from the Ministry, he was for a short time *chef du Cabinet* to the Préfet of the Seine; but a strong attack was made upon him, and his popularity became seriously weakened. He was, nevertheless, elected in April, 1849, for Paris, with 129,000 votes.

On June 13th, 1849, Ledru Rollin made an earnest, but ineffectual, appeal in the Assembly against the murder of the Roman Republic by the French army under General Oudinot. The story is told by Joseph Mazzini, how clericalism in France triumphed in inducing the soldiers of one Republic, only just born, to crush the efforts of another Republic struggling into birth.

Forced to quit France, Ledru Rollin was an exile from his native country for twenty-one years. In 1857 he, then in England, was judged *par contumace* for alleged complicity in the attempt by Felice Orsini against the life of Louis Napoleon, but the charge was utterly unfounded, and was probably never even believed by the French police. The only pretence for the use of Ledru Rollin's name in the matter seems to have been that Charles Delécluze, who had established some political associations in France, was known to be in correspondence with the exile; but there was not even a shadow of complicity between Delécluze and Ledru Rollin.

It was in 1857 that I first saw Ledru Rollin, who often consulted me on points of English law during the time of his subsequent residence in St. John's Wood. On one point he was entirely in error: he judged France to be always as he left it in 1849, and was bitterly dis-illusioned when, on his return to Paris in 1870, he found a new generation had grown up with new ideas.

The life of an exile is not a very happy one; the sketch of the career of Joseph Mazzini illustrates this. Ledru Rollin, in his "Decadence de l'Angleterre," says: "Proscribed, we bore with us the sacred right of misfortune, which even amongst barbarians was regarded as a kind of public religion. How has it been respected? We have been each day submitted to insult; the English aristocracy has drawn us about on its journalistic hurdles, denouncing

us to its people as convicts escaped from the galleys, as miserable bandits, as the refuse of the sewers of Paris." Ledru Rollin endured exile for nearly twenty-one years.

In 1870, now with whitened hair, and with his heart withered by the exile chill, Ledru Rollin once more returned to his home at Fontenay aux Roses, and was in 1871 chosen by three departments as deputy to the French Assembly, where, however, he at that time declined to sit. A Republican Society in Paris, the Alliance Républicaine, nominated Ledru Rollin as its President; but the hero of 1848 does not seem to have ever regained his old power in Paris.

At his funeral an enormous mass of Parisians gathered. His career had been honest, his devotion had been sincere. While the Empire lasted he had refused it allegiance; he had been loyal to France.

THE lives of Owen, Mazzini, Mill, Sumner, and Ledru Rollin, present several features of likeness. To the whole of these men the clergy were bitterly hostile, for each of them was an apostle of at least some chapter of the gospel of progress. The Welshman, Robert Owen, who taught the communism imperfectly shadowed out by Jesus and his Apostles, was denounced, with more than ordinary fierceness, from nearly every pulpit in England, the Bishop of Exeter encouraging the cry from his place in the House of Lords. The Italian, Joseph Mazzini, the greatest modern preacher of Republicanism, was excommunicated by the Pope, head of a Church always hostile to liberty, and the Italian patriot was anathematised by almost the whole of the Roman Catholic priesthood. The Englishman, John Stuart Mill, had scarcely been lowered into the grave, at Avignon, when the weak-brained and orthodox *Church Herald* yelled out its curses against the scarce-cold form of one who will always rank amongst the chief of Europe's thinkers; when John Stuart Mill was invited by the electors of Westminster to allow himself to be their candidate for election to Parliament, the cry of "heretic" was loudly raised by all sects of Christian preachers, and a

Liberal dignitary in the Church was bitterly assailed because he cast his ballot for the great logician. The New Englander, Charles Sumner, the Abolitionist, was preached against alike from Northern and Southern pulpits; the unfeed pleading of the Massachusetts barrister, on behalf of dark-skinned humanity, was impartially scorned by the sects who pretended to kneel to a common father: and last, though hardly least, in the value of its testimony, the Frenchman, Ledru Rollin's grave—surrounded by the many thousands of men and women who came to honour his civil burial—marked once more the hostility between progress and the Church.

Robert Owen, though he himself died poor, having devoted to popular redemption the fortune he had created, yet lived to see thousands lifted at least a little from their poverty by the practical co-operative efforts which gradually, and after many trials, grew out of his Socialistic theories. The glory of the experiment in infant education, which he first pressed at New Lanark, was, before he died, claimed by the very religious teachers who had so long hindered all education, and who must in time be destroyed by the rescue of children's brains from the control of priestly manipulators. Joseph Mazzini did not die until his much-loved Rome had been proclaimed the capital of Italy, and—though generations of education in liberty and self-reliance will be required to efface the trace of the Divine Bourbon in Naples and in Sicily—yet the lone man's life was not without its fruitful harvest. John Stuart Mill, dying ere his strength was spent, had nevertheless found himself recognised as the thought-maker of his people. Charles Sumner, who had spoken for freedom when angry and brutal men pointed revolvers in his face; who had continued to speak for abolition when the whole continent of America cried out that the speaking was hopeless; who had fallen in the Capitol—at the close of a grand speech against slavery—bathed in his own blood, shed by a felon hand; Charles Sumner lived to see his speech grow into law. And even Ledru Rollin survived long enough to see the Imperial sham fade away, and to hear the very peasantry of France utter their yearning cry for the Republicanism to which he had devoted himself.

It will not be until another age that full justice will, or can, be awarded to the memories of these men. Statues and monuments are readily erected to princes pensioned

for the merit accruing from accident of birth, or fortune of marriage; memorial stones are easily found to record great wealth and huge rent-rolls. For the dead who lived for the poor, and died in poverty; for the dead who struggled for freedom, and died worn out in the effort to burst the shackles theretofore worn by others; for the dead who, living, were not known by fashion, nor honoured by wealth; for these the monuments can only be slowly raised, as a new generation inherits, without obstacle, the prizes of social advancement and political freedom, which these dead won with bleeding hearts and wearied brains.

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A Contrast.

BY

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CROMWELL AND WASHINGTON.

I.—CROMWELL.

OLIVER CROMWELL is probably one of the mightiest amongst England's children. His memory, always fresh, has for its protection no array of statues. A modern Prince has his otherwise undiscoverable goodness prominently recorded in many cities, lest without the stone record all traces of his virtues should be lost; but we can recall Cromwell's greatness without even one marble or granite reminder of his glorious manhood. Statues are now chiefly erected by Englishmen on Utilitarian principles. We build the most monuments to those men who, but for such aids, would perhaps be least remembered.

Oliver Cromwell was born at Huntingdon on April 15th, 1599, just as the reign of Elizabeth was drawing to a close A Royalist from birth until death, Royalist by early association and family tradition, of easy fortunes and fair connections, Cromwell had no special temptation to the adoption of a course of rebellion against the Crown. When about twenty-nine years old he sat in the House of Commons for his native borough of Huntingdon. He owed his seat probably more to the family influence and old estates than to any special merit then manifested; and in this first essay at Parliamentary life Oliver Cromwell has left us very little for record, although the Parliament in which he sat was a great one, and had its stirring scenes. It was the third Parliament of Charles I. Carlyle calls it "a brave and noble Parliament.' This was the Parliament to which his Majesty sent a message, requiring it "not to cast or lay any aspersion upon any Minister of his Majesty," and which forthwith accused and impeached the great Duke of Buckingham. This was the Parliament in which Mr. Speaker Finch tried to stifle speech, and to avoid all Parliamentary remonstrance, by adjourning the House; the only Parliament, as far as I know, in which some of the members held the Speaker in the chair while they, on March 2nd, 1629, voted respectful remonstrances against tonnage, poundage, and other matters.

Denzil Holles, Sir John Eliot, William Strode, and John Selden (who were afterwards fined or imprisoned for their daring) were amongst the most prominent in thus forcibly retaining Mr. Speaker. "Let him go!" cry the King's Privy Councillors. "No," answers Holles; "God's wounds! he shall sit there until it pleases the House to rise." And in all this stir we see no sign of Oliver Cromwell.

Poor Eliot—for his part in this business fined £2,000, and to be imprisoned during the king's pleasure—will make no submission, ask no grace, and the Tower dungeon is his tomb: he comes not out of gaol alive. How many grand men die in the effort to make a country live, and these dead have not even the honour of a grateful memory from the children of those they served so well! Living a day or two too early, they were the forlorn hope, whose bodies helped to fill the ditch, that others might pass more easily to victory and glory. This third Parliament should be memorable if only that gallant Eliot sat in it. It was this Parliament which solemnly declared, in the famous Petition of Right, "That no man hereafter be compelled to make or yield any gift, loan, benevolence, tax, or such-like charge, without common consent by Act of Parliament."

Parliament was soon dissolved; it had only been needed to vote "supply." Not fulfilling this need, it was extinguished, as had been its predecessors. There had already been in this yet short reign two preceding Parliaments, both brief-lived, because they would not vote money without discussing grievances; and now this third Parliament, its members having acted, as the king thinks, like "vipers," is also dismissed. Then, for eleven years, no Parliament in England, and during this space Oliver Cromwell leads apparently a gentleman farmer's life on his lands at St. Ives, near the River Ouse. He had a strong tendency to the fast-developing Puritan spirit of the times; his prominent relatives were Puritans, too; but Cromwell manifested—so far as we can judge—little, or no, inclination to meddle in rising political strife. Yet his very Puritanism counted for something in making him a rebel. Sturdy Puritanism struggled against servile Episcopalian flunkeyism. Mainwaring was made a Bishop by Charles I., and Sibthorp gained preferment in the Established Church, for preaching "that the king might take the subjects' money at his pleasure, and that no one might refuse his demand, on penalty of damnation."

No Parliament for eleven years, and yet the king wants money! and without Parliament he cannot have it. The charges of the king's Government grew more serious in each reign. The Crown lands, once extensive enough for everything, had been given and granted to favourite and favourite's flatterer; now broad acres to this pretty face; now wide baronies to this strong arm; now far-stretching slopes and fertile dales to this proud churchman; until the recipients of royal bounty were sometimes as rich as, or richer than, the kingly donor. Feudal obligations to contribute in peace and war to the maintenance of the royal state, are not, and were not, quite as accurately calculable in their realisable results as would be the proceeds of a modern property-tax. "Forced loans" and "benevolences," then a good source of income, were well enough, if collected from the Jews, whom nobody protected; but when the moneys were sought in the cities, the merchants stood resolutely on their privileges and charters, and obstinately refused to lend or give. "Tonnage and poundage" — which divine-right Charles considered a tax to be levied within his own discretion— was much denied. "Tonnage and poundage" was an imposition upon goods and merchandise exported and imported, and was first granted by Parliament about 1523 to Henry VIII., and the right thus accorded to the sovereign to levy had been renewed in each succeeding reign, until the time of Charles I., when it being proposed in the Commons to limit the right to a single year, the Lords rejected the Bill, and Charles Stuart was left without any statutory right to collect the tax.

It was in 1635 that Oliver Cromwell's cousin, John Hampden, was required to pay ship-money, and refused. According to the old practice, there were military tenures, which bound the landholders in a great part of the kingdom to furnish actual men and arms, or to pay in money their cost. So also the Cinque Ports, and other English seaports, and sometimes maritime counties, had been called upon to furnish a quota of ships for the public service, and there had even been instances of similar demands on inland towns, when piracy was prevalent. Attorney-General Noy, to win favour with the king, and backed by the opinion of a corrupted and time-serving Bench of Judges, sought, under cover of ship-money, to levy taxes from the nation without the authority of Parliament. The first ship-money writ was issued to the City of London and other seaports, in October,

1634, requiring them to provide vessels and armaments to oppose the pirates at sea, and under it £35,000 was obtained from the City of London alone, though not without remonstrance or resistance on the part of the citizens. One Richard Chambers refused to pay, and being committed to gaol by the Lord Mayor of London for this non-payment, Chambers brought an action against the Lord Mayor to recover damages for the false imprisonment. His fight was gallant, but hopeless; for the twelve judges, headed by Lord Chief Justice Finch (the former Speaker), had already given their public opinion that the king might, in his sole judgment, issue such a writ as that under which the ship-money levy was made. On Chambers's trial Mr. Justice Berkely refused to allow his counsel to contest the validity of the writ, declaring "that there was a rule of law, and a rule of government, and that many things which could not be done by the first rule could be done by the other." I expect this man Berkely must have been related to the Governor Berkely, of Virginia, who, in the same reign, declared "free schools and printing to be pernicious inventions of the devil for the spread of heresy and sedition." On a portion of his property John Hampden was required to pay 20s., which he refused. The king sued and won judgment for the 20s., but lost a crown as the final result to the suit. The case was argued on behalf of Hampden by Oliver St. John, who was distantly related by marriage to our Oliver Cromwell. The 25th Edward I., "which forever abrogated all taxation without consent of Parliament," was pleaded, but without avail. Another statute called *de Tallagio non Concedendo*, was urged to like effect, but the judges had pre-determined their judgment. Last, but not least, the famous Petition of Right, "that noble legacy of a slandered Parliament," as Hallam calls it, was brought forward by Hampden's counsel. All to no purpose! Seven judges upheld the ship-money levy against five dissenting. The majority laid down the damnable doctrine that King Charles had absolute power "to command his subjects, their persons and goods, and I say their money too." These were the words of Lord Chief Justice Finch, and he found six judges servile enough to re-echo the slavish formula. Five judges dissented, but only two of them, Justices Croke and Hutton, had the courage to squarely deny the alleged prerogative of the Crown, and to declare ship-money unlawful. Unhappily for them, their names stood already committed in

writing to the extra-judicial opinion, concocted by Finch, affirming the king's right to issue the writ, and make the levy. It is said that Justice Croke would have given judgment for the king, the justice being in fear of losing his appointment, but that he was kept on the right side by his wife, "who implored him not to sacrifice his conscience for fear of any danger or prejudice to his family, being content to suffer any misery with him, rather than to be an occasion for him to violate his principles."

Hopeless of obtaining justice from the English Law Courts, and not yet driven by despair to the last desperate appeal to force, many of the Puritan leaders looked across to the New England settlements as a haven of refuge. It is said by Hallam that, "Men of a higher rank than the first colonists are now become hopeless alike of the civil and religious liberties of England; men of capacious and commanding minds, formed to be the legislators and generals of an infant Republic; the wise and cautious Lord Say, the acknowledged chief of the Independent sect; the brave, the open, and enthusiastic Lord Brook; Sir Arthur Hazelrig; Hampden, ashamed of a country for whose rights he had fought alone; Cromwell, panting with energies that he could neither control nor explain, and whose unconquerable fire was still wrapped in smoke to every eye but that of his kinsman Hampden: were preparing to embark for America, when Laud, for his own and his master's curse, procured an order of council to stop their departure." They were to be driven to bay, all loopholes being stopped, all escape being prevented. They turned, and at last the hunted became the hunters.

The litigation with Hampden, from the first assessment to the final judgment, had lasted more than three years; and ship-money was paid less willingly after the judgment, than even while the suit against John Hampden was yet undecided. Passive resistance, when it takes the shape of a general "We won't pay," is very effective. The king needed money; for effectual collection of money he must have a Parliament. London would lend money if a Parliament were summoned, none without; and at last, on the 13th of April, 1640, King Charles's fourth Parliament was assembled, and in this our Oliver Cromwell sat as Member for Cambridge. The duration of this Parliament was of the briefest; it is known as the "Short Parliament," for—not providing money for the king with sufficient rapidity, and

providing protest against the Hampden judgment, and criticism against Strafford much too freely—it was dismissed "in a huff, on the 5th of May, after a session of three weeks." Charles I. resolved to get his money without the aid of Parliament, but could not. Ship-money was enforced with greater rigour than before, and brought less profit. Sheriffs who would not levy the tax were fined and imprisoned, but even these fines were not always paid. Loans were asked for, and citizens preferred committal to prison to lending to the king. Merchants' bullion was seized in the mint, and debased coin issued. But all these expedients failed. The king still needed money; London would lend £200,000, but only on condition that a Parliament should be summoned; and, accordingly, on the 3rd of November, 1640, there assembled at Westminster the most notable of all the Parliaments that St. Stephen's has ever known, the "Long Parliament." Instead of being dissolved by the king, it ultimately resolved the king's dissolution. It created a Frankenstein monster in its army, which, at last, under Colonel Pride, weeded out its strength with an array of pikes for weed-hooks. It was driven away by angry Oliver Cromwell, but claimed not to be dissolved, and as "the Rump" Parliament it appeared once more to act as usher-in for the restoration of the pious and virtuous Charles II. In this fifth Parliament, Oliver Cromwell again sits as Member for Cambridge, and now gets notice from friend and foe. The friendly words have struggled through the Restoration period with much difficulty; the hostile comments are thick and strong. Thomas Carlyle quotes from Philip Warwick, doubly returned, to sit for Romney and Radnor, but who preferred the latter borough: "I came into the House one morning, and perceived a gentleman speaking, whom I knew not, very ordinarily apparelled, for it was a plain cloth suit, which seemed to have been made by an ill-country tailor; his linen was plain, and not very clean, and I remember a speck or two of blood upon his little band, which was not much larger than his collar. His hat was without a hat-band. His stature was of a good size; *his sword stuck close to his side;* his countenance swollen and reddish, his voice sharp and untuneable, and his eloquence full of fervour." The trait of Cromwell here, which marks the man, is in the seven words, "his sword stuck close to his side." The sceptre of Cromwell was his sword: his sword was his tongue, his pen. Cromwell's will, and Cromwell's

sword were alike of a metal which bent little and cut through everything. Lord Clarendon would make out that our Oliver Cromwell, as a young Member, was a blusterer, whose "carriage" was "tempestuous," and "behaviour" "insolent:" and this, even in private committee, where Clarendon alleges that Cromwell replied to Lord Mandevil "with much indecency and rudeness," and in "contrary and offensive" language. It is so easy for a plain man to be rude and indecent to a lord. Our English lords are not to be mauled with rough hands, or pelted with rough words. We have a bankrupt Duke of Newcastle and a bankrupt George Odger. No well-trained mind would think of using the same harsh phrases to the well-housed Duke of Newcastle, in his Clumber Castle palace, that might be fittingly applied to the needy Radical shoemaker, in his poor Bloomsbury home. It is "contrary and offensive" language, even now, to suggest that princes, who live on the country, owe service to it; and I am prepared to admit that Oliver Cromwell, in Parliamentary debate, might have been "contrary," "offensive," "indecent," and "rude," but blusterer he was most surely none. Bluster is the wind-bag weapon of the weak man; the warrior who wears and handles a mace never fights with an air-bladder as his arm of offence. Cowards bluster—those who from the rear shout "Forward," and from a safe distance, and in a crowd, cry "Down with him." But a man like Cromwell, a real man, whose "sword was stuck close to his side," who rode at the head of his troop; who, when the forlorn hope was repulsed, and he was general, went himself "at push of pike" into the breach; he was no blusterer.

The Long Parliament began its work well. It declared ship-money illegal; it annulled the judgment against Hampden; it declared that no tax could be levied on exports or imports, save by common consent in Parliament; it made Parliaments triennial; it abolished the Star Chamber, the Court of High Commission, and several other arbitrary and irregular tribunals; it denied the king's right of impressment for military service; it voted that bishops should not sit in the House of Lords; it impeached and brought Strafford to the block, Charles being cowardly enough to sacrifice his minister as a scapegoat; and on the very day that Strafford's death-warrant was signed, it enacted that this Parliament should not be dissolved without its own consent. To get money, the king assented to this Bill, which in the

end proved his death-warrant too. There was some talk even of a Puritan Ministry, with the Earl of Bedford as chief, and Pym, Hampden, and Holles in the Cabinet; but this talk ended in worse than nothing; it only irritated the men, and widened the breach. These Puritans wanted Parliamentary Government; Charles Stuart wanted to be despot, riding England with Parliament as his riding whip. At last, on the 4th of January, 1641, Charles I. determines to stop the daring of Parliament by a blow which shall terrify the most audacious. Pym, Hazelrig, Holles, Strode, and Hampden have been over-daring in their speech, and these the king will punish. So to the House of Commons with a strong armed force enters the king—the Earl of Roxburgh holding open the doors of the House—to seize with his own hands the famous five. But they are no longer in the House. A friendly word of warning had gone before to notify the coming of his angry majesty, and Hampden and the four others are safely within the City walls, where, indeed, all Parliament goes for protection next day, to "consider and advise how to right the House in point of privilege, broken by the king's coming yesterday with a force to take Members of our House." The Parliament, threatened with the sword, takes up the sword to protect itself, and yet with a show of profound reverence for royal authority. It asks the king for permission to raise a militia; it raises the militia without consent, when the request is denied. It vests the command of the militia in persons to be appointed by Parliament, and it prays for the custody of the Tower and other strong places. Its prayer refused, it takes all it can, backing its respectful request with pike, broadsword, and battering ram. And now Oliver Cromwell comes to the front! It is time. He offers to lend £300 to aid the Parliament in reducing the Irish rebellion; he sends down arms to Cambridge; he commences to organise troop 67; he seizes the magazine at Cambridge Castle; and he has prevented the king from getting the University plate, value some £20,000. The king, unhindered by the Parliament, as yet too reverent to touch his sacred majesty's person—has fled from Whitehall to York, on the way gathering an army round him. The queen and the crown jewels have been sent away, to negotiate foreign aid and to raise money abroad.

There is now civil war, not as of old, between rival pretendants for the throne, but of the army of the king and Parlia-

ment, against the army of the king. High treason, and yet not enough of Republican spirit to shape the treason into war against monarchy. A strange civil war, in which there are many Parliament men who do not hope to win, many who do not desire to win, and many who do not deserve to win. Captain Cromwell grows daily in his strength, and is soon first in the Cambridge county, and then the eastern counties are associated for common defence, and Cromwell gradually takes the lead; no bigger, braver, or wiser captain being there to stand in front. When there is some defeat, and much terror, Cromwell is firm and unreceding. When lawless troops, in the name of Parliament, do as much wrong to friends as to foes, Cromwell is a stern and strict captain. When cold friends will not find food, forage, and pay for the "God-fearing" "Ironsides," Cromwell's sword pens the requisition which knows no evasion, and must be fully complied with. Cromwell seems daily to grow conscious of his augmenting power, and to play cautiously for more authority: and yet I stand with Cromwell. To re-quote the words attributed to Lord Chatham: "There was ambition, there was sedition, there was violence, but no man shall persuade me that it was not the cause of liberty on the one side, and of tyranny on the other." Lieutenant-Colonel Cromwell is busying himself in fortifying the town of Cambridge against Prince Rupert, in levying "freewill contributions" for the good cause, and in seizing "malignants'" horses; busying himself, too, in riding hard and striking hard, as the need arises, until the Colonel Cromwell is chief of the seven associated counties, with a large force of well-ordered men; "not a man swears but he pays his twelvepence; no plundering, no drinking, disorder, or impiety allowed." Lord Essex, the Lieutenant-General, grows less, and Colonel Cromwell grows greater, until the big fight comes at Winceby, where, "within half-pistol shot, his horse was killed under him at the first charge, and fell down upon him, and, as he rose up, he was knocked down again by the gentleman who charged him.....but afterwards he recovered a poor horse in a soldier's hands, and bravely mounted himself again," and rides to victory.

Puritan Cromwell is now Governor of Ely; the Cathedral Service does not please him, and so he writes to the Reverend Mr. Hitch, "Lest the soldiers should in any tumultuous or disorderly way attempt the reformation of the Cathedral Church, I require you to forbear altogether your

choir-service." Cromwell's will is to be law to Mr. Hitch, even in the regulation of the Ely Cathedral Choristers. The Reverend Mr. Hitch disregarding, next Sunday in walks Oliver Cromwell, his hat on his head, a force at his back, and with a "Leave off your fooling, and come down, Sir," he dismisses poor Mr. Hitch from his pulpit, just as a few years later he dismisses Speaker Lenthall from the House of Commons. The Lieutenant-General Cromwell, early in 1644, finds time to appear in Parliament to complain of my Lord Willoughby, a Parliament General, but one not too well-inclined to see the Parliament over-much-succeeding against the king, and who has "strangely dissolute people about him." And a little later, to Major-General Crawford, the Lieutenant-General Cromwell delivers a sharp reprimand, because Crawford has discountenanced an "anabaptist" Lieutenant-Colonel: "Sir, the State, in choosing men to serve it, takes no notice of their opinions; if they be willing faithfully to serve it, that satisfies. I advised you formerly to bear with men of different minds from yourself.....Take heed of being too sharp, or too easily sharpened by others, against those to whom you can object little, but that they square not with you in every opinion concerning matters of religion." And still a little later—with the extra glory of Marston fight giving further force to his authority—Oliver Cromwell rebukes the Ely Committee for having released some prisoners who had been arrested by some of Cromwell's officers, and forthwith has the released men re-arrested by the warrant of his (Cromwell's) will. The newer soldiers, especially those with strong convictions on religious matter, all inclined to Cromwell. "The man," Baillie says, "is a very wise and active head, universally well-beloved, as religious and stout, being a known Independent, and most of the soldiers who love new ways, put themselves under his command."

After the second battle of Newbury, on October 27th, 1644, there was strife between Oliver Cromwell and his superior officer, the Earl of Manchester. The latter, it was alleged, "does not want to press the king too hard, will not pursue after a victory, does not even wish to fight;" and in December we find Cromwell in Parliament declaring that "it is now a time to speak, or forever to hold the tongue," and urging in effect that these Earls of Essex and Manchester are poor shiftless things, with which it will be indeed difficult to save a nation from ruin. While on the

other side it is contended that the firebrand Cromwell has openly avowed that "there never would be a good time in England until we had done with Lords;" and still worse, that "if he met the king in battle, he would fire his pistol at the king as at another." The Scots Commissioners, fearful of Cromwell's growing influence and bold speech, want to learn "whether there be not ground to prosecute Cromwell as an incendiary;" but Cromwell has already too many "Ironsides" to make such a prosecution desirable. And now Lords Essex and Manchester are got out of the army with soft words and flattering distinctions. Sir Thomas Fairfax is Lord-General, and Cromwell is scarcely second.

The self-denying ordinance—which took from all Members of both Houses of Parliament their commands in the army and their civil employments—would, if it had been strictly carried out, have deprived Cromwell of his military position; but Prince Rupert is to be attacked, and who shall be relied on to do it save Oliver Cromwell? Accordingly, "forty days' leave" for his continuance in command being granted, he routs convoys, captures strong houses, and goes on so victoriously, that the leave is renewed for "three months," and at last the "self-denying ordinance" is dispensed with, at least in this case, and the Lieutenant-General Cromwell still remains M.P. for Cambridge.

And now the attempt at any treaty at Uxbridge having failed, the king and Parliament come again to blows on the 14th of June, 1645, when Naseby fight brought Charles and Cromwell very close indeed, and the king's majesty fled. For a moment the daring Rupert seems likely to win, but his cavaliers are better thieves than soldiers, and staying to plunder after their first dashing charge, lose their vantage; and then stern Cromwell, whose "Ironsides" never plunder, drives away Prince Rupert's troopers into disastrous defeat.

Through 1645 and 1646, we find Cromwell continually fighting and growing stronger, capturing Bristol and various strong places, battering forts, and personally doing daring deeds, with a tinge of fierceness, which made his name feared, until the king surrenders to the Scots, and is by the Scottish leaders traded away to the Parliament. Now comes complication of quarrel; Parliament has not only to fight the king, but is also divided against itself; one party thinks the king low enough, the other section would push the man Charles Stuart still harder, even though he fell too low to rise again. With the latter goes the army; with the first

ranks the city. City and Parliament Presbyterians would fain disband the army, which has grown too potent through its victories, and at last has marched much too near to London. The army requires its arrears of pay, insists on its "old commanders," and begins to rank itself a power in the State. The king, high with hope, plays army against Parliament, and Scots Commissioners against both. The army appoints "agents," or "adjutators," from each regiment, and Cromwell, though he sits in Parliament, and does not openly side with the growing malcontent spirit, is evidently more inclined to count upon the sword than upon the tongue, and declares to Ludlow that "these men will never leave until the army pull them out by the ears." The army petitions, and marches nearer London, and now the Lieutenant-General Cromwell goes to Saffron Waldron to see "the army disbanded," which does not disband, but, on the contrary, and probably by Cromwell's connivance, seizes the person of the king, not altogether too unwilling to be so seized. There is some thought in Parliament to arrest Cromwell, but no opportunity. He now plainly sides with the army, and it marches still nearer London, and demands not only its arrears of pay, and redress of other grievances, but claims also "a settlement of the peace of the kingdom, and of the liberties of the subject." On the one side Presbyterian Parliament and London; on the other, the army, drawing closer to the city walls, with Oliver Cromwell its real commander, and with the king in its midst, his majesty vainly hoping that the contending parties may destroy each other, leaving him the master. Hallam says that the royalists "seem never to have comprehended that many active spirits looked to the entire subversion of the monarchy. The king, in particular, was haunted by a prejudice, natural to his obstinate and undiscerning mind, that he was necessary to the settlement of the nation." Nor was Cromwell, nor were his followers, irrevocably hostile to the king. Soon after the capture of the king by Cornet Joyce and his troopers, they declared, "we do not see how there can be any peace to this kingdom, firm or lasting, without a due provision for the rights, quiet, and immunity of his majesty." Unfortunately for himself, Charles Stuart irritated even the portion of the army well disposed to him by his utter deceitfulness.

For a little time there is compromise between the Presbyterian and Independent factions, and an effort is made to

limit the duration of the Parliament by its own vote, in which effort Oliver Cromwell is beaten by a small majority only. The king keeps a sort of prisoner's state in Hampton Court Palace, which serves as a not unpleasant gaol, until all negotiations fall through, and on the 11th of November, 1647, he absconds from Hampton Court. His Majesty's flight had been hastened by the discovery—through the interception of letters to the queen—of the worse than double part that his insincere kingship was playing. The army had been provoked at the notion that they had been tricked by the king. Fifth-monarchy men began to menace the king's person; and in the army the levelling spirit, which had threatened Parliament, turned also, for an instant, its angriness against Oliver Cromwell, who quickly, and without mercy, trampled out the mutinous spirit, the leader being shot as a warning to prevent other want of discipline.

The king is a prisoner in Carisbrooke Castle. The Scotch, who not long since delivered him into bonds, now march, or threaten to march, into England, to obtain his majesty's release. The very hope encourages Presbyterian royalism in Wales, which bursts out in royalist risings; but Cromwell burns one place, starves another, and generally terrifies the Welshmen into quiescence; even if he does not win them to the complete abandonment of the now utterly-ruined monarchy. The Scotch threatening is at last real invasion. Duke Hamilton has crossed the border with heavy forces, and is coming southward, Preston way, with a huge and straggling army stretching miles backward, like some unwieldy serpent. Cromwell, hurrying out of Wales, and over the Lancashire and Cheshire hills, throws himself on this Londonwards marching army, breaks its back, stamps on its tail, and pounds its fangs into impotence. With the rout at Preston commence the funereal ceremonies for Charles Stuart; to be delayed for a scant space, while in his turn Oliver Cromwell crosses the Scottish border in pursuit of Hamilton's broken men; but coming to an end at Whitehall on the 29th of January, 1649.

The theory of divine-right rule was exploded for ever in England on that day. The divinity which doth hedge around a king proved no barrier to the headsman's axe. There had been an effort in the Presbyterian Parliament to save the king, and, in December, a majority of 129 against 83 had voted that "his majesty's concessions in the treaty of Newport are a ground of settlement." On the second day

after this vote, on the 6th of December, 1648, Colonel Pride's regiment of foot paraded under arms in Westminster Hall, and Colonel Rich's regiment of horse stood in the Palace Yard outside. Pride's purge is applied to the House of Commons. Those who are against the army, may not go in, but must get them gone. The sword is stronger than the law. Lieutenant-General Cromwell has hurried up to town: the minority has become majority, and Charles Stuart is "convicted, attainted, and condemned of high treason." Here it is not fair matter to discuss regicide at any length; killing kings is poor work and useless work. Republics are not created by carving off the head of a monarch; they can only grow gradually in the development of peoples into a grandeur of stature higher than tinsel kingcraft knows. Regicide is weak work, for it is mostly the vengeance of an indignant people, for a wrong which was only possible while that people participated or acquiesced in the perpetuation of the wrong. I am against beheading kings, as a matter of policy; it is only chipping off an unimportant morsel of the monarchy; but I am still more against killing kings, as a matter of principle, for I object entirely to capital punishment. Punishment can only be lawful—that is, moral; that is, useful—when it has for its end and aim the prevention of the recurrence of crime, not only in the criminal, but also in the society to which the individual culprit belongs. Punishment which is only vengeance for past offence is itself crime, and it brutalises those by whom, and amongst whom, the vengeance is carried out. I am against killing kings, for I am against the right of society to take human life; but while capital punishment obtains in any country, I know no reason that the headsman's axe should be blunted and turned from a king's neck. The law should see no distinction of person in any citizen, unless, indeed, it tempers itself with tenderness to the poor-born, the weak, the starved, and the ignorant. I do not understand the cant of warped humanity, which sheds a tear for the royal martyr, and has, nevertheless, dry eyes for the scores of thousands, whom the royal murderer pushed to death and ruin by his crime, his folly, or his impotence.

On the 19th of May, 1649, it is solemnly declared that England is "A commonwealth or free state, and shall from henceforth be governed as a commonwealth and free state, by the supreme authority of this nation, the representatives of the people in Parliament, and by such as they shall

appoint and constitute officers and ministers under them for the good of the people, and without any king or House of Lords." Alas! paper decrees do not make commonwealths, and England as yet is hardly full enough of men to continue a government "without any king." An uncrowned king has already commenced to reign by the force of his own grand will. Charles Stuart is indeed dead, but there is not even the hope or shadow of a possible Republic in England. The one-man rule is more potent than ever; but it is now the rule of a real, resolute man, not that of a mere irresolute royally-born puppet; an Oliver Cromwell wields power, not a Charles Stuart. The uncrowned king governs with a steel sceptre, but he governs for England; Charles Stuart misgoverned for the king. Oliver Cromwell is tyrant, not Republican; but his heart is, despite the lust of power, a patriot's heart, and he uses a giant's might to build his country's glory and its strength. He knows no mercy, no toleration, for episcopal royalism, or mass-saying adherents to the monarchy. He is law and judge, and his verdict is fiercely severe.

Poor Ireland was for, and was against, Charles I., and now is nearly all in arms for Charles II. And so in Ireland, the Lord General Cromwell acts with a Puritan mercilessness of judgment against these misguided Papists. The Irish page is a bloody one—"One could pity this poor Irish people; their case is pitiable enough." But Cromwell does not torture the captive, nor strike the fallen. To the foe in arms, and counting high his strength, fierce fight, no truce, no peace, no mercy. To the foe on his knees, abandoning his arms, all manner of protection and fairness, save one—no shadow of toleration for Rome. The freedom of worship, claimed and taken for Independents, was denied to Romanists. "I shall not where I have the power, and the Lord is pleased to bless me, suffer the exercise of the mass where I can take notice of it. No, nor in any way suffer you that are Papists, where I can find you seducing the people." When the Lord General Cromwell landed, nearly all Ireland was united against the Commonwealth, and had declared for the young Charles II. Two cities alone, Dublin and Derry, and they besieged, still held for the Parliament. In less than twelve months Oliver Cromwell had burned and trampled out all resistance, and, save the city of Waterford, had captured in turn every strong place. No plundering, no murder, no violence permitted;

but when the fight comes, and Tredah summoned will not cede, Cromwell himself has to lead the fresh assault: then no mercy, no pity, all the garrison are put to sword. And more than one Tredah in this twelvemonths' history!

"A train of favouring events, more than any deep-laid policy," says Hallam, "had now brought sovereignty within the reach of Cromwell. His first schemes of ambition may probably have extended no farther than a title and an estate, with a great civil and military command in the king's name. Power had fallen into his hands because they alone were fit to wield it; he was taught by every succeeding events his own undeniable superiority over his contemporaries in martial renown, in civil prudence, in decision of character, and in the public esteem which naturally attached to these qualities." And this from Hallam, hostile, it must not be forgotten, to our Cromwell. The wine of power is an intoxicating draught. The taste grows with the drinking. It is easy now to condemn Cromwell for taking power, but who is there who—having dared to lift the glass to his lips when each drop was bitter—would have the courage to turn away the goblet when the hour of triumph came, and the whole contents seemed sweet and pleasant, and the world, with loud shouts, acclaimed the drinking? It requires a hero's might to leave the won prize ungrasped, and this Cromwell was only a man. A grand man, it is true, as men are measured in these peddling days.

Hardly is Ireland roughly smitten into sullen peace before Scotland again calls for similar chastening. Charles II. has there become a covenanted king; has signed a public declaration acknowledging his late father's sins, and his own errors, which he filially puts to the account of evil training. On the 26th of June, 1650, "Oliver Cromwell, Esq., is made Captain-General and Commander-in-Chief of all the forces raised, or to be raised, by authority of Parliament, within the Commonwealth of England," and in a few more days is on the march to Scotland, where he has to match himself against cool and cautious General David Lesley, who is too strongly intrenched to be attacked safely on his own ground, and who will not leave his chosen lines. Here for nearly two months, with a little poor skirmishing, until Oliver Cromwell and his men get short of supplies, and David Lesley is much worried for his over-caution by kirk committees and royalist civil dignitaries, and battle is given at Dunbar; and on the 3rd of September, 1650, "the Scotch

army is shivered to utter ruin." The day before the battle the Scotch were sure of victory, and Cromwell deemed defeat possible. The fight at Dunbar was not his choice, "we were necessitated," he writes Ireton. The day after the battle his view has changed; he now writes, "the kirk has done their do," and so they had. There is yet more fighting to be done, but it all goes one way. At last, as a desperate effort, the Royalist Scots march southward, carrying with them their young king, and Cromwell hurries after. Through Lancashire, past Shrewsbury to Worcester, where some rest is taken, goes Charles II. Through Northumberland and Yorkshire, and by way of Nottingham, comes Cromwell; and on the 3rd of September, 1651, a year to a day from Dunbar fight, comes the battle of Worcester, where too there is another utter rout, and the young king is a fugitive, without the shadow of an army.

Ten weeks after the battle of Worcester the Long Parliament voted that it would cease to exist on the 3rd of November, 1654. "But why," asks the army, "should there be still three years delay?" And then there are difficulties about the new representation, and on these the army officers and the Parliament are by no means agreed. The army desires to shut out the possibility of a Presbyterian majority, and the Parliament hopes to prevent any other. It is thought by many officers that the Rump Presbyterian Parliament desires to keep its power, and continue its existence. These difficulties grow into dangers, until on the 20th of April, 1653, the Lord-General Cromwell, in plain black, but with a company of musketeers close at hand, goes into the House, and sits him down for about a quarter of an hour, and then, with an "I will put an end to your prating," calls in the musketeers, and dissolves the Parliament by the sole warrant of his will. After a brief two months, by the same warrant of his will, and by no other law, Oliver Cromwell issues his summonses for a National Council, to which come 138, selected by him as members for various counties. This Council, called by some the Little Parliament, by others the Barebones Parliament, is greeted on the 4th of July, 1653, by Oliver Cromwell, in a speech wherein he declares that in the "Act for a Representative," brought forward in the Parliament he had just dissolved, "plainly the intention was, not to give the people a right of choice," but "was only to recruit the House, the better to perpetuate themselves," and "truly, I say, when we saw all this, having

power in our hands, we could not resolve to let such monstrous proceedings go on." This "Little Parliament" worked vigorously for five months, doing in that time some good service to the State, and then resolved, "That the sitting of this Parliament any longer, as now constituted, will not be for the good of the Commonwealth, and that, therefore, it is requisite to deliver up unto the Lord-General Cromwell the powers which we received from him."

On the 16th of December, 1653, "a council of officers, and other persons interested in the nation," nominated Oliver Cromwell Lord Protector of the Commonwealth of England, Scotland, and Ireland. "Through a gross and glaring evidence," says Hallam, "of the omnipotence of the army, the instrument under which he took his title accorded to him no unnecessary executive authority. The sovereignty still resided in the Parliament, he had no negative voice in their laws."

On the 4th of September, 1654, was assembled the first Protectorate Parliament duly elected by the nation. This Parliament wants to discuss too freely; for it discusses the very right and authority of the Protector himself; but only for a week, for on the 12th of September the Parliament House is locked up and guarded with soldiers, and the Members are all invited to attend his Highness in the Painted Chamber, and there he, Oliver Cromwell, tells the assembled Commons "that he would sooner be rolled into his grave and buried with infamy" than throw away the Government, and that, until they all acknowledge his position as Lord Protector, he says, "I have caused a stop to be put to your entrance into the Parliament House." Some submit at once, some more submit to-morrow, some—as Bradshaw, Hazelrig, Thomas Scott, Major Wildman—will not submit at all. Non-submission avails nothing; those who will not submit may have no entrance, no voice, but may get them home, or go whither they will, save into the Parliament House.

The Lord Protector's Government is certainly of the most despotic; but says one, "it makes England more formidable and considerable to all nations than it has ever been in my days." Cromwell looks to Virginia; deals sharply with Spain; refuses to sign the French treaty until some show of justice is done by the Duke of Savoy to the Protestants "of Lucerna, of Perosa, and St. Martin;" and generally marks himself as a live head for England.

There are plots against Cromwell's life, a reward is offered by Charles II. of "virtuous life and blessed memory," of £500 a year to any one who by "sword, pistol, or poison," shall kill "the base mechanic fellow, named Oliver Cromwell," and this reward is offered "on the word and faith of a Christian king." There are men too more dangerous, because more honest, who seek Cromwell's life, because they regard his power as paralysing all hope of liberty. And there is a Parliament which has so reluctantly recognised his chieftainship that it cumbers and hinders his Government by its resolutions and red-tape provisions for limiting his authority; so that on the 22nd of January, 1655, Cromwell makes it a last long speech, of which the peroration is: "I think it my duty to tell you that it is not for the profit of these nations, nor for the common and public good, for you to continue here any longer"; and Parliament is dissolved, even before the five calendar months are yet run out during which it is provided that Parliament shall not be dissolved. Cromwell construes the month to be but four weeks, and he wears a sword that would, if need be, measure a hour to have only fifty minutes.

Parliament had voted the Protectorate elective by 200 voices against 60, and although compelled by Cromwell to admit his personal might unquestioned, had resolutely debated and examined every other article of the instrument of Government, under which the Protectorate had been created. Parliament dissolved, Cromwell governs by a pure military despotism, dividing England into ten districts, presided over by Major-Generals, nominated by himself. These Major-Generals levy heavy taxes on disaffected persons, their authority being, that it is by Cromwell's will. Duties on merchandise having been levied in excess of law, by Cromwell's authority, and a Mr. George Cony, on whom the tax had been enforced, having made suit at law against the collector, Cromwell sent Cony's counsel to the Tower, while the Lord Chief Justice Rolle retired from the bench rather than give judgment against the Protector.

And yet after his fashion, and as between individuals, Cromwell dealt out a rude justice, and in all matters other than those which touched the firm maintenance of his Government, was equitable in his dealings as chief-magistrate of the land. He filled the benches with wise and able judges, and, outside the one question of his personal rule, he governed well for the country which he held in the grip

of his iron gauntlet. In all matters, even of minor appointments, he would have his way, and writes to Mr. Secretary Thurloe: "I have not the particular shining bauble for crowds to gaze at or to kneel to, but—to be short—I know how to deny petitions, and whatever I think proper for outward form, to 'refer' to any officer or office, I expect that such my compliance with custom shall be looked upon as an indication of my will and pleasure to have the thing done."

On the 17th of September, 1656, a fresh Parliament is summoned of about 400 members, and of these Cromwell, against all law, prevents nearly ninety persons from taking their seats. The men excluded have been duly elected, but some are too Republican, some few too Royalist, and Cromwell will have none of them. Under this Parliament the major-general system is abolished with Cromwell's consent, and some slight show of constitutional Government presented. At last, on the 31st of March, 1657, the House of Commons present to Cromwell their petition and advice that his Highness, the Lord Protector, may be pleased to adopt the title "king." Irate major-generals and stern Puritan officers have already remonstrated and urged upon his highness the danger of even seeming to covet any such title. And Cromwell, he will, and he will not, become king. For himself, he is far stronger with the Lord Protector's staff than he would be with the king's sceptre; but then the crown, should he take it, would pass to his son by custom. So he refuses, in view of army opposition, but not too peremptorily, for he still hopes and wishes to wear the crown, if it may be done without too much war with his old Ironside following. In discussing whether or not he shall take the title, he uses no grand thought of right or plea of duty; it is a shambling, hesitating, argument, with none of the thoroughness of Cromwell in it. "I suppose it will have to stand on its expediency," he says, and so it does, and being judged by Cromwell to be not expedient, is at last refused. On the 8th of May his Highness says: "I cannot undertake this Government with the title of king," and so keeps the Government as Protector, with such new advantages and stipulations as Parliament sees fit to give and make; and on the 26th of June, 1657, Oliver Cromwell, now more formally recognised as Protector by the English Parliament, is solemnly installed in his Protectorship, in Westminster Hall, with grand State ceremony, and Parliament is prorogued

until January, 1658, when it meets again with two Houses as of old, Lords and Commons. But into the Commons House now the excluded Members may (by terms of the Petition and Advice) enter if they will but take the oath, and they, or at least some of them, do take the oath, and entering range themselves in sturdy opposition. For ten days there is discontented debate in Parliament, with at least the echoings of disaffection outside; and on the 4th of February, therefore, Oliver Cromwell makes his last speech to the two Houses, saying: "You have not only disjointed yourselves, but the whole nation.....it hath not only been your endeavour to pervert the army while you have been sitting, but some of you have been listing of person by commission of Charles Stuart to join with any insurrection that may be made. And what is likely to come upon this, the enemy being ready to invade us, but even present blood and confusion?.....And if this be the end of your sitting, and this be your carriage, I think it high time that an end be put to your sitting. And I do dissolve this Parliament! And let God be judge between you and me." And now for a brief seven months governs alone again Oliver Cromwell, and on the 3rd of September, 1658, dies.

Oliver Cromwell dead, the Protectorate was dead too. It had never been a Government created by the people, it was the work of one resolute man. During the storm-strife provoked by Charles Stuart's arrogant imbecility, Cromwell had taken the helm of the State ship, and had navigated her, roughly but safely, through tempest, fury, and dangerous passages. But he had allowed none other of the crew to study navigation, nor to share with him the piloting; and when the rudder slipped from his hand, palsied by death, the poor Protectorate bark drifted to wreck, because none had been trained to fill his place. Cromwell's was a one-man rule, a pure despotism. Two thousand years earlier he would have been carried into Rome on the shields of his soldiers, and saluted "Imperator." Cromwell was no Republican; but he was a grand Englishman, who pushed to the front by virtue of his sturdy thoroughness, and who did mighty service for the nation whose authority he took, whose power he wielded. One with whom he dealt roughly said of him: "One could bear a little with Oliver Cromwell, though contrary to his oath of fidelity to the Parliament, contrary to his duty to the public, contrary to the respect he owed to that venerable body from whom he received his

authority, he usurped the functions of Government. His merit was so extraordinary, that our judgments, our passions, might be blinded by it. He made his way to empire by the most illustrious actions; he had under his command an army that had made him a conqueror, and a people that had made him their general." The author of a fine history of "Democracy," recently published in Massachusetts, describes Cromwell as "hypocrite in his religion, a fanatic in his politics, and a despot in his rule." That he was "a despot in his rule," is true; that he was a "fanatic in his politics," I see no evidence. Clearly a monarchist, he trampled on the monarchy and accepted a Government without a king; was content with a Protectorate with one chamber, equally content with a Protectorate with two chambers. Having overthrown the king, would have accepted himself the kingly title, had it not been for the dangerous opposition of men who were alike fanatics in politics and religion. Whether Cromwell was, or was not, a "hypocrite in religion," is harder perhaps to decide, and I may not be the best one to express an opinion. Many great leaders have professed themselves God-sent, and even I, who would always regard such a profession as utterly untrue in fact, am not prepared to say that the utterer is necessarily a hypocrite. Hindostan gave us recently a great leader claiming to be god-sent. The Moslem, twelve centuries ago, had his Mohammed. That Cromwell was a "fanatic" in his religion is, I think, more easily proveable; and that he was, at any rate, in the last eleven years of his life "a hypocrite" in his politics, is, I think, capable of demonstration. But, despite all this, he was a man of huger stature and of mightier will than any other who lived in his age. He made the haughty Spaniard bend; forced Mazarin to be tender to Piedmontese Protestants; compelled the sturdy Dutchman to admit England's supremacy; and made his brief page of power dazzling with the glory of his grand rule. He died, and the night of his life was without starlight; his grave without honour afforded no shelter to his bones. A people whom he had overmastered became again willing servants to the dynasty he had expelled. Sole ruler of his race, his sceptre fell as his coffin was lowered. The might of his manhood had offshoot in no breast. The Captain is dead, and the wind and waves urge the helpless ship to ruin, for amongst the crew none dares take his place.

II.—WASHINGTON.

On the 22nd of February, 1732, nearly three-quarters of a century after the death of Cromwell, George Washington was born at the family homestead on Bridges Creek, on the Virginia side of the Potomac River. Washington was the offspring of a royalist family of estate and position, and his early associations with the friends and relatives of Lord Fairfax were calculated to increase his feeling of reverence for Monarchical and aristocratic traditions. When yet only nineteen years of age, George Washington was appointed Major and Adjutant-General of the Virginian Militia, and before he was twenty-two was charged with a most difficult and dangerous mission to those of the Indians and French then united in arms against the English Colonists, and also to the tribes of Indians who had not yet committed themselves to open hostilities. In this mission he exhibited much prudence, firmness, and devotion, coupled with admirable tact and self-possession.

In April, 1754, Washington fought his first battle with a small French force; and writing to his brother in the flush of the excitement, says how he "heard the bullets whistle." His first campaign ended most disastrously, his command having, after hard fighting, to surrender to a very superior force; but Washington received, nevertheless, the thanks of the House of Burgesses of Virginia for the bravery he exhibited.

In 1755 a great expedition, under General Braddock, having been organised against the Indians, Washington's talents were utilised by the English commander, who appointed Washington as a volunteer aide-de-camp, but only partially adopted the advice given by the young Virginian. The utter disregard by Braddock of part of Washington's information was attended by most fatal consequences; for the English general led his troops into an ambuscade of Indians and Frenchmen, against which he had been warned,

where the English regulars were literally cut to pieces, and Braddock himself was mortally wounded. In this sad business Washington distinguished himself alike for his courage, his modesty, and his wisdom; and when, a little later, the Colony of Virginia raised special forces to defend its boundaries against attacks from the French and Indians, Washington was, with the full assent of his countrymen, appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Colonial forces (somewhat against the wish of Governor Dinwiddie, who behaved with coldness and ungraciousness to the Virginian militia-man). The position of the young Commander-in-Chief was further embarrassed, by the fact that any officer holding a commission from the king refused to obey orders from an officer whose commission was only signed by the Governor; and we find Washington journeying to Boston in the hope to get himself and officers put upon the regular establishment, with commissions direct from King George III. It is useless now to speculate on what might have been the result on Washington's military future had his request been complied with. Luckily for the struggles for independence, his demand in this respect was refused. Theodore Parker, speaking of his severity as a military disciplinarian at this period, says: "From natural disposition, he loved the exercise of power. But he was singularly careful to defer to the civil authority when possible. If the right was doubtful, the conscientious young soldier left it to be exercised by the magistrate, not by the military arm. This is to be noted, because it is so rare for military men to abstain from tyranny." Washington's position was a very painful one; he had to defend a wide-stretching frontier against a wily and savage enemy, and this with an utterly inadequate force, badly supplied with munitions of war. He was thwarted and snubbed by Governor Dinwiddie, and nearly all his requests for necessaries in the conduct of military operations were disregarded. Washington's health entirely broke down under these varied annoyances, and he ultimately resigned his position. Having been elected to the House of Burgesses of Virginia, he took his seat in 1759, being greeted on his entry to the Legislature by the special thanks of the House for the services he had rendered. To these thanks Washington could make no reply; his talents were not those of the orator. Self-possessed in face of danger, he was unnerved amidst his friends by the praise thus publicly tendered to him.

In the House of Burgesses George Washington was not, therefore, at first a conspicuous figure, save as the soldier who had earned its thanks prior to his installation. There is, however, a storm rising through the land which shall so endanger the liberties of the citizens, and excite their wrath, that a man of Washington's stature cannot long be overlooked. The Navigation Laws enforced by England against the Colonies had entirely excluded the Colonists from trade with foreign countries; had subjected the trade between the various Colonies to heavy duties, and had either totally prohibited, or imposed prohibitory restraints on, all Colonial manufactures thought likely to interfere with the manufacturing interests of the mother country. Much discontent and dissatisfaction had been produced, especially in New England, by the operation of the Navigation Laws; and in 1760 this feeling of discontent was aggravated by an attempt made in Boston to collect, under writs of assistance, duties on foreign sugar and molasses, which had been smuggled into Massachusetts. Those writs of assistance were resisted before the law courts as unconstitutional, the question being argued so eloquently by the famous James Otis, that it is said that all his hearers went away ready to take up arms to resist the enforcement of such writs. The litigation on these writs of assistance was really the first potent step in the struggle for independence—the beginning of the great American Republic.

At the conclusion of the French war, the most active efforts were made by the British men-of-war, acting under stringent orders from the Home Government, to suppress the clandestine trade theretofore carried on with the Spanish Colonies. To this the New England men replied by resolving not to purchase British fabrics, and the home trade was in consequence much diminished.

In 1764 the ill-advised Ministry of George III. sought to levy taxes in the Colonies, and in 1765 the famous Stamp Act was passed. Washington, who had hitherto been a devoted royalist, and had shown himself submissive to all the procedures of the Home Government, now denounces "this unconstitutional method of taxation." The resistance to the Stamp Act was so great that it was repealed on the 18th of March, 1766; and Washington then writes that all "who were instrumental in procuring the repeal are entitled to the thanks of every British subject, and have mine cordially." So that in the spring of 1766 Washington not only

regarded himself as a British subject, but actually raised no objection—perhaps saw no objection—to the clause of the repealing act—so much impeached by Henry, Otis, Franklin, and the Adamses—which declared that "the king, with the consent of Parliament, had power and authority to make laws and statutes of sufficient force and validity to bind the Colonies and people of America, in all cases whatsoever." Those who contended for principles in America still protested against this clause, but Washington took no part in the protest. He remained quietly at Mount Vernon attending to his plantation. Year by year the attitude of the Home Government grew more menacing, and the dissatisfaction in the Colonies grew more marked. In 1767 a variety of duties were enacted for collection in the Colonies. To prepare for a possible struggle "armed negotiators," in the shape of two regiments, were sent from England to Boston to protect the Commissioners of Customs. The inhabitants of the Bay State City resolved, in towns' meeting, that the king had no right to send troops thither without the consent of the Assembly, and quarters were refused to the troops, who were thereupon billeted in the State House, in Faneuil Hall, and other public buildings. The resistance offered in Massachusetts encouraged others. Washington in 1769 writes to his friend George Mason: "At a time when our lordly masters in Great Britain will be satisfied with nothing less than the deprivation of American freedom, it seems highly necessary that something should be done to avert the stroke, and maintain the liberty which we have derived from our ancestors. But the manner of doing it, to answer the purpose effectually, is the point in question. That no man should scruple, or hesitate a moment, in defence of so valuable a blessing, is clearly my opinion; yet arms should be the last resource."

In 1769, on the proposition of Washington, the burgesses of Virginia—following the example of the northern Colonies—pledged themselves neither to import nor use any goods, merchandise, or manufactures taxed by Parliament. Washington adhered rigorously to this, and strictly enjoined his London agent not to ship him anything subject to taxation.

In 1770 Lord North became Prime Minister in England, and he abandoned all the duties levied in 1767, save one, the right to a tax on tea, which he reserved, "to maintain the Parliamentary right of taxation." "A total repeal," he said, "cannot be thought of till America is prostrate at our

feet." This tea tax, if it had been collected, would have produced not quite £300 a year. England spent £139,521,035 in the vain endeavour to enforce the tax!!

EARLY in 1773 Lord Dunmore was appointed Governor of Virginia, and despite the hostile feeling arising between the Colonists and the Government, Washington appears to have been on the most friendly and intimate terms with the Court Party, until the arrival in Virginia of the news of the monstrously mad and vindictive policy adopted by Lord North—a policy which it is now clear was actually strongly urged and enforced by George III.—by which the port of Boston was to be closed and its commerce entirely ruined. The whole of Massachusetts determined to stand by Boston, and the query now was, Would the other Colonies stand by Massachusetts? Washington offered to "raise one thousand men, and subsist them at my own expense, and march myself at their head for the relief of Boston." General Gage had encamped his infantry and artillery on Boston Common, and the cry went round the whole country to break off all intercourse with Great Britain, until the colony was restored to full enjoyment of all its rights; and further, to renounce all dealings with those on this American side, who should refuse to enter into a similar compact. On the 18th of July, 1774, a meeting was held in Fairfax County, at which a committee was appointed, with Washington as chairman, to draw up resolutions, which state first the illegal conduct of the British Government; covenant not to import or hold intercourse with England or any colony, town, or province refusing to agree to the plan adopted by the General Congress; then recommend a petition to the king, "lamenting the necessity of entering into measures that might be displeasing; declaring their attachment to his person, family, and Government, and their desire to continue in dependence upon Great Britain." The attachment to the person of "mad George" may be passed by as a phrase of fashion, and even when we remember that his family included the lustful and lying George IV., the corrupt and brutal Duke of York, the niggardly and paltry William IV., and the bestially immoral Duke of Cumberland, it must not be forgotten that the "family" was then very young, and the "attachment" was probably for the good qualities which the Royal Family might have manifested had their lives been reversed, and their vices passed for virtues.

On the 3rd of September, 1774, a General Congress of

fifty-one deputies, delegated from the various Colonies, assembled at Philadelphia (Georgia alone being unrepresented). It was from this Congress that the famous address was sent to England which won such high praise from the lips of Chatham. On his return from this Congress, the eloquent Patrick Henry was asked whom he considered the greatest amongst the men assembled there. He replied; "If you speak of eloquence, Mr. Rutledge, of South Carolina, is by far the greatest orator; but if you speak of solid information and sound judgment, Colonel Washington is unquestionably the greatest man on that floor." Even yet Washington—irritated as he and his friends had become by aristocratic misrule—had no sort of disposition to advocate any separation from the mother country. Writing to Captain Mackenzie as to Independence, he says: "I am well satisfied that no such thing is desired by any thinking man in all North America."

It is worthy notice that the struggle in England, out of which Cromwell grew into power, and that in America, which ended in the elevation of Washington to the chief magistrature, had each its inception in the denial of the right claimed by the king and his ministers to levy taxes without the consent of the taxed. It was not, says Washington, "against paying the duty of 3d. per pound on tea..... No, it is the right only that we have all along disputed." Although Washington appears to have been opposed to some of the extreme measures of resistance advocated by a strong party of the Eastern men, yet so soon as a definite course was resolved upon, he went loyally with the majority; and he wrote to his brother, "It is my full intention, if needful, to devote my life and fortune to the cause."

The crisis soon came; General Gage detached a body of regular troops to destroy some provincial military stores at Concord, Massachusetts. At Lexington Green these troops fired on the local yeomanry, and before night a large body of English troops had been literally chased into the City of Boston by the "minute men," who ran, gun in hand, from their industries, to revenge the blood recklessly shed on the road to Concord. The Massachusetts yeomen, in their indignation, blockaded the English army within the limits of Boston, and the second Philadelphia Congress shortly afterwards appointed George Washington Commander-in-Chief of the insurgent army, now assembled in front of the Bay State City. Washington—who had in no fashion sought

the appointment, and whose nomination had been unanimous—when he accepted the position, added: "But lest some unlucky event should happen unfavourable to my reputation, I declare that I do not consider myself equal to the command I am honoured with. As to pay, I beg leave to assure Congress that, as no pecuniary consideration could have tempted me to accept this arduous employment, at the expense of my domestic ease and happiness, I do not wish to make any profit of it. I will keep an exact account of my expenses. These, I doubt not, they will discharge, and this is all I desire." Adams, in a letter written at the moment, praises highly the conduct of Washington, "a gentleman of one of the fairest fortunes upon the Continent, leaving his delicious retirement, his family and friends, sacrificing his ease, and hazarding all in the cause of his country. His views are noble and disinterested."

There is a tree at Cambridge—an old elm—where it is noted that Washington assumed his high command; and the first time I halted under the tree I tried hard to picture to myself the variously accoutred, roughly-dressed, badly-armed array of agriculturists which had so shut into Boston the well-drilled, well-armed, and highly-trained regular troops of the British Monarchy. The great fight at Bunker Hill—in which the gallant though unsuccessful attempt to fortify a position which would have commanded every portion of the City had shown the sturdy stuff of these New England "minute" men—had taken place prior to Washington's assumption of command. What army he found was to him very disappointing. Tired of merely watching the British forces, many of the newly-enrolled troops had returned to their farms, which sorely needed cultivation; and instead of 20,000 men supposed to be in camp, Washington only found there about 14,000 fit for service, and many of these without muskets or ammunition. The only troops presenting any appearance of drill or fair equipment were those from the small colony of Rhode Island. Theodore Parker says: "The camp was full of jealousies, rivalries, resentments, petty ambitions; men thinking much for themselves, little for their imperilled nation." Washington desired to force General Howe into general action, but, on taking stock of the gunpowder in the stores, found that the whole supply of powder would not provide nine cartridges per man.

In the American, or "Continental," army, as it was called, there were many divisions of opinion and interest. Some of the New England officers were personally indisposed to co-operate with the Virginian gentleman, whom they found much too aristocratic for their home-spun fancies. To quote the words of Washington himself: "Confusion and discord existed in every department, which in a little time must have ended either in the separation of the army, or fatal contests with one another." While Washington was organising his troops, and slowly obtaining for them the necessary military equipment, he had the constant fear that the British army might be able to take advantage of the disorganisation in the newly-raised levies he commanded. But General Gage and General Howe were content, while waiting for reinforcements, to thunder away from Bunker Hill batteries, while keeping their troops within their own works; the Americans, from want of powder, making but scant reply to the noisy cannonade.

The delay in the siege produced many embarrassments. Men who were brave enough in a fight would not patiently wait, doing nothing, in front of this fortified city, while their farms went to ruin. Enlisted for one year only, many would not re-enlist at all. Those who did manifest willingness to re-enlist would only serve under officers of their own choice; and men from one Colony, as Connecticut, would not serve under Rhode Island officers. In a letter written at this juncture Washington says: "I find we are likely to be deserted at a most critical time.....Our situation is truly alarming.....Could I have foreseen what I have experienced, and am likely to experience, no consideration upon earth should have induced me to accept this command." It must not be forgotten that the position of the men was not of the most enviable kind. "The first burst of revolutionary zeal had passed away; enthusiasm had been chilled by the inaction and monotony of a long encampment." No regular commissariat, and nearly all comforts absent. "The troops had suffered privations of every kind—want of fuel, clothing, provisions. They looked forward with dismay to the rigours of winter, and longed for their rustic homes and family firesides." Throughout the Colonies much more was expected from Washington than he was able to perform, his available force was over-rated, and his motives for inaction mis-construed. "I know," writes Washington on the 10th of February, 1776, "the unhappy predicament I stand in; I

know that much is expected from me; I know that, without men, without arms, without ammunition, without anything fit for the accommodation of a soldier, little is to be done, and, what is mortifying, I know that I cannot stand justified to the world without exposing my own weakness, and injuring the cause by declaring my wants; which I am determined not to do further than unavoidable necessity brings every man acquainted with them.....My own situation is so irksome to me at times that, if I did not consult the public good more than my own tranquillity, I should long ere this have put everything on the cast of a die. So far from my having an army of 20,000 men well armed, I have been here with less than half that number, including sick, furloughed, and on command, and those neither armed nor clothed as they should be. In short, my situation has been such that I have been obliged to use art to conceal it from my own officers.....To have the eyes of the whole Continent fixed with anxious expectation of hearing of some great event, and to be restrained in every military operation for want of the necessary means of carrying it on, is not very pleasing, especially as the means used to conceal my weakness from the enemy conceal it also from our friends."

Ultimately, as every one knows, the regular army of England evacuated Boston, beleagured by "an undisciplined band of husbandmen," and General Howe and his well-equipped legions sought safety in the warships from the persevering advances of Washington to the reduction of the Bay State City.

Convinced that "no accommodation could be effected with Great Britain, on acceptable terms," and that "a protracted war was inevitable," Washington now sought to force upon Congress the need for enlisting an army disposable for the whole war, and available in any portion of the continent. While his energetic remonstrances produced some improvements, there was still much left to be desired. The base of operations was changed from Massachusetts to New York State. Now, to a much larger degree, than when near Boston, Washington felt the effects of treachery; one plot nearly cost him his life, his very body-guards having been corrupted. Those who were the most willing agents of Monarchy and Toryism were found amongst the Quaker families, one of which, for its cowardly rascality, still receives from the British Government a pension of £4,000 a year.

On the 4th of July, 1776, Independence was declared in words; but a severe reverse, sustained by Washington on Long Island, made many persons despair of its realisation. The troops he had under him in this campaign were very ill-equipped. "Many of the yeomen of the country, hastily summoned from the plough, were destitute of arms, in lieu of which they were ordered to bring with them a shovel, spade, or pickaxe, or a scythe straightened and fastened to a pole." The effect of the defeat on Long Island was shown in the wholesale return to their farms in Connecticut alone of more than 4,000 men. Despite all this, Washington always presented a firm face to the enemy, even when himself nearly heart-broken, by the disregard of his entreaties by Congress, and by the indisposition shown by the several Colonial Governments to second his exertions, and comply with his requirements.

In September, 1776, the difficulties of his position, and the defection of some of his troops, seem to have rendered Washington desperate, and in some of the frays he risked his life needlessly. His natural calm, however, soon returned, and though evidently very doubtful as to the possibility of ultimate victory, he now recommenced those series of careful manœuvres which so embarrassed the English and German generals to whom he was opposed. General Washington had the danger of his position considerably heightened by the conduct of General Lee and General Gates. The first a brave and ambitious soldier, who aspired to the chief command, and who regarded Washington's star as on the wane, actually withheld reinforcements from Washington's crippled forces, when the latter was retreating through the Jerseys after the British successes at Fort Washington. The second (Gates) about the same time pleaded ill-health as an excuse for avoiding a command, so that he might go to Philadelphia to intrigue against Washington before the Congress.

If not entirely disregarding, at any rate in no fashion publicly noticing, the hostility of Lee and Gates, General Washington gave courage to his army, and restored the sinking spirits of the American Colonists, by a most brilliant dash at the Hessian quarters at Trenton, where, with actually inferior forces, he created an utter panic amongst the British troops. Just after the Trenton victory there is a fine illustration of the slender thread on which hung the future of American Independence. Several of the

regiments wished to return home; only enlisted for one year, their term of service had expired, their pay was in arrear, their presence was indispensable to Washington, at any rate for a short time, and by the offer of a bounty of ten dollars per man, they were induced to agree to stay for six weeks; but there was no money in the pay-chest, and the poor, penniless men could not rely on promises of future payment. Washington had to borrow £150 to enable him to pay the most pressing, and thus temporarily kept his forces together.

At the close of 1776 Washington was invested by Congress with almost dictatorial powers, and in acknowledging the resolution of Congress, he says: "I find Congress have done me the honour to entrust me with powers, in my military capacity, of the highest nature and almost unlimited extent. Instead of thinking myself freed from all civil obligations by this mark of their confidence, I shall constantly bear in mind that, as the sword was the last resort for the preservation of our liberties, so it ought to be the first thing laid aside when those liberties are firmly established." Washington was true in letter and in spirit to this promise. No enticement of ambition made him waver for one moment in his fidelity to the trust he had accepted.

Although Washington possessed nearly absolute authority, he seems to have been extremely reluctant to use it, and often permitted Congress to interfere, and to make appointments and arrangements which were neither consonant with his views nor with the dignity of his position. This is of course open to the criticism, that had Washington been less wise, it might have been very difficult for him to have held together the Eastern men, some of whom honestly seemed to entertain the notion that despite his professions Washington was really aiming at the establishment of a military rule.

The surrender of General Burgoyne, and the division under his command, to General Gates in the north; and the repulse of the army under Washington at Germantown, gave room for some of the disaffected to revive the intrigues hostile to the Commander-in-Chief. General Gates not only omitted to report to George Washington the surrender by Burgoyne, but actually corresponded secretly with dissatisfied officers in Washington's camp to induce them to cabal against their chief. The glorious achievements of Gates were compared with the disasters which attended

Washington in this campaign. It was overlooked that Gates —who was afterwards utterly ruined by his defeats in the South—was only carrying out Washington's original far-seeing plan of operations, and with a very large force at his command, aided by a generally favourable spirit in the part of the country where his military operations were conducted, while Washington had an inferior force weakened by troops he had detached to aid Gates—which troops General Gates now withheld from his Commander—and was in a lukewarm State, where many were disaffected to the American cause. Washington himself says that "General Gates was to be exalted on the ruin of my reputation and influence." The American army had great difficulty in obtaining provisions; in some places where the inhabitants had provisions and cattle, they denied them to General Washington, and preferred taking their cattle and food to Philadelphia, where the English army gave them higher prices.

In 1778 Washington writes: "For some days past there has been little less than a famine in the camp; a part of the army has been for a week without any kind of flesh, and the rest three or four days. Naked and starving as they are, we cannot enough admire the incomparable patience and fidelity of the soldiery." Philadelphia was occupied during the winter by a British army 20,000 strong, provided with every comfort; while Washington was at Valley Forge, besieging the city after a fashion, with not more than 5,000 men, in sadly wretched plight, sometimes without ammunition to serve its cannon. At last General Howe resigned the command of the British army to Sir Henry Clinton, by whom Philadelphia was evacuated, under orders from the Home Government.

Now came the effect of the treaty concluded by Franklin, between France and America, in the aid of a French squadron and French funds. This French contingent rather increased the temporary difficulties of Washington as Commander-in-Chief, although the general effect of the French alliance was to render the British prospects in the Colonies one of the gloomiest character. George III. was wicked enough, personally, to encourage the barbarous employment of Indians; and scalping, ravishing, and burning were amongst the means ineffectually resorted to by an anointed king to win back the affections of his subjects. The English Church and English landed aristocracy, by public addresses, encouraged their king in his cruel obstinacy, and the war

to subdue the Colonies was to be carried on in despite of the failures already experienced. In America the French alliance had at least one bad effect; many deemed that the war would now cease at once; that there was, therefore, no necessity for continuous supplies to the army; for long drills or great preparations. The several Colonies were unwilling to comply with military requisitions, which they thought had now become needless, and General Washington found himself exceedingly embarrassed, and his popularity endangered by his persistence in requiring the means for continuing a long, arduous, and costly struggle; and at the close of 1778 he writes: "Our affairs are in a more distressed, ruinous, and deplorable condition than they have been since the commencement of the war."

Difficulties in the internal condition of the army, and its relation to the various States, may be best illustrated by the case of the Jersey Brigade, in which, in 1779, the officers —who complained that they could get no pay, and that their families were starving—refused to march unless their arrears were first discharged. Here Washington acted with great tact as well as with great firmness; and while entirely denying the right of the officers or men to utilise their military position, he at the same time pressed Congress and the State Legislature to deal more patriotically with their defenders in the field.

For weeks at a time the army was on half allowance of food, sometimes without meat, sometimes without bread, sometimes without both. Congress being destitute of the power of levying general taxes, the State Governments were each severally charged with the duty of supporting their own quota of troops to the army. This naturally resulted in great inequality and discontent. Some States furnished their troops amply with pay and clothing; some States were niggardly in these respects; and some States were so neglectful as to leave their troops practically destitute, producing in these latter a more discontented and mutinous spirit from the contrast with their more favoured brethren.

To remedy this disastrous condition of things increased powers were sought for Washington, but any augmentation of his already large authority was strenuously objected to by some of the best men. It was urged "that his influence was already too great; that even his virtues afforded motives for alarm; that the enthusiasm of the army, joined to the

kind of dictatorship already confided to him, placed Congress and the United States at his mercy."

In the middle of 1780 matters came to a crisis. Two Connecticut regiments turned out in armed meeting, resolved to march home, "or at best to gain subsistence at the point of the bayonet." Suppressing this mutinous outbreak with considerable difficulty, Washington found it nearly impossible to get bread for his famishing soldiers, and in a spirit of deep despondency he wrote: "I have almost ceased to hope." Yet when the English commander, informed by his spies of the condition of Washington's forces, marched to attack the American troops, he found that Washington's great personal influence was enough to arouse their patriotism and unite their ranks; and instead of a discontented and disorganised rabble, the British were confronted by a compact and well-ordered, though badly-equipped, army, before whom the English forces retreated, despite the superiority on the royalist side.

In 1780 Washington seemed at the end of his resources. He writes: "I see nothing before us but accumulating distress. We have been half our time without provisions, and are likely to continue so. We have no magazines, nor money to form them; and in a little time we shall have no men, if we have no money to pay them." The Pennsylvanian troops mutinied in 1781, and compelled Congress to treat with them. Encouraged by this, a part of the Jersey troops also revolted; but Washington, here close at hand, sternly stamped out this revolt. A striking feature connected with these mutinies by the American troops against Congress is, that the mutineers nevertheless remained faithful to the American cause, and made prisoners of agents sent to them with money and promises from the English camp.

In October, 1781, the war was practically decided by the surrender of Lord Cornwallis at Yorktown; and it is needless to dwell here at any length on the closing scenes of a struggle which terminated on the 20th of January, 1783, by the signature of the treaty at Paris.

The army, as in the case of the Commonwealth struggle, was now a power in the land. The pay of officers and men was in arrear; they had many grievances; the future conduct of affairs was doubtful; there was a suggestion of—if not an absolute attempt to organise—a military government. One veteran officer took upon himself to suggest to Washington

that "the title of King would be attended with some material advantages." Washington replied without hesitation that no event in the war had given him so much pain as "your information of there being such ideas expressed in the army," which "I must view with abhorrence and reprehend with severity." With the army General Washington had a most difficult task. Their grievances were real, and to the Congress at Philadelphia he represented these in the strongest terms. To the army itself he was sternly firm in forbidding any use of their military force in support of their claims against Congress.

At last, on the 23rd of December, 1783, at Annapolis, having first in methodical fashion settled up his pecuniary accounts—and without one farthing pay or profit or recompense for his military services—George Washington relinquished the authority the nation had entrusted to his hands, and retired to private life without a stain on his shield, unhesitatingly disregarding those allurements of power which would have been irresistible to a weaker man. It is noteworthy that the total amount of Washington's account—including £1,982 10s. for secret service—was only £19,306 11s. 9d., and this was from July, 1775, to December 28th, 1783. In General Washington's own private book there is an entry that he was a considerable loser from items that, "in the perplexity of business," he had omitted to charge. No claim was ever urged by him to have this deficiency made up.

In 1785, the Assembly of Virginia, by an unanimous vote, gave to Washington a number of shares, value about 40,000 dollars, in two schemes connected with the navigation of the Potomac and James Rivers. Washington, who had resolved not personally to accept any valuable reward, asked and obtained the permission of the Virginian Legislature to apply the gifts to objects of a public nature, and ultimately the value was devoted to educational purposes.

The conclusion of the struggle with the mother country left the many, discontented with the burdens and troubles of the war, a full opportunity for the expression of their dissatisfaction. The Government had little or no effective authority now that the war was concluded, and martial law no longer prevailed. "The confederation," writes Washington, "appears to me to be little more than a shadow without the substance, and Congress a nugatory body, their ordinances being little attended to." Colonel Henry Lee

having applied to George Washington to use his influence with the people, the latter thus replied from Mount Vernon: "You talk, my good Sir, of employing influence to appease the present tumults in Massachusetts. I know not where that influence is to be found, or, if attainable, that it would be a proper remedy for the disorders. Influence is not government. Let us have a government by which our lives, liberties, and properties will be secured, or let us know the worst at once. There is a call for decision. Know precisely what the insurgents aim at. If they have real grievances, redress them if possible; or acknowledge the justice of them, and your inability to do it at the moment. If they have not, employ the force of the Government against them at once. If this is inadequate, all will be convinced that the superstructure is bad and wants support.....Let the reins of Government be braced and held with a steady hand, and every violation of the constitution be reprehended. If defective, let it be amended; but not suffered to be trampled upon whilst it has an existence."

Something had to be done to bind the independent Colonies together. "A government," says Marshall, "authorised to declare war, but relying on independent States for the means of prosecuting it; capable of contracting debts, and of pledging the public faith for their payment, but depending on thirteen distinct sovereignties for the preservation of that faith, could only be rescued from ignominy and contempt by finding those sovereignties administered by men exempt from the passions incident to human nature."

On the 25th of May, 1787, a Congress assembled at Philadelphia, of which George Washington was appointed President. After several months of doubtful, and sometimes bitter, discussion and uncertainty, this Congress published the Constitution of the United States of America. Of this Constitution Washington writes to Lafayette that, while not free from defects, "the general Government is not invested with more powers than are indispensably necessary to perform the functions of a good government," and 'that these powers, as the appointment of all rulers will forever arise from, and at short stated intervals recur to, the free suffrages of the people, are so distributed among the legislative executive and judicial branches into which the general government is arranged, that it can never be in danger of degenerating into a monarchy, an oligarchy, or an aristocracy, or any other despotic or oppressive form, so

long as there shall remain any virtue in the body of the people."

Under the New Constitution the first Wednesday in January, 1789, was appointed for the election by the people of their first President, and the vote was unanimous in the choice of George Washington.

III.—THE CONTRAST.

THOUGH in many respects occupying positions of similar character, no two men could be more dissimilar than Oliver Cromwell and George Washington. The first, as is shown by his life, grew into a ruler of men by the force of his own character and by the warrior skill he manifested, and this in spite of the leading spirits of his age. The second became the chief magistrate of a newly-made nation by the force of the times, by the suffrages of men with intellects clearer, and even bolder, than his own, and because of the thorough faithfulness he had shown to the cause to which he had most disinterestedly and unselfishly devoted himself. Cromwell made his will the law for the nation, and used his sword to enforce the law. Washington accepted the will of the majority, which had entrusted him with authority, as the law which he was bound to obey. Cromwell played the army, and especially his Ironsides, against the Parliament. Washington submitted most completely to Congress, and refused to side with the dissatisfied army when it wished to rely on its weapons to enforce the redressal even of its just grievances. Neither Cromwell nor Washington were really Republicans. Cromwell, though destroying the Monarchy, never ceased to be Royalist, and took himself the throne—uncrowned, it is true, save by the trooper's helmet, in which he had fought his way to the right to wield the Protector's sceptre-staff. Washington, wrestling against a far-away and blundering Government, amidst men with more vigorous politics than he had learned, went with the stream, and became Republican *malgré lui*—that is, he accepted the form, and honestly strove to adopt the spirit from the grander brains who gave to the world the famous Declaration of Independence. Washington made a better man than Cromwell. Cromwell was a bigger man than Washington. Washington rejected the mere whisper of a crown, and indignantly condemned the suggestion, even

before it had found clear shape of utterance. Cromwell created the spirit which formally presented to him the kingly dignity for acceptance, and he weighed the glittering bauble regretfully in his hands before he put it aside as an ornament scarcely valuable enough to wear, as against the danger of weakness it brought to the wearer.

There can be few men more thoroughly true and honourable than George Washington. History tells of *no* other man that you may rank in the same line with Oliver Cromwell. Washington has many statues, for the century which has marched over his grave has freshened each year the laurel-wreath with which the giant child-Republic crowned its foster-father. Oliver Cromwell has few or no monuments. The country to which he devoted his virility has seen his bones rattle in gibbet chains, and for two hundred years has, on its knees, thanked God that hollow, tinsel, lying, lustful, Stuart was restored to rule England, in lieu of this fierce, sturdy, Puritan man, whose soul inbreathed power only because the power carried England's standard higher.

A fitting emblem for Oliver Cromwell is presented by the grandly glorious Western sunset. Still mighty in the fierceness of its rays, few eyes can look steadily into the golden radiance of that evening sun; the strongest must lower their glances, dazzled by its brilliance. Every cloud is rich with ruddy gilding, as if the mere presence of that sun made glorious the very path it trod. And yet, while one looks, the tints deepen into scarlet, crimson, purple, as though that sun had been some mailed warrior, who had gained his grand pre-eminence by force of steel, and had left a bloody track to mark his steps to power. And even while you pause to look, the thick dark veil of night falls over all, with a blackness so cold, complete and impenetrable, as to make you almost doubt the reality of the mighty magnificence which yet has scarcely ceased. In the eventide of his life's day such a sun was Cromwell. Few men might look him fairly in the face as peers in strength. His presence gives a glory to the history page which gilds the smaller men whom he led. And yet Tredah and Worcester, Preston and Dunbar, and a host of other encrimsoned clouds, compel us to remember how much the sword was used to carve his steps to rule. And then comes the night of death—so thickly black that even the grave cannot protect Cromwell's bones from the gibbet's desecration.

And not unfittingly might the sunrise, almost without twilight, in the same land, do service as emblem for George Washington. He must be a bold man who, in the mists and chill of the dying night, not certain of its coming, would dare watch for the rising sun. And yet, while he watches, the silver rays, climbing over the horizon's hill, shed light and clearness round; and soon a golden warmth breathes life and health and beauty into blade and bud, giving hope of the meridian splendour soon to come. George Washington was the morning sun of a day whose noontide has not yet been marked—a day of liberty rendered more possible now that slavery's cloud no longer hides the sun; a day the enduring light of which depends alone on the honest Republicanism of those who now dwell in that land where Washington was doorkeeper in Liberty's temple.

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THE LAND, THE PEOPLE,

AND THE

COMING STRUGGLE.

BY

C. BRADLAUGH.

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THE LAND, THE PEOPLE, AND THE COMING STRUGGLE.

THE growth of the Agricultural Labourers' movement in England, the increasing agitation for the repeal of the law of hypothec in Scotland, and the wail from ruined farmers in the Lowlands, all serve to show that it will be on the Land Question that that large section of the English aristocracy which regards the preservation of territorial rights and privileges as essential to good Government will shortly have to encounter a stronger force, and to cope with a wider movement, than has been manifested in England during the last 200 years. It is in connection with the Land Question that thoughtful working men are commencing to look for a speedy solution of some of the most difficult problems as to the more striking evils of modern society.

So long as skilled labour in mine or factory could easily earn the means of purchasing grain from foreign lands, men remained comparatively quiescent, while the native landholders usurped power and avoided obligations. To-day labour struggles despairingly against reduced wage, and to-morrow's outlook is still more gloomy. While wages are decreasing, the cost of living is augmenting. House rent in England and Wales alone has increased from £36,575,600 per year—which it was in 1846—to £80,726,502—which it had become in 1873—a growth of more than thirty-four millions of pounds in twenty-seven years, all paid by the poor to the rich. The annual income from land, including mines and minerals, has increased, since 1698, from a little over £6,000,000 to about £200,000,000.

The bulk of the land is in the hands of comparatively few persons, and these monopolise the House of Lords, and materially control the House of Commons. In Scotland, 171 persons own 11,029,228 acres of land, and 409 other persons own other 3,876,980 acres, that is, 580 persons own 14,906,208 acres. In England 773 persons own 8,219,468 of acres, making that, in England and Scotland, 1353 persons own more than twenty-three millions of acres.

In too many cases these landholders treat their freehold rights as of infinitely more importance than the happiness of the peasantry of the neighbourhood. Ancient footpaths are closed, common rights denied, game preserving and rabbit breeding carried on to the point of crop annihilation, county members nominated and returned as if the title to the freehold carried with it monopoly of political right; and a most contemptuous indifference is shown as to the condition of the tiller of the soil, or, what is even worse, there is a mockery of charity, to remedy in small part the evil which the very charitable gentry have themselves created.

For the last 163 years this landed aristocracy has been the real governing class, superseding the Crown, and, until 1832, entirely controlling the people.

During this time—viz., from 1714—the standing army has been built up, and the National Debt has been almost entirely created, while Imperial taxation, and the rent-rolls of the few privileged ones, have enormously increased; thus the burdens of Imperial and local taxation have been shifted from the shoulders of the landholder to those of the labourer. For since, with the accession of the Brunswick family to the English throne, the monarch, excluded even from the political councils of the nation—at first because he could not speak the language of his subjects, as in the case of George I.; then because of his indifference, as in that of George II.; and then because of his oft-recurring insanity, as in that of George III.—has been practically reduced to a mere costly show puppet, it is impossible for the student of our history not to remark how the landed aristocracy have utilised their possession of political power for the transference from their own shoulders of the bulk of the local and Imperial taxation.

Amongst the agricultural classes, pauperism has become more permanent and more widespread, and certain classes of crime and misery have more prevailed, as the land monopoly has become more complete.

The agricultural labourers of many English counties, and notably of Dorset, Wilts, Gloucester, Norfolk, Suffolk, have, from bad and insufficient food and shelter, so degenerated, that their state is a disgrace to any civilised country in the world. The *Westminster Review* urges, on the evidence of Mr. Simon, Medical Inspector, that rather more than one-half of our Southern population are so badly fed, that a class of starvation diseases, and a general deterioration of mind,

must result. In Berkshire, Oxfordshire, and Somersetshire, insufficiency of nitrogenous food is the average.

Landowners, in the large majority of instances, and this whether the proprietor be Whig or Tory, regard their tenants as bound to follow the politics of their freeholder, and as fairly liable to ejectment when malcontent.

Mr. Latham, a magistrate of Cheshire, before the House of Commons' Committee, said that "it was the evil of property that a man considers that he owns not only the property itself, but that he owns the souls of the tenants also."

The Duke of Buccleuch, not content with the influence which his vast holdings in Scotland give him, has actually followed the practice of manufacturing voters, by granting to certain persons feu rents or freehold rent-charges, to qualify them for county voters, and this to such a glaring extent as to excite popular indignation. This fabrication, however immoral, is held to be legal, although, since the grant of the rent-charges, his Grace has actually sold to a railway company a considerable portion of the property charged. This Duke of Buccleuch, in his Wanlockhead mining works, in Dumfriesshire, employs a number of wretched lead miners, who sometimes do not see five pounds in actual money from year's end to year's end, being constantly in debt to the overseer's shop. They are badly paid and tyrannically dealt with.

In Wales, because at the general election in 1868 the advantage was "won by the Liberals, through the votes of the freeholders and leaseholders of cottages, the landlords," says the *Westminster Review*, "enraged at their defeat, proceeded to wreak their vengeance upon those of their tenants who had presumed to vote in accordance with their convictions." Mr. Harris, a gentleman of independent means in Cardiganshire, "believed that as many as 200 notices to quit had been served in Cardiganshire alone, at Lady Day after the election. He was himself aware of from thirty to thirty-five served upon tenant farmers, in some cases where the families had been 200 years upon the estates; in others where considerable sums had been laid out by the farmers in improving their farms, which, as the law now stands in England, they have no means of recovering."

In Ireland you have a landlord—perhaps like the late Most Noble the Marquis of Hertford—constantly residing out of the country, having no sympathy or connection with

his property, except that of sucking it as dry of vitality as the law permits him. At election times, "his lieutenant, the agent, armed with notices to quit, and backed by the police, is sufficiently formidable. Threats of eviction (and more than half a million evictions have taken place in Ireland during the last thirty years), distresses, and demands for immediate payment of rent, large arrears of which are usually due," assail the voter. "It has long been the practice in Ireland for the landlords to collect together their tenants who are voters, to place them upon cars, and send them in a body under the agent to record their votes at the polling-booth. These parties of voters are frequently escorted by detachments of police and military, on the alleged ground that there is fear of their being prevented by violence from going to the polling place : it is observable that these escorts are always asked for by the landlords or their agents, never by the voters themselves." General MacMurdo, who commanded a brigade in Ireland at the 1868 election, admitted, before the House of Commons' Committee, in answer to Mr. Gathorne Hardy, that these voters are practically prisoners, one of whom would not be allowed to go away even if he desired, until he had been escorted to the polling-booth.

Under the feudal system in England, bad as it was, there were no seignorial rights without a declaration of corresponding duties—the vassals gave their services, and in return the lord apportioned them land, and gave them some sort of protection ; but now the lord claims the land as his own freehold, without any admission of obligation accompanying the ownership, and regarding himself as unduly taxed if any fiscal imposition touches his pocket. In many cases, in order to relieve themselves from the burdens of supporting the poor, the great proprietors have ordered the wretched cottages of the labourers working on their lands to be destroyed. The tillers of the soil cleared out from a noble landowner's domains get shelter how they can, in hovels in bad condition and dearly priced, where they are huddled together, as the following picture, taken from the Parliamentary Blue Book, shows :—"Modesty must be an unknown virtue, decency an unimaginable thing, where, in one small chamber, with the beds lying as thickly as they can be packed, father, mother, young men, lads, grown and growing up girls—two and sometimes three generations—are herded promiscuously, where every opera-

tion of the toilette and of nature—dressing, undressing, births and deaths—is performed by each within the sight or hearing of all; where children of both sexes, to as high an age as twelve or fourteen, or even more, occupy the same bed; where the whole atmosphere is sensual, and human nature is degraded into something below the level of the swine. It is a hideous picture, and the picture is drawn from life."

In Scotland, even under the old semi-barbarous, but patriarchal, system of clanship, the land was treated as the property of the entire clan—so much so, at any rate, that the chief of the clan had no power, under penalty of death, to alienate any portion of the land without formal authority of the clan given in solemn assembly, and the meanest member had privileges in connection with the cultivation of the soil.

In Ireland, the old Brehon laws as to the land are more clear and distinct than on most other topics. Each member of the local society or tribe had a life interest in the land of the society; and when he lost it by death, or by quitting the tribe, a new partition of land was made, so as to prevent too large a portion falling into the hands of any one holder. And yet, after generations of progress, we find that at the passing of the Church Disestablishment Act the land was practically in the hands of a few large families, who consider that they are entitled to hold the soil without any sort of consequent liability to provide for the lives or to ensure the happiness of the inhabitants. Under the provisions of the Irish Land Act, 1871, and of the Church Disestablishment Act, some facilities are now offered in Ireland to small tenants to become landowners, and under the second Act 4000 proprietaries, averaging twenty acres, have been created, and 6000 similar freeholds are said to be in course of purchase. Unfortunately, no similar possibility exists in any other part of the United Kingdom.

The land is constantly increasing in value, or, at any rate, a higher rental is exacted by the freeholder, and yet there is no corresponding contribution from the landowner towards the imperial burdens; on the contrary, the landowner shifts the fiscal burdens on to the labourer.

In illustration of this, the territorial incomes for England and Wales alone amounted, in 1800, to £22,500,000; in 1810 they had increased seven millions; in 1850 they had swollen to £41,118,329; in 1861 they had grown to

£54,678,412; to-day, including mines and minerals, they exceed £198,000,000; while the land-tax, which in 1800 was about £2,032,000 per annum, is now reduced by redemption to about one-half that amount.

Since the date of the usurpation of power by the territorial aristocracy—viz., since the accession to the throne of the House of Brunswick—land has, according to the *Westminster Review*, increased in value in Great Britain to a startling extent. Our taxation is constantly and fearfully on the increase; in 1842 it was, without the charge for the Kaffir war, under 57 millions; in 1877 it overtops 78 millions—an increase of 22 millions in twenty-eight years.

Out of this taxation, in this country, less than one-seventy-seventh portion of the burden falls on land. In France, land, prior to the Franco-Prussian war, bore one-sixth of all imperial burdens; in India, nearly one-half of the taxation falls on the land. To make the contrast more striking, we may point out that twenty-five years before the accession of the House of Brunswick, land paid nearly two-thirds of all the imperial taxes, the rents received by the aristocracy being then only the tenth part of what they are to-day. And these rents, which have grown tenfold in two hundred years, for what are they paid? For the natural fecundity of the soil, which the owner seldom or never aids. It is for the use of air, moisture, heat, for the varied natural forces, that the cultivator pays, and the receiver talks of the rights of property. We shall have for the future to talk in this country of the rights of life—rights which must be recognised, even if the recognition involves the utter abolition of the present landed aristocracy. The great rent-takers have been the opponents of progress, they have hindered reform, they kept the taxes on knowledge, they passed combination laws, they enacted long parliaments, they made the machinery of parliamentary election costly and complicated, so as to bar out the people. They have prevented education, and then have sneered at the masses for their ignorance. All progress in the producing power of labour has added to the value of land, and yet the landowner, who has often stood worse than idly by while the land has increased in value, now talks of the labourer as of the lower herd which must be checked and restrained. As Louis Blanc says: "The general wealth and population are susceptible of an almost indefinite increase, and, in fact, never do cease increasing; commerce demands for its operations a territorial basis

wider and wider; towns are enlarged, and new ones built; the construction of a railway suddenly gives to this suburb, to that district, an artificial value of some importance. All this combines in a manner to raise the value of land."

These land monopolists, too, are ever grasping; they swallow common lands and enclose wastes, relying on their long purses, the cost of legal proceedings, and the apathy of a peasantry ignorant of their rights and unable to perform their duties.

The *Westminster Review* says that no less than 7,000,000 acres of commons have gone to increase the already large estates of adjoining proprietors during the last 200 years—all, be it remembered, since the landed aristocracy have, under the present reigning family, wielded full parliamentary power—all taken during the time that the imperial national debt had risen from about £52,000,000 to that enormous sum, of which we still owe upwards of £750,000,000 in England, besides our debt in India, being estimated at over £120,000,000 more. Side by side with this increased taxation, and upon these huge estates, we find an unimproved—if not an absolutely deteriorated—farm population. The parliamentary blue-books of 1867 describe the population round Mayhill as seeming "to lie entirely out of the pale of civilisation; type after type of social life degraded almost to the level of barbarism." In Yorkshire we are told of the "immorality and degradation arising from the crowded and neglected state of the dwellings of the poor."

In Northamptonshire some of the cottages "are disgraceful, necessarily unhealthy, and a disgrace to civilisation." In a Bedfordshire parish "one-third of the entire population were receiving pauper relief, and it seemed altogether to puzzle the relieving officer to account for the manner in which one-half the remainder lived." In Bucks the labourer has to "pay exorbitant rent for a house in which the ordinary decencies of life become a dead letter." So we may go through all the eastern, southern, south-western, and most of the midland rural districts, until the repetition grows as nauseous as it is hideous.

The wages of this wretched agricultural class varied before the union of agricultural labourers from 7s. to 15s. per week, wage of 10s. to 12s. per week being the most common, out of which a man had to pay rent, and feed, clothe, and educate himself and his family. Children were

sent into the fields to work sometimes before they were seven years old, often before eight years, and nearly always about that age. Even now, in Somersetshire and Dorsetshire, agricultural labourers' wages average about 11s. per week. Lord Walsingham claimed them at from 13s. to 15s. The Prince of Wales pays 13s. And with education thus rendered practically impossible, we find the organs of "blood and culture" taunting the masses with their ignorance. We allege that the mischief is caused by those who exact so much for rent, and waste so much good land for pleasure, that no fair opportunity for happy life is left to the tiller of the soil. While the condition of the agricultural population is as thus stated, it cannot be pretended that sufficient compensation is found in the general prosperity of the artisan classes. Probably there are at this moment in England and Wales more than half-a-million able-bodied paupers—that is, men able to work, who cannot get work in a country where millions of acres of land fit for cultivation lie untilled.

In Plymouth, in 1870, one out of every fifteen persons was in receipt of pauper relief; and we fear that throughout England and Wales it would be found that, at the very least, one in every twenty is in the same position, while, in addition, many thousands struggle on in a sort of semi-starvation misery. During the last half-dozen years the figures have been improved by the restrictions on out-door relief, but the improvement is but a surface-polish. At Cardiff the most fearful revelations have been made before the Parliamentary Commissioners as to the state resulting from the folly or criminality of some of the large capitalists. In this part of Wales, by paying wages at long intervals, men who were sometimes justices of the peace and large landowners, in 1870 compelled their labourers to ask advances as of favour when they were really entitled to payment as of right. Then, by a dexterous evasion of the Truck Act, the men were forced to a "tommy shop," where the advance was made in goods instead of cash. Men swore before the Commissioners that it was with the greatest difficulty they could get a few shillings of ready money, and that, to obtain it, they were often compelled to re-sell the goods forced on them at a loss. The shop being sure of its customers, the women have been kept waiting for nine hours for their turn, and have had to assemble two, and sometimes four, hours before the opening of the shop, this

even in the winter weather; and, in two or three cases, have been known to wait outside all night, and this through rain and storm, to secure a good place when business should commence, so that they might get the food they were unable to obtain elsewhere, and without which the breakfast meal could not be got. We wonder what kind of homes they can possess which can be left for nine hours, and what is done with the young children! The cruelty inflicted upon the women themselves by such a necessity is scarcely credible. One woman had not "seen money for twelve years," being constantly in debt to the shop. The same woman on oath said: "I went once when my son-in-law was ill, and I wanted only two or three shillings, and I begged and cried for it, but do you think I could get it? No!" Nay, it was proved that when a collection was made for a funeral, as the bulk of the workers were without money, the cashier entered the amount subscribed by each man in a book. Five per cent. was charged for cashing the list, then any amount due from the deceased's family to the shop was taken out, and even then part of the balance had to be taken in goods. Deductions were made week by week for the doctor, who was paid by bill at the end of the twelve months, and the men had no means of knowing the amount paid.

Nor is the state of things just described confined to Wales. In Scotland a companion picture may be traced. In the lead mines belonging to His Grace the Duke of Buccleuch, near Elvanfoot, in Lanarkshire, the miners have been treated more like serfs than free labourers. Young men of from eighteen to twenty were stated in 1870 to be working for 10d. a day; and while the nominal wages are 14s. to 16s. per week, or £36 8s. to £41 12s. per annum, for the ordinary working men, a horribly clever system of infrequent payments, occasional advances, a "tommy shop," and a complicated system of accounts, has so entangled the men that their pay for the year is said to range from £25 to £35. The Duke of Buccleuch is more careful of his game and his salmon than he is of his lead miners. About twelve months before the first edition of this pamphlet was issued, not far from Hawick, a poor woman, with a child at the breast, was sent to gaol for being in possession of a salmon for which she could not account. The child died whilst its mother was in gaol; but the Duke of Buccleuch's interest in the salmon fisheries was maintained.

In the *Liverpool Mercury* it was alleged that the wickedly-fraudulent truck system—here, too, cunningly disguised to evade the Truck Act—also prevailed in the Wednesbury district. And yet the noble lords and high-minded gentlemen who thus grind down the poor, and who, by cheating their labourers, demoralise honest labourers into cheats—will preside at pious gatherings, and talk about saving the souls of those whose lives they are damning. Or these born legislators will denounce trades union outrages—these high-minded men, who draw scores of thousands out of the muscle and heart of their wretched workpeople, and then endow a church, and listen to a laudatory sermon preached by the local bishop.

We affirm the doctrine laid down by Mr. Mill and other political economists, "that property in land is only valid, in so far as the proprietor of the land is its improver," and that "when private property in land is not expedient, it is unjust;" we contend that the possession of land involves and carries with it the duty of cultivating that land, and, in fact, individual proprietorship of soil is only defensible so long as the possessor can show improvement and cultivation of the land he holds. And yet there are—as Captain Maxse shows in his admirable essay published in the *Fortnightly Review*—in Great Britain and Ireland, no less than about 29,000,000 acres of land in an uncultivated state, of which considerably over 11,000,000 acres could be profitably cultivated.

There are many thousands of labourers who might cultivate this land, labourers who are in a semi-starving condition, labourers who help to fill gaols and workhouses. To meet this let the legislature declare that leaving cultivable land in an uncultivated state is a misdemeanour, conviction for which should give the Government the right to take possession of such land, assessing it by its actual return for the last five years, and not by its real value, and handing to the proprietor the amount of, say, twenty years' purchase in Consolidated 3¼ per cent. Stock, redeemable in a limited term of years. The land so taken should not be sold at all, but should be let out to persons willing to become cultivators, on sufficiently long terms of tenancy to fairly recoup the cultivators for their labour and capital, and these cultivators should yearly pay into the National Treasury, in lieu of all other imperial taxes, a certain proportion of the value of the annual produce. This tenancy to be immediately

determinable in the event of the improvement being insufficient, and extensible on evidence of *bonâ fide* improvement of more than average character.

All land capable of producing food, and misused for preserving game, should be treated as uncultivated land. The diversion of land in an old country form the purpose it should fulfil—that of providing life for the many—to the mere providing pleasure for the few, is a crime. The extent to which the preservation of game has been carried in some parts of England and Scotland shows a reckless disregard of human happiness on the part of the landed aristocracy, which bids fair to provoke a fearful retribution. Paragraphs in the newspapers show how almost tame pheasants are driven to the very muzzles of the guns, to be shot down by royal butchers, who have not even the excuse of sport in their wholesale slaughterings.

It is calculated that for the deer forests of Scotland alone nearly two million acres of land—some of it the choicest pasture, much of it valuable land—is entirely lost to the country. Two red deer mean the displacement of a family, and it is, therefore, scarcely wonderful that we should learn that much of the Duke of Sutherland's vast estate is a mere wilderness.

Country members who shun the House of Commons while estimates are voted, and go to dinner when emigration and pauperism are topics for discussion, crowd the benches of St. Stephen's when there is some new Act to be introduced for the better conviction of poachers without evidence, or for the protection of fat rabbits, which eat and spoil crops, against lean farm labourers, who, having not enough to eat, pine alike in physique and intellect.

The Game Laws are a disgrace to our civilisation, and could not stand twelve months were it not for the overwhelming influence of the landed aristocracy in the Legislature. The practice of game preserving is injurious in that, in addition to the land wasted for the preserve, it frequently prevents proper cultivation of surrounding lands, and demoralises and makes criminals of the agricultural labourers, creating for them a kind and degree of crime which would be otherwise unknown.

Poaching, so severely punished, is often actually fostered and encouraged by the agents of the very landholders who sit as Justices of the Peace to punish it. Pheasants' and partridges' eggs are bought to stock preserves; the game-

keepers who buy these eggs shut their eyes to the mode in which they have been procured, although in most instances it is thoroughly certain how they have been obtained. The lad who was encouraged to procure the eggs, easily finds that shooting or catching pheasants gains a much higher pecuniary reward than leading the plough-horse, trimming the hedge, or grubbing the plantation. Poaching is the natural consequence of rearing a large number of rabbits, hares, partridges, and pheasants, in the midst of an under-paid, under-fed, badly-housed, and deplorably ignorant mass of agricultural labourers. The brutal outrages on game-keepers, the barbarous murders of police, of which we read so much, are the regrettable, but very natural, measures of retaliation for a system which takes a baby child to work in the fields, sometimes soon after six years of age, commonly before he is eight years old, which trains all his worst pro-pensities, and deadens or degrades his better faculties, which keeps him in constant wretchedness, and tantalises him with the sight of hundreds of acres on which game runs and flies well-fed, under his very nose, while he limps ill-fed along the muddy lane which skirts the preserve—game, which is at liberty to come out of its covert and eat and destroy the farmer's crop, but which is even then made sacred by the law, and fenced round by carefully-drawn covenants.

An agricultural labourer (with a wife and family), whose weekly pittance gives him bare vitality in summer, and leaves him often cold and hungry in winter, in the midst of lands where game is preserved, needs little inducement to become a poacher. Detected, he resists violently, for his local judges are the game owners, and he well knows that before them he will get no mercy. The game watchers are armed with flails, bludgeons, and firearms; the poacher uses the same brute argument. Indicted at the Assize he goes to the county gaol, and his wife and children go to the union workhouse. Imprisonment makes the man worse, not better, and he is confirmed into the criminal class for the rest of his life, while his family, made into paupers, help to add still more to the general burdens of the country.

In the agricultural districts, offences in connection with the Game Laws are more numerous than those of any other class. Men suspected of inclination for poaching are easily sent to gaol, for cutting a twig or for nominal trespass, by magistrates who, owning land on which game is reared, re-

gard it as most wicked sacrilege that hungry labourers should even look too longingly across the hedge.

In this land question the abolition of the Game Laws must be made a prominent feature.

The enormous estates of the few landed proprietors must not only be prevented from growing larger, they must be broken up. At their own instance and gradually, if they will meet us with even a semblance of fairness, for the poor and hungry cannot well afford to fight; but at our instance, and rapidly, if they obstinately refuse all legislation. If they will not commence inside the House of Parliament, then from the outside we must make them listen. If they claim that in this we are unfair, our answer is ready—

You have monoplised the land, and while you have got each year a wider and firmer grip, you have cast its burdens on others; you have made labour pay the taxes which land could more easily have borne. You now claim that the rights of property in land should be respected, while you have too frequently by your settlements and entails kept your lands out of the possibility of fulfilling any of the obligations of property, and you have robbed your tradespeople and creditors, because your land was protected by cunningly contrived statutes and parchments against all duty, while it enjoyed all privilege. You have been intolerant in your power, driving your tenants to the poll like cattle, keeping your labourers ignorant and demoralised, and yet charging them with this very ignorance and degradation as an incapacity for the enjoyment of political rights. For the last quarter of a century, by a short-sighted policy, and in order to diminish your poor-rates, you have demolished the cottages on your estates, compelling the wretched agricultural labourers, whose toil gave value to your land, to crowd into huts even more foul and dilapidated than those you destroyed. We no longer pray, we argue—we no longer entreat, we insist—that spade and plough, and sickle and scythe, shall have fair right to win life and happiness for our starving from the land which gave us birth.

To the landowners in the House of Peers we say:—It is on the land question, my lords, that the people challenge you, at present in sorrow and shame. Take up the matter while you may, and do justice while yet you can. The world is wide for you to seek your pleasure, the poor can only seek life—where death finds them—at home. Give up your battues, your red deer, your black game, your pheasants,

your partridges; and when you see each acre of land won by the fierce suasion of hardy toil to give life and hope to the tiller, in this you will find your recompense.

You few, who lock up in your iron safes the title-deeds of more than half Scotland's acreage, I plead to you; forget mere territorial pride and power, and be generous while you may, for the day is near when your pride may be humbled, and your power may be broken.

For you, lords of Erin's fertile soil—you who have wrought her shame and made her disaffection—you who have driven her children across the broad ocean to seek for life—even for you there is the moment to save yourselves, and do good to your kind. Thoughtful workmen will try to gradually win your land by law, hungry paupers may suddenly wrest it from you in despair; you may yield it now on fair terms, and grow even richer in the yielding. England is growing hungry, empty bellies make angry faster than heads reason, and the Land Question cannot stand still.

The struggle—if you compel it, landlords of Great Britain—will be one in which the landless will claim political power, and use it as a weapon, as did their French brethren eighty-five years ago.

At present by gradual concession, you may even win a meed of praise for generosity of conduct, and you may avert for generations that appeal which hunger has always prompted, when pride and power have been deaf to the cry of a nation. At present you have prestige to aid you; use it for good, while you can, for once let the storm-wind of popular indignation turn against your rank and position, and your peerage-prestige will be like a rotten reed on which to lean.

To-day the arbitrament is in your hands, and we pray a just deliverance. To-morrow—if to-day you do nothing—it may be your turn to pray, while your judges may be too hungry to listen. To-day you make the law; use it for human right; for it may be that if you do nothing, to-morrow the law will unmake you, as penalty for having worked and permitted so much wrong against your poorer brethren.

AMERICAN POLITICS.

BY CHARLES BRADLAUGH.

To deal with American Politics with any pretensions to fairness, it is necessary to consider several points, often overlooked by critics, and some of which are peculiar to the United States of America. The most important of these are as follows :—

1. The enormous extent of its territory, stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific; from the great lakes to the Gulf of Mexico: supplemented by Alaska, or Russian America, and containing in all about 3,510,978 square miles. Its diversities of climate and physical character, and these so extreme that, even excluding Alaska, you find in the North the vegetation of an almost arctic region, while in the South you have "the luxuriant foliage of the tropics."

Grand mountain ranges, like the Alleghany, the Rocky Mountains, the Coast range, and the Sierra Nevada; huge fresh-water lakes, larger in their total extent than any others known in any country in the world, and a river valley drained by the Missouri—Mississippi, for nearly 4,500 miles. The widest diversities of food, climate, and soil, each and all affecting most materially the social and political character and conduct of the various persons of foreign birth or foreign parentage, subjected to these influences.

2. The rapidly-increasing population, to-day numbering more than 40,000,000; in 1860 numbering only 31,183,000. The fact that this increase differs in character from that of any other country in the world. In most of the old and settled countries, all increase in population is from the excesses of births over deaths. In the United States of America the increase is in chief the result of immigration, and is only in very small part due to the preponderance of births. It is perfectly true that in many of the British

Colonies the augmentation of population is by the immigrant stream, but there is a wide distinction between the effect of that stream on political affairs in the British Colonies, and of the influx of immigrants in the United States.

Nearly all the accessions of population to Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and British Columbia, are of emigrants from the British Isles. They speak the language of the people amongst whom they come to dwell; they are already acquainted with the habits, literature, and traditions of the people with whom they are to associate. The new comer and the old colonist have almost the same national feelings and interests; the same general views on religious and social questions. In the United States, on the contrary, the increase is from diverse races, with distinct and often opposing traditions, with national associations generally hostile to those held by the people amongst whom they are to live, with strange tongues and contrary habits, and with creeds which can never amalgamate, but which must extinguish or be extinguished. English, Russian, German, Swede, Italian, Pole, Wallachian, French Canadian, French, Chinaman, Dane, Norwegian, all jostle together in the New World; where they have to struggle for existence; the Chinaman at one end of the country is now to have the Esquimaux at the other; all are to be governed under the constitution of the United States Republic. And yet critics in English journals amuse themselves with leading articles illustrative of America and its shortcomings, written by men whose highest qualification is that they write in the sublimest ignorance of the subject on which they treat.

Of these new comers to America, the large majority have little or no interest in the form of the government under which they are to dwell. They have, for the most part, left the country of their birth because food was scant, and mouths many. Some of the immigrants are too old even to acquire the language of the country of their adoption, and there are not a few who place obstacles in the way of the instruction of their children in the tongue in which is administered the law of their new homes. There are Pennsylvanian Dutchmen who have gone through generations of residence in the Quaker State, and who to this day conserve a barbarous patois, the relic of their native tongue. There are French Canadians, and these a rapidly increasing element, who will not, when adults, learn the English language, and whose priests (Roman Catholic), probably to

prevent heresy, do their best to hinder the education of the children. Through Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island, you find this French Canadian stream. The signs, painted in French, in front of many shops, evidence the illustration here given. Thus you have a population increasing vastly every year, and at present not betraying the slightest interest in the political conduct of the country where it obtains the means of existence.

There are Germans, arriving even in greater numbers than the English, who, when they come into newly-settled lands as in Wisconsin, Minnesota, or Iowa, sometimes continue to speak little or nothing but their own language. These have journals of their own, printed in German, some, as the *Staats Zeitung*, of very wide circulation, and who by mere diversity of user of tongue are kept to a great extent apart from their fellow citizens. Even in great cities they often dwell in large bodies by themselves. "Germantown," or "little Germany," is a well-known description for the suburb of many a good-sized city from Buffalo westward. The Germans have amongst them men who are able political leaders, notably Carl Schurz, who, but for the fact of his foreign birth, might well hope to attain the Chief Magistrates' seat. Yet it is no easy task to identify with the political life of the country a mass of men, thinking in a strange tongue, whose home life has had in it no training for political citizen duty. Here they are not rallied by a religion of Fatherland, they have no other interest at first in the country than the estimate of next year's crop. The life is new, the land is new. At home they have been governed, and it is hard for the one taught under a paternal "blood and iron" monarchy, all at once to realise that here, in this United States, it is the duty of each man to govern himself, and of all to help to govern one another. The struggle for mere existence is so absorbing to the immigrant settler that the political national vitality is of slow growth, and there is, therefore (amongst many hundreds of thousands of new comers for the first few years), an utter indifference as to who "runs" the Federal or State Government. There are no traditions dear to the newly-arrived man associated with his future home; the page of his adopted country's history has to be read when he can find leisure, in a language which he has often to learn, laboriously or reluctantly, at a period of life when the child's aptitude for being taught has long since departed.

3. The United States of America differ, further, from all other countries in having within their confines an aboriginal race, who seem on the road to extermination—a race protected nominally by treaty with, and by authority of, the Federal Government, in territory which is not subject to ordinary United States law; a race which does not seem to be amenable to the influences of civilisation, except so far as "civilisation" tends to utter annihilation. Here I speak of the Indians—the "red" men, who once owned the whole vast expanse of North America, but whose descendants now number not more than some 25,000 persons. The political difficulty is here one of the soil—*i.e.*, whether a few can hold land which the vigorous and hungry many press for. Not reckoning the various Indian reservations in other States and territories, there is the Indian territory lying between Arkansas on the east, New Mexico on the west, Kansas on the north, and Texas on the south. Here you have 55,000,000 acres of land, with a rapidly-decreasing population, to-day numbering about 15,000 human beings. To these, "a mere handful," the whole territory is preserved by treaty as long as "river runs and grass grows." If treaties make enduring barriers, the Indian would be safe enough against the swelling tide from the Old World. But coal crops up to the surface for many miles, and the Indian does not work it. The land is rich in metal, which the Indian does not mine. It is not in his nature to search the bowels of the earth with slow and painful strokes; he loves to roam its surface. The soil is a fruitful one, but is left by the Indian comparatively untilled. The Old World empties the white race from out its bosom, and they look too greedily over the Indian borders for the period to be very long, ere the pressure of population shall burst the treaty limits, and drive the red man from his last retreat in the West. In the North-east no trace of the pure Indian scarcely exists.

In Maine the Indian is gradually disappearing by amalgamation with the "superior" race. The money originally devoted in the East to the education of the Indian finds at Dartmouth College only one to teach, and he not of pure Indian blood. At Oldtown it is easy to see that, despite the law which declared void all marriage between the white and red races—the mingling of bloods is ending in the entire destruction of the aborigine by the Teuton. Yet, while the solution is certain, the problem is one not free

from grave questions, all to be considered when estimating American politics.

The lawlessness which is prevalent in parts of Western Askansas, Southern and South-Eastern Kansas, Texas, and Eastern New Mexico, is a natural result of the existence of this Indian territory, wherein ordinary civil authority is powerless. No doubt the difficulty has been aggravated by the anti-slavery struggle fought out on these borders, in the worst spirit, by the worst men; and on the cessation of which struggle even, had its too long-enduring mischief in the presence of those remnants of the guerilla fighters from both sides, who had become too much corrupted by war to again settle down into peaceful citizens.

4. The existence in the United States of America of 4,500,000 human beings, not indigenous to the soil, until recently treated as mere chattels, and who enjoy now nominal political rights, with the disadvantage in very many cases of having been utterly unfitted for political duty by their whole life surroundings. Throughout North and South Carolina, in Virginia, Tennessee, Georgia, Alabama, and Louisiana, the negro has for nearly 100 years been treated as if he were a kind of superior cattle; and although the fifteenth amendment did, five years ago, give a paper political equality to the coloured man, no one can doubt that it would—even under favourable and peaceful conditions—require several generations of average school training, several generations of practice in self-reliant effort, several generations of participation in self-government, to even give the coloured race the possible chance of making the best of the organisation they inherit. Much more difficult is this negro problem, embittered as it is by the conduct of those long-resident in the South, who, by the warmth of the climate, and the habits of their fathers, have been unfitted to cope with their Northern or Western brethren in the struggle for life. Still more difficult of solution is this negro problem, encumbered as it is by the rascality of some who, really caring nothing whatever for the negro, seek to use his vote as a means of winning power for their party or place for themselves. Terrible enough is this negro problem, even for those who have their hearts sternly set against slavery in all its forms.

The fearful war-struggle in America broke down legal slavery; but it did not win, it could not win, the Southern planter to co-operate with the Northern merchant, or manu-

facturer, or farmer, in the work of elevating the newly-enfranchised man. The result of a war may crush, but it does not convince, the defeated party. The pro-slavery men in the South, who organised the armed Kuklux conspiracy immediately after the war, and who now organise the White League, represent an element which will never cease to oppose the recognition of the equality before the law of the negro race. I do not in this brief space do more than allude to the purely ethnic question, and yet without considering this, it is impossible to treat American politics except in the most superficial manner.

The Civil Rights Bill, to which Charles Sumner attached so much importance, and which he intended should remove all obstructions to the gradual raising of the coloured man, has been robbed of its most important and most valuable provision—viz., the School clause. Mr. G. S. Boutwell, in a recent speech in the Senate of the United States, said: "When the children of the white people and the black people are compelled to go into the same schools, sit upon the same forms, accept the same teachers, study the same books, become rivals in education and in the pursuits of life, you will have a community that will believe practically in human equality. Therefore it is that that provision which has been stricken out of the Civil Rights Bill in the other House is of more consequence than all the other provisions of that Bill." Draper says: "That while the Slave States existed as a political power, they were forced by the necessities of their position to impose a forced ignorance on the low elements of their society." It is only by insistance on the most complete facilities for negro education that permanent improvement can be hoped.

Hitherto in America there have been two great parties—Republican and Democratic; and one of these, the Democratic party, has suffered severely, first, from its identification with the pro-slavery movement and the Southern rebellion; and, second—and more recently—from the fact that the men convicted in New York City of misdealing with, and misappropriation of, the city moneys were elected by the Democratic vote, which in that city has an overwhelming majority, nearly the whole Irish vote being cast for the Democratic ticket.

Candidly, I do not think that the Democratic party ought to be condemned entirely for the sin of slavery; nor do I hold that the Republican party ought to be credited with

the original virtue of abolition principles. Unfortunately for the Democratic platform, the affirmation of State rights involved the perpetuation of national wrongs. The English Monarchy had planted slavery more or less throughout the thirteen colonies, but especially in Maryland, Virginia, North and South Carolina, and Georgia. The slavery so planted had been enforced, preserved, and encouraged by direct acts of the Home Government. When the several colonies became independent States, they conserved—unfortunately for themselves—the fatal privilege of retaining their negro brethren in bondage. The privilege of slave-holding became a State right; and in the Southern States the climatic conditions helped to give colour to the notion that it was a social necessity. The affirmation of State right identified the Democratic party with the maintenance of the curse of slavery in those States respectively which refused to vote for abolition.

In judging American politics an Englishman should at least remember two things: first, that slavery was a legacy left by the English Monarchy to the new Republic; and next, that when the great American people had at last determined to free themselves from the shame and disgrace of the slave blot on the American escutcheon, it was the English aristocracy and land-owning interest which, while making profession through the world of a policy of universal emancipation, nevertheless gave its sympathy to the slave-holding South, and permitted without protest the building in, and issue from, its ports of war vessels to be used against its ally the North, though that North had then, by the force of events, become pledged to the abolition of slavery.

In declaiming, too, against corruption in New York State, it should be especially borne in mind by English critics that the controlling voting power of the city of New York was thrown into the hands of a large mass of men who, in the country of their birth, had been debarred from any wholesome political activity, whose fathers had for generations been absolutely deprived of political life, and who had personally suffered the severest want. These men, to escape death by starvation, left their own shores absolute paupers; and the country of their adoption has had to pay some of the penalties attending the early practice of full political right by a mass of men not yet educated to the consciousness of their duty.

New issues are now raising in the United States, and neither the platform of the Republican party nor that of the Democratic party seems to me to make full provision for facing the serious points involved. One of the most grave is the approaching conflict between Labour and Capital, a conflict which will now be aggravated by the presence in the large cities, such as New York, Boston, Philadelphia, and Chicago, of very large bodies of men either entirely without employment, or unable to earn enough to obtain decent food, clothing, and shelter. Very many of these men—especially the recently-arrived Germans in the West—hold extreme Socialistic theories, and do not regard the Government of their newly-adopted country with even the habit-reverence which does much to restrain the inhabitants of old countries. They have many of them quitted Europe with exaggerated ideas of the value of labour in the New World, and without any notion of the smaller purchasing power of money. Many of them are unprepared to go out of the range of civilisation, and they, therefore, stick close to some great centre of population. Some find themselves and their families absolutely unequal to the task of battling in the open country with a climate more severe than that of their native land. They prefer the shelter a crowded city apparently offers, and they forget the bitter disadvantages it involves. These poor men, crowded together in rich cities where they are strangers, grow to regard the suffrage rather as a weapon of offence against the capitalist class, than as a means of performing a common duty in carrying on the Government of the country.

The gatherings in New York City, and the menaces in Chicago, are the outward exhibitions of a terrible undercurrent of discontent, resolvable all into one sentence, Dear food, dear lodging, and poor wages. The politician who grapples boldly with this labour question will need a firm courage and clear head; the party which avoids the question must certainly be ruined.

Another difficult problem in United States politics is presented by the claim of the Western pork and grain-raiser to have his produce cheaply transported to the Eastern markets. In the fertile Mississippi valley, produce may be raised sufficient for the whole population of Europe. In the great West and the North-West, the soil yields readily of its abundant richness, but the cost of transport to the

consumer's door is often so great as to entirely devour the farmer's hard-earned profit.

The protest of the cultivator against the railroad owner has resulted in those Grange associations now thickly scattered through the West, and which, if they gave their temporary allegiance to either party, might easily determine a Gubernatorial, or even a Presidential, election.

That the Grangers have legitimate grievances cannot be disputed, but that the remedy is to legislate down the charge for railway transport is not so clear. No railway company can or will carry at a freight rate which does not meet the cost of permanent way, provide for payment of servants, and furnish some interest on capital. While there are many inconsistencies, and probably some extortions, in the charge for conveying produce, the real remedy will probably be found, partly in the utilisation of the great Mississippi as a pathway to the sea, and partly in the creation of more industrial centres in the agricultural States, so as to bring the consumer closer to the means of subsistence. Railway companies in Europe only construct railways to meet the needs of population already settled. Railways in the United States are built into wilds where there is no population, to provide an iron track for the conveyance of future settlers. The railway monopolist in the East, and his customers in the West, are likely to be arrayed on different sides in a political struggle, unless indeed much forbearance be shown by the leaders of both parties, and unless wise statesmanship can teach each side its common interest and duty.

In America the Roman Catholic question, which is just now so agitating the Old World, is of extreme importance. America has no State Church, and amongst the various and conflicting religious bodies, the Roman Catholic Church stands out prominently, not only as the richest and most complete organisation, but also as having more rapidly increased in numerical strength than any other body. Probably nearly one-fifth of the population of the United States are now Roman Catholics. I am inclined to doubt whether this increase is not a little more nominal than real. I do not regard it as showing an addition to the general strength of the Roman Catholic body. It is nearly all the result of immigration of Irish, Germans, and French Canadians. The latter are the most superstitious, the most ignorant, and the least disposed to permit themselves or their children to be educated; but they are also fortunately the fewest. The

two former occupy a very different place. The Germans are, as a body, extremely indifferent on religious matters, and are strongly inclined, when they give themselves any trouble at all, to favour Rationalistic views; and the American-Irish—that is, children American-born of Irish parents—are figuring so well in the common schools that as long as the education is unsectarian it only needs in addition to be made compulsory, and the political future of the United States would be perfectly safe-guarded from danger, from this source at any rate. And I avow that I do regard the overwhelming predominance of the Roman Catholic Church in any country as an element of grave hostility to Republican institutions. Roman Catholicism maintains the principle of authority not derived from the people; as against the right of private judgment, and the constitution of government by the exercise of individual suffrage. I do not mean by this that it is the duty of a Republic to legislate against the Roman Catholic Church; on the contrary, I conceive it to be the duty of a Republican Government to ensure to all its citizens the fullest liberty and protection in religious matters, permitting to each and all the profession of faith the individual judgment inclines to, securing, to each and all, the fullest right of dissent and nonconformity without penalty or disability. The law should secure free Church in free State, and should protect, equally with the believer, the man who makes work his worship, and who refuses to kneel at any altar.

I am not unaware that Father Hecker, a really admirable man, and his able co-workers in New York, make a very strong plea that the Catholic in America can be a consistent and intelligent citizen of a Republic, and if I pass their plea here in silence, it is from no want of respect for the men, and most certainly in no contempt of their ability.

One evil in the practice of American politics is the habit which has grown up of changing most, if not all, of the lower government officials on the election of each President. All thinking Americans regret this; it is no necessary consequence of the constitution, and there is little doubt that at an early period a President will be found who will revert to the line of conduct observed by the earlier occupants of the Presidential chair, who only displaced officials for actual misconduct.

Another evil is the abstention in some States and cities of many of the best educated men from the performance of their political duties. This has been especially so in New York

City, but is not, I think, so much the case in Massachusetts. I believe, too, that this is an evil which originally arose from the Southern pro-slavery influence on the Democratic party, and that the future will show a vast improvement under this head.

For the information of many who have addressed me questions on the subject, I beg to add the following rough sketch of the American political machine.

The United States of America contains 37 distinct States, and also the territories of Colorado, Wyoming, Dacotah, Montana, Oregon, Idaho, Washington, Nevada, Utah, Arizona, and New Mexico. Each State has its own law courts for administration of State laws; its House of Representatives and its Senate for internal legislation; also its executive, headed by the State-Governor, who is the supreme executive magistrate within the limits of the State. In describing Massachusetts constitution I present a fair notion of the several constitutions of the other States, although there are many minor differences. The Governor, who must be a resident freeholder, is chosen annually by manhood suffrage. The vote is by ballot. He is commander-in-chief of all State, naval, and military forces, and has the sole right of resorting to force against the enemies of the State; but he cannot, of his own authority, order State troops outside the limits of the State. He has absolute power of pardoning criminals convicted in the States courts of offences against the State law. With the consent of his councillors (who are elected by the people) he nominates all State officers. No moneys are paid from the State treasury except on his warrant. In the event of the death of the Governor, the Lieutenant-Governor, likewise chosen by popular vote, succeeds to his office. All the several States and territories are alike subject to the constitution of the United States. The United States has at Washington[1] its House of Representatives, who are elected for two years, in the proportion of at least one representative to 30,000 inhabitants, by the people of their several States. Every representative must be twenty-five years of age, must have been seven years resident in the United States, and must be an inhabitant of the State by which he is elected. The Second Chamber, or Senate, contains two senators from

[1] Washington is the seat of Government; its inhabitants have no votes.

each State. These senators are elected for six years, but are nominated one-third every second year, and are chosen by the vote of the Legislature of the electing State. A senator must be resident in his State, must be thirty years of age, and have been for nine years a citizen of the United States. The Senate has the power on impeachment to try and condemn the various Federal officials, including the President of the United States. The Senate and the House of Representatives are together Congress, and they have the power to levy and collect taxes, to borrow money on the credit of the United States, to coin money, regulate foreign commerce, declare war, maintain an army and navy and militia, but no army appropriation can be made for more than two years. The executive power is vested in a President elected for four years. The President is chosen by an electoral assembly, chosen by popular vote from each State, equal in number to the whole number of Senators and Representatives entitled to set in Congress from such State. The President must be native born, must be at least thirty-five years of age, and must have been fourteen years resident in the United States. The President and Vice-President cannot both be inhabitants of the same State. The President is commander-in-chief of all military, militia, and naval forces. He can pardon all persons convicted of offences against the United States laws, except those convicted on impeachment. He can make treaties, subject to the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate. He nominates, and, if approved by the Senate, appoints, all ambassadors, consuls, judges, and other officers, whose appointment is not specially provided for.

Each of the severally-named territories has its own government, legislature, and law courts, under act of Congress. These territories send delegates to the Congress at Washington, but with limited authority.

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HOW IT ORIGINATED,

AND

WHO BEARS IT.

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TAXATION:

HOW IT ORIGINATED, AND WHO BEARS IT.

In ancient times, in this country, the ordinary expenditure of the sovereign, as representing or wielding the executive power, was made up of Crown rents, feudal dues of various natures, prisage—a right the king claimed of taking to his own use and at his own valuation as much as the king had occasion for—of all merchandize belonging to merchant strangers, and sometimes merchandize of native-born merchants, out of every ship importing the same; and butlerage, a similar exaction applied to wine. These prisage and butlerage exactions were at first a mere sort of uncertain extortion by force, and were taken by some feudal lords, as well as by the Crown; but in time they became a prescribed or customary levy, payable by native merchants and by merchant strangers in different proportions; and the exactions having been at first taken in kind, were at last commuted into a money payment, and were called "tonnage and poundage," being so much per ton on wine, and so much per pound on other goods. The word "customs" in ancient time seems to have covered many customary payments and dues, regal, feudal, and ecclesiastical, but became gradually restricted until it was at last limited only to the duties payable to the king upon the importation, exportation, or carriage coastwise of various articles. In the reign of Richard I. an import duty on wine, called "prise," was payable to the king and was accounted for to the Exchequer. In the reign of John import duties are mentioned on wood, salt, and fish, and export duties on wool and leather. The first parliamentary authority we can find for the exaction of a customs duty is in 1297, when the community of the realm granted to Edward I., in aid of his war with France, a customs duty of

40 shillings for every sack of wool, and 5 marks for every last of leather, exported, for the space of two or three years, if the war should last so long. There must have been earlier parliamentary grants than this, but we cannot trace them. When the grant of 1297 was made, the king declared that he would take no fresh custom of the nation without its common consent, but that he reserved the right to continue to collect the "old customs duties," said to have been granted before that time, of half a mark for every sack of wool, and a mark for every last of leather. The duties of "tonnage and poundage" were generally granted to the king by one and the same Act of Parliament, and were called the subsidy of tonnage and poundage. Some of the kings claimed the right to levy tonnage and poundage at their own will and discretion, and by their own authority, but this was from the 16th century forward almost always contested by Parliament. It was in 1629 that what Carlyle calls "a brave and noble Parliament" held the Speaker in the chair until remonstrances had been voted against the king's claim to collect tonnage and poundage by his own writ. It was this same Parliament which declared: "That no man hereafter be compelled to make or yield any gift, loan, benevolence, tax, or such like charge, without common consent by Act of Parliament." Prior to this declaration forced loans and compulsory benevolences were extremely common, and the Jews were especial and unpitied sufferers.

In the early times the customs were let or farmed by the Crown to collectors for a cash purchase-payment, or as a recompense for services rendered, or as a reward to a favourite, or to secure, and as a repayment of, a loan, previously made or then agreed to be made, to the king. In 1329 the entire customs of England were farmed for £20 a-day, Sundays excepted, the total amounting to £6,260 a-year. In the year 1400 the customs were let for £8,000 a-year. In the year 1650 they averaged £500,000 per annum; in 1800 they were £8,144,380; in 1876 they amounted to £20,341,502, or, with the excise, to £48,641,321 per year.

The practice of farming customs ceased in 1671, when the collection was transferred to a board of commissioners. For extraordinary war expenditure, the old military tenures involved special charges on the landowners, but these feudal obligations slowly disappeared, and subsidies and aids by Parliament were gradually substituted for them. In 1635,

in consequence of the reluctance of Parliament to vote any subsidy until certain grievances had been redressed, an effort was made by King Charles I., while no Parliament was sitting, to levy a tax called ship-money by his own writ, without any concurrence or sanction of Parliament, and the courts of law affirmed the king's right to make this levy; but in November, 1640, the Long Parliament declared ship-money illegal, and enacted that no tax could be levied on exports or imports save by the common consent of Parliament. Amongst ancient direct taxes was one of hearth-money, which does not, however, appear under this name as a statutory tax until 1662, when Parliament granted two shillings per year to Charles II. for every firehearth or stove. This hearth-money was voted as a compensation for the suppression of the Court of Wards, and of other feudal tenures. Hearth-money was finally abolished in 1689, on the resolution of the House of Commons "that the said revenue cannot be so regulated, but that it will occasion many difficulties and questions, and that it is in itself not only a great oppression to the poorer sort, but a badge of slavery upon the whole people, exposing every man's house to be entered into and searched at pleasure by persons unknown to him."

Several poll-taxes were from time to time enacted; the first we can find is in 1377, of 4d. per head for every man and woman above 16. The aristocracy paid higher rates, a ducal head being rated at £6 13s. 4d. The Wat Tyler rebellion grew out of resistance to a poll-tax. The last poll-tax was enacted in 1698, but some collection of arrears was continued for a few years later. There have been several very absurd direct taxes. In 1723 there was a papist tax, and in 1695 taxes were levied on weddings, burials, bachelors, and widows. In 1710 and 1718 two shillings a ton duty was laid on coals in order to build some new churches, and afterwards to provide for the clergymen.

Whenever extraordinary funds were necessary for the purpose of carrying on a war, or for any other special object, Parliament made an extraordinary grant as an aid or subsidy. These subsidies were a specified proportion—as a tenth or fifteenth—of the nominal income; or a special duty for a limited period upon wines or goods. The most usual aid to the king was the grant of a fifteenth, and was at first rather a substitution for the feudal revenue payable by the landowner to the king. By the 14th Edward III., statute

1, cap. 20, A.D. 1340, a ninth and a fifteenth were granted for the wars in Scotland, France, and Gascony. The ninth lamb, ninth fleece, and ninth sheep were to be taken for two years, and the ninth part of all goods and chattels in cities and boroughs. Foreign merchants not dwelling in cities and boroughs, and other people dwelling in forests and wastes, were to pay one-fifteenth. Poor cottiers, and those living by bodily travail, were exempt.

The last grant of a tenth and a fifteenth appears to have been made in the reign of James I., and the last subsidy was in the reign of Charles II. The land-tax grew out of these subsidies, the king complaining that the aristocracy defrauded him by under-rating their incomes.

A land-tax should in every country be the chief source of internal revenue. In India land pays to-day a very large proportion, nearly one half, of the total taxation. In France, before the late war, land paid one-sixth of all the taxation. In England, on the accession of George I., it paid two-fifths of the total taxation; to-day land bears less than one-seventy-eighth part of the national burdens.

Land to-day is assessed at the rate of 4s. in the £ on a valuation made in 1692. Under this assessment land paid, in 1798, £2,037,627 net, and the gross annual value of land was then stated at £22,500,000. In 1877 the land-tax realised, gross, £1,084,889, and the parliamentary return gives the gross annual value of land, including mines and quarries, for 1873, at £198,275,717. At the rate of 4s. in the £—thought fair by the landowners themselves eighty years ago—the land-tax alone ought to amount to £39,655,143, or about half the present total of our extravagant taxation.

This unfairness in the land-tax will scarcely be wondered at when it is known to what an enormous extent land is owned by persons who are either members of the House of Lords or of the House of Commons, and when it is considered how few persons own a large proportion of the whole area of the United Kingdom. The total area of the United Kingdom is 77,635,182 acres, and of this 38,875,522 acres are owned by 2184 individuals, of whom 421 persons own no less than 22,880,775 acres. Can it be wondered at that land-laws are unfair when it is remembered that nearly every one of these landholders speaks or votes in one or other of the legislative assemblies either by himself or by his nominee. The land valuation of 1692 was certainly imper-

fect, and some have urged that it was purposely and fraudulently understated. This valuation was adopted without challenge by William Pitt in 1798; he had, however, the grace to say that his measure for the nominal land-tax of 4s. in the £ was not intended to prevent a future Parliament from augmenting the tax. So far from augmenting the amount, we have the fact that the land-tax to-day represents throughout Great Britain a most unequal and ridiculously low figure. The accountants of the Liverpool Financial Reform Association have made a careful analysis of the land-tax as it is paid, and the land-tax as it ought to be paid, and it appears from this calculation that—entirely omitting the value of mines, quarries, iron works, and other real properties transferred to Schedule D in 1866—the highest land-tax paid is in Suffolk—5½d. in the £; in many counties the tax is less than 1d. in the £, and in some less than one farthing in the £. In Lancashire the land-tax is half-a-farthing in the £, and in Scotland three-sixteenths of a 1d. The general average of the land-tax throughout the United Kingdom is 1d. and five-eighths of a 1d. per £.

The contention in this essay will be that the landholding class, being practically the legislating class, with a monopoly of one House, and, until 1832, with absolute control of the House of Commons, have gradually shifted from off the land the fiscal burdens which land ought not only to bear, but which would be less oppressive if levied on land than they are when borne by labour.

While the tax-levying Parliaments were composed—as in the first half of the seventeenth century—of the persons who actually paid the taxes, the votes were small and hard to carry through the House of Commons. Now the votes are large, and pass much too easily. Joseph Hume is dead, and no one bears his mantle.

It ought, however, to be remembered that Members of the House of Commons are not sufficiently encouraged and supported by their constituents on questions of financial reform. Members are derided for "cheeseparing" and "nibbling at the estimates," and yet it is only by close investigation of each separate item and by attempted restriction of each disbursement that any permanent economy can be hoped for. Voters should carefully watch the conduct of their local members when the estimates are being discussed, and should, when necessary, hold meetings and

send in petitions to give weight to the voice of the man who represents them in Parliament.

The gross taxation for 1877 amounted to £80,099,051; in 1848 it was £59,323,465; in 1837 it was £49,878,124; in 1706 it was £5,691,000. It is submitted that the increase during the present reign, and especially during the last twenty years, has been unduly extravagant, and it is urged that, unless the increase be stopped, and a marked reduction be effected, revolution must result from this enormous increase of the people's burdens.

The increase in our home expenditure during the present reign has been nominally about £29,250,000, but has been really almost £31,000,000, allowing for the lesser charge in 1877 for the interest and management of the National Debt.

The first item in our National Expenditure consists of the charge for interest and management of our National Debt amounting to £27,992,833 14s. 7d.

I agree with Mr. Dudley-Baxter that a national debt is a national evil. It is a mortgage of the earnings of generations unborn—a mortgage created by the Parliament of the nation—a mortgage on earnings in which Parliament has no property. Parliament, and the Government maintained by its authority, have not even the right of ownership of the actual earnings of the living citizens, much less has either Parliament or Government any right of ownership in labour not yet existing. It has only a protectorate and limited jurisdiction over the vast aggregate of existing property, and over the living workers, whose economies constitute the capital—and the ability to create the capital—of the country. No Government has justification for the creation of national debt, save "in case of great emergency, with which the State is otherwise unable to cope," and then only if it may be fairly maintained that those who are to be called upon to bear the burden shifted from the borrowing generation will enjoy benefits which would be impossible, save for the borrowing. The creation of a national debt is only justifiable when the money is expended on public works which increase the productive ability of the nation, or so facilitate commerce as to render actual produce more available. Mr. Baxter says: "Owners of property that was not in existence at the

time of the loan, and workers who have inherited no property at all from their borrowing ancestors, are obliged by this law of public credit to pay interest as to the amount of which they have had no discretion, and to deprive themselves of comforts, and even necessaries, for the cost of services in which they have no share, and probably have derived no benefit. Such a power as this transfers a burden from one set of workers and property to a materially different set of workers and property, and inflicts a great deal of hardship, and often of injustice, upon future generations—more particularly on the poor among them. Hence the power of borrowing ought only to be exercised on the clearest necessity, and with the utmost economy." And, further: "The unnecessary or extra portion of war expenditure, occasioned by the adoption of borrowing, is capital unnecessarily diverted from productive investments, and spent on unproductive objects. Instead of being employed in trade or industrial undertakings, or improvements, adding a new annual produce to the net income of the nation, this capital becomes a pensioner on the old net income of the country. It is like taking an army of artificers and agricultural labourers from their workshops and fields, to maintain them, and their children after them, without labour, upon the taxes. An unproductive debt, by its absorption of useful capital, prevents improvements, hinders the growth of industrial capital, and stunts the development of a nation; while, at the same time, to meet the necessity of paying interest, it imposes additional taxation, and lessens the margin of tax-bearing power of the nation." The whole of the debt owing to-day by Great Britain is the unpaid balance of money borrowed for war expenditure. To-day we owe about £776,000,000; we have spent for wars alone, during the last 180 years, £1,555,421,160, and this without reckoning the cost of borrowing, and without calculating the interest paid on the money borrowed.

The total military and naval expenditure during the war in Ireland and against France, 1688 to 1697, amounted to £36,876,203.

During the war from 1702 to 1713, called "the war of the Spanish succession," the total cost for army, navy, and ordnance was £66,279,292. It was at this time that the increase of our standing army commenced, and the system of subsidising foreign Powers and hiring foreign troops originated.

The naval and military expenditure during the war with Spain, from 1718 to 1721, came to £11,399,324.

Between 1739 and 1748, we had the "war with Spain (right of search) and Austrian succession," and in those years spent for fighting £62,077,642. When the treaty of peace was made at Aix-la-Chapelle, the right of search was not even referred to.

The "seven years' war" was nominally 1756 to 1763, but really involved military expenditure over eleven years, at a cost of £104,611,374.

The war which severed the connection between the North American colonies and the British monarchy—the war which served to create the Republic of the United States of America —necessitated a total outlay of £139,521,035.

The war with France—nominally commencing in 1793, but really commencing with the signature of the secret arrangement in 1791 (concurred in by George III. and the Tory Government), by which the various Continental Powers, parties to the secret treaty of Mantua, agreed to invade France, in order to overthrow the Constitution—made up the enormous total of £989,636,449, when the expenditure ended in 1817. So that if we had not joined in the conspiracy to enable Louis XVI. to break his oath, we should now have had no debt, and France might possibly have escaped the Reign of Terror.

The Crimean war cost £116,053,151, for the maintenance of the Turk at Constantinople and the prevention of Russian war vessels in the Black Sea. The first result has enabled the Sublime Porte to borrow English money, and to misgovern and maltreat Bulgarian, Bosnian, and Herzegovinian peasants. The Russian diplomatists have since persuaded the English Government to abandon the second result, despite the blood and treasure lavished to secure it.

Some contend that it is unjust to include, as I have done, the whole expenditure for army, navy, and ordnance during war years; but I submit that I should be justified in adding to the above items all increase of the annual charge of the public debt, and all interest paid on money borrowed towards defraying the war expenditure. If this were done, the total cash wasted for and through war, during the last 180 years, would not be less than £2,000,000,000.

Our Military Expenditure.

The second item is for our army and navy, £28,186,117, and of this the army cost us altogether £16,820,716, being nearly double what it cost us in 1852, while the navy cost us £11,364,383, as against £5,849,916 in 1852. Omitting the items for army purchase and localization of forces, the cost of the army for last year was £15,421,356. For this we had a supposed effective force of 96,275 men, with a total muster-roll of 132,884 men of all ranks. The German army, on a peace footing with 420,000 men of all ranks, costs as nearly as possible the same sum as does the English army, although the latter has 287,000 less men. In the British army we pay the salaries of a large number of gentlemen as nominal colonels of regiments, which these titular commanders sometimes never see; the salaried colonelcy is occasionally the reward of merit to a tried warrior of foreign lineage who has done this country the honour of associating himself by marriage with our Royal Family. The increase in the peace cost of our army has been very terrible. In 1871 the cost was £13,430,400. In 1847 our army, militia, commissariat, and ordnance cost £9,061,233, everything included; showing the outrageous addition in twenty years of £7,775,000 per annum to the one item of military expenditure. Compare this with the cost of the army in 1792, just prior to the great continental wars, and the total then for Great Britain and Ireland was £2,410,212, or about one seventh of the army expenditure for 1877.

Estimates are so wonderfully framed that it is possible some inaccuracies may be found in these figures; if so, the inaccuracies will only be of form and not of substance. Without regarding any increase for war, our peace establishment for the army for 1878 is to cost £15,595,800, and for this, unless we denuded Ireland of her garrisons, we could probably not collect and have ready in the field within two months more than 50,000 men. It is true that we have in the three Indian presidencies 60,000 men, but we dare not remove these at the risk of an immediate rebellion. Divine service in the army costs £49,300; and as each officiating clergyman for his share of this sum has to devote about two hours per week to each regiment, it can hardly be said that religion is too cheaply provided for. As the Gospel does not make all soldiers good, the expenditure for military punishments comes to £28,600. The total charge for the

militia is £1,287,753; and the yeomanry cavalry, whose availability for war will be evident to the meanest capacity, cost £74,400. The most famous achievement of the yeomanry cavalry was in 1819, at Peterloo, and the recollection of this should endear that branch of the service to all real Radicals. It is sometimes pretended that the Duke of Cambridge foregoes some of the salaries attaching to the numerous colonelcies he holds, but in the foot note to the statement on the estimates of his salary of £4432 as Commander-in-Chief, it is expressly stated that this is "in addition to the full pay" "of the military ranks" "held in the army." When commissions in the army were sold, there was a regulation price, and every officer selling his commission used to pledge his word of honour that he did not receive, and every officer purchasing gave a pledge on honour that he did not pay, more than the regulation price. It was always well known that the whole system was a farce; that more money was always demanded and paid; and that the amount varied according to popularity or otherwise of the regiment. When the practice of promotion in the army by purchase was abolished, there was actually provision made for paying compensation to officers for these fraudulent "over-regulation prices;" the amount apportioned for 1878 under this head is £29,200.

Revenue Departments.

The cost of collection of our customs and inland revenue might be much lessened if direct taxation were made the rule. Almost all earnest financial reformers seek to substitute direct for indirect taxation. Indirect taxation is a levy of revenue by taxes on the transit of merchandise, on articles of food, on the raw materials used in manufacture, and on the process of manufacture. Direct taxation is here intended to mean the levy of revenue by a tax on income. There are, of course, various direct taxes of obnoxious character which would be utterly impolitic. Indirect taxation is objectionable, because, in the end, the pressure of it always falls most severely on the mass of the consumers, and the richer tax-payers manage to transfer their burdens with interest to the poorer and ultimate purchasers. Indirect taxation is always a hindrance to industrial enterprise. It encourages smuggling, fraud, and perjury, and compels the maintenance of a strong force for the detection and punish-

ment of the crime it creates. The governing classes, and those who are opposed to economy, will naturally object to direct taxation, for its very simplicity makes each taxpayer unpleasantly and immediately conscious of every increase in his fiscal burdens. Almost all local taxes are direct taxes, and when all imperial taxes are direct there will be less opportunity of annual increase in our expenditure without a vigorous protest. Men and women ought to pay taxes for the preservation of their property, their liberty, and their persons, but the severest pressure of tax ought not to come upon those whose wage is insufficient for the decent maintenance of themselves and their families. In 1849 the Liverpool Financial Reform Association issued some most able tracts dealing with the questions of direct and indirect taxation. Since that date very many indirect taxes have been entirely abolished, but there is still enough of indirect taxation remaining to make the following passage worth reproducing from the Financial Reform Tract, No. 3 :—

"On a careful examination of the sources whence the public income is derived, the Association are astonished to find how completely the taxation is laid on the trade and industry of the country. Contrasted with the accounts of the expenditure, it divides the community into two distinct classes : one, those who pay ; the other, those who spend the taxes. The former comprises the great mass of the population, all who labour and produce the wealth of the nation ; the other, the favoured few who from accident of birth or connections are exempt from the necessity of toil ; and who seem on that account (for no other reason can be discovered in the examination of official documents, but the fact that such is the exemption) to be relieved from the duty of contributing their fair and proportionate amount to the pecuniary requirements of the state."

It is, of course, just to add that—thanks to men like Joseph Hume, John Bright, Richard Cobden, and last but most certainly not least, William Ewart Gladstone—much change for the better has been made since 1849 in the imposition of our national taxation.

Public Works and Buildings.

In the expenditure, under the head of "Public Works and Buildings," there are some items to which special attention should be drawn. 1st. Palaces in the personal occupation of Her Majesty, which cost £12,397 last year, and for which £12,158 are asked for 1878. £5454 is charged in addition for palaces partly in the occupation of

Her Majesty. 2nd. £3357 is the bill for repairs, *inter alia*, to the apartments of Her Royal Highness the Duchess of Cambridge in St. James's Palace, but including also rent of stables for Her Royal Highness in Brick Street, Piccadilly. This is in addition to the pension to the duchess, which will be found given under the head of "Payments to the Royal Family." Why the nation should pay the Duchess of Cambridge's stable rent is a mystery which poor and hungry taxpayers would do well to clear up. 3rd. The repairs for 1878 to Marlborough House, the residence of the Prince of Wales, for 1878, are estimated at £6450; the actual charge for last year under this head was £4100. 4th. There are items amounting to £45,907, in 1877, for diplomatic and consular buildings, which shall be dealt with later, together with the other items for foreign office services.

Expenses of Public Departments.

The House of Lords nominally cost, in 1877, for salaries and similar expenses, £47,053, but this does not include £6000 further charged on the Consolidated Fund for the Lord Chancellor, making a total of £53,053. The House of Commons, including a sum of £5000, also charged on the Consolidated Fund for the Speaker, costs £61,649. Warming, ventilating, lighting, dusting, and general looking after both Houses of Parliament, comes to £21,130. This is a total for Parliament—without reckoning payments to counsel who draw Parliamentary Bills—£115,832. This is a fairly large outlay for a Parliament in which there is no payment of members, except of the speaker and chairmen of committees. The Foreign Office costs £83,400, one notable item in which total is the salary of £1250 to the Chief Clerk, who is at the same time in receipt of £794 2s., being compensation granted to him for abandoning against his wish and will the illegal and extremely profitable practice of levying black mail on the salaries of Foreign Office *employés*, who were compelled to employ him as their agent to receive their salaries. The Lord Privy Seal's Office figures for £2807, a not unreasonable yearly stipend for acting merely as a "gilt figure-head." This was the office recently held by the Earl of Beaconsfield, from which he professed to gain no emolument, but from which he actually received the full salary, until public attention was drawn to the matter.

Secret Service.

There are two items, one of £10,000, charged on the Consolidated Fund, and the other of £24,000, in the Civil Service Estimates, for Secret Service Money. These are items which ought to be erased from our national expenditure. The usually accurate "Financial Reform Almanack" for 1878 gives the sum for Secret Service in the Civil Service Expenditure at only £14,000, but this is an error, the sum is £24,000, making £34,000 in all.

The House of Commons ought to insist on the nation knowing whether this amount is disbursed at home or abroad. If the sum is only paid to supplement official salaries, it should be voted openly. If it is employed for bribery, or in pursuance of dishonest work, it should not be voted at all. About 250 years ago the House of Commons committed a Secretary of State to the Tower for refusing to give information as to the alleged disposal of Secret Service Moneys, and the House only released the, at first, obstinate offender on his making full submission and furnishing complete accounts. To-day the House of Commons is too subservient to Ministers to do anything half so bold.

Foreign Office Expenditure.

Without reckoning diplomatic pensions or allowances but including diplomatic and consular buildings, our Foreign Office Service costs in all for the current year £567,205, and this, not including special missions such as that of the Earl Rosslyn to Madrid to attend the marriage of the King of Spain, which cost £3200, or the Duke of Abercorn's journey to Rome to invest the new King of Italy with the insignia of the Order of the Garter, the charge for which is £5500. First, in point of expenses and, possibly, also in the prospect of future mischief, come our legations and consular expenses in China and Japan. The charges of the embassies—£9460 for China, and £5660 for Japan—compared with the extravagant totals, are apparently comparatively moderate. The total charge for the United States embassy to China is £6100, including in this all contingencies; while to the £9460 which our embassy cost have to be added the items for legation buildings, legation guards, &c., amounting to several thousand pounds more. The United States embassy to Japan, including all expenses comes to £3000; our embassy costs £5660,

without reckoning the costly additional expenditure. What good our ambassador is to us in China at all is not very clear, as a good Consul-General would do all the real work; but this is only the commencement of a long series of items for the Celestial Empire. The consular services in China amount to £50,664, and those for Japan to £27,772, while the legation and consular buildings come to an additional £15,948, with £2674 for rents, or a round total for our representation in China and Japan of £112,178. It should be borne in mind by taxpayers that many statesmen and their advisers have in recent times suggested the possibility of the extension of English territory in China and Japan.

Diplomatic and consular representation in Persia, where there are only two consulates, costs us £10,085, and the embassy buildings at Teheran are continually figuring in the estimates. Last year they cost £1938. This is one of the cases where a costly embassy is worse than useless. The Shah was a rather uncomfortable visitor, and seems a most expensive acquaintance. If we desire any benefit from the embassy it would be interesting to have such benefit clearly recorded.

Turkey costs us for its embassy no less than £11,345, for embassy and consular buildings, £4,628, and for consulates, after deducting the fees acknowledged and returned, £20,287. For this huge outlay we get the worst of all returns—absolute misrepresentation by our officials to the Turks of the state of English feeling, and to England of the condition of Turkish misrule. If it had not been for the correspondents of the *Times* and *Daily News* during 1876, we should have been absolutely without reliable information as to what was happening in Bulgaria and Bosnia. Our present ambassador is A. H. Layard, who, when he was the English minister in Madrid, actually did all he could to prevent the abolition of slavery in Porto Rico, and plotted actively with Marshal Serrano to overthrow the Republic temporarily established under Castelar. Marshal Serrano travelled through Spain to Santander disguised as the servant of and in company with the English Ambassador, and thus escaped arrest. Turkish embassies are not, however, expected to do special work, and there is a Danubian Navigation Commission which costs us £3,000 a-year, and a Turco-Persian Boundary Commission for which we pay £2,000 a year. Last year there was a special service in

Montenegro, at an expense of £650. The United States embassy to the Ottoman Porte costs for everything £5,600; our embassy, not including legation buildings, costs more than double.

Many of the petty continental legations have been swept away during the last 25 years, and there are several more which ought also to be abolished. The Chargé d'Affaires at Coburg, and his brethren in Wurtemburg, Darmstadt and Dresden, might well be spared, our consuls being most certainly sufficient for all useful purprses.

The eccentricities of disbursements in the Foreign Office department are very wonderful. Vice-Consuls in small places are found receiving more pay than vice-consuls in larger towns. Consuls in important ports receive often lesser salaries than consuls in ports of little or no consequence. Sometimes consuls receive less than vice-consuls. No sort of reasonable explanation can be given for such anomalies.

We now come to the items for superannuations, retired allowances, and gratuities for charitable and other purposes, or in plain words to the Pension List.

We who are Radicals do not object to pensions given for real service; nor do we object to large pensions if the service rendered to the nation has been equivalent. The retiring pensions to our common-law and chancery judges are generally well, sometimes even hardly, earned, and none of them should be grudged. We do object to all pensions corruptly obtained, or granted without equivalent national service; we object, especially, to hereditary pensions, and we contend that Parliament has the right to cancel an improperly received pension without having either the legal or moral obligation to make any compensation to the deprived pensioner.

In the list of payments on behalf of the nation, for the year 1876, appears a pension of £843 as paid to the Duke of Grafton. This pension is a compensatory annuity paid to the Duke of Grafton on the abolition of a legal sinecure conferred on the first Duke of Grafton, who was the son of Charles II.

The modest £843 per annum — received as compensation for ceasing to perform certain supposed legal

services, actually never performed—is but a very small proportion of the amount still really paid by the nation to, or on behalf of, the Duke of Grafton. King Charles II.—of pious and virtuous memory, for whose restoration to the Crown of England a grateful and devout people until very lately repeated a thanksgiving service, which was officially printed in the Common Prayer Book—in his desire to provide sufficiently for his offspring, gave to his son, the Duke of Grafton, the right of levying and taking prisage and butlerage duties on all wines brought into England, with the exception of such wines as should be imported within the jurisdiction of the Duchies of Cornwall and Lancaster. In 1797 it was estimated that the Duke of Grafton received from this source alone about £7,500 a-year. In 1806 under 43 George III., c. 156, and 43 George III., c. 79, the prisage and butlerage privileges of the Duke of Grafton were purchased for an annuity of £6,870 payable to the Duke of Grafton and his heirs male. This annuity was nominally extinguished by the redemption, as to a part, in 1809, and as to the remaining part, in 1816. In 1809 the Duke of Grafton received £49,133 11s. 8d., and in 1816 he received £86,435 7s., or together £135,568 18s. 8d., as the compensation for no longer taking prisage and butlerage on wines.

It would of course have been utterly unreasonable in a rich country like Great Britain—where in 1877 Paisley weavers are averaging 10s. per week all the year round, where a Herefordshire labourer gets eight shillings per week, and where Lord Walsingham proudly boasts that agricultural labourers' wages average 13s. to 14s. per week—to expect a man of the merit and services of the great Duke of Grafton to exist on a wretched pittance of £7,500 a-year, and, therefore, on the 22nd October, 1673, by Royal Letters Patent his loving father Charles II. created a further hereditary pension of £9,000 a-year, which somehow got reduced in 1856 to £7,191 12s., which latter sum was all that the Duke of Grafton then received for that particular pension. This sum of £7,191 12s. was also nominally extinguished in 1856 by the payment to the Duke of Grafton of the further sum of £193,777 13s. 2d.

There was still another pension received by the Duke of Grafton. This last pension appears to have been originally charged upon the Post Office Revenues as a pension of £4,700 a-year to Lady Castlemaine. Unfortunately, on

this point authorities conflict, for in 1663 the whole revenue of the Post Office was apparently given to the Duke of York. Perhaps the accounts of the General Post Office were then as elastic as were the notions of the duties attaching to letter carriers, for we find "Fifteen couple of hounds" passing through the post, "going to the King of the Romans with a free pass," and we also find delivered without charge by the General Post Office, "Two servant maids going as laundresses to my Lord Ambassador Methuen;" and, last but not least, safely and gratuitously transmitted by the same patient Post Office "Dr. Crichton, carrying with him a cow and divers other necessaries." Post Office regulations at present hardly include the foregoing curiosities. In 1857 the sum received by the Duke of Grafton for this special pension amounted to £3,384 a-year, and for the extinguishment of this he was paid a still further sum of £91,181 17s. 7d. If these composition sums are totalled, they amount to £420,528 9s. 5d., and this vast total has helped to swell our national debt, and the nation, in fact, pays the interest on it until this very day. By removing the three several pensions of £3,384, £7,191 12s., and £6,870 from the surface of the pension list, the grievance has been dexterously hidden without having been redressed. A permanent charge has been created equal to the interest at £3 5s. per cent. on about £450,000, or, in round figures, nearly £15,000 per year, which is the sum the Duke of Grafton still costs the country for pensions which do not appear on the face of the Finance Accounts. Besides the above-mentioned commuted pensions, the post of Remembrancer of the Court of First Fruits was, under Charles II., made a patent place for ever, and was conferred upon the family of the Duke of Grafton, and it is from this source that the £843 is derived. If "high wage" helps to drive away trade, as the landowners and capitalists say, it would be interesting to know their opinion on the value of the Duke of Grafton as a stimulant to commerce.

William Henry Fitz-Roy, sixth and present Duke of Grafton, owns 7,316 acres in Buckinghamshire, 8,458 acres in Northampton, 13,642 acres in Suffolk, and 2,784 acres in Banff. We shall be glad to hear from any of our readers the wages paid to agricultural labourers on his several estates. His Grace is a Whig in politics.

After speaking in strong terms of the origin of these Grafton pensions the author of the Financial Reform

Tracts, No. 2, published by the Liverpool Financial Reform Association, says: "Many generations have since succeeded each other, but no Duke of Grafton has yet arisen with sufficient honour or patriotism to refuse to profit by the wickedness of his ancestors, and to reject money taken, without requital, from the honest earnings of the industrious poor."

Another pension which the country continues to pay practically, while theoretically relieved from the burden, is one of £19,000 per year to the Duke of Richmond. On the 18th December, 1676, Charles II. granted to the Duke of Richmond and his heirs 1s. per chaldron on all coals exported from the River Tyne, and consumed in England. On the 5th July, 1799, this burden on poor colliery workers and coal consumers, known as the "Richmond Shilling," was changed into a permanent pension of £19,000 per year, which pension was nominally extinguished in 1825 by a payment of £490,833 11s. 6d. paid in three instalments. Charles Henry Gordon Lennox, sixth and present Duke of Richmond, owns 17,117 acres of land in Sussex, 69,660 acres in Aberdeen, 150,950 acres in Banff, 12,271 acres in Elgin, and 27,400 acres in Inverness. In Sussex we know something of the wretched earnings of the farm labourers, but we shall be glad to have more precise details from any of our Sussex readers. All names will be considered as strictly confidential. His Grace is a Tory, and is Lord President of the Privy Council; his official salary is £2,000 per annum.

Before we quit this Richmond Pension there is one most scandalous feature requiring notice. The heirs of Sir Thomas Clarges at present receive £800 per year on the pension list. This pension is an extremely puzzling one. Originally, in 1676, Sir Thomas Clarges, his heirs and assigns, had a charge on the 1s. per chaldron coal duty granted by Charles II. to the Duke of Richmond. In 1799, by some process of government manipulation, while the Tories were in power, the Clarges annuity was taken off the shoulders of the Duke of Richmond and placed on the backs of the British taxpayer. The effect of this was that the great Duke of Richmond twenty-six years later actually received a huge money compensation for this £500 a-year, to which he had no right, while the country, having thus paid the principal monies to the Duke, continues to pay the annuity to the Clarges family. The pension though

nominally paid to the heirs of Sir Thomas Clarges turns out to be really paid to Lord St. Vincent, who also receives a further sum of £3,000 per year. The £3,000 is made up of two pensions granted to the famous Admiral St. Vincent, of whom the present Viscount is heir, but I cannot make out why Carnegie Robert John Jervis, third Viscount St. Vincent, should also receive the Clarges pension.

In 1662 a pension of £1000 a year was granted in perpetuity by Charles II. to the Earl of Kinnoul. George Drummond Hay, eleventh Earl of Kinnoul, and Viscount Dupplin, a Conservative peer, still receives on account of this pension £676 4s. per annum. This Earl of Kinnoul owns 12,577 acres of land in Perthshire. Apparently the original pension was of a most iniquitous character. James Hay, Earl of Carlisle, had upon the accession of Charles I. a grant of the Island of Barbadoes, as a sort of compensation for property expended about the court and in general extravagant and voluptuous living. On the death of James, Earl of Carlisle, in 1660, without issue, William, Earl of Kinnoul succeeded to the Barbadoes estate, which, in 1661 was ceded to Charles the II., who, in lieu thereof, granted the £1000 per annum for ever to the Earls of Kinnoul.

Amongst the continuing pensions specially worthy of notice there is one of £4,000 a-year payable for ever to the Duke of Marlborough. This pension, originally of £5,000 per annum, was granted by Letters Patent by Queen Anne, in 1706, to the Duke of Marlborough and his heirs in consideration of the "meritorious services" of the Duke. By an Act of Parliament, 5 & 6 Anne, c. 4, the annuity of £5,000 was granted out of the Post Office Revenues for ever to the Duke of Marlborough, the Duchess, and his heirs, and to go with the title. This pension was paid out of the Revenues of the Post Office until 1857, when by the 19 Vic., c. 59, it was transferred to the Consolidated Fund as a pension of £4,000 a-year, which is the sum now paid. The Duke of Marlborough owns 2,755 acres in Buckinghamshire, 1,534 acres in Wiltshire, and 21,944 acres in Oxfordshire. In the event of the failure of heirs male to the body of the Duke of Marlborough, the Honor and Manor of Woodstock, with Blenheim Palace, ought to revert to the nation. J. Winston Spencer Churchill, the present and sixth Duke of Marlborough, is a Tory and is Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, his official salary for which is £20,000 a-year.

His Grace is a patron of fourteen livings. His Grace also receives £91 5s. 3d. per year for his pay as officer in the army.

In the payments of 1876 there appeared an item of £2,160 payable to "the heirs of the Duke of Schomberg." In one Parliamentary return for 1869 this £2,160 figures as "three-fourths of an annuity granted by King George I. to Maynard, Duke of Schomberg, and his heirs;" and in a Treasury minute for 1853, the actual recipients of this Schomberg pension, nominally as the heirs of the Duke of Schomberg, were stated to be the following persons, in the several proportions given after their respective names, viz.; the Duke of Leeds, £1,080, C. Eyre, £720, P. Powys, £360, R. Gosling, £360, Colonel Macleod, £288, Henry Macleod, £72. The portion of the pension payable to C. Eyre was redeemed in 1855 by the payment to him of £19,399 18s., and last year the sum of £29,101 was paid to the Duke of Leeds to redeem the portion payable to him. The original grant of the pension to Frédéric Amand, the first Duke of Schomberg, was by Letters Patent of William and Mary, and was expressed to be out of the Post Office Revenues. In the estimate dated 10th August, 1699, although the Duke had been killed at the battle of the Boyne on the 11th July, 1690, the pension figures under the head "Pensions and Perpetuities" as "Duke Schonberg, on the Post Office, £4,000 per annum." George Godolphin Osborne, ninth and actual Duke of Leeds, owns 3,117 acres in Buckinghamshire, 5,911 acres in Cheshire, 5,911 acres in Cornwall, 3,234 acres in the North Riding, and 10,034 acres in the West Riding, of York.

Another curious pension is one of £4,000 per annum, also payable for ever, which figures in the national accounts as payable to trustees for the use of William Penn and his heirs and descendants for ever, in consideration of his meritorious services and family losses from the American war. The original William Penn died in 1718; we do not know who was the William Penn who, in 1790, was judged so worthy.

Under the 43 George III., c. 159, a pension of £3,000 per year is payable for ever to the representatives of Jeffery, Earl Amherst. The present recipient of this pension is William Pitt Amherst, second earl, who owns 741 acres of land in Essex, 4,269 acres in Kent, and 1,789 acres in Warwick. William Carpenter affirms that General Sir Jeffrey

Amherst, the first grantee of the pension, "was a creature of George III.," and obtained the pension "without merit of any description." In the Black Book, published by Effingham Wilson forty-eight years ago, the editor says :—

"This is one of the most objectionable of the hereditary pensions. It was transmitted by the uncle of the peer, Sir Jeffrey Amherst, a favourite of George III., and placed by him at the head of the army; when, as a commander-in-chief, he introduced and protected such barefaced jobbing and traffic in commissions as both disgraced and ruined our military power. The loyalty of that day was not to entertain even a suspicion of the misconduct of the individual who had the ear of Royalty, however flagrant, and thus the Court favourite died in the full enjoyment of the rewards of his baseness."

Horatio, third Earl Nelson, is the son of the nephew of a Norfolk Church of England clergyman, the Rev. William Nelson, who was created an earl with a pension of £5,000; having been born the brother of Horatio, Baron Nelson of the Nile. Admiral Lord Nelson received pay, pensions, and presents to a large amount. After his death, £20,000 was granted out of the people's money to Mrs. Bolton and Mrs. Matcham, two sisters of the well-rewarded admiral, and £90,000 was, in addition, voted for the purchase of an estate and mansion for the Rev. William Nelson, Prebendary of Canterbury, and Norfolk vicar. At present Earl Nelson receives from the pension list £3,500 and the balance of £1,500 is received by the Countess Frances Elizabeth Nelson. The estate bought for his lordship's father's uncle is, we believe, in Wiltshire, 5,735 acres.

The Duke of Wellington receives £4,000 per year, and in addition to this, the sum of £700,000 was granted to his father, the late Duke, in addition to his ordinary pay and extraordinary allowances, and in addition to a like annuity of £4,000 a-year for life. The present Duke owns 15,847 acres of land in Hants and 2,246 acres in Herts. The total annual income of the "Iron Duke" during the latter years of his life was about £43,178—a very fair yearly pay.

The non-existent Earl of Bath receives, or some persons as his heirs receive to-day, a pension of £1,200 per annum. This pension was originally £8,000 and was granted to the Earl of Bath—£3,000 out of the revenues of the Duchy of Cornwall, £2,500 out of the Post Office, and £2,500 out of the firstfruits and tenths. The Parliamentary return of

1869 states the £3,000 pension to have been originally granted by King William III., and also states it to have been granted by Charles II. On the 12th August, 1715, the pension of £3,000 was transferred by Royal Sign Manual Warrant of George I. from the charge of the Duchy of Cornwall to the Hereditary Excise, as from the previous 24th June, in effect increasing the income of the Prince of Wales by that amount. In 1826, Lord Melbourne, who had somehow become entitled to receive a moiety of this pension, obtained from the country the sum of £30,000 in discharge of his portion of the pension. If in America Cabinet Ministers used their influence to obtain heavy money compensation for pensions originally granted without reason, the English Press would soon expose the corruption of republican administrations. Here corruption is unknown, for this is a monarchy.

On the 9th of June, 1694, William III. granted two pensions, each of £2,000 per year, to Henry Lord d'Auverquerque, one pension to be paid out of the revenues of the principality of Wales, and the other pension to be paid out of the revenues of the Duchy of Cornwall. On the 24th December, 1698, Lord d'Auverquerque was created Earl of Grantham. In 1732, Earl Cowper married into Earl Grantham's family, and for this latter service the Earls Cowper received, and down to 1853 continued to receive, four-fifths of each of the above pensions. In 1853 Earl Cowper received two several sums—on the 5th April, £40,000, and on the 13th May, £43,000—as compensation for foregoing the annual allowance so gallantly deserved. The pension of £2,000 being payable out of the Duchy of Cornwall the actual result was to benefit the present Prince of Wales to the extent of £43,000. F. Thomas de Grey, seventh Earl Cowper, P.C., K.G., owns 2,787 acres in the county of Derby, 10,122 acres in Herts, 2,078 acres in Kent, 1,064 acres in Northampton, and 5,294 acres in Notts. Countess Cowper owns 3,227 acres in Essex, 2,536 in Wilts, and 5,720 acres in the West Riding of Yorkshire, The Dowager Countess Cowper owns 8,888 acres in Bedfordshire. The motto of the Cowpers is "Tuum est" and includes the pension.

Amongst the small curiosities of the pension list we find £209 per year to Samuel Hallyer for not being Deputy Chaffwax. James Gordon Seton gets £442 for the like absence of service (it is to be presumed that he is a superior

kind of non-deputy Chaffwax), while John Holdship, as actual ex-Chaffwax, gets annually £1,145 11s. The Hon. J. H. Knox gets as ex-Weighmaster of Butter £1,076 15s., and for not holding this sinecure office this honourable gentleman has personally received £49,530 10s. There is a gentleman of the same name who owns 6,909 acres of land in county Mayo. Can any of our readers tell us if the two Dromios are one? and if yes—what sort of a landlord he makes? There is another pensioner, Caleb Tyndall, who is also not a Weighmaster of Butter, who only receives for his non-service the paltry annual stipend of £118 6s. As Mr. Tyndall and Mr. Knox each do the same work, it seems unjust that they should not have the same pay. Each of them has been ex-Weighmaster of Butter for forty-six years, and prior to that date neither of them weighed any butter. Mr. C. Panton has for fifty-five years received £850 each year as ex-Clerk of the Pipe.

A pension of £600 a year to Lady C. M. Gardiner, as one of the bedchamber women in the household of the late Princess Charlotte of Wales, is stated, in the estimates, to have commenced on the 11th December, 1865. Now, as Princess Charlotte of Wales died on the 6th November, 1817, my curiosity was excited as to the nominal origin of this pension 48 years after the death of the Princess; stated in the Government estimates as having commenced on the same day, is a pension of £100 a year to Charles Andrews, footman to the same Princess, and the age at the time of retirement from office of this footman is declared to have been 65. Now, as Charles Andrew may be fairly presumed not to have continued as footman to Princess Charlotte of Wales after her death, it is difficult to understand what is meant by the retirement from office of Charles Andrews. The Princess Charlotte received first £6,000, then £13,000, and then £60,000 a year, besides special grants amounting to £69,777; and the Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg received £50,000 a year for marrying the Princess. Prince Leopold is supposed to have ceased to receive this pension from the date of his acceptance of the throne of Belgium. We still continue to pay pensions to persons belonging to the household of the late king of the Belgians, Edward Robert, gamekeeper to the king, gets £75; Charles Moore, the late king's steward, £85 10*s.*; and William Pitcher, the groom, £75. Recipients of pensions are long lived. One view of the pension to Prince Leopold, which I had

not sufficiently regarded, has been forced upon me in examining the statements as to the Russo-Dutch Loan. In 1876 there is an item of expenditure for interest and sinking fund on Russian Dutch loan of £63,384. This money represents an annual payment of decreasing amount, which commenced in 1817 at £122,480, and which will end with a payment of £21,354 in 1915. The liability seems to have been undertaken at the close of the great war in 1815, for the purpose of "establishing the King of the Netherlands in his new sovereignty." The 55 George III., cap. 115, provided that Great Britain should only continue to pay her proportion of this Russian-Dutch Loan so long as the Belgic provinces remained part of "the dominions of his Majesty the King of the Netherlands." In 1830 Belgium formed itself into an independent State, and its secession was decreed on the 25th August, 1830. Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg was made King of the Belgians, and in consequence of the severance of Belgium from Holland, Great Britain ought no longer to have continued to pay for interest and redemption of the Russo-Dutch loan. A new treaty was, however, entered into on the 16th November, 1831, between this country and Russia, and the engagement to continue the payments was renewed.

Mr. E. G. Johnstone was Clerk of Patents to the Attorney-General, and Solicitor-General for England. On the 1st October, 1853, his office was abolished by the 15th and 16th Vic. cap. 83, and he, as compensation for the abolition of this office, receives £850 per annum. Mr. Johnstone also receives £528 a year addition "as long as he holds the office" (*vide* Civil Service Estimates, 1874, p. 456), notwithstanding that, as the office has been abolished for nearly a quarter of a century, his holding is hardly an ordinary one.

Miscellaneous Expenditure.

Amongst miscellaneous expenditure to March 1st, 1878, £439 3s. 4d. is charged for fees paid on the installation of Prince Frederick William of Prussia as Knight Companion of the Garter, and £380 is paid for special packets for conveyance of certain "distinguished persons," whose names and destinations are not given. £7320 is charged as the cost of conferring the distinction of the Order of St. Michael and St. George upon several colonists, and of completing the insignia of the various classes of the Order.

The secret inquiry into the frauds on the London Stock Exchange cost £600. If it had been public it would not have been dear at £6000; but with closed doors and with millionaire culprits sitting on it, the whole procedure is a sham. There are several ancient fees, which have no merit except their antiquity, and which, although small, ought all to be struck out of our annual national expenditure—the City of London, £7; Duchy of Lancaster, £100; Duke of Rutland, £20; Duke of Norfolk, £60; The Bursar of Trinity College, Cambridge, £5; the Dean and Chapter of Norwich, £5.

If any evidence should be needed of the marvellous effect on health and life of the receipt of a government pension, it may be found in the item of £261, paid in 1878, "for relief of certain distressed Spanish subjects resident in this country, without the means of subsistence, who were employed with the British army, or under British authorities, in Spain, or who have otherwise rendered service to our military operations in that country during the war from 1808 to 1814." Suppose the persons who so assisted us in 1808 to have been only 25 years of age, they must now have attained the ripe age of 95. But these are only infants compared with the unnamed American loyalist who has figured for the last half-century on our national accounts, and who still continues to draw his £18 a year. What age had he attained to at the time of the Declaration of Independence? and what service had he done to be immortalised on the face of our estimates? Assume the loyalist to have been precocious, and to have exhibited his interest in Imperial politics at a very early age, as did Mr. Disraeli's famous school-girl—say ten years old—even then he would, to-day, be 112. I should like to know that American loyalist, and, in any case, I affirm that a pension is far more effective than Parr's life pills for the prolongation of human life.

We now come to the Civil List and the annuities paid to members of the Royal Family.

In 1856 the Liverpool Financial Reform Association reprinted a precise statement of the cost of the Royal Household, and about seven years ago Sir Charles Dilke caused a considerable stir in this country by his famous speeches at Newcastle and elsewhere on the expenditure of the Royal Household. Since then, Mr. J. C. Cox, of Derby, has pub-

lished, in pamphlet form, an essay on the same subject. A parliamentary return, ordered to be printed by the House of Commons on the 26th July, 1869, contains the only accessible official information as to the origin of the Civil List.

On the 19th of March, 1872, Sir Charles Dilke in the House of Commons treated the subject at great length in a vain endeavour to obtain parliamentary investigation or more complete official returns. This speech he afterwards republished.

The Civil List, which is now understood to mean the annual sum granted by Parliament for the support and maintenance of the sovereign and royal household, formerly meant much more. The first Civil List Act passed by Parliament was the 9 and 10 William III., cap 23, by which £700,000 per annum was voted. This included—as the accounts for the year 1700 show—all the expenses of the nation except interest, management, and repayment of National Debt, army, navy, and ordnance. The following are the approximate items of the cost of the Royal Family per annum :—

Her Majesty the Queen, £385,000. Income of the Duchy of Lancaster, £42,000; including a compensation annuity from the Consolidated Fund, the total income of the Duchy is about £69,000. As Duchess of Lancaster Her Majesty receives £101 every year from the nation as an ancient fee. Cost of royal palaces inhabited, or partly inhabited, by Her Majesty, or inhabited without parliamentary authority by pensioned members of the royal family, £35,680. Cost of royal yachts paid by the country, amount not at present ascertainable. The *aides de camp* to the Queen are charged separately in the army estimates.

Her Majesty's enormous private property in foreign funds and landed estate is not included here, although the whole of this property must have been obtained by her from moneys economised out of the allowance made by the nation to herself and to Prince Albert, as the Duke of Kent, her father, died hopelessly insolvent, and the Prince Albert had practically no estate when he married.

There is a further sum of £1500 voted annually to Her Majesty to enable her to be charitable in Scotland, and a smaller sum of £300 to enable her to be charitable in Ireland, and there have also been yearly votes of about £1500 for racing plates to be given in Her Majesty's

name. In Scotland the vote for Queen's plates comes to £218.

There is no pretence for the allegation that the Duchy of Lancaster is the private property of the Queen. In the reign of Anne, the revenues of the Duchy of Lancaster were not only part of the Civil List, but the Crown was restrained from making grants except under the provisions of 1 Anne, c. 7. So far as I am aware, although a recital was introduced into an Act of George III. that the king is possessed of himself, his heirs, and successors, of the possessions of the Duchy, it was not until 1830 that any claim of purely private property was set up. On December 1, 1830, William IV., in a letter written to Earl Grey, claimed the Duchy "as his separate, personal, and private estate, vested in His Majesty by descent from Henry VII. in his body natural, and *not in his body politic as king.*" This claim is monstrously absurd, as William IV. in his body natural was most certainly not the heir male of Henry VII., even if the Duchy had passed by natural succession.

The Princess Royal has an annuity of £8000. Her Royal Highness is Crown Princess of Prussia and received a grant of £40,000 on her marriage.

Prince of Wales and Princess of Wales, £50,000.

Net income of Duchy of Cornwall about £70,000. The total income of the Duchy in 1875 was £101,828.

The Duchy of Cornwall is the result of a charter of Edward III. stated to be confirmed by a statute of 11 Edward III., which statute is not in the revised statutes. The Duchy of Cornwall is not and cannot be the private property of the present Prince of Wales, who can only have a life estate in it, yet parts of the Duchy have been sold, but no return has, so far as I am aware, been made of the capital moneys received, or of their disposition, though in some years the receipts from such sales have been many thousands of pounds. There were formerly three pensions —one of £3000 a year to the Earl of Bath, another of £2000 a year to Lord D'Auverquerque, and a third of £300 to Sir Peter Killigrew, all payable out of the revenues of the Duchy of Cornwall. These pensions have all been transferred to the cost of the nation, thus increasing the net income of the Duchy of Cornwall. Interest on £602,720 Duchy of Cornwall accumulations in 1861, say £18,000 per annum. Sir Charles Dilke, in Parliament, stated these accumulations without contradiction at £743,000. Landed

property rents, say, yearly, £8000. Military income as colonel of several regiments and field-marshal, not included.

There is no record here of the property inherited by the Prince of Wales from his father, nor can any information be given, as the will is illegally kept secret.

Occasional sums are voted for the repairs of His Royal Highness's residence. In one year £8000 was paid for this. In 1876, £550 was charged. This year £6450 is the figure of expenditure. Last year it was £4100.

There is an item each year in the national accounts of £16,216 paid to the Receiver-General of the Duchy of Cornwall for loss of duties on the coinage of tin. This item is, in fact, an annuity paid by the nation to the Prince of Wales. Although then enormously rich, His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales was content to receive from the people on the occasion of his coming of age, a parliamentary grant of £23,455.

The Duke of Edinburgh, £25,000. The naval income is not included in this annuity, nor is any account taken of the value of the hereditary rights to the Dukedom of Saxe-Coburg, and which are variously estimated. The Duke of Edinburgh has now a large additional income from his wife.

Prince Arthur, £15,000. No estimate is here made of the yearly value of the premises belonging to the nation occupied, without any parliamentary authority, by the Prince, and for which he pays no rent.

Prince Leopold, £15,000.

Princess Alice, £6000. On marrying Prince Louis of Hesse, Her Royal Highness received a grant of £30,000.

Princess Helena, £6000, and a grant of £30,000 on her marriage to Prince Christian of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderburg-Augustenburg.

Princess Louise, £6000, and a grant on her marriage to the Marquis of Lorne.

Princess Augusta, Duchess of Cambridge, £6000 (the Financial Reform Almanack for 1878 gives this at £3000 only). In addition we spend a large sum of money to repair Her Royal Highness's apartments in St. James's Palace, and we pay the rent of her stables in Brick Street, Piccadilly.

Princess Mary of Cambridge, £5000 (married to the Duke of Teck). The White Lodge, Richmond Park, is occupied by the Duke and Duchess of Teck, and no sort of

rent or compensation is paid by them to the nation, nor is there any parliamentary authority for the occupation.

Princess Augusta of Mecklenburgh-Strelitz, £3000.

Prince George, Duke of Cambridge, £12,000.

This does not include His Royal Highness's salary as Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, and Colonel of several regiments, nor does it include any benefits derived by the Duke of Cambridge from any rangerships or other posts held by him. As far as can be ascertained, the military salaries of the Duke of Cambridge are, as Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, £4432; as Colonel of the 17th Lancers, £1350; as Colonel of the Grenadier Guards, £2200; as Colonel of the Royal Regiment of Artillery, as Colonel of the 60th Rifles, as Colonel of the Corps of Royal Engineers, for these three it is not clear whether or not he takes salary. It is extremely difficult from the military estimates to say if these are given accurately. In the army list Honorary Officers are distinguished by the addition of the word Honorary, and none of the above are so marked.

Some persons pretend that the amounts paid to the royal family are justly due to them as part compensation for valuable properties surrendered by them to the nation. The only property belonging to the Brunswicks when they came to England was their Hanoverian property; this they not only kept, but actually added to out of English taxpayers' pockets. They surrendered nothing. When James II. was declared to have forfeited the Crown, and his heir male was disinherited, it is clear that the nation, or Parliament on its behalf, gave a distinct schedule of revenues for the royal maintenance, first to William of Orange, and then to Queen Anne and the children of the Electress Sophia, but there was no sort of private inheritance for the newcomers to surrender in return. They, at that time, were not even the heirs to the private estate of James II., if he had left any private estate in this country.

In the early stages of the Civil List the grants to members of the royal family were made by the Monarch for the life of the Monarch. In 1737 Frederick, Prince of Wales, applied to Parliament for a larger allowance than had been made to him by George II., and the King then objected that Parliament had nothing whatever to do with the maintenance of the royal family.

In order to find out the real cost of the royal family it is

needful to examine the whole of the financial accounts with the most careful scrutiny. In the Naval expenditure for 1877, £1262 4s. was charged for conveyance of Her Majesty and the Royal Household. It was stated in the House of Commons that the amount voted for the journey of the Prince of Wales to India was more than sufficient, and that a small surplus had been left undisbursed. Despite this there is, on page 210 of the "Naval Estimates," the following item:—"Expenses incurred in connection with the visit of H.R.H. the Prince of Wales to India, £4,360 14s. 8d." Lumped in an item of £3386 8s. 7d., so that it is impossible to fix the exact amount, I find: "Pay of equerry to the Duke of Edinburgh" and "allowance to messes of Her Majesty's ship *Sultan*," while H.R.H. the Duke of Edinburgh was in command; and this year, £11,000 is to be devoted for "Conveyance by sea of the Royal Household, entertainment of royal personages, and other small or unforeseen expenses."

The True Principle of Taxation.

The true principle of taxation should be, that every member of the State who earns more than is necessary for the mere subsistence of himself and his family should contribute towards the national taxation in due proportion to his ability to pay, and to his stake and interest in the nation. It is submitted that at present the main source of revenue from taxes in the United Kingdom is the earnings of the labourer, and that even the burden of the income tax, assessed taxes, and other taxes, which seem to fall exclusively, or principally, on the richer classes, are really ultimately borne almost entirely by the producing classes.

All taxes direct and indirect, paid by the producers or importers of commodities, or paid by the dealers therein, and all taxes direct and indirect incurred on the productions of land, must in the end be paid by the consumers of house commodities and productions. Taxes originally paid to the tax collector by the producer or importer of any commodity, and by the traders and dealers therein, are all repaid by the ultimate consumer in the augmented price of the article he purchases.

TORYISM FROM 1770 TO 1879.

BY

CHARLES BRADLAUGH.

FROM 1688—when the Whig Revolution which dethroned James II., and took away the possible succession from James II.'s son, affirmed the principle that "the people of the land, fully and freely represented," have the right to take back from the wearer of the crown the authority entrusted by the nation to the monarch—down to the accession of George III., the Tories were rigidly excluded from office. During this period of nearly eighty years the Tories were consistent haters and revilers of the reigning members of the House of Hanover. No words we have ever uttered or written were half so bitter against the Brunswicks as those which came from Tory lips and Tory pens. As the Tories were not allowed to dip into the national purse they were eloquent in and out of Parliament in favour of national economy. Tories not being permitted, except in rare instances, to be commissioned officers, we have strong denunciations of the evils of standing armies from Tories, both in the House of Lords and in the Commons. With the coming to the throne of George III. there was a marked change in Tory utterances, if not in Tory principles. George III. was a natural Tory. Buckle says of him that he was despotic as well as superstitious, and he adds: "Every liberal sentiment, everything approaching to reform—nay, even the mention of inquiry—was an abomination in the eyes of that narrow and ignorant prince." The "great Commoner" who in the very Cabinet Council talked "of being responsible to the people," was no fitting minister for a true Tory King; so by the aid of Lord Bute we have in 1770 Lord North as a real Tory Prime Minister, his administration lasting until 1782. None can doubt the pure Toryism of Lord North. On the 2nd March, 1769, he declared that he could not remember that he had voted for a single popular measure. It is to George III. and his worthy minister Lord North that we owe the whole bitterness of the struggle with the North American

colonies. Lord North vowed that he would never yield until "he had seen America at his feet;" but like a true Tory, he placed England at the feet of America and yielded. Lord Hillsborough, his Tory colleague, a sort of Marquis of Salisbury of a century ago, said: "We can grant nothing to the Americans except what they may ask with a halter round their necks." King George III. threatened that if the colonists succeeded he would go to Hanover; but he repented and stayed.

What was the effect of this Tory struggle with the American colonists on our National Debt and national taxation? In 1770 the National Debt was £129,197,633. The war with the American colonies cost £139,521,035, and at its conclusion the Debt had increased to £245,466,855. Just prior to the commencement of the revolution in America the annual expenditure of Great Britain and Ireland was £10,866,580. In 1785, when the war had ended in the defeat, disgrace, and impoverishment of England, the tax-bill had increased to £26,841,141. As every one knows now, this Tory war resulted in the Republic of the United States, and this result was achieved by Tory obstinacy and Tory folly, absolutely against the wish of the majority of the American colonists. George Washington was Monarchical, until the Tories made him a Republican *malgré lui*. Two petitions from the colonists to the "King's Most Excellent Majesty" were treated with scorn and contempt by the King, and by Lords North, Dartmouth, and Sandwich, his Tory advisers. The struggle began with imperial brag and ended in national shame. Those who, in South Africa, employ Basutos, Fingoes, and Swazies under Lord Beaconsfield in 1879, may well read Lord Chatham's grand denunciation of the employment of Indian savages as our allies in North America in 1777. "Who is the man," asked the great orator, "that—in addition to these disgraces and mischiefs of our army—has dared to authorise and associate to our arms the tomahawk and scalping-knife of the savage? To call into civilised alliance the wild and inhuman savage of the woods, to delegate to the merciless Indian the defence of disputed rights, and to wage the horrors of his barbarous war against our brethren—my Lords, these enormities call aloud for redress and punishment. Unless thoroughly done away with, it will be a stain on the national character." The Tory minister, the Earl of Suffolk, replied that "in a contest with rebels there were no means which God and nature might have placed at the disposal of the governing powers to which they would not be justified in having recourse." Lord Chatham's indignation knew no bounds, and in words of fire he denounced the employment of "these horrible hell-hounds of savage war." Now Tories sanction the employment of Basutos to help to steal Baphuti cattle, and assegai Baphuti wounded, while we, Christians and civilised, explode dynamite in the caverns

where Baphuti women and children are hidden. As late as 1782, when the Whigs were moving resolutions in both Houses of Parliament in favor of peace with America, the Tories still encouraged the King to continue the mad and suicidal war.

From 1783 to 1801 we had the Tory Ministry of William Pitt, and in the compass of this Tory rule are crowded so many iniquities—injustice to India, cruelty and treachery to Ireland, the struggle against political progress in England and Scotland, and the war with France—that if there were no other Tory sins in the whole record of the past 100 years, these would be sore enough, and disastrous enough in their consequences, to make all honest working men guard an undying enmity to Tory Governments. Warren Hastings, the Indian Governor-General, had been impeached for fraud, corruption, for hiring out English soldiers to invade the land of the Rohillas as wholesale butchers, ravagers, and destroyers, and for murder, under the cover of the law, of an inconvenient witness against him. It was the Tory Ministry that protected the Tory Governor-General of India in his wanton course of bloodshed and dishonor. In those days there were English members of the House of Commons with the courage to impeach, but the Tories covered the crime with a party vote, and left, without redress, to the oppressed in Hindustan only the memory of their wrongs, to grow ultimately into mutiny when despair of all justice had made the bitterness of life unendurable. Then it was the Rohilla, now it is the Afghan, and to-morrow it will be some other scientific frontier, if for our shame we endure these Beaconsfields and Salisburys much longer. The Irish story has been told so often that men speak as though the repetition of the record of our shameful doings had in some degree remedied or absolved the wrong we had done. But it was not only the Tory cruelty in Ireland under Pitt, it was not only the breach of faith to the Catholics at the time of the Act of Union, it was the consistent and persistent hindrance by the Tories of all approach to religious liberty through more than a quarter of a century of embittered struggling. In the teeth of his own distinct pledge the Tory Pitt in 1805 directly voted against Lord Grenville's resolution in favor of the removal of Catholic disabilities. True to Tory instincts, in 1807 Lord Liverpool and the Duke of Portland secured the rejection of Lord Howick's proposal to enable persons of every religious persuasion to hold commissions in the army. The Tories might have made Ireland loyal by justice ; they made disaffection chronic by keeping the pressure of injustice always acute. Even when, after the masterly agitation conducted by Daniel O'Connell, the Tories at last gave way to the claim for Catholic emancipation, they were only moved by fear. Eloquence found them deaf, entreaty found them stern, but the threat of civil war found them coward.

The Tory Duke of York, putting his hand to his left breast, near the region where the heart should have been, pledged himself in the House of Lords that the measure for the relief of the Roman Catholics should not be carried, "so help me God." The virtuous and Tory Duke of Cumberland menaced the nation that he would leave it for ever if it dared to pass the Bill. But Tory resistance was vain. On the 4th of April, 1829, the Duke of Wellington declared that his unconvinced Cabinet had been compelled to submit to the popular will, being at last thoroughly convinced that they had no choice between concession and civil war. It was not that they would have cared for the horrors of civil war if they had dared to believe they would have won, but they feared defeat. It is only men with the sustaining courage of principles who can again and again, and with foreknowing persistence, fight losing battles, and since the Tories have been faithless to the Stuarts they have had no principles. And, except that modern opinion limits their power for mischief, the Tories of to-day are to Ireland as were the Tories of Pitt, Portland, Liverpool, Castlereagh, and Wellington. It was on the 2nd of December, 1868, that Mr. Disraeli declared that he would continue to give an uncompromising resistance to the disestablishment of the Irish Church. The Tories made '98; they sowed the seed for '48; they planted the roots of Fenianism; they it is whom we must indict for the continuing discontent in our sister isle. We come back again to the Ministry of Pitt, to the war with France, which arose out of the bargain made by Lord Elgin in 1791 to support the Royal Family of France—that is, to encourage, with armed support, weak and vacillating Louis XVI. to betray the very Constitution he had solemnly sworn to maintain. Without English subsidies, furnished by the Tory ministers, the European princes could have given small aid to the tottering Monarchy of France. The Tories feared that the contagion of liberty would be too fierce, and they made a war which endured from 1793 to 1815; and again, lovers of an Imperial policy, look at the effect of this war on our National Debt and national taxation. The war cost, in hard cash, £989,636,449. Before the war began the annual taxation of Great Britain and Ireland was £18,349,344; in 1815, when the war finished, the tax-bill had swollen to £77,887,335. Before the war commenced the National Debt was £247,874,434; when the war had finished England's future industry was mortgaged to repay £861,039,049, besides the capital value of the terminable annuities.

The political liberty we use to-day, the right of meeting we enjoy to-day, the cheap Press we read to-day, have all been won in spite of bitterest Tory opposition. Under Pitt the most infamous repressive laws were passed against tongue and pen.

One statute of 1796 declared that if a man permitted lectures or debates on any subject whatever without licence of a magistrate he might be fined £100 a day, and that if a man without a similar licence lent books, newspapers, or pamphlets, he might be fined £20. Under Lords Liverpool, Sidmouth, and Castlereagh, acts were passed in 1819 which actually prohibited the publication of a cheap pamphlet or a cheap newspaper until the publisher had given two sureties to the extent of £800 not to publish anything seditious. These statutes were only repealed under Mr. Gladstone in 1869, and after many a journalist had been ruined. In the period between the accession of Pitt to power and the termination of the long administration of Lord Liverpool, how many poor men went over and over again to gaol to win us free speech and free Press! In Scotland, Gerald, Skirving, Palmer, Muir, Margarot, and a host of others paid the penalty for their advocacy of reform; some died in the plantations, others died at home from dungeon fever. In London, Erskine's grand defence of Hardy, Tooke, and Thelwall, and in Manchester his brilliant pleading for Walker and his fellow-prisoners, serve to show us a little how the struggle was conducted, and the later fights, as in 1820, when a whole regiment of poor men were on trial with Hunt and Balmforth at Lancaster —all these mark the fashion in which political liberty has been painfully battled for and slowly won, despite Tory rule. And the present Tory Ministry is true to its old Tory traditions; while it dare not gag the Press in England, it has issued a Press gag law in India, and has stifled the Press in Cyprus. It dare not now use yeomanry to disperse a political meeting in Lancashire, as it did sixty years ago, but it ventures on a similar outrage in South Africa.

In office or out of office the Tories tried to keep bread dear until they were beaten by Cobden and the men of the anti-corn-law movement. In office and out of office the Tories hindered reform, until in the struggle prior to 1832 they were affrighted by Bristol riotings, Nottingham burnings, and the threat of Attwood and his Birmingham men that they would march on London. As they were in 1830, so they were in 1866, when Lord Derby, on the 9th July, as Tory Prime Minister, declared that he would not introduce a Reform Bill, but modified his opinion fourteen days later, when the Hyde Park railings were on the ground in Park Lane. The measure of reform of 1867 grew into its ultimate shape under pressure of large meetings held throughout the land. And as Tories have been, in office and out of office, since 1770 to 1874, so have they been under the present Ministry, from 1874 to 1879. When they came into office in 1874, our national expenditure amounted to £73,270,000, not including the sum paid for the "Alabama" claims. In 1878

our admitted national expenditure was £85,407,000, but this does not include many items for the Afghan war, which India cannot pay if she would, and ought not to pay if she could. These eighty-five and a half millions do not include the whole of the items of the disbursements in South Africa, although it is hopeless to expect that the South African colonies can contribute much to this cost. The Tories have taken from the nation each year a larger sum in respect of the National Debt, and yet the national indebtedness is to-day actually larger than when they came into office. In March, 1874, the debt was nominally £779,283,245, but as the estimates of the outgoing Government showed a receivable surplus of income as against expenditure on the current year, of more than five and a half millions, the real balance should only be taken at seven hundred and seventy-three and three-quarter millions. In March, 1879, the National Debt was admittedly £778,078,840, but this left out many millions to be added of Indian and South African war debt, and who dares say to how much the butcher's bill has already swollen or will swell the debt before this year has finished?

Lord Sandon pleads that our Imperial interests need this enormous expenditure. I answer that our national interests do not need it. In England we want no Empress and will not have one. Lord Sandon says that the expenditure is required for the protection of our colonies. I reply that this wanton waste for powder and steel is only required in those colonies where we practise injustice, annexation, and oppression.

The bill of indictment against the present Tory Ministry is a most serious one. In November, 1875, they bought from the late Viceroy of Egypt—at a time when they ought to have known him to be utterly insolvent—a large quantity of practically worthless shares, for which £4,080,000 was paid. These shares not even giving a right to speak or vote in the Company, the Tory Ministry have since purchased other more valuable shares to qualify salaried directors to watch over the valuable property so acquired. As this purchase was actually most illegally completed, and the money treasonably paid before Parliament was consulted on the matter, an extravagant rate of interest was paid by the Government to the Messrs. Rothschild, by whom the scheme was temporarily financed. To cover this reckless waste of public money to Rothschilds the Prime Minister made two statements, both of which he either knew to be, or might have known to be, positively untrue—1. That Rothschilds had, at the request of the Government, bought the shares, and might have been compelled to keep them if Parliament had not endorsed the transaction. 2. That Rothschilds had found one million in gold on the 1st of December, 1875, and might have been called on to find the remaining three millions on the

following day—the facts, on the contrary, being that Rothschilds refused to be, and were not, parties to the purchase, except as lenders of the purchase-money, and that they expressly stipulated against being called on to find the three millions except at dates convenient to themselves. Subsequently to this the whole conduct of the Ministry in Egypt has been characterised by deception so far as the Ministerial explanations to Parliament are concerned, and by gross fraud on the nation.

The six millions' vote prior to Berlin was obtained by a fraud on the country; the Government, afterwards pledging itself that the abstract of the secret agreement with Russia was wholly unauthentic, thus led infatuated Jingoes to believe that Lords Beaconsfield and Salisbury were really advocating a bold policy at Berlin. Lord Beaconsfield made a wantonly false boast of having secured at Berlin an enduring peace when in Europe Austria was invading Bosnia; when the plans for the invasion of Zululand were already submitted to and approved by the Duke of Cambridge; and when the schemes for forcing a quarrel on Shere Ali, in breach of our solemn treaty, and in defiance of our deliberately pledged word, were being eagerly hurried on. In South Africa, in absolute bad faith, the Tories have most illegally destroyed the Dutch South African Republic. They have quarrelled with the Gaikas, the Galekas, and the Pondos, burning their kraals, stealing their cattle, and shooting their women and children. The Tories have landed us in a quarrel with the Baphutis, who have three times beaten us back from Moirosi's mountain, despite that English Christians have thrown dynamite to explode in the caverns where Baphuti men, women, and children lay hidden. These Tories planned long beforehand the invasion of Zulu territory, and sent reinforcements to enable Lord Chelmsford to make the invasion, and yet Lord Salisbury calls our defeat at Isandalana "an unexpected attack made by savages on one of our colonies, which came on us like a thunder-clap." They have decorated as a hero the Lord Chelmsford who, in coward terror, left our dead unburied for four long months.

With the warning of thirty-eight years since before their eyes, with a solemn treaty binding this country not to force European residents upon the Court of Cabul, the Tory Government have wantonly disregarded treaties, promises, and warnings, and they have, in breach of their own distinct statement to the English Parliament, tried to compel the late Shere Ali to receive a British resident at Cabul. These Tories have succeeded in deceiving the present English Parliament by false and fraudulent representations as to what was really happening in India and Afghanistan, and now, by excluding the representatives of the Press, except under most disgraceful conditions, they prevent the

real truth from reaching the English people. Lords Beaconsfield, Salisbury, and Lytton are responsible for the death of Sir Louis Cavagnari, as Lord Beaconsfield and Sir Bartle Frere are responsible for those who died at Isandalana. They were warned over and over again that there was danger to any European resident at Cabul, but Sir Bartle Frere mocked the warning in 1875, and Lord Lytton not only mocked the warnings prior to and after the entry of Sir Louis Cavagnari amongst the Cabulese, but he actually permitted lying telegrams of safety and quiet to be published in England in lieu of the discomforting reports which continually reached the Government.

What has this Tory Government—now said to be about to dissolve Parliament—to show to the people as compensation for this waste of treasure and loss of life? Seven thousand troops brought from India and marched back again, just enough to teach the inhabitants of Hindustan—whom we govern in their own country at the point of the bayonet—that we were not strong enough to hold our own in Europe without the help of Hindu swords. Cyprus, "a place at arms," desolate and fever-stricken, leased from the Porte at a high rent, which we are to hold as vassals of the Sultan to practise there a little slavery, a little Press-gagging, and some priest-shaving. The Asia Minor Protectorate, a dissolving view in a political magic lantern with the slides twisted and blurred. We are repudiated by Turkey; Safvet Pasha himself told me that England had betrayed Turkey into war by promises of support which had never been kept. We have made Italy uneasy. Germany ridicules our pretence of boldness, and France regards us with mistrust. At home trade is bad, our people are hungry and unemployed. But their verdict is to be given at the polling-booth on the day of the general election.

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SPEECHES

BY

CHARLES BRADLAUGH.

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SPEECHES BY CHARLES BRADLAUGH.

FOUR SPEECHES DELIVERED AT THE BAR OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS DURING THE PARLIAMENTARY STRUGGLE.

First Speech: June 23rd, 1880.

Mr. Speaker,—I have to ask the indulgence of every member of this House while, in a position unexampled in the history of this House, I try to give one or two reasons why the resolution which you have read to me should not be enforced.

If it were not unbecoming I should appeal to the traditions of the House against the House itself, and I should point out that in none of its records, so far as my poor reading goes, is there any case in which this House has judged one of its members in his absence, and taken away from that member the constitutional right he has. ('Hear, hear.') There have been members against whom absolute legal disqualification has been urged. No such legal disqualification is ventured to be urged by any member of this House against myself. But even those members have been heard in their places; those members have been listened to before the decision was taken against them; and I ask that this House shall not be less just to myself than it has always been to every one of its members. ('Hear, hear.')

Do you tell me I am unfit to sit amongst you? ('Hear, hear,' and 'Order, order'.) The more reason, then, that this

House should show the generosity which judges show to a criminal, and allow every word he has to say to be heard. But I stand here, Sir, as no criminal. I stand here as the chosen of a constituency of this country, with my duty to that constituency to do. I stand here, Sir—if it will not be considered impertinent to put it so—with the most profound respect for this House, of which I yet hope and mean to form a part, and on whose traditions I should not wish to cast one shadow of reproach. I stand here returned duly; no petition against my return; no impeachment of that return. I stand here returned duly, ready to fulfil every form that this House requires, ready to fulfil every form that the law permits this House to require, ready to do every duty that the law makes incumbent upon me.

I will not in this presence argue whether this House has or has not the right to set its decision against the law, because I should imagine that even the rashest of those who spoke against me would hardly be prepared to put in the mouth of one whom they consider too advanced in politics an argument so dangerous as that might become. I speak within the limits of the law, asking for no favor from this House for myself or for my constituents, but asking the merest justice which has always been accorded to a member of the House. ('Hear, hear,' and 'Order'.) I have to ask indulgence lest the memory of some hard words which have been spoken in my absence should seem to give to what I say a tone of defiance, which it is far from my wish should be there at all; and I am the more eased because although there were words spoken which I had always been taught English gentlemen never said in the absence of an antagonist without notice to him, yet there were also generous and brave words said for one who is at present, I am afraid, a source of trouble and discomfort and hindrance to business. I measure the generous words against the others, and I will only make one appeal through you, Sir, which is, that if the reports be correct that the introduction of other names came with mine in the heat of passion and the warmth of debate, the gentleman who used those words, if such there were, will remember that he was wanting in chivalry, because, while I can answer for

myself, and am able to answer for myself, nothing justified the introduction of any other name beside my own to make a prejudice against me. (Cheers, 'Question,' and 'Order'.)

I fear lest the strength of this House, judicially exercised as I understand it to be—with infrequency of judicial exercise—that the strength of this House makes it forget our relative positions. At present I am pleading at its bar for justice. By right it is there [pointing to the seats] I should plead. It is that right I claim in the name of those who sent me here. No legal disqualification before my election, or it might have been made the ground of petition; no legal disqualification since my election—not even pretended.

It is said: "You might have taken the oath as other members did". I could not help, when I read that, Sir, trying to put myself in the place of each member who said it. I imagined a member of some form of faith who found in the oath words which seemed to him to clash with his faith, but still words which he thought he might utter, but which he would prefer not to utter if there were any other form which the law provided him; and I asked myself whether each of those members would not then have taken the form which was most consonant with his honor and his conscience. If I have not misread, some hon. members seem to think that I have neither honor nor conscience. Is there not some proof to the contrary in the fact that I did not go through the form, believing that there was another right open to me? ('Hear, hear,' and 'Order'.) Is that not some proof that I have honor and conscience?

Of the gentlemen who are now about to measure themselves against the rights of the constituencies of England, I ask what justification have they for that measurement? They have said that I thrust my opinions on the House. I hold here, Sir, the evidence of Sir Thomas Erskine May, and I can find no word of any opinion of mine thrust upon the House at all. I have read —it may be that the reports misrepresent—that the cry of "Atheist" has been raised from that side. [Pointing to the Opposition side.] No word of all mine before the committee put in any terms those theological or anti-theological opinions in

evidence before the House. I am no more ashamed of my own opinions, which I did not choose—opinions into which I have grown—than any member of this House is ashamed of his; and much as I value the right to sit here, and much as I believe that the justice of this House will accord it to me before the struggle is finished, I would rather relinquish it for ever than it should be thought that by any shadow of hypocrisy I had tried to gain a feigned entrance here by pretending to be what I am not. (Cheers, and cries of 'Order'.)

On the Report of the Committee as it stands, on the evidence before the House, what is the objection to my either affirming or taking the oath? It is said I have no legal right to affirm. I will suppose that to be so. It is the first time that the House has made itself a court of law from which there may be no appeal, and deprived a citizen of his constitutional right of appeal to a court of law to make out what the statute means in dealing with him. There is no case in which this House has overridden everything, and put one of its members where he had no chance of battling for his right at all. Take the oath. It is possible that some of the lawyers, who have disagreed among themselves even upon that (the Opposition) side of the House, may be right, and that I may be wrong in the construction I have put upon the oath; but no such objection can come. There is no precedent—there is, I submit respectfully, no right—in this House to stand between me and the oath which the law provides for me to take: which the statute, under penalty even upon members of this House themselves if they put me out from my just return, gives me the right to take.

What kind of a conflict is provoked here if this resolution be enforced? Not a grave conflict in a court of law, where the judges exclude passion: where they only deal with facts and evidence. I do not mean that these gentlemen do not deal with facts; but, if I am any judge of my own life's story, there have been many things put against myself which I can hardly reckon in the category of facts. I don't mean that they are not right, for hon. members may know more of myself than I do myself; but, judging myself as I know myself, some of the members who have attacked me so glibly during the last few days must have

been extraordinarily misinformed, or must have exceedingly misapprehended the matters they alleged. It has been said that I have paraded and flaunted some obnoxious opinions. I appeal to your justice, Sir, and to that of the members of this House, to say whether my manner has not been as respectful as that of man could be—whether in each case I have not withdrawn when you told me. If I now come here with even the appearance of self-assertion, it is because I would not be a recreant and coward to the constituency that sent me to represent them; and I mean to be as members have been in the best history of this assembly.

I ask the House, in dealing with my rights, to remember how they are acting. It is perfectly true that by a majority they may decide against me now. What are you to do then? Are you going to declare the seat vacant? First, I tell you that you have not the right. The moment I am there [pointing inside the House] I admit the right of the House, of its own good will and pleasure, to expel me. As yet I am not under your jurisdiction. As yet I am under the protection of the law. A return sent me to this House, and I ask you, Sir, as the guardian of the liberties of this House, to give effect to that return. The law says you should, and that this House should. And naturally so; because, if it were not so, any time a majority of members might exclude anyone they pleased.

What has been alleged against me? Politics? Are views on politics urged as a reason why a member should not sit here? Pamphlets have been read: I won't say with accuracy, because I will not libel any of the hon. members who read them; but, surely, if they are grounds for disqualification they are grounds for indictment to be proved against me in a proper fashion. There is no case in all the records of this House in which you have ransacked what a man has written and said in his past life and then challenged him with it here. My theology? It would be impertinent in me, after the utterances of men so widely disagreeing from me that have been made on the side of religious liberty during the past two nights—it would be impertinent in me to add one word save this. It is said that you may deal

with me because I am isolated. I could not help hearing the ring of that word in the lobby as I sat outside last night. But is that a reason, that because I stand alone the House are to do against me what they would not do if I had 100,000 men at my back? (Cries of 'Oh!'.) That is a bad argument, which provokes a reply inconsistent with the dignity of this House, and which I should be sorry to give.

I have not yet used—I hope no passion may tempt me to be using—any words that would seem to savor of even a desire to enter into conflict with this House. I have always taught, preached, and believed in the supremacy of Parliament, and it is not because for a moment the judgment of one Chamber of Parliament should be hostile to me that I am going to deny the ideas I have always held; but I submit that one Chamber of Parliament—even its grandest Chamber, as I have always held this to be—has no right to override the law. The law gives me the right to sign that roll, to take and subscribe the oath, and to take my seat there [pointing to the benches]. I admit that the moment I am in the House, without any reason but your own good will, you can send me away. That is your right. You have full control over your members. But you cannot send me away until I have been heard in my place, not a suppliant as I am now, but with the rightful audience that each member has always had.

There is one phase of my appeal which I am loth indeed to make. I presume you will declare the seat vacant. What do you send me back to Northampton to say? I said before, and I trust I may say again, that this assembly is one in which any man might well be proud to sit—prouder I that I have not some of your traditions and am not of your families, but am of the people, the people that sent me here to speak for them. Do you mean that I am to go back to Northampton as to a court, to appeal against you—that I am to ask the constituency to array themselves against this House? I hope not. If it is to be, it must be. If this House arrays itself against an isolated man—its huge power against one citizen—if it must be, then the battle must be too. But it is not with the constituency of Northampton alone—hon. members need not

mistake—that you will come into conflict if this appeal is to go forward, if the House of Commons is to override the statute law to get rid of even the vilest of members. Had you alleged against me even more than against one man whose name was mentioned in this House last night, I should still have held that the House cannot supersede the rights of the people. But not as much is alleged against me as was alleged against that man, in whose case the House itself said that its conduct had been subversive of the rights of the people. I beg you, for your own sakes, don't put yourselves in that position. I have no desire to wrestle with you for justice. I admit that I have used hard words in my short life, giving men the right in return to say hard things of me; but is it not better that I should have the right to say them to your faces? If they are within the law, let the law deal with me fairly and properly; but, if they are without the law, not unfairly, as I submit you are doing now.

You have the power to send me back; but in appealing to Northampton I must appeal to a tribunal higher than yours —not to courts of law, for I hope the days of conflict between the assembly which makes the law and the tribunals which administer it are passed. It must be a bad day for England and for Great Britain, if we are to be brought again to the time when the judges and those who make the law for the judges are in rash strife as to what they mean. But there is a court to which I shall appeal: the court of public opinion, which will have to express itself. You say it is against me. Possibly; but if it be so, is it against me rightly or wrongly? I am ready to admit, if you please, for the sake of argument, that every opinion I hold is wrong and deserves punishment. Let the law punish it. If you say the law cannot, then you admit that you have no right; and I appeal to public opinion against the iniquity of a decision which overrides the law and denies me justice. I beg your pardon, Sir, and that of the House too, if in this warmth there seems to lack respect for its dignity; and as I shall have, if your decision be against me, to come to that table when your decision is given, I beg you, before the step is taken in which we may both lose our dignity—mine is not much, but yours is that of the Commons of England—I beg

you, before the gauntlet is fatally thrown: I beg you, not in any sort of menace, not in any sort of boast, but as one man against six hundred, to give me that justice which on the other side of this hall the judges would give me were I pleading there before them. (Loud cheers and cries of 'Order', amid which Mr. Bradlaugh again bowed and retired.)

Second Speech: April 28th, 1881.

Mr. Speaker,—I have again to ask the indulgence of the House while I submit to it a few words in favor of my claim to do that which the law requires me to do.

Perhaps the House will pardon me if I supply an omission, I feel unintentionally made, on the part of the hon. member for Chatham [Sir J. E. Gorst] in some words which have just fallen from him. I understood him to say that he would use a formal statement made by me to the Committee against what the Chancellor of the Duchy had said I had said. I am sure the hon. and learned member for Chatham, who has evidently read the proceedings of the Committee with care, would, if he had thought it fair, have stated to the House that the statement only came from me after an objection made by me—a positive objection on the ground that it related to matters outside this House, and that the House in the course of its history had never inquired into such matters; but I can hardly understand what the member for Chatham meant when he said that he contrasted what I did say with what the Chancellor of the Duchy said I said; for it is not a matter of memory, it is on the proceedings of this House, that being examined formally before the Committee, I stated: "That the essential part of the oath is in the fullest and most complete degree binding upon my honor and conscience, and that the repeating of the words of asseveration does not in the slightest degree weaken the binding of the allegiance on me".

I say now I would not go through any form—much as I value

the right to sit in this House, much as I desire and believe that this House will accord me that right—that I did not mean to be binding upon me without mental reservation, without equivocation. I would go through no form unless it were fully and completely and thoroughly binding upon me as to what it expressed or promised.

Mine has been no easy position for the last twelve months. I have been elected by the free votes of a free constituency. My return is untainted. There is no charge of bribery (cheers), no charge of corruption, nor of inducing men to come drunken to the polling booth. I come here with a pure untainted return —not won by accident. For thirteen long years have I fought for this right—through five contested elections, including this. It is now proposed to prevent me from fulfilling the duty my constituents have placed upon me. You have force; on my side is the law. The hon. and learned member for Plymouth spoke the truth when he said he did not ask the House to treat the matter as a question of law; but the constituencies ask me to treat it as a question of law. I, for them, ask you to treat it as a question of law.

I could understand the feeling that seems to have been manifested were I some great and powerful personage. I could understand it had I a huge influence behind me. I am only one of the people, and you propose to teach them that on a mere technical question you will put a barrier in the way of my doing my duty which you have never put in the way of anyone else.

The question is, has my return on the 9th of April, 1881, anything whatever to impeach it? There is no legal disqualification involved. If there were, it could be raised by petition. The hon. member for Plymouth says the dignity of this House is in question. Do you mean that I can injure the dignity of this House? This House which has stood unrivalled for centuries? This House, supreme among the assemblies of the world? This House, which represents the traditions of liberty? I should not have so libelled you. How is the dignity of this House to be hurt? If what happened before the 9th of April is less than a legal disqualification, it is a matter for the judgment of the constituency and not for you. The constituency has judged me;

it has elected me. I stand here with no legal disqualification upon me. The right of the constituency to return me is an unimpeachable right. I know some gentlemen make light of constituencies; yet without the constituencies you are nothing. It is from them you derive your whole and sole authority. The hon. and learned member for Plymouth treats lightly the legal question. It is dangerous to make light of the law—dangerous, because if you are only going to rely on your strength of force to override the law, you give a bad lesson to men whose morality you impeach as to what should be their duty if emergence ever came. ('Hear, hear.') Always outside the House I have advocated strenuous obedience to the law, and it is under that law that I claim my right.

It is said by the right hon. baronet who interposes between me and my duty that this House has passed some resolution. First, I submit that that resolution does not affect the return of the 9th April. The conditions are entirely different: there is nothing since the date of that return. I submit, next, that, if it did affect it, the resolution was illegal from the beginning. In the words of George Grenville, spoken in this House in 1769, I say, if your resolution goes in the teeth of the law—if against the statute—your resolution is null and void. No word have I uttered outside these walls which has been lacking in respect to the House. I believe the House will do me justice, and I ask it to look at what it is I claim.

I claim to do that which the law says I must. Frankly, I would rather have affirmed. When I came to the table of the House I deemed that I had a legal right to do it. The courts have decided against me, and I am bound by their decision. I have the legal right to do what I propose to do. No resolution of yours can take away that legal right. You may act illegally and hinder me; and unfortunately I have no appeal against you. "Unfortunately" perhaps I should not say. Perhaps it is better that the Chamber which makes the law should never be in conflict with the courts which administer the laws that the Chamber makes. I think the word "unfortunately" was not the word I ought to have used in this argument. But the force that you invoke against the law

to-day may to-morrow be used against you, and the use will be justified by your example. It is a fact that I have no remedy if you rely on your force. I can only be driven into a contest, wearying even to a strong man well supported, ruinous and killing to one man standing by himself—a contest in which, if I succeed, it will be injurious to you as well as to me. Injurious to me because I can only win by lessening your repute, which I desire to maintain. The only court I have the power of appealing to is the court of public opinion, which I have no doubt in the end will do me justice.

The hon. member for Plymouth said I had the manliness on a former occasion to make an avowal of opinions to this House. I did nothing of the kind. I have never, directly or indirectly, said one word about my opinions, and this House has no right to inquire what opinions I may hold outside its walls. The only right is that which the statute gives you; my opinions there is no right to inquire into. I shelter myself under the laws of my country. This is a political assembly, met to decide on the policy of the nation, and not on the religious opinions of the citizens. (Cheers.) While I had the honor of occupying a seat in the House, when questions were raised which touched upon religious matters, I abstained from uttering one word. I did not desire to say one word which might hurt the feelings of even the most tender. ('Hear.')

But it is said, why not have taken the oath quietly? I did not take it then because I thought I had the right to do something else, and I have paid the penalty. I have been plunged in litigation fostered by men who had not the courage to put themselves forward. (Loud cheers below the gangway.) I, a penniless man, should have been ruined, if it had not been that the men in workshop, pit, and factory had enabled me to fight this battle. (Interruption.) I am sorry that hon. members cannot have patience with one pleading as I plead here. It is no light stake, even if you put it on the lowest personal grounds, to risk the ambition of a life on such an issue. It is a right ambition to desire to take part in the councils of the nation, if you bring no store of wisdom with you, and can only learn from the great intellects that we have. ('Hear, hear.') What will

you inquire into? The right hon. baronet would inquire into my opinions. Will you inquire into my conduct, or is it only my opinions you will try here? The hon. member for Plymouth frankly puts it, opinions. If opinions, why not conduct? Why not examine into members' conduct when they come to the table, and see if there be no members in whose way you can put a barrier? ('Hear, hear.') Are members, whose conduct may be obnoxious, to vote my exclusion because to them my opinions are obnoxious? As to any obnoxious views supposed to be held by me, there is no duty imposed upon me to say a word.

The right hon. baronet has said there has been no word of recantation. You have no right to ask me for any recantation. Since the 9th April you have no right to ask me for anything. If you have a legal disqualification, petition, lay it before the judges. When you ask me to make a statement, you are guilty of impertinence to me, of treason to the traditions of this House, and of impeachment of the liberties of the people. My difficulty is that those who have made the most bitter attacks upon me only made them when I was not here to deal with them. One hon. and gallant member recently told his constituents that this would be made a party question, but that the Conservative members had not the courage to speak out against me. I should have thought, from reading "Hansard", not that they wanted courage, but that they had cultivated a reticence that was more just.

I wish to say a word or two on the attempt which has been made to put on the Government of the day complicity in my views. The Liberal party has never aided me in any way to this House. ('Oh!' from the Opposition.) Never. I have fought by myself. I have fought by my own hand. I have been hindered in every way that it was possible to hinder me; and it is only by the help of the people, by the pence of toilers in mine and factory, that I am here to-day, after these five struggles right through thirteen years. I have won my way with them, for I have won their hearts, and now I come to you. Will you send me back from here? Then how? You have the right, but it is the right of force, and not of law. When

I am once seated on these benches, then I am under your jurisdiction. At present I am under the protection of the writ from those who sent me here. I do not want to quote what has happened before; but if there be one lesson which the House has recorded more solemnly than another, it is that there should be no interference with the judgment of a constituency in sending a man to this House against whom there is no statutory disqualification. Let me appeal to the generosity of the House as well as to its strength. It has traditions of liberty on both sides. I do not complain that members on that (the Conservative) side try to keep me out. They act according to their lights, and think my poor services may be injurious to them. (Cries of 'No'.) Then why not let me in? (Cheers.) It must be either a political or a religious question.

I must apologise to the House for trespassing upon its patience. I apologise because I know how generous in its listening it has been from the time of my first speech in it till now. But I ask you now, do not plunge with me into a struggle I would shun. The law gives me no remedy if the House decides against me. Do not mock at the constituencies. If you place yourselves above the law, you leave me no course save lawless agitation instead of reasonable pleading. It is easy to begin such a strife, but none knows how it would end. I have no court, no tribunal to appeal to; you have the strength of your votes at the moment. You think I am an obnoxious man, and that I have no one on my side. If that be so, then the more reason that this House, grand in the strength of its centuries of liberty, should have now that generosity in dealing with one who to-morrow may be forced into a struggle for public opinion against it. (Cheers.)

Third Speech: February 7th, 1882.

Mr. Speaker,—In addressing the House for the third time from this position, I feel the exceeding difficulty of dealing fairly with myself without dealing unfairly with the House. If I were to

follow the hon. member who has just sat down into his errors of law, of history, and of memory, into his reckless misconceptions as to what are the views I hold and write about, I should only be giving pain to numbers of members here, and departing from that mandate with which my constituents have trusted me. It is—I say it with all respect—not true that I done anything more with reference to the succession than maintain the right of Parliament, meaning by Parliament both Houses, to control it; and any member who pretends that I done anything else, either does it, not having read what I have written, or heard what I have said, or having forgotten entirely what I have written or said, and being extremely careless in representing my views to the House.

I regret that the hon. member [Mr. Newdegate] should have imported into the discussion some fact supposed to have occurred in a police-court since I stood here before. I can only give the House my positive assurance that the hon. member is perfectly inaccurate in his representation of what took place. It is exceedingly painful to bandy words in this way. The hon. member was good enough to say he did not hear. He could not well have heard, for the magistrate did not refuse my affirmation at all. I happened to have been before Sir J. Ingham before, and he knew me, and knew the particular form of affirmation; and when the clerk read it to me no discussion took place on the subject. I hope the House will forgive me for contradicting such a small thing, but small things are sometimes much used. They have been used to work my ruin since I stood here before; and I regret that the shame of reticence did not at least keep it from this House: that the hon. member thought it his duty, by a common informer, to attempt to drive me into the Bankruptcy Court, and outside this House has boasted that the question would be solved in that way. It may be a brave boast, it may be consonant with piety from the hon. member's point of view; but I believe that every other gentleman's sense of piety would revolt against the notion of driving a single man into bankruptcy, and then canvassing for subscriptions—('hear, hear')—for the "bold and vigorous, and patriotic and noble conduct", as the advertisement said, which consisted in hurrying in a cab to

find the common informer to issue a writ against me. I dismiss that, however. I ask the House to pardon me for having wasted its time on this poor thing. I do not hope, I dare not think, that any word I may say here will win one vote; and I would have let this go silently against me, were it not that I owe a duty to the constituency that has twice entrusted me with its suffrages, a duty to every constituency right through the land in time to come—('hear, hear')—whose representative may be challenged as Northampton's has been. ('Hear, hear,' and 'No'.) Some gentlemen say "No", but where is the challenge to stop? ('Hear.') It is not simply theology, it is politics too. ('Hear, hear.') It is not simply theology that is brought before the House, but the wild imaginings of some member who, with the nightmare of panic upon him, and a wild imagining of the French Revolution clothed in terrors of which I know nothing, comes here to tell you of mighty Russia successful, and of the unfortunate United States with its Presidents assassinated because of religious and political opinions. Panic of that kind is not evidence as to my opinions. If this House intends to try me for my opinions, let it do it reasonably, and at least have the evidence before it.

I would show you how unfair it is to trust to memory of words. The hon. member was good enough to tell the House that I had declared to a Committee of the House that certain words were meaningless. I hold in my hand the report of the Committee and the minutes of evidence; and no such words exist in any declaration of mine. ('Hear, hear'; and Mr. Newdegate shook his head.) The hon. member does not believe me. I cannot make more than facts. I cannot make the comprehension which should distinguish, when prejudice has determined that nothing shall be right that is put. The only way in which it can be pretended that anything of the kind in reference to the oath can be brought in, is by taking my letter of the 20th of May, written outside the House, which does not contain a specific declaration the hon. member has put into it, which letter I protested ought not to be brought before the Committee at all, which I never volunteered to the Committee—(Opposition laughter)—which I objected to the Committee having before

them. ('Oh!' and laughter from the Opposition.) The gentlemen who laugh, laugh because the laugh is the only answer that could be given. No reason can be given in reply, no facts can be quoted; and I ask hon. members who laugh to remember that I am pleading as though a quasi-criminal at this bar, and that I have a right to an audience from them; and I appeal to the House at least to give me a silent hearing. Judges do that. If you are unfit to be judges, then do not judge. ('Hear, hear.') It shows, at least, the difficulty of dealing with a question like this, when those who are to judge have come to a judgment already, not upon any facts, but upon what they think ought to be the facts.

I ask the House to deal legally and fairly with me. Legally you are bound to deal; fairly, as an assembly of English gentlemen, you ought to deal with me, even if you have differences with me, even if you think my opinions so obnoxious, even if you think that the politics with which you identify me in your minds are dangerous to you. ('Oh, oh!') If I am not dangerous, why not let me speak there [pointing to the seat he occupied last Session]? If there is no danger, why strain the law? If there is no danger, why disobey the law? It is put by the hon. gentleman who spoke last that there are certain words of the oath which the courts of law have declared essential. The courts of law have declared the exact opposite. So far as a decision has been given, the very report of the Committee shows that the highest court of judicature in this realm has decided the words are not essential to the oath at all.

I ask the House to deal with me with some semblance and show of legality and fairness; and first I say that they ought not to go behind my election of the 9th of April, 1881, and that the House ought to reject the resolution moved by the right hon. gentleman, because it deals with matters which antedate my election, and because the House has nothing to do with me before the 9th of April, 1881. That is the return of which the Clerk at the table has the certificate. That is my only authority for being here. If I did aught before that rendered me unworthy to sit here, why did the House let me sit here from the 2nd of July to the 29th of March? If what I did

entitles the House not to receive me, why has not the House had the courage of its opinions and vacated the seat? Either the seat is mine in law, and in law I claim it from you, or I am unworthy to hold it; and then why not vacate the seat and let the constituency express its opinion again? But my return is unimpeached, it is unimpeachable, and there has been no petition against me. The hon. member who went into back alleys for common informers could not find a petitioner to present a petition against it.

If I speak with temper—(Opposition laughter)—the House, I trust, will pardon me. I have read within the last few days words spoken, not by members of no consequence, but by members occupying high position in this House, which made me wonder if this is the House of Commons to which I aspired so much. I have read that one right hon. member, the member for Whitehaven—(laughter from the Ministerial side)—was prompted to say to his constituents that I was kicked down stairs last Session, and that he hoped I should be again. If it were true that I was kicked downstairs, I would ask the members of the House of Commons on whom the shame, on whom the disgrace, on whom the stigma? I dare not apply this, but history will when I have mouldered, and you too, and our passions are quite gone. But it is not quite true that I was kicked downstairs, and it is a dangerous thing to say that I was, for it means that hon. members who should rely on law rely on force. It is a dangerous provocation to conflict to throw to the people. If I had been as wicked in my thought as some members are reported to have been in their speech, this quarrel, not of my provoking, would assume a future to make us all ashamed.

I beg this House to believe, and I trust, Sir, that you at least will believe me, that I have tried as much as man might to keep the dignity of this House. I submitted last Session, and the Session before, to have things said against me without one word of reply, because having had your good counsel, I felt it might provoke discussion upon matters which this House would willingly not have speech upon, and that I had far better rest under some slight stigma than occupy the House with my personality. I appeal to the recollection of every member of the

House whether from the moment of my entering into it I did not utterly disregard everything that took place prior to my coming into it, and direct myself to the business for which my constituents sent me here.

The most extraordinary statements are made as to my views, statements as inaccurate as those which have fallen, no doubt unconsciously, from the hon. member who has last addressed the House. One noble lord in a great London gathering convoked against me—a gathering which was not as successful as some that have taken place in my favor—denounced me as a Socialist. I do not happen to be one. I happen to think that Socialists are the most unwise and illogical people you can happen to meet. But the noble lord knew that I ought to be something. (Laughter.) I am a red rag to a wild Conservative bull, and it must rush at me and call me Socialist.

I ask this House to be more fair and just. If I am to be tried, at least let me be tried for the opinions I hold and the views I express. Why, there are members who have soiled their tongues with words about social relations and marriage for which I have no proper reply in this House, as unfortunately the forms of the House do not permit me to use the only fitting answer, and perhaps it is as well. But I ask the House, Do not let this be the kind of weapon with which a return is met. Deal with me as the law directs, and in no other way. It is said "You have brought this upon yourself". ('Hear, hear.') One baronet who has spoken of me with a kindness more than I deserve, in the very borough which I represent, said I had brought it upon myself, because when I originally came to the House I flaunted and most ostentatiously put my opinion upon the House. ('Hear, hear.') Well, not one word of that is true. Not a shadow of it is true. I hold in my hand the sworn evidence of Sir Erskine May. I do not ask gentlemen to take my word, for it is clear they will not, but that of their own officer. And when the right hon. baronet said I claimed under the statute, and drew an inference from it, he knows that my claim contained no such words, until the clerk at the table of the House challenged me as to the law under which I claimed. I do not quarrel with him, but I submit that the clerk of the House had

no right to put that question to me. I submit that the House had nothing whatever to do with it—that it certainly is no ostentatious flaunting by me. I submit that, at any rate, it is prior to the 9th of April, 1881, and the House has no right to revive it against me.

I ask the House to try and deal with me with some show of fairness. They will find that when I was before the Committee, instead of obtruding my opinions, I said I had never directly or indirectly obtruded upon the House any of my utterances or publications upon any subject whatever; and when pressed by one of the members sitting on that (the Opposition) side of the House as to certain opinions I was supposed to hold, by asking me particular words I was supposed to have used in a judicial proceeding, I said that if the Committee wished I would answer, but that I objected to answer, because I had carefully refrained from saying any word which would bring my opinions before the House. I therefore ask the House whether it is not monstrously unfair to say that I have obtruded any opinions here when I have expressly, carefully, and thoroughly kept them from the House? But it is said by the right hon. baronet that it would be a profanation to allow me to take the oath, and that the House would be no party to such a profanation. (Opposition cheers.) Does the House mean that it is a party to each oath taken? ('Hear.') There was a time when most clearly it was not so a party. There was a time when the oath was not even taken in the presence of members at all. But does the House mean it is a party now? Was it a party the Session before last? Was it a party when Mr. Hall walked up to that table, cheered by members on the other side who knew his seat was won by deliberate bribery? (Loud Opposition cries of 'Order'.) Bribery sought to be concealed by the most corrupt perjury. Did the House join in it? (Renewed cries of 'Order'.) If the House did not join in it, why did you cheer so that the words of the oath were drowned? But was the House a party when John Stuart Mill sat in this House? ('Hear'; 'No'.)

A member who is, I think, now within the walls of the House—the hon. member for Greenwich—in addressing his constituents, said that Mr. Bradlaugh's opinions were hardly

more objectionable than those of some other members of the House. If the hon. member knew that, then he was a party to the profanation of the oath; but perhaps they were on his own side, and he did not feel the profanation so acutely. ('Hear, hear,' and laughter.)

But it is said, "Our real objection is that you have declared that the oath is not binding upon you". ('Hear, hear,' from Mr. Alderman Fowler.) That is exactly the opposite of what I did declare. The hon. member whose voice I hear now, I unfortunately heard on the 3rd of August, and heard so that I shall never forget it. (Mr. Bradlaugh here looked towards Alderman Fowler and paused.) The hon. member admits that is the point—that I have declared the oath is not binding upon my conscience; but, unfortunately, all the print goes the other way. I am asked by the Committee who sat as to whether the oath is binding, and on page 15 I reply: "Any form that I went through, any oath that I took, I shall regard as binding upon my conscience in the fullest degree; and I would go through no form and take no oath, unless I meant it to be so binding". Again, I am asked as to the word "swear". I say: "I consider when I take an oath it is binding upon my honor and upon my conscience"; and with reference to the words of asseveration to which the hon. member for North Warwickshire referred, he would at least have been more generous towards myself, if generosity be possible with him, if he had said: "I desire to add—and I do this most solemnly and unreservedly—that the taking, and subscribing, and repeating these words of asseveration will in no degree weaken the binding effect of the oath upon my conscience".

I say here, Sir, before you, with all the solemnity man can command, that I know the words of the oath the statute requires me to take; that I am ready to take that oath according to law; and that I will not take an oath without intending it to be binding upon me; and that if I do take the oath it will be binding upon my honor and conscience. (Conservative cries of 'Oh! oh!') Members of the House who are ignorant of what is honor and conscience—(Loud cries of 'Order', 'Oh, oh', and 'Withdraw', from the Opposition.) If members

will allow me to finish my sentence——(Cries of 'Withdraw'.) Members of this House who are ignorant of what is ——(Renewed cries from the Opposition of 'Withdraw'.) These (Mr. Bradlaugh pointing to the Opposition benches) are my judges! Members of this House who are ignorant of what is the honor and conscience of the man who stands before them —('Oh', and laughter from the Opposition)—have a right to shout 'Withdraw'; but they must beware lest a greater voice outside—('Oh, oh', and laughter from the Opposition)—at the ballot-box, where it has a right to express it, may not only say 'withdraw', but make withdraw all those who infringe the constitutional rights of the nation, as they seek to infringe them now. If I knew any kind of word which might convince members whom I desire to convince that I would take no pledge that I did not mean to be binding, I would use that form of words. But I have found myself so harshly judged, so unfairly dealt with, that one feels a difficulty in understanding whether any form of words, however often repeated, would convey any kind of conviction to some minds.

I presume that this House will repeat its vote of April 26th. What then? Will it have the courage of its opinions, and vacate my seat? ('Hear, hear.') If it does not, this House leaves me in an unfair position before the law. I am bound to come to this table, and will come to this table, as long as the mandate of my constituents sends me here, unless the House vacates the seat. If my seat be vacated, it is my duty to bow to the House, and appeal to my constituents again; and then the verdict rests with them. But to take away part of the right, and deal with it in this fashion, leaving me with the full legal responsibility and no kind of legal authority, I submit is not generous. Well, will this House repeat its vote of 9th May? Will it substitute force for law? At present the law is on my side. ('No, no,' and 'hear, hear'.) If not, let me sit and sue me. ('Hear, hear.') If not, try by petition. If not, bring an action. But shouting 'No' won't decide the law, even with the united wisdom of the members of this House who shout it.

I know that no man is a good advocate for a great principle unless he himself be worthy of the principle he advocates; and I

have felt acutely the judgment properly passed upon me by many members of this House, who, knowing their superiority to me, say how unworthy I am that this question should be fought in my person. I admit I am unworthy, but it is not my fault that I have this fight to make. I remind you of the words of one of the greatest statesmen who sat in this House more than a hundred years ago, that whenever an infringement of the constitutional right was attempted, it was always attempted in the person of some obnoxious man. ('Hear, hear.')

I ask the House for a moment to carry its mind to the 3rd of August last. I do that because either I do not understand what took place then, or my memory has failed me, as the memory of other hon. members sometimes does, or things happened without my consciousness. I thought I had stood aside until Parliament had dealt with the pressing business of the nation. I thought that had been recognised by this House. I thought I only came saying at the very door of the House that I was ready to obey its lawful orders; and I thought I was then seized by force while saying it. My memory may not serve me well on that, but I think it does. There were plenty of witnesses to the scene. I saw one hon. member climb on to a pedestal to see how fourteen men could struggle with one. It was hardly generous, hardly brave, hardly worthy of the great House of Commons, that those sending out to the whole world lessons of freedom, liberty, and law, should so infringe and so stamp them under foot. I had no remedy in any court, or I would have taken it. With all respect to you, Sir, and the officers of this House, if there had been any possibility of trying at law against the mighty privilege of this House, I would have appealed to that possibility.

Let me now, before I finish, ask the ear of the House for one moment. It is said it is the oath and not the man; but others, more frank, say it is the man and not the oath. Is it the oath and not the man? I am ready to stand aside, say for four or five weeks, without coming to that table, if the House within that time, or within such time as its great needs may demand, will discuss whether an Affirmation Bill shall pass or not. I want to obey the law, and I tell you how I might meet the

House still further, if the House will pardon me for seeming to advise it. Hon. members have said that would be a Bradlaugh Relief Bill. ('Hear, hear.') Bradlaugh is more proud than you are. ('Hear, hear.') Let the Bill pass without applying to elections that have taken place previously, and I will undertake not to claim my seat, and when the Bill has passed I will apply for the Chiltern Hundreds. (Cheers.) I have no fear. If I am not fit for my constituents, they shall dismiss me, but you never shall. The grave alone shall make me yield. ('Hear, hear,' and 'Oh'.)

Fourth Speech: May 4th, 1883.

Mr. Speaker,—With the indulgence of the House, I desire to submit a very few words in support of my right to take the oath and my seat pursuant to my return. I was elected on the 4th of March of last year, and since that election I have not presented myself for the purpose of taking my seat. The House, after my election, expressed its pleasure that I should not be permitted to obey the law that Session; and this Session the House has been engaged in considering a measure which, if it had passed, would have been a measure which would have rendered it possible, supposing my constituents to have re-elected me, for me to have taken my seat on affirmation. Last night the House felt it right to reject that measure, and now it is my duty to do what the law requires of me, and I ask the indulgence of the members who are hostile to me in the few words which it is my unpleasant duty to address to them.

I ask that indulgence because my position for some time has been one of considerable pain. By the privilege of an unsworn member, I have been within hearing of everything that has taken place in this House; but by the practice of the House I have been precluded from offering the smallest dissent to any phrase, however severe; to any insinuation, however

harsh; to any charge, however much I think it false. My constituents have a right to the voice and speech of two representatives in this House. (Cheers.) That is their unquestionable right. They have chosen me three times in this Parliament to be one of their burgesses; and if I were as vile as some of the members have chosen to describe me, if that vileness imposes no legal disqualification, no one within these walls has a right to challenge the return of my constituents. (Ministerial cheers.) The law requires me to take my seat; it imposes a penalty upon me if I do not take my seat; it gives me privileges which I ought to enjoy while I hold unchallenged this certificate of return; and here I ask whether there ought to be any hindrance between the returned of a constituency, the duty which the law imposes upon him to perform, and the services which his constituents have a right to demand; and I submit that any hindrance which is not justified by law is an act which in itself is flagrantly wrong, whoever may commit it; and that the mere fact that a majority of voices in one Chamber may prevent a citizen from appealing to the law in no sense lessens the iniquity of the illegal act; and that history will so judge it, whatever to-day you may think it your right and your duty to do. ('Hear, hear.')

I listened, Sir, with pain to one dangerous doctrine that was put forward against my admission: viz., that Parliament recognises no rights but its own; and that it never treated those claims—that is, those of the electors of Northampton—for electoral or representative concessions as rights; and that it had always regarded them as high and valuable privileges which it was in its power to withhold or bestow; and that it had never been guided by any other principle than expediency or policy. I submit that that doctrine is treason to the Constitution of England. (Cheers from the Ministerialists.) I submit that the suffrage is a right; and in the famous case of Ashby *v.* White it was decided by the highest courts of judicature in the realm that the suffrage is not a privilege, but a right. And I submit that, while it is true that Parliament has a right to take away, negate, or destroy the right of any citizen in this country, yet that one Chamber is not Parliament, and that neither House,

by its mere resolution, may override, negate, or suspend a law; and although you may have the right of force, that is a bad right to put against the right of the law. (Cheers. Some dissent being expressed by Irish members, Mr. Bradlaugh turned to them and said:) I can only thank the courtesy of the members who interrupt me on my right—(several voices: 'Left') —for their consideration for me in the difficult position in which I am placed; and I will ask the indulgence of the House while I put one or two words of explanation as to matters which have been prominently urged as reason why I should not sit.

It is said, first, that I am a candidate of the Government, put forward by the Government. Surely, if that were true, it would be no great objection in the way of my return; but there is not a particle of truth in it. I stood in 1868 for Northampton to fight the seat of Lord Henley. The present Prime Minister on that occasion thought it his duty to oppose my election, and wrote a letter, against which I then thought I had fair ground of complaint, advising the people of Northampton to return the two sitting members, Lord Henley and Mr. Charles Gilpin. I have never had, directly or indirectly, the smallest aid or assistance from either the present Prime Minister or from any member of the Government, or, to my knowledge, from any member of the Liberal party, in any of the elections I have fought in that borough—('hear, hear')—and when the hon. member who has thought it his duty to come into unfortunate collision with me elsewhere (Mr. Newdegate, who expressed dissent) chooses to contradict that, he contradicts it without the smallest knowledge of the facts. With reference to the allegation made by the right hon. baronet the member for South-West Lancashire (Sir R. Cross), that the late Mr. Adam had in some fashion recommended me to the electors of Northampton, there is not the faintest shadow of foundation for that. I never held the smallest communication, direct or indirect, of any character whatever with Mr. Adam, or with anyone on his behalf, until in this House, in his official position as Commissioner of Works, it was my duty to address questions to him on behalf of my constituents. With that exception, I never had the smallest connexion, direct or indirect, with Mr. Adam or with any mem-

ber of the Government; and to my belief—perhaps it may be incorrect—I have always regarded the Liberal party as standing in the way of my election, rather than as in any way helping my return. (Cheers.) This, however, I submit, was matter unworthy of this House. No such consideration has ever entered at any time into the discussion of any other candidature. ('Hear, hear.') I submit that a great House, which claims the powers of one of the highest courts of these realms, should try to be judicial. (Cheers.)

Then it is said that all that has happened I have brought on myself; that it is not the opinions which were alleged against me, but, to use the words of more than one right hon. and hon. member, the offensive way in which, at the table of the House, I paraded my views, and threw down the gauntlet in the face of the House. There is not a shadow of foundation for that allegation. (Cheers.) The only way in which it is attempted to support the allegation is by saying that, when at the table of the House, and when in writing I claimed to affirm, giving no reasons whatever in support of that, and when thereupon asked under what law I claimed to affirm, I named the statutes; then it is said that that was a declaration of Atheism. But it is not true, and no person with the smallest acquaintance with the law should make such a declaration; though I think that I heard a right hon. and learned gentleman commit himself to the statement that none but Atheists could affirm under the Evidence Amendment Acts, 1869 and 1870. That is not so. By the law prior to the passing of those Acts, any Theist who did not believe in future rewards or punishments was one of those who were not competent to give evidence on oath, who might have been objected to as incompetent, and who became competent to affirm under those statutes. Therefore there was no declaration of Atheism involved in what was said at the table, and no member has a right to examine my opinions. (Cheers.) I have never uttered them in this House. Under great temptation I have refrained from saying a word which could wound the feelings of the most religious, although I have heard within these walls within but a few hours language used by one who had declared his religion which I should have felt ashamed to use in any

decent assembly.[1] (Cheers.) Nothing of my opinions was communicated to this House until the Committee which examined me before it asked whether I had written a certain letter to the *Times*—and it has been stated over and over again on both sides of the House that any declaration in the *Times*, or any declaration outside these walls, is a matter with which Parliament has no concern; but when the Committee insisted I gave way, for I had no desire to be a hypocrite or to conceal my real convictions. I had put, I hope as respectfully as man could put, what I thought a fair reason for the line I took; and although I believe that it was a matter which the House had no right to deal with—entirely without its province—yet when the Committee pressed me upon it I believed that I was dealing with generous English gentlemen, who would not distort what they had asked for into a declaration that I had paraded it at the table of the House. ('Hear, hear.') I had to sit with pain while reckless charges, probably supplied to members by persons not having the responsibility of a seat in this House, have sounded in my ears; and I heard two right hon. members and several hon. members quote against me during this week letters as of "An Avowed Atheist", as expressing my opinions on religion and on family life. They were quoted against me on the 1st and the 3rd of May, although on the 26th of April, in the paper in which these letters were printed, there appeared a declaration that they were not written by an avowed Atheist at all, but by a professing Christian, for the purpose of injuring me and preventing my candidature; and I ask the House whether this is a loyal and brave way to deal with a man who has no right of speech until too late to remedy the wrong done. ('Hear, hear.')

Members have been industrious in reading all the things I have ever written, and many I have not written. One hon. member, the hon. member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Ritchie), read to this House phrases which when he read them I could

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[1] This referred to some exceedingly filthy and blasphemous language used by Philip Callan, M.P., in the presence and hearing of the Right Hon. Lord R. Grosvenor and other members.

not remember, but which I knew it was impossible that I could have used in the way they were put, because they would have been fatal to the candidature I desired to preserve in Northampton. What do I find? I find that instead of its being in any matter, or happening in any fashion, in connexion with these contests, a portion of a speech attributed to me in a report fifteen years ago has been taken, although at the top of the very paragraph from which the hon. member quoted I find that there is a declaration that I am in no way responsible for what appears in the report. Surely it would have been generous to have said that; it would have been fair to have said that; it would have been just to have said that. (Cheers.) I do not pretend that in everything I have said I have never deserved the blame of this House; but there is a great difference between things deserving blame, and twisting and distorting every phrase to make groundwork for the heaviest punishment that can fall upon a man who desires to serve the constituency which elected him to represent it in this House. ('Hear, hear.')

Then I heard that I had been convicted of circulating a filthy book, and had escaped only by a legal quibble the punishment it was said I deserved. The hon. member who thought it right to say that in this House, might have said that the learned judge who tried me—whose gravestone will perhaps protect him from the charges and insinuations which have been heaped upon the other judges who have had the misfortune to do me justice—(cheers)—the late Lord Chief Justice Cockburn, said: "That the defendants honestly believe that the evils that this work would remedy, arising from over-population and poverty, are so great that these checks may be resorted to as a remedy for the evils, and as bettering the condition of humanity, although there might be things to be avoided, if it were possible to avoid them, and yet remedy the evils which they are to prevent—that such is the honest opinion of the defendants, we, who have read the book, and who have heard what they have said, must do them the justice of believing". Is that the language which one of England's greatest judges would use if he had before him a man charged with circulating a filthy book? And the jury who found me guilty in their verdict

said: "We entirely exonerate the defendants from any corrupt motive in publishing it". ('Hear, hear.') Surely when foul words of condemnation come, a generous and strong opponent would have at least said this on the other side, so that the House might know how far the condemnation was warranted.

I will say no more personally save this: Members who have said that I attacked marriage, that I attacked the family, cannot have read what I have said on either subject. I have never in my life attacked either. Members who charge me with Socialism and Communism are ignorant of the whole history of my life, and of the whole political strife in which I have been engaged. ('Hear, Hear.')

But all these, although they were as true as they are false, give you no right to stand between me and my seat. (Ministerial cheers.) For I ask the House to be logical—(laughter)—I ask the House with all respect to be logical—though I do not doubt that it would be difficult for some members to get into that frame of mind which would enable them to be so. I would ask the House either to declare my seat vacant at once, or introduce a Bill rendering me incapable of sitting for any constituency. (Ministerial cheers.) Deprive me of all civil rights by law, and then I must submit, as better men before me had to submit, whom the Parliament of England attainted and outlawed; but while I have civil rights I will claim them. (Ministerial cheers.) If the law cannot give them to me—and perhaps it is better this House should be above the law—if the law cannot give them to me, then I can only try, wherever voice may go, to show that you, the High Court of Parliament, greater than the law, have trampled on the law—(Ministerial cheers and counter cheers) —and at least try at the hustings and in the ballot-box, when the time comes, that the people whom you say are on your side shall decide, as it is their lawful right to do. (Ministerial cheers.)

I heard a strange phrase from a noble lord, that both sides had gone too far to recede. The House honors me too much in putting me on one side and itself on the other. The House, being strong, should be generous. The strong can recede, the generous can give; but the constituents have a right to more than generosity—they have a right to justice.

(Ministerial cheers.) The law gives me my seat. In the name of the law I ask for it. (Ministerial cheers.) I regret that my personality overshadows the principles involved in this great struggle; but I would ask those who have touched my life, not knowing it, who have found for me vices which I do not remember in the memory of my life, I would ask them whether all can afford to cast the first stone—(Ministerial cheers)—whether, condemning me for my unworthiness, then that, as just judges, they will vacate their own seats, having deprived my constituents of their right here to mine. (Loud Ministerial cheers.)

INDIA:

HOW WE OBTAINED IT; HOW WE HAVE RULED IT; AND HOW IT SHOULD BE RULED.

Delivered at the Town Hall, Northampton, November 19th, 1883.

Friends, when I was invited to deliver the annual lecture in aid of the Infirmary, I thought I might do that which would be useful work in taking a subject upon which there is much misinformation and very much misrepresentation. I take this subject really in view of the discussion on the Ilbert Bill; but there is so little known among the general public as to our relations with India that I thought you would permit me to roughly sketch our past connexion with it, and show you what seem to me to be our responsibilities in relation to it.

I am of opinion that we have obtained our authority in India in a great part by means of which we ought to be heartily ashamed. And I think if we continue to govern India there is the weightiest duty upon every Englishman and Englishwoman to take care that the despotic authority of England shall be used as much as it can be to redeem our past and to make our Indian fellow-citizens desirous of being governed by us. Conservative speakers seem to hold a different view. They hold the view that was put forward by Lord Ellenborough in the House of Lords many years ago. He said then: "Our very existence in India depended upon the exclusion of the Natives from military and political power. We have won the Empire of India by the sword, and we must preserve it by the same means." I say that that is a shameful doctrine. I say that is a doctrine which no Englishman, to whatever party he may belong, ought to pro-

pound: and, although my views are well known, I desire to-night not to treat this question in a party spirit. I desire to appeal to Conservatives as well as to Liberals, to Radicals as well as to Liberals and Conservatives, and to urge upon them that there is the common duty of trying to deal with the immense mass of the people of India, so that our Government, if it must continue, shall produce as little misery as may be humanly possible, and as much benefit as we can possibly contrive for them.

I am sorry I did not provide such a map of India for you as could be seen through this hall, because the very appearance of India has something in it of such immensity compared with our own small island, as at once to make us wonder how a handful of Europeans should ever have acquired such authority over that enormous tract of country. It is a pear-shaped triangle. Its northern base, so to speak, if you turn it upside down, is the famous Himalayan range. On its western side it is bounded by the Arabian Sea; and on a great portion of its Eastern side, and on the South East, by the Bay of Bengal. Its apex is the famous Cape Cormorin, a sort of pear-shaped curve, which completes the triangle. Its length and breadth in its widest part are curiously almost the same, namely nearly 1,900 miles; and when you consider that that represents a space of something like one and a half millions of square miles, you will form some idea of the enormous extent of territory with which we have to deal. At the census of 1881 that contained nearly 254 millions of human beings, of whom 198,790,853 were under direct British rule, and the others were in those Native States which are subject to England and which are called mediatised States—States regarded as feudatory to England. So that we have 254 millions of Hindu population—when I say Hindu population I am not using the word in its religious sense, but simply in its geographical sense, to designate the native population. We have as against that, in the same territory, 89,798 British-born subjects, men and women. Deducting the army, which consists of 55,808, we have 33,990 of British subjects controlling the welfare of these 254,000,000. And I would put to you at once that if there were equality of interest, if you had

to measure the desires of the 33,000 against 254,000,000, we should be bound to pay the greatest attention to the wants and needs of the 254,000,000, and, if necessary, to disregard very much the desires of the 33,000—when we remember that they have gone to a foreign land for their own benefit, and the others are there already in the land of their birth, where we are only by right of conquest.

I hope you won't think me wearisome if I trouble you with one or two figures of facts. I know they are always tiresome, but I will make them as interesting as I can. The total expenditure of India for 1882 was £71,113,079. That expenditure has increased 16¼ millions in ten years. Now, when you remember that, by over-taxation, famine has resulted in several districts—that the population, the native population, have had no voice, except such small voice as I shall show presently, in relation to that taxation—I put it to you that a gross increase of 16¼ millions in ten years either has to be justified by great improvement for the country, or, when we are making subscriptions in aid of starved inhabitants of Hindustan, we ought to consider whether we have helped to starve them first by the pressure we have put upon them. Not only has taxation increased, but so also has the debt. The total debt of India in 1882 was £156,820,614. That debt has increased no less than 15½ millions in ten years; and it has increased 104 millions since the Crown assumed the Government in 1857. It is right that I should say with reference to the increase in 1857 that there was, as I shall have occasion to mention to you presently, an increase of no less than 40 millions of debt in four years in connexion with the Mutiny and its suppression. But let me urge to you that this Indian debt is one we cannot afford to disregard in this country. In the event of any insurrection having a permanent character, that debt having been contracted under English authority, the English taxpayer would have either to pay it or repudiate it.

I won't, till I come to the end of my lecture, discuss further the probabilities involved there. But I will mention to you that which most of you will know, that until 1858 our relation with Hindustan was only in connexion with the East India Com-

pany, a Company which went there simply to make money. Since then we have governed India under what is called the government of the Governor-General in Council, and that is the government of seven persons alone—the Government of Lord Ripon, or whoever may be the Viceroy, and six gentlemen whom I will describe to you. For all purposes, save one, they are supreme. For all purposes, save one, every order they make is an order against which there is only one appeal, namely to public opinion in this country. And I am sorry to say that that is an appeal which is very little likely to be availing, for English people have not paid the attention they ought to have done to India, either in Parliament or out of Parliament. I have seen Indian matters discussed with twenty men languidly sitting or reclining on the benches of the House of Commons. And I have not found amongst the people of England any great interest taken in what may have been the nature of the debate. Yet I ask you, you who rule 254 millions of people, you whose rule, if it be bad, to them may mean crime and disaster—I ask you, of whatever party you are, of whatever religion you are—have you the right to be indifferent to the happiness or misery of 254 millions of people whose destinies you control without appeal? Your judgment being final upon it, I ask, Are you not bound to consider every question that arises, and to influence the decisions that may be come to? (Loud cheers.)

Now, the Governor-General in Council has six for his ordinary Council: one for Finance, one for Legislative matters—and at the present moment the Legislative member is at any rate well-known in England, that is Mr. C. P. Ilbert, whose name is identified with the Bill with which I shall presently have to deal—one for Military matters, one for Public Works, and two members of the Council who divide between them the departments which in this country would figure as Home Office, Post Office, Trade, Education, and Local Government. Now for all purposes, save one, they are supreme. For new legislation they are not. For new legislation the statute requires that every time they legislate there must be summoned not less than eight and not more than twelve additional members, of whom not more than half are to be official: half may be non-official.

And, in addition, wherever the Council may be sitting, that is, whether it be sitting in the Presidency of Bombay, Bengal, or Madras, the Lieutenant-Governor and the Advocate-General of the Presidency where it sits are also invited to those Legislative Councils. So you have twenty members of the Legislative Council, of whom four are now natives, who sit when matters of legislation are brought forward.

There is one thing one ought to say to the credit of Lord Ripon, and that is, for the first time in the history of India, knowing that the Bengal Rent Bill would be one of the matters on which the Council would have to legislate, his lordship has consulted the large associations in Bengal interested in the question as to the man they would like to have nominated to sit on the Council to speak on their behalf. (Cheers.) I only hope this may be only one specimen of wise direction on that subject.

Now, if you please, I want to say a word to our Conservative friends. I want to express my intense regret that any question affecting Indian rule should be made a matter of party cry and party politics. We ought to forget the parties to which we belong in dealing with Indian questions. We ought only to ask ourselves, Is the measure for the advantage of the people of Hindustan? We ought not to ask who introduced it. We ought not to ask who supports it. We ought not to ask which Government brings forward the measure. We ought only to ask, Is it a measure which is just, humane, wise and generous? And then each party should give it their support without reference to who may be Prime Minister, or who the legislative officer who brings it forward. The danger of making Indian questions matters of party cry is this. If the Tory cry now succeeds—I won't say the Tory cry, but the cry put forward by men like the Hon. Edward Stanhope, by men like the Rt. Hon. James Lowther—(ironical laughter and hisses)—if the cry is to be maintained that we are a dominant race, that we won India by the sword and that we are to keep it by the sword, then remember the answer that may come to that cry. The Sikh people may say: "We can fight as well as you. We were loyal during the Mutiny, when nearly all your rule was swept away. We stood by you in the hour of danger. Our swords

have been drawn in your defence." Others may say: "Our regiments have come to Egypt and to Europe at your beck and call; you can no longer rule us by force as you did, because the enterprise and knowledge of the West which belonged to you has been made more common to the world by education, by telegraphs, by steam, by the thousand facilities which civilisation to-day puts at the service of the weakest". And they may say: "If you rely on force, then we will reply by force, unless you treat us so that we may love you, unless you make it so that it is our interest to be with you. If you continually teach us that we are slave and you are master, that we are down and you are up; if you continually teach us that, then we may draw the sword when you are weakest, and our millions will crush your thousands, as they must."

I don't think that the people of Hindustan desire to quarrel with us. I believe that the best educated Hindus, and I have had some opportunity of judging during the last twenty years, are sensible that in the Western world there are resources and traditions which they have not, which will benefit them: and I believe that they desire to work with us. But there is much dissatisfaction in Hindustan. Just think for a moment. Before a native can be a civil servant, before he can occupy any one of the posts which the English Government can give, he must come over to this country to be examined, on the mere risk that he may pass an examination which is not easy even for Englishmen. He has to be examined in English. Look at the cost of such a long journey. Look at the waste of time in such a long journey. Look at the fact that if he be a Hindu he loses caste entirely, and, if he fail, he is entirely an outcast from his own home and people. I say it is a shameful thing. If there are to be competitive examinations for Civil Service, and I think it wise and right there should be, then the candidates should be examined in Calcutta, Bombay, or Madras. Why should they be obliged to cross the ocean? It is a journey none of them ought to be forced to take as a condition of entering Government service. We ought to hold out facilities for competitive examinations, and not raise these great obstacles —we ought to hold out every inducement to natives to become

servants of the Government, if we want to keep our rule in India. Thirty-three thousand cannot hold 254 millions in check; and I put it to you that this matter of Civil Service Reform is one that will have to be dealt with.

But I must follow the line marked out by the title of my lecture. I begin it by saying how we obtained our rule in India. And I say without fear of contradiction that our past in India has been so shameful, so tainted with crime or marked with dishonor, that if it were the history of any other people, every English orator on every platform would denounce it with the strongest words of castigation and shame. We went there very early in the 17th century—perhaps a little to the end of the 16th century. But we are traceable there early in the 17th. The Portuguese and Dutch had gone there before us. The French were rivals with us. We all wanted to trade, but the Portuguese and Dutch were weaker than we, and therefore we immediately came to the conclusion that they had no right to trade there. At first the French were stronger than we, and therefore we made a distinction. The Portuguese and Dutch being the weakest, we arrived at the conclusion that they were pirates. We could not permit such a clashing with British interests; and as they wickedly persisted in trading to places they had been abominable enough to find out before we did, we burned their ships and hanged their crews, and gradually they left off their iniquities.

At first we only went there as simple traders, and in 1613 the East India Company begged leave of the ruler of that part of the territory on the gulf of Cambay, which is now within the Bombay Presidency, to erect a British station at Surat; and directly afterwards they obtained permission to establish another station a little to the north of that at Cambay; and directly after that at Ahmenabad. But these were only factories or shops. We did not claim any right to be there, and paid tribute or rent for the right to have our factories there. Three years after that we came down to the South East, and there we got leave to establish a station at Masulipatam, or rather more East than North East of what is now Madras. About the same time we got leave to establish another station at Calicut,

on the West, almost on a line with Masulipatam. And then —we began to feel our feet.

At first we only asked rulers whether we might have jurisdiction over our own servants; and the rulers granted that, with strict provision that it was not to go any further. Then we found out that we had a great deal of valuable property, and we asked leave to erect Fort St. George, just by what is now Madras; and then, when we began to fortify, we proceeded to kill. We did not kill the inhabitants of the country—they were too strong as yet; but we killed the Portuguese, and we killed the Dutch, and we made short work of them. We made it a rule to whip to death or starve to death the crews of every one of the vessels that was caught trading, declaring that they were pirates of the seas.

This encouraged us, and we began to think it was not worth while asking further leave. We began to take it. Up in the North of the Bay of Bengal, due east of what is now the City of Calcutta, but which then did not exist as a city, and on the coast, was a place called Chittagong. We tried to take it, and the people of Chittagong wickedly resisted. We burned one or two places on the coast, in order to show them that they ought to appreciate the advantages of civilisation which we brought them. We did not succeed, and about the end of the century we humbly petitioned for leave to have trading stations at the three villages of Chuttanatti, Govindpur, and Calcutta. Calcutta has grown from a village to a city since then. In 1742 we were strong enough to steal, and we stole. Perhaps I ought not to say that. I think it would be better to say that finding ourselves strong enough to give the advantages of the civilisation we possessed to the uneducated natives, we brought some of their territory within the benign influence of our rule.

I won't weary you with the stories of what Clive did. You will find them in Macaulay. I will hardly, except for one thing, trouble you with the story of Warren Hastings; but it is needful I should tell you something of that, or you may not comprehend what grievances India has against us. In 1780, Warren Hastings was impeached by the High Court

of Parliament in England, and the grounds of his impeachment which were proved in evidence were these—that he had been guilty of injustice, cruelty and treachery, in hiring British soldiers to extirpate the Rohillas. The Rohillas were the inhabitants of the province of Rohilcund, an agricultural people, with whom we had a solemn treaty of peace; a people who made no war on us, a people who wanted to make no war on us; and yet, for £20,000 in cash, paid to Warren Hastings, and £400,000 paid to the East India Company, British soldiers were hired out to a native Indian prince to devastate their country, burn their towns and villages, kill their people, and ravish their women. He was charged with cruelty to the Emperor Shah Alum, in withholding his tribute; with extortion and oppression in the case of the Rajah of Benares; with ill-treatment of the family of the Vizier of Oude; with improvidence and injustice in his policy towards Faruckabad. He was charged with reducing Oude from a garden to a desert. Think what it means to reduce a country far larger than our own from a garden to a desert—a densely-populated country. It means that people die of starvation in hundreds. It means that a state of things is produced, so horrible as to shock even those who take part in it, and so terrible in its horrors as to surpass the power of imagination to conceive. It means a state of things in which men, women and children are marked for misery, and shame, and death. I will only read you one or two extracts to point what I say. "The cattle were sold, tools pawned, seed-corn eaten, children offered for sale, till purchasers could not be found; and finally the Government were informed by subordinates that the living were known to prey upon the dead. Troops of famished peasants, worn and wan, came crowding into the towns, bringing with them pestilence in various forms, small-pox, dysentery, and fever, and spreading terror and dismay among rich men and rulers. Death did not heed being told to begone. Its carnival was come, and the ghastly revel was prolonged from week to week and from month to month, till the gravedigger was weary, and the jackal and vulture grew lazy and tame."

You may ask, what is the use of reviving these things of

one hundred years ago? I revive them because in 1879, when a Tory Government wanted to extract money from the North Western Provinces of India, when Sir George Coupar, our governor there, petitioned that the taxes should not be enforced, and told the Government that if they enforced them the people would be unable to cultivate their fields, the Government insisted upon their enforcement, and within a period of four months 250,000 people perished of starvation, and tens of thousands died, because the tax-gatherer had robbed them of the means of cultivating their fields.

I cannot go through the story of vice-royalty after vice-royalty. It is enough to say that it is one page after another of war and annexation. Every Viceroy who annexed territory had a step in the peerage. Every Viceroy who annexed territory figured amongst the grandees of our land. He had example. He knew that he should not be punished, for when Warren Hastings was impeached Lady Hastings brought diamonds to Queen Caroline, and King and Queen canvassed the peers for an acquittal.

This sort of thing ended in mutiny. "Greased cartridges" has been the story; but the annexations of Lord Dalhousie, the seizure of Oude, and other cases of territorial rapacity, were the real cause. The "greased cartridges" were but the spark; there would have been no explosion if the powder had not been already there. It is not that which lies on the immediate surface that unlooses revolution. The causes of each revolution grow in the miseries of the people for long generations, and the outbreak comes when you least expect it.

It is no part of my duty to-night to tell the terrible story of the Mutiny, or the more terrible story of its repression. If the Mutiny was wicked, our repression of it was cruel, murderous, and abominable. Nay, when Canning went there as Governor-General, from 1858 to 1862, because he tried to be just he was mocked with the title of "Clemency Canning", as though clemency were a shame, when in a judge clemency is the highest honor. Yet in the peerage of Canning his clemency will shine when the gems which he wore are forgotten.

I admit that the rulers of Hindustan have since then made

efforts at wise legislation. The Penal Act of 1860 and the Codes of Civil and Criminal Procedure of 1861 stand out as marks of that wisdom. But I will ask you to remember that the Hindus have to forget their history before they will love us. They have to forget the frauds, the perjuries, the villainies that have been perpetrated. They have to forget their burnt cities and their ruined homes. They have to forget the wrongs of their ancestors. And they have only now, if we want to hold them, the guarantees of the future; and unless we make that future full of brightness and of hope, unless we try to show that our professions of freedom are not a sham, unless we try to show that the civilisation of which we boast, and the benevolence which, in famine time, we so widely advertise, are not all false, not all a sham, we must show that we can be just and generous to these people.

Now the questions which will be dealt with by the Govern-General in Council, almost immediately, are important questions. There is the Bengal Rent Bill, the Local Government Bill, some measure in connexion with Civil Service Reform, and the Ilbert Bill.

I confine myself now particularly to the Ilbert Bill, because that is the question on which it is most needful to speak. And I ask first, What is this Ilbert Bill? Because I hold in my hand a memorial sent to me, as to every other member of Parliament, against that Bill. You will find the Ilbert Bill best explained, popularly, in a speech made last week at Bristol by Lord Northbrook. I shall use that speech, or some extracts from it, because Lord Northbrook speaks with the authority due to the words of one who himself has been Viceroy of India—from 1872 to 1876. I will ask those who attack Lord Northbrook to remember that he was honorable enough to give up what is probably nearly the highest office an Englishman can hold in the world—the position of controller of the destinies of 250 millions of human beings—rather than be guilty of a falsehood towards these people.

Lord Northbrook, speaking of this Bill, reminds those to whom he speaks that so long ago as 1833 the then responsible Minister in England, as against the East India Company, used

these words: "I wish it to be clearly understood that whatever may be the immediate regulations of the Governor-General and the India Council, no European shall enter India except upon the condition of being placed under the same laws and tribunals as the natives". There is nothing unfair in that. If you go to a foreign country for your own benefit, why should you have a superior position to the people who belong to that country and to whom that country belongs? You are an intruder there. The least you can do is to meet them on a footing of equality. And if you go as a conqueror and shelter yourself like a coward and a mean rascal behind the bayonets of the soldiery, then you have no claim on the sympathies of intelligent people. Lord Northbrook points out that in pursuance of this a law was passed by which Englishmen were made subject to all the civil laws of the country; and, at the present moment, Englishmen in all things over that one-and-a-half million square miles are subject to the Civil Judges, whether they be native or European. In addition to that, in all the cities of the Presidencies, Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, Englishmen were made also subject to the same Criminal Code and to the same Judges, whether they were native or whether they were European. I will ask you to remember that the bulk of these 33,000 people are precisely within the cities of Calcutta, of Bombay, and of Madras, that it is a small proportion of them only who are scattered through the country, and that proportion not the most creditable.

I hold here a Government Report, not a Report of a party character, but a Report made under the authority of Governments, both Conservative and Liberal; and I find that since railways have commenced, "mean whites" or European vagrants have begun to spread over the country, and are increasing in numbers, so that efforts have been made to grapple with this evil. This Report has not been made for the Ilbert Bill, for it was printed nine years before the Ilbert Bill was proposed. The gaols and workhouses have found in them too many of these European vagrants. But none of these have been subject to Criminal Law, because there was no European Judge; and, in order to get them tried, you had to send them to

the High Court of Madras, Calcutta, or Bombay. Often you could not transport the witnesses thither, and therefore there was a failure and miscarriage of justice.

The Ilbert Bill is to remedy this, to give the same jurisdiction outside the Presidency cities as exists inside. There is no damage done. The Englishman will still have a right of appeal. He may appeal to the Sessions Court or to the High Court. He may be tried by a jury, half of which shall be composed of Englishmen or Americans, in cases in which the law provides there shall be a jury; and there is no sort of pretence of any injustice at all. What are the objections? The objections are urged in this memorial. The objections are also urged not simply by wild Tory speakers at after-dinner banquets—they are also urged by a man whose words I desire to treat with the most profound respect—I mean Mr. Justice Stephen. Now Mr. Justice Stephen claims that the Ilbert Bill ought not to be accepted because it is the privilege of the European not to be tried by a Hindu. I deny that privilege. If an Englishman puts himself in contact with the Hindu, knowingly beforehand, he is bound to submit himself to the law and he has no right to privilege which prevents his crime from punishment.

The objections to the Bill are stated by Lord Northbrook; and before I refer to the memorial I will give Lord Northbrook's statement of them. First, that Englishmen in India are a dominant race, with right to be tried by their own countrymen only; secondly, that a change in the law is unnecessary; and, lastly, that for various reasons native judges are not to be trusted to try Englishmen. But, as a matter of fact, native judges have tried Englishmen ever since this English law which has been in existence nearly fifty years; and there have been no complaints of their injustice or unfairness. Curiously, it was one of the native magistrates who recently dealt with an important case in which religion was involved. It was a native Indian judge who dealt with the Salvation Army riots; and on that decision I have not heard any complaint that he was unjust or unfair. As a matter of fact, Jews, Mahometans, Parsees, men of every sort and creed, are tried without reference

to their creed, and there has been no pretence for saying that the law has been unfairly administered.

Now what does this memorial say? That is, the memorial of the Europeans who object to the Bill. "Not only are Europeans in the interior of the country isolated in the sense of being solitary units in the midst of tens of thousands of an alien race, but, by reason of difference of language, habits, and feelings, and the absence of common ties and sympathies, they are also morally and socially isolated from the natives around them." The people who have no sympathy with the natives amongst whom they go, should not go there; they should not go amongst them if they intend to regard them as an alien race. And if they go they have no right to ask us to protect them with the sword, because they do not choose to be sympathetic with the natives to whom it is their profit to go. I am afraid of being wearisome in putting this question—but I have to ask you when a memorial urges, as this memorial does, that there will be false charges, and that people will be unfairly tried—I have to ask if these things happen? There are false charges in every court in the world. But here justice has been administered by these very natives in the three most densely-populated cities, where most Englishmen have congregated, and there has been no such complaint.

Now, what is the character of the Hindus? And I take again this Report, which is a statement of the moral and material progress of India—a Government Report printed in 1874, and which is continued year by year. What does it say of the people? It says that, as a rule, they are "chaste, honest, peaceful, singularly docile, easily governed, and patient".

Why should we insult these people? I ask you who have made my poor words of service to the Infirmary by crowding this hall, I ask you—and I would have you forget the speaker in the sentiment I put—I ask you who really dislike me, or who are in any way against me—do not let these people feel that you intend to treat them always as a conquered race. If you do, they will despair of justice, and they will try revenge. If you hold them only by force they will break the fetters when they can, and strike back with the steel when the steel is in their

hands. The past we cannot change, but we may redeem it. The shame of yesterday exists, but we may make the glory of to-morrow so great that the people may forget the iniquity which preceded it. We cannot make glory by dominance. That is a brute doctrine, the doctrine of the days when men cased themselves in armor and pierced their way with steel. It is the school, the lessons of equal justice, interest, and love, that will win to-day.

I appeal to you to protest in favor of this Ilbert Bill as the measure of your desire to do justice to those whom you have wronged.

The Tories are talking in their meetings of a Mr. Atkin, or Atkins, who has come here to represent somebody. I received a strong letter from Madras last week asking me to assure every audience I addressed, or any people with whom I had influence, that he represented nobody but those who had paid him to do their official work. He does not represent the people. And if he did, the people who want you to rule by the sword don't deserve to be represented.

We don't want to rule India by the sword. We want to put before the people of India a future in which, if they will be patient, as they have been, they may climb, slowly it may be, but surely, to the fullest right of self-government, in course of time.

We know that India is populated with divers races, that, having broken up their old systems, they may not be able to climb to the fullest enjoyment of freedom at once. They may have to climb slowly and painfully, but that will give them the opportunity of making their way upward all the more surely. We will not shut the door in their face. If we are to rule these 250 millions of people at all, we must rule them not in the way in which we have gone to their country and taken possession of it, but in the way in which we should like to be ruled if it had been their people who had come and taken possession of our country.

I regret that it should be needful, before an audience speaking the tongue which pretends to be identified with the traditions of liberty, to make such an appeal; but it is needful. When we

find words of mocking go from such gatherings as the recent Conservative banquet at Wellingborough; when we find words of mocking go from a Conservative banquet at Bristol; when we are told that Mr. Gladstone wants to put the Englishman with his neck under the heel of the Hindu; I say either these men are uttering wild and mad things, that they do not think, or are uttering wicked things that they may provoke an echo from the other side. The Hindus have been brave enough to fight beside us, loyal enough to keep our rule. We, at least, owe them that, having taken their land with the strong hand, we shall hold it as gently as it is possible for human hand to hold.

CAPITAL AND LABOR.

Delivered at the Town Hall, Northampton, on January 7th, 1886.

There is probably no subject on which any man could be invited to speak more serious—not only in its actual influence, but in what must come from it during the next few years—than that of Capital and Labor. In old times the laborer was not reckoned at all, except perhaps as a superior sort of animal—a kind of conscious machine. He was never treated as a human being to be reasoned with. If any of you take up any of the old Roman books you find work and slavery not simply immediately connected, but both having nearly the same signification—in fact, in your language there is even yet preserved the evidence of that old slave notion. In connexion with all kinds of labor, the man who directed the labor was called master, the man who performed the labor was called servant; and the servant, or serf, or slave, or bond-man, was owned by his lord and master, owned as to life and to liberty—as to brain it was seldom considered.

During late years there has been a vast change; but Professor Thorold Rogers, in a volume—or rather two volumes—recently issued, entitled, "Six Centuries of Work and Wages", says that "the pauperism and degradation of the English laborer were the result of a series of Acts of Parliament and acts of government which were designed or adopted with the express purpose of compelling the laborer to work at the lowest rate of wages possible, and which succeeded at last in effecting that purpose". And if you look back to our old legislation you would be astounded: there were statutes directing that wage should not exceed this amount or that amount; there were

statutes making it crime to claim higher wages; there were statutes against combinations of workers, and the people were treated as dangerous—not as men, not as women, but as the lower classes—the dangerous classes, and the treatment sometimes made them so. Men who were not reckoned with as thinking human beings, sometimes, in times of despair, times of political excitement, times of starvation, times of anger, acted as though they were unthinking, wild, ferocious beasts. If you use the whip, the whipped one turns sometimes; if you use the fetter, when the fetter breaks there is no restraining influence on the hand; if you constantly drive by fear, if there is no outlet of hope, if there is no opportunity, no sort of break in the dark life, then when the day of mischief comes it is fearful. And in every country it has been so. In the past times the uprisings of the poor, the revolts of the slaves, the wars of the peasants, the revolution of the starved of France—and, coming to more modern times, the riots of the Blanketteers in Lancashire, and in various trades—these all were when men had no right of meeting, when such a meeting as this could not have been held, when the fact that a trades organisation convened a meeting for a man to address it on the relations between capital and labor would have been considered such an element of danger that the magistrates would have prevented it, the military would have been called in to disperse it, and the people who took part in planning it would have been prosecuted.

It is perfectly true, as Professor Thorold Rogers points out, that there have been great changes. Laws have been repealed. "The despotic law", he says, "of parochial settlement has been materially modified; working-men are no longer liable to imprisonment and penal servitude for trying to sell their labor at the best advantage; and the wages of labor are no longer mulcted by Corn Laws and other restraints of trade." But although that is true, many of the effects of old bad laws still remain.

Trades Unions, which have only had legal protection for comparatively the last few years, have not yet been able to grow into the exercise of the full moral control which I trust they will exercise

by-and-by. Take for example one of the latest classes of labor in which organisation has been attempted—I mean the agricultural laborers. If it had not been for the work of men like Joseph Arch and a number of others who have been associated with him, especially for the last fifteen or twenty years, the Franchise just acquired would have been simply a weapon for mischief rather than a tool for utility—simply a sword for mischief rather than a shield for defence. It would not have been, as it is in the hands of educated persons, the opportunity of delivering a verdict, the opportunity of exercising a judgment; it would only have been an opportunity for mischief, because the class had ever been oppressed and there did not seem a possibility of their redemption. But Mr. Arch has taught that class the advantages of organisation; he has taught them the advantages of education; he has taught them the advantages of sober, steady work for the deliverance of their fellows; and he has enabled them to play a part in the election which has just taken place which has won the admiration even of their foes by the judgment they have exercised.

In dealing with the relations of labor and capital, I occupy an exceedingly difficult position: I have no capital, and I have hardly the right, save that of sympathy, to speak for those who are ordinarily called those who live by labor—not that my life is ever free from labor, or that my day is ever an idle one—and I have the difficulty in trying to treat the subject impartially, as I hope I shall; fairly, as I trust I may; but with my sympathy with those of whom I was born, and to whom I belong—the poor of this land—I feel that I render myself open to criticism, open perhaps to reproach, from both sides. Those who own capital may fear my counsels as extravagant, and those who plead for labor may think me diffident and hesitating in the remedies I recommend; and yet I trust that all will do me this justice: that I shall not speak simply to please, that I shall not counsel simply to gain favor, and that the language I use is the language I have used for more than a quarter of a century of my life to those who have permitted me from time to time to address them on subjects of this character.

I take it then that by all reasonable men, the laborer is to-day reckoned with not as a servant, not as a mere serf or slave, but he is reckoned with as a person, who has his labor to sell, and who is entitled to make a fair bargain for that labor before the world; and there is neither inferiority nor superiority between the buyer of labor and the seller, so long as they are both honest; that the inferiority comes in when either tries to cheat. If, trade being good, if, profit being large, the owner of capital conceals the fact of his large profit and the goodness of his trade, in order to extort from the hungry seller of labor a hard bargain and a harsh contract, then that employer is lower than the laborer whom he cheats. If the laborer, having agreed to labor, having contracted to perform a duty, is idle, lazy, dishonest, fraudulent, then he is the lower, and he deserves the contempt and scorn of those whose labor he ruins by his dishonesty.

Unfortunately the purchaser of labor and the seller of labor do not meet on equal conditions. The laborer must sell his labor at a fair price or starve; the capitalist who does not buy his labor may live, sometimes comfortably, till better times come. Hunger cannot wait; if the man would, his wife cannot; if his wife would, the children cannot—there must be breakfast, there must be food, and hunger frightens often a weak man into having day by day less than he should have in his struggle of life.

I propose to enquire what are the rights of labor, what its duties; what the rights and privileges of capital, what the duties of those who possess it. I affirm that every laborer willing to work has the right to life: and by life I do not mean merely existence from day to day; I do not mean merely continuing on sufferance from to-day till to-morrow; I do not mean one constant round of toil that makes all life a gloomy cloud, and has no gleam of sunshine in it—I mean life, reasonable life, life with leisure in it, life with hope in it, life with relaxation in it, life with fair reasonable shelter, food, clothing, won by the wage-earner for himself, and for those of his family who are yet unable to win it—short enough hours of toil to give possibility of enjoyment for all, education for all, hope

for all; time sometimes for music, if music may be; time for looking at sculpture, if sculpture be near; time for pictures, if pictures be gathered in your public galleries; and if you tell me that music, poetry, sculpture, and painting are luxuries, I say they may be luxuries for the rich, but they should be necessaries for the poor, the gleams of sunshine softening life and making it worth living. How can you wonder at men being rough and brutal, whose life has nothing soft, cheering, or humanising in it? How can you wonder at men using rough words and coarse epithets, if no harmony comes into their daily life? How can you wonder at the surroundings of men being brutal, if you never show them the beautiful, or give them the opportunity of imparting their knowledge of it to those whom they rear around them?

In the report issued in 1875 by the Labor Bureau of Massachusetts the Chief Commissioner, Mr. Carrol D. Wright, a gentleman to whom labor is much indebted, says, in a report made by him under the Legislature to the Senate of Massachusetts: "It seems natural and just that a man's labor should be worth, and that his wages should be, as much as, with economy and prudence, will comfortably maintain himself and family, enable him to educate his children, and also to lay by enough for his decent support when his laboring powers have failed". If you tell me that in any country a laborer cannot win that much, then I say that must be a pitiful country, a country that ought not to be able to afford any Rothschilds, that ought not to be able to indulge in any wars, that ought not to be able to afford any costly generals, that ought not to waste any of its money in cannon, that ought to be economical in Royal grants, and sparing in the matter of pensions. I can understand that there may be countries where trade is so bad, where commerce is slack, where enterprise has been so crushed, that no kind of effort can bring anything in surplus over subsistence, but England, at any rate, is not one of those countries yet. And such an unhappy land should be the country where there are no great landlords; that should be the country where there were no enormous rent-rolls; that should be the country where no man could take huge royalties from mines and

minerals, and, being himself worth his hundreds of thousands, say that labor has too much, and is driving the trade away.

What are the rights of capital? For capital has rights. There are people who talk absolute nonsense, and say that capital should be given without interest and used without profit to the capitalist, and who talk of forcible revolution against the capitalist class. Those men are either enemies of the people, or they are idiots; they are either traitors to the people, or they are madmen. If you want to dig a field and you have no spade, if you can earn something by digging and some other one has that spade, you must pay for the loan and user of that spade. It is impossible that capital will enterprise itself to make you live more easily unless capital has some inducement.

What is capital? Sir Thomas Brassey, speaking at the Industrial Remuneration Conference—and I think that was a good sign: rich men and poor men, men with millions and men with nothing, met together in Piccadilly, London, in 1885, to discuss if it were possible to improve the relations between capital and labor. It is the first time that that ever was done in England. It should be done again and again, until working men and the people owning capital understand one another, so that lock-outs and strikes will be regarded as insanities of the past, and not weapons with which either should meet the other. Sir Thomas Brassey, speaking at the Industrial Remuneration Conference, speaking as a representative of capital, used these three phrases. He said: "(1) Abstinence from enjoyment is the only source of capital; (2) it is upon the increase of capital that advances of wages depend; (3) while labor is the vivifying principle which preserves capital from decay". Permit me to make one or two comments on the first and second parts of this proposition. While it is true that all capital arises from abstinence from enjoyment, it is not true that capital is to be found always, or mostly, in the hands of those who abstain. The enormous accumulations of capital in the hands of an Overstone, a Baring, a Rothschild, or Vanderbilt—these did not come by any stroke of wit: there is no fashion of striking one blow upon the rock and a stream of capital pouring out. This capital

represented pence there, shillings here, pounds there, which were the surplus which men created by their labor, beyond what those men had to live upon. If men could save amongst themselves, if men would knit their savings together amongst themselves for trade enterprises which they all understood, the capital and profit would pass into their hands. That will not come to-day nor to-morrow—and I will tell you why: you are not educated enough for that; you mistrust one another too much—not until men trust one another more—and that means until you are truer to one another, for you would not mistrust one another so much if you were all true to one another; it is because so many of you know that in the struggle of life, sometimes driven by hardship, I admit, you have pushed others out of your way, that you do not trust your fellows as much as you should.

The accumulations of produce, of labor, are capital. Those accumulations come into the hands of the crafty sometimes, the clever sometimes. Sometimes the crafty and the clever leave them to fools after them. But whoever may have the accumulated wealth, you cannot expect, if you have nothing but your labor, nothing but your muscle and sinew, that capital shall clothe you, feed you, while you are working, unless you pay capital something for it. Capital is entitled to fair profit and reasonable insurance against loss, and to hope for some prize for the capitalist in the struggle of life, or he would not make the endeavor. Men will not risk thousands in hazardous speculations, say, of mining or manufacture, hundreds of thousands in enterprises which may fail, unless they have some hope that they will gain some possible prizes.

The mistake that capital has made—and the mistake that labor has made too, but that capital made with its eyes open, and labor never having been permitted to see—was that they believed that the interests of capital and labor were hostile to one another, and the man who bought labor bought it as they buy pigs, except that he bought it to starve instead of to fatten. Wiser councils are prevailing, wiser thoughts are growing; it is beginning to be admitted that hostility between capital and labor is injurious to both, and it is beginning to be urged that

the best method for men to grow rich is to give the opportunity to those who make their riches of sharing some of the enjoyments that are accompanying the work they conduct. Unfortunately many employers of labor have deemed, and some still deem, that it is good policy to get labor too cheap. It is not, not even for them; for if you buy labor too cheap, that is, if you buy it so that it leaves the laborer no margin, if you buy so that the purchase involves poverty and hunger, what happens? That poverty you have to feed; you have unwholesome and dangerous employment; you have unhealthy and immoral dwellings; you have disease; and you have crime. Poverty, disease, and crime, cost more when they break out into mischief both to rich and poor than any possible advantage in the temporary bargain. I copied to-day from a report of the Agricultural Commission of 1867 some words written by the then Rev. John Fraser, whom many of you have since known as the Bishop of Manchester—whose death all regret, whether they are friend or foe to him, for he was a man who, although very ardent in his faith, although very bitter against those he disagreed with, was a good earnest true man, endeavoring to make life better for all, and devoting himself, according to his light, to the task of so making it. Now he, dealing with the Agricultural Laborer, said, speaking of some dwellings he visited: "Modesty must be an unknown virtue, decency an unimaginable thing, where in one small chamber, with the beds lying as thickly as they can be packed, father, mother, young men, lads, grown and growing-up girls—two and sometimes three generations—are herded promiscuously: where every operation of the toilette and of nature—dressings, undressings, births, deaths—is performed by each within the sight or hearing of all; where children of both sexes to as high an age as twelve or fourteen, or even more, occupy the same bed; where the whole atmosphere is sensual, and human nature is degraded into something below the level of the swine. It is a hideous picture; and the picture is drawn from life." That is what the Bishop of Manchester said in 1867. You may tell me, "That is 18 years ago". But there was a Commission on the Housing of the Poor, which reported during last year, and they said, not of

agricultural districts or country places, but of great cities, like Liverpool, like Manchester, like London itself, almost under the very shelter of palaces, close to warehouses where millions of pounds-worth of goods were stored, they said that in little rooms, in filthy alleys, that even now in London itself, you could find more than one family in one room, and several families in one house. There it is where typhoid comes, there it is where small-pox touches, there it is where fever rages; it is on the hungry, on the poor, on the miserable, that squalor and disease lay their foul touch; and the men who bought their labor too cheap, the men who exacted from them the sale in despair, pay in crime—these make the burglars, these the robbers in the streets; and the gaol and the poor-house stand as monuments to mark the crime of the nefarious transaction.

I am encouraged to hope because there has been a vast change in the last few years. Sir Thomas Brassey said: "It is in the highest degree desirable, as far as possible, to liberate industry from the deadening influence caused by the antagonism between capital and labor". Sir Thomas Brassey said that which Trades Union leaders had been assailed for saying. It was thought that there could be no hostility, that capital was so strong that it could ride over all; and in some countries it has. It has done it in Russia, it has done it in parts of Austria, it has done it in parts of Italy; and you have Socialism, internationalism, anarchism: the revolt of hunger, and the stiletto, dynamite, and other explosives. These are the results of ignorance, misery, poverty, and despair, breaking out of all control. The question is, how can capital and labor be reconciled: how far is the reconcilement possible?

Once the capitalist foolishly thought that an Act of Parliament would do his work, and enacted that a man should not do more than so much. You have only to read the story of it all in your own country in Thorold Rogers' "Six Centuries of Work and Wages". You read stories of battles, battles where generals lead, battles where men draw the sword; but any real history of the struggle of work for wages contains the narratives of battles more severe, more enduring, more full of

pain, more full of heroism too; battles where the men are working that men may live, not die; battles for their wives' lives, battles for their children's lives, battling with pick and bar, battling in the mine against fire-damp, gas, and water—the one blows them limb from limb, another stifles them, another drowns them. And the workers go, with the courage of despair, day by day down in the cage again, always facing death in this never-ceasing struggle for life; and these make the heroes out of whom the country grows.

I say that capital and labor may be reconciled by treating men fairly and reasonably on one side, and by the laborers knitting themselves together in the effort to try and treat others fairly and reasonably too. I will not disguise the difficulties; I know there are many; I know that when disputes arise, on the one side the employer thinks you are doing something unfair if you ask him how much profit he makes, and on the other you are not sufficiently careful sometimes when you think how little profit he may make. Sir Thomas Brassey—and you will pardon me quoting him so often, but it was a speech he made at the Industrial Conference, which has not been enough commented upon—said "The rate of profit in business is a subject of great importance to the laborer". That was perhaps the first time that that was so plainly admitted by a great employer of labor. The employers of labor have said, "You have no right to know our profits". The truth is that you have a right to know and the duty to submit. And what you have the right to say is: "But you have never told us your profits. We have seen some growing rich, and we thought all could; we have seen some have costly mansions, and we knew sometimes we had no carpet to our floors, and we cannot help noticing it." Sir Thomas Brassey says, "More or less, wages must follow the fluctuations in profits". Men say, "Yes, we are content with that, if they shall follow them upwards as well as downwards". "In many cases and in many trades", Sir Thomas Brassey says, "the want of correct information as to the profits realised by their employers constitutes a great difficulty as to workmen. They do not know when to press their demand, nor when to

acquiesce in reduction in the rate of remuneration for their labor."

Mr. Giffen, in an essay on the progress of the working classes during fifty years prior to 1883, points out that by the end of 1883 there had been a general improvement in the wage of the classes he deals with; but Professor Thorold Rogers makes a comment upon that which ought to have special interest for you. He says: "It is noteworthy that the kinds of labor for which Mr. Giffen has adduced evidence have all been aided and protected by Trades Unions". That is, in England, where men have stood alone the stronger have pushed them down; and it is only where they have been organised, well organised, carefully led, thoroughly trusting, that they have been able to realise the improvement in their wage, which should go with the improvement of profits made. This shows the clear advantage of association. It is the old fable of the bundle of sticks: the one broken by itself with ease; impossible for the strongest man to break the bundle on his knee—he can but hurt his own knee in the endeavor.

Now men of capital have long recognised the advantages of association. The great bankers, the great railways, the great canal companies, the tramways, the insurance companies, all these are associations of people of capital, and do together what one or two cannot do by themselves. And you ought to learn the lesson too, why it is that there is much of the capital, that the bankers use, from your shillings and from your sixpences which you put into the savings bank, and which they are able to use better than you. Why better than you? If you put them together under special control in your own hands, why should not you use them as well? It is not because you cannot. The co-operative stores in the country have shown what you can do if you try to do it. Although only on a small scale, your own sick and trade societies are showing what you can do if you will. I say only on a small scale, for although it amounts to many hundreds of thousands of pounds, it is small compared with the millions you put in the hands of others to use. And what you do in the co-operative system, what you have done in industrial insurance, with

sick and benefit societies in connexion with your trades, what you have done with your trades' associations, you ought to be constantly doing. If you say you cannot, you deserve to be serfs, slaves, animals to be whipped, imposed upon, and you have no right to claim for yourselves the rights of human beings.

I urge that there is a duty of association, as well as a right that all workers should unite together. Every man who does not unite in an association with which his trade is connected, is failing in duty to himself and them, failing in duty to them if he is strong, failing in duty if he is wise, for it is his duty to give them the benefit of his strength and wisdom; failing in duty to them if he is weak and ignorant, because his weakness and ignorance make them weaker in the struggle in which he gives way.

Now there are two great trade societies in this country which have permitted me to talk to them: I mean the Northumberland Miners and the Durham Miners. When they had no unions, their homes—why, what the Bishop said about the agricultural laborer's home was true of almost every miner's home. It was not his fault: he could not get any other home. They were the pit cottages built by the pit owners. The kennels for the owners' dogs were better than the miners' dwellings, and yet good folk grumbled that these men went to the public-house! Why, when these men came out of the pit, the coal-dust caked upon them through the sweat, dirty to a dirty house, they washed in it as best they could. They worked nearly naked in the pit; they had to strip naked to wash—wives, growing girls, and lodgers round them. Can you wonder at immorality? The wonder is that our people have been so moral and so good, and have improved so much as they have done. During the last fifteen years, and during the last ten years especially, there have been literally thousands of new houses built in Northumberland and Durham. The pitmen have got votes, and they have elected Local Boards of Health, and they have made proper drainage, and they have done this under the guidance of wise leaders.

It is only right I should say—because the Northumberland

and Durham pitmen, if they were here, would say it—that for many years they have found the employers of labor ready to meet them in this new work. There are some exceptions, I am sorry to say; still the best of the men and the best of the employers are making the worst of the men and the worst of the employers better than they were. And the tendency is to do everything by arbitration and conciliation. There have been some failures. I will try to show the remedies. The dwellings have improved, the wages have improved, and at the present moment the Trades Unions of Northumberland and Durham set an example to the whole nation, by having returned their own representatives of their own class into Parliament, whose election expenses they have paid, and whose salaries they pay while they are there.

The Society under whose auspices I speak here to-night—I mean the National Union of Operative Boot and Shoe Rivetters and Finishers—is not so large as the Northumberland Miners'—it is not so big as the Durham Miners'—it is not so large as it ought to be; but it is large enough to be useful. I would like to see it much more extensive, much more efficient, much more wealthy; and one of my objects here to-night is, if I can, to induce men who do not belong to that Union to join it. I especially address my remarks to those who do not approve of it amongst the workmen. I say that it is necessary that there should be a Union in the trade, and if this one is not as good as they think it could be, let them join it and make it better. Standing outside they weaken it and themselves. And I say to the employers: It is to your interest that this Society should be made so powerful, that it shall do for you what the coal owners of Durham and the coal owners of Northumberland admit that the Trades Unions of Northumberland and Durham have done for them—avoid disputes, and enable enterprises to be conducted with more profit to the owners of capital as well as more advantage to the men who worked in them. Although I do not call yours a big society, it is not a little one. I understand that you have something like 11,000 members; that since 1874 you have paid some £20,234 in connexion with trade conflicts; and that since 1875

you have paid £19,450 in sick relief and in funeral grants to those who are your members and have been your members.

Workmen, to provide against distress, should rely upon themselves and not on the parish. If you say, "My trade won't give me medicine for my children", I reply that it will if you make your Society effective enough to extort from the buyers of labor a full price for your labor. It would be no dearer for the employers of labor to pay a full price; and it is less dishonorable than paying it in Poor Rate. Unfairly low wage is dishonoring to payer and receiver. Labor does not want charity, it wants justice: it wants life; and that when it is struck in battle by sickness, by disease, or when the wage-earner is struck by death, there shall be some protecting hand other than the Board of Guardians, other than the Union Workhouse. I understand that you have a balance in hand of some £8,447, of which £4,215 is in the hand of your Central Union, and the other £4,232 in the hand of your branches. You ought to have ten times as much as that in hand. You ought to be in a position to do this: Suppose you said to a great shoe manufacturer, "I know you are making an enormous fortune". Suppose he answered, "I am making an enormous loss". You ought to be in a position to start a factory of your own, where you could make the same things and know then your own profit and loss; and then when you understood whether it were true that profit could be realised you would be able to enforce the claim if it were true, and not be foolish enough to persist in it if it were a mad declaration.

No. 15 of your rules desires to promote conciliation and arbitration. Every sane man must agree that a strike is an evil. It is an evil even when it is successful; it is a horrible evil, if not a crime, when it is a failure. It is an evil, because you do not fight on like bases. A day's labor once lost you can never get back; it is gone, it is so much of the capital of your life gone. Enforced idleness from a strike is bad; existence on charity has a demoralising influence; the influence on the home is degrading. Strikes are always bad. I admit that if a man has only the choice between starving and striking, it is very hard to counsel him against a strike. I don't blame every

man who has advised a strike, or every man who has taken part in one; but I do say that the experience of England, of America, of every country in the world, has shown that the horrible evils that come out of great strikes are such as to outweigh any advantages gained from them.

Why is there not more arbitration and conciliation? An answer was given at the Industrial Conference. Mr. Lloyd Jones complained that arbitration had failed in the opinion of the men, because, he said amongst other things, the data were not sufficient and not correct enough to base any decision upon.

In America they have tried to cure this by having special statistics collected without reference to disputes; when disputes arise, both of you are interested in making out the worst case. Americans have these statistics collected not simply in one establishment, where they may be misleading, nor in one town, where they may not speak the whole truth, but right through the whole of the country. In 1860 the Labor Bureau of Statistics in Boston, Massachusetts, was established; and each year the Bureau publishes a report. At first everybody cried out against it: the workmen said it was inquisitorial; the employers said it was abominable. But by-and-by both found it admirable. Two other States took it up, and then four others, till at last more than twenty States of the Union, and the Province of Ontario in Canada, have Labor Bureaus, all of which are issuing statistics showing the cost of living, the rate of wages, the number of hours worked, the number of people—men, women and children—and ages, the rate of wage each class earns, how long they work in the year, how much capital is used in each kind of enterprise, how much raw material is required for it, what rate of profit is made, and what is the proportion it bears towards wage.

Well, I hope within four weeks to propose in the House of Commons that there be established an office or Bureau of Labor Statistics to chronicle the following things:—

"1. Character, and number of each character, of the various industries of the United Kingdom, number of persons and amount of capital employed in each, specifying when any of these industries are increasing or diminishing, and

why, and whether any special industry is limited to any particular locality, and the reasons, if known, for such local limitation.

"2. The hazardous nature or otherwise of each class of industry, with the results to life, limb, and general health and habits of life, in each industry; giving also particulars as to laborers' dwellings, and whether held from employers, and on what conditions.'

I may say that some of the revelations in America have shown that the different kinds of trades not only lead to different kinds of diseases—that has been known for a long time—but also to special habits, either moral or immoral as the case may be.

"3. Showing how many cases of exploitation in each industry by limited liability companies or other corporations, with their subscribed and actually paid-up capital, and profit, and loss, distinguishing cases where workers to any extent share profits.

"4. The minimum, maximum, and average amounts of capital embarked in each industry, distinguishing fixed and floating capital, the raw material used, the gross wages paid, the value of manufactures produced, and the gross and net profit.

"5. The individual wages paid in each industry, distinguishing men, women, boys, and girls, and specifying highest, lowest, and average wage; also showing whether wage is paid weekly or at long periods, and in latter case, whether companies' shops exist."

I press for these because I find that in several parts of the United Kingdom, the misery and demoralisation arising from a long wage-period and advances have never been properly estimated or dealt with.[1]

"Also showing the longest, shortest, and average number of hours worked per day, and the industries in which there is both night and day work; and showing the average duration of employment in each industry during each year, and showing the cost and nature of living, including rent, food, clothing, necessaries, and luxuries; specifying the cases:—(1) in which the earnings of individuals and of families, where more than one individual was wage-earner in a family, were large enough to leave a surplus beyond fair subsistence; (2) in which the family has subsisted without incurring debt or receiving poor-law relief; (3) in which the earnings did not equal the cost of subsistence. Showing what trades and friendly societies exist in connexion with various industries, with the amount of subscriptions and accumulated capital of each, with annual amounts spent in strikes, sick and other relief, etc., and whether such societies are registered under the Friendly Societies Acts; number of Unionists and non-Unionists in each trade; comparative states of trades in which Unions exist extensively, as against those having no Unions; amount of Savings Banks' deposits, and occupation of depositors.

[1] I have endeavored to diminish this evil by the 3rd section of the Truck Act. compelling advances without interest or discount.

"6. Specifying the other countries where any, and which, similar industries are carried on, with similar details where ascertainable."

All these statistics can be procured with comparatively little cost. A number of them already exist, but are so separated in books as to be utterly inaccessible. Those relating to foreign countries are, many of them, contained in our Consular reports. They want systematising and gathering together; and then people would be in a better position to win their fair rights in any wage contest.

I am pleased in Rule 34 to see that you give bonds on behalf of your members as sureties for honesty. While workmen are sureties for one another, the practice of honesty is made more thorough amongst them. Poverty has often compelled dishonesty, despair has often made men drink, the wretched home has driven men away, and what was not intended for dishonesty became it. But the knowledge that your fellows are responsible for you will make you truer to one another, braver and more loyal. I am glad to see that you are willing to take women among your members. The only unions that can well exist are unions in which the whole family have an interest, in which the wife feels that the man does not go away from her once a week simply to drink. Connected with your unions you can—and ought to—establish places of meeting in each town, where you can have your little reading-room and library, and place of entertainment. You can do it without trenching upon your means, and thus help yourselves step by step. I am glad to see that you have means for helping your sick, that you have duly registered yourselves under the law.

The great struggles of the future will be not between Republicans and kings, not between heretics and churches, but between laborers and employers of labor. Those struggles may be beneficial to both, if they are struggles of reason —if they are conducted considerately, usefully, thoughtfully; but they will be struggles which will be ruinous to both if they are conducted with the notion that either has the right or the duty to destroy the other. The progress of both can go together—one may grow richer as the other grows happier; it is only wanted that there should be fairness, openness. There

is no secret in this; the man's muscle and the man's profit, the man's hammer and his chisel and his plough: all these are things that can be seen; and—by those who know—the other man's profit is seen just as clearly. To make fiction, to make frauds, is dishonorable to all, and I plead here to laborers to meet capital not in vengeance for the past, but for a good living in the future. And I plead to owners of capital if I may: I plead to them that the others are the strongest: money is not the strongest: all they own of it only makes two or three years' earnings. You can earn it — the Rothschilds' wealth, the Overstones' wealth, the Barings' wealth; you, the millions, if you are only loyal to yourselves and to one another, may put all this into your own Savings Banks, and your own Friendly Societies, and your own Trades Unions, within a dozen years. You accumulate it for others; you can do it for yourselves. And I plead to you that your wives may be happier, that your children may be more moral, that your homes may be more pure, more clean, more wholesome; I plead that your whole lives may be better worth living.

MARKET RIGHTS AND TOLLS.

House of Commons, 22nd of April, 1887.

Mr. BRADLAUGH moved :—

"That a humble address be presented to her Majesty, praying her Majesty to appoint a Royal Commission to inquire as to the extent to which market rights, and rights affecting places where markets are held, are in the hands (1) of public bodies, and (2) of private persons or bodies of persons. To inquire generally how such rights are exercised, and particularly what accommodation is given in return for charges levied : in what ratio market tolls stand to the value of goods on which they are levied, and how far the regulation of markets by means of bye-laws or otherwise, market rents, stallages, and tolls, and tolls affecting market towns, are restrictive of trade. To report as to the advisability of compelling the transfer of all such rights to local authorities : of prohibiting the farming of tolls and stallages, of prohibiting the placing of restrictions on the sale of goods in a market that may be lawfully sold elsewhere, of providing—by means of the incomes from markets or otherwise—for the extinction of the capital account chargeable to such markets, and for declaring all markets to be free and open."

In proposing this motion, Mr. Bradlaugh said : I trust that the Government will be able to accept the motion, which in no sense raises a party question. The real object of the motion is to decrease the cost of food to the poor—to increase the facilities of the poor for obtaining good food at moderate prices—to encourage the augmentation, by increased cultivation, stimulated by early sale, of home food produce. At the present time market rights and tolls in many places have the contrary effect.

Whatever may be the result of this motion, and whatever action the Government may feel compelled to take, I desire to acknowledge the courteous consideration which has been given to the subject by the Right Hon. the President of the Local Government Board.

I only propose in this speech to deal with England and Wales, but the terms of my motion apply to the whole of Great Britain and Ireland, and I trust that some Scotch and Irish members will give the House the benefit of their special knowledge. As to Scotland, I am personally without sufficient information, though it is clear that the evil does not now exist in Scotland to the same extent as in the rest of the United Kingdom. There is a report of a Select Committee on Market Tolls in Ireland in 1826, from which I will read a few lines. The Committee reported that "many most exorbitant and illegal charges are still made in markets, seaports, and fairs in Ireland, all of the most injurious tendency in checking commerce and industry. Several of these charges appear to your Committee to be so burthensome and oppressive as to produce the most mischievous restraint both on the sale and transit of commodities." And they said: "Nor are these examples of violation of the general principles of the Common Law the only abuses existing; the Statute Law has been violated in many important particulars;" and they reported specifically that "the intentions of the legislature, in exempting from burden the food of the lower classes of the community, have been defeated". I believe that Irish members sitting near me will be able to state that many of these evils are as bad in Ireland to-day as they were sixty years ago, and this although a Royal Commission in 1853 had again strongly reported against the same evil. Members for Ireland have sought ineffectually to deal with this by legislation. Bills have been introduced session after session into this House by Irish members, which been blocked both by Tories and Liberals, and have never even been discussed. The grievance which was and is still endured in Ireland, is the grievance which now exists in England and Wales.

I submit that a Royal Commission is absolutely neces-

sary in order that the matter may be dealt with in a thorough manner. Neither the House nor the Government has at present sufficient information on which to legislate wisely.

The President of the Local Government Board might say that the Government intend to deal with the evils complained of in a Bill which they are prepared to introduce with regard to local government; but I understand that such a Bill would only propose to give local authorities power to acquire rights. This is not enough, because in many scores of cases the local authorities are as bad offenders as private individuals. There are so many instances of the misuse of power by local authorities that it is absolutely necessary that information upon the subject should be obtained by a Royal Commission before it is sought to legislate. In any case it would be necessary to prevent local authorities from farming tolls to private persons.

It might also be said by the President of the Local Government Board that his department carefully revised all the bye-laws of local authorities, and that there could be no fear of such things happening as I complain of. This is no doubt true, but I would point out that this care has not been exercised at all times, and that there are in force at the present time in different parts bye-laws of a very objectionable character. It is not enough to give the local authorities power to purchase; there must be some restriction put upon them as to what they should pay.

I am quite prepared to accept the position that where the present local representatives under a charter have held markets, and have done anything for the promotion of trade in a district, they should be compensated. Where the local representatives of the holders of the original charters are simply leeches sucking the vitality of the districts and giving nothing in return, hindering food from reaching the poor, driving the sale of food into "rings," limiting the number of shops, and taxing the local produce that comes to market so that it does not pay the people in the neighborhood to grow it—in such cases the local authorities, on acquiring the market rights, ought not to be permitted to pay the same price for them that they would rightly pay where an owner had done a number of things to promote the

convenience of buyers and sellers, and to encourage the trade of the district.

I obtained last year an unopposed return of market rates and tolls. But it did not include any of the many—and some most objectionable—markets within the densely populated metropolitan area; in several cases there was a suggestive deficiency of information, and in others the information given was misleading. Over and over again it was said that the gross receipts were "not known". Of course they were "not known" to any one but the person who got them. And I was told that in several cases the receivers of the tolls had said that it was not the business of the House of Commons to inquire into the matter, and therefore they did not intend to give any information. In reply to the question whether the market was held in a street, the answer "No" was given in many cases, thereby suggesting that some sheltered place was provided, whereas the market was held on an open space known as the market-place, and no shelter of any kind was provided.

Originally these market rights were prerogatives of the Crown, and grants have been made of them to ladies and gentlemen in recognition of some service rendered to the Crown, the service being deemed a sufficient consideration at the moment, although it was one which in modern times no one would deem worthy of such a recognition. Sometimes the consideration was a valid one. There were charters which were granted for the protection of trade. Often the lord of the manor provided armed men to protect the market and those who attended it, and in connexion with it there was a Court for the settlement of disputes which was known as "Pie Powder Court". Although some of the Courts remained in name, all that kind of responsibility ceased centuries ago. The rights granted often included the power to set up a fair or a market in the neighborhood, and under cover of a right of this kind, 300 or 400 hawkers had been prevented entering the district of Rochdale for the purpose of supplying the people with food and vegetables. Some of the charters date back to the time of Henry I, Henry II, and Henry III. Some of the toll receivers had no charters. If they had them they had lost them; but they

still took the money. In some cases they took it quite illegally, but the local magistrates enforced the claim to the privilege as their predecessors had done.

The old law as to market rights, which is still the enforceable law, is: "The king is the sole judge where fairs and markets ought to be kept; and therefore it is said that if he grants a market to be kept in such a place which happens not to be convenient for the country, yet the subjects can go to no other". (Bacon's Abridgment, Title, "Fairs and Markets".) "If a person hath a right to a fair or market, and another erects a fair or market near his," the charter owner may prevent all sales even by hawkers or shopkeepers, and this "although the new market be holden on a different day".

Under this, the charter owner in East London has, as against the Great Eastern Railway, been able to do much mischief. The Clerk of the Whitechapel District Board of Works has forwarded a long statement with respect to the evil effects of the monopoly existing in the Spitalfields Market. I will only trouble the House with one passage from the letter: "This Board, having been informed of the motion which stands in your name for Friday on this subject, have thought that their experience as to Spitalfields Market, which demonstrates how markets of insignificant origin may become very formidable monopolies, may be of some value to you as a matter of information".

Important as is this report, I prefer to venture to appeal to the hon. member for Preston, who has just had specially to investigate this matter upstairs, to give the House the benefit of his special knowledge on this subject. The effect of the existence of private market rights is to unduly increase the price of food, to limit in many places the sources of food supply, to throw land out of cultivation, so far as varieties of dairy and market produce are concerned, and to facilitate in hands of private owners, or where the market rights are farmed, the formation of "rings" for keeping up the prices of food, and particularly of butcher's meat. In many places the poor have had no opportunity of buying Australian or other imported dead meat as such; but as large quantities are known to have entered

the districts, it has no doubt been sold as English meat at English prices. In such places as I have described, the poor are robbed in consequence of the existence of these rights. The regulations with respect to the sale of perishable food, such as fish and vegetables, and sometimes for the limiting of the number of shops in particular trades, are such that if they were framed with the intention of preventing the poor from buying cheaply they could not have been better devised for that purpose. The existence of these market rights has created a class of middlemen, who hinder distribution and render it costly.

If owners of land looked to their own interest, they would prevent toll-keepers from interfering, as they did, with the sale of produce and consequent cultivation of land, and would thus increase their rents.

Market rights, as I have explained, are claimed under charter, or letters patent, nearly all were granted in feudal times, in connexion with manors, under conditions as to population no longer even comparable, and with responsibilities and duties now never performed. The charters are granted for no real service or consideration other than the duty of protecting the traders at the market, of providing sufficient accommodation for buyers and sellers, and of administering justice in connexion with the market trade as to quality, weight, and so on. There are three classes of owners of market rights:—Cities or boroughs, with market charters or claiming prescription; private individuals, under charters or alleged prescription, this last being often a species of what in the colonies would be described as "impudent squatting"; local authorities authorised to establish markets under statutes, these now chiefly governed by Public Health Act, 1875, secs. 166—168.

Where local authorities claim to levy market tolls by prescription, this claim is clearly unfounded, as the whole of these local authorities must have been instituted since the Public Health Act, 1848, and many since the Local Government Act, 1858. I will take as a sample of many, from p. 72 of the return, the case of Slaithwaite. In many cases local authorities have acquired chartered rights, paying heavily for them, thus unduly taxing food of the district to recoup outlay. I agree that in all

cases local authorities ought to acquire, and I do not object to the toll-owners being paid fully where some consideration has been shown in providing market premises; but I do object to twenty or twenty-five years' purchase, or a heavy rent, being given where the toll-owner is only a leech. In many cases the local authorities have been compelled to pay enormous prices for the charter rights they required.

I do not propose to give the Royal Commission any power over contracts which have been completed, but it is necessary to show the House the kind of cases I desire to prevent in future. In 1846, Manchester purchased manorial rights and property at the cost of £200,000. I think that more than £170,000 represented the value of the manorial rights. Since then Manchester has had to pay £359,000 for its own markets. The food of the district has been unduly burdened by the payment of that £170,000. In Bradford the corporation acquired on lease from the toll-owners the market rights for a payment of a rent of £5,000 a year. The markets were held in the streets until the corporation leased the rights, so that the charter went back to a time when Bradford was a little hamlet. This £5,000 a-year taken from the corporation is a tax on the food of the poor. In Huddersfield the return is modestly reticent, but as far as I can learn some £44,000 have been paid for the street right.

There are many cases of absolutely illegal assumption of rights, and of illegal levy of tolls. I will take as samples from p. 21 of the return, the Nottingham Highway Board at Basford, and from p. 64, a market committee at Fareham. There are many cases in which the return lacks frankness on these points. In Ware a private owner has been levying tolls. That cannot be by prescription or by charter, because the market was established on the 24th of March, 1886. This market is chiefly accessible by a bridge, and there are tolls for the bridge which come into effect only on market days for cattle, sheep, and pigs; thus the food of the unfortunate people of Ware is doubly burdened.

Even in municipal boroughs the markets are very often in private hands. In Rochdale the old market proprietors got a statute passed in the reign of George IV, which shows how

iniquitous some private Bill legistation could be. They claimed exclusive rights over the whole of Rochdale, though the borough limits have been since largely extended. There has been taken from every hawker who came within the borough 30s., and some who could not pay it have been sent to gaol. One of the hawkers went to a lawyer, who held that the old proprietors had no right to levy such a tax. Then they shut every hawker out of Rochdale, a borough which has set a better example than any town in England, or in the world, in its co-operative endeavors for procuring necessaries of life cheaply for its people. At least the House will be with me in slaying this iniquitous usurpation.

I have received from 2,000 to 3,000 letters dealing with this subject, but I will content myself with specifying four instances in which these tolls have caused considerable hardship to the population of these particular towns. The towns I will select are Market Drayton, Fleetwood, Taunton, and Bridgewater. In the first-mentioned case tolls are charged on all vegetables, though sold in the open streets, and no accommodation is provided. The restrictions are of such a nature that people who were growing agricultural produce and bringing it into the town will not now do so in consequence of the annoyance. The result has been that the trade has fallen into the hands of the middlemen. At Fleetwood hawking from door to door is forbidden, and it has been announced that farmers are to be forbidden to sell milk to customers except in the place where they pay toll. At Taunton butchers are not allowed to open shops except on payment of £20; and at Bridgewater[1] they allow only a certain number of shops connected with particular trades in the town. What is the effect of limiting the number of shops in this way? To heighten the prices of commodities to the poor.

Not content with reaping a harvest of this kind, however, the toll-owner, when markets are held in the open streets, robs the ratepayers in another way. After the cattle market or other market has been held, there is scavenging to be done

[1] The Market Toll Collector, Bridgewater, afterwards wrote me that on this point I had been misinformed, and I corrected the statement in the *Times*.—C. B.

at the cost of the ratepayers; the toll-owner escapes. He carries off his tolls in his pocket; there is nothing which can be rated; and the local ratepayers are left to pay for scavenging the streets. How many hundreds such cases there are in England and Wales alone is shown by the return, which is divided into three parts: (1) Municipal boroughs; (2) Improvement Acts and local government districts; (3) Rural sanitary districts. In Part 1, 255 corporations made returns: of these, in 223 cases, rights belong to corporation; of these 223, 75 are farmed, and of the total 255, 125 are admittedly held in the open street, whilst more are actually so held. In Part 2, 249 markets under local authorities are shown: of these 161 belong to private owners, and of the remaining 88, 17 are farmed; 145 of these are admittedly held in the open street, the real number so held being far larger. In Part 3, 206 cases are stated to be all in private hands, and mostly held in the open street.

In any reform of local government which may hereafter be introduced, I trust that steps will be taken to prevent municipal authorities from farming tolls.

The effect of such a remedy as I propose will be to increase the wage of every wage-receiver without increasing the amount which his employer has to pay him. The value of the wage to the laborer must not be measured by its nominal amount. It is what it will procure of food and other necessaries of life. Cheapen the cost of food, as this proposal would, and the value of the wage is augmented. Afford facilities for better food, and the standard of comfort is heightened. I trust I shall receive the support of the Government. There are cries outside for turning society upside down, of real grievances pressing on the poor. I have never in my life been a revolutionist so far as this country is concerned—I have always urged the redressal of wrongs by Parliamentary action. But a crisis is undoubtedly coming, and unless Parliament deals with these outside clamors and shows that it intends to redress the wrongs which can be redressed, we cannot complain if violent men should become prone to use violent language.

SECOND READING OF AFFIRMATION BILL.

House of Commons, March 14th, 1888.

MR. SPEAKER, — This Bill consists only of two clauses, expressed in almost the same language as that which was used in the Affirmation Act of the Quakers. The only difference is one made in accordance with a suggestion that I should make it differ from the Affirmation Act which applied to the Society of Friends, by introducing words to provide that the initiative should be taken by the person who desired to have the opportunity of affirming. To meet that suggestion, which does not appear to me an unreasonable one, I have introduced the words "upon objecting to being sworn" in the first line in the clause. As the law then stood, in reference to jurors, no juror who is without religious belief, or who, having religious belief, does not believe in future rewards and punishments, can take the oath or affirm. There is no provision to allow a person, under these circumstances, to affirm, except the provisions which relate to jurors who have religious belief, and that is clearly marked. I do not know that it will be necessary to make any long statement on that point. The law was clearly put by Lord Bramwell in 1881, when he said that the class of persons mentioned in Section 4 of the Evidence Further Amendment Act, 1869, who were at that time incompetent, but for that Act to give evidence from want of religious belief, would not be permitted to serve on a jury on the condition of merely making a solemn affirmation or declaration, instead of taking the oath. That decision was concurred in by the Lords Justices.

In the case of a juror without religious belief being sworn by mistake, or because the matter had not been brought to the knowledge of the Court, or supposing he affirmed, as some persons had

affirmed as jurors, under what I may call the Religious Belief Clause, then it is quite clear that, in a criminal trial, error may be brought after conviction and sentence, and a murderer may thus escape punishment. In 1838 Lord Denman moved in the House of Lords a Bill for the substitution of affirmations for oaths, and drew attention to a case in which a murderer had escaped because a Presbyterian in Ireland—a Dr. Cook—had insisted upon taking the oath in the manner in which Presbyterians thought binding upon them, but had not been sworn in the method required by law. The point was raised after conviction and after sentence, and the objection was sustained. The consequence was that the prisoner who was convicted in that case escaped the sentence which had been passed upon him. During later years there have been a large number of jurors who, being without religious belief, or at any rate claiming to be without such belief, have been ordered to stand aside. They were persons summoned to serve and sit as jurymen, and when they, in *bona fide*, brought the matter under the notice of the Court, or made a claim to be exempt on the ground of having no religious belief, they were able to escape the performance of their duty. In either case, it is equally bad for the rest of the public that these men are not allowed to act as jurymen. They can neither affirm nor can they take the oath. The law has been laid down beyond the possibility of question by the High Court sitting at Bar, by three judges whose decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal, that if a person so disqualified has taken the oath, however regularly in point of form, yet he has not really taken it in point of law, and error might be brought. It is to avoid the possible consequence of this state of things, that I appeal even to those who take a somewhat hostile view of my Bill, as to whether legislation on this question would not be wise.

There is, however, another view of it which appears to me even more serious. Painful scenes are sometimes enacted, especially in coroners' courts, on the question whether jurymen are entitled to affirm or not, and occasionally squabbles occur on matters of religious opinion. I have noted some twenty or thirty such cases within the last two or three years, and I have several times in the House brought such cases to the notice of the

Attorney-General. The coroner decides sometimes in one way, sometimes in another, and great suffering is often entailed on the relatives of the deceased who are in waiting at the inquest. Surely this is a reason for making the law clear. In regard to jurors, then, I would put the matter in this way: jurors without religious belief, or jurors having religious belief of some kind, who yet did not believe in future rewards and punishment, were by law incapable of taking the oath, and were not by law permitted to affirm.

Leaving that class, I come next to the cases of the Oath of Allegiance, with respect to which there is no provision for affirming at all except in the case of Quakers, Moravians, and Separatists. A Christian, in the fullest sense of the word, who conscientiously objects to take the oath on the ground that oath-taking is unlawful by the terms of his own creed, is not entitled to affirm his allegiance. There is no provision for a case of this kind at all, and yet the oath is taken, not only by Members of Parliament and Justices of the Peace, but by barristers, solicitors, a variety of constables, officers and the rank and file of the Army, petty officers in the Navy, and others. There is a decision of the Court of Appeal confirming that of the Court of three Judges—of whom the present Lord Chief Justice is one—a full report of which is in the Library of the House. If that decision is good—and as it is the decision of the Court of Appeal it must be assumed to be good law—its effect is that no Justice of the Peace without religious belief can have the oath administered to him, and in consequence his acts are open to challenge in a variety of ways: ways with which I need not trouble the House at any length. Nor can any soldier who falls within this category be properly attested.

There is no need to enlarge on the serious inconveniences which may follow, nor do I wish to deal with the matter simply from the point of view of the Oath of Allegiance as taken at the table of the House. I am happy to say that my Bill is no longer a party measure. It has upon its back the endorsement of Members of both sides of the House, and it is within my own knowledge that these members consider this to

be a fair and proper solution of an exceedingly difficult problem, which may now be settled without a particle of bitterness.

There has necessarily been present to my mind the consideration of objections which members may fairly feel in dealing with such a measure as this. I would point out that the whole tendency of legislation for the last sixty years has been to abolish oaths which were once thought necessary, substituting for them, in cases of testimony, affirmations which carry with them all the legal consequences which attached to the oath, so that a false statement made under affirmation should bear with it the same penalties as attached to perjury. I have seen, however, that several members have written to their constituents with reference to this measure, saying that so far as it applied to the Oath of Allegiance they have no objection to it, but that they did object to it so far as it applied to witnesses. I will just point out to those hon. members, that the law already gives witnesses who are without religious belief the right to affirm, so that they are raising a difficulty which does not occur. It may be said, "If so, why do you not exempt witnesses from the operation of your Bill?". I will answer that question at once. It is because, unfortunately, the wording of the Evidence Amendment Acts of 1869 and 1870, is so peculiar that it has given rise to a variety of practices, and only met the cases which I have previously referred to. When the Evidence Amendment Act of 1869 left the House of Commons, it did not contain the words which gave rise to the misconstruction. They were inserted somewhat suddenly in the House of Lords, and were as follows:—"If any person called on to give evidence in any Court of Justice, whether in Civil or Criminal proceedings, should object to take the oath, or should be objected to as incompetent to take that oath".

The only person who can be objected to as incompetent to take the oath is a person without religious belief, or one who, having religious belief, does not believe in a state of future rewards and punishment. Any such person should, "if the presiding Judge is satisfied that the taking of the oath would not be binding on his conscience," make a promise and declaration. This has unfortunately given rise to much difficulty. In 1875

a case was brought before the Court of Queen's Bench, the late Lord Chief Justice presiding. Mr. Woolrych, the police magistrate, had refused to receive the affirmation of a man called Lennard, who had avowed himself an Atheist. The Court of Queen's Bench made the rule absolute for a mandamus requiring Mr. Woolrych to take the evidence on the ground that he ought to have been satisfied that an oath would have had no binding effect upon Lennard's evidence. Unfortunately, the case was not reported. It was, however, traceable by the lawyers, there being a record of it in the Rule Office, though there was no official report of the case. The consequence has been that—especially in proceedings before the magistrates and in the inferior Courts—a curious looseness has been observed in the construction of the words "the Judge shall be satisfied that an oath has no binding effect upon his conscience".

As an illustration of the difficulties on this point, I have received a letter which states the matter very clearly. The writer says:—"A witness in a court of law objects to take the oath, and states that he is without belief in 'a future state of rewards and punishments,' but confesses to a belief in the existence of a Supreme Being, and declares that the taking of an oath would have a binding effect upon his conscience. In such a case, if I rightly understand the law as it at present stands, the witness would be utterly incompetent, and his testimony therefore wholly inadmissible. For, not possessing the required belief as to a future state of rewards and punishments (Reg. *v.* Taylor, Peake, 11; Maden *v.* Catanach, 31 L. G. Ex. 118), he would be unqualified to take the *oath*, even if he changed his mind and waived his objection to taking it; and the opportunity of *affirming* would be denied to him, because, as it seems, to the right to affirm there is attached a condition precedent 'that the Judge must be satisfied that the taking of the oath would have no binding effect,' etc.—a condition which in the present case clearly remains unsatisfied." This clearly shows the extremely unsatisfactory character of the present law.

I was present at a trial in which the present Lord Chief Justice, with his usual kindness, took a great deal of trouble, and occupied some seven or eight minutes in ascertaining whether an oath

would have a binding effect upon a witness's conscience. A short discussion took place, in which an explanation was given on the part of the witness, and an interpretation on the part of the Bench, before it could be ascertained whether the oath would have this binding effect on the witness's conscience. In minor proceedings, such as those in the coroner's courts and before the magistrate, cases of this kind constantly occur, and they have arisen because the wording of the Evidence Acts left room for much misconstruction and misinterpretation in practice.

It is known to all who watched the progress of the Acts of 1869 and 1870, as I have done—and the Amending Act of the latter year passed in consequence of objection to my evidence, that the Bill left this House without the words which have caused all the difficulty, and which were introduced in the House of Lords to meet the objections of a member of that assembly. It had, however, the effect of importing into the matter an element of extreme difficulty. In England, Ireland, and Wales, all witnesses—whether they have religious belief or none—can affirm. In Scotland that is not the case. This Bill would relieve witnesses in Scotland, as the Acts of 1869 and 1870 had relieved them in England, Ireland, and Wales. To illustrate the necessity for the Bill, I will instance a case at Aberdeen of the week before last, where the sheriff was obliged to refuse the testimony of an Atheist who claimed to affirm, at the same time expressing his opinion that the attention of the Legislature ought to be directed to the question. The sheriff also pointed out the serious consequences which might ensue in a murder case, the learned gentleman using these words :—"Supposing this man was the only witness in a murder case, the murderer must escape because of a technical objection to his evidence".

There has been during the last 60 years, as I have already said, a disposition to give every facility in our Courts for the ascertainment of the truth, and to get rid of all incompetence to give evidence; and my Bill is a contribution to the attainment of that end. There was an amendment upon the paper which asked the House not to consider the Bill, but to refer the grievance to a Royal Commission. I would suggest that the hon. member who is to move that amendment can hardly have

remembered that there was a Royal Commission which, in 1867, issued no fewer than five reports, one of which was signed by Lord Lyveden, the present Lord Sherbrooke, and others. This report stated that "oaths of allegiance had seldom been found to be of any practical benefit to the persons or institutions whose safety and interest it had been sought to maintain by imposing them. In peaceful and prosperous times they were not needed, and in times of difficulty and danger they were not observed." Commenting upon the oath of allegiance imposed by the Mutiny Act, the Commission reported that it would be idle to describe this ceremony as either solemn or impressive, nor did it even appear certain that it was intelligible to the lads who invoked Almighty God. The words of the Commission were these: "As an example of an oath which appears to us open to nearly every possible objection, we may cite the oath of allegiance imposed by the Mutiny Act on recruits for the Army, which the Commission in its Report recommends to be maintained. The oath is a part of the ceremony of attestation which is necessary to complete the enlistment. It may be taken before any Justice of the Peace, not being an officer in the Army, and in London it is commonly taken before the Magistrate at the Westminster Police Court. There at certain fixed times, before and after other business, recruits are attested and the oath administered to them in a body by the Usher of the Court, the recruiting Sergeant and his batch of recruits being surrounded by any persons who happen to be present, and who are not required to suspend any conversation in which they may be engaged."

I pass by the historical portion of the Reports of the Commission, because it does not affect what I desire to put to the House. There is, however, an objection which I feel it my duty to consider, and which has been urged. Last year the Right Hon. J. G. Hubbard, now a member of the other House, who has very frankly admitted that the general sense of the House was in favor of the second reading, objected that the Bill did not exclude the Coronation or episcopal oath. I will say frankly that I thought it would have been impertinent on my part to make such

a proposal, but I should offer no objection in the Committee to an amendment to that effect. Last Session gave me great encouragement. There were two divisions taken, nominally on the question of adjournment, but really on the principle of the Bill. On the first division the majority was 91 in its favor, and on the second the majority was 104. It is with no desire to avoid the subject that I have passed over the recent history of the question in this House; I think it better taste on my part to avoid it now that the question is no longer one of party bitterness, and now that members on both sides are trying to find a solution of the difficulty, which is to me no longer a personal question, although I should be glad if the House would permit me to do by law what it was my desire to do eight years ago. But I am now pleading for cases in a large number of which serious evils may arise. I plead in accord with the general legislation of this century, in which, step by step, disqualifications and disabilities have been removed. I plead in favor of the recognition of a principle which the late Mr. Justice Mellor put so clearly in his marvellously able pamphlet. Speaking of the legislation of 1869 and 1870 on this question, the learned Judge said:—"The legislature has enabled even Atheists to depose without any obligation of taking an oath, but at the same time making them liable to punishment for false testimony as if they had committed perjury. Profoundly convinced by long experience of the general worthlessness of oaths, especially in cases in which falsehood cannot be tested on cross-examination or criminally punished, I have become an advocate for the abolition of oaths as the test of truth; but I would retain the punishment for false declarations wherever the law prescribes a penalty for a false oath." It may be urged that this is an argument for the abolition of oaths altogether. I admit it; but I am not prepared to ask the House to go with my argument and abolish oaths altogether, because I know there are many men —many conscientious men—who think that they ought to be permitted to swear their allegiance. I do not propose to interfere in any way with their tender consciences. I only ask an option for all who are either disabled by law at present or who desire to be relieved from a position which often becomes intolerable.

THE COMPULSORY CULTIVATION OF WASTE LANDS.

Speech delivered in the House of Commons, May, 1888.

Mr. Speaker,—The array of amendments which has been put down to the motion I have now to submit induces me to hope that the subject is, at least, one in which the House is beginning to take a greater interest; and the almost unanimous expression of opinion among those who had given notice of those amendments, that there was a large quantity of uncultivated land in this country, also leads me to hope that I may be able to secure their assistance against the other amendment which challenges that proposition. There is an amendment put down by the hon. member for Wandsworth (Mr. Kimber), which, if not moved to-night, may I suppose be taken as a speech for the debate, and which declares that the proposition contained in my motion is one not altogether consistent with the liberties of a free people: besides, the process of compulsion shadowed forth in it seems so repugnant to the hon. gentleman that he feels he must earnestly protest against it at once. There is to me a comfort in being opposed by a devoted follower of the Government like the hon. member for Wandsworth, because, when the hon. member saw the First Lord of the Treasury going into the lobby in support of that motion—as he was bound to do if he carried out the traditions of his own Government—I hoped that the hon. member would no longer feel inclined to denounce the principle of compulsion. (A laugh.) I should hardly have ventured to take up the ground I have upon this subject, if I had not known that the present Leader of the House, and the Prime Minister, belonged to a Cabinet which

had twice, within the last nine years, deliberately made proposals and put them into force for the compulsory taking of uncultivated land. In Cyprus, a law was passed to promote the cultivation of land, and the ordinance was dated the 2nd of April, 1879. Among other things, it enacted that where a landowner had left more than two-thirds of his land which was capable of cultivation in an uncultivated state, he should pay a penalty, a tax on the whole of the land left uncultivated and uncropped, to the Government, as a fine for not having cultivated it. That having failed, the Government took more stringent measures, and in an ordinance dated June 24th, 1885, it was set forth that all cultivable land which had been left uncultivated for ten years should be confiscated by the Government. I hope, therefore, that the hon. gentleman who is to reply to me on behalf of the Government (Mr. W. H. Long), and who last year so eloquently denounced the proposal shadowed by the Bill of 1886, will now, with these Cyprus ordinances before him, modify the severity of his antagonistic criticism. In the discussion of this question I will lay down certain propositions, the first of which is: That the ownership of land should carry with it the duty of cultivation or utilisation. This was generally admitted in last year's debate. In a crowded country like this, I think that no right of property should allow a man to pursue a dog-in-the-manger attitude, and so arrest development of the natural resources of the soil. The authorities should compel the possessors of land to use it for the general welfare. The action of the Government in Cyprus shews that they have accepted that proposition, at least, in part. In the debate on this subject last year, the right hon. gentleman the member for the Sleaford Division of Lincolnshire said that land carried with it the duty of cultivation, no less than the practice, unless, indeed, there were good reasons to the contrary. Unfortunately, I have learnt that in law the ownership of land does not carry with it that duty; and further, I shall submit that it has not carried with it the practice of cultivation. In the case of "the Attorney-General against Lord Sefton", to which my attention has been drawn in the debate on death duties, the following facts appear from the judgment of Mr. Baron Martin: "Earl Sefton died

2nd August, 1855. He was the owner of land in Toxteth Park, Liverpool. This land then, and for ten years previously, had been wholly unoccupied and unproductive." In 1862, seven years after, some of it was sold "at the rate of upwards of £4,000 per acre, which is forty times the value of the best agricultural land". "The present income is nil, but the land is of enormous value, thousands of pounds per acre more valuable than the best agricultural land;" and Baron Martin added, "a great quantity of by far the most valuable land in the kingdom is similarly circumstanced". This land, which paid nothing in respect of local burdens, which contributed little or nothing to the Imperial exchequer, was held not to be liable to even succession duty, although Baron Martin said, "I cannot believe that it was the deliberate intention of the legislature to relieve such land from the payment of duty". Lord Chief Baron Pollock said: "The proprietor of property in this country has a right to make what reasonable use of it he pleases, and sometimes even an *un*reasonable use of it, and he is not bound so to use it as to yield the largest revenue to the Government, or to pay taxes as if he did. A landed proprietor whose park is over the most valuable mineral property has a right to say: 'I prefer living where my ancestors have lived to obtaining the wealth which opening the mines would afford'." Now I challenge the doctrine that a man has any right to prevent the opening up of mines underneath his property. I do not challenge the fact that this may be the law: but I do challenge that it should be the law. In this high court of Parliament, which has the right and the duty to alter the law, I submit that, in a crowded country like this, where admittedly hunger and misery exist, no right of property ought to be allowed by which a man may retard the natural development of the wealth of the country for the benefit of the toilers and workers in it. (Hear, hear.) If the law at present gives the right to an owner of 50,000 acres to say that, although his land will provide employment to hundreds or thousands of people in mines underneath it, he will not permit mines to be worked there, and will thus compel the people to starve; that law should be altered, and the authorities should have the right to step in and compel him to

utilize his property, even as they compel the laborer to utilize his labor, for the well-being of society, of which the individual is a part. (Hear, hear.) The mere laborer is not permitted to say: "I will not work; I will do as I please with my muscle and sinew;" the law punishes him as a rogue and vagabond, society passes on him moral condemnation, when he does not with his labor fulfil his part in contributing to the local and imperial burdens. My next proposition is: That there is now a large quantity of land in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland which is in a vacant, waste, or uncultivated state, and which might and ought to be properly cultivated or utilized. In speaking of cultivation I do not necessarily mean corn-growing. I mean that the land should be utilized for whatever it can be used most profitably. Last year I estimated that there were some 12,000,000 acres of land in the United Kingdom and Ireland in an uncultivated state; which land might well be cultivated for profit; and the right hon. member for the Sleaford Division then asked: "Where did those 12,000,000 acres come from?" and the hon. member for Maldon (Mr. Gray) disputed the accuracy of this estimate. Taking England, Wales, and Ireland—for I propose to leave Scotland to the hon. member for the Leith district, who I hope will second the resolution, and who will be able to speak with a special knowledge of the country—Mr. Denton, in his evidence before the Royal Commission on Agriculture in 1882, said that the irreclaimable land in England and Wales was 4,722,100 acres in extent, the cultivable land 27,000,000 acres, and the uncultivated land capable of improvement 5,596,000 acres. As an illustration of the kind of land, I will quote a passage taken from the *Weekly Bulletin* of 11th February, from an article headed "A Sussex Desert". The editor says: "When we were told a few days ago that in the middle of Sussex, within less than two hours' reach of London, there were something like 100,000 acres of land absolutely without cultivation of any sort, lying wild and waste, much as they did in the times of the Henrys, we were at first disposed to doubt the sanity of our informant. But as he gave us chapter and verse, furnished the name of the noble lord who owns this immense tract of land, and provided us with careful

directions as to the station at which we were to stop to reach the spot, etc., we determined on at least ascertaining by the evidence of our own senses whether it could be actually true that while tens of thousands of people are on the verge of starvation in London, there are within easy reach of them tens of thousands of acres of land lying idle which, under proper cultivation, would support an even larger population."

Sir W. Bartelott: Will the hon. member state who is the owner of this land?

Most certainly I will. The writer gives the name as Earl Delawarr, and he adds: "Why, we ask in amazement, is all this vast tract of country left to lie idle? Simply, we are told, because 'my lord' wills it so. Is the soil barren? Not at all; it will grow almost any crops to perfection, and in proof we are pointed to the little oases, at long intervals, which have been reclaimed and brought into cultivation. A drive of twelve miles over a beautiful undulating country, on which the great sun stretched down his long rays like loving arms, and yet not a third of the forest had been seen. One vast solitude, stretching away mile after mile, which might be changed like magic into smiling cornfields and verdant pastures, be dotted with homesteads and alive with lowing cattle and bleating sheep, but for the imperious will of one noble and reverend lord!"

Viscount Curzon: Does the hon. member say that Lord Delawarr owns all this land?

I have no personal knowledge on the subject. The *Weekly Bulletin* said it was the property of Earl Delawarr. I can only vouch for the fact that it is uncultivated; but, from letters I have received, I believe it to be capable of profitable cultivation. The *Weekly Bulletin* writer concluded his article by saying: "Of course, many who read this will say at once that the land must be worthless, or it would long ago have been brought under cultivation. But surely the villagers who live upon its borders must know its character and its capabilities, and they one and all agree that most of the forest so-called is as fine land as ever laid out of doors. We confess ourselves to be of the same opinion. What has Lord Delawarr to say?" As

to Ireland, Professor Baldwin and Major Robertson, one of whom had been intimately connected with the present parliamentary Under Secretary for Ireland, affirm that there are 6,000,000 acres of land in Ireland "comparatively worthless"; and they declare that the greater part of this land ought to be cultivated, and could be profitably reclaimed. Professor Baldwin, in his evidence before the Duke of Richmond as to Ireland, said: "There has been a good deal of exaggeration with regard to the waste lands of Ireland. I have gone very carefully into the matter, and I do not believe that there are more than 1,500,000 acres of waste lands that would admit of reclamation; but there are at least 1,000,000 of acres of bog-lands in Ireland that would admit of reclamation;" and he added there was "at least three or four times that" of "semi-waste". These 4,000,000 acres of semi-waste Professor Baldwin thinks could make provision for a large number of families if they were allowed to cultivate. Major Robertson agreed that there were large quantities of waste and semi-waste lands on which people might be profitably planted. Why is not all this land reclaimed? Why do we talk of emigrating people while it is left thus uncultivated? I will also quote what Mr. A. J. Kettle gives as evidences of the hindrances to reclamation in Ireland. He says: "In the greater part of Mayo, and, in fact, all over the mountain and bog sides in Tipperary and Kerry, the land had been reclaimed by the tenants, and that without any assistance from the landlords. They created property in a rude way, and the moment that it by means of their exertions furnished a crop, the landlords raised their rents from 1s. per acre to 2s. 6d. per acre, in order to reap a profit on it." "These small tenants were put on some bog or swamp or mountain land, and they reclaimed this either from a state of nature, or barrenness, or a state of swamp." Describing Connaught, the Most Rev. Dr. Duggan said: "We have bogs and mountains unreclaimed; not only that, we have agricultural tenements not half tilled". Mr. E. D. Leahy said: "There is no question that there is in Ireland a vast quantity of reclaimable land". Mr. E. Murphy said: "I have seen large tracts in the south and west of Ireland

where there might probably be a good deal of reclamation". Mr. J. Hegarty stated to the Commission that "a large quantity of land in Ireland might be made into productive land". Mr. A. L. Tottenham, M.P., a Leitrim landowner, conceded that the bog of Allen and other bogs lying in the centre of Ireland might be reclaimed by the population. There is plenty of evidence that land in Ireland has been reclaimed by tenants without any assistance whatever from landlords, who, however, raised the rent upon it as soon as it had been made to produce anything; with better security the land now unreclaimed could be made equally productive. Similar things have happened in England, particularly in the case of lands controlled by the Duchy of Cornwall. A letter now before me gives an instance where 110 acres at South Tawton, formerly common land, producing nothing to the Duchy, has been reclaimed by poor laborers with the free consent of the commoners, and now the Duchy officials demand rent. I do not pretend that all kinds of cultivation could be made profitable in this country. (Hear, hear.) But we import three millions' worth of eggs annually, and uncultivated lands would at least maintain the poultry that might produce eggs in lieu of those imported. In many places agricultural laborers are not permitted to keep fowls, and in some places where they do so the business is made utterly unprofitable by the landlords' foxes. We also import enormous quantities of fruit and dairy produce that we ought to produce at home. It is true there are difficulties in the way, and among them, one is the favoritism shown by our railway companies to imported produce. The Mayor of Manchester gave evidence that produce can be brought from France at lower rates than those that are paid for carrying English produce one-third of the distance. It is dearer to take fruit from one part of Lincolnshire to another than to take it from the South of France to a Lincolnshire market. Speaking without special knowledge, I believe that part of the evil results from the charge being made per ton—many trucks now being half empty, which, if the maximum charge were per truck, it would be the interest of the cultivator to fill. The question is, further, much complicated by the existence of market tolls and regu-

lations, as well as by the absence of market facilities in many places in the country. These difficulties, I trust, may however be met by the Royal Commission which the House has authorised, and which is now sitting. I will ask the House not to reject my motion because of the difficulties in the way; but to remember that I am raising the question, less for the purpose of making an attack upon landowners, than for suggesting the best way of meeting the rising storm which must one day break out from the close juxtaposition, especially in our large towns, of hunger and misery with vast accumulations of wealth. Will it not be wise to meet that storm by remedial measures? The Socialist cry which is heard everywhere, is it not translatable into the expression of hunger and want? If I now plead with the House on this question it is because I am speaking for the class among whom I was born and for whom I am bound to plead. (Hear, hear.) I am convinced that much of the land in this country, which now does not pay, could be made to pay. As a striking proof of that, I will cite one remarkable instance brought to my notice, where a landowner in Northumberland, having failed to get anything out of 700 acres, had handed them over to his bailiff, with the result that the land was made profitable to the landlord. I am now asking the House to listen to facts; and my proposition is that the ownership of land involves duties as well as rights. And my desire is to avert in England what in Ireland has already become, and in Scotland is gradually becoming, a fearful war between one class of society and another. I earnestly hope, therefore, that I shall not be met by a bare *non possumus*. My plan will do far more for the people of this country than the many plans for the employment of the unemployed, plans which generally and ultimately involve an increase of debt and taxation. I have modified my motion into a form which I hope will prove acceptable to the House. It is said that I propose to confiscate property; I do nothing of the kind; but even if I had proposed to do that I could plead the authority of the present Government. (Hear, hear.)

MARKET RIGHTS AND TOLLS.

Examined before the Royal Commission.

(Lord Derby, *Chairman.*)

I would submit, first, that the local authorities should be empowered and required by law to acquire all existing rights to hold markets, to levy tolls, and to make regulations in connexion with markets. The reason why I say that they should be required as well as empowered, is that I think it possible, if the local authorities only had optional powers, powers which they might or might not exercise, they would sometimes be deterred from resorting to the exercise of those powers owing to the expenditure which, rightly or wrongly, they might think that they would be put to in the compulsory acquisition of market rights. I would respectfully submit that the legislation which will be necessary should entirely sweep away all private market rights; and that where compensation is given (I use that phrase, and the Commissioners will see presently my reasons for it), the compensation should be on an adequate scale, to be settled, not by the ordinary means which would be open to local authorities treating with an individual or with bodies, but either by the High Court or by some specially appointed tribunal, which would be competent, not only to investigate the title of the person claiming charter or other rights, but also to ascertain how far he had acted in fulfilment of what I should submit is the expressed or understood obligation in connexion with all charters, namely, the protection and development of the market. So that in ascertaining the compensation to be given, all these matters might be taken into consideration, under authority given by statute, in a way that I do not think at present they

could be taken into consideration. And I would submit that it might possibly be best that the acquisition of market rights, so far as England is concerned, should be undertaken by the County Council in each case. The reason why I say "so far as England is concerned" is only because as yet no County Councils are established elsewhere; but the same principle would of course apply if County Councils are established elsewhere. I suggest that the amount which is necessary for the purchase of the rights should be defrayed out of a special loan fund, and apportioned equally amongst the sanitary districts in respect of which the rights are acquired, and that each such sanitary district should be empowered to carry on the markets in such a way as would eventually extinguish their proportion of the loan charges. I submit next that the local authorities should be absolutely prohibited from leasing or farming any market; that where the charter owner, or manorial owner, or prescriptive owner of market rights, has not provided any market accommodation whatever, his present rights should be extinguished, abolished, and cease, without any compensation whatever; that where he is providing some accommodation, but clearly insufficient accommodation, the compensation should not exceed seven years' purchase, calculated on the average of the last ten years of the net annual receipts by him. It may be that the charter owner, desiring to provide the fullest accommodation, has been by local circumstances, by possible conflict with private rights, prevented from acquiring the property that might be necessary for the proper development of the market; but where he had tried to provide, or had provided, proper accommodation, then the compensation money should be ascertained by valuation and arbitration, as in the case of any freehold. Then I submit that when the tolls are in the hands of the local authorities, the tolls which they levy on foods ought never to be in relief of the rates, but should be only sufficient to provide, first, for the maintenance and necessary extension of the market; secondly, for a sinking fund for the repayment, spread over not too long a term of years (say, thirty years, which seems to me to be sufficiently long), of all moneys expended in acquiring rights, purchasing land, and erecting

buildings; and I think also that the tolls might be so calculated as to provide a small, not a large, reserve or contingency fund to meet sudden increases of population. Sometimes, in the case of new manufacturing industries, there are instances in which there has been increase of population which has rendered necessary an increase of market accommodation; and there would be, I think, no harm and some advantage in the power to have a contingency fund, not too large, for such purposes. Then, if the Commission would permit me to say so, on the evidence as taken, there seems to be—whether from the class of people examined or not I do not quite know—a rather widespread opinion that markets should be conducted with a view to the advantage of the tradesmen of the town. That seems to me upside down, if I may be allowed to put it so roughly. I think that the markets should be conducted primarily in the interest of the consumers of food. I do not know that I need trouble the Commissioners with the references, in any case, to the evidence, but I may say that it is sometimes put that hawkers, for example, should be licensed and put under stringent rules and regulations. I should rather submit to the Commissioners that the class of people who supply foods to the poorest persons should be encouraged, and that no difficulties whatever should be put in their way; that, in fact, the powers of the local authorities shall be limited, so that they should be unable to check free trade in food; that they may afford additional facilities in markets, but that they may not, either under cover of protecting their market or otherwise, hinder anyone from taking to the most wretched, in the cheapest fashion, any foods that it may pay the hawkers to bring, or that the others may desire to get. I do not think that the ratepayers in a town should be allowed any more favorable use of the market than persons who come into it who are not ratepayers. I have noticed that, in one or two cases, there has been evidence given which seems to imply that persons coming out of the country, who did not pay rates, were not entitled to share in the market advantages on the same terms as the ratepayers. I suggest that every facility ought to be given for the obtainment and selling of food, and that that is of the highest importance; and

that the mere small relief to the rates or the ratepayers ought not to be allowed to weigh against that. Then I respectfully suggest that there should be the most complete and thorough statutory abolition of all through tolls, and of any tolls which in any degree resemble the Continental *octroi*; and that there should be provision in any legislation to prevent tolls, rents, or stallages, operating oppressively against small traders. I would submit that, so long as high rents and tolls are demanded from persons such as small growers, holders of allotments, and small farmers having surplus stock, which they may take to the nearest market to dispose of, the imposition of these high tolls operates to the discouragement of that industry, and the community is deprived of home-grown food; and I suggest to the Commission, that at present our system gives an advantage to foreign food-raisers and foreign food-vendors over the home-raisers and home-vendors; and I say that that is amply shown by the fact that small quantities of produce of various kinds are collected over the whole of Europe, and imported into this country, and that there is nothing like a similar attempt made at present to bring into our markets small quantities of home-grown produce, even though grown within a few miles of the market. Then I think it is clear that there are a considerable number of bye-laws, regulations, and scales of tolls in different places (without its being necessary to specify any particularly) which are open to objection; and I submit, therefore, that in any legislation, there should be an enactment that the local authorities should have power to make new rules; and not only that they should have power to make new rules, but that, say, the Local Government Board should, upon the matter coming before them from any district, have power to compel the local authorities to make new rules; and that any such new rules, when made, should be submitted for the approval of the Local Government Board, or such other authority as was thought right. I think it might be well, if it be possible, that the Local Government Board, or some special authority created by the Act, should frame some kind of regulations which might apply as a guide everywhere upon the subject. At present, as I understand it (I am not quite sure that I am speaking correctly on that, and therefore, I speak subject to correction), where any

Government department is required to confirm anything, in the first place, it is no part of their duty to raise objections which are not raised before them; and I suggest that the regulations of which I am speaking ought to be framed and considered, subject to the kind of objections which poor people would make if they had the power to make them, and which appear to arise over and over again in the course of the evidence which has been taken. I propose also that the tribunal I suggested, which should deal with compensation, that is to say, with the amount of purchase money and so on, ought to have the duty imposed upon it of ascertaining whether the charter owners have fulfilled the conditions of their charters. In some cases, it is possible that the charter owner has held his market on a day on which the original charter did not authorise him to hold it, or has assumed to hold it on additional days when he had no authority to do so. I would suggest that, if legal proceedings had been taken, say, by the Attorney-General, it is fairly clear that these charters or patents might have been quashed in olden times, and that all these matters should be taken into consideration in determining what, in cash, the charter owner should get on being deprived of his rights.

Lord Derby: To take these points which you have raised one by one; in the first place, I observe that you think the local authority should not merely be empowered, but should be required, in every case to take charge of the markets. Let me put such a case as this: That the local authority finds itself already heavily burdened with debt, that the rates are high, and that the market is in private hands, but has been so carried on as not to give rise to any local complaint; under those circumstances do you think it would be desirable, not merely to force the seller to part with what he does not wish to part with, but to force the local authority to become a purchaser when neither the authority itself nor its constituents desire that it should do so?—Yes, I do, and for these reasons: I start first from the principle that market rights in private hands are bad; I quite concede that there are very many cases in which the private owner has used his power as wisely and humanely as it is possible for a man to use it, but I do not think that such excep-

tions ought to prevent the general enactment. Either the market is profitable to the private owner, or it is not. If it were not profitable to the private owner he would not carry it on; at least, I have not met any such instance anywhere. If it were profitable to the private owner it would be no burden to the local authority to take it, and it would be equally profitable to them, and therefore no real increase of burden upon the ratepayers would result.

Admitting, at any rate for argument's sake, that all market rights in private hands are bad, do you not think that the local authority may be left to judge of the badness?—No, because it is quite clear that the local authorities at present have not been as active as they should have been in a large number of matters—not only in the case of markets—and if it be admitted that market rights in the hands of private owners are bad, I do not think that the local authorities should have left to them any option of permitting the continuance of an admittedly bad thing.

Is there any precedent that you are aware of for compelling a local authority to purchase something which it does not want to purchase?—No, I think not; I am not aware of any, although there may be precedents; but I would respectfully suggest that if the thing be good it would be well to make a precedent; and local authorities are now being compelled by Parliament to do a number of things that they have heretofore not been compelled to do.

You say that the local authorities should in every case be the County Councils?—No, I beg your Lordship's pardon; I did not express myself clearly. What I felt was this: The authority for the acquisition of the market rights, I suggested, should be the County Council, but only because over a large district I thought that the County Council could probably raise the money on cheaper terms and in a better way; and I also thought I had expressed in my answer my intention that each district should be empowered to carry on its own market, and to carry it on in such a way as would extinguish their share of the loan charge, which I suggest should be apportioned equally among the sanitary districts.

I am not sure that I understand the process that you propose.

Take the case of a large borough within a county; you would say that the County Council should buy the market and hand it over to the borough?—I think that most of the large boroughs are made counties of themselves by the operation of the Local Government Act.

That is only so in the case of the largest boroughs?—Yes; so that that, if it would be difficult, I submit does not arise in the case of very large boroughs.

You think that the middle-sized boroughs would be content to have the market which is held in them purchased by the County Council?—I think it would be an advantage, if my assumption is correct, if the County Council could borrow large sums for the whole of these purposes in a sort of general loan, on easier terms than each small authority having to buy its market could; and I think that it would also leave less possibility of jobbery in the loan, and involve less charges for commission in raising the loan, and so on.

I suppose you would admit that the question whether the County Council or the borough should be the purchasers is a question of detail?—Quite so; that is a suggestion which I respectfully put before the Commission.

You would prohibit the local authority from leasing a market: that is, of course, in pursuance of the principle that markets ought not to be in private hands?—Yes; and I also think there is clear evidence that where markets have been leased, or, what is the equivalent of leasing, farmed in any way by individuals, sometimes the evils have been even greater than where the private owner has himself exercised any authority, because the lessee has tried to make his thirteenpence for a shilling, and has not been careful as to how he made it.

The person who leases the market has only an interest for a limited time, and probably has no interest in the surrounding district?—That is so.

As to the special tribunal which you propose to create for the purpose of buying up markets, why is the matter not one that could be dealt with by the ordinary courts of law?—I think it might be dealt with by the ordinary courts of law; but what I want to shut out is this: whether it be a division of the courts

of law which deals with it or not, I want the amount which is to be paid to the charter owner not to be a matter in which the personal local influence of the charter owner operates upon the local authorities. Many of the members of the authority, being elected, are sometimes more or less under his influence, because the very fact of his being the charter owner generally implies the possession of estates in the district, and considerable local influence; and there are cases in which, where a very large sum to my mind has been demanded by the charter owner, there has been reluctance in fighting him in the council, because of his being deservedly respected for other matters and so on, which prevent the thing being discussed upon business grounds.

Then you mean that it should be taken out of the hands, not of the courts of law, but of the local authority?—Out of the hands of the local authorities.

That they should have no option as to the procedure or as to the price?—No.

That neither the purchaser nor the seller should be consulted, but that the price should be fixed irrespectively of both of them? —Yes. The only thing I would suggest is that it might perhaps be cheaper to appoint a special tribunal in the nature of an official referee, or something of that kind, than to add it to the work of the courts, in view of the delay which necessarily results from its being taken with other matters; and, perhaps, the form of being represented by counsel and other details might be omitted before some tribunal specially appointed.

Now, with regard to the question of compensation where satisfactory accommodation has been provided, you would consent that the seller should receive the fair market price for the thing which he is selling?—Yes.

You say that where no accommodation is provided the rights should cease without compensation; is it to be assumed that in every case the charter has been granted upon condition of accommodation being provided?—The theory that I should respectfully submit to the Commissioners is this: that all these charters were originally granted, or that the legal assumption in connexion with them was, that the person to whom the charter was granted, protected the people coming to sell and to buy, and

also provided some kind of accommodation for them in selling and buying; probably in the old times he had most to do in providing armed men to prevent them from being robbed. There are clear cases of this, and I say that where this has died away and the charter owner has continued to take for nothing a profit which was granted originally on the condition of something being done, he is not entitled to any compensation for having that determined which appears to have degenerated into the acceptance of money without right.

Then it follows that your argument upon that point that where inadequate accommodation has been provided, there should be some compensation paid, but not to the full value?—Yes.

How would you test the inadequacy of the accommodation?—I should leave it to the special tribunal that I have been speaking of to take evidence upon it in each case where complaint was made; I should not like to lay down any hard and fast rule. I would say, certainly, that there is insufficient accommodation where you find a large number of persons who attend the market complaining, for example, that in winter and in inclement weather it is impossible for them to carry on their trades.

But there may be cases where very little accommodation has been provided because very little accommodation has been asked for; is not that so in out-of-the-way districts?—If that be so, I would suggest, either that the charter owner's rights are very small, and the question of compensation is a very trivial question there, or that, perhaps, the not providing of sufficient accommodation may have been the reason for the non-attendance at the market, for indifference to it, and for want of complaint about it.

You have laid down another principle, that the tolls may not be in relief of the rates; you put broadly that the markets are to be self-supporting, but that no profits are to accrue from them to the local authority?—Save that I would allow a margin for a contingency fund; and it is of course possible that if the contingency did not arise, that fund might become a source of profit to the local authority; but I do not think that it would be fair, looking at the development of the population and the needs of markets, that they should be hampered; I think they should have a contingency fund, and a means of meeting these difficulties.

You say that the rates should be primarily in the interests of the consumer, and that the powers of the authorities should be so limited that they should not check the supply of foods; but is it in any case their interest to check the supply of food?—I do not think it is in any case their interest to do so, but I think they have very often done it.

In what way?—I think by high tolls in some cases; and by stupid regulations, if I may be permitted to say so, which give preference in other cases; and I think the fact that what the French call *la petite culture* is more attended to on the Continent, and that produce finds its way from France, and from other parts of Europe into England, instead of from close handy, shows that they have done so.

But is not that part of the general system by which dealings on a large scale are generally more profitable than dealings on a small scale?—I am not sure that it is clear, that to the public consuming and raising foods, dealings on a large scale are more profitable. I am sure that to the conveyers of produce, such as the railway companies, to the factors who deal as middle men between suppliers at a distance and consumers at home, large quantities are a benefit; but I am not speaking for the factors, the middle-men, and the conveyers of produce. What I would suggest is that by facilitating the small raising of food produce here you develop industry, and you increase opportunities of employment as well as make the food cheaper.

Do I correctly understand that you would give any special advantage to the very small traders in the market?—Special advantage, no; but I would not have such a minimum rate of stallage or toll as should preclude it from being profitable to the small sellers to come in.

You think that the minimum is apt to be fixed too high?—I think so. I consider that the tendency of all regulations should be to encourage the small dealers; but I do not think that the encouragement should ever be in the nature of giving a special advantage to a special man, because he is a small man.

You only wish to put him upon an equal footing with others, and that cannot be done unless a very low minimum rate is fixed?—Quite so.

You have not touched upon one subject which has been raised before this Commission, I mean as to that kind of monopoly which the existing law gives to a market for a certain distance round; would you in all cases do away with that?—I should do away with it.

Even in the case of a borough, you would not allow any private person to set up a new market, I presume?—I think that all markets should be in the hands of local authorities, and therefore, necessarily, I would not.

You have said that no markets should be in private hands; therefore, clearly, that would exclude the possibility of any private person setting up a new market?—Quite so.

But subject to that, and all markets being in the hands of some public authority, you would leave the authority to determine how many markets there should be?—Yes. There is just one point which has occurred to me on that, and on which I am not quite sure that my law would be right. I remember that in the case of the Spitalfields Market, and the Great Eastern Railway Company, some shops were held to be markets; I should not in what I have just said about private markets include shops as markets.

It would be necessary carefully to distinguish what is a shop and what is a market?—Yes.

Then you say that the local authorities ought to have power to make new rules for markets where desired; that, I presume, would be inherent in their authority, would it not?—Not only should they have power to do so, but I think that they should be bound, say, within two or three years (the time is a matter of detail), to examine and revise their rules now existing in all cases; that those should be submitted to the Local Government Board, if that be the proper authority, for examination and confirmation; and that the mere fact that they have existed for some time should give them no sort of sanctity so far as that is concerned.

Then you would let the Local Government Board have power to compel them to make new rules if necessary?—Yes.

Would you give the Local Government Board a corresponding power to veto any new rules?—Yes, I would give them not only the power to veto, but the duty of raising objections, if objections

were not raised before them; my suggestion being that some of the poorest who are most affected have neither the knowledge nor the means, sometimes from want of knowing how to do it, to go before the Local Government Board upon such points.

Lord Balfour of Burleigh: I should like a little further explanation as to the exact local authority which is to be compulsorily obliged to acquire markets in any given district?— I think that in each case it should be what you would ordinarily describe as the local authority. It was rather for the purpose of raising money generally that I put the County Councils.

Your desire being that those who use the market and benefit by the market should have the management of it?—That is to say, that the representatives of those who use the market and benefit by the market should have the management of it.

How will you insure that the constituency which elects these representatives will be even generally the same as those for whose benefit the market is established?—It never will be entirely so; but there is nothing perfect in legislation at any rate, and therefore we get the nearest we can to it. We cannot get the local authorities elected by the consumers, nor would it be fair with reference to other matters which they have to deal with; so that one takes, without making a fresh authority, the authority which certainly will have the burden of taking charge of these things and keeping them up and maintaining them.

But do not these difficulties, although they may be difficulties of detail, suggest some doubt in your mind as to the wisdom of compelling the local authority, as distinguished from empowering it, to buy up and manage markets?—No.

Would not the evil of one set of people managing a market, which is used largely by and established for others, arise in the case which I have just put?—Yes; but the evils on balance do not appear to me to be shown to be so great in the case of management by local authorities as in the case of management by private individuals. I think that if we take markets now existing in the hands of local authorities, even allowing to the fullest all objections that may be urged against them, they have been much more beneficial to the people than those in the hands of private owners.

But would it not be, as the Chairman suggested to you in one of his questions, that when these grievances did exist, if the local authorities had the power, they would be quick to act; but that when they thought that the difficulties that would occur would be greater than the existing evils, they would not act, and that therefore it would be a pity to do away with the elasticity of the system?—I do not see my way to modify the answer which I have already given.

I understood you, I think, to say that this special tribunal was to investigate the title, and the manner in which the present owner of the market had discharged his duty?—Yes.

How far back would you go in that investigation?—I think that in order to prevent harassment, it would be a fair thing to limit the time to which they should go back, but I have not considered the point at which the limits should be fixed. I think they should ascertain first what the original charter was, and unless there had been clear evidence of greater advantages having been afforded at particular times which had subsequently been diminished, there should be some limit as to the time of going back.

Could you suggest any limit?—No, I have not sufficiently considered it to suggest a limit, but I should see no harm in limiting it to the last 40 years, or something of that kind.

Did I rightly understand you to say that when, in the opinion of this tribunal, insufficient accommodation had been provided, you would only allow seven years' purchase of any net revenue which was going into the pockets of the present holder of the market?—Unless the charter owner could show that he had tried to provide sufficient accommodation, and that he had been prevented from providing it, as might be in some cases by the adjoining owner of private land asking an exorbitant price, or by the local authorities preventing him, as they might do, supposing that the powers in their hands happened to conflict with his.

Would you lay down a hard and fast rule that if a man had spent a considerable sum of money, but not in the opinion of the tribunal a sufficient sum, you would still give him only a seven years' purchase of the revenue that he is deriving from *bonâ fide*

expenditure?—Certainly, if the tribunal found it to be insufficient, because, although it might be considerable, so far as that individual was concerned, it might be absolutely ridiculous as compared with the population for whom he ought to have provided the accommodation.

But you would have, would you not, to allow a very considerable amount of discretion to the tribunal, because the necessity for increased accommodation might have arisen very suddenly, or the trade might have increased very rapidly?—I think there should be very wide discretion in the tribunal, because so many new matters with no precedent to guide them in coming to a decision would arise.

Would you allow any appeal from the decision of that tribunal?—It would depend upon what the tribunal was. If the tribunal was a Division of the High Court (and I am inclined to think that that would be an expensive tribunal) I should think not; but if a special tribunal was erected of an inferior character (not using the word in any disrespectful sense), then I think there might be, and perhaps ought to be, an appeal to the High Court of Justice; but I would not have it appealable to the Court of Appeal and to the House of Lords; I do not think there should be that expense, because that might be practically ruinous to the one side or the other.

They would have to deal so much with matter of fact, at least, as much with matters of fact as with matters of law, that you think that an appeal to a Court as such would not be satisfactory?—No, I am not putting it in that way; I only thought that one appeal to an independent tribunal was sufficient, because the questions that arose would be very limited; but, on that, I have not a very definite opinion.

On what principle do you think that the revenue derivable from the markets should be raised—upon rents for the accommodation of the people who wished to sell, or duty upon packages of goods going in?—I think that the guiding principle should be to let all produce come in on the easiest terms, and whatever method was found to involve the easiest terms, consistent with the convenience of the market, I think should be adopted.

I have not special knowledge enough to enable me to answer the question otherwise.

Should the local authority that owns the market in the first instance fix the method?—As I suggested in my statement in chief, I think it is possible that the framing of general regulations, and so on, will have to be done by some authority, as a general guide in this matter. There will always be special instances at seaports and inland places, places easily accessible by rail, and places not easily accessible by rail, places where the surrounding population is of a character likely to bring in small quantities of produce, and places practically excluded from that, where different reasons would operate; and I should hardly like to express a more definite opinion.

Surely, as a general principle, it would be better that the local authority should make the first draft of the byelaws, and then submit it to the revising authority?—Clearly, I think so.

In your opinion, what should that revising authority be, the Local Government Board or the County Council?—I have no objection to the Local Government Board except this: that I think the less we go to the centre the better; and as you have got your local authorities now, they, with special local knowledge, ought to be far better able to say what is right than the central authority, which must get information somehow with somebody to guide it.

You would be in favor of transferring the powers from the Local Government Board to the County Council?—I think so.

One risk would be that you would thereby not perhaps secure regulations on the same general principles?—I see no reason why you should not have them on the same general principles, if the general principles are expressed in the legislation, which is what I have suggested.

But if the general principles can be laid down in the legislation, you would like to see the confirming power transferred to the County Council?—Yes, certainly.

What are the small growers and producers, to whom you particularly refer as being put to a disadvantage, in comparison with those who produce abroad?—I will take a case at once. I was lecturing in a northern town, and I was having my tea

with a friend who attended the lecture, a working man working in a mill. His wife raised eggs, and I went carefully into the statement with her as to the cost of the fowls and food, and I found that this poor woman was making a profit of some 6s. or 7s. per week, not a large sum perhaps for the Commission to consider, but a very large sum for them. This woman appeared to be very lucky in the position in which she was. The small cottage in which they lived, in a small street, happened to abut upon some waste land which is the property of the municipality of Rochdale, and for a very trifling sum she had the permission to let her fowls run over it, so that she conducted it at great advantage there. But I would suggest that there are many cases in the agricultural districts in which that advantage might be easily acquired. First, I think that there are instances showing that the persons who might keep the fowls and raise the eggs are prevented from doing so; and there are others in which there is no inducement to the parties to make the exertion.

Of course it is obvious from your statement that the individual to whom you refer in this case conducted her business under exceptional advantages?—No doubt.

But what is there in the existing market regulations, or in any regulations which you dread in the future, to put at a disadvantage those who can conduct such a business as you describe?—That very case illustrates it. This woman might occasionally have sold her eggs for a better price to the hawkers who would have taken them round, and thus have saved her the trouble of taking them to her customers; but she was prevented from doing so by the regulations in force at Rochdale, of which, I think, the Commissioners have evidence.

Would those regulations have been relaxed in favor of those sending in eggs from abroad?—Oh, yes.

Why so?—The eggs come in from abroad, and they do not come into the hawkers' hands at all. You see abroad the equivalent of your hawker only as a collector, and not as a distributor. He goes round and collects from all these small people, and delivers to the factors that which is sent by cheap through rates: to take my own illustration, to a large egg vendor in Rochdale, to whom those who want eggs have to go.

If there were any large number of small producers in this country, what is there in any regulations which, you apprehend, would prevent the collector going round in the same way, and handing the produce in large quantities to the sellers?—You will never, I think, have an attempt at small growth here until the people are reasonably sure of a fair possible profit upon their exertions.

With regard to your recommendations on the subject of hawkers, is it your view that persons should be absolutely free to hawk goods without any intervention on the part of the local authorities?—Except the police regulations, which apply to hawkers generally.

Such as that they must not be an annoyance by their cries, and so forth?—Those are the ordinary kind of regulations, which I do not propose should be interfered with.

You do not object to those regulations?—I do not consider that it comes within my province to examine them.

I understood your recommendation to be so general that you would allow hawkers to go without any interference at all?—Without interference from market authorities; that was the only kind of interference that I was referring to.

You made no recommendation then that the restrictions for the general convenience of the inhabitants should be relaxed?—No.

Mr. Childers: I will not examine you upon your general plan, which appears to me perfectly homogeneous and self contained; but there is one point as to which I should like a little more information. You propose to sweep away all private rights of market altogether, and to confine market rights to local authorities; would you explain to the Commission precisely what you mean by market rights? Market rights are a monopoly against other people; in what way would you restrain other people from competing with the market?—I would impose no new restriction upon any one in competing with the markets. If one had to deal with the thing now on a plain sheet of paper, I am not at all sure that I should be disposed to advocate the creation of market rights even on the part of local authorities; but I have to deal with a state of things which exists, and which, on the

balance, seems to be attended with more advantage than disadvantage, and any attempt to abolish which entirely seems to me to open the door to possible difficulties which I admit I have not fully considered, and which I am not prepared to deal with. Therefore this is rather an alleviation of existing evils, and as making the best provision one can for food reaching those who need it under the easiest and cheapest circumstances.

But would you kindly explain to the Commission what restrictions you would still leave? I think you said that you would not allow any private persons to form a market in competition with an existing market?—I have not contemplated that it is at all possible that any private person would try to form a market anywhere. I do not think that he could do so. In the only cases in which there has been any attempt to form a market by private persons, they have had to come to Parliament for powers. There are two cases which were rejected, one, I think, the year before last, and one the year before that. If a private person was foolish enough to build a big market on land which he had bought for the purpose, or which he had acquired for the purpose, I would not interfere with him at all; but I do not think he would find it a wise investment for his money. That private person would have no right to levy tolls; he could only take tolls by bargain with the people who chose to come to his place, and if certain people chose to come to his place and pay him so much for coming there, with no exclusive rights against anybody else, except within the limits of his place, I do not think I should impose any restrictions.

Hitherto, of course, no private person could get a market right, if he had no charter, even if he was within the distance, except by Act of Parliament. The point that I want to put to you is this: Do you propose that in the future, restrictions should still continue, so that if I or a Company in possession of a certain amount of land were to put up a market, I should be restrained from putting up that market if it was within an area in which a local authority had a market?—My proposition does not deal with that, because if you registered your Company, unless you obtained statutory powers, which I should oppose and urge ought not to be granted to you, you could not possibly acquire

any exclusive market rights. All that you could do would be to open a big building where people might come to sell and where others might buy from them, but you could not possibly have any sort of right against other people.

I was not dreaming of exclusive rights at all.—I should not prevent it in such a case.

You would not draw any distinction in future between a market and a shop. If I liked to establish a shop on such a very large scale as that, it would be practically a market; and if I sold goods in it, you would not restrain me from doing so because I was not a local authority?—No, because it is clear that, as against the local authority providing the accommodation, you would have no inducement to do so; for I am proposing that the local authority itself shall be prevented from making profit out of its market in relief of the rates, and there is no inducement to a private individual to undertake a necessarily profitless enterprize.

And therefore you would trust to that being a bad speculation?—I would trust to the things which govern ordinary trade.

You would not set up any Parliamentary objection to it, so that I should be restrained before I even went into the business at all, from considering whether I would do it or not?—My view is to encourage people to sell and to buy, not to prohibit anyone from selling and buying.

On whatever scale?—On whatever scale.

Even if I followed the ordinary machinery of a market on my own property?—You would not follow the ordinary machinery, because you could not by law levy any tax; you could only make special bargains with the people, who came to you in each instance, which would not be enforceable apart from the special bargains.

But if I ran that risk, and made a special bargain in each case, you would not prevent me?—I should not prevent you.

Then while you would encourage in every possible way, and make it, in fact, compulsory upon certain local authorities to establish markets, you would not interfere in the least with the sale on their own property, by any person or company, of the

same goods which may be sold in the market?—Most certainly not.

Sir Thomas Martineau: Would your limit of the seven years' purchase apply only to those cases where the owner had not, as you think, done his duty under his charter, or in the provision of the necessary accommodation?—Not quite so. Where he had not done his duty at all I would give him nothing: I think he has too much already; but where he had insufficiently done his duty, and the insufficiency had not been caused by matters over which he had any control, I would give him limited compensation.

In a case where everything has been done that he ought to do, or could be expected to do, you would put no limit at all to the compensation?—No, I would leave that to the tribunal to assess just as in the case of any other compulsory expropriation.

Without limit?—I think that a man who has done his best should be liberally dealt with when you cancel his ability to do it any longer.

Are you aware that in some of these cases where there has been a sale and purchase of rights, the future contingencies are very largely taken into account in fixing the price?—Yes, I think that would be all matter for the tribunal to deal with.

So that it might be that a price would be fixed which was not based altogether upon what had been received, but upon the expectation of what the future receipts might be?—I must not be taken as implying that there is any case conceivable to me at the moment, in which increase beyond the actual value can be considered; but I should not like to exclude the possibility of cases which I have not considered.

We have had evidence in one or two cases here of that having very much affected the price which has been asked for market rights.—I would suggest that sometimes local considerations have operated very much—the very thing that I have tried to exclude—in the settlement of local bargains.

If the price is to be regulated by future expectations, as well as by what has been done in the past, it very much affects the answer which you gave to the noble Chairman, as to the point whether the income received by the present owner would be a

fair equivalent for the purchase money fairly given by the local authority?—I would not take any larger methods of calculation in examining and assessing the purchase money to be paid in the case of an owner of market rights compulsorily expropriated, than I would in the case of any other individual compulsorily expropriated, either by a railway company or by a local authority for other purposes.

But the effect might be this: that a very large sum of money would have to be found by the local authority, for which it would not get any corresponding income at the time of its purchase?—I cannot convey into my answer an assumption that that is possible. I cannot assume any case in which the assessment of the amount will involve the payment of a sum of money for which return cannot be got. That would seem to me to show at once that an improper sum had been fixed.

Do you not think that if there had been a steady increase in receipts for a long series of years, it is a very conceivable case that an arbitration or special tribunal would so take that into account that, in fixing a price, he would name a sum which would cover the probable increase for a reasonable time?—It is quite impossible to answer a general question of that kind, because I have in my mind now, a district not very far distant from Sheffield, in which there had been a gradual increase of population in connexion with a developing industry, and in which that increase has not only entirely ceased, but the population has lamentably diminished by the transfer of that industry to another place. I therefore could not give a specific answer to the general question.

What I want to call your attention to is this: that if it should be enacted that a local authority should be bound to buy the markets, whether they wished it or not, whether they think they can make it a good bargain or not, you may be landing some of them in a very large outlay, for which they will not get an immediate remuneration?—I do not quite know whether the stress of that question comes on the word "immediate", but I cannot conceive any fairly assessed purchase money which does not give them a return. If there is any stress on the word

"immediate", of course these local authorities never do immediately get back their outlay.

Supposing that they do not get back their outlay for 10 years, which is a large part in the life of a ratepayer, it is a severe tax on the ratepayers in the meantime, is it not?—I could not, unless I had some special case to consider, bring my judgment to bear on a proposition which does not seem to me at present (I say it respectfully) well founded.

I will not pursue it further, except to ask whether you have considered the possibility, in any legislation of that kind, of making an exception in favor of cases where peculiar hardships might be shown?—No. I quite admit that all laws involve some hardships; I am not sure that any such hardship could arise, but I do see the possibility of exceptions being very dangerous in the destruction of the utility of legislation.

You would not even allow an exception under an order from the Local Government Board, or any central board, on cause being shown?—I think that dispensing powers are not good generally.

With reference to the byelaws, Lord Balfour asked you about the confirming authority. A large number of the larger boroughs and cities, as you have mentioned, are now governed by County Councils; I suppose that in those cases you would still go for the confirmation of byelaws to the Local Government Board?—Yes; I would not leave people to confirm their own byelaws.

And you would not take Liverpool to Lancaster, for instance, or Birmingham to Warwick?—Whatever the ordinary law has done with reference to other matters in that respect, I would not propose to make any exception, but to follow what happened under the Local Government Act, to which I am sorry to say I have not given quite sufficient attention from that point of view.

Mr. Picton: His lordship put it to you that if the price were fixed by the special tribunal that you have indicated, neither purchaser nor seller would be consulted, but the price would be fixed irrespective of both; but I do not understand you to object to the possibility of settlement by mutual arrangement?—Yes,

I rather think I should, and I will tell you why; I want to avoid dealing with instances as to which my information may be doubtful, and which would be unfair to persons mentioned in their absence; but I think I know instances in which, by mutual agreement, sums have been already agreed to be paid, either as cast down, or say as a sum of £5000 a year for ever, which have seemed to me to be open to objection, and I do not think that local authorities should be permitted to make unfair agreements. They would be exceptional cases, and they would become more exceptional still as the thing went on. The interests require watching, as the evidence shows.

Are you aware that under the Elementary Education Act, bargains made by School Boards have oftentimes to be approved by the Education Department before the price is agreed upon?—I should have no objection on the ground of saving of expense. If the persons came together and arrived at the sum, and that was submitted to some authority for confirmation, there would be no use putting people to the expense of ascertaining a thing if they could reasonably agree upon it.

To that extent your answer would be modified?—If my former answer implied more than that.

With regard to the necessity of compelling local authorities to purchase, you ground that necessity on the interest of the consumer, do you not?—Yes.

As a universal rule, the objects of markets ought to be to distribute commodities as cheaply as possible to the consumer; your view, as I take it is, that unless there was one universal rule applied, and all markets passed into the hands of the local authorities, there would be some consumers neglected and unfairly treated?—Yes.

Mr. Charrington: With regard to compulsory purchase, the case of a private market where the market owner offered it to the public authority for the price which it had cost him was before the Commission, but they, on looking into the figures, considered it a bad investment on the part of the public, and declined it. Now if there was compulsory purchase in such a case as that, either the one or the other would be a great loser; either the public would lose in giving too much, or the market

owner would lose a great part of what he had spent?—No; with submission, because either the price asked was a fair and reasonable price, and the refusers were wrong in their judgment, or it was too high. If the price was too high the vendor would not get it from the tribunal; and if the others had been mistaken in their judgment, there is no reason why they should persist in it.

In this case the vendor only asked what he had spent upon it?—But it is quite possible that a man may have spent on a horse more than the value of it.

Mr. Elton: It seems to me that by the details into which you descended in your statement, you rather veiled the real idea that underlay them. What you mean is not a series of purchases and sales between contracting parties; they are only dummies, and they are not according to your plan, as I understand it, to contract at all. What you want is to abolish the existing system of markets, with compensation to private owners on proper rules?—Quite so.

I have heard the discussion, and I daresay it has occurred to you that there may be difficulties, if you express it in language, in saying "purchase" when you really mean abolition?—Yes.

The theory of the English markets, so far as it has appeared in the Blue Books, seems to be rather what you said, that it is a monopoly of taking toll granted in consideration of public convenience being provided?—That is my view, and if I may be permitted to say so, I think the public are very much indebted to the Commission for the statement of the law and history of the markets in the report already issued.

That accommodation was sometimes provided, of course, in modern times, and sometimes in very ancient times. You rather assumed in one of your answers that if a person had given the accommodation in very ancient times, and had never given any since, he could not possibly be legally taking the money now-a-days for what his ancestors had done; is that your view?—If I used the word "legally" I was, perhaps, thinking of the word "morally".

I venture to correct you, because you are no doubt aware that it has been decided in the courts of law that a somewhat

problematical antique benefit to the public is sufficient consideration for a modern toll?—Yes. I am not quite sure whether, in these cases, the non-performance has been argued with the help of the Attorney-General as a reason for stopping it.

The great case of Gunn *v.* The Free Fishers of Whitstable was taken to the House of Lords, and it was laid down in that case; but that view you would modify at any rate?—Yes, the word "legally" was clearly a wrong word to have used.

Take a case where a person had provided accommodation in this way: that when he built the town he left one of the streets very much wider than the others, and called it a market place, the market still being held there; and he, perhaps, still the owner of the soil, and, further, they have their markets there; would you consider that sufficient accommodation?—I would rather not put myself in the position of the special tribunal to determine what is sufficient. I do not consider that I have the ability to determine what is and what is not insufficient accommodation.

That follows from your previous answer. You said that you would not regard the accommodation which was given in those very ancient times as making a title to modern toll. I took a well known case (I think it is Leeds) where, in one market, it was stated that the owner left one of the streets a good deal wider than the others, and called it a market place, and built the town in that particular shape; is that the kind of ancient accommodation that you would disregard?—That is a matter upon which I would rather not express an opinion. I would rather leave that to the tribunal whose duty it would be to adjudicate upon it.

Then, of course, there is another view of markets which has prevailed in some other countries, that the market is merely a matter for the local authority to administer as an ordinary matter of public convenience; that is the view to which you lean?—If "public convenience" includes in it the getting to the consumer in the easiest and cheapest manner all that he requires of food produce.

You would do away with monopoly as far as possible?—Yes.

Either for persons or for classes?—Yes.

Even for the class of the ratepayers of the place where the

market is founded?—I think that the ratepayers, in relation to food, should have no rights superior to those of the consumers of the food. I do not think that the ratepayers should have to incur a special burden for the consumers, but they ought not to have any privilege as against the consumers.

Instead of providing this food supply by means of a franchise or privilege you would substitute a new principle of doing it through local self-government?—I think so.

Of course, there are a great number of private Acts regulating markets over the country: I understand your view to be that if you established a system of making market schemes subject to proper bye-laws, you might follow some other examples, and say that all Statutes and Acts inconsistent with that scheme are hereby repealed?—I think it might be as well in the general legislation to repeal all these Statutes at the end of, say, three years, so as to give sufficient time.

That is what we have done in the case of the Endowed Schools Department?—I quite agree that your opinion and information upon that matter would be much more valuable than mine. I have not sufficiently considered it as a point of detail, and, therefore, I should not express an opinion upon it.

Would it not be more convenient not to go into all these hundreds of Acts and abolish them separately, but to allow schemes to override them when made?—Except that I would not leave them to live if by accident the schemes were not made.

Then with regard to the compensation, I understand that you want to avoid the evils which have sometimes occurred in the case of Lands Clauses Act compensation; that is to say, over-valuations and valuations on wrong principles, and local land surveyors giving people large prices. Have you ever considered the way in which the Land Commissioners manage the compensation in the case of the enfranchisement, for example, of copyholds?—No, my information is very incomplete on that point; I have only very general information upon it.

Take the system to be something like this: that except the parties agree a competent valuer shall go down, acting on certain principles laid down, that he holds an inquiry and fixes the value, that it is subject to an appeal to the Board of Agriculture, or to

the Land Commissioners, or the Local Government Board, or whatever may be the tribunal existing at the time; and that then, if they do anything wrong, there should be an individual appeal on the point of law by way of injunction or mandamus to a court of law, but that a department should do it rather than a tribunal in the sense of a court. Do you think that is a convenient system?—I think it is.

Would not that work out your plan?—I think it would. I only used the word to avoid the difficulties which you have already anticipated. However, that is a matter of detail.

You are not hard-and-fast devoted to having a judge, and a court, and wigs, and all that sort of thing, in the case of every market in England?—Certainly not, if it were possible to avoid it.

You take it that it might well be considered whether that Land Commission plan, subject to an appeal in case of a legal point arising, might not be the best method of dealing with the matter?—Yes, and I think that it would be an advantage to deprive any such negotiations of the character of litigation.

Unless a point of law arose?—Unless there was an absolute necessity.

What you said about model bye-laws and model schemes is carried out in other departments, and that, of course, would be most convenient. Then, putting it shortly, the observations which you have made about the principles on which compensation should be assessed would, in my view of a department doing it, be laid down as rules?—Yes.

Such rules as the Land Commissioners issue to the public now about copyholds?—Yes.

That in fixing the compensation the valuer should take into account the following rules as to whether accommodation has been properly provided, and so on?—I would rather not go into the "as to's"; I am agreed in the main.

As to such points as those you have mentioned to-day?—Yes. I should not like to give a list of cases from which I might omit something or in which I might improperly include something. Such details, governed by what I have already said, I should think ought to be included.

The principle which you suggest, or something like this, might be embodied in rules for the guidance of the tribunal?—Yes, or any principles which the Commissioners finally considered should govern the matter.

I will not go into such details as those of sham markets. You would not interfere with stores; anybody who tried to set up a sham market would not get any compensation?—No. Perhaps I may be permitted to add that I do not think that anybody setting up any kind of market from now, ought to be entitled to any compensation under any legislation.

You told us that they could not set up any market at all, in which I quite agree?—That is so.

When you started the discussion which led to this Commission being appointed, you mentioned two or three towns in which I am interested; I should like to know whether you have made further inquiry as to those, or whether you have read the evidence. I see that you have been speaking of them quite lately; have you any special objection to the way in which the markets in those three towns, Taunton, Bridgewater, and Chard, are conducted, or do you wish to modify the observations that you have made?—If the Commission will permit me, I may only say that I have read as carefully as it is possible the whole of the voluminous evidence which has been taken, except the batch which reached me last night. If I may say so, I am perfectly content with the case as the Commission has taken it; I think that it has been most exhaustively taken; and I have no desire to make any kind of comment upon it. Naturally my speech in Parliament, though I tried to make it as accurate as I could, was made upon the *ex parte* statements that reached me up to that time, and I would rather not put it as in any way clashing with the evidence that has been taken. There was one obvious error, I think, as to Bridgewater, which I corrected in the *Times* the following week. I think, if I may be permitted to say so, the case which I submitted has been more than made out.

With regard to the cases of Taunton, Bridgewater, and Chard, subject to the correction which you have already made in public, you prefer that the evidence should be taken as it has been published by the Commission, rather than that we should

go back to the statements which might possibly have been (I do not say they were) inaccurate in some points?—Certainly. I should prefer that the Commission disregarded the speech I made on that occasion entirely so far as regards matter of fact, because it was made on imperfect information. I think it has been more than substantiated right through, but there may be inaccuracies as to place, or date, or detail.

And you refer us to the evidence on those points?—Quite so.

Chairman: Is there anything that you wish to add?—Nothing at all except to express my regret for having detained you so long.

RELIGIOUS PROSECUTIONS ABOLITION BILL.

House of Commons, 12th April, 1889.

Mr. SPEAKER,—the Bill, the second reading of which I have asked the House to pass, is directed against prosecutions which are partly prosecutions at common law and partly prosecutions by Statute. The Statute is the 9th and 10th William III, chapter 35, and that Statute enacts that any person convicted of blasphemy shall, for the first offence, be adjudged incapable and disabled in law, to all intents and purposes whatsoever, to have, to hold, or enjoy any office or offices, employment or employments; and shall, for a second offence, be adjudged disabled from being a plaintiff or defendant in any suit, or from being the guardian of his own children, or from being capable of receiving any legacy, and shall be liable to imprisonment for the space of three years. The Act has been held to be supplemental to the common law. I may best describe the Statute by using the words of Lord Coleridge, uttered in a case which was tried six years ago. In the course of the defence, the Statute had been described as shocking, and Lord Coleridge said: "Some old things, and amongst them this Statute, are shocking enough, and I do not defend them". In a judgment which Lord Justice Lindley delivered in 1885, His Lordship spoke of this Statute as cruel in its operation against the persons against whom it was directed. The Statute of 6th of George, chapter 47, which applies to Scotland, makes the offence punishable by 14 years' transportation. Now, Mr. Justice Stephen in his "History of the Criminal Law", which was written and passed through the Press in 1882, although it was published in 1883, wrote: "Offences against religion can hardly be treated as an actually

existing head of our criminal law. Prosecutions for such offences are still theoretically possible in a few cases, but they have in practice become entirely obsolete." Unfortunately, whilst the History was passing through the press, several prosecutions were initiated. One of these cases was tried at Maidstone; two were tried at the Old Bailey; and two, in one of which I was myself the defendant, were removed by *certiorari* to the High Court, and were tried before the present Lord Chief Justice of England. Here are two views of the law which it is my duty to submit to the House, one, the view taken by the present Lord Chief Justice of England—namely, that it is only the manner of a blasphemous libel which should be censured, and that a calm, and clear, and cool statement of views could not bring a person within the operation of the laws relating to blasphemy; and the other, the view which, with all submission to the great Judge who has expressed the contrary opinion, I am afraid is the real view of the law—the view which was formed by Mr. Justice Stephen and Mr. Justice Hawkins sitting in the Queen's Bench Division, and which was mentioned in the charge of Mr. Justice North in the trials at the Old Bailey; and formed in the case of the Attorney-General *v.* Bradlaugh reported in the *Weekly Reporter*, vol. 433, especially by Lord Justice Lindley. It seems to me that the real state of the law has been very fully explained by Mr. Justice Stephen in an article that appeared in the *Fortnightly Review*, and which had been published in examination and criticism of the charge of Lord Coleridge to the jury in the case of the Queen *v.* Foote and others. Mr. Justice Stephen there urges that the law as it now stands is a bad law, and recommends the very measure which I am bringing before the House to-night. It is right, however, I should state Lord Coleridge's view—the view that it is the manner and not the matter of the blasphemous libel which should be considered—before I put what I conceive is, unfortunately, the real view of the law. Lord Coleridge says: "It is clear, therefore, to my mind that the mere denial of the truth of the Christian religion is not enough alone to constitute the offence of blasphemy;" and he goes on to point out that all prosecutions for blasphemy, according to his view, tend to failure.

Further on in his judgment, Lord Coleridge says: "Persecution, unless thorough-going, seldom succeeds. Irritation, annoyance, punishment which stops short of extermination, very seldom alter men's religious convictions. Entirely without one fragment of historical exaggeration, I may say that the penal laws which 50 or 60 years ago were enforced in Ireland were unparalleled in the history of the world. They existed 150 years ago; they produced upon the religious convictions of the Irish people absolutely no effect whatever." I submit to the House, that all kinds of enactments which are in the nature of persecution for opinion, are enactments which fail in doing anything except driving the expression of opinion into its worst and roughest forms, and therefore, they ought not to be desired by anyone who has in any degree any faith in any kind of liberty. Mr. Justice Stephen, reviewing the charge of Lord Coleridge, a charge which he praises in language not too strong, says: "My only objection to it is that I fear that its merits may be transferred illogically to the law which it expounds and lays down, and that thus a humane and enlightened judgment may tend to perpetuate a bad law by diverting public attention from its defects. The law I regard as essentially and fundamentally bad." Now when a learned judge, who is now engaged in trying cases, can thus describe this portion of the law, I think I can submit there is something like a *prima facie* case for its repeal. Lord Justice Lindley in delivering judgment in the case of the Attorney-General *v.* Bradlaugh adds: "It is a mistake to suppose, and I think it as well the mistake should be known, that persons who do not believe in a Supreme Being are in the state in which it is now commonly supposed they are. There are old Acts of Parliament still unrepealed by which such people can be cruelly persecuted." And it was because Lord Justice Lindley found this law on the Statute Book, that he said he felt constrained to hold it as he did in the case then before him. What is the state of the law? I prefer to put it in the words of Mr. Justice Stephen rather than in my own. He quotes in support of his statement a large number of cases, and he proceeds: "The result of the examination of the authorities appears to me to be that to this day Blackstone's definition of blasphemy must be

taken to be true; and, if this is the case, it follows that a large part of the most serious and most important literature of the day is illegal—that, for instance, every bookseller who sells, every one who lends to his friend, a copy of Comte's *Positive Philosophy*, or of Renan's *Vie de Jésus*, commits a crime punishable with fine and imprisonment. It may be said that so revolting a consequence cannot be true; but, unfortunately, this is not the case. I suppose no one will, or indeed can deny that if any person educated as a Christian, or having ever made profession of the Christian religion, denied that the Bible was of divine authority, even by word of mouth, he would incur the penalties of the 9 and 10 William III, c. 32. I will take a particular instance by way of illustration of this. The late Mr. Greg was not only a distinguished author, but an eminent and useful member of the Civil Service. I suppose he was educated as a Christian, and no one could have a stronger sympathy with the moral side of Christianity. In every one of his works the historical truth of the Christian history is denied: and so is the divine authority of the Old and New Testament. If he had been convicted of publishing these opinions, or even of expressing them to a friend in private conversation, his appointment would have become void, and he would have been adjudged incapable and disabled in law to hold any office or employment whatever; in a word, he would have lost his income and his profession. Upon a second conviction, he must have been imprisoned for three years, and incapacitated, amongst other things, to sue or accept any legacy. About this there neither is, nor can be, any question whatever." And after a long and careful summary of the law, as laid down in many decisions, Mr. Justice Stephen winds up: "In my own opinion the practical inference is that blasphemy and blasphemous libel should cease to be offences at common law at all, that the Statute of William III should be repealed, and that it should be enacted that no one, except a beneficed clergyman of the Church of England, should be liable to ecclesiastical censures for 'atheism, blasphemy, heresy, schism, or any other opinion'. Such an abolition would not only secure complete liberty of opinion on these matters, but it would prevent the recurrence at irregular

intervals of scandalous prosecutions, which have never, in any one instance, benefited anyone, least of all the cause which they were intended to serve, and which sometimes afford a channel for the gratification of private malice under the cloak of religion." I ask this House to give effect to what the learned Judge has said. I know there are one or two arguments that may be used to weigh heavily against me. One is, that the class for whom I speak is a comparatively small class. (Mr. DeLisle: "Hear, hear.") There would be no reason in denying liberty to one man, even if he stood alone. Every opinion, in every age, has been at some time small; and those who hold opinions which, within 100 years, have been the subject of cruel persecutions within this realm, should be the last to endorse the doctrine of persecution against those weaker than themselves. It may be urged that the severe penalties of the law are seldom enforced. It is only about 50 years ago that, under this Act, one man suffered nine years and eight months' imprisonment in this country, and was also condemned to pay an enormous fine. It did not check his issuing the literature against which the prosecution was directed. It only had the effect of endearing him to a large number of people, and of making many purchase the writings he issued, who might otherwise not have done so. I hardly like to seem to be thrusting my personal case upon the House, but I may be permitted to remind the House that the declaration has been made very formally, in print, that the prosecution which was directed against me was initiated for the direct purpose of disqualifying me, under this Statute, for the term of my natural life, from taking part in the political work of the country. I submit to the House that, ruling as it does over 330,000,000 of human beings, of every kind of faith or lack of faith, it is our duty to treat all alike. What is the effect of the law as it stands? Two years ago a legacy was left to myself and a gentleman in Manchester for the purpose of endowing an institution. We were all persons who might have been indicted as blasphemers under the law. The legacy was left for purely educational purposes, but the legacy was set aside, first of all in the Court of the Palatine of Lancaster, and next on appeal, on the ground that a bequest for such a purpose was an illegal

bequest and voidable. It may be said: "we would not object to your being allowed to utter your views, but we object to your uttering your views in offensive language". But if persons utter their views in an offensive manner, and so as to provoke a breach of the peace, they are punishable under the law as it now stands. The fact that the law is not always enforced; the fact that it is seldom enforced; the fact that Mr. Justice Stephen in his "History of the Criminal Law" describes the law as obsolete; the fact that Lord Justice Lindley has referred to the law as cruel in its operation, should tend, I submit, to induce the House to grant the Second Reading of this Bill. I can quite understand it is possible that people will say that views differing from their own should not be offensively urged; but that brings in the question of the manner of the advocate rather than that of the matter, and I put it to persons who hold this view, whether the keeping on the Statute Book of this harsh and cruel law does not deprive many of us, who may wish to tone and temper argument, of any fair reason for checking harsh or hasty speech or utterance. Again, let me point out that the word "blasphemy" for which you punish to-day, has been an ever-changing word. It is only 240 years ago that a man, Naylor, the Quaker, of the same faith as the man (Mr. Bright) whom all of us in this House honored, was tried for blasphemy. George Fox, William Penn, and scores of their co-workers were sent to goal, or whipped at the cart tail as blasphemers. The Unitarians, had they lived even later than the times of which I have just spoken, would have come within the penalties of this Statute, which Lord Coleridge says gives a ferocious power against people, and which Lord Justice Lindley condemns as an essentially bad law. I feel that this is not a time of night to trespass unduly on the attention of the House. I can only appeal to the generosity of the majority, but I would point out to them the position in which they put those who differ from them when they lack generosity themselves. I have sometimes tried to argue with my friends in France against the strict enforcement some of them have put on the Anti-Clerical laws; they have answered me, "the Church shows us no mercy". It is that kind of unfortunate spirit which treats opinion as if it were a crime, and

thought as if it were a crime, when the very honesty of the utterance of that thought, that expression of opinion, shows you that the persons against whom you direct your Statute have at least the virtue of honesty to redeem their action from being classed with that of the ordinary criminal. It is against this unfortunate spirit I am arguing; it is for these people I am pleading to-night. I am pleading for many who have found trusts for their children cancelled, as was the case with a member of this House, honored while sitting in it because of the family to which he belonged, and for the great name and greater traditions associated with it—I mean Lord Amberley. He found his trust for his children cancelled, because the man whom he honored enough to give the trust, might have been brought within the scope of this statute. It is too late to-day to keep these penalties on the Statute Book. The Bill may not receive sanction for its second reading to-night; but it is something—and I thank the House for it—that the House has listened patiently and generously to an appeal made on behalf of an unpopular minority; and one day or other justice will have to be done, and I ask the House to do it whilst those for whom they are asked to do it are few and weak, rather than leave us to win, as win we will, that outside public opinion by the ballot which determines what the law shall be.

PERPETUAL PENSIONS.

House of Commons, May 16, 1889.

Mr SPEAKER,—I beg to move "That this House dissent from so much of the proposals of the First Lord and Chancellor of the Exchequer, contained in the Treasury Minute of July 20, 1888, relating to perpetual pensions, as proposes 'that holders of pensions, allowances, and payments which the law officers of the Crown consider to be permanent in character, and to which no obligations of an onerous kind attach, should be invited to commute such pensions, allowances, or payments on the same terms as have been accepted in the numerous cases already commuted'; and this House approve the Report of the Select Committee on Perpetual Pensions, 'that the rate of commutation usually adopted, of about 27 years' purchase, is too high'". In view, sir, of what I understand to be the general wish of the House, that an early division should take place upon the motion, I do not intend to cumber the discussion with matters of personal detail of the pensions which can be found by all hon. members in the Report of the Select Committee—in the evidence, as well as in the appendices to the Report. I shall only take the distinction made by that Report, namely, that there are some pensions, not many, granted for services rendered, and a great many ranking under circumstances difficult to justify at any time, and almost impossible to justify with the feeling at present prevalent in the House. I hope it will not be necessary to treat the subject as a party question, although the Government may feel bound to defend a minute for which, as it is, I presume, the work of the Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, the Chancellor of the Exchequer is nominally responsible. At no time has the agitation on the question been of a

party character, and the vote to be taken will not, I hope, be made by the Government one of mere party allegiance. When I had the honor of bringing this motion before the House—very imperfectly, it is true—in the short autumn Session of 1881, I presented a number of petitions, a large proportion of the signatures to which were those of Conservatives. Now, to-night, I am merely asking the House to stand by the decision of its own Committee—a decision not arrived at by a party or majority vote, but with absolute unanimity and with the consent of her Majesty's Attorney-General, who then represented the Government very effectively upon that Committee. The constitution of the Committee shows ten supporters of the Government, and seven members of the Opposition, and I think that without exceedingly strong grounds, grounds which I have never yet heard alleged, it will be almost to much to imagine that the House will repudiate the decision of the Committee, which has been practically endorsed by the House itself, in a resolution of March 23, 1888. I hope that the House will on this occasion, as it usually does, support Committees which have been at great pains to examine into grave matters, involving much detail, and that it will not hastily and lightly dismiss from its attention a judgment arrived at after full consideration, after many sittings, and with the absolute and active concurrence of the Attorney-General and nine supporters of the Government. The resolution arrived at by the Committee was to the effect that steps should be taken forthwith to determine hereditary pensions and allowances, with due regard to the just claims of the respective recipients, and to economy in the public service. In consequence of that resolution, the minute with which I disagree was laid on the table of the House on July 20 last, and 20 days had to elapse before it could come into force. As the minute, however, was in print during only the last three days of the interval, it was impossible to challenge it at the time. A day for its discussion was promised in the adjourned session last year, but the promise could not be fulfilled, and therefore, though nearly a year has elapsed since the minute was first laid on the table of the House, the delay in challenging it has not been due to any fault of mine. This opportunity is now given

me, in accordance with the terms of the letter sent me by the First Lord of the Treasury, specifically promising an early day this Session. In the minute the Government agree that pensions, allowances, and payments ought not in future to be granted in perpetuity; that offices with salaries and without duties, or with mere nominal duties, ought to be abolished; and that the existence of all perpetual pensions, allowances, and payments should be determined and abolished. The Government, having agreed to that last declaration, are hardly dealing fairly with the House if they propose to give all pensioners, in abolishing their pensions, a sum which would realise to them for ever an amount nearly equal to the pension. I see the Chancellor does not agree with me, but I am going to quarrel with his arithmetic, if the House will bear with me.

Mr Goschen: We do not propose to give in each and every case any particular sum.

I am delighted to hear that, but if there is to be a distinction between cases it is a pity the Government have not said so before. The Government say most accurately that it is not in their power to bind their successors, and I am glad of the admission, because it has weight in reference to a later statement in the minute to the effect that the present Parliament and Government are bound by the Acts of previous Parliaments and Governments. If the former declaration be true, there can be no force in the latter one. I would urge as a principle that no Parliament has the right to bind for ever all future Parliaments in relation to payments which may come to be considered as disastrous, fraudulent, and demoralising. The Government state: "The remaining payments and pensions due to individuals are 16 in number, involving a yearly cost of nearly £12,000, while further annuities, amounting to between £23,000 and £24,000 a year, are mainly payable to bodies and corporations". I do not know whether the word "mainly" was used accidentally or designedly, or whether it was used to cover the fact that there are other individuals not included in the 16, and other pensions not included in the £12,000. They are 25 in number, and I will read them to the House. It is just I should say the Secretary to the Treasury has laid on the table

to-day a paper in reference to this subject. In the paper there is a statement that there are only 16 individuals receiving pensions. Let me read my list to the House. It is one which members can check for themselves from the appendices to the Report of the Select Committee: "(1) Viscount Exmouth, £2000; (2) Earl Nelson, £5000; (3) Lord Rodney, £2000; (4) Duke of Grafton, officer of the Pipe, £62 9s. 8d.; (5) Sir Edward Hulse, £10 4s. 6d.; (6) Heirs of T. Warren, £12 7s. 2d.; (7) F. J Prescott, £261 5s.; (8) E. Wadham, £9; (9) Duke of St Albans, £965; (10) Earl Dysart, £75 10s.; (11) Lord Dauverquerque, £375 16s.; (12) Marquis of Devonshire, £216 3s. 4d.; (13) Marquis of Devonshire, £13 18s. 4d.; (14) Duchess of Lancaster, £803; (15) Duke of Cornwall, £16,216 16s.; (16) Sir Patrick Walker's heirs, £242 15s.; (17) Duke of Hamilton, £45 10s.; (18) Mary Pendrell and Richard Pendrell's heirs, £100: (19) William Pendrell's heirs, £100; (20) Jno. Pendrell's heirs, 100 marks; (21) Humphrey Pendrell's heirs, 100 marks; (22) George Pendrell's heirs, 100 marks; (23) Elizabeth Yates' heirs, £50; (24) Duke of Grafton, £6870; (25) Duke of Richmond, £19,000." I, therefore, make the number of individuals 25, and the amount a few thousands more than £12,000.

Mr. Goschen: Will the hon. gentleman refer to the particulars of the grants to the Duke of Richmond and Duke of Grafton?

I can quite understand why the Chancellor of the Exchequer has been misled by his advisers as to these particular pensions. It is the fashion to say that the pensions of the Duke of Grafton and of the Duke of Richmond have been commuted. Neither of them has been commuted. [The Chancellor of the Exchequer signified dissent.] I see the Chancellor of the Exchequer disagrees with that, but as I have given at least 16 years to the study of this question, and had the opportunity of considering it while Parliament allowed me to do nothing else, the Chancellor of the Exchequer will perhaps allow me to state my own view of it, especially as it is fully corroborated. What was done in the cases of the pensions of the Duke of Grafton and of the Duke of Richmond? The Duke of Richmond was the son of one of our kings, who would not in ordinary law have been entitled to any kind of

maintenance. He was, however, provided for by his father out of the coal industry of this country by 1s. per cauldron upon coal, a charge which operated as a curse on the Tyneside industry for fully a century and a quarter, and which at the end of the last century was turned into a cash payment of £19,000, to secure the due payment of which—perhaps to protect it from irreverent hands, like those of Joseph Hume, or from worse ones, like those of myself—a sum of money was invested in Consols. The money was not given to the Duke of Richmond, but kept as the property of the nation, with the First Lord of the Treasury, for the time being, always one of the trustees. It is true that with the consent of the House the bulk of the sum of £633,000 so invested has since been invested in land, every farthing of surplus on which beyond the £19,000 per annum belongs to the nation. It is true that until the Committee sat there was great doubt whether a large amount of this land had not been dealt with as if the nation had little or only a remote right to it. But each parcel of this land is scheduled in the Report, and I cannot understand why the Chancellor of the Exchequer leaves it out, because, if I am well informed, this land is worth more than £19,000 a year; it has often brought in more since it was bought; and therefore I wonder that the acute mind of the Chancellor of the Exchequer has not looked for this surplus also. I mention this to show the absolute carelessness of the Treasury in dealing with matters of such importance. The case of the Duke of Grafton, as to which the Chancellor of the Exchequer also asks for information, is a case of similar provision made by the same king for another of his sons, but by another of his wives, I do not mean by the Queen. This was only one of several provisions. I know nothing more monstrous than the story of the Grafton pensions, some of which have been commuted and are now outside the reach of Parliament, but which within the last 40 years have brought to the dukedom of Grafton enormous sums out of the taxpayers' pocket for services, if they could be called so, against which all the morality of this nation would revolt if the persons had happened to be the poor, the wretched, and the miserable. All the pensions of the Duke of Grafton, save three,

had been commuted before 1881. Large as has been the income of the Duke of Richmond, it has been a trifle compared with the pensions poured into the pockets of the Grafton family. Every member of the first Earl of Grafton's family was pensioned, and the pensions reverted, on the decease of the original pensioner, to the Earl. The pension of the lady whose services originated the pensions with which I am now dealing was fixed for life, with reversion to the Earl of Grafton, who afterwards was Duke of Grafton. In the case of the Grafton money a sum of £30,000 still stands in the Consolidated Stock, but in the case of the Duke of Richmond there is only £80 odd standing there—possibly left there to keep the account open—the rest of the money having been put in land. I have only given these particulars in answer to the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Now, the Government go on to state their disagreements. The Committee recommended that in all commutations of existing pensions and allowances, the Lords of the Treasury should take into consideration the causes of such pensions, whether or not any real service had been rendered by the original grantee, or is now performed; and I understand the Treasury, as represented by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the First Lord of the Treasury, to say they will do nothing of the kind. Their reasons astonish me. They say they are not prepared to commit themselves to a pledge which may bring the public faith in question, and they make their case strong by referring to the report of the Select Committee which was appointed by Mr. Spring Rice in 1837. They say they are now going to do what the Committee did in 1838, and they add, "The Committee, it is true, recommended that a few pensions should lapse or be modified". That is rather an astounding presentation of what that Committee did. There was a Committee which the right hon. gentlemen do not allude to, which sat prior to 1838, but which is referred to in the report of the Committee of 1838. That Select Committee of 1830 reduced the pensions, which amounted to £145,750 per annum, to £75,000. Was there a breach of faith in that, or did they do the duty this House should always do—stop improvident payments by whomever made? What did the Committee of 1838, on which the Chancellor of the Ex-

chequer and the First Lord rely, do? The Committee said it did not appear to them rash or unjust, but, on the contrary, strictly their duty to inquire into the causes which originally produced and justified the grant, and to find out whether they still existed; and they further said they endeavoured to decide whether each separate grant could be either objected to or defended—the very thing the Treasury to-day say they will not do, and which they said they would not do on the authority of the Committee of 1838. As I have said, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the First Lord of the Treasury say the Committee recommended that a few pensions should lapse or be modified. I find that the Committee instituted such a searching inquiry that 21 pensioners resigned their pensions rather than face the inquiry. They absolutely suspended eight pensions. With reference to six pensions, they lessened the amounts paid and shortened the time for which they were to be paid; while with respect to 14 pensions, they reported that they did not consider it expedient that any of them should be continued. Parliament endorsed what the Committee did, and this is what the Treasuary calls recommending that a few pensions should lapse or be modified! I do not want the Government to get rid of 21 pensions, or even to suspend eight, or thus deal with six or 14; all I ask is, that the House having determined they thould be abolished, and a Committee of the House having unanimously voted that 27 years' purchase is too high, and that they should not give to any pensioner who has rendered no service at any time an amount which is equivalent, or nearly equivalent, to a perpetuation of the pension, the Government should act accordingly. This is no party question. Conservatives as well as Liberals have pledged themselves upon it. The Committee has dealt with the question in no rough spirit. The Attorney-General, representing the Government, has carefully gone through every line of the Report, and in these circumstances it is too much for the Government to come forward and say they intend to fly in the face of the constant declaration of the representatives of the nation. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, indeed, suggests, and suggests truly, in the paper which has just been laid on the table, that

even at 27 years' purchase there will be an effective saving to the nation of, roughly, something like £9000 a year. I admit at once that that is better than nothing. But that leaves the Richmond and the Grafton pensions entirely out of the question; because under no circumstances can they be dealt with as part of the scheme on which the House is to pronounce an opinion to-night. I have never denied that a commutation is a saving. I am glad that 330 pensions have been commuted since I commenced my attack upon them, because I know that involves a considerable saving to the nation; but I say that now you have a solemn judgment of the Committee; you have deputed a Committee to examine whether or not the rate of 27 years is too much, and that Committee has reported that it is; and it is no answer to say, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer says, that because the conversion scheme was carried last year therefore we are to go back. Whether the people put their money into the Funds or anywhere else is no affair of mine, but of these pensions not one-fourth should be given at all; and, in fact, it is a shame to the House that it has suffered them to be paid so long. It is not a sufficient answer to say that a saving comes to the nation at 27 years' purchase, for the Committee knew that. In the minute to which I am objecting, the Government say that they cannot agree that the terms given to individuals are too high, and they do not agree because some saving comes to the nation in commutation. It will not do, because some nobleman or gentleman, or some person high in influence, may feel dissatisfied, to go back on the decision of the Committee and undo all they have done. The plea put forward in the minute, that it would be a breach of faith, cannot be maintained for a moment, except in the cases of pensions for which services may have been rendered; and if there are such, I do not want to put on the Government any stress of strictness. But, I understand the Committee have said, in effect, that 260 years, 240, or 200 years ago, pensions were put upon the taxpayers that ought never to have been so put, for causes that cannot ever be plainly stated in the House of Commons without provoking immediate reprobation, and without seeming to make a grossly personal attack. But if persons do not wish

to inherit the blame they should not wish to inherit the profit. Although I fear I have already trespassed too long on the indulgence of the House, there is still one point I must answer. I do not often endeavor to ascertain the feelings of hon. members on the other side as to any proposition I intend to submit to the House, for I think it is hardly fair to do so. But one of the most intelligent members of the party opposite said "I agree with you in principle, but it is a small matter". But I say nothing is too small to be honest upon, and if you require honesty from the people, you must be honest towards them in all matters, whether they affect £10,000 or £10. I ask the House to affirm the principle, and I confidently ask the House not to go back upon the unanimous decision of the Committee.

THE STORY OF A FAMINE INSURANCE FUND,

AND WHAT WAS DONE WITH IT.

House of Commons, August 27th, 1889.

I have placed on the Paper notice of my intention to move an Amendment expressive of the deep regret of the House, that the accounts have not been laid before it at a period when they could be properly debated. I do not propose to move that Amendment, because the state of the House is such that no division on it could accurately represent the feeling of the House upon it; and if I did divide, it might go forth to the people of India, that a very large number of members had no regard whatever for the Indian people, and that a very small number of members of this House thought their affairs ought to come before Parliament for discussion. Therefore, while making as I do a most earnest protest—a protest which, I believe, would be joined in by members on the other side of the House as well as by members on this side, if it were not for party exigencies at this late period of the Session—I desire to give it especial emphasis, because of the fact that the modification in the new Rules of Procedure, during the last two years, has deprived those who desire to present to this House any statement or criticism, of any opportunity whatever of doing so, unless such opportunity is furnished by the action of the ballot. Even if a member happens to be fortunate enough, as I was early this session, to obtain first place for a motion dealing with the affairs of India, it may be that the Government will take away the opportunity which the ballot has given him. India stands here in an entirely different position from any other part of the dependencies of this great

empire. There is no colony, however small, but that, upon the estimates, we have had afforded us one or more opportunities of raising any question which any member thinks ought to be brought before this House in relation to it; but the same thing cannot be said with regard to India, with the enormous population, to which the hon. gentleman the Under Secretary has referred, of something like 210 millions of actual subjects of the Imperial Crown, and another 65 millions of people more or less subject to its influence. I am of opinion the present system is one which any person taking any interest whatever, however remote, in the honor of Britain, ought to deplore and endeavor to have changed. I would venture to appeal—it seems rather a mockery to say, to the Government, with only the Under Secretary for India, able representative of the Government as he is, present in the House. It seems also a mockery to appeal to the leaders of the party on this side of the House, none of them being present. I deem it right to say that if the Government are deaf to our appeal, and if they will not so modify the new rule as to enable us to raise questions which we cannot now raise during this debate, I shall take the one opportunity which I have never taken since I have been a member of this House, and shall take care that the question is raised by an amendment to the Address. At any rate, the Government cannot deprive me of that opportunity, as they have twice this session deprived me of the opportunity I had obtained by means of the ballot. While I admire the good-humored and able speech to which we have just listened, I could not help being struck with the marvellous coolness—I suppose I must not say audacity—which characterised some of the statements of the Under Secretary for India. He was good enough to tell us that the only proposal of economy had come from the Government; but he coolly ignored the fact that he and his Government had taken away from me the opportunity I had obtained of submitting to the House proposals which I thought would have tended in that direction. He had the frank audacity to inform the Committee that the Council of India Bill had been hindered on this side of the House, and had only got through with great difficulty, when he knows as well as any other member of the Committee that the

Government never put it down earlier than the ninth order of the day—I think that one night I saw it the 19th—and when he knows it was in the power of the Government to have put it down as the first or second order of any day they pleased, and so have tested the question whether there was any real opposition to it. Surely the hon. gentleman might have acknowledged that on the first appeal made to me by the leader of the House, to the effect that if I kept on the paper a notice of amendment I had to the second reading of the Bill he would be obliged to withdraw it, I at once withdrew the notice, although I regarded the Bill as wretchedly small and exceedingly ineffective, and although I regarded it as being more effective in words than it would be in reality. If I had pressed my amendment on the attention of the Committee, I should have pointed out that any discussion of the Indian Budget with the benches as they are now is utterly impossible. It is impossible to take the sense of the Committee on any proposition which may be submitted to it without a shameful and disgraceful exhibition of the utter neglect by so many members of Parliament of the interests of so many millions of our fellow-subjects. I cannot say I quite followed the right hon. gentleman's first figures. It seems to me that they do not quite agree; but on this point it may be that I did not pay sufficient attention to his corrections, and I shall confine myself more especially to the figures which I have in print, and which at any rate are capable of being more clearly examined. The hon. gentleman complained that he was met by ironical cheers when he referred to the chief increase in the income of India this year as resulting from the Salt Tax; and he went to the length of saying that he was shocked by the statements made by people, who ought to know better, as to the effect of the increase of the Salt Duty on the consumption of salt. Well, he managed to shock me, because, with the almost blind reliance that I have on the accuracy of everything told me by the hon. gentleman, notwithstanding that I have occasionally found that he has been misled by those who instruct him to reply in this House, I had thought that the Blue Book circulated under his authority amongst the members of the House, only within the last few days, has told us expressly that

the consumption of salt had fallen off in consequence of high prices, which prices I proposed to show were the result of the increase of duty. I do not understand why he should be shocked at our entertaining an opinion which the Government of India officially puts to us. The hon. gentleman complains also that we have spoken of the "Famine Insurance Fund". Well, that is how his own Government have spoken of it and have described it. They have now spent the whole of the fund, and do not like to acknowledge that such a fund existed. In a marvellously emphatic tone the hon. gentleman appealed to the Committee, and said: "We have spent the surplus we had; if a larger surplus is wanted for this purpose, do gentlemen on the Opposition side of the House advocate increased taxation, which is the only way of getting a larger surplus?" Our answer is that we have had increased taxation for the purpose of raising a specific sum which you pledged yourselves never to apply to any other purpose; that you have applied it to many other purposes; that you have seldom applied it to the purposes for which it was intended. Before examining the memorandum of the Under Secretary, which was issued later this year than last, I will very briefly draw the attention of the Committee, in view of the fall in silver, to the impolicy of maintaining even the slightest hindrances to the consumption of silver for manufacturing purposes. As was most fully pointed out in a debate on this question in another place about a month ago, the duty of 1s. 6d. per ounce, and the requirement of hall-marking, are practically prohibitive of the importation for trade purposes of Indian manufactured silver articles, and the exportation of English manufactured silver for the Indian market. I appeal specially to the Chancellor of the Exchequer on this question, which is of high importance to India, and vitally affects our silver trade with many foreign countries. I now come to that branch of the speech made by the hon. gentleman, the Under Secretary for India, which has occupied so prominent a position in this evening's debate. I allude to that portion of it which relates to the provision for famine relief and insurance, or, as I prefer to call it, to the Famine Insurance Fund. I ask the Committee to turn to the famine relief and insurance item, on page 50, in the

explanatory memorandum of the Under Secretary. But, in the first place, I desire to say a word or two as to what has been urged by the hon. gentleman with reference to the correction of figures which appear in that memorandum. I would point out that it would have been quite possible for the Government to have taken the discussion on the Indian Budget a week or a fortnight after the Indian Budget statement had been circulated; and had the hon. gentleman taken that course there could not then have been any necessity for the corrections he now makes. The hon. gentleman has taken credit for the fact that the memorandum has been circulated for a period of more than six weeks; but I would point out that it was published later this year than last year, and it might have been criticised at an earlier date, as the financial year ends at the same date in one year as in another. I think that, considering the matter is one which affects the welfare of 275 millions of her Majesty's subjects, the Government ought to recognise it as being one of sufficient importance to be discussed in this House at a period of the year when it can be freely and fairly debated, and nearer to the end of the financial year. It is quite possible that every explanation the hon. gentleman has given has been comprehended by every member of this House except myself; but I certainly do find it difficult to follow a set of figures, as to which the hon. gentleman himself is not quite sure, and which, even in their corrected form, do not commend themselves to us as matters about which there is a possibility of our all being in agreement.

The hon. gentleman has referred to the Famine Insurance Return, which I myself moved for, and which has been laid on the table of this House. He referred to it as a document of which the Government might fairly be proud. Now, sir, I should say that if it were possible to imagine any man holding the position of a minister being capable of shame—and I believe such a phænomenon has never been known in the history of Parliament—I should have thought that that return was a document of which any minister ought to be heartily ashamed; and although I do not put it personally to the hon. gentleman as being any ground for shame on his part, yet I think he might

reasonably feel a sort of vicarious shame in finding that promises which have been so solemnly made, have nevertheless been so deliberately broken, and that a large sum of money collected for a particular purpose, has been just as deliberately misapplied. The hon. gentleman, the Under Secretary for India, referred to the origin of the Famine Relief Fund, but he did so in the vaguest of all fashions. The first reference I will make is to the financial statement for 1878-9, to the financial resolution of the Government of India, dated 18th March, 1878, and to a minute by the Viceroy of India, dated 12th March, 1878, for a detailed explanation of the principles on which it was proposed to make a systematic provision against periodical famines and deaths from starvation. In the Parliamentary Paper, No. 37, dated 1878, page 5, the speech of the Finance Minister in the Legislative Council of the Government of India proposes to raise an additional £1,500,000 a year "on account of famine alone", and he says that this is done because of the "recognition of her Majesty's Government of the duty of making definite provision for the cost of famine". On page 24 of that paper, he further says: "It is the firm intention of the present Government to apply the funds now to be provided for this special purpose strictly to the exclusive objects which they were designed to secure;" and he also goes on to say: "The Government of India intends to keep this million and a-half as insurance against famine alone". Now, there have been twelve years during which that sum of a million and a-half has been collected, making a total of £18,000,000 sterling; and I shall presently show that that money has not been kept, as was promised, and also how little of it has been spent for the purposes it was intended to serve. The hon. gentleman the Under Secretary has told us that it has been religiously disbursed. For my part, I cannot imagine in what sense the hon. gentleman uses that expression; but I can say that it was certainly not honestly disbursed nor truly disbursed. Well, in the same speech the finance minister says: "We consider that the estimates of every year ought to make provision for religiously applying the sum I have mentioned to this sole purpose; and I hope that no desire to carry out any administrative improvement, however urgent, or any

fiscal reform, however wise, will tempt the Government to neglect this sacred trust". They imposed a specific tax of £1,500,000 and promised that it should be devoted to famine, and to famine alone, and hoped that no Government would be able to make away with it. Indeed, the then Viceroy, Lord Lytton, used language so strong that I feel bound to refer to it, and to show that this "sacred trust" was neglected by Lord Lytton himself for the purposes of war; while when the noble lord the member for Paddington, Lord R. Churchill, was Secretary for India, the same "sacred trust" was abandoned for purposes of annexation. As I have said, Lord Lytton, the then Viceroy, used very remarkable language on the 27th December, 1877, which is to be found on page 36 of the paper I am referring to. He anticipated that objectors might say, "Your good intentions are possibly sincere; but the path to the nethermost pit is already paved with good intentions". I do not know whether the hon. gentleman the Under Secretary was thinking of that downward path when he spoke of the money having been religiously disbursed; but Lord Lytton proceeds with what the objectors might say as follows: "Promise is a good dog, but Performance is a better: we have often heard the bow-wow of the first; we have yet to see the tail of the second. We have been told over and over again by the highest authorities that India is to be insured against famine in this way, or in that; but when famines come upon us we find that the promised way is still wanting." Lord Lytton then solemnly declared: "We promise nothing which we have not, after long and serious consideration, provided ourselves with the means of performing. I must have very imperfectly explained myself thus far if I have failed to make it clearly understood that I am not now speaking of what we ought to do, or would do, to insure this country against the worst effects of future famine had we only the means of doing it; but of what we can do, and will do, with the means already provided for, in the measures now before the council." In the debate on the 16th January, 1878, in the Legislative Council, in Parliamentary Paper No. 118, of 1878, page 5, a native member of the Legislative Council, speaking of this famine insurance, suggests: "That it should be formed into a separate fund with

a separate account, so that it may satisfy the people that it is what it in reality is intended to be—a separate famine fund". And, on page 44, Lord Lytton says: "The necessity of a Famine Insurance Fund, and the duty of the Government to provide such a fund, has been generally acknowledged". And yet this session the Under Secretary denies that it ought to be called a fund, and admits that that duty has never been fulfilled. These are not mere empty words, for the hon. gentleman said he did not know whether his trusted Indian Councillors had been dead or alive.

Sir J. Gorst: I did not say that I did not know whether they were dead or alive; but that the hon. gentleman did not ask the question whether they were dead or alive.

Whether we were told that he did not know whether they were dead or alive, or whether the hon. gentleman's own experience of the Indian Council rendered it difficult for him to distinguish if it was a Council composed of living or dead men, is a matter upon which it is not necessary to dilate. At any rate, in order to raise that £1,500,000 it was necessary to levy increased taxes on the natives of India. Well, what does the finance minister say upon this? In 1878-9 the finance minister observed, by way of justifying the increased taxation: "I feel confident that I shall be able to satisfy the Council and the public that the resolution which the Government has proclaimed will be faithfully carried out, and that the proceeds of these new taxes will be expended for the purpose of providing what I have called an insurance against famine, and for no other purpose whatsoever". If words have any meaning at all, Lord Lytton and his finance minister say: "We impose a special tax—a new tax—for the purpose of raising a special sum of money, and pledge the honor of ourselves and our councillors that that money shall never be applied to any other object". If hon. members will refer to the Return moved for by myself, they will see that this promise was never kept, except when Lord Ripon was Viceroy. That I am not stating the case unfairly, may be seen from the minute of the Viceroy, dated 12th March, 1878. The Viceroy then wrote: "The sole justification for the increased taxation which has just been imposed upon the people of India, for

the purpose of ensuring this Empire against the worst calamities of future famine, so far as such an insurance can now be practically provided, is the pledge we have given that a sum not less than a million and a-half sterling, which exceeds the amount of the additional contributions obtained from the people for this purpose, shall be annually applied to it". And here I would ask, how have you applied the £18,000,000; and I repeat that I will show that, except when the Marquess of Ripon was Viceroy, you never applied it to the purpose for which it was intended, and that if you have not got it now it is because you have devoted it, as I have already said, to purposes of war and annexation, and the erection of costly buildings at Simla, and for similar purposes, while the people of India have been starving. The Viceroy's minute goes on to say: "We have explained to the people of this country that the additional revenue raised by the new taxes is required, not for the luxuries but for the necessities of the State, not for general purposes but for the construction of a particular class of public works; and we have pledged ourselves not to spend one rupee of the special resources thus created upon works of a different character". The English language has very little value if this can be so translated from the Ministerial benches as to explain away its plain and direct meaning; and surely in such a case we ought not to be treated with what I must call a miserable farce of arithmetic like that I hold in my hand. But there were people who doubted whether this £1,500,000 would be applied to its intended purpose; and when the British Indian Association later on hinted at the possible breach of faith on the part of the Government, Lord Lytton openly rebuked them in these memorable words:—"You have entirely failed to recognise the fact that the sole purpose of this additional taxation you complain of was the preservation of the lives of the people from the effects of famine. To insinuate the contrary is to insinuate a calumny." After the 11 years' experience we have had, I not only insinuate the contrary, but I say that that which Lord Lytton characterises as a calumny has been proved up to the hilt. I now proceed to complain of, and criticise, the Return. The tax was first imposed in 1878, but the Return commences with 1879-80. Why is the year

1878-9 omitted? Surely £1,500,000 is a sum worthy of being accounted for. Probably the hon. gentleman the Under Secretary will tell us what was the intention of the Indian Government in omitting that year. He might also tell us what was the amount applied in 1878-9 to the prevention of famine, that being a year so close to Lord Lytton's solemn promise. I refer again to the summary of the twelve years contained on page 4 of the Return. There ought to have been £18,000,000 sterling raised by additional taxation for famine relief alone during those twelve years. How is that sum accounted for? It is only alleged that 9,900,737 tens of rupees, or much less than £10,000,000, has been so applied; and I ask what, in that case, has become of the remaining amount of over £8,000,000 sterling? The only years in which Lord Lytton's promises were kept were the years 1881-2, 1882-3, 1883-4, 1884-5, and 1885-6, during which years Lord Ripon was Viceroy. In those years the promise which Lord Ripon did not make was kept; but the promise which Lord Lytton did make has never been kept at all, and since Lord Ripon's time no one appears to have been in a position to keep it. I may here say that I am going to make the Under Secretary and the Secretary of State himself both responsible for what has been going on. Reverting to Lord Lytton's specific declaration that the "sole purpose of the additional taxation" was the "preservation of the lives of the people from the effects of famine", I will ask the Committee to refer to page 2 of the Return. I would remind the Committee of the questions I have felt it my duty to put, sometimes, I fear, in a way that must have been somewhat wearisome to the House, and for which I invariably laid myself open to rebuke; and I would point out that since last October it was certainly known to the Government of India that famine was approaching in Madras and Bengal and was also threatening in Bombay. This was known, so far as a great portion of India was concerned, by the partial failure of the south-west monsoon of 1888, which was due in June and July. The effect of this was aggravated by the almost complete failure of the north-east monsoon which was due in October. The Government must have known that the natural result of these things

without any other cause would have been higher prices for food, great pressure, possible hunger, and even probable famine. Well, what is the estimated provision made by the Government out of the earmarked £1,500,000? It is of no use your saying you have not got it. You have spent it. You took it, and promised to keep it for the purpose of saving life in case of famine. See what a mockery you have made of it! This Return shows that £20,500 was devoted for relief—namely, £500 for charitable relief in Madras, and £20,000 for charitable relief in Bengal. No provision was made by the present Government for the relief works, for want of which hundreds of people certainly, many thousands probably, died of starvation before the works were commenced. I beg pardon; I was wrong in saying the Government made no provision. In 1888-9 they actually wrote off as irrecoverable the sum of £200, which was the amount of debt due from some wretched Madras agriculturalists whose debt had been outstanding from the famine of ten years ago. The general result is that in 11 years real famine relief has been given to the extent of 2,631,750 tens of rupees only; and on page 5 of the statement exhibiting the moral and material progress of India we are told that "no surplus was available as a reserve against famine in future years". This £18,000,000 has been extracted from the peasantry of India on the solemn promise that it should only be applied for the purpose of making provision against times of famine, and that promise has never at any time been kept. In 1877-8 the Government found itself unable to make provision against famine, but at least it did something for the prevention of starvation. I trust I shall not shock the Under Secretary in what I am about to state. I know that his feelings are generally shocked, especially by any statement made from this side of the House with regard to legal questions, which may be accounted for by the fact that the hon. gentleman has been sitting for so many years on the same bench with the law officers of the Crown. Now, what did the Government do? On the 19th January, 1888, they actually raised the salt duty 25 per cent.—viz., from two rupees per maund of 82 lbs. to 2½ rupees per maund; and the Government themselves in their own statement, say that the effect of this was to reduce

the consumption of salt. Less salt means less food, and the official declaration is that in 1888 the consumption of salt fell off markedly in the district of Ganjam. Page 75 of the statement —and a very explicit statement it is—shows that the consumption of salt in Ganjam fell from 12·31 lbs. per head to 8·27 lbs. per head, owing, as the Government say, partly to high prices, or, as I say, almost wholly to the high prices resulting from the increased duty. No wonder there have been famine and starvation in Ganjam. If I possessed the cool freedom of speech which characterises the hon. gentleman the Under Secretary of State for India when attacking members on this side of the House, I should be inclined to use exceedingly hard words against a Government, which takes credit for its high officials, going into a district where it had been pointed out that famine existed, and where, having previously extorted some Rx. 1,800,000 to make provision for such contingency, they must have known that it was going on eight or nine months before (for it had been pointed out in this House).

It is one of the misfortunes of only one debate in the year taking place on the finances of India, that a member is obliged to be exceedingly wearisome in the length of the matter he addresses to the House. But I must ask the Committee to note on page 4 of the explanatory memorandum, a most extraordinary difference between gross and net revenue and expenditure—the gross being swollen by matters of account, and clearly in some instances creating a false impression. For example, railway receipts go to make up gross totals. From page 12 it will be seen that in three years 1887-90, railways impose a burden upon the taxpayers of Rx. 7,502,780, though the hon. baronet, the member for Hythe (Sir E. Watkin), urges the Government to spend £100,000,000 on more railways. In the official statement, page 14, it is admitted that "Though the dividend on the total railway capital is apparently more than 5 per cent, and though the Government is not liable for more than 5 per cent on any guaranteed capital, or for more than per cent on State Railway capital; still the Indian Treasury lost on its current railway transactions Rx. 2,267,800 in 1887-8, and estimated to lose Rx. 2,115,000 in 1888-9". The actual

loss turned out to be more than half a million of rupees larger than the estimated loss. I am sure the Under Secretary did not purposely omit it, but I should have liked an explanation of the fact that the actual loss was more than half a-million of rupees greater than the estimate.

Sir E. Watkin: The hon. member has referred to me. I should like to ask whether he is not aware that it has been proved that the advantage to the people of India is greater than the total value of the railways?

The hon. member will have an opportunity of following me. I do not see how his interruption is to the point. There is one matter as to which the hon. gentleman the Under Secretary has told us nothing in his explanatory Memorandum, and I am rather surprised that he has not, because it is a matter upon which I have felt it my duty to ask him several questions already. He has not in the Memorandum under the head of "Railways" given any information as to the change of policy with reference to the projected railway to Chittagong, as to which a concession of 3,000 square miles of waste land with the right to prospect for coal and petroleum has either been actually granted, or is under consideration. If this be a wise policy there is no necessity for concealment, nor ought members of this House to be driven to obtain information from private sources. I do not suggest that such a concession would be bad or good, but the House is entitled to know what are the views of the Department and of the Viceroy. What is the reason of this entire change of policy? on what conditions are these rights of prospecting to be conceded? The hon. gentleman, in reply to a question the other day, said that if all railway enterprise was to wait until Parliament had expressed an opinion there would be no railways in India at all. I admired the cleverness and ingenuity of the reply, but unless the Secretary of State is the master of Parliament as well as of India, it was his duty in making his annual statement to tell us if such a change of policy has been made or is contemplated, to give the House information on this point so as to enable the House to form a judgment upon it. Referring to irrigation works on page 13, I wish to ask as to table 2, which in col. 1 states the total cost to 1886-7 as Rx. 23,770,346, from

what date the commencement of cost is taken? And whether the two tables mean that a total expenditure to the present date of Rx. 25,332,935 shows an estimated loss for the year of Rx. 725,400; and whether, as a higher loss still is shown in the two other years given, he will date the deficit for the preceding years? I also ask the Under Secretary, as he states the total capital outlay to date on the irrigation works, first, to state the total deficit of all the years covered by the capital outlay. I ask whether the Rx. 629,400 mentioned in col. 3, table 1, page 13, is the portion of the Land Revenue from new works only, or does it include receipts from old works? And I ask whether, to give the Committee an opportunity of comparing, he can state the amount credited to Land Revenue from irrigation in 1858? Further, I would ask him if he will state the net addition to the food production of the Empire which has accrued from the total expenditure of £25,000,000? In the statement of assets and liabilities on page 20 I would ask are the railway and irrigation works set down at their full cost? Is any allowance made for depreciation? Is any Sinking Fund provided? Referring to page 10, on Burma, I would ask the Committee to note that while the cost of annexation was originally estimated in November, 1885, at some £270,000, it has already cost some £8,000,000, and it is impossible to limit the further expenditure required to carry out what the Under Secretary of State has called the pacification of the country. I note that in relation to the Burma Ruby Mines Parliament has never had submitted to it the particulars, with the names and amounts of the various tenders. I would ask the Under Secretary to state the cost of, and incidental to, the sending out of Mr. Barrington Browne as Government expert; what kind of valuation he made; and the general nature of his Report; and how many higher tenders—and to what amount—were received than the one accepted, with the names of the persons tendering.

Sir J. Gorst: I can answer that at once; there were none.

I should like to know whether the hon. gentleman attaches any subtle meaning to the word "tender," and whether there are not offers in writing within the knowledge of the Viceroy of India?

Sir J. Gorst: The tender for the Burma Ruby Mines was settled in this country by public advertisement in the newspapers. Tenders were received at the India Office, and they were opened in my presence. I can vouch for the fact that those tenders were received.

I cannot think that I and the hon. gentleman mean the same thing in the words we are using. I should be glad, however, if the hon. gentleman would oblige the committee with the names and particulars of the various tenders, together with the replies, so that the committee may be enabled to form a judgment as to the higher or lower tenders. Will the hon. gentleman tell the committee why it is stated here—

Sir John Gorst: In what statement?

In your own book [*holding it up*] on page 17 of the Government statement dealing with the moral and material progress of India—that a lease of the Burma Ruby Mines was granted to a British company in 1887-8, when the hon. member more than once in the most express terms has stated in the House that no such lease has been granted? The company is to pay a rental of £40,000 a year and one-sixth of the profits, and I should like to know why it is that in the estimated receipts for 1888-9 and 1890, there is no sum whatever even entered in the Estimates as likely to be received? If the hon. member tells me that this statement as to the rental to be paid is not true, I will not press him further, but he must not wonder if I am a little shocked—electrified—in dealing with such matters.

And now, I have only to apologise to the Committee for the length of my remarks. I hope, however, that what I have said will show that there is some need for effective financial control in India, and that if it be possible—as I believe it to be—to exercise that effective financial control in this House, even supposing more than one day in the year is devoted to the work, something will be done to enlarge the legislative councils in the various provinces and to increase their powers, so that they may have a better opportunity of interpellating in relation to these matters of finance. I would assure the hon. gentleman, the Under Secretary of State, that it is not our desire to destroy provincial activity in India.

On the contrary, we desire to enlarge and develop it. I should like to see the Government carry out their promises in this respect. I should like, to use the words of Lord Lytton, "having heard their bow-wow of promise, to see at least the tail of the performance". We hope that there may be enlarged Councils strengthened by a Committee of this House, or a Joint Standing Committee of both Houses, to which may be addressed questions on which it is necessary that some expression of opinion should he obtained as to the advisability of bringing matters in dispute before Parliament. Although, in the present scanty House, it seems a mockery to do so, I would venture to appeal to hon. members, and, if necessary, I will go from this House to Parliament, and from Parliament to the people—that some opportunity of bringing forward their grievances may be given to those who are connected with the movement for reform in India. I agree that they are only a small body, but small as they are, they are sufficiently important to have some attention paid to them. There assembled at Allahabad some 1,200 delegates, representing some three millions of people, and I appeal to the English people for reasonable attention to the wants of India, especially as its grievances are now finding constitutional expression in the great Congress movement, of which Lord Dufferin said that he regarded with feelings "of approval and goodwill their natural ambition to be more extensively associated with their English rulers in the administration of their own domestic affairs". From the report of that Congress, it is evident that the natives are inspired with a laudable ambition to be more closely associated with their English rulers in the administration of their own affairs.

It is, of course, impossible to hope that within these walls any criticism or complaint made under existing circumstances will have any very great effect, but I do hope that the protest now made and concurred in, as it seemed to me at the beginning of the speech with which I have troubled the Committee, by members sitting on the Conservative benches—that the protest now made against the late period of the session at which this subject is brought forward will not be without effect. The House is wearied with the labors of a long

session, and the bulk of the members have gone away. I do not make this protest from party motives, as I acknowledge that the party with whom I vote are as amenable to every kind of blame in the matter as the party opposite. The right hon. gentleman, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, is now in his place, and I appeal to him, during the Recess, to give effect to words which I hope I have not wrongly understood—and I am only dealing with words uttered across the floor of this House—which have come from the Leader of the House, that it is only due to the vast mass of our Indian fellow-subjects that at some time they may be able to approach this House in a constitutional way, with the Speaker in the Chair, and not be driven to bring forward their grievances at a time when a question of finance is under discussion, and they are not susceptible of radical and effective debate.

INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS.

Bombay, December 29th, 1889.

Friends, fellow-subjects, and fellow-citizens — (cheers) — I address you as friends, for the greeting you have given me entitles me to use the same language to you that I would to those at home. (Loud cheers.) You have made me feel since I have been here that home has a wider significance than I have yet given it, for I have learned that if I have only a little home I have one, too—a larger one, in your sympathies, in your affections, and—I trust to deserve it by future work—in your love. (Loud cheers.) I address you as fellow-subjects, for we are here loyal to one rule with the best of loyalty. (Renewed cheers.) That is no real loyalty which is only blind submission. (Hear, hear, and cheers.) Real loyalty means that the governed help the governors by leaving little for the Government to do. (Renewed cheers.) And I feel proud to be fellow-subject with you, in the hope that the phrase fellow-citizen may grow into reality even before my life is ended. (Cheers.)

I pray your indulgence to-night, for this is the first speech I have made since I looked into the blackness of the grave; and I am not sure how far I may trust my tongue to be the interpreter of what I would wish to say; but of one thing I am sure, that you have over-rated alike my work and my ability. (Cries of "No, no".) I pray you be as indulgent to me as you have been generous. And if you disagree with what I say, let me say it in my own poor fashion, that you may find at least my meaning clear to you. I am here only a visitor by your courtesy, a member of a great assembly, the mother of Parliaments, within the walls of which I am one of the poorest members, and to its generous audience is due any praise that I may have had in

advocating the cause of those to whom I belong—and when I say to whom I belong, I was sorry to hear that I was thanked for my work in a popular cause. But for whom should I work if not for the people? (Loud and prolonged cheers.) Born of the people, trusted by the people, I hope to die of the people. (Renewed cheering.) And I know no geographic or race limitations to this word "people". If the nationality—pardon the word—to which I am proud to belong, has raised its empire here, the rule carries with it the duty on the part of every citizen to recognise that which I recognise in you, a loyal constitutional association for the assertion of your just claims, and for the amelioration of your homes and the advancement of your industries. (Cheers.)

And I will ask you not to expect too much. One man is only a water drop in the ocean of human life. You are the breeze driving the water drop on to the western side of the seas, and by your encouragement adding others to it and giving it a force that shall wash away the old rock of prejudices that has hindered progress. I have noted with pride the speeches here, which show that you share our language, our traditions and hopes, and are willing to work with us to make our triumph peaceful. (Cheers.) Do not expect too much, and do not expect all at once. (Hear, hear.) Grand as this assembly is, mighty in its suggestiveness, by its delegates travelling hundreds, thousands of miles, you are yet only the water drop of the nearly two hundred and ten millions whom you number under our empire—yours and mine, not mine against yours, not English against Indian, but a common empire to be maintained for common interests. (Loud cheers.) Do not be disappointed if of the largest claims only something is conceded. If not just now, it shall be on a day that is to come. Just now you have those to stand in the House of Commons and plead for you—not me alone. There are members as devoted to you as I can possibly be; and I hope soon to see added to those ranks one speaking with that authority, that knowledge, which his long residence in India has given him. I mean your President, Sir William Wedderburn. (Cheers.)

I would remind you, as encouraging you to patience—(hear, hear)—that in England great reforms have always been slowly won. Those who introduced them first have been called seditious, sometimes sent to gaol as criminals. (Cries of "Shame!") But no imprisonment can crush the truth. It may hinder it for the moment; it may delay it for the hour; but the oppressed opinion acquires electric force inside the dungeon cell, and moves to the front again when the prisoner comes out. (Cheers.)

Your presence here to-day confutes and answers by anticipation one sneer that I have heard spoken within the walls of Parliament itself. It is said there is no Indian nation, and that there can be no Indian National Congress. It is declared that there is no Indian people. There are over two hundred millions of diverse races and diverse creeds. But the lesson I read here is that this Congress movement is an educational movement acting as a hammer upon the anvil of millions of human brains, until it welds into one common whole men in whom the consciousness of the need for political and social reforms, and the desire to effect such reforms, are higher than all distinctions of race and creed. (Loud cheers.)

It will be my duty, as it is my right, to present to Parliament directly I get back, on the very first day of its opening, the claim you make to have a Bill considered. (Cheers.) On the second day the Bill will be introduced. For so much I can answer; I can answer for nothing more. (Laughter and cheers.) I think it possible that the Government may introduce some Bill themselves. If they do it will take precedence of, but it will not evade, the one you have charged me with; because on the Government Bill in committee I can take the decision of Parliament on every one of the propositions you desire, just as upon the Bill with which you have charged me. It is not easy work; and I have been glad to see that you can meet and discuss differences as you have done. It shows that men who can give lessons to one another, express diversity of views with one another, can be trusted with the right of electing and being elected to make the laws they can so discuss. (Loud cheers.) Then you may take it that, either on your own Bill or on the Government

Bill, the decision of the House of Commons will be taken on your proposals; and you can help that decision, for you have the constitutional right, not of going into the House and being heard yourselves, but of sending your petitions there—(cheers)—from every town, from every division—from far-off Sind and from every part. And I would ask you, if you really want to make me your mouthpiece in that House, to send signatures to petitions which you understand, by the thousand, by the hundreds of thousands, by the million if you can, so that India's people may kneel—and there is no shame in kneeling—on the threshold where the mother of Parliaments sits, and ask that she may do justice to those 6,000, 7,000, 8,000 miles away, in the same way that she has done such justice to those who can assemble with a living voice within hearing of her own walls. (Cheers.)

You will permit me to say, although I am only a guest, that we are here not in a seditious movement; we are not seeking—though if we did there would be no crime in the high endeavor—to transplant the democratic institutions of England to this land. We are only seeking, in the hill which is hard to climb, to carve steps in which the strongest may stand, and there giving support, may help their weaker brothers to higher positions. (Cheers.) It is said there are many who stand aloof from this movement. But on looking at you my wonder is that in its infancy so many have joined it. (Laughter and cheers.) It is said that there are influential men of this party and of that who have not yet come in; but the sun's rays grow as the sun rises. (Cheers.) You are the dawn; I see the day, and do not count the rays which are yet below the horizon. I count the gilding of the clouds I see, from the rays I do not yet see. (Cheers.)

I feel I should like to have the title which some have given me in sneer and some in hearty meaning, of "the Member for India". (Cheers.) But men whose measure I cannot hope to cope with have partly held that title; and I am not to hold it simply by great efforts on great occasions, but by small doings wherever there is injustice to be redressed. (Cheers.) I know how little it is one man can do; and little though one man can

do, I will tell you what he can do. When after rain and storm the waters have gathered in some huge store, one man may make the little boring through which the water begins to percolate that, as it grows in stream, washes all away. I will try and be that man, leaving greater ones than I can ever be to swim on the tide when the water flows in fulness. (Cheers.) I am here because I believe you loyal to the law—(cheers)—which I am bound to support. (Cheers.) I am here because I believe you wish—as we in England have—to win, within the limits of the constitution, the most perfect equality and right for all. (Cheers.)

I have no right to offer advice to you, but if I had, and if I dared, I would say to you men from lands almost as separate, although within your own continent, as England is from you—I would say to you men with race traditions, caste views and religious differences—that in an empire like ours what we should seek and have is equality before the law for all—(cheers)—equality of opportunity for all, equality of expression for all—penalty on none, favoritism for none. And I believe that in this great Congress I see the germs of that which may be as fruitful for good as the most fruitful tree that grows under your sun. (Cheers.) I am glad to see that you have women amongst you—(cheers)—although they are few, for they are your mothers and teach your children; glad to see that in your land you are ready to learn, as we in Britain have learned, that wives may counsel their husbands; and that great thoughts and great endeavors are not made less because the man goes to the woman for counsel in the hour of need and makes the woman stronger. (Cheers.)

I fear I have already spoken to you too long. (Cries of "No, no".) If not for you at any rate for myself. (Laughter.) I beg you—many of you here the most eloquent whom I have heard—I beg you put into your own words and into your own thoughts what you would have me say at home for you and let that there be said. (Cheers.) One thing be sure of—I will only advocate the right. (Cheers.) I must judge the right I advocate, and I may not always judge it as you do; but as long as you let me speak for you, I will only

speak that which seems to me to be right and true. (Cheers.) In this movement let there be no force save the force of brain, no secret union—let all be open, frank, and before the law. Then if mischief touch you, so far as one man may and so far as one man's speech can, English liberty shall put itself on the side of yours. (Cheers.) This is the first and it may be the last speech I may ever make to you—(cries of "No, no.")—but, when I am speaking on the other side within the walls of our Parliament house, let me beg you to think, and let me think, that you are listening, and that if I do rightly you will be generous with me in your judgment, and that even if I do not always plead with the voice that you would speak, you will believe that I have done my best. And I mean my best to be the greater happiness for India's people, greater peace for Britain's rule, and greater comfort for the whole of Britain's subjects. (Loud and prolonged cheering.)

Mr. Bradlaugh then withdrew amid continued cheering, and the meeting afterwards dispersed.

THE MAHARAJA OF KASHMIR.

House of Commons, July 3rd, 1890.

I am obliged to move the adjournment of the House, because it is the only possible way in which any appeal for the Maharaja of Kashmir can be submitted to Parliament. The Government of India have deprived this chief of his authority and of his property under cover of allegations which are emphatically denied by the Maharaja himself. The Maharaja, as I shall show, has applied for a trial in India. That has been denied him. The Secretary of State here has been asked to sanction an enquiry, and has refused; the leader of the House has been asked to appoint a Select Committee of enquiry, and has also refused; so that neither judicial nor Parliamentary nor Governmental enquiry is being allowed, although this gentleman has been subjected to penalties which in the case of the meanest person in this country would entitle him to have the accusations brought before some tribunal and witnesses against him heard. There is no other manner of bringing this matter before the House than by moving the adjournment. Though I can understand that hon. gentlemen opposite may think it unfair that the adjournment should be moved, they must remember that on Indian matters I have always shown the greatest consideration to the Government; so much so that at the beginning of this Session I did not avail myself, as I might have done, of my right to move an amendment to the Address, and I only now make a motion for the adjournment because there are no Estimates in Supply in which, as in any other case affecting any other portion of her Majesty's dominions, a question of grievance may be raised. It is either in the manner I am raising it to-night that this grievance must be submitted, or not at all.

Now on May 14th of last year—that is more than twelve months ago—the Maharaja himself asked the Government of India for a fair trial. I will read to the House presently the touching words in which that appeal for a fair trial was made. From then till now, except in a despatch from which it will be my duty to quote, no kind of answer has been made to that appeal, and the Maharaja has been condemned unheard. I should have pressed this claim for enquiry twelve months ago, but there were then no papers before the House. It would have been open for the Government to say, in the fashion in which rumor has said, that this unfortunate gentleman has been guilty of crime or was suffering the consequences of vice, because these suggestions could be found embodied in official despatches to which I shall refer, and that there was, therefore, a lack of duty in bringing the matter before the House until the Government had put before it the statements on which they rely.

Although this unfortunate gentleman was deprived of his authority and his property at the beginning of last year, the presentation of papers has been delayed until last week. They have been repeatedly pressed for by myself and other members. Until the Government had put their case on the table, any one else would have been at a great disadvantage in submitting to this House any matter for its decision.

I do not propose to ask the House, in the division I shall challenge, to express any other opinion of the facts I shall submit than that when such a penalty is enforced against a prince with whom we have a treaty—who has recently been regarded as being in the position of a feudatory prince—the man so dealt with is entitled to that which any other subject of her Majesty, if he be a subject of her Majesty, is entitled to, viz., a fair trial before condemnation. The Under Secretary must not shelter himself under considerations of State. If considerations of State can justify the Government of India in depriving one man of his authority and property unheard, there is no protection for any one, be he prince or peasant, throughout the whole of our Asiatic dominions.

The other day the question was stated as simply as possible in the language of the right hon. gentleman the Under Secretary

for India (Sir J. Gorst), in answer to a question put by myself. The right hon. gentleman said, "The action of the Government in Kashmir had been based, not upon grave personal charges made against the Maharaja". I would ask the House to remember that, because this man's character has been rumored away and lied away with the help of forged letters during the last year and a-half—forged letters used as instruments of political warfare—letters, the authenticity of which has been denied by the Maharaja, letters which have never been produced in his presence, and which yet the Government have the face to refer to in their worst fashion in one of the despatches I shall read to the House.

I shall be relieved from any question as to the personal conduct of the Maharaja. He may be good or bad. I do not care what he is—he is entitled to justice. If he has been criminal let him be condemned and punished, but do not rob him under cover of a criminality which you dare not bring in evidence against him, and as to which you will allow no enquiry either in India or here. The right hon. gentleman the Under Secretary said the action of the Government was based upon the long-continued misgovernment of Kashmir. Well, this unfortunate gentleman has only been the ruler of Kashmir for about five years, and I will quote the testimony of the Government itself that, to within a few months of the time he was dispossessed, misgovernment did not exist as far as it was in his power to help it. I cannot conceive—I should not be justified in saying before you, sir, anything more impudent—but I can conceive nothing more cool than the audacity of the confidence that this House would be imposed upon by the statement of the right hon. gentleman, the Under Secretary, that there had been long-continued misgovernment in Kashmir such as justified the dethronement of this man. Vague statements there are here, but not one statement of fact. Misgovernment must be made up of something. You may shadow a man, put him unjustly in prison, or take away his property. None of these things are alleged against this unfortunate gentleman. Well, the right hon. gentleman went on to say that the Government of India have never attached any importance to certain treasonable and

criminal correspondence attributed to the Maharaja. It would have been as well not to have so described the character of the correspondence if no importance was attached to it. Why suggest that it was criminal and treasonable if it was not true, as it was not, that he was responsible for it? I do not suggest that the right hon. gentleman has made an inaccurate statement, but I do say he has been ignorant of the facts.

I will read the evidence given by the Viceroy himself with regard to this correspondence which the right hon. gentleman dare not lay before this House, which he dare not put in print, but on which the emissaries of the Government have lied away the Maharaja's character during the last year and a half. I will dispose of this point at once because, fortunately, we have the papers on the Table and are able to deal with them. So far from its being true that the Government have never attached the smallest importance to the correspondence, the Viceroy himself says the Government were justified "not merely by the disclosure of these letters"—so that they consider themselves in part justified by them—[Sir J. Gorst indicated dissent.] The right hon. gentleman shakes his head. It is the Viceroy's head that should be shaken here. I admit that the right hon. gentleman dare not rely on the letters. I admit the right hon. gentleman has too much good sense to use in justification of the position assumed by the Government letters which the man himself declares to be forgeries, and which the Government have never dared to produce to his face. But in a long despatch, dated "Simla, June 26th, 1889", I say the Viceroy did say these letters were amongst the things on which the Government acted in condemning this unfortunate gentleman.

What did the Maharaja himself say about these letters? In a letter, which unfortunately time will not permit me to read fully to the House, he made a plea for justice, first to the Government of India, and then through the Government to the English Parliament. He said: "these letters are nothing but most daring forgeries"; and he suggests that one of the forgers, if not the only forger, is his brother, whom the Government of India has placed in the position of authority of which

they have deprived this unfortunate gentleman himself. My allegation will be that it was on those letters—for the papers disclose nothing else, and further negative everything else—that this action of the Government was based. (Sir J. Gorst again expressed dissent.) The right hon. gentleman shakes his head, but I have read the papers, which he evidently has not done himself, and I shall read extracts to the House to show that I am within the mark in every statement of this kind I make. Why did the Government of India, twelve months ago, say they did not merely act on these letters? What did that phrase mean if they did not act on them at all? Have the Government since discovered they are forgeries? If so, as they are part of the case on which misgovernment and criminality are alleged against this unfortunate gentleman, the whole story of it does now fall to the ground, at any rate rests on other matters, with reference to which this man demands to be put on his trial, and as to which no evidence has been offered.

Lord Cross, speaking last year at Sheffield, used words a little stronger than, and, if I may be allowed to say so, not quite so skilful as the euphemistic language of the First Lord to-night, and of the right hon. gentleman the Under Secretary last week. He said, "we did interfere in the matter of the Kashmir, and why? Because the people of Kashmir were so ground down by the tyranny and mis-government of the Maharaja that we were bound as the paramount power to interfere for the protection of the interests of the inhabitants." Where in these papers is there one instance of this grinding down? If you want to steal Kashmir, as unfortunately we have stolen State after State in India and other parts of the world, then say so at once, and at least have the merit of honest thieves; don't be hypocritical, by saying you set up self-government where self-government has no real existence.

What is the position of Kashmir towards this country? Fortunately the history is not long, so far as it affects this unfortunate man, and I will deal with it as briefly as it is possible to do. The history of Kashmir, for the purpose of to-night's discussion, began with the Treaty of 1846, with the

grandfather of the gentleman whose cause I am pleading. Then for a considerable money payment, recorded in the third section of the Treaty, the British Government transferred and made over for ever, in independent possession, to Maharaja Golab Singh and the heirs male of his body, the territory which includes Kashmir and Jummoo. This is not a case of an ordinary feudatory State. So little is it regarded as a feudatory State, that in the statistical abstract of this very year, you have the evidence of its non-inclusion up to 1881 amongst the feudatory States, and there was never anything to suggest that we had a right or duty to send a Resident there until 1885, on the death of the father of the present Maharaja.

I won't trouble the House with what passed until a few days before the commencement of the reign of the present chief. The Maharaja Golab Singh, with whom the Treaty of the 16th of March, 1846, was made, was succeeded by his son about the time of the Indian Mutiny; and Lord Canning, in an official document, gave Maharaja Rumbir Singh, who had succeeded Golab Singh, in 1857, the *Sanad* of adoption, which provided that in case of failure of issue he and his successors would be competent to adopt an heir and thus perpetuate the line. This was given on the ground of the great service rendered by the Maharaja during the Mutiny. The Maharaja Rumbir Singh was ill in 1884, and I am afraid that some fourteen or fifteen years ago, when Jingoism was specially paramount in the making of great military frontiers and things of that kind, we looked with longing eyes upon the property of others, and were disposed to ignore any sense of justice in our dealings with them. It was then said that Rumbir Singh had misgoverned his country. If he had, it was a matter with which, except as being by treaty the paramount power, in which case we might have made remonstrance, we had nothing whatever to do. But, as a matter of fact, we made no remonstrance to him. The Under Secretary of State dissents. Then why is it not in the papers? The papers began in 1884 with a despatch relating to the alleged misgovernment during the time of the present Maharaja's father. The words of the despatch preclude the possibility of remonstrance having been made.

But what happens is that while the Maharaja was dying, the Viceroy of India, looking to the matter, as he says, with a view to his troublesome neighbors on the north-west frontier, suggested certain reforms which on the accession of the son of the then dying man it would be well should be carried out; and I will read to the House in the words of Lord Dufferin himself the admission that many of these reforms had been carried out during the short period that this gentleman sat on the throne. In 1885 the succession of Prapat Singh was formally recognised by the Government. He came to the throne under the treaty which I have read to the House. One new departure there was against which the Maharaja protested, namely, the establishment of a Residency, instead of Kashmir being an independent possession, which under the treaty it was, subject to the supremacy of the Empress Queen. After the appointment of a Resident, it is a monstrously unfair thing to spring a mine four or five years afterwards, and allege as an excuse for confiscating property and power that there had been misgovernment where, if there had been misgovernment, it should have been reported day by day, week by week, month by month, and year by year. There are no such reports. If the Secretary of State has got them he ought to have printed them.

I am not asking the House to say that this unfortunate man is guiltless, but I am asking them to say that he is entitled to be tried, and to have an enquiry before he is deprived of his rights. In 1889 the Government deprived this gentleman of his chieftainship. By what right? By no right save the right of force. By what law? By no law save the law of force. Upon what charges? Upon charges of the vaguest description. It is clear these papers are delusive papers. There must have been reports made to the Viceroy, which reports ought to be in the hands of the House. If it is said that they are of a confidential character; if it is said they cannot be produced, at any rate the witnesses who can prove the occasions of misgovernment ought to be produced in some court. Is it because this man is rich; is it because his property is in a place where you want to have possession because of frontier considerations, that he is to be deprived of the

right which you admit to the meanest person accused within this country, or within the Asiatic dominions of the Empress Queen? It is a monstrous thing, and I ask the House to look at it without consideration of party; because you must remember it is not a question only of this man, but of every feudatory prince whose property you may want to take and merge in our dominions. The papers have not been put on the table in a hurry. They have been in the skilled hands of the Under Secretary. We all know how frank the Under Secretary can be if he tries, and I ask him to tell the House how many papers relating to these important despatches between the Government of India and the Secretary of State have been kept back, and why? It is clear some have—the language shows it. Why are any kept back? They have been kept back because the action of the Government cannot be defended. I do not know what the charges are against the Maharaja, and I am only asking that this Parliament shall say that the Government of India, however powerful, and whatever the State considerations are, has no right to rob this man.

On the 14th of September, 1885, the Viceroy sent a despatch to which I must allude for a moment. It was sent just on the accession of the present Maharaja to the throne, and I allege to the House it makes a clear bill up to the time, so far as any charges of misgovernment entitled our Government to interfere. The Viceroy says: "I trust that your highness's life may be long and prosperous; and that, in all difficulties of whatsoever kind, you will rely with confidence upon the goodwill of the British Government, which will never fail you so long as you are loyal to the Crown, and earnest in the desire to rule your State with justice and moderation. Your Highness has before you a difficult task. During the illness of your father the administration of the State became seriously disorganised, and it will be necessary for you to introduce many reforms." I will show you that three years after Lord Dufferin's time reforms had been carried out, and that misgovernment is a pretext for stealing the man's property. The Maharaja wrote in reply protesting against the Residency being placed upon him. He said: "I do not hesitate to admit that the existing

state of affairs in Kashmir and Jammu urgently requires immediate introduction of substantial reforms into the administration of the country, and now that I have power commensurate with my responsibilities, I beg to answer your Excellency that nothing shall be spared on my part, and no time will be lost to prove beyond any possibility of doubt that it is my ambition to succeed in making my country a model of a well-governed State in alliance with the Government of India."

Having got the Resident at the capital, what do we find? We find that the Resident wants to get rid of the Maharaja; he submits some report to the Government, the particulars of which we do not know, and a report, the particulars of which we do know, dated March 5th, 1888. Let me point out in the first place that in the despatch of the 5th of March, 1888, there is nothing to justify any of the words of Lord Cross at Sheffield, or the words of the Under Secretary of State last week, as to misgovernment, or the words of the First Lord of the Treasury to-night. Now, what was the decision that the Government of India came to in August, 1888? It was that the condition of the State did not seem to demand such action as Mr. Plowden had suggested, and that the Government had therefore determined not to resort to measures which would have the effect directly or indirectly of taking the power out of the Maharaja's hands. Yet no less than seven months after that despatch power was taken out of his hands, and taken out solely on these letters. Solely, perhaps, is a strong word to use; but it was immediately after coming into possession of these letters, which suggested the worst of crimes—letters which the Maharaja has always denied, and as to which he is certainly entitled to be heard before a Select Committee of this House or before the Viceroy himself. He had confidence in the British Government, but he had no confidence in the officials who, he said, misrepresented him. The decision that there should be no interference with the Maharaja, directly or indirectly, disposes of Mr. Plowden's report of the 8th of March, 1888.

I come now to April, 1889, when we had some further action. I will first mention that on the 25th of July, 1888, Lord Dufferin wrote: "I do not overlook the fact that since the appointment

of the Council of which Diwan Lachman Dass was a member, considerable progress has been made in the direction of reform; useful work has been done with regard to the revenue administration, and in the reorganisation of the Public Works and Medical Department. But much remains to be done." This is not the language of condemnation of chronic misgovernment and the grinding down of the people. Misgovernment is only on invention—an excuse for having dispossessed this man, and I think I have a right to quote the evidence given by Lord Dufferin in 1888. This unfortunate prince, hampered by the Resident who dictated the policy he should pursue, did make such reforms as entitled him to the praise of Lord Dufferin—a statesman of the greatest eminence, of the keenest judgment, and a man who cannot be charged with being at all partial to the class of man I am defending here this afternoon.

Now I come to these forged letters. There is a batch of thirty-four, and the Maharaja says that they are all forgeries. I do not ask you to say whether they are or are not, but I say that if they are used against him he is entitled to go into court and cross-examine the witnesses against him. Other letters on which the Government have relied have been abandoned as forgeries within the memory of many of us in this House. What is the character of these letters as described by the Resident? The character of them is that the Maharaja offered large sums of money to certain individuals on condition that they would murder, or cause to be removed, Mr. Plowden, the late Resident. It is alleged that these letters showed treasonable correspondence with the enemies of England. All these things are denied by the Maharaja. I do not ask you to say whether the Maharaja is right or wrong, but I say that when letters alleging murder are produced against a prince with whom we have a treaty of alliance, immediately after which we take away his property, the commonest and the merest justice demands that he should have an opportunity of being heard before a Select Committee of this House, or some tribunal competent to deal with his offence, if offence he has committed. The Government are not going to stand by these letters to-night, but the Viceroy has stood by them, and I will read you words in which they are so

stood by. The Viceroy said "In the spring of this year"—that is last year—"my attention was called to the documents referred to in your Highness's letter. Many of these had every appearance of being genuine, and they have moreover a striking resemblance to those other papers of which I have already spoken, and which came into the possession of the Government of India at a previous time." "Your Highness is correct in expressing your belief that the action subsequently taken by my Government was not justified merely by the disclosures contained in these letters." Where is the report upon which they acted? The man had a right to be tried. The letters are vague statements. The Viceroy goes on: "Notwithstanding the ample resources of your State, your treasury was empty". Well, if you are going to dethrone every Prince whose treasury becomes empty, I do not know how far you are prepared to carry your policy. Does the Government really mean that? If that be so, how is it they took from this man the advance or deposit or loan of a large sum of money, amounting to twenty-five lakhs of rupees? They had this in their hands when the treasury was empty. Why did they take money for Lady Dufferin's admirable fund? Why, if the treasury was empty, did they not reckon the millions of rupees for railway works in the interest of frontier defence? Treasury empty! Why, you and your Resident helped to empty it, and then you tell this unfortunate man it is a reason why he should be dethroned!

Sir J. Gorst: Will the hon. gentleman finish the sentence?

Mr. Bradlaugh: You put on the table what you please, and I have to make the best I can with the House half empty, because every member feels the difficulty when the motion for adjournment is moved. I have, with such knowledge as is supplied, to make what case I can with this far off matter.

Sir J. Gorst: I only interrupted the hon. gentleman to point out that he had not read the sentence to the end, and I thought to put the case fairly it should be given to the end.

Mr. Bradlaugh: I will read it to the end and show that the right hon. gentleman gains nothing by making me read it. "Notwithstanding the ample resources of your State, your treasury was empty; corruption and disorder prevailed in every department

and every office; your Highness was still surrounded by low and unworthy favorites; and the continued misgovernment of your State was becoming every day a more serious source of anxiety." Well, there is not a word affecting finance there. I was going to deal with each allegation in turn. "Low and unworthy favorites!" Every prince has these even in his own household; every Oriental prince has such. The whole history of our transactions with native princes shows that when we have hankered to take their money, their land, their position, we have used vices which appeared at the time to suit our purposes and help us to gain our ends. I do not know what the right hon. gentleman means by inviting me to read to the end, as if I had omitted some allusion to the empty treasury. Why, the Indian Government had then twenty-five lakhs of rupees of his, and millions of rupees had been laid out in railway works. Who are these low and unworthy people? It is not enough to make a vague statement: where is the evidence? Let the man be tried. A man complains of a burglary in his jeweller's shop, and you say to him, "Oh but you were misusing the jewels".

I ask the House to take at least some tone of dignity in this matter. This despotic government of India, as an Indian Secretary once said, has no public opinion to influence it, no Parliament to control it, no Press to criticise it. The Government of India is a despotism that has in many degrees been well for India; it is a despotism which has brought in its train advantages which many of these poor people would not otherwise have obtained; but it cannot be denied that in many respects that despotism in the past has been tainted with fraud and crime, and I hope it is not left to the present Government to revive these evil traditions in obtaining possession of Kashmir. The Empress Queen, the paramount Power, acting as Judge, has condemned this man unheard. No man should be under menace of this injustice. The grandfather of the Prince bought these lands, and we by treaty declared they belonged to him for ever. (Sir John Gorst expressed dissent.) The right hon. gentleman does not seem to be acquainted with all these facts in the history of India. Shall I ask him to read and tell us the exact sum paid for the Maharaja's dominions?

How do the Government justify their action? They say the Maharaja resigned. He says he did nothing of the kind. I am more inclined to believe him than even the Under Secretary, for whose statements I have always the profoundest respect. Officially, there could be nothing better than the way he answers questions in this House; but when history some fifty years hence comes to deal with him, the comment of the historian will be how wickedly the Government deceived the Under Secretary, by making him say as truth the things that were not true.

It is said the Maharaja voluntarily resigned. It is true that on March 8th, 1889, the Maharaja issued the following document. I will abridge it; if it is said I am incorrect I will read the whole willingly; but I do not think my abridgement will differ from the exact words. The Maharaja appointed a Council who were to govern the country for five years, he reserving to himself all his princely rights and reserving certain powers, but allowing them much the same authority as, allowing for Oriental position, a Cabinet enjoys here. The Government of India do not accept that, yet they say they accepted a voluntary resignation. What he offered they would not have, what they wanted they took from him. The Maharaja says that even in the decree of March 8th he acted under pressure. I do not ask the House to accede to that, but I do say that he is entitled to a Select Committee here—or he would be even content with an enquiry conducted in India, if Lord Lansdowne will give his personal attention to it. The right hon. gentleman is better acquainted with the Government of India than I am. He knows that Residents are not always perfect, that Residents sometimes quarrel with a prince, and that matters are alleged as facts which do not always bear the test and scrutiny of examination.

This man through my mouth appeals to this House, not that you should declare that the Government of India is wrong—he simply asks for an enquiry. He has a right to that enquiry. I regret that the appeal has not been made by an abler tongue, by a better informed man. But I am limited to the information that the Parliamentary papers

presented to the House, and such records as the history of India, enable me to present, and I say without fear of contradiction that no case is made out for the action that has been taken. In 1888 the Government of India and the Secretary of State in Council at home came to the conclusion there was nothing for which directly or indirectly the Maharaja ought to be deprived of power; and within seven months they take it all away. If you trample on treaties, if your obligations to the Princes of India are to be broken, and the native rulers are not to rely on your word, and English justice in India is a shadow and a delusion, let that be known: but let those who hold a contrary opinion vote for my motion as the means of protest. The government of India is no party question; alike for Liberal or Conservative, Radical or Whig, it is our duty and our interest that our paramount rule in India should be just.

CLOSING ADDRESSES AT VARIOUS CONFERENCES OF THE NATIONAL SECULAR SOCIETY.

CHARLES BRADLAUGH, President.

Newcastle-on-Tyne, June 1st, 1879.

IN bidding you farewell, let me pray you take home for the work of the coming year some of that sturdy Northern spirit which has ever characterised the Tyneside. I desire for each individual more real, more true, self-assertion. You want to feel that the body you belong to is worth belonging to, that the cause you serve is worth the service; you need to be proud, not ashamed of your opinions, and to be ever ready to avow them; not impertinently thrusting them forward, not aggressively obtruding them, but holding your colors, so that while you are by, none shall dare insult them nor touch them without feeling that the hand which holds them can strike a blow in their defence.

And there is need of individual effort; national work is nothing without local work; individual life is made up of its seconds, its minutes, its hours, which add and roll into months and years; society life is made up of its individuals, who weld themselves together to form the mighty whole. Let each year find you with a fuller table of contents to show the year's work. If, as you say, you take pride in my work and my name, make it your work and your name by joining your efforts to mine; and remember that if I am strong, my strength is made by yours, and because I believe—believe with my whole heart and mind—in the grandeur of our work and in the love and trust the workers give me.

There is plenty of local work to be done; go avowedly as Freethinkers on to your local boards; in every munici-

pal election—and here I desire to honor Mr. Slater, whose long life of earnest discharge of duty has placed him high in honor among his fellow-townsmen—in every School Board election, in every Parliament contest, you should be the most earnest workers. And here let me pay tribute to Mr. Forster, who has worked most ably at Darlington. Work may be done in the local Press; no wrong should pass without protest; and here recognition is due to Mr. Symes for the work so well and so carefully done. Let us feel that we are alive, with a sting to use if sting be needed; not on our knees, not cringing, not creeping, but walking on our feet, erect, unflinching. Let us aid each other, and grow strong by each other's help; not for my sake, not for me, Charles Bradlaugh, but for that mighty cause which lived ere I was born, and will live long after my bones have crumbled in the grave.

I believe the prospect before us is better than it has been at any period during the last fifty years. Though I am now turning grey, I am still young—as young as I was twenty years ago—young in hope, young in energy, young in trust, young in ambition, young in strength, young in heart. Mr. Symes said the fight was unequal. Yes and no; the army against us in numbers is greater than our own, but it is not armed with weapons so good; every new book is a new weapon for us; every discovery in science, every fresh truth, every step in civilisation, every struggle of thought, all these make new weapons for us, and day by day the fight grows less unequal. Unequal! Have you seen the flood kept back by the barrier? The barrier looks so strong, and the water looks so weak, until the barrier rots, and grows worm-eaten and worn, and the flood bursts over it and through it, bearing it all away; the old flood-gates are the Church, the priests, the creeds—they are rotten, they are worm-eaten, they are crumbling; but the peoples are the flood behind the barrier, and the flood-gates are giving way.

Mr. Symes was right when he said that liberty's chief foe was theology. It is so in France, where the Republic and the Roman Catholic Church stand face to face, and the fight is nearing; we may hereafter have the same battle to fight

here with the same strong enemy. Fight theology always; but fight also politically and socially. Freethought must be identified with progress. In France civil marriages, civil funerals, mark the Radical party. Our chief fight here just now is the political and social one; fight the priest in his stronghold, fight the priest in the school, and let us keep our children from his touch. The Press is fighting for us, often unwillingly, often reluctantly, not always consciously.

Before the next Conference there may be another fight in the struggle which has been going on in Northampton. I trust that the next fight may carry your flag into the Commons' House. I have hope, I have trust, I have ambition. Many men and many women who made our movement are forgotten; the memory of their names has passed away; we have not looked back enough. Other men and other women have cut their names deep in the rocky path upwards. I have the hope, I have the trust, I have the ambition, that by and by those who hereafter read our story may find my name cut faintly there beside those names, and at least I shall have done nothing to militate against the glory of the cause.

London, May 16th, 1880.

I must not again go over the record of our year's work, but that record is one in which we take just pride. Glancing at the late election struggle, we see in nearly every borough our men on the right side. We do not claim perfection for our party, but we do claim that its men are more thorough, more earnest, more hearty in their work than most, and that they are, in the vast majority, to be found on Liberty's side.

1880 gives fair promise for 1881. A large part of this promise, in bud to-day, depends on you for its fruition. If each of you takes care that no child of his is taught theology, there will be no need for attacking theology twenty years hence; but there is need to-day. We cannot deal with the field as though it were virgin soil, as though there were no weeds in it, as though

spade and plough had never touched it, as though it had not for years been sown with the falsehoods of theology, and rolled hard with priestly customs. Many a weed has grown upon it; we see the seeds. I see them in the religious tracts showered on me by the dozen—as though I had not read the rubbish long ago: accounts of Atheist deathbeds, with nothing in them save the inventive genius of those who serve the Lord.

While I am determined that in the House of Commons I will never use my position there against religion, let all understand that outside the House I will not change one syllable of all I have to say. The field, then, is covered with many weeds, and the weeds are so twined round many a good plant, that it is hard not to destroy the plant while you pull off the weed. Weeds you may burn, forests you may hew down, but the roots are left cumbering the soil, sucking its moisture, draining its nourishment. The trunk may be rotten, yet vermin may hide there; the trunk may be rotten, yet fungi may grow there; we must rid the earth of it, not only for ourselves, but for the future.

Who is on our side? Every schoolmaster, even though he know it not; every library; every book that is not filled with fable and bound in fraud: for every book written with honest purpose, aye, though it be against us, may light a spark of thought that shall burn and blaze in the future.

Who is on our side? The bold were on our side long ago. Dungeons held them, faggots and fire stifled and scorched them, penal enactments crushed them, yet the bold went on. And there is life in their deadness, not the sham immortality, but the true, as Bruno's spirit goes through the world, alive as 280 years ago.

Who is on our side? our work is not only negation, not only mocking, not only hewing: mock, sword, mace, these are all weapons in our fight; but we would rather not fight, but grow; we would rather not fight, but march; we would rather not fight, but work our hope out in life; but when we strive to do our duty well, on every side foes swarm hidden, forging lies like stilettos to stab us unawares.

It is something to remember how we have grown. This little hammer that I hold in my hand is the hammer used by

Julian Hibbert, by Richard Carlile, by Gale Jones. If you had told Richard Carlile that before the wood had grown rotten its holder, without one wavering of principle, would stand in the legislature of the nation, he would have thought it a wild dream.

Friends, you have done much for me. Without your aid I should not be entitled to the greeting (pointing to the motto behind him) given me here to-day. Some folks are here to remember me very young. I am speaking in the presence of old men who have known me from my boyhood until now. I was born to no large estate. Without your aid I could not have won the present victory. I owe you much: whether the debt will be paid in the future, only the future can tell. Yet I may, perhaps, dare to say to you that the debt is not all on one side; I, too, have striven to aid you in the time past. You have heard me speak of my ambitions. Suffer me to say a word of them to-night. One ambition I had and have, one as strong as ever, that men may number my name among the names of those who made this free platform possible. This ambition I hope to keep unchanged until I die. Though my life may not be over-long, yet I hope to see our party so organised as to be able to defend its weakest. My other ambition is to be recognised as wielding political power for good or for ill. For good, I hope. For Good, for Liberty, for Redemption, for all without distinction of color, of skin, of race or of type, but for our common Humanity.

We ought all to be gratified by the assurance of our growing strength that comes to us in the bitterness of clerical attacks, in the wild fanatical rage, since my election, of prayers and of sermons. The Central London Branch has decorated this room with the Northampton colors: let me hope that none of you in the years to come may be ashamed that your Society wore them to-day. 1849 to 1880. It is a large piece out of a man's life. From Bonner's Fields to Westminster Hall. It is a long stride. And I have climbed, not crawled; marched, not crept; I have held clenched fist, not silken hand. But, friends, do not expect too much now. Man can only do what man may. I will try and do my best. More than this none may promise truly. I

will try to do as our bravest dead would have done in my place. Thomas Allsop gave me that motto of "Thorough" (pointing to the beam). Strafford put bad tradition into it, but it is a good motto, for without that a man is nothing, I am ready to learn; I have learned much since I first stepped to your front; I have much to learn in my new place. I will try always to be "Thorough" there, and if you do not always agree with me, let me have fair trial before you judge.

I have learned to love many of you, for in the hour of trial men and women of Lancashire, of Yorkshire, of Tyneside, of Glasgow, have stood by me, and have been my friends. In the old times many abrave man has fallen, because he has been alone. During thirty years, lone though I have often seemed, I have never been utterly alone, and all through men and women have loved me, men and women whose love kept my heart warm when it seemed well-nigh frozen. What one man may do, I will strive to do: the result must be left for the story to tell.

Of my foes—for those in front, they must move. For those behind me, who ought to be with me, they are finished. I have no word of further reproach for them, but also I will not work with them. Foes in front I will fight, and friends I will win in the new circle as in the old, but for those who have known me for years, and whose petty jealousy makes them slander me, let them stand off; my way is in front.

Let me speak to you of my duty, my faith, my hope. It is my duty to build up, but also to attack. A big wall blocks the way; I hold a crowbar in hand, and will pull down and make way for the sowers with their bags of good seed. It is my duty to build up, but also to attack. In the far West a man is promised land, and he finds his land covered with trees marking centuries of growth; he must clear before he can build: he must cut logs before he can raise the hut: these trust me with the axe, and I will wield it to make room for the builder. It is my duty, and it is no painful duty; it would be pain to be shut out from doing it. I read to-day in many journals—journals which have discovered in me ability they never saw before, powers of oratory they never knew of—I read in these remarks as though my position were one for pity,

as though I stood only with tabooed men. Were it so, it were no cause of pain. Last Tuesday I saw a member of a little sect which men tried to crush and failed. Fifty-five years ago that sect was in a worse case than we are to-day. They could not sit on juries; they could not give evidence in criminal courts; they are now in the Cabinet. We see the fetters falling from us; we see the redemption of our children by the conscience clause. When I see this, I feel pride, not pain—pride which knits itself into my life, my hope, and my faith. Faith? Yes, my faith. I have faith more than many. I do not believe in the far-off yesterday, too far off to catch a glimpse of, nor in the far-off to-morrow in worlds of the future. But I have faith in Humanity, faith in men and women, faith that is proved by test. Humanity grows larger, not lesser. Look back and see men, ignorant, savage, brutal; see them growing; see struggling thought moulding itself into speech; see speech, the child of thought, bringing forth new thought out of her ever-fruitful womb. Humanity is growing larger than castles, larger than temples, larger than empires, larger than creeds, larger than churches; men once built these, now they are outgrowing them. I have faith in that Humanity. I have hope in the future; hope in deliverance from the fears, the shackles, the fetters of the past. The age is not far off when men shall be free and equal, not in the dead level of that equality which can never come, but the age in which men rank higher than kings, and priests are not.

Bury, June 5th, 1881.

Something had been said by Mr. Slater about the change in the day—beginning so gloomily and ending so brightly, and he (Mr. Bradlaugh) thought that might be taken as an emblem of what the Freethought struggle had been. The morning of Freethought was gloomy, but the storm was lighter now. Any quarrel they had that day, any fighting or penalties they risked, were trifles when compared with the risk Bruno and others,

whose names even were lost to them, faced in paying the penalty in fighting for what was enjoyed now.

He could not help congratulating them on the general progress of their movement—a progress shown in the intense fear manifested in most Christian declarations, and that fear was especially on the part of the State-aided clergy. These had most to fear, because their weapons against all Nonconforming bodies were solely reason, argument, discussion, and pleadings, as those bodies might plead with them; but against the others they claimed to tear asunder the statutes which gave preference to one religious body over the others, and which gave it a position which ought not to belong to a State establishment.

He desired to say a word of thanks both to the society and the open conference for the trust and confidence which they had been good enough to express. It was necessary that he should speak honestly and plainly. The political struggle was not a struggle of Freethought against religion. It might be made a struggle by those who opposed them, of Freethought against bigotry. It would be unjust in the extreme —knowing what they owed to Nonconformists at Northampton during the past two years—it would be unjust indeed on their part not to recognise that when men like John Bright stood out as he had done; when men like Henry Richard had taken the ground he had taken, and when a man like Mr. Gladstone, not without pang and grief to him, claimed the same right for the man who was attacked for his Atheism as he claimed for every other citizen—it would be ungrateful and wrong indeed for them to pretend that the struggle which they were fighting side by side was a struggle for their party. Naturally their party was advantaged at any advance in freedom and by everything which tended to snap some of the old ties which hindered and prevented progress, but only in that sense could the struggle be said to be a Freethought struggle.

Now a word on the gravity of the twelve months they had to face. They were going to their homes, but he could not fight without their help, and he wanted them to know the people they had to fight. If he read the signs of the times aright, the

thing which was expressed by Professor Rainy and Dr. Begg, in Scotland, and in a coarser manner by a man like Dr. Berger, that which found expression in Convocation and which was more virulently and grossly put in the *Whitehall Review*, showed that there was some intent on the part of some to try to revive the old blasphemy laws for the purpose of defeating him with one weapon when they failed with the other; and that fight was the more difficult because they had to deal with the grossest misrepresentations from the daily press, and with grave misapprehension on the part of the people who should be on their side.

Some men in some meetings stood up and said that if his conduct had been different the result would have been different, and that the law would already have been changed. Such a man had the advantage of his ignorance to protect him from the charge of unfairness. But in the position in which they had placed him he had generally succeeded in winning from the judges who had decided against him some compliments for the industry he had exercised in ascertaining the law. They had to meet with most wicked representations as to what they did and taught. He said nothing of the foul pamphleteer who for election purposes strung together some truths and many falsehoods for the purpose of producing an untrue impression. He had paid to Henry Varley a compliment he perhaps should not have done, in asking him to submit his pamphlet to arbitration. Henry Varley had refused that, for he would have him (Mr. Bradlaugh) sue him for libel, as he knew that reiterated actions meant ruin to him in the mere cumulation of expenses. The only court before which he (Mr. Bradlaugh) would sue him would be that of public opinion.

It was not only a coarse speaker like the Vicar of Bolton, or the men like the Rev. Dr. Begg, who, corrected in a misrepresentation, still repeated it, but he found that men whose honesty in ordinary life he felt sure about constantly repeated, as though they were his, views on Socialism which he did not hold, views on marriage which never had an equivalent in his feelings, and declarations on prostitution which were abhorrent to his thought. He found that he had not only to

answer for what he had said, but for a number of assertions which, as they knew, never from the beginning of his life until now came from him.

There were some good but weak people, who were good enough to tell him that they were his friends, and he dared say meant it, but of whose friendliness he had not had the slightest trace during the whole of his career; they perhaps thought that neutrality was true friendship; if they did, he did not. They said that if he had done something different he would have served the movement better. When he was sent to do parliamentary work he was not sent to serve the movement; he was sent to serve Northampton. He would not do anything to hinder the movement or be untrue to it, nor did he intend abandoning one declaration that he had made; but it was not true that he had gone to the House to fight the battle of Freethought. He could fight that on the platform and in the press.

He had no intention, if he could avoid it, of ever opening his mouth on the question of religious belief in St. Stephen's, where he meant to sit for many years. But it was said that if he had pursued another course he would have won the right to affirm. They should see if it were so. A man brave and true, one John Archdale, who had a religious objection to the oath (which did not weigh with him), saw in the form of the oath an absolute breakage of a command which seemed to him divine, and refused to take the oath, and 150 years passed before the right to affirm was accorded. That was longer than he (Mr. Bradlaugh) could afford to wait. He might be told that things moved quicker now, but he did not believe that bigotry would make one step until they pushed it.

Men tried to win the right to affirm for Freethinkers long before he did, and they failed; he might boast that he partially won it, for the Act of 1869 was framed by the Hon. George Denman after a special argument in a case of his own, and after consultation with him on the subject. For years the fight went on. It was not won by standing or by remaining outside; it was only won by fighting thoroughly and completely, as he meant to fight that case. The people who told him that he might have

refused the oath and still have kept his seat were people utterly unacquainted with parliamentary law. Such people referred to Baron Rothschild, who took the oath of allegiance and therefore protected his seat; but did not take the oath of abjuration, in which occurred the words "on the true faith of a Christian," the refusal of which did not cause him to vacate his seat.

With regard to the growing feeling in the country he was bound to say that the provincial press was much more fair and just, he might say generous, to him than the London press was. He had not often trespassed on their columns with any sort of explanation, but had left his opinions to speak for themselves. But in London they had powerful daily papers, which would suppress as far as they could all traces of the agitation; they would ignore its facts and neutralise its forms. They had a powerful organisation against them. So powerful that he found last week that at several post-offices in Ireland the postmasters exposed in the offices notices asking the people to sign petitions against his admission to Parliament. He was bound to say that on his making representation, the Postmaster-General had written saying that he had given orders for the removal of the notices. But that showed them the grave difficulties they had to contend with in that fight.

In many cases they had evidence, which was extremely difficult to bring before Parliament, that petitions were submitted to Sunday school children and were signed indiscriminately by those children from eight to twelve years of age; he had cases in which children had had petitions brought to them to sign; being told that it would help them to go to heaven if they helped to keep an Atheist out of Parliament. That was the sort of thing which made him ask them if they would work for him.

He was proud to see that the Northampton colors were so worn. The selection of those colors was a question with which he had nothing to do in 1868. They had been worn in many a lawful struggle for law and liberty; they were never defeated. It might be said they were defeated in 1868 and twice in 1874 but those were only repulses and not defeats, for they were skirmishing only to gain the victory in the end.

He wanted them to work unitedly; they had been told that if there was no division amongst them people on the other side might say that he was their dictator. If they were afraid of that they should not belong to the society. If he was good enough to be their general by their commission in the fight, they must let him be their general while the fight was going on. He should not like to measure the feeling of Northampton against theirs, but he would forfeit the right to sit in Parliament rather than forfeit the right to hold their love and trust.

For him, personally, the fight was a fairly big one; it was not merely the litigation in which they boasted they would ruin him. It was not easy after travelling all night, as he had to do lately, to go into court in the morning to argue points of law—it was not easy to hold one's own and keep one's temper; it was not easy to meet foes when amongst those foes were those who pretended to be friends. There were some who pretending friendship tried to trip him, who said the bitter word which reached him from behind, and then the struggle was made harder still. Luckily that was not his first fight; it was at present his biggest fight—he did not mean the litigation; he did not mean the common informing tools. He saw in the papers a paragraph speaking of the generosity of the common informer—in the papers was the only place in which he had seen it. It was stated that the informer might have arrested him, but the man never had the legal right to do it; he never had judgment to do it. If he had had judgment, imprisonment for debt under ordinary circumstances was abolished eleven years ago, and if it were not, imprisonment for debt did not apply to a member of Parliament under any circumstances whatever. The Tories said they would make him bankrupt; let them not believe it until they saw it.

They might leave that side of the fight. The serious part of the fight did not lie there, but elsewhere. It was no light thing for one man to challenge the authority of the House of Commons, even if the House of Commons gave a decision against the law, as it had done. It was said that new legislation was required to admit him. It was not true. If he

was not qualified by law, they could turn him out. He was only kept outside by pure physical force, and he had only for the present submitted to that physical force because the man whom they had charged with the duty of taking care of the affairs of the State had to face a state of things in Ireland which was shameful to all English people, and he would not, if he could help it, permit himself to be made the means, even for one moment, of delaying the remedy—if remedy were possible—still less the means of harassing the man whose life was a mighty one, whose career was a grand one, who stood now on the edge of the tomb, with the shadow of the grave near him. No thought of his, no word of his, should give him pain if it were possible for him consistently to avoid it. But the fate of the Irish Land Bill once settled, so far as the House o Commons was concerned, and then his duty was clear. The Government would be able to pass the Affirmation Bill, or it would not. They would be able to introduce it, or its introduction would be obstructed. If they were able it would be his duty to wait a reasonable or unreasonable time, because the advantage of affirmation was so great that as long as the people of Northampton were good enough to give him leave to wait, he should do so. If the Bill were obstructed, hindered, or rejected—it was possible it might be in the House of Commons, and still more possible in the House of Lords—then his duty was clear—to that table he must go again; to that table he would go again. If, then, an accidental majority of the Tories and weak-kneed Whigs, relying upon physical force, and physical force alone, if for the first time in the history of England a majority of the House of Commons, having no law on its side, used force against one man, grave as the issue was, serious as were the consequences, he had looked at them all, and would not give way.

International Freethought Conference, London, September 25th, 1881.

At a gathering at which Freethinkers are present from many foreign countries, it is an acceptable task to endeavor to trace the progress of heresy throughout the world.

It is somewhat wonderful that in the last quarter of the nineteenth century it should be possible, in any civilised country, to make the heresy of any woman or man matter of reproach or hindrance to her or him. It is, indeed, to the heresy of the world that all progress is due. Without the sceptical challenge, the firm enquiry, the examining doubt, the testing and verifying experience, there would always have been the stagnation of ignorance, or the deterioration and warping influence of superstition. In old times much heresy was impossible; there was no general education; there could not be any popular heresy. The heretics were few in number, their brilliant mental achievements and often terrible sufferings marking them out in the darkness of their age and country, as stars stand out clearest in the blackest night. There are many classes of heresy. Religious heresies—challenging either the religion of a particular country, or assailing the very foundation of all religions—political heresies and social heresies. In an International Freethought Conference it is with heresies in questions of religion that we are alone concerned. We do not, in thus limiting our work, mean any slight to earnest workers for human enfranchisement in social or political matters. We only desire to keep our propaganda distinct and clear. Political and social needs may vary in each land, but the conflict between ignorance and reason is in truth but one conflict in all climes, whatever the formula attacked or faith asserted.

In matters of religion there can only be two clear logical positions. One, the completest submission of the intellect to authority: to some book, or church, or man. The other, the most thorough assertion of the right and duty of individual thought and judgment. These positions are so antagonistic that there can be no truce or peace between the defenders of the one and of the other. As Freethinkers we claim this right and duty of individual thought, the free and complete expression of the individual judgment. Guided, and aided too, this thought must needs be, by the thought of yesterday and of to-day. But we deny that yesterday's thought ought to be allowed to conclude all thinking. We deny that yesterday's knowledge may be held to include all that is or can

be knowable. We claim to search for truth, and to show others what we find, that they, with us, may test whether it be true or no. We assert the right to think, and to tell openly and clearly all we can of what it is we think, and how we think it.

We affirm that in no country ought thought on matters of religion to be hindered by penal laws. We declare that in every country religious disabilities should be swept away. We do not want to train our children while babies so that they must grow into the assailants of any creed, but we refuse to allow the priest to twist and distort the infant mind with creed and fear. We would have children's education limited to science, leaving each unfettered to build his theory or choose his creed as brain-strength comes with growth. We have no desire to prevent or punish any religion by law. We would have all religions, like all sciences, on equal terms, the reward being in the future to the greatest discoverer of new truths, not as it has been in the past, to the most obstinate upholder of ancient delusions. We claim the same equality of citizenship for professors of belief, unbelief, and disbelief. But if special honor is claimed for any, then heresy should have it as truest servitor of human kind. We, here, all claim to be Freethinkers, therefore, we are no more all of one thought than we are of one stature or of one country. Nor do we make any claim that we, or any other thinkers, know all that can be known. We stand by the great ocean of the unknown, each mental eye seeing different shades of color on its waves, each thought-diver gathering from its depths truth-corals and pearls, that others missed to grasp or cannot reach.

In one of the very oldest countries, but where education has been most general and most esteemed, there heresy has been reputed and valued, instead of punished. That country is China. Professor Douglas, writing for the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, admits that Confucianism "has supplied the guiding principles of all that is great and noble in the life of China for more than twenty centuries". Yet there is nothing of the supernatural in the teachings of Confucius. He troubled himself much as to how men might live. He concerned himself not at all with what should be their career, or if they should

have any career, when they were no longer living. This paradox has no place in his teachings. So of another great child of this Chinese race, Laou-tze. Of him Professor Douglas writes: "Of a personal God, Laou-tze knew nothing; and, indeed, a belief in such a being would be in opposition to the whole tenor of his philosophy". Yet these twain are, with Buddha, the great masters of Chinese thought.

Perhaps the clearest record of heretic progress is preserved to us from Greece. There—almost about the very time when Buddha indelibly engraved his name on Chinese thought—philosophy lifted its head in Greece, and made thought easier in all time for all the Western world. There is not the time to-night to trace the history of Greek Scepticism, nor to linger over the page that tells of the hemlock cup which silenced the tongue without smothering the sayings of questioning Socrates. We must not even—after some centuries leap—stop to pity the sore martyrdom or to admire the eloquence of the pure, the beautiful Hypatia. Temples have been built to these and their heretic brothers and sisters, not in marble or in granite, but in working, stirring, doubting, reasoning, truth-coining, human brains.

It would be ungrateful to quite pass by Arabian heresy and our indebtedness to it, even though we have not space enough to give due honor; it is to the Arab of the tenth and eleventh centuries that we to-day owe much. When learning had been trampled down throughout all Christendom it was the Arab who not only gathered and preserved the mental legacy of India, Italy, Greece, and Egypt, but added to it the tenfold interest of his new discovery and keen thinkings in every then possible branch of science.

But our business to-night is with heresy since real heresy has been possible. That is, possible for the many. That is, since the printing press has been known in Europe, and since men talked to men openly in their own tongue. In the great arsenals of Europe huge monster cannon are built to shatter human homes, and shot and shell are cast and filled with which to load these cannon. The printing press is our grand cannon; thought, question, and affirmation our shot and shell. Book and tongue are our sword and bayonet; pen and speech our

lance and spear. But neither our writers nor our speakers have gone through the fight unscathed.

Italy shows us, during the last three and a-half centuries, a terribly full martyrs' roll. Dungeon, rack, and faggot were the ready arguments of the Roman Catholic Church. And these were freely used. The mere list of names of these Italian martyrs for Freethought would take more time than to-night can be spared; but one name must at least be repeated with much of reverence and more of triumph:—that of the man burned in Rome 281 years ago. A man whose tongue, pen, and body were alike untiring; who in Naples, Switzerland, France, England, Germany, and Venetia worked to make Freethought possible for us; who lay eleven long years in prison; who endured the rack and perished at the stake. True till death, the grand and glorious Giordano Bruno, whose ashes were scattered in Rome, but whose memory still lives, whose energy still survives, whose martyrdom we honor, and whose marble presentment we hope ere long to see challenging the Vatican, with the promise of the Freethought victories which the twentieth century shall bring to crown this nineteenth century effort and to redeem that sixteenth century shame.

In France it was in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that the struggle was most fierce, and for some time least fruitful. The mass of the people fed too little to think much, and the work of the Encyclopædists was as that of the sower on the rock so far as concerned the great mass of the nation. But the men who were imprisoned and whose books were burned during the Regency and in the reign of Louis XV made possible the more general intellectual array of this century. Fewer giants perhaps, but more men. The fire which burned Vanini in the beginning of the seventeenth century is quenched for ever; and, though the priestly hatred against Voltaire still lives, the wit they fear, and hate because they fear, has been fruitful mother of freer thought in France.

Holland and Germany have been mighty for thought-leading through Europe, from Spinoza to Kant, Fichte and Feuerbach. In England, from Hobbes to Mill, a grand march of great thinkers. But it is not alone of the great thinkers we have here

to take account; it is of the village orator, the local pamphleteer, the poor and often rough-mannered defender of the right of speech and of publication. These in turn have each and all had hard battles to fight. Gaol for themselves; poverty and contumely for their families. To be "infidel" was worse than to be burglar. For the "sinner" there was welcome by the pious: he might repent. For the heretic thinker, no mercy to be shown him. But the poorer soldiers have left scant personal record of their work. This work is best known by the platform and press which they have won for our use. Who shall tell in each land the histories of those humbler ones who have faced hunger and mockery, prison and shame, to win even the grudged freedom we enjoy to-day? They are the privates in the Freethought army, their loss scarce counted in each country's victorious progress.

In every department of science the triumphs of heresy are distinct and clear. In astronomy the *e pur si muove* has been real moving onwards. The sun and moon are no longer the two great lights, with little twinkling stars, to give light to the central earth. The aforetime heresy of Copernicus and Galileo has conquered. The astronomic heresy which the priests could not crush has become the astronomic science to which they give their sanction. In geology the vast periods to which yet no maximum limit can be set utterly outshadow the old church chronologies, which place the creation of the world B.C. 4,004; and the evolutionist helps us to trace back into the vastnesses of these geologic æons how the development of life has slowly but surely progressed. To-day the churches cannot burn Darwin, Huxley, or Wallace; Broca, Topinard, or Hovelacque; Vogt, Hæckel, or Büchner. The priest of the old altar of the unknown is powerless save for petty spitefulness against the newer workers in the temple of truth. Even in psychology, the domain in which the priest was lord and the creed was master, even there heresy triumphs. Mental diseases are no longer demoniacal possessions; science cures, prevents, and alleviates, where religion chained the lunatic to the walls and exorcised the devil-possessed unfortunate. Maudsley, Huxley, Tyndall, Clifford, Lewes, great living and, in thought

still living, dead, these honored names mark heresy's triumphs.

And perhaps you will pardon a poor addition to these mighty things in the mention that even in the Cortes of Catholic Spain Martos and Castelar are claiming to get rid of the oath, which we, too, have had to fight at home.

Edinburgh, May 28th, 1882.

It is my duty and my pleasure, as President, for the current year, to deliver the closing address of this first Freethought Conference openly held on Scottish soil. We may congratulate ourselves on its national character. Forty towns, some in the extreme south and south-west of England, have sent their delegates, some of them travelling over 500 miles to be present here; so that we may take the gathering as a fair proof of real earnestness. It has been a source of great pleasure to me, and I am sure to all, to find the thorough unity and harmony of discussion prevailing. Our Scotch friends seem to have laid aside to-day their critical swords, but I trust that they do not think that we resent criticism; we have often found theirs most useful. Let me thank all for their efforts to make everything harmonious. One speaker has referred to Scotland as a land of bigotry. Perhaps that is so; but let us not forget that the land of bigotry is also the land of earnestness, and I almost prefer bigoted earnestness to hypocritical indifference. There is hope of winning the one; there is little use in the other. But Scotland has higher attractions to Freethinkers than that of earnestness. Freethought owes enormously to Scotch thought, whether it be for or against itself. Some of the closest reasoners bear Scottish names. Need I add to that of David Hume the names of Dugald Stewart, of Adam Smith, of Sir William Hamilton, to prove how much Scotland has contributed to our strongest thought, not claiming them as agreeing with us, but as helpers to us, since all strong thought makes the possibility and the education of Free-

thought? It is right also to say here that Scotland, above the other English countries, has done most to destroy the hope of bigotry by its universities throwing open the highest education to the children of the poor. Scotch, too, is that Chambers' literature which has done so much for education, without serving one sect more than another. But I must turn from this, lest you should think that I am trying to flatter you, and I know that flattery is considered by a Scotch audience as the worst of bribery, and that you would rather I should break your heads with hard blows against your most cherished opinions than try to win you with compliment, however well deserved and sincerely meant.

The post renewed to me by our society to-day is a post of honor, of higher honor than could have been foreshadowed sixty years ago. Some of you are old enough to remember hearing from lips living at that period what the position of Freethinkers was in Scotland then, how impossible it would have been to have then held such a Conference as ours. One value the post has to me is that it brings me into contact with men of every country who hold that the position entitles me to their friendly greeting, greeting not to me for my own sake, but for your sake in whose trust I stand. This free platform that has been won needs from us to-day vigorous defence. You have heard from Mrs. Besant and Mr. Foote how that liberty is won and is grudged. Won, in that the laws against us are not enforced, but the laws are there and may be enforced. We have not yet won equality with other sects; we have not yet won social liberty and equal right. Our platform is only tolerated. Tolerated? But no one has right to tolerate. I have no right to tolerate the thought of the churches. They have no right to tolerate mine. Their thought is theirs of right; mine is mine of right; and the judgment of to-morrow only can be final both on their thought and on mine. But I ask you to remember that no strong defence can be made by one.

Sixty, nay fifty, years ago men and women went to gaol in Edinburgh for holding the opinions with which we are identified to-night. There was no society to stand by them

then; no organisation to aid them then. We should be as weak as they, were it not for the public opinion made by the organised propaganda we keep up. You have the right to help; you have the duty of work and the right of work, so that all the pressure may not fall on a few. None has the right to stand alone, to refuse to join a society. Why not? Because he could not think save for the thought before him. Because he could not know but for the destruction of the censorship which blotted pages out of the books which teach him. Because his thought would be silenced but for the struggles of gallant thinkers of yesterday. Each who links himself to our Society makes us stronger to meet the powerful organisations against us, and in some measure repays the debt he owes to the Freethinkers of the past.

Mr. Foote has spoken to us of the heretical works of the great dead, of Emerson, of Rossetti, of Darwin. As he spoke I remembered the Anti-Clerical Conference in Rome, held when the Œcumenical Council was sitting there, in which I was invited to take part by Ricciardini. I was reminded also of a remarkable phrase in the London *Spectator*, that Carlyle had denied miracles, while Darwin left no room for a special providence. Westminster Abbey for Darwin's bones; Belfast pulpits against Darwin's brains; and Darwin's monument his work, destroying the Church which enshrines his coffin, and which is the most powerful foe of education in this land.

The signs of persecution spoken of by Mrs. Besant are not confined to England, Scotland, and Ireland. There are traces of fierce activity in France and in Italy; the Roman Catholic Church in those lands must either drive back heresy or be broken; the school is rising against the Church, the schoolmaster against the priest who trades on ignorance. Here among ourselves there is a danger in the growing strength of societies cast out from other lands, and it is not wise to ignore it. We have Cardinal Manning interfering in our political strife; a foreign Cardinal impudently issuing his Bull to a free people; it scarce needs another Luther to burn such Bulls as his. It is too late for Rome to try and grapple with the Rationalistic spirit of to-day!

Is the power of the priest broken? I wish I felt sure it is. Some of the weapons of the priest are broken. His rack, his faggots, his chains, his prisons are broken, but his power, while the power of the confessional exists in these lands, over our mothers and sisters is not broken, and we must break it. The power of the priest is shaken, but I fear another generation or two must pass ere it will be wholly crushed. Yet well may Mr. Foote have said so, when he knows that in Rome itself, where Bruno died, to-day orators speak, under the very shadow of the Vatican, the heresy for whose sake he gave his life. I ask you to-night to join hands to forward this great cause. You need not lectures now and then, not applause of some favorite orator, but that every Freethinker should think it his duty to stand by the colors. There are matters connected with the press which we are bound to guard; we must keep it thoroughly free, and we must try to create a public opinion that will prevent any taint falling on those who work for us, any slur, any injury to their means of livelihood; we must win for the platform the right enjoyed by the pulpit, and give to our speakers the same honor as is given to the most favorite preacher. We want a platform guarded by an enlightened public opinion, so that no bishop, no member of the House of Commons, no assembly of a kirk, shall dare to join immorality with unbelief. Why should these two be united? Why should immorality be connected with unbelief rather than with belief? Freethought should surely rank higher than the mumbling of old prayers!

You will think that I ought not to conclude without some words as to my personal fight. I can only say that I shall fight on, that I have never been beaten in the long run yet, and that I don't mean to be now. I have been reproached for lack of education; one word certainly I have never learned: Defeat, and I am too old to begin to learn it now. So far as their legal attacks are concerned, I will fight them in every court. If bankruptcy must come, let it come to those who commenced the fight; we did not. Let us empty their purses, and teach them to regret that they ever provoked the struggle. That is my fight. On the hustings the fight is yours. You must show

no mercy, no sparing, when you deal there with the men who have insulted the women of our party. We cannot in every case win the seat, but we can always make it lost to the man who has maligned us. No seat of these that I can strike at will I spare. I have settled about a dozen of them already. I do not pretend, friends, that I shall in the future do all you wish; a man can only do his best. My judgment may not always be yours, but I will try to guide it by the best judgments of those who have gone before.

The Edinburgh society has set before us two mottoes: one that of the N. S. S., "We search for truth": the other my own, "Thorough". For the Freethought one I say, that we do not pretend to know all truth, but we have learned enough to know how vast is that for which we search: no statute has the right to check our search; no Church has the right to stop it; no priest has the right to hinder it; no curse has the right to doom it; no prejudice has the right to forbid it. Truth we will have, if human effort may make the road to find it. Our grasp is not big enough to hold all we find, but by gripping some facts we may teach others to grip more strongly, while we learn ever that truth lies beyond. For my own motto, I will strive to justify it, both in the office you have given, and in any other I may win. And when my work is over, and the stone covers the spot wherein I lie, may I be entitled to have the word "Thorough" carven upon its face.

Manchester, May 13th, 1883.

Crowded as this gathering has been, I have seen gaps in it which make sorrow to me — gaps, which old faces used to fill; gaps where sturdy friends, tried in struggle, used to sit; gaps where younger ones sit to-day, but which are still gaps to me, carved by the hand of death, and left empty for ever.

In re-electing me President I would ask you to remem-

ber that I am only what you make me. I have only the strength you give me; I wield only the authority you form for me. I am your mouthpiece, not your dictator; your servant, not your master. I am your standard-bearer, not your leader: standing in the front rank because you put me there. It is the trust you give me, the love you bear me, the sympathy you show me, the loyal work you do in response to my appeal, that make me strong; it is the echo you send out from every village, every valley, every township, when I call to you, that rings into every church and chapel in the land. Therefore, now, I appeal to you that in the coming year you will help and sustain me and the Executive you have elected to do your work. The world expects more from us to-day; the opposition is fiercer, more bitter, more unsparing than ever. It needs that we should be not reckless, but firm; not insulting, but not flinching; we fight not with our own strength, yet with the strength of generations upon generations who lie in their graves, but whose work lives in our work to-day.

I appeal to you to organise and unite. Isolated, you are like the dust, blown by every breath of wind; linked together you are rock. Children linked together could hold a strong man, who could throw them over one by one. Link yourselves together as our cause is linked with all that is great and grand, noble and sublime. There is no need to ask you to unite for great things, but for small: a crisis finds you all ready, but I want you ready when you do not see the crisis, when you do not see the difficulty. I want you to form part of the political life of the district to which you belong. When men see you firm, when they admire your straightforwardness, when they note your courage, they will turn to you as leaders in the hour of strife.

A man whom I will not name, in an influential position, with wealth at his disposal, a power in chapels throughout the land, a man of lifelong integrity, said to me lately: "One thing, Mr. Bradlaugh, I cannot understand, and that is how ready your people are to help ours, though they disagree with us". I answered: "We are ready to help you when we think you right; we judge your work,

not your creed". In all contests, municipal and political, teach men to turn to you, and try to judge with as much freedom from prejudice as you can. If a man is not all you want, yet select the best man you can find and work for him. No Freethinker who can get a vote should remain without one. He is disloyal to the cause if he leaves ungrasped a sword he might use. The suffrage is a weapon, and it is one we will use; those members who have trampled on our rights, those members who have slandered our lives, those members who have gibed at our ignorance, those members who have insulted our women, we will meet those members at the polling-booth, and we will fight them there. We may have a general election before the year now commenced has closed. There are storm-signals flying, and I promise you to keep a sharp look-out, and to give warning of the bursting. We are a fighting party; we are fighting for our existence; our platform is not yet free. The danger is not so much from the prejudiced folly of a man like Mr. Justice North, as from the reasoned views of such a man as Mr. Justice Stephen.

All Liberals have rejoiced to hear, or to read, the humane, the generous, the kindly, the broad, the liberal views of the Lord Chief Justice of England; but we must remember that these views only open out possibilities; they are dicta which may grow into law, if we are careful and wise. Now, the history of the law is really our danger, and in the hands of judges determined to strain the law the platform would be made precarious. Carlile spent nearly nine years and eight months in gaol to make our platform. Poor men went from your valleys in hundreds, and lay in gaol to make the platform safe, to win the right of speech. The right of speech, the right of platform, the right of press, these rights have not been given: they have been bought with hunger, as men in gaol left their families starving outside; they have been bought with torture of heart and torture of body; not with the torture of the rack, for that was merciful—the rack was followed by the grave; this torture left men—living men—surrounded by starving wives and starving children, yet they bore all that they might win freedom for us.

Our worst danger, however, is not from indictment for blasphemy, but from Rome; Rome, which is mingling now in our political strife; Rome, which dared to send message to Northampton to bid free Englishmen vote as the Vatican dictated; Rome, as to which Sir Massey Lopes in the House said he rejoiced in its aid. Rome is too bold; we will not have it. Rome has cursed Italy; it shall not curse us again. Rome shall have free church for its worshippers, free bench for its bishops, free right for its speech; but Rome shall not touch our liberty, Rome shall not master our political life. Rome shall not put back our Freedom's clock to the time of the Middle Ages; we will break first the hands that touch it. We see an ominous union of Newdegate and Manning; the old ultra-Protestant has forgotten the words, bitter and coarse, with which he assailed the scarlet lady of Babylon, words too coarse for repetition in our meeting here. Yet we see him walking into the lobby arm-in-arm with the protégé of Cardinal Manning, and we must admire the forgetfulness of each. But most of all must we admire the forgetfulness of the Protestant; for Cardinal Manning only uses the ultra-Protestant as his tool against a foe more dangerous to Rome. The fight between us and Rome must come one day. It may be far-off; it may be to-morrow—the fight between Rome and Rationalism, between the fullest assertion of the right of private judgment and the most complete submission to authority.

I have now only to dismiss you and to look into the coming year. Shall we have more blasphemy prosecutions? I think not; at any rate as against myself, unless Sir Hardinge Giffard learns some fresh trick of law, I may hope to give reasonable account thereof. But am I right to say that I think there will be no more? Baffled against one, may they not try to touch another whom they deem less skilful of fence? Shall more men wear prison dress? Shall more men live on prison food? I cannot tell you how pained I felt, when, on visiting Holloway Gaol, I heard a letter and a number given to summon one, and then a letter and a number given to summon another, and when two men came in, in dirty brown prison garb, bearing letter and number, and I recognised them as those I knew. They have

offended against good taste? But do you send men to gaol for offending against good taste? Do you dress men in prisoner's garb for offending against good taste? Do you shut men up in small cells for twenty-three hours out of the twenty-four for offending against good taste? Do you make men pick oakum for offending against good taste? At any rate men are not so treated who offend grossly. To-day on the walls of your city I see huge bills headed "Blood and Fire", and if religion be a reality, what could be more offensive than those bills? And if good taste is to be the rule, what of those religionists who libel our dead, who slander our living, who shut our men out of employment, who close colleges against our women, who mock us with our ignorance while they shut us out from knowledge?

I have said many a bitter word and many a harsh thing; perhaps some had been better not said. Yet were I to live my life again, with the knowledge of how cruel, how merciless the Church has been, how it has made speech impossible, how it has poisoned our lives, I might wonder that all my language had not been bitter instead of only some. It is better not to offend, if offence may be fairly avoided, and it is better because we hurt the good men, not the bad. Good men, such as Canon Shuttleworth and my friend, Stewart Headlam; among Dissenters, such as Charles Williams: among the United Presbyterians such as Mr. Marjoribanks; in the Church of England, such as the Vicar of Coalville: we regret to give these men pain, and if we needed anything to make our tongues gentle and to soften our memory of yesterday's wrong, we might find it in one of England's greatest judges, Christian to the utmost, creed-bound to the fullest, wrestling with his creed that he might do justice, and wringing himself with pain that he might not injure us. I ask everyone of our speakers, every one of our writers, while they are striking at the Church which has cursed the land, at least to remember that there was one strong in creed, strong in prejudice, separated from us by an abyss of judgment and of feeling, who yet stretched his hand across the gulf, and strove to be gentle as well as just.

I cannot part with you without reminding you how Freethought is spreading through the world, through India, through New Zealand, through Australia, through the United States, through Holland, through Germany, through Italy, where no Atheist is precluded by his non-belief from the enjoyment of civil rights, through France, where the vast gathering round the grave of the man she loved, where the sympathy, the hope, the love, the patriotism shown, were all without shade of religion. But though the cause is winning, the struggle is not over yet. We struggle against the fetter-customs of yesterday, against the reputations made when men libelled and racked and burned the heretic. Time is on our side? Yes, for our cause; but Time marches with iron scythe and cuts down the living soldiers, and their blood waters the fields over which they march. Time is always on the side of Truth; but in time they have racked our warriors; in time they have burned our martyrs; in time men have lain in dungeon, and the grave had given the fulness of time to the man yearning for freedom.

Friends, I finish gratefully, hopefully; gratefully, for all you have done; hopefully for the coming year. I greet you as fellow-soldiers in the army that fights for liberty. All truth, all right are not ours, but we have the right to search for truth in trust for those who come afterwards, and we will do our best to make the search rich for those for whom we gather.

Plymouth, June 1st, 1884.

Let me congratulate you on your unanimous and hearty way of work: this informal Parliament grows more useful every year, although there is no way of holding it together save by goodwill and by desire for the good of the common cause.

Twenty-four years ago, as has been already said, I was brought up through a hole in the floor into the dock of the Devonport police court; I was not then tried for blasphemy, because the Young Men's Christian Association had been too hasty: they

had arrested me as soon as I had said: "Friends, I am about to address you on the Bible". Even then my reputation had such a peculiar turn that it was thought that these words justified my arrest. We have had some growth since then, some change in position since then. Then, in court in Devonport, in court at Exeter, where I fought the matter, Freethinkers were objected to, and their evidence was rejected on the ground of their heresy. We have destroyed that, but we have not yet destroyed the insult attached to our evidence-giving, we have not destroyed the power of the bigoted to make the giving painful and difficult; but we will. This we may boast, that we have always fought within the law. We have threatened no violence, we have used no violence, we have acquiesced in no violence, we have encouraged no violence. We appeal to men's brains, to men's reason, and we may remind those who are against us that wherever Freethought makes its way in a country, there the reforming spirit in politics is orderly, peaceful, and must be useful.

I am glad that you have carried Mr. Foote's motion on the Blasphemy Laws. For years in that agitation I stood almost alone. Twenty-three years ago I was rebuked by one who then stood high in the Freethought ranks for wasting the energies of the party in attacking obsolete laws. Bad laws live for mischief always. They are weapons in the hands of the cruel, which may be used at any time. The iron was cold then when I struck it, and the effort was wearying; but if we did not repeal the laws, at least we won friends enough not to leave their victims undefended when they were themselves silenced. I ask you not to let this resolution be of words alone. You, who by your presence here, show that you are Freethinkers, I ask you, hundreds of you not enrolled in our ranks, I ask you to come boldly out and join us, for to be Freethinkers to-day, and not active workers, is treason to the common cause. In the coming year there will be fighting enough for all. On June 13th I am to argue whether Atheists have any civil rights at all; whether holding the position you have given me, and which I am proud to hold, whether that position in free England makes me an outlaw, without political

rights. I shall argue with ten times the force because you trust me to argue it, and because I shall know that I am arguing for you and not for myself alone. I mean to win. The matter is so grave that I would not say so to you unless I felt sure, and you know that I have never said so to you unless where I have won before the finish. I cannot tell you when, nor where, but if it has to be in the House of Lords then I will go there to win, and will win there. But I will try to win before.

If we want to measure progress we must not reckon it by the last twenty-four years: twenty-four years is nothing but a speck of time in history. We must not measure it by the twenty-five years before that, although that quarter of a century held in it nine years of gaol for Richard Carlile; although in it hundreds went to prison for blasphemy, out of one shop alone nine men and two women. It is something to be proud of in our movement that women have shared in its perils; something to be proud of that we have women now, able to endure, able to speak, able to instruct, and to make us purer by struggling by our side. We must not measure our progress by the century. One hundred years ago they burned Diderot's works, and this year Freethinkers will gather in honor of Diderot's centenary. One hundred and ten years ago in France penalty of death was put on any who should dare to publish any "book calculated to disturb the public mind". A Nonconformist sent Mr. Foote to gaol last year, but a hundred years ago Lord Mansfield rebuked the persecution of Nonconformists, declaring that the city of London, in paltry thieving spirit, nominated Nonconformists to offices they could not fill, so that they might fine them for the non-fulfilment; Lord Mansfield characterised that persecution as mean and paltry; persecution had been cruel, it had become petty. And persecution is always petty—petty, paltry, and short-sighted. The twelve months' imprisonment have given to Mr. Foote a force and an influence, not among you who love him, but among those who hate him, that no work could have won in the same time.

Three hundred years ago Bruno was burned for Atheism; to-day in the Italian Parliament men sit who hold views

more extreme than those for which Bruno suffered in the Piazzai dei Fiori in Rome. Then Galileo was compelled to recant, while he muttered: *E pure si muove.* Then Spinoza was excommunicated by the Jews, the Jews who have suffered so much, and who suffer still, and who, like many who are persecuted, are sometimes too ready to persecute in their turn. Take Pomponatius racked, Vanini mutilated, and then you can measure the progress made, for as against these the three, or nine, or twelve months' prison may seem as sunshine.

We, meeting in Conference, take this position: that no authority save that of reason is valid; that no place save that of freedom is worthy; we dictate only by the clash of thought, and we are against every form of ecclesiastical establishment, not because we disagree with its creed, but because every form of thought should be equal in opportunity.

I thank the Plymouth Branch that opposite Mr. Foote's words they have put the word I hope to deserve, "Thorough". We mean to be thorough. We claim no right to dictate views to others, but we do claim that none who hold ours shall be forced before a judge; we claim education secular and universal, no social, no political, no religious disabilities put upon us; we will not have toleration, but equality; falsehood should not be tolerated, it should be exposed, but none should punish the man because his views are false. Leave him to judge. Give fair play and free play to all.

It would be unfair now to keep you longer, so I will only say that the morrow is full of promise. Fifty years ago education without religion was impossible; it was superstition or nothing; on your knees or nothing; church prayers or nothing. Now we may try to walk, even if we stumble. I thank you, friends, that you have trusted me to lead you for another year. There is fighting to be done, and I still can fight. I have said nothing to you to-day of my political struggle, because it would not be fair to others. Cordially agreeing as I do with what Mr. Foote said of those who are willing to stand beside us in fighting for liberty, you will recognise how I feel to good folk who disagree with my heresy, but who are good enough to give me their

political trust, and hopeful enough to believe that I shall not dishonor it.

Birmingham, May 24th, 1885.

Not all of you in this great meeting are of us; not all of you are for us: not all of you, perhaps, are even well inclined towards us; yet all of you, every one of you, friendly or hostile, ally or foe, is lending strength to us to-night: is helping us to mark a great step of progress in this land. Progress, but progress not yet complete; which until it is complete must be painfully won, hardly won, sorely won; won, as *he* (Mr. Foote) helped to win it by gaol-suffering as payment won as *she* (Mrs. Besant) helped to win it by house laid desolate, and heart-strings wrung, and child's life torn away.

I congratulate you on the progress Freethought has made throughout the world. Here we meet in this noble hall by grace of your good town. In New Zealand, Robert Stout and John Ballance, men holding the views I hold, speaking as openly as I speak, hold office, one as Prime Minister, the other as a Cabinet Minister. In New Zealand there is perfect equality for all before the law, without mockery of oath to make shame or taunt of. There an Affirmation Bill has given to every one the fullest right, without hindrance, without insult, without question. New Zealand gives us promise of what we shall win; win with your help, if you will give it; win despite your hindering, if you will hinder; win in any case, for we will have it.

To-day we have still many disabilities, but we have also many possibilities of hope. Disabilities not only complained of by men of our own side, but recognised as such by those outside our ranks. Mr. Justice Stephen has sketched the Blasphemy Laws in what he calls "all their naked deformity". Lord Justice Lindley, administering the law against unbelievers, admitted that there were laws against heretics of "cruel severity". We demand the repeal of all

such laws; we demand equality of civil right. We do not ask for toleration from our enemies. Toleration implies superiority; we claim equality. We claim fair play. We say that in the conflict of thought, in the multiplicity of creeds, in the multitude of churches, in the myriads of sects, some must be wrong, all may be wrong, and the duty of each is to give fair play to all.

In a country like Great Britain, in an empire with 350,000,000 of subjects holding differing faiths, the duty of a Government is to hold the scales level, giving privilege to none, putting penalty on none, yielding protection to all. And we are grateful to your Corporation in that it has held the balance even; that it asked no pledge from us that it does not ask from all; put no restriction on us that it does not put on all; and I ask it to believe that we desire to take no advantage beyond that which each body has which meets in this hall. We do not deny to any the right to worship; we do not ask that any shall not be protected in their worship if they need protection: but we do claim that we may stand as safely as they may kneel. We challenge only any special privilege for any; we rebel against any special penalty on any; claiming fair play for all, free ground for all, equality for all before the law.

There must be, with liberty of thought, many shades of thought. We claim free utterance for all of them, however extreme any may be. Let enlightened public opinion hear all, weigh all, judge all. Let all thoughts be equal before the law, with no opinion-penalty, no opinion-imprisonment, no opinion-heartwring. Against special disabilities we are rebels. Years ago, long years ago, generations ago, the fire burned up Bruno. Those fires were relit here, and Priestley saw their flames lick up his library and his instruments; now in this hall his pictured face looks down from the place in which you have raised it high in honor, looks down on a crowd to which our speech utters his thoughts carried further than he carried them. We have the right to think as far as we can. Are you more enlightened than we? then answer us. When our thoughts have been uttered let the best exponents of

orthodoxy answer them; but do not burn, do not imprison. I say nothing of the small obstacles that have lain in my own path; you have helped me to climb them, and you have lifted me higher than I could have lifted myself. We will think, and we will let our thought be heard.

Mr. Foote has referred to Victor Hugo, and we may well join in reverent tribute at his grave, for he was a big man among small men, a big pen writing clear strokes where others scratched, a painter with huge brush painting upon the world what he saw and what he dreamed, beyond the petty gutter-realities of many who mocked him. This man, dying, would have no priest at his side; he was, as described in the *Times*, a "Voltairean Deist". A few years ago he presided with Victor Schœlcher and Maria Desraimes at a Freethought Conference at Paris. Recently he was named on the Committee of Honor for the Bruno Memorial, for that monument which marks the progress of Freethought, which climbs the Roman hill to look down on the Roman mockery that has hindered hope, poisoned Italy, and is now dying of its own corruption.

We have no creed, but we have much faith; faith in the possibility of human progress; faith in digging after truth; faith in searching after truth; not in looking backwards to yesterday but in working for the morrow; not in lying prone on the ground praying, but in climbing upwards towards the light. We believe in the decrease of human woe, as men hate less, as they love more, as each helps the other to make his grip the firmer. We believe in the lessening of human hatreds, as men recognise that varying opinions may be held with equal honesty. We believe in the use of reason instead of force, in peace instead of war. Religion may bless bayonets; Freethought cannot. To us war is murder, capture is theft; we have no joy in ruined homes, in fire-scorched villages, in trampled fields; we would rather strive to raise than to strike down, and we believe that bright eyes and keen intellects are better than armed men.

We do not pretend that we are always right; we only try to be. We do not pretend that we have truth, but that we search for it. Our motto is: "We seek for truth", and with Lessing we believe that he is most ignorant who thinks he

knows all. Let us search. If you have the truth, we will have it from you. We are ready to listen, if we may question; ready to hear, if we may answer; ready to receive, if we may test the purity of the coin you give.

I thank those of you who are not of us. I congratulate those of you who are. I thank those who are not of us for their kindly courtesy, and I would say to them: We are on the side of the poor; we plead for those who are mocked and insulted, for those who are called "dregs" and "scum", and if you help us we will help you, that we may all have our truth truer, healthier, fuller in the age to come.

Glasgow, June 13th, 1886.

In speaking here to-night, and delivering the closing speech of this meeting, I am conscious that there are probably many present who do not hold the views with which we of the National Secular Society have been concerned to-day. On behalf of those who have to-day elected me as their President for another year, I stand here to claim for them from those of you who do not agree with us a right equal to your own: a right to think, to speak, to do. You may say: Have you not that right? Do you not use it? We use it, but your laws do not give it to us; you deny it to us in your habits. Habits cannot be changed in a day, but laws may.

With a general election now imminent, with power in your hands, I would put two points to those who disagree with us. You gain nothing by keeping bad laws. Bad laws give us a right of complaint. While they exist your religion of love is a sham; your declaration of brotherhood is a pretence. You may say, what laws?

First, take the laws about oaths, and see how they hinder us. If we do not take them, they are a difficulty, a block in our way. If we do take them, you who compel us to do so cry out that we are hypocrites. The hypocrisy is yours: the dishonor is yours; so long as you force your oaths on us. North of the

Tweed no unbeliever in future rewards and punishments has any right to take an oath, nor has he any right to affirm. If he state his views, or if his views be known, if he has expressed them in unguarded conversation, his evidence can be objected to. If the case be a civil one, his claim may be shut out; if a criminal one, the criminal may escape, the innocent may suffer, for want of his excluded evidence. A juror who disbelieves in hell can neither affirm nor swear. The witness, however, may by travelling escape his disability. If he goes to Newcastle, the judge will accept him; the objection is valid north, but not south, of the Tweed. The question ought surely not to be one of geographical limitation. Be fair; allow a man his choice between oath and affirmation. A man who is honest enough to avow unpopular opinions is a man likely to speak the truth. Every Christian should work for this reform, until the men who you say mock the oath are no longer compelled to take it. We do not ask to escape the legal penalty attached to false swearing. We are willing that the same penalty shall attach to our simple declaration. We only ask that we may not be forced to go through a form of words of which we do not know the meaning, and to which you attach meanings as various as your opinions. I do not argue with you as to the meaning of the phrases, "Swear not at all"; "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain". But I remind you that the Bishop of Peterborough has told you that if you pretend we are hypocrites you fail; that if we say words to which we attach no meaning we cannot blaspheme; that in so doing we give no pledge of belief.

Secondly, we complain of the Blasphemy Laws; laws under which Mr. Foote was imprisoned, under which Mrs. Besant was deprived of her child; laws under which the late Lord Amberley's will was cancelled, and the trust he made for his children's education was set aside; laws which Mr. Justice Stephen said he wanted to expose in all their hideous iniquity. We demand that these laws shall be repealed. They are of no service, save for purposes of persecution. They do not serve religion nor check heresy. Voltaire mocked at them: Hobbes sneered at them. You may lock up one or two

by means of them: but you cannot lock up thought. If your religion is true, you should not want them; if it is false, you should not have them. If your religion is love, you should not use them; if it is hate, they should be taken from you as weapon. A Bill is now brought forward to abolish them, brought forward by religious men; by men who believe that persecution is bad, and that it shows the weakness of those who use it.

We appeal for equal right. We shall win that right. You cannot prevent; you can only hinder. Many have been burned, but burning has not stopped thought. Many have been imprisoned, but imprisoning cannot stop speech. Our platform is won, despite stake and gaol. The pen, the telescope, the microscope, are won for fuller teaching, for finer touches, for new fact and new thought. We are heretics, you say; we claim equal right as men. We are men, and you can be no more. We claim the right to reason, the right to argue, the right to answer. The gaol door is no syllogism; the gaoler's key is no argument. But you say we use mocking words. Why not? You mock at every religion save your own, and why not we at yours? But if you would not have us mock, treat us justly; if you would have us kind, treat us kindly; if you want us not to use words that hurt, then be fair. Many creeds have lived and died; perhaps yours may be wrong. If you are sure that you are right, then you can afford to be generous; if you are sure that you have the truth, then the greater need to be just.

I dare not fancy that you all agree with me; I know there are some here who think that we are not right. But remember how many have been denounced in their own time who have been honored afterwards, and though we may not deserve to be ranked with them, yet you may be wrong in your hasty forbiddal of new thought. Bacon was assailed as a Materialist; Newton was decried as a heretic. Men who were branded Atheist in their own age have been canonised in the ages after them for their efforts for human redemption.

I give you thanks for the patience with which you have listened to much with which you disagree, and I bid you all good-night.

South Shields, May 20th, 1888.

It is now my duty to deliver the closing speech of this Conference gathering.

Some of you may be inclined to ask why it is that we invite outsiders who do not agree with us to listen to declarations that must often be offensive to them; you may ask why do we make parade of the strength of a movement which, from your point of view, can only be mischievous and injurious. I will try to answer that question. We ask those who do not agree with us, we ask those who think we are wrong, we ask those who say that they are right and we in error, to give us the evidence of their conviction of having the truth by working to make us as free as they are. We ask that there shall be no penalty on our opinions; we ask that there shall be no disabilities following on the expression of our opinions; we ask that there shall be no privilege connected with any phase of speculative thought. Have you the right? What higher privilege do you ask than the privilege of having it? Have you the right? Then do you need the State to add bribe to duty? Have you the right? Then do you wish to have our error marked with the prison? Have faith in your own conviction. Have belief in your own creed. Fling your truth into the arena of public discussion, relying on its own virtue to bring it out the victor. Who is there among you most convinced of the truth of his religion? On what does he rely? His religion is but one among many; within the limits of this empire there are scores, hundreds, of jostling creeds; how can you be sure that you are right? If you rely on reason, let us reason. Do not gag us when we argue, send us to gaol when we speak. Or are you only sure that you are right so long as there is no challenge? Here is one who is sure he has fine gold, but he will not assay it; who is sure he has gems, but will let no lapidary touch them; who has diamond, ruby, all that is priceless, but who hides them away where none can see them, lest they should prove to be false.

We appeal to you for fair play. We ask you to join us in

demanding for all equal right before the law. We ask you to join us in working for the removal of every disability on opinion. We ask you to join us in securing the repeal of all penalties on heresy. You may say that, granted the laws are harsh, they are not often enforced. Not often enforced! If they are enforced once, it is too often. But they are always being enforced. A man who was on this platform last night, was reproached by the pastor of his church because he had let his roof shelter my ungodly head while we were engaged in political work. We claim that within this empire, wherein exist so many different creeds, that neither the affirmation of one nor the denial of another may avail for privilege or penalty, that the sword of the law shall strike none because he differs from his neighbors in his creed. Neither law nor custom should punish unbelief nor reward belief; a man is neither vicious nor virtuous because of his unbelief; let men's lives be tried and measured by their discharge of duties. We claim that all opinion shall be open to criticism, and that no criticism shall be subject to punishment.

Mrs. Besant spoke of Freethought and Free Speech as means to an end. What end? The enfranchisement of the human mind from the trammels of old legends, which the ignorance of some, the credulity of some, the folly of some, the fraud of some had bound around it, till like the constrictor they cramped and crippled the brain into helplessness. Means to an end! what end? The freeing of the human mind from the fetters of prejudice, prejudice which drives the poor into hypocrisy because of the penalty on honesty. Why should you do the Freethinker wrong? why should you libel him, slander him, starve him? is that the best way to teach him you are right? The man who is outside the chapel because he deems it right to stand there should be subject to no prejudice from the man inside who kneels there because his father knelt there before him. Means to an end! what end? The freedom of the human mind from priestly dominance, whether it be by attempt of Roman bull or as here by a broken-horned bull, who runs against a post which hurts him more than he hurts it. Freedom from the priestly interference which twists science ere

it reaches the child, and which deforms it for men and women. The end that man may work out his own deliverance, free to use his brain as sword, as spade, as plough, without bondage to any.

In the brief but pregnant speech of your townsman, he alluded to your School Board. I am glad that he and other Freethinkers sit on the School Boards of the kingdom, but I am sorry that no School Board, not one, from one end of England to the other, has ever encouraged parents to take advantage of the conscience clause and to withdraw their children from religious education. In four words, themselves a speech, Mr. Peacock said: "Education is our salvation". It should be our salvation. One hundred years ago the ignorant population of France believed that a king might be their salvation. Now, a population spread over every land thinks that the spiritual king in Rome will be their salvation. But education, to be salvation, must begin when the sheet of the new life has nought written on it save the lines of tendencies drawn there by heredity, by the father and mother and their fathers and mothers before them; it must be free to receive the impress of every fact, free to receive the light of every new discovery of science, free, so that as the brain grows it may examine all religions through its microscope, as the biologist examines every minute living form.

Do you ask why we are not content to go on our way, why do we war against other creeds? Because they war on us, they attack us, they will not let us have the salvation of education. You give the Bible to the young children in the school; although it may be criticised by men, you guard it from all criticism till the edge of criticism has been blunted in childhood by belief. We war against creeds, because if a Freethinker endowed a library of Atheist books, the law would take away the endowment and prevent their educative influence. Mrs. Besant spoke of the price some had paid for liberty. But that price is not yet paid. Richard Carlile paid a small part of it, with his nine years of prison. One after another has paid some of it. But no one has yet paid the full price, and when the grave closes over each, each has paid a little more, and even then prejudice exacts the interest of the yet unpaid purchase-money.

We are driven to attack Christianity, because it is the State religion, because it attacks us. And it is hard to say what Christianity is. Christianity in Rome will not let Bruno's monument be raised; but in England a Cardinal goes to Westminster Abbey where Darwin lies among the saints of science. Those who to-day played their tunes outside this hall [the allusion was to the passage of a Salvation Army procession during the morning and afternoon meetings] think that they are Christians. Who is the Christian? This Church or that? All creeds are modifying; all creeds are changing. And this is not only true of our own time. Religions, like languages, like nations, have their periods of growth, their prime, their full strength, their hour of decay, and out of each grows another of a higher type.

I am afraid that I have kept you with my speech even now unfairly, and I will only say one or two words more ere I close this meeting. We are not here to-night in a spirit of defiance or of warfare; we are here letting you know in what we differ, if you do not agree with us. But we are obliged outside to be at war and in defiance, so long as the laws are harsh and customs harsher, so long as the children of the poor are marked out for scorn as though to be unbeliever ought to be brand of contempt. All are infidel to every religion but their own; all are unbelievers in the eyes of those who differ from them. And you who are against us, have you ever thought that as Bruno, who three hundred years ago was bound to the stake with iron, scorched by the flames which licked his life away, is looked on to-day as a martyr of science, so in the future some of you may be marked as infidels who are most believers, and some of us as saints who now are most condemned?

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FIVE DEAD MEN

Whom I Knew when Living:

ROBERT OWEN, JOSEPH MAZZINI, CHARLES SUMNER, J. S. MILL, & LEDRU ROLLIN.

BY

CHARLES BRADLAUGH.

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FIVE DEAD MEN WHOM I KNEW WHEN LIVING.

In selecting as the subject for a lecture "Five Dead Men Whom I Knew when They were Living"—Robert Owen, Joseph Mazzini, John Stuart Mill, Charles Sumner, and Alexandre Auguste Ledru Rollin—I do not mean more than that the accidents of my chequered life, having thrown me into contact with these men, I take their lives for the lessons such lives give, without either pretending to maintain their several views, or to imply that all, or either of, the five are, or is, in any fashion identified with my own advanced opinions, except where such identity shall be expressly stated. Naturally, the compass of a lecture is prohibitive of any biographic detail, or of any completeness of statement of the respective teachings of the men I briefly deal with.

I.—ROBERT OWEN.

Robert Owen, the great advocate of English Socialism, was born at Newtown, a Montgomeryshire village, on the 14th May, 1771. His early life-struggles—his rapid, but sober and business-like, conquest of that wealth which the world worships so much, but to which he seems to have attached little value, except as it gave him facilities for spreading his views—are familiar enough. It is at New Lanark, in 1797, and thenceforth for twenty years, that one would wish to show Robert Owen, for if he had never done

aught outside New Lanark, he did enough there alone to win grateful recollection. Surrounding the factory workers in his employment with humanising conditions, ameliorating their position, he made the wage-winners something more than mere human machines. Recognising that it was easier to bend and mould the tendencies of the child than to break the long-acquired habit of the grown man or woman, Robert Owen set an example to all Britain by introducing infant schools in his New Lanark village. It was Robert Owen who practically demonstrated that the child's mind is a sheet of paper, varying in colour, quality, and size, but which cannot be left blank; it must be ornamented or disfigured, fact or falsehood must be written on it. It was Robert Owen who gave an example which might be followed with advantage by teetotal advocates. He made New Lanark a sober village, not so much by denouncing drink, as by providing home inducements and evening amusements which outrivaled the beer-shop or whisky store. Many an unfortunate man, returning to his overcrowded unwholesome dwelling, wearied with his toil, finds that it is foul with the breath of so many huddled together, and he consequently escapes to the glare of the gin palace or the gathering at the beerhouse to fly from the misery he finds at home. It is true that he thus aggravates the ill, but we cannot make men sober unless we purify their lives, unless the domestic hearth has its charms and enticements for them; what we want is, that the workers shall have a dwelling to go to from their work which has in it the real tokens of comfort, purity, and health of life. No four-leaved shamrock, nor magician's wand, could have even been supposed to effect so great a transformation as the persistent Humanitarianism of this earnest Robert Owen effected at New Lanark. His doctrines on the formation of character have found practical and authoritative expression more recently in the law-established reformatory schools. Instead of trampling juvenile criminals still lower into the earth, society now adopts the view which Robert Owen was the first to popularise—although not the first to enunciate—that man is better or worse according to the conditions surrounding the parent previous to the birth of the child, and those which surround the infant itself during its childhood, and accompany the boy or girl during youth. Young criminals are now sought to be made less criminal by being placed for lengthy periods under conditions which shall modify and improve their characters.

In 1817 Robert Owen—who had up to this time been regarded by fashionable society as an amiable but eccentric philanthropist, whose whims were to be pardoned on account of his wealth—startled all England by his famous declaration at the London Tavern. Impeaching the religions of the world, he aroused against him all the clergy, and frightened away most of his titled admirers. It has been the custom of late years for street-corner tub-thumpers—utterly incapable of imitating Owen's unselfish devotion to human improvement—to malign Robert Owen's name, and to cast all kinds of opprobrious epithets against his life. Undoubtedly Robert Owen furnished some cause to his foes, when he declared in his London Tavern speech that all the religions of the world were founded in error. And yet every religious man will contend that all the religions of the world save one, and that one his own, are false. It is said, too, that the doctrine that man is the creature of circumstances involves a theory of fatalism demoralising to the human character. Those who take ground against Mr. Owen overlook the fact that it is better to teach the truth, whatever that truth may be, so that the knowledge may furnish the motive for the selection of improving conditions. Nor is man a merely passive figure to be acted on; he re-acts and modifies his surroundings, improving or aggravating them and their effects. As each drop of water is to the ocean, so is each human unit to the world—part of the great whole, from which it cannot escape, and from which it cannot be eliminated. Freewill theorists delude themselves with empty words when they claim for the phenomena of volition that they are outside all law. The formula that man's character is formed for him, and not by him, does not express all the truth, but it expresses much more than is taught by those whose dogma it is that man may will, uninfluenced by events. Robert Owen has been too fiercely assailed for his views on marriage, those who are his assailants, forgetting how much the laws affecting woman's position and property, and regarding divorce, have been modified during the last fifty years. The marriage question is one hedged round with huge difficulties. In Roman Catholic countries extreme harshness forbids all divorce. In some States of the American Republic great facilities are given for determining a contract, which holds by force of law only, against the desire of each. Human passion enters too much with some into the consideration of this question, and is too utterly excluded by

others. It is chiefly as the inaugurator of the English Socialist Propaganda that Robert Owen will be remembered. No Socialist myself, I yet cannot but concede that the movement had an enormous value, if only as a protest against that terrible and inhuman competitive struggle, in which the strong were rewarded for their strength, and no mercy was shown to the weakest. I am probably too much of an individualist to judge a system fairly which seems to me to neutralise individual effort; but it is only necessary to look to the enormously beneficial results of co-operative effort in the North of England, in order to affirm that the Socialist Missionaries, with good old Robert Owen at their head, have left proud monuments of the effect of their teachings. If any early reconcilement is possible, as I believe it is, between the owners of accumulated capital and the vendors of labour, it must come by the enlightenment which efforts at co-operative manufacturing give to all those who take part in them. The war between capitalists and workers is an insane and suicidal war, aggravated because the rights of life are too often made secondary to the privileges of wealth. Robert Owen's Socialism was the utterance of one of the many efforts to give life and dignity to labour. Honour, then, his human effort, even if you deny his dogma. I first saw Robert Owen as a Sunday evening lecturer on the platform of the old John-street Institution, about 1848, and it was from the same platform, ten years later, that it became my duty, in consequence of the ill-health of Robert Cooper, to read for Mr. Owen the last speech he ever prepared for delivery at a Freethought meeting. No one, friend or foe, could come in contact with Robert Owen without being most thoroughly convinced of the old man's complete conviction of the accuracy of his views on society, and of his full certainty to the very last that those views would all be realised at no distant date. He was a good, pure, one-idead man, whose long life, from its prime to its close, was one never-ceasing struggle to soften the world's harsh conflict, and to create a new moral world for after-livers.

II.—JOSEPH MAZZINI.

GUISEPPE MAZZINI, the untiring preacher of Italian Republican unity, was born at Genoa on June 22nd, 1805: and he tells us it was in April, 1821, just after the unsuccessful Piedmontese insurrection, that he was first impressed with the idea "that we Italians could, and therefore ought to, struggle for the liberty of our country." When about twenty-two years of age Mazzini commenced his literary career by writing brief book notices for a mercantile journal at Genoa, which journal he made sufficiently political to at length bring down upon it a Government decree of suspension. Vetoed in Genoa by the Sardinian authorities, Mazzini, in a second journal, braved more openly the Tuscan Government at Leghorn; but, after about twelve months, the *Indicatore Livornese*, as the new journal was called, was also suppressed. Induced by his new political associates, Mazzini joined the Carbonari, a secret association, in which the police had usually—as is commonly the case in secret political organisations—sufficient members to betray the whole of the plans of the Society. Betrayed and arrested in 1830, Mazzini was confined for some months in the Fortress of Savona, whence he was ultimately released—the formal evidence against him failing—but was exiled, because the Government were only too sure of his Republican tendencies.

It was while a solitary prisoner in Savona that Joseph Mazzini conceived the plan of *La Giovina Italia* (Society of Young Italy). Intensely national, Mazzini believed that "regenerated Italy was destined to arise the *initiatrix* of a new life, and a new and powerful unity to all the nations of Europe." It is doubtful whether the movements of the Southern and Northern races in Europe have not a distinctness of character which must always be fatal to Mazzini's conception of the *rôle* of Italy. Mazzini rightfully asserted the unity of Italy; but Italian intellect is too poetic and too subtle to be the guide of some of the less musical, but not less thorough, politics of the Teutonic races. From

Italy Mazzini went to Lyons, and in 1831 he joined a forlorn expedition into Corsica, intending to cross thence into the Romagna, where an insurrectionary rising was planned. This expedition failing, Mazzini took up his residence at Marseilles, where he formally founded the Society of Young Italy, to create "an Italy, one, free, and powerful; independent of all foreign supremacy, and morally worthy of her great mission." The statutes declared "Young Italy is Republican and Unitarian. Republican, because theoretically every nation is destined, by the law of God and humanity, to form a free and equal community of brothers; and the Republican is the only form of government that ensures this future. Because all true sovereignty resides essentially in the nation, the sole progressive and continuous interpreter of the supreme moral law. Because, whatever be the form of privilege that constitutes the apex of the social edifice, its tendency is to spread among the other classes, and, by undermining the equality of the citizens, to endanger the liberty of the country. Because, when the sovereignty is recognised as existing, not in the whole body, but in several distinct powers, the path to usurpation is laid open, and the struggle for supremacy between these powers is inevitable; distrust and organised hostility take the place of harmony, which is society's law of life. Because the Monarchical element, being incapable of sustaining itself alone by the side of the popular element, it necessarily involves the existence of the intermediate element of an aristocracy—the source of inequality and corruption to the whole nation. Because both history and the nature of things teach us that Elective Monarchy tends to generate anarchy, and Hereditary Monarchy tends to generate despotism. Because when Monarchy is not, as in the Middle Ages, based upon the belief now extinct in right divine, it becomes too weak to be a bond of unity and authority in the State.....Young Italy is Unitarian, because without unity there is no true nation; because without unity there is no real strength.....The means," say the statutes, "by which Young Italy proposes to reach its aim are—education and insurrection, to be adopted simultaneously, and made to harmonise with each other. Education must ever be directed to teach by example, word, and pen, the necessity of insurrection. Insurrection, whenever it can be realised, must be so conducted as to render it a means of national education."

It is a little difficult, when Mazzini teaches that "insurrection, by means of guerilla bands, is the true method of warfare," to understand how guerilla warfare and educational progress can be consistent. Guerilla warfare is so nearly allied to—and so often results in—mere brigandage that the certain evil seems greater than any possible advantage; and, as a matter of fact, history has most clearly shown that these guerilla bands are more effective for mischief on the enemy than for good to the cause on behalf of which they are arrayed. Mazzini himself teaches that "Great revolutions are the work rather of principles than of bayonets, and are achieved first in the moral, and then in the material sphere." In the programme of Young Italy Joseph Mazzini, who was bitterly opposed to what he called Materialism, affirmed that "the reformation of a people rests upon no sure foundation, unless based upon agreement in religious belief." He declared that "the doctrines of Materialism disinherit man of every noble aim, and abandon him to the arbitrary rule of chance or blind force." Joseph Mazzini was, at the same time, devotedly Republican and religious. He blended his piety with his politics, and regarded Republicanism as God-ordained.

Exile, and some sorrow beyond—a sorrow which he alludes to, but does not state—had given a tone of sadness to his life. Tenacious of purpose, he was fit to be the mainspring of a secret society, but hardly so fitted to be the conductor of any open movement where his views would be subject to contradiction or criticism from his co-workers. He was grandly thorough in his Republicanism, but he dreamed it for the working men of Italy before he knew what those working men were; and although he made great efforts to educate the people, he never seems to have recognised the fact that the proclamation of a Republic to a people of whom the majority are not prepared for it, is but a small step towards real Republicanism. In Rome he was —when invested with authority—so roughly brought face to face with the bitter truth, that he says "it was put to the vote whether we should not resign our charge the day following. The population, in consequence of the long corruption of slavery, was ignorant and idle; distrustful and suspicious of all things and of all men."

The extension of the propaganda of the Young Italy became rapidly so formidable, that on the representation of the Italian Government, the French authorities, in August,

1832, ordered Mazzini to quit Marseilles, but the order was rendered inoperative by the extraordinary ability with which Mazzini eluded the police, and yet continued most actively his revolutionary work, so that, by the middle of 1833. the Society of Young Italy had become widely extended, if not powerful, through Lombardy, the Genoese territory, Tuscany, and the Roman States. Treason from some, and incaution on the part of others, giving the Government a clue as to the members of the society, many were arrested and put to death.

Mazzini could not help feeling deeply his own share, as the founder of the Association, in the deaths of his co-workers. Four years afterwards he says: "I feel myself a criminal—conscious of guilt, yet incapable of expiation. The forms of those shot at Alessandria and Chambery rose up before me like the phantoms of a crime, and its unavailing remorse. I could not recall them to life. How many mothers had I caused to weep? How many more must learn to weep should I persist in the attempt to arouse the youth of Italy to noble action, to awaken in them the yearning for a common country? And if that country were indeed an illusion, whence had I derived the right of judging for the future, and urging hundreds, thousands of men, to the sacrifice of themselves, and of all that they held most dear?"

Early in February, 1834, an abortive attempt was made to take a column of insurgents, under the command of General Ramorino, into Italy from Geneva. In this column Joseph Mazzini, although the contriver of the expedition, marched as a private soldier. Treachery on the part of the General, and inefficient means of action, caused the failure of the plan; and the defeat almost made Mazzini despair of his whole mission.

The Swiss authorities—compelled by the representations of the European Powers—seized the war stores of the Italian exiles, and menaced themselves with expulsion.

In Berne, where he then took refuge. Mazzini projected the formation of the Society of Young Europe, a combination of Young Italy with two kindred associations, called Young Poland and Young Germany. The ideal of the Association of Young Europe was the federal association of European Democracy under one sole direction; so that any nation rising in insurrection should at once find the others ready to assist it. To this organisation, later in 1834, was

added the new Society of Young Switzerland. Writing of Switzerland, Mazzini says: "Since January 1st, 1338, that little people has had neither king nor master. It presents the spectacle—unique in Europe—of a Republican flag floating for five centuries above the Alps, although surrounded by jealous and invading Monarchies, as if to be an incitement and a presage to us all. Charles V., Louis XIV., Napoleon, passed away, but that banner remained sacred and immoveable." The Constitution of the Swiss Republic was regarded by Mazzini as specially defective, in that its Diet, or Central Government, is composed of delegates from each Canton, chosen in each case by the grand *conseil* of the Canton, instead of being directly elected by the people. Mazzini also objected that in the Swiss Diet each Canton has but one vote, irrespective of size, or population, or taxation contribution; and he further objected to the *mandat impératif*, or special instruction to the delegate, as nullifying all spontaneity of thought and conscience. Mazzini justified the Association of Young Europe by affirming that "Liberty is an European right. Arbitrary power, tyranny, and inequality cannot exist in one nation without injury to others." In the middle of 1835 "Young Switzerland" had its journal, *La Jeune Suisse*, and a printing press at Bienne, in the Canton of Berne. The European Governments used considerable pressure to prevent the little Swiss Republic from being continued as the centre for this Republican work, and ultimately a *conclusum* of the Swiss Diet, in 1836, condemned Mazzini to perpetual exile from Switzerland.

In January, 1837, the great Italian conspirator arrived in London. This was a gloomy period in Mazzini's life; exiled, poor, doubting, and doubted, it seemed to himself almost as if his young life had been an utter failure. England gives the shelter of its land to the political exile, but it is a cold shelter if he be a poor or an unknown man; and, until Mazzini's pen had won for him a position amongst English writers, he often knew the extremest bitterness of want. Joseph Mazzini found, too, that although the English nation gave nominal protection to his person, the English Government nevertheless was guilty of the baseness of opening his correspondence, and communicating the contents to foreign powers. That Austria utilised the information communicated to her by Lord Aberdeen's Government, which had tampered with letters addressed to Mazzini by

the unfortunate Brothers Bandiera, is now a matter of history. Writing eighteen years later, Mazzini said: "The secret of correspondence is violated in the English Post Office at the present day, precisely as it was in 1844, though perhaps somewhat more rarely." It is certain that in the Irish Post Office letters have been opened by authority during the last few years; and it is also certain that secret police reports have, within the last five years, been furnished in writing by the London Detective Department to the Paris Police. Whether letters are still opened at St. Martin's-le-Grand I have no sufficient means of determining.

The political volcano of 1847-8, shook severely several of the Italian princedoms, and Joseph Mazzini returned to Italy to take part in the struggle which overturned, at any rate temporarily, more than one ducal throne.

On February 9th, 1849—the Pope having fled, and Rome being without any Government—a constituent assembly, chosen by a very large popular vote, and of which Mazzini had been elected member, proclaimed a Republic in Rome. On March 29th, Mazzini, Saffi, and Armellini, were chosen Triumvirs; and on April 25th, the French Republic disgraced itself by landing an army, under General Oudinot, at Civita Vecchia. The story of the siege of Rome, of its heroic defence by Joseph Garibaldi, of its fall at last in July, is too well known to need repeating at length, and is too grand to be pressed into one or two lines. Rome fell, and in July Mazzini was once more a fugitive from his loved Italy.

In 1857 Mazzini endeavoured to organise a general Italian insurrection, and went to Genoa himself to take his part; but although detached risings took place in various parts of Italy, the differences of opinion between the leaders, such as Mazzini, Manin, and Garibaldi, were so great, and the people were so unprepared, that another failure had to be chronicled. Mazzini opposed himself bitterly to the diplomacy of Cavour, who was then endeavouring, chiefly through Prince Jerome Napoleon, to obtain the alliance of France against Austria.

In 1858 Mazzini penned the following words on woman, worthy reproduction, alike from their great merit, and as chronicling this phase of his faith: "Love and respect woman. Seek in her, not merely a comfort, but a force, an inspiration, the redoubling of your intellectual and moral faculties. Cancel from your minds every idea of superiority over her. You have none whatever.....Long prejudice, an

inferior education, and a perennial legal inequality and injustice, have created that apparent intellectual inferiority which has been converted into an argument of continued oppression. But does not the history of oppression teach us how the oppressor ever seeks his justification and support by appealing to a fact of his own creation? The feudal castes that withheld education from the sons of the people, excluded them on the ground of that very want of education from the rights of the citizen, from the sanctuary wherein laws are framed, and from that right of vote which is the initiation of the social mission.....Consider woman as the partner and companion, not merely of your joys and sorrows, but of your thoughts, your aspirations, your studies, and your endeavours after social amelioration. Consider her your equal in your civil and political life."

Mazzini and Mill were alike eloquent pleaders for womanhood, and each deserve woman's tribute of grateful memory.

In 1859 the brain of Mazzini and the arm of Garibaldi effectually moved the peoples of Sicily and Naples, and rousing even the lazzaroni from their lethargy, frightened away Bomba from his Neapolitan Palace. Mazzini and Garibaldi then took entirely different ground, and bitterness arose, which was never cleared away. Mazzini desired Garibaldi to hold the Two Sicilies as Republican, and to strike a blow at Rome for the unity of Italy, while Joseph Garibaldi consented to the annexation of Naples and Sicily to Piedmont, under the rule of Victor Emanuel, and returned to his island home at Caprera, satisfied that his country had advanced one step to the unity, which he, equally with Mazzini, so ardently desired.

It was shortly before this date that I first saw Joseph Mazzini, at his modest lodgings, in Onslow Terrace, Brompton, where he then lived under the name of Signor Ernesti. He was one of the few men who impress you first, and always, with the thorough truthfulness and incorruptibility of their natures. Simple in his manners, with only one luxury, his cigar, he had that fulness of faith in his cause which is so contagious, and by the sheer force of personal contact he made believers in the possibility of Italian Unity even among those who were utter strangers to his thought and hope.

In 1865 the city of Messina elected Mazzini as Deputy to the Italian Parliament; but he refused to take his seat in an Assembly where he would have had to take the oath of allegiance to Victor Emanuel. He said, "Monarchy will

never number me amongst its servants or followers. I dedicate myself wholly, and for ever, to constitute Italy one free, independent, Republican nation. I have lived, I live, and I shall die a Republican, bearing witness to my faith to the last."

When in 1870 Mazzini set foot in Sicily, the Government arrested him, and sent him to Gaeta. A general protest went out through Europe, and the imprisonment was not of long duration, but it was yet enough to weaken the already diminished vitality of the oft-disappointed conspirator for Italian Republican Unity.

On the 10th March, 1872, at Pisa, where, under an assumed English name, he had passed five months in almost complete solitude, Joseph Mazzini died; worn out in body and spirit by the forty years' never-ceasing toil for the liberty and unity of his much-loved native land. At his funeral 80,000 men and women met to testify to his truth, to mourn his death. Sentences of death and exile stood unrevoked against him while living. Italy, from that Rome which Mazzini had defended, could not enforce these penal sentences, but it was only her dead son she honoured. Living, she let his broken heart bear undiminished the sorrows of his intense struggle. Dead, a whole population witnessed that the liberty-lesson his life had taught would bear its fruits now the white-haired teacher could no longer use his pen. In seven-hilled Rome a laurel crown was placed by Italy's hand on the head which had bowed to earth in the mighty effort to teach Italia's children how to compass the freedom of their birth-land.

III.—JOHN STUART MILL.

To record the mere life of John Stuart Mill would present little of lasting interest, especially as Mr. Mill never seems to have sought to use his official knowledge of Indian affairs to govern his conduct as a practical politician, after his connection with the East India Company had been

determined. It is not so much how he lived as what he thought, not so much what he did as what he taught, that is worth remembering. Born May 20th, 1806, and dying May, 1873, he probably, during the last twenty-five years of his life, influenced, more than any other man, the various thinkers in England and America. As a political economist, a logician, a politician, a metaphysician, the exponent of Utilitarianism, and advocate of woman's rights, he stands in all phases remarkable, in some without superior. In political economy it is his merit to have popularised amongst the people a science which had been generally regarded by artisans as cold and hard, only to be used by the rich against the poor; and it is noteworthy that Mr. Mill won his popularity despite his steadfast maintenance of the Malthusian theory of the law of population.

Mr. Mill clearly distinguished between the laws of production of wealth, which are real "laws of nature," dependent on the properties of objects, and the modes of the distribution of wealth, which, subject to certain conditions, depend on the human will. In this he differed from those who pretend that the distribution of wealth is determined by economic laws, which are incapable of being temporarily defeated or modified by human effort.

As a politician, Mr. Mill affirmed that women were entitled to representation on the same terms with men. He supported Mr. Thomas Hare's scheme for obtaining a more perfect representation of minorities; and, whether or not Mr. Hare's proposal shall ever be embodied in a statutory form, Republicans should remember that thorough respect can never be shown to the decisions of the majority unless the minority are afforded a fair occasion to be heard on all important questions. It is right that the majority should decide, but only on condition that the voice of the minority has full utterance prior to the delivery of the final award. Mr. Mill opposed the ballot, and I avow that I should be pleased if voters could be true and self-reliant enough to dispense with the protection it affords.

Admitting "the irresistible claim of every man and woman to be consulted, and to be allowed a voice in the regulation of the affairs which vitally concern them," Mr. Mill desired to give a plurality of votes to "proved superiority of education," in order to secure "the superiority of weight justly due to opinions grounded on superiority of knowledge."

In his Political Economy Mr. Mill had taught that the

right of freehold proprietorship in land could only be maintained subject to the duty of cultivation; and late in life, as the President of the Land Tenure Reform Association, he propounded a scheme by which the unearned augmentation of rent was to be applied otherwise than to the private aggrandisement of the landlord. The land question in England is yet to become a battle question, serious in character, and uncertain as to its method of solution. Only one thing is certain—viz., that thousands must not be allowed to continue to grow poor and wretched, in order that a few dozen persons may become unfairly, as well as enormously, rich.

In the great American struggle Mr. Mill regarded the course of the Southerners, in all its stages, as "an aggressive enterprise of the slave-owners to extend the territory of slavery, under the combined influences of pecuniary interest, domineering temper, and the fanaticism of a class for its class privileges;" and, therefore, when the upper and middle classes in England expressed pro-Southern views, Mr. Mill arrayed himself with the artisan classes of England on the side of the North.

In philosophy, Mr. Mill affirmed that "the prevailing tendency to regard all the marked distinctions of the human character as innate, and in the main indelible, and to ignore the irresistible proofs that by far the greater part of those differences, whether between individuals, races, or sexes, are such as not only might, but naturally would, be produced by differences in circumstances, is one of the chief hindrances to the rational treatment of great social questions, and one of the greatest stumbling-blocks to human improvement." While describing himself, in the Autobiography published since his death, as one who never had a religious belief, John Stuart Mill was, unfortunately, taught that his heretical opinions "could not prudently be avowed to the world." Now, it is true, he affirms that the time appears to have come in religious matters "when it is the duty of all who, being qualified in point of knowledge, have, on mature consideration, satisfied themselves that the current opinions are not only false, but hurtful," to make their dissent known; "and," he adds, "the world would be astonished if it knew how great a proportion of its brightest ornaments—of those most distinguished even in popular estimation for wisdom and virtue—are complete sceptics in religion."

The effect of Mr. Mill's early teaching is manifested by

a reticence which pervades his writings; a reticence often liable to be utterly misunderstood. Three essays, published since his death—in which the subjects he specially refrained from discussing are treated at some length—make us more completely regret that his silence during life leaves his posthumous utterances, if not contradictory, at any rate deficient in that clearness for which his ordinary writings are so remarkable. Perhaps the most distinct declarations from Mr. Mill's pen, published during his lifetime, were: first, the one in which, in his review of Hamilton, he declared it to be profoundly immoral to teach, with Dean Mansel, that it is man's duty to worship "a being whose moral attributes are affirmed to be unknowable by us, and to be, perhaps, extremely different from those which, when we are speaking of our fellow creatures, we call by the same names." Mill says: "If, instead of the 'glad tidings' that there exists a being in whom all the excellences which the highest human mind can conceive, exist in a degree inconceivable to us, I am informed that the world is ruled by a being whose attributes are infinite, but what they are we cannot learn, nor what are the principles of his government, except that 'the highest human morality which we are capable of conceiving,' does not sanction them; convince me of it, and I will bear my fate as I may. But when I am told that I must believe this, and at the same time call this being by the names which express and affirm the highest human morality, I say in plain terms that I will not. Whatever power such a being may have over me, there is one thing which he shall not do—he shall not compel me to worship him. I will call no being good, who is not what I mean when I apply that epithet to my fellow creatures; and if such a being can sentence me to hell for not so calling him, to hell I will go." The other is in the review of Comte: "Candid persons of all creeds may be willing to admit, that if a person has an ideal object, his attachment and sense of duty towards which are able to control and discipline all his other sentiments and propensities, and prescribe to him a rule of life, that person has a religion; and though every one naturally prefers his own religion to any other, all must admit that if the object of this attachment, and of this feeling of duty, is the aggregate of our fellow-creatures, this Religion of the Infidel cannot, in honesty and conscience, be called an intrinsically bad one."

Occasionally, as in the essay on Utilitarianism, there are

passages in Mr. Mill's writings which a Christian would probably read as meaning more than Mr. Mill intended to convey; and in the two last essays of the latest volume there are several positions conflicting seriously with the ground taken in the first essay.

In 1861, when I fought the authorities at Devonport on the question of the right of meeting, Mr. John Stuart Mill, with whom I had up to that time held no communication, sent me a cheque for £25 towards the heavy costs I then incurred; and in 1868, for reasons which he has himself stated towards the close of his Autobiography, he also subscribed towards the expenses of my election struggle at Northampton.

To show how even his opponents can speak of him, I give the following extract from an official lecturer of the Christian Evidence Society, Mr. W. R. Browne, M.A., Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge :—"John Stuart Mill was one of the keenest, the clearest, the most influential thinkers of his day. He was also a man much beloved by his friends (Heaven forbid that I should stint a word that can be uttered in praise of the dead!), devoted to the welfare of his fellow-men, regular and temperate in his life, honest, upright, sincere; and he was an utter unbeliever in any form of religion whatsoever. This fault, which was tolerably well known in his lifetime, is made perfectly clear and certain by the volume before us. He was all that I have described, morally and intellectually, either in consequence of, or in spite of, his rejection of all that Christians hold true and sacred. Which of these is the case? There can be no denying that, at first sight, his life makes against the party of religion. I know that it has been felt to be so by many; I have felt it to some extent myself. Can that be true which a thinker so careful and so brilliant—the greatest master, in this age at least, of the science of logic and the laws of evidence—pronounced unhesitatingly to be false?"

Mr. Mill's almost sudden death at Avignon was mourned as a national bereavement. As an able writer in the *Daily News* wrote in the obituary notice, "the full measure of his political influence will not be known until the next generation, when the younger men, who of late, at Oxford and the other seats of learning, have drunk in his doctrines, come in their turn to the front, and assume the task of shaping the nation's destinies."

IV.—CHARLES SUMNER.

ENGLISHMEN need to be reminded that slavery was a vice instituted and fostered in the American colonies by aristocra ic and monarchical England. Efforts made by various colonies to check the slave trade were rebuked by the English Government. The barbarism of slavery was the enduring legacy to the West from civilised and Christian England. In the Federation of the United States the right of holding slaves was retained, amongst other State rights, by the Southern States.

As the Republic grew, two hostile elements were distinctly manifested—the one for the abolition, the other for the extension, of the slave power. In 1844 Texas was annexed to the United States by the influence of the Southern members of Congress, and the vast extent of Texan territory promised the Slave States the command of the Gulf of Mexico, and their preponderance as a political party. It was on this occasion that Charles Sumner—known theretofore as a cultivated, eloquent, and rapidly-rising Massachusetts barrister—made his first distinct stand on the side of freedom against slavery. In November, 1845, in a speech in Faneuil Hall against the admission to the Union of Texas as a Slave State, Sumner said: "God forbid that the votes and voices of the freemen of the North should help to bind anew the fetter of the slave." From thenceforward, until the day of his death, Charles Sumner never wavered in the course he had chosen.

Dealing with the matter with the reverence for law, natural to one trained as he had been, Charles Sumner challenged the slaveholders on constitutional grounds; urging that the provisions of the United States constitution, in favour of slaveholding, were merely temporary, and were framed in the expectation that the slave traffic would be abandoned at no distant period. He affirmed that the Congress could, even then, by express legislation, abolish slavery in the district of Columbia, and in any territories; that it could abolish the slave trade on the high seas between the States; and that it could refuse to admit to the Union any new State with a constitution sanctioning slavery;

further, that the people of the United States might, by regular amendment to the constitution, destroy slavery.

In 1851 Mr. Sumner, who was then forty years of age, having been born January 6th, 1811, was elected United States Senator for Massachusetts; and at first he stood at Washington almost alone in his direct pleading for abolition. In 1854, by the Kansas and Nebraska Act, a large extent of fine territory was practically thrown open for competition between free and servile labourers.

Streams of Northern men advocating free soil, and bodies of Southern men, eager to extend slave power, pressed on to the new lands. The Southerners were not, however, content to fight fairly; organised bodies of armed men entered Kansas from Missouri, and controlled the elections with bowie knife and pistol. At the first election of the Kansas Legislature, March 30th, 1855, the revolver and knife were freely used, several unoffending citizens were shot, and the abolitionists, finding themselves overpowered by force, appealed to the Government for protection. Mr. Seward presented to Congress "A Bill for the Admission of Kansas into the Union." During the debate Mr. Sumner delivered, on the 19th and 20th May, 1855, his celebrated speech, "The crime against Kansas," described by the poet Whittier as "a grand and terrible philippic." He said: "The wickedness which I now begin to expose is immeasurably aggravated by the motive which prompted it. Not in any common lust for power did this uncommon tragedy have its origin. It is the rape of a virgin territory, compelling it to the hateful embrace of slavery: and it may be clearly traced to a depraved longing for a new Slave State, the hideous offspring of such a crime, in the hope of adding to the power of slavery in the national government." With almost prophetic voice he added: "The fury of the propagandists of slavery, and the calm determination of their opponents, are now diffused from the distant territory over widespread communities, and the whole country in all its extent; marshalling hostile divisions, and foreshadowing a strife, which, unless happily averted by the triumph of freedom, will become war-fatal, fratricidal, parricidal, war—with an accumulated wickedness beyond the wickedness of any war in human annals."

The speech caused a tremendous sensation through the whole of the South. Previous to its delivery there had been many threats of personal violence against Mr. Sumner; two

days after it had been delivered Preston S. Brooks, member of the House from South Carolina, with a gold-headed gutta-percha cane in his hand, came to the seat in the Senate where Charles Sumner sat writing, and, with scarce a word of warning, struck the abolitionist orator a fearful blow, inflicting a severe wound upon the back of the head, repeating the blows until the cane was shivered to pieces, and Mr. Sumner lay bleeding and insensible on the floor of the Senate. The spirit of Southern slave-holding chivalry was well shown. Richmond and Charleston journals praised Brooks for his dastardly blow. Southern clergymen preached in his favour. South Carolina re-elected him as the representative of the State. Southern ladies bought for him a new cane, in lieu of the one which he had destroyed in his murderous onslaught on Charles Sumner. It was nearly five years before the effects of the attack had sufficiently passed away to enable the Massachusetts Senator to plead again for freedom. Perfect recovery was impossible; the shock to the nervous system had been too severe; and Mr. Sumner never ceased to feel the effect of the cowardly attack.

While travelling in Europe to recruit his health, Mr. Sumner, on the introduction of the Duchess of Argyll, had an interview with Lord Palmerston as to the repression of slavery in Cuba, the particulars of which I will give as nearly as possible in Mr. Sumner's own words: "Prompted to it by nearly the last words John Adams used to me before he died, I reminded his Lordship that his own Circular as Foreign Secretary had, in express terms, pledged any Government, in which he was influential, to an abolition policy; and urged on him that Great Britain could, if it would, at any time put an end to slavery in the island of Cuba." "How?" asked Viscount Palmerston. "By simply enforcing the treaty between Great Britain and Spain, which absolutely prohibited all importation of slaves after a fixed date, and provided that any slaves landed in Cuba in contravention of this convention, should be declared free." I added to this that "more than seven-eighths of the slave population of Cuba were under this provision entitled to their freedom." Lord Palmerston was very courteous, but did nothing.

It was in June, 1860, he spoke of "that better day, near at hand, when freedom shall be restored everywhere under the national government; when the national flag, wherever

it floats, on sea or on land, with n the national jurisdiction, will not cover a single slave; and when the declaration of independence, now reviled in the name of slavery, will once again be reverenced as the American Magna Charta of human rights. Nor is this all. Such an act will be the first stage in those triumphs by which the Republic—lifted in character so as to become an example to mankind—will enter at last upon its noble prerogative of teaching the nations how to live." The story of the election of Abraham Lincoln, the huge war convulsion, the emancipation proclamation, the amendments to the constitution giving the coloured man political equality—this cannot be told here in fitting words.

Sumner is one of the few great warriors for a principle who have lived, not only to witness its emergence from unpopularity and obscurity, but have actually seen victory crown the apparently hopeless effort of their lives.

Charles Sumner, whom I first saw in the autumn of 1873, seemed to feel deeply the charge that he had acted unfairly to England in the matter of the claims arising out of the damage done to United States' commerce by the vessels built for the Southern Confederacy by Messrs. Laird. He said: "I distinguish between the English people, whom I have always regarded with the utmost friendliness, and the English Government. But put yourself in my place. Suppose civil war between Ireland and England; suppose a Member of Congress to build war steamers at Portland under orders from those whom you called the Irish Rebels; suppose the Government at Washington, duly warned, taking no real steps to stop the vessels; suppose these vessels coming direct from the American port—and without ever entering an Irish port at all—being fitted with munitions of war, and burning and destroying your merchant vessels; suppose the builder to sit in Congress, not only without censure, but receiving there constant friendly greeting, and to be treated as a friend by members of the Cabinet—what would be your feelings, Mr. Bradlaugh, as an Englishman, against the America which permitted such a wrong?"

Charles Sumner died on March 11th, 1874; all America felt his loss, and Massachusetts mourned for him as though her dearest son had been taken. At his grave Curtis and Schurz vied with each other in laudations on his life. Amongst those who delivered funeral orations over S.mner

was Robert B. Elliott, Senator for South Carolina, who said: "I am a negro, one of the victim race;" and from this oration I take the following: "Fellow citizens, the life of Charles Sumner needs no interpreter. It is an open, illumined page. The ends he aimed at were always high; the means he used were always direct. Neither deception nor indirection, neither concealment nor disguise of any kind or degree, had place in his nature or his methods. By open means he sought open ends. He walked in the sunlight, and wrote his heart's inmost purpose on his forehead. His activity and capacity of intellectual labour were almost unequalled. Confined somewhat by the overshadowing nature of the anti-slavery cause in the range of his topics, he multiplied his blows, and re-doubled the energy of his assaults upon that great enemy of his country's peace. Here his vigour knew no bounds. He laid all ages and lands under contribution. Scholarship in all its walks—history, art, literature, science—all these he made his aids and servitors. But who does not see that *these* are not his glory? He was a scholar amongst scholars; an orator of consummate power; a statesman familiar with the structure of governments and the social forces of the world. But he was greater and better than one or all of these; he was a man of absolute moral rectitude of purpose and of life. His personal purity was perfect, and unquestioned everywhere. He carried morals into politics. And this is the greatness of Charles Sumner: that by the power of his moral enthusiasm, he rescued the nation from its shameful subservience to the demands of material and commercial interests, and guided it up to the high plane of justice and right. Above his other great qualities towers that moral greatness to which scholarship, oratory, and statesmanship are but secondary and insignificant. He was just, because he loved justice; he was right, because he loved right. Let this be his record and epitaph."

V.—LEDRU ROLLIN.

ALEXANDRE AUGUSTE LEDRU ROLLIN was born February 2nd, 1808, when Napoleon I. was in the height of his power. Louis Philippe—after whose flight Ledru Rollin sought from the popular suffrage the post of chief magistrate—was then thirty-five years of age. Louis Philippe at that time an exile, afterwards to be King, and then an exile once more. Poor France! a line of Bourbon Kings ruling for centuries over starved peoples, and ending in a revolt of despair—an attempt for liberty, rendered impossible by bayonets, hired by England from every corner of Europe, and ending in centralised authority and military mania; a one-man rule, without heart or conscience, save such as the lust for power creates, ending in a ruined France, and a Divine-right King restored to his loving people by Uhlans and Cossacks; 1830, and the fallen successor of Louis XVIII. escorted to Cherbourg with much ceremony, Divine-right Monarchy having collapsed by its own feebleness; then, for a little more than seventeen years, Louis Philippe Citizen King. Louis Blanc says: "Charles X. était tombé, parceque son trône reposait sur un principe faux: Louis Philippe est tombé parceque son trône ne reposait sur aucun principe."

Ledru Rollin, who in 1830 became a barrister, won considerable popularity as an *avocat* by his defence of various persons charged with political offences. In 1834 we find his name amongst a muster-roll of the most brilliant names of France, as one of *les défenseurs choisis par les accusés d'Avril*, and the signature of Ledru Rollin appears to a memoir, telling, in terrible language, the horrible story of the slaughterings by Monarchical authority done in the City of Paris, under the Citizen King, on April 14th, 1834.

During the period of O'Connell's great Repeal gatherings in Ireland, Ledru Rollin, who had married an Irish lady, visited his wife's native country, and, being present at one of the monster assemblages, was cheered by the Irish

peasantry as a delegate from the Republican party in France.

As Louis Philippe's power diminished, the voice of the Republican advocate made itself heard more distinctly, and his influence was felt over a larger area. At Lille, shortly prior to the end of 1847, he pictured the coming revolution, which, "like the waters of the Nile inundating the land, should sweep away the corruptions and impurities, and deposit the germs of a new and rich life." When the first of the Reform banquets was held at the Château Rouge on July 9th, 1847, Ledru Rollin refused to attend, because—although the toast of the King's health was to be omitted—he apprehended there might still be equally obnoxious toasts. On the morning of February 24th, 1848, Louis Philippe was pressed to abdicate by Emile de Girardin—always the consulting physician to dying governments; in the evening the Monarchy had ceased with the King's flight, and a Provisional Government was chosen, of which M. Alphonse de Lamartine was the nominal head, and in which Ledru Rollin became Minister of the Interior. This Government was in name Republican; but at that date no Republic was possible in France. France was not a country with innumerable municipal centres of political vitality; it was rather a huge watch, with Paris for its main-spring. Whoever controlled Paris, the army, and the telegraphs, controlled France. M. Louis Blanc, in the fourth chapter of his "Histoire de la Révolution de 1848," tells the story how the Republic was proclaimed. Unfortunately, Lamartine, in his own account of his acceptance of the conduct of the Provisional Government on February 24th, shows how easily a few active, earnest men in Paris named the Government which was for a brief space to replace that of Louis XV. The new Minister of the Interior is thus described by his fellow-Republican: "He was well suited to his mission, one entirely of revolutionary propaganda. Quick-witted and penetrating, a political energy tempered by frank and engaging manners, an ardent will, integrity, a vehement desire to assure the success of the Republic, and an oratorical talent of the first class. These were the qualities which Ledru Rollin brought to the accomplishment of his functions, and they were heightened in him by a handsome figure, an imposing stature, and an indescribable magnetism, which, when he spoke seemed to pervade each of his

gestures." Lord Normanby, an English ambassador, in his "A Year of Revolution in Paris," thought it right to libel Ledru Rollin, just as former English ambassadors had libelled the men of 1789. Unfortunately for Lord Normanby, and happily for the truth, he published his libels to the world, and there were more newspapers to criticise, and more readers to judge, in 1848 than in the period when Louis XVI. reigned.

On March 5th, by a decree of the Provisional Government, universal suffrage was declared to be the law of France. The law was right; but it should have been demanded by the nation, and voted by the national representatives; the men to whom it was freely given were, in the majority of instances, unable to properly value the right they gained unsought.

Ledru Rollin has been severely assailed on account of an official circular issued just prior to the elections, and addressed to the Commissioners, who acted as his provincial subordinates, directing them to replace the various préfets, sous préfets, and other officials, with persons avowing Republican opinions, and declaring that "all political functions ought to be allotted to men of sure and of Republican principles." Undoubtedly, both Ledru Rollin and Louis Blanc felt justified in using on behalf of Republicanism the centralised authority which had been so long used against it. As a Republican, the exercise of any pressure on the voters was unjustifiable; especially was it unjustifiable when, on April 15th, Ledru Rollin permitted his bulletin newspaper to suggest that, if the result of the elections should prove adverse to Republicanism, a second appeal to the barricades would be necessary on the part of the Parisian populace. A Republican is bound to submit to the vote of a majority, even if that vote annihilates the Republic. An appeal to force is an appeal to the past; it justifies the conduct of the strongest. When some of the regiments of the National Guards were permitted, if not encouraged, to exact from the officers they were electing a pledge, "that in the event of the new Assembly declaring against a Republic, they would march against the Assembly, and put it down," every teaching of Republicanism was outraged.

A few weeks later, Ledru Rollin, as a member of the Executive Commission, found himself obliged to submit to his colleagues, who gave authorisation to Gen. Cavaignac to

use force when the people at the barricades appealed against the decision of the Assembly hostile to the further existence of the Ateliers Nationaux. The bloody days of June were the result of this appeal, and all hope of present Republic was dead. After Ledru Rollin's retirement from the Ministry, he was for a short time *chef du Cabinet* to the Préfet of the Seine; but a strong attack was made upon him, and his popularity became seriously weakened. He was, nevertheless, elected in April, 1849, for Paris, with 129,000 votes.

On June 13th, 1849, Ledru Rollin made an earnest, but ineffectual, appeal in the Assembly against the murder of the Roman Republic by the French army under General Oudinot. The story is told by Joseph Mazzini, how clericalism in France triumphed in inducing the soldiers of one Republic, only just born, to crush the efforts of another Republic struggling into birth.

Forced to quit France, Ledru Rollin was an exile from his native country for twenty-one years. In 1857 he, then in England, was judged *par contumace* for alleged complicity in the attempt by Felice Orsini against the life of Louis Napoleon, but the charge was utterly unfounded, and was probably never even believed by the French police. The only pretence for the use of Ledru Rollin's name in the matter seems to have been that Charles Delécluze, who had established some political associations in France, was known to be in correspondence with the exile; but there was not even a shadow of complicity between Delécluze and Ledru Rollin.

It was in 1857 that I first saw Ledru Rollin, who often consulted me on points of English law during the time of his subsequent residence in St. John's Wood. On one point he was entirely in error: he judged France to be always as he left it in 1849, and was bitterly dis-illusioned when, on his return to Paris in 1870, he found a new generation had grown up with new ideas.

The life of an exile is not a very happy one; the sketch of the career of Joseph Mazzini illustrates this. Ledru Rollin, in his "Decadence de l'Angleterre," says: "Proscribed, we bore with us the sacred right of misfortune, which even amongst barbarians was regarded as a kind of public religion. How has it been respected? We have been each day submitted to insult; the English aristocracy has drawn us about on its journalistic hurdles, denouncing

us to its people as convicts escaped from the galleys, as miserable bandits, as the refuse of the sewers of Paris." Ledru Rollin endured exile for nearly twenty-one years.

In 1870, now with whitened hair, and with his heart withered by the exile chill, Ledru Rollin once more returned to his home at Fontenay aux Roses, and was in 1871 chosen by three departments as deputy to the French Assembly, where, however, he at that time declined to sit. A Republican Society in Paris, the Alliance Républicaine, nominated Ledru Rollin as its President; but the hero of 1848 does not seem to have ever regained his old power in Paris.

At his funeral an enormous mass of Parisians gathered. His career had been honest, his devotion had been sincere. While the Empire lasted he had refused it allegiance; he had been loyal to France.

THE lives of Owen, Mazzini, Mill, Sumner, and Ledru Rollin, present several features of likeness. To the whole of these men the clergy were bitterly hostile, for each of them was an apostle of at least some chapter of the gospel of progress. The Welshman, Robert Owen, who taught the communism imperfectly shadowed out by Jesus and his Apostles, was denounced, with more than ordinary fierceness, from nearly every pulpit in England, the Bishop of Exeter encouraging the cry from his place in the House of Lords. The Italian, Joseph Mazzini, the greatest modern preacher of Republicanism, was excommunicated by the Pope, head of a Church always hostile to liberty, and the Italian patriot was anathematised by almost the whole of the Roman Catholic priesthood. The Englishman, John Stuart Mill, had scarcely been lowered into the grave, at Avignon, when the weak-brained and orthodox *Church Herald* yelled out its curses against the scarce-cold form of one who will always rank amongst the chief of Europe's thinkers; when John Stuart Mill was invited by the electors of Westminster to allow himself to be their candidate for election to Parliament, the cry of "heretic" was loudly raised by all sects of Christian preachers, and a

Liberal dignitary in the Church was bitterly assailed because he cast his ballot for the great logician. The New Englander, Charles Sumner, the Abolitionist, was preached against alike from Northern and Southern pulpits; the unfeed pleading of the Massachusetts barrister, on behalf of dark-skinned humanity, was impartially scorned by the sects who pretended to kneel to a common father: and last, though hardly least, in the value of its testimony, the Frenchman, Ledru Rollin's grave—surrounded by the many thousands of men and women who came to honour his civil burial—marked once more the hostility between progress and the Church.

Robert Owen, though he himself died poor, having devoted to popular redemption the fortune he had created, yet lived to see thousands lifted at least a little from their poverty by the practical co-operative efforts which gradually, and after many trials, grew out of his Socialistic theories. The glory of the experiment in infant education, which he first pressed at New Lanark, was, before he died, claimed by the very religious teachers who had so long hindered all education, and who must in time be destroyed by the rescue of children's brains from the control of priestly manipulators. Joseph Mazzini did not die until his much-loved Rome had been proclaimed the capital of Italy, and—though generations of education in liberty and self-reliance will be required to efface the trace of the Divine Bourbon in Naples and in Sicily—yet the lone man's life was not without its fruitful harvest. John Stuart Mill, dying ere his strength was spent, had nevertheless found himself recognised as the thought-maker of his people. Charles Sumner, who had spoken for freedom when angry and brutal men pointed revolvers in his face; who had continued to speak for abolition when the whole continent of America cried out that the speaking was hopeless; who had fallen in the Capitol—at the close of a grand speech against slavery—bathed in his own blood, shed by a felon hand; Charles Sumner lived to see his speech grow into law. And even Ledru Rollin survived long enough to see the Imperial sham fade away, and to hear the very peasantry of France utter their yearning cry for the Republicanism to which he had devoted himself.

It will not be until another age that full justice will, or can, be awarded to the memories of these men. Statues and monuments are readily erected to princes pensioned

for the merit accruing from accident of birth, or fortune of marriage; memorial stones are easily found to record great wealth and huge rent-rolls. For the dead who lived for the poor, and died in poverty; for the dead who struggled for freedom, and died worn out in the effort to burst the shackles theretofore worn by others; for the dead who, living, were not known by fashion, nor honoured by wealth; for these the monuments can only be slowly raised, as a new generation inherits, without obstacle, the prizes of social advancement and political freedom, which these dead won with bleeding hearts and wearied brains.

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THE TRUE STORY

OF

MY PARLIAMENTARY STRUGGLE.

BY

CHARLES BRADLAUGH.



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So much misapprehension and misrepresentation prevails as to what has really taken place in the House of Commons with reference to my Parliamentary struggle, that I reprint the Report of the Second Select Committee and the Evidence taken before such Committee, together with my three speeches at the bar and the resolutions of the House: these together giving the actual facts.

Ordered,—[Tuesday, 25th May 1880]:—THAT Mr. Bradlaugh, the Member for Northampton, having claimed at the Table of this House to make an Affirmation or Declaration instead of the Oath prescribed by Law, founding his claim upon the terms of the Act 29 & 30 Vict. c. 19, and the Evidence Amendment Acts of 1869 and 1870, and stating that he had been permitted to affirm in Courts of Justice by virtue of the said Evidence Amendment Acts: And it having been referred to a Select Committee to consider and report their opinion whether persons entitled, under the provisions of the Evidence Amendment Act, 1869, and the Evidence Amendment Act, 1870, to make a solemn Declaration instead of an Oath in Courts of Justice, may be admitted to make an Affirmation or Declaration instead of an Oath in this House, in pursuance of the Acts 29 & 30 Vict. c. 19, and 31 & 32 Vict. c. 72; And the said Committee, having reported that in their opinion such persons cannot be admitted to make an Affirmation or Declaration, instead of an Oath in pursuance of the said Acts:

And Mr. Bradlaugh having since come to the Table of the House for the purpose of taking the Oath prescribed by the 29 & 30 Vict. c. 19, and the 31 & 32 Vict. c. 72, and objection having been made to his taking the said Oath, it be referred to a Select Committee to inquire into and consider the facts and circumstances under which Mr. Bradlaugh claims to have the Oath prescribed by the 29 & 30 Vict. c. 19, and 31 & 32 Vict. c. 72, administered to him in this House, and also as to the Law applicable to such claim under such circumstances, and as to the right and jurisdiction of this House to refuse to allow the said form of the Oath to be administered to him, and to report thereon to the House, together with their opinion thereon.

Ordered,—[Friday, 28th May 1880]:—THAT the Committee do consist of twenty-three Members.

Committee nominated of—

Mr. Whitbread.
Sir John Holker.
Mr. John Bright.
Lord Henry Lennox.
Mr. Massey.
Mr. Staveley Hill.
Sir Henry Jackson.
Mr. Attorney General.
Mr. Solicitor General.
Sir Gabriel Goldney.
Mr. Grantham.
Mr. Pemberton.
Mr. Watkin Williams.
Mr. Walpole.
Mr. Hopwood.
Mr. Beresford Hope.
Major Nolan.
Mr. Chaplin.
Mr. Serjeant Simon.
Mr. Secretary Childers.
Mr. Trevelyan.
Sir Richard Cross.
Mr. Gibson.

THAT the Committee have power to send for Persons, Papers, and Records.

THAT Five be the Quorum of the Committee.

REPORT.

THE SELECT COMMITTEE appointed to inquire into and consider the facts and circumstances under which Mr. BRADLAUGH claims to have the OATH prescribed by the 29 & 30 Vict., c. 19, and 31 and 32 Vict., c. 72, administered to him in this House; and also as to the LAW applicable to such claim under such circumstances; and as to the right and jurisdiction of this House to refuse to allow the said form of the OATH to be administered to him; and to Report thereon to the House, together with their Opinion thereon:—HAVE agreed to the following REPORT:—

IN pursuance of the terms of the reference to your Committee, they have inquired into and considered (1) the facts and circumstances under which Mr. Bradlaugh claims to have the oath prescribed by the Parliamentary Oaths Act, 1866, and the Promissory Oaths Act, 1868, administered to him in the House, (2) the Law applicable to such claim under such circumstances, and (3) the right and jurisdiction of the House to refuse to allow the form of the said Oath to be administered to him.

In order to carry out such inquiry and consideration, your Committee thought it right to examine Sir T. Erskine May as a witness before them. Mr. Bradlaugh applied to be permitted to make a statement to your Committee, and the application was granted. After such statement had been made by Mr. Bradlaugh, he submitted himself for examination, and was examined by any Members of your Committee who desired to put questions to him. Under the circumstances appearing in the Evidence and in the Appendix to this Report, your Committee admitted in evidence a letter written by Mr. Bradlaugh to certain newspapers, dated 20th May, 1880. All the evidence taken by your Committee appears in the Appendix to this Report.

Facts of the Case.

The facts and circumstances under which Mr. Bradlaugh claimed to take and subscribe the Oath are as follow: On Monday, the 3rd of May, Mr. Bradlaugh came to the Table of the House and claimed to be allowed to affirm, as a person for the time being by law permitted to make a solemn affirmation instead of taking an oath; and on being asked by the Clerk upon what grounds he claimed to make an affirmation, he said that he did so by virtue of the Evidence Amendment Acts, 1869 and 1870. Whereupon Mr. Speaker informed Mr. Bradlaugh, "that if he desired to address the House in explanation of his claim, he might be permitted to do so." In accordance with Mr. Speaker's intimation, Mr. Bradlaugh stated shortly that he relied on the Evidence Further Amendment Act, 1869, and the Evidence Amendment Act, 1870, adding, "I have repeatedly, for nine years past, made an affirmation in the highest courts of jurisdiction in this realm; I am ready to make such a declaration or affirmation." Thereupon Mr. Speaker acquainted the House that Mr. Bradlaugh having made such claim, he did not consider himself justified in determining it; and having grave doubts on the construction of the Acts above stated, he desired to refer the matter to the judgment of the House. Thereupon a Select Committee was appointed to consider and report their opinion whether persons entitled, under the provisions of the Evidence Amendment Acts, 1869 and 1870, to make a solemn declaration instead of an oath in courts of justice, might be admitted to make an affirmation or declaration instead of an oath, in pursuance of the Acts 29 & 30 Vict. c. 19, and 31 & 32 Vict. c. 72; and on the 20th of May the Committee reported that, in their opinion, persons so entitled could not be admitted to make such affirmation or declaration instead of an oath in the House of Commons.

On the day after the receipt of this Report, Mr. Bradlaugh presented himself at the table of the House to take and subscribe the Oath; and was proceeding to do so, when Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, one of the Members for Portsmouth, objected thereto, and Mr. Bradlaugh having been ordered to withdraw, Sir H. D. Wolff moved, "That, in the opinion of the House, Mr. Bradlaugh, the Member for Northampton,

ought not to be allowed to take the Oath which he then required to be administered to him, in consequence of his having previously claimed to make an affirmation or declaration instead of the Oath prescribed by law, founding his claim upon the terms of the Act 29 & 30 Vict. c. 19, and the Evidence Amendment Acts of 1869 and 1870; and on the ground that under the provisions of those Acts the presiding judge at a trial has been satisfied that the taking of an oath would have no binding effects on his conscience." This Motion was superseded by an Amendment appointing your Committee.

The Law Applicable to Mr. Bradlaugh's Claim.

Your Committee have been furnished by Sir T. Erskine May with a list of precedents which illustrate the jurisdiction and proceedings of the House in regard to the taking of Oaths. These precedents, and others which Mr. Bradlaugh placed before your Committee as bearing on the case, will be found in the Appendix to this Report. They may generally be divided into three classes: first, cases of refusal to take the Oath; secondly, claims to make an Affirmation, instead of taking the Oath; and, thirdly, claims to omit a portion of the Oath of Abjuration. Among them there is no precedent of any Member coming to the table to take and subscribe the Oath, who has not been allowed to do so, nor of any Member coming to the table and intimating expressly, or by necessary implication, that an oath would not, as an oath, be binding on his conscience. The present case is, therefore, one of first impression.

Now there is not only a *prima facie* right, but it is the duty of every Member who has been duly elected to take and subscribe the Oath, or to affirm according to the Statute. No instance has been brought to the attention of your Committee in which any inquiry has been made into the moral, religious, or political opinion of the person who was desirous to take any Promissory Oath, or of any objection being made to his taking such Oath. It would be impossible to foresee the evils which might arise if a contrary practice were sanctioned. But the question remains whether, if a Member when about to take the Oath should voluntarily make statements as to the binding effect of the

Oath on his conscience, it is not within the power of the House to take such statements into consideration, and determine whether such member would, if he went through the form of taking the Oath, be duly taking it within the provisions of the Statute. In the present instance, when Mr. Bradlaugh claimed under the Parliamentary Oaths Acts his right to affirm, and also stated that he had on several occasions been permitted in a Court of Justice to affirm, and had affirmed under the Evidence Amendment Acts, 1869 and 1870, he thereby in effect informed the House that on such occasions a judge of such court had been satisfied that an oath would have no binding effect upon his conscience. Your Committee did not think it right to accept this implication as conclusive without permitting Mr. Bradlaugh an opportunity of making a statement to, and giving evidence before, them. Nothing that has come before your Committee has affected or altered their views as to the effect of that which occurred when Mr. Bradlaugh claimed to affirm, as above stated.

As to the Right and Jurisdiction of the House.

As to the right and jurisdiction of the House to refuse to allow the form of the Oath prescribed to be taken by duly elected Members to be taken by them, your Committee are of opinion that there is and must be an inherent power in the House to require that the law by which the proceedings of the House and of its Members in reference to the taking of the Parliamentary Oath is regulated, be duly observed. But this does not imply that there is any power in the House to interrogate any Member desirous to take the Oath of Allegiance upon any subject in connection with his religious belief, or as to the extent the Oath will bind his conscience; or that there is any power in the House to hear any evidence in relation to such matters.

And your Committee are of opinion that by and in making the claim to affirm, Mr. Bradlaugh voluntarily brought to the notice of the House that on several occasions he had been permitted in a Court of Justice to affirm, under the Evidence Amendment Acts, 1869 and 1870, in order to enable him to do which a Judge of the Court must have been satisfied that an Oath was not binding upon Mr. Brad-

laugh's conscience ; and, as he stated he had acted upon such decisions by repeatedly making the Affirmation in Courts of Justice ; and, as above stated, nothing has appeared before your Committee to cause them to think Mr. Bradlaugh dissented from the correctness of such decisions, your Committee are of opinion that, under the circumstances, the compliance by Mr. Bradlaugh with the form used when an oath is taken would not be the taking of an Oath within the true meaning of the Statutes 29 Vict. c. 19. and 31 & 32 Vict. c. 72 ; and, therefore, that the House can, and in the opinion of your Committee ought, to prevent Mr. Bradlaugh going through this form.

But your Committee desire to point out to your Honorable House the position in which Mr. Bradlaugh will be placed if he is not allowed either to take the Oath or to affirm.

If the House of Commons prevent a duly elected Member from taking the Oath or Affirming, there is no power of reviewing or reversing that decision, however erroneous it may be in point of law.

But it appears to your Committee that if a Member should make and subscribe the Affirmation in place of taking and subscribing the Oath, it would be possible, by means of an action brought in the High Court of Justice, to test his legal right to make such Affirmation.

The Committee appointed to inquire into the law relating to the right of certain persons to affirm in effect recorded that Mr. Bradlaugh was not entitled by law to make the Affirmation.

But, from the fact that this Report was carried by the vote of the Chairman, thus showing a great division of opinion amongst the members of that Committee, the state of the law upon the subject cannot be regarded as satisfactorily determined. Under these circumstances it appears to your Committee that Mr. Bradlaugh should have an opportunity of having his statutory rights determined beyond doubt by being allowed to take the only step by which the legality of his making an Affirmation can be brought for decision before the High Court of Justice.

The House, by an exercise of its powers, can, doubtless, prevent Mr. Bradlaugh from obtaining such judicial decision ; but your Committee deprecate that course.

Your Committee accordingly recommend that should Mr. Bradlaugh again seek to make and subscribe the Affirmation he be not prevented from so doing.

16 *June*, 1880.

LIST OF WITNESSES.

Wednesday, 2*nd June*, 1880.

SIR THOMAS ERSKINE MAY, K.C.B.
MR. CHARLES BRADLAUGH, M.P.

Monday, 7*th June*, 1880.

MR. CHARLES BRADLAUGH, M.P.

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE.

Wednesday, 2*nd June*, 1880.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. Attorney General.
Mr. John Bright.
Mr. Childers.
Sir Richard Cross.
Mr. Gibson.
Sir Gabriel Goldney.
Mr. Grantham.
Mr. Staveley Hill.
Sir John Holker.
Mr. Beresford Hope.
Mr. Hopwood.
Sir Henry Jackson.
Lord Henry Lennox.
Mr. Massey.
Major Nolan.
Mr. Pemberton.
Mr. Serjeant Simon.
Mr. Solicitor General.
Mr. Trevelyan.
Mr. Walpole.
Mr. Whitbread.
Mr. Watkin Williams.

The Right Honorable SPENCER HORATIO WALPOLE in the Chair.

Sir THOMAS ERSKINE MAY, K.C.B.; Examined.

1. CHAIRMAN: You are the Clerk of the House of Commons?—I am.

2. You, I believe, are perfectly acquainted with what took place when Mr. Bradlaugh came to the table of the House, and proposed to make his affirmation instead of taking the oath?—Yes, I was personally present on that day.

3. Will you have the kindness to state to the Committee exactly what took place on that occasion, in order that we may have the facts upon our proceedings?—I will read what occurred, mainly from the Votes and Proceedings of the House, in which an accurate and authentic record of the proceedings of that day will be found. It appears that on Monday, the 3rd of May, 1880, "Mr. Bradlaugh, returned as one of the Members for the borough of Northampton, came to the table and delivered the following statement in writing to the Clerk: 'To the Right Honorable the Speaker of the House of Commons. I, the undersigned Charles Bradlaugh, beg respectfully to claim to be allowed to affirm, as a person for the time being by law permitted to make a solemn affirmation or declaration, instead of taking an oath. (Signed) CHARLES BRADLAUGH.' And being asked by the Clerk upon what grounds he claimed to make an affirmation, he answered: By virtue of the Evidence Amendment Acts, 1869 and 1870. Whereupon the Clerk reported to Mr. Speaker, that Mr. Bradlaugh, Member for the borough of Northampton, claimed to make an affirmation or declaration instead of taking the Oath prescribed by law, in virtue of the provisions of the Evidence Amendment Acts, 1869 and 1870. Mr. Speaker thereupon informed Mr. Bradlaugh that if he desired to address the House in explanation of his claim he might be permitted to do so. Mr. Bradlaugh addressed the House in accordance with Mr. Speaker's intimation, and then he was directed to withdraw." The Committee will observe that there is no entry in the Votes of the words used by Mr. Bradlaugh; it is not customary on such occasions to make an entry of the observations made, which are considered to be part of the debates of the House, which are not recorded in the Votes and Proceedings; and there was no shorthand writer

authorised by the House to take notes, and therefore there could have been no authentic record upon which one could rely.

4. Have you any reason to believe that something was said upon that occasion by Mr. Bradlaugh other than what appeared upon the Votes?—Mr. Bradlaugh's observations were very short. He repeated that he relied upon the Evidence Further Amendment Act, 1869, and the Evidence Amendment Act, 1870, adding, "I have repeatedly, for nine years past, made an affirmation in the highest courts of jurisdiction in this realm; I am ready to make such a declaration or affirmation." Substantially those were the words which he addressed to the Speaker.

5. What took place after that?—Whereupon Mr. Speaker addressed the House as follows: "I have now formally to acquaint the House that Mr. Bradlaugh, Member for the borough of Northampton, claims to make an affirmation or declaration instead of the oath prescribed by law. He founds this claim upon the terms of the 4th clause of the Act 29 and 30 Vict., c. 19, and the Evidence Amendment Acts, 1869 and 1870. I have not considered myself justified in determining this claim myself, having grave doubts on the construction of the Acts above stated, but desire to refer the matter to the judgment of the House."

6. That is substantially all that took place upon that occasion?—I presume the Committee will scarcely desire that I should proceed through all the subsequent Votes of the House in regard to the appointment of the Committees.

7. There is nothing beyond what you have stated which is material for the Committee to consider?—No, nothing besides what happened on that day in reference to this matter.

8. You are, of course, acquainted with the terms of the reference to this Committee.—Yes.

9. What were the proceedings which took place after the Report of the former Committee?—The Report of the Committee was ordered to lie upon the table, and no further proceedings were taken upon it; it lies upon the table at present.

10. Mr. Gibson: On what day was it laid upon the table?—On the 20th of May, the day on which the House assembled for business.

11. Mr. Attorney General: I think some of the members of the Committee would like to have some account of what took place in the interval between the time when Mr. Bradlaugh claimed to make the affirmation, and the time when he appeared at the table to take the Oath?—Mr. Bradlaugh presented himself at the table to be sworn on the 21st of May, the day after the receipt of the Report from the Committee; and if the Committee would desire it, I can read from the Minutes what took place upon that occasion. "Mr. Bradlaugh, returned as one of the Members for the borough of Northampton, came to the table to take and subscribe the Oath, and the Clerk was proceeding to administer the same to him, when Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, Member for Portsmouth, rose to take objection thereto, and submit a motion to the House; whereupon Mr. Speaker directed Mr. Bradlaugh to withdraw." And then, as the Committee are aware, several proceedings occurred, which extended over some days: the Committee will scarcely desire them to be read.

12. Chairman: Those proceedings are really stated in the Order of Reference to this Committee?—Yes.

13. Mr. Gibson: At what date did this Parliament meet for the first time?—On Thursday, the 29th of April.

14. And on what day did Mr. Bradlaugh claim to make the affirmation?—On Monday, the 3rd of May.

15. The swearing of Members had been going on in the meantime, had it not?—The swearing of Members began on Friday, the 30th of April.

16. You are acquainted with Mr. Bradlaugh's appearance; are you yourself aware whether he had been in the House during the swearing of Members on any of the intervening days?—He had been about the House, unquestionably.

17. Mr. Serjeant Simon: Mr. Bradlaugh was present, I believe, and voted when the Speaker was elected?—Yes; none of the members had then been sworn.

18. Chairman: Since this Committee has been appointed have you made a search into the Journals of the House for any precedents which bear upon the question before the Committee?—Yes, I directed the Clerk of the Journals to make a search for every precedent which would tend to illustrate the jurisdiction and proceedings of the House in regard to the taking of oaths.

19. What is the result of the search?—The result of that search is the paper which is upon the table to-day, and in the hands of all the Members of the Committee.

20. I see that one of those is a precedent of a Member disabled for having sat in the House without taking the Oath; then there is a precedent of a Member being admitted to sit without taking the Oath of Allegiance and Supremacy; then there are precedents of Members being discharged for declining to take the Oath; then there is a precedent of a Member, being a Quaker, refusing to take the Oath; then there is a precedent of a Member expelled for absconding, and not taking the Oath; then there is a precedent of a Member refusing to take the Oath of Supremacy; then there is a precedent of a Member, being a Quaker, claiming to make an affirmation; then there are precedents of Members omitting the words in the Oath of Abjuration, "on the true faith of a Christian;" and lastly, the precedent of a Member stating that he had a conscientious objection to take the Oath. I should like to ask whether there is any precedent amongst those of a member coming to the table and stating that he was ready to take the Oath, and any objection being taken to him in consequence of that statement?—No, there is no precedent to that effect, unless it might be argued that the case of Mr. O'Connell, in 1829, was, to a certain extent, analogous. He claimed, as the Committee are aware, to take the Oath recently provided by the Catholic Relief Act, and which, he contended, was the oath that he was entitled to take; it was a question of law whether that was the oath which he could take.

21. In that case he refused to take the old oath, and he offered to take the new oath under the Catholic Relief Act?—That is so.

22. And the House refused, I believe, to allow him to take that oath?—That was the case. I may state briefly that these precedents may generally be divided into three classes: first, cases of refusal to take the oath; secondly, claims to make an affirmation instead of taking the oath; and thirdly, claims to omit a portion of the Oath of Abjuration. With one or two exceptional cases, those three classes comprehend all the cases which have been laid before the Committee.

23. Mr. BRADLAUGH (through the Committee): I should

like to ask upon that whether the case of Daniel O'Connell was not a case of absolute refusal by the Member to take the oath required by law?—I think the best way will be, perhaps, to read the precedent from this paper, and then any inference can be drawn from it. It is at page 5. "Precedent of Member refusing to take the Oath of Supremacy; Daniel O'Connell, Esq., professing the Roman Catholic religion, returned knight of the shire for the county of Clare, being introduced in the usual manner, for the purpose of taking his seat, produced at the table a certificate of his having been sworn before two of the deputies appointed by the Lord Stewart, whereupon the Clerk tendered to him the Oaths of Allegiance, Supremacy, and Abjuration; upon which Mr. O'Connell stated that he was ready to take the Oaths of Allegiance and Abjuration, but that he could not take the Oath of Supremacy, and claimed the privilege of being allowed to take the oath set forth in the Act passed in the present Session of Parliament 'for the relief of His Majesty's Roman Catholic subjects'; whereupon the Clerk having stated the matter to Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker informed Mr. O'Connell that, according to his interpretation of the law, it was incumbent upon Mr. O'Connell to take the Oaths of Allegiance, Supremacy and Abjuration, and that the provisions of the new act applied only to Members returned after the commencement of the said Act, except in so far as regarded the repeal of the declaration against transubstantiation; And that Mr. O'Connell must withdraw unless he were prepared to take the Oaths of Allegiance, Supremacy, and Abjuration. Whereupon Mr. O'Connell withdrew. Motion, That Mr. O'Connell be called back and heard at the table. Debate arising, a Member stated that he was requested by Mr. O'Connell to desire that he might be heard. Debate adjourned. Resolved, That Mr. O'Connell, the Member for Clare, be heard at the bar, by himself, his counsel or agents, in respect of his claim to sit and vote in Parliament without taking the Oath of Supremacy. Mr. O'Connell was called in and heard accordingly: and being withdrawn; Resolved, That it is the opinion of this House that Mr. O'Connell, having been returned a Member of this House before the commencement of the Act passed in this Session of Parliament 'for the relief of His Majesty's Roman Catholic

subjects,' is not entitled to sit or vote in this House unless he first take the Oath of Supremacy. Ordered, That Mr. O'Connell do attend the House this day, and that Mr. Speaker do then communicate to him the said resolution, and ask him whether he will take the Oath of Supremacy. And the House being informed that Mr. O'Connell attended at the door, he was called to the Bar, and Mr. Speaker communicated to him the resolution of the House of yesterday, and the order thereon, as followeth." Then the resolution and the order are repeated. "And then Mr. Speaker, pursuant to the said order, asked Mr. O'Connell whether he would take the said Oath of Supremacy? Whereupon Mr. O'Connell requested to see the said Oath, which being shown to him accordingly, Mr. O'Connell stated that the said Oath contained one proposition which he knew to be false, and another proposition which he believed to be untrue; and that he therefore refused to take the said Oath of Supremacy. And then Mr. O'Connell was directed to withdraw, and he withdrew accordingly;" and then a new writ was ordered.

24. Mr. JOHN BRIGHT: Were those oaths separate oaths? —Yes, they were three separate oaths.

25. And they require three separate acts in taking them? —Yes.

26. Mr. ATTORNEY GENERAL: I think the result is that the House first determined that the Oath of Supremacy which ought to be taken by Mr. O'Connell was the old oath, and not the oath under the Catholic Relief Act?—Clearly.

27. And having determined that it was the old oath that required to be taken, Mr. O'Connell refused to take it?—Certainly.

28. Mr. BRADLAUGH (through the Committee): Have you searched for any precedent affecting the taking of the oath by a Member alleged to be disqualified or ineligible; has your attention been called to the case of John Horne Tooke, in Volume 35 of Parliamentary History, in the year 1801, commencing at page 956?—Not in respect of any question relating to oaths: it is not amongst these precedents.

29. As a fact, was Mr. John Horne Tooke's capacity to sit in the House challenged in this case?—Yes, as being

in Holy Orders, but not in relation to any question of taking the oath.

30. The next question that I have to ask is whether your attention has been called to the case of the alleged ineligibility of Francis Bacon, the King's Attorney General, in 1614, cited in the Commons Journal, Volume I., pp. 459 and 460?—No, my attention has not been directed to any questions of incapacity: it has been confined to questions arising out of the taking of the oaths prescribed by law.

31. There is one other question that I should like to ask, and that is whether your attention has been called to any case in which the House has discussed and dealt with the election of a Member, before that Committee was sworn?—With regard to the Jews, that would apply to Baron Rothschild and to Alderman Salomons.

32. I do not mean a case of a Member refusing to be sworn, but a case in which the House has dealt with the election before the Member had been sworn; has your attention been called to that?—No.

33. There is one case, the case of John Wilkes; the cases of O'Donovan Rossa and Mitchell were cases of legal disability; has your attention been called to any case in which the House has dealt with the election of a Member before he was sworn except for statutory disability?—Sir John Leedes sat in the House without having taken the Oath, and therefore he had clearly vacated his seat, and a new writ was issued.

34. I mean a case in which the Member has not been sworn, and in which there has been a discussion upon his eligibility outside the precedents which you have handed in; I refer to the case of John Wilkes, which is to be found in 38 Commons Journals, p. 977, and Cavendish's Parliamentary Debates, Volume I., extending over many hundred pages, commencing at 827. May I ask Sir Erskine May whether the practice has not been that when a Member appears to take the Oaths within the limited time, all other business is immediately to cease and not to be resumed until he has sworn and has subscribed the roll?—That was the old practice, but it has been superseded by a recent Standing Order under the Parliamentary Oaths Act of 1866, and the rule is now different; Members can be sworn until the

commencement of public business and afterwards; but no debate or business may be interrupted for that purpose.

35. That is not quite the question that I wish to put; the question that I wish to put is whether it is not now and has not always been the practice of the House that within a limited time, whatever that time may be, if a Member appears to take the oaths all other business is immediately to cease and not to be resumed until he has been sworn and has subscribed the Roll?—That was the old practice, when the oaths were required to be taken before four o'clock, but it has since been altered. This is the present Standing Order under which the oaths are administered, and this order was made in pursuance of the Parliamentary Oaths Act of 1866: "That Members may take and subscribe the Oath required by law at any time during the sitting of the House before the Orders of the Day and Notices of Motions have been entered upon, or after they have been disposed of, but no debate or business shall be interrupted for that purpose."

36. Then I again repeat my question, whether the practice has not been that a Member so appearing under the Standing Order just read to take the oath, all other business is immediately to cease and not to be resumed until he has been sworn and has subscribed the Roll?—I have already stated that such was the old practice, which has been distinctly and specifically superseded by the last Standing Order, which is now in force.

37. Is that the Standing Order which you have just read?—Yes, that is the Standing Order now in force.

38. Of course it will be a matter for argument whether it has altered it or not, but is there any other Order altering this practice except the one which you have just read?—There is no other Standing Order, and that Standing Order was made, as I have already stated, in pursuance of the Parliamentary Oaths Act of 1866, which authorised the House to make regulations with regard to the swearing of Members.

39. But except so far as it may have been altered by the Standing Order which you have just read, was the practice that a Member appearing to take the oath all other business was to cease, and not to be resumed until he had sworn and subscribed the Roll?—Yes, certainly.

40. Mr. Attorney General: The present Standing Order is dated the 30th April, 1866, is it not?—It is.

41. Mr. Bradlaugh (through the Committee): Are you aware that the House has refused to make any inquiry as to what is consistent, or what is not consistent with the Oath of Allegiance taken by a Member?—I presume that the reference must be to a case which arose in debate. That I do not consider, in any way, in point in the present inquiry, but the question was this: "In one case an attempt was made to obtain from a Member who was about to bring forward a motion, a repudiation of statements made elsewhere, which were alleged to be at variance with the oath he had taken; but the Speaker stated that it was no part of his duty to determine what was consistent with that oath, and that the terms of the motion were not in violation of any rules of the House." That was a point of Order, and had no reference whatever to the taking of the Oath.

42. Mr. Attorney General: What was the motion?—It is in the 210th volume of "Hansard's Debates," 3rd Series, page 252. It is at page 197 of my book, in a note.

43. Mr. John Bright: In what year?—On the 19th March, 1872; there is merely an incidental reference to it.

44. Mr. Bradlaugh (through the Committee): Are you aware of any precedent for the dealing by the House with the election of any Member not disqualified by statute or common law, until after that Member had sat and been sworn?—My attention has not been directed to any precedent bearing upon that precise point, but I apprehend that the fact of whether the Member had been sworn or not would not interfere with any proceedings. For example, under an election petition, if a Member's seat were contested, under the old system, the matter would have proceeded in the usual way, without reference to the question of whether the Member had taken the Oath or not.

45. But in such a case the Member would have been sworn, and would have sat until the question was decided?—Not necessarily; under the terms of the question I assume that he had not taken his seat.

46. Are there not very numerous cases in which with a petition against a Member for alleged statutory disqualification that Member has been sworn and has sat until the

decision?—Unquestionably; there can be no doubt about it; it frequently happens.

47. Then I ask whether there is any precedent whatever for the House dealing with a Member's election or his right to sit, except in cases of absolute statutory disqualification, until that Member has taken his seat and the oaths?—So far as I understand the question, I should say that whether the Member has been sworn, or not, the matter of his disqualification, or of his right to sit would be open to the decision of the House.

48. I am not arguing the point at the moment; I am only trying to get at the fact. If you have not looked for it, of course I cannot have it; but is there, so far as you know, any precedent of such a thing ever having happened?—I know of none; but I have not searched for any such precedent.

49. Mr. Attorney General: It would not appear, would it?—I hardly know how it would appear; unless one's attention were specifically drawn to any case, there would be no means of discovering it.

50. Mr. Bradlaugh (through the Committee): I will ask whether that question was not raised in the case of Wilkes, and whether it was not in the consideration of that case fully discussed, and whether the House did not resolve that any such dealing with a member was subversive of the rights of the whole body of electors of this kingdom?—I do not understand how that case has any bearing upon the present question.

51. There are three cases: one of expulsion, two of election annulled, and then ultimate reversal of the whole of that and expungment by the House?—Yes, but that has no bearing upon the present case. Of course, I am familiar with the case of Wilkes, but not in connection with any matter arising out of the administration of oaths, which is the special matter referred to this Committee.

52. Have you had your attention called to the Journal of the House of Commons, Vol. I., page 460, in which Sir Francis Bacon, the King's Attorney General, having sworn to his qualification, which was challenged, the House said, "Their oath, their own consciences to look into, not we to examine it?"—That case is not one of the precedents that we have collected.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: They are entered extremely curiously, and one can only take the decision. It begins on page 459, "Eligibility of the Attorney General," and it does not show there that it is Sir Francis Bacon: but I have learnt that by looking up the other records; and there being then a statutory declaration which lasted until a few years ago for all counsel, solicitors, and practising men of the law, it was objected that the King's Attorney General could not sit; it appears that he had to swear to his qualification, and the question of his oath and of his disqualification, being Attorney General, were put, and the House said, "Their oath, their own consciences to look into, not we to examine it," and they left him in the House, resolving that no future Attorney General should sit in it.

CHAIRMAN: That was the case which was raised as to whether the law officers of the Crown, who had for certain purposes seats in the House of Lords, had seats in the House of Commons.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Not quite that. There was an obsolete statute of the 46th Edward III., which was only repealed eight or nine years ago, but which does not seem to have been attended to, by which all practising barristers and solicitors were disqualified for sitting for counties.

53. Mr. BERESFORD HOPE: Wilkes's precedent being expunged, is it still legible in the Journal, and could it be produced for historical information?—Certainly.

54. Major NOLAN: With regard to the evidence about O'Connell, I think you stated that an Act was passed to enable O'Connell and his co-religionists to sit in Parliament?—Not to enable O'Connell to sit in Parliament, but to enable Roman Catholics to sit in Parliament.

55. O'Connell was not allowed to take advantage of that Act until he was re-elected?—No, because he had been elected prior to the passing of the Act, and the Act was clearly prospective.

56. Was the wording of that particular statute the reason why he was not allowed to take advantage of that Act?—Certainly; distinctly.

57. Would it be possible for the present or any future

Parliament to pass an Act which would enable a man who had been elected previous to the passing of the Act to sit in the House?—It is not for me to say what Act of Parliament might be agreed to by Parliament, but that is quite a distinct case. In that case Mr. O'Connell had actually been elected when the Catholic Relief Act was passed, and there was a clause in the Act which made its operation prospective, and therefore distinctly, and, I believe, intentionally, excluding Mr. O'Connell from the benefits of the Act.

58. Then he was only prevented from taking advantage of that Act owing to the particular wording of that particular clause, and not owing to anything inherent in the House of Commons?—Yes; the decision was founded upon a literal construction of the words of the recent statute.

59. Mr. WHITBREAD: The case of Mr. O'Connell was this: that he declined to take the oath which was required of Members of Parliament elected at the time that he was elected, and that he requested to be allowed to take another form of oath; he was ordered to withdraw, and the House considered his case; is there anything that you have found in the Journals or in the Debates to indicate that if Mr. O'Connell had been willing to take the oath required of him by the House, the House would have objected to his so taking it?—Certainly not; they put it to him whether he would take the Oath of Supremacy, and upon the face of the Journal, it would seem that if he had taken that oath, he would have been admitted.

60. Mr. BRADLAUGH (through the Committee): After John Archdale had claimed to affirm, did not the House absolutely order him to attend in his place for the purpose of being sworn, and tender the oaths to him?—Mr. Archdale was ordered to attend, and the House being informed that Mr. Archdale attended according to order, his letter to Mr. Speaker was read. That letter is printed at full length among the precedents. "And the several statutes qualifying persons to come into and sit and vote in this House were read, viz., of the 30 Car. II., 1 Will. and Mariæ, and 7 & 8 Will. and Mariæ. And then the said Mr. Archdale was called in, and he came into the middle of the House, almost to the table; and Mr. Speaker, by direction of the House, asked him whether he had taken the oaths, or would

take the oaths, appointed to qualify himself to be a Member of this House; to which he answered, That in regard to a principle of his religion he had not taken the oaths, nor could take them; and then he withdrew, and a new writ was ordered."

61. Mr. Serjeant SIMON: With reference to what the Honorable Member for Bedford has put to you just now, Mr. O'Connell refused to take the Oath of Supremacy on the ground that it contained matter which he knew to be untrue, and other matter which he believed to be untrue?—Yes, he so stated.

62. Thereupon he withdrew; but is there any precedent among the Journals to show that a Member stating beforehand that what was contained in the oath was untrue, or a matter of unbelief to him, has been allowed to take the oath under such circumstances?—No, this is the only precedent, so far as I know, of that particular character. The others are cases of absolute refusal to take the oath, or a desire to make an affirmation instead of an oath, or to leave out certain words of the Oath.

63. But is there any precedent where, as in the case of Mr. O'Connell, a Member coming to the table of the House, has made a statement such as Mr. O'Connell made, that the oath contains matter which he knows to be untrue, or believes to be untrue, and has been allowed to take the oath afterwards?—There is no case to be found, so far as I know; certainly there is none in any of these precedents.

64. Mr. Secretary CHILDERS: Is the precedent in Mr. O'Connell's case this; that on the 15th May Mr. O'Connell said that he could not take the Oath of Supremacy, and that, nevertheless, on the 19th, he was asked whether he would take the Oath of Supremacy, although he had previously informed the House that he was unable to take it?—Yes, because he had been heard, in the interval, upon his claim to take the new oath, under the recent Catholic Relief Act.

65. But was not that a precedent for a Member who had already stated that he could not take a certain oath, nevertheless being afterwards asked by the House whether he would take it?—It so appears on the face of the precedents.

66. I will put that question again more clearly; is it not the case that, as appears on page 5 of the Paper which you

have placed before us, Mr. O'Connell on the 15th May said, that he could not take the Oath of Supremacy?—Yes.

67. And that, nevertheless, on the 19th of May it was ordered that Mr. Speaker do communicate to him the Resolution passed on the same day, and ask him whether he would take the Oath of Supremacy?—It was so.

68. Although the House was aware that Mr. O'Connell had said that he could not take it?—Yes; but as I observed before, in the interval he had been heard upon the question of his right to take the new oath; and that, I think, accounts for the fact that the question was repeated to him as to whether, after the decision of the House had been communicated, he still persisted in refusing to take the Oath of Supremacy.

69. Mr. Watkin Williams: Was not Mr. O'Connell's objection to taking the Oath of Supremacy an objection to the truth of the matter sworn to?—Yes, certainly; and it was an oath which no Roman Catholic could take.

70. It was the truth of the matter which he was asked to pledge his oath to that he objected to, and he did not express any disbelief in the binding character of the oath itself?—No. Every Roman Catholic objected to take the Oath of Supremacy; in fact, the Oath of Supremacy was expressly designed to exclude them from Parliament.

71. Mr. Attorney General: And in consequence of the objection a new form of oath was put in the Catholic Relief Bill?—Certainly, because the Oath of Supremacy was intended to exclude Roman Catholics, and did exclude them, and was known to exclude them.

72. Mr. Watkin Williams: It was not his inability to take the oath, but his inability to pledge himself to the truth of what he was asked to swear to?—Certainly.

73. Mr. Staveley Hill: I gather from you that the House never asked O'Connell to take the oath after his giving the grounds of recusancy?—Yes, that is so.

74. Mr. Serjeant Simon: It appears that the Speaker first asked him whether he would take the Oath of Supremacy, and then he says, No, and gives those reasons?—Yes.

75. Mr. Pemberton: In addition to Mr. O'Connell's having been heard after he had at first declined to take the oath, was there not some further discussion in the House

in which other Members took part?—Certainly; those Debates will all be found in Hansard.

76. Sir GABRIEL GOLDNEY: His refusal to take the oath in the first instance was accompanied by a claim at the same time to take the new oath?—Clearly.

77. It was a refusal to take the oath accompanied by a claim for a new one; afterwards he was allowed to be heard upon that point, and then it was that the House, having decided that he could not be admitted on the new oath, he was asked if he chose to take the old oath, which he refused to do?—That is a correct statement of the case.

78. Mr. HOPWOOD: With regard to the point of the Standing Orders as to which Mr. Bradlaugh has asked, as I understand you, under the old practice, as pointed out in Hatsell, and as we know it existed, the occasion of a Member coming to be sworn caused all other business to cease?—Yes.

79. And then as you say, a Standing Order was passed that particular times more appropriate should be allotted for taking those oaths?—Yes.

80. But even though that may be so at the time of taking an oath, no other business can go on?—Clearly not; it is the sole business that is transacted at the moment.

81. No other business can be interposed, and nothing else can be proceeded with but the oath of the Member?—Certainly not; it is the business of the moment, and no other business can interpose.

82. Mr. GIBSON: You have been asked by several honorable Members about O'Connell's case; in your opinion, is there the slightest analogy between the facts and circumstances in O'Connell's case and those of the case now before the Committee?—I see none myself, but I would rather leave such questions for the determination of the Committee. I have stated the case in print, and of course the points of difference are matters of argument.

83. So far as you know, is there any precedent for permitting a Member of the House of Commons to take the Oath after he has stated in the House expressly, or by necessary implication, that it will have no binding effect upon his conscience?—There is no such case on record, so far as I have had the means of ascertaining.

Mr. CHARLES BRADLAUGH, a Member of the House; Examined:

84. CHAIRMAN: You were in the room, I think, when Sir Thomas Erskine May gave that part of his evidence as to a matter which was not on the Votes and Proceedings?—Yes, but which took place upon the occasion of my first coming to offer to affirm.

85. Is that accurately and fully stated?—It is accurately and fully stated. I shall have to ask the indulgence of the Committee if in any of the points which I press there seems to be any undueness in the pressing of them, because, as far as I can see, this is the first occasion on which such a matter has arisen. In the reference which the Committee have to deal with, I claim to be sworn and take my seat by virtue of my due return, a return untainted by illegality of any description, and in pursuance of the Statute of the 5th of Richard II., which puts upon me the duty of coming here to be sworn and do my duty under penalty of fine and imprisonment. I do not know whether the Committee wish that I should read the Statute. It is the second Statute of Richard II.; it is on page 228 of the revised Statutes, Vol. I.; it is a Statute of the year 1382. I submit that although a Member may not sit and vote until he has taken the oaths, he is entitled to all the other privileges of a Member, and is otherwise regarded both by the House and the laws as qualified to serve, until some other disqualification has been shown to exist; and I quote in support of that Sir Thomas Erskine May's book, p. 202, that there is nothing in what I did in asking to affirm which in any way disqualified me from taking the Oath. The evidence that that is so is found in the case of Archdale, on page 3 of the Precedents handed in by Sir Thomas Erskine May, where, after John Archdale had claimed to affirm, he was called into the House, and Mr. Speaker, by direction of the House, asked him if he would take the oaths; that I have never at any time refused to take the Oath of Allegiance provided by Statute to be taken by Members; that all I did was, believing as I then did, that I had the right to affirm, to claim to affirm, and I was then absolutely silent as to the oath; that I did not refuse to take it, nor have I then or since expressed any mental reservation, or stated that the appointed Oath of

Allegiance would not be binding upon me; that, on the contrary, I say, and have said, that the essential part of the oath is in the fullest and most complete degree binding upon my honor and conscience, and that the repeating of words of asseveration does not in the slightest degree weaken the binding effect of the Oath of Allegiance upon me. I may say, that if it would be more convenient for any Member of the Committee to ask me any question upon my statement as I go on, it will not interrupt me at all.

86. I think the Committee would rather hear you through.—I submit that according to law the House of Commons has neither the right nor the jurisdiction to refuse to allow the said form of oath to be administered to me, there being no legal disqualification on my part of which the House can or ought to take notice, and there being on my part an express demand to take the Oath, this demand being unaccompanied by, and free from, any reservation or limitation. I submit that there is no case in which the Oath of Allegiance has been refused to any Member respectfully and unreservedly tendering himself to be sworn. I submit that any Member properly presenting himself to be sworn, and not refusing to be sworn, is entitled to be sworn, and to take his seat without interruption, and that the discussion of any disqualification or ineligibility must in such case, according to the practice and precedent of Parliament, take place after the Member has taken his seat; and I quote in support of that John Horne Tooke's case, which came before the House in 1801. It was alleged that John Horne Tooke was ineligible because he was an ordained clergyman of the Church of England. There he was allowed to take the oaths first, and after he had taken the oaths Earl Temple rose and said (I am quoting from page 956 of the Parliamentary History, Volume 35), that he observed a gentleman who had just retired from the table after having taken the Oaths whom he conceived to be incapable of having a seat in the House in consequence of his having taken priest's orders, and been inducted into a living. Earl Temple agreed he would wait to see if a petition were presented against him, and if not he should move a resolution upon the subject; and ultimately a resolution was moved that John Horne Tooke was ineligible. The House allowed John Horne Tooke to sit, but declared clergymen for the future

to be ineligible for sitting. I rely upon that as showing that the proper course to be pursued, supposing that any Member should think that I am ineligible, is to wait until I have been sworn and have taken my seat, and then to challenge it; and that this is clear, because if it were not so it would be possible for the first 41 Members sworn or for a majority of that 41, that is, for 21 Members to hinder the swearing of all Members coming later to the table without any remedy on the part of the Members aggrieved; and I submit, with great respect for the evidence of Sir Thomas Erskine May, that he has misapprehended the force of the Standing Order that he read to you. Hatsell's Precedents, Volume II., page 90, declares distinctly that when a Member appears to take the oaths within a limited time, all other business is immediately to cease, and not to be resumed until he has been sworn and has subscribed the Roll; and with great submission to Sir Thomas Erskine May, there is no word in the Standing Order which he quoted as altering and changing that practice, which does so alter and change it. All that the Standing Order does is to specify the time and the manner in which the Members might come to the table to be sworn, which had not been hitherto specified; but it does not in any way deal with what was to happen when they did come to the table to be sworn. And if the Committee would permit me respectfully to submit, it would be most dangerous to the House if it were not so. The first batch of Members called over by the Clerk of the House are sworn, and they may then, if the contention raised upon the Standing Order quoted by Sir Thomas Erskine May be correct, prevent every other Member being sworn, if there be more than 40. They may fulfil all the duties of a House of Commons, and do what they please, without any remedy, as the matter stands; every election might be declared null and void, and every one sent back to their constituencies one after another. I submit also that the case of the Attorney General, Sir Francis Bacon, Volume I. of the Commons Journal, page 459, is also a precedent in the same direction. I am obliged to tell the Committee that I cannot quote it with the same reliance that I can put upon Horne Tooke's case, for the notes seem to have been taken, I will not say irregularly, but they do not seem to convey the whole of what took place, and therefore

I can only deal with the result. Sir H. Hobart is quoted as being "the only attorney that hath been in this House;" and then there arises a discussion, some of which does not seem to me to be material, as to whether the then Attorney General could sit or not, and I find in the returns that the Attorney General at that date was Sir Francis Bacon, who, three days after this discussion, elected to sit for the University of Cambridge, and although I have not the legal evidence, because the returns are incomplete for that year, as he elected to sit for the University of Cambridge, the probability is that he had also been returned for a county. There was then a Statute of the 46th Edward III., which has only recently been repealed, which made a practising man of the law absolutely ineligible; and it also appears that there was some oath of qualification, of which I have not been able to find the words, which was then taken by a Member coming to the table; and it appears here that the Oath was alleged in the course of the discussion, and two things were said which I press upon the attention of the Committee; one, that the precedents to disable a Member ought to be shown on the side of those who seek to disable (it is not written so lengthily as that; the words are, "The precedents to disable him ought to be showed on the other side"), and the other is, "Their oath, their own consciences to look unto, not we to examine it," which meant, as I submit, that the House did not constitute itself into an Inquisition to look behind a man coming to take the Oath, but that, subject to his being dealt with by law if he had taken it improperly, or subject to a legal disqualification being made clear to the House, they assumed his oath to be properly taken. I submit that even Members absolutely petitioned against and alleged to be disqualified or ineligible by law, are always allowed to be sworn when they come to the table to be sworn and to sit pending the decision of the petition. The only cases which I have found of absolute legal disqualification in which the Member's election was annulled before he had entered the House, are the cases of Mitchell and O'Donovan Rossa (both of whom were away), and the case of John Wilkes, who was physically incapacitated from taking the oath from the act that he was in the custody of the law at the time, and those who held him would not have permitted him to come to the table to be

sworn. Those are the only cases even with an allegation of an absolute disqualification in the case of O'Donovan Rossa and Mitchell, and of a disqualification alleged, but not admitted, and not legal, not statutory, in the case of Wilkes, that I have been able to find; and in Wilkes's case the House has solemnly decided that it did wrong there, and I submit that it ought not to do it again. But here the return is not questioned. It is not pretended that there has been a single circumstance of illegality connected with the election, the sole point being, Am I qualified to sit? If I am qualified to sit, I have the duty to take the Oath, and the House has neither the right nor the jurisdiction to refuse the Oath to me, nor to interrupt me in the taking of it. If my qualification or eligibility to sit is to be discussed, the precedent for the proper mode of discussing that qualification is in Horne Tooke's case, and rightly so, because then I have the opportunity from my place in the House of defending myself, and of correcting any misstatements that may possibly be urged by Members who may be too anxious that I should not sit, supposing in any other House of Commons it should happen, and it then gives the Member attacked fair play. While I admit entirely that the House has a full and most complete right to expel any sitting Member, and this in its own discretion, and for any reasons in its wisdom sufficient, I submit that it has never done this without first calling upon the Member to be heard in his own defence, and that that cannot possibly happen until the Member is sworn and is sitting. I submit that while the House has the right to annul the election of a person absolutely disqualified by law, it has never, except in one case, that of John Wilkes, claimed the right to interfere, and in that case it ultimately expunged from its proceedings the whole of its hostile resolutions, as being subversive of the rights of the whole body of electors of this kingdom. I quote on that the Commons Journal, Vol. 38, 3rd of May 1782. I do not think that I should be right in troubling the Committee with the very strong arguments used time after time by Edmund Burke, Thomas Pitt, and others; but I want to point out this, that in addition to the charge on which John Wilkes was expelled from the House (and I am not questioning his original expulsion), there were also charges introduced against John Wilkes for his publications outside the

House. That will be found in 1st Cavendish, page 73 and page 129, and they are charges far exceeding anything (if I may judge from the reports which have even been put in) in relation to any supposed publications of my own. None of those charges were ultimately considered by the House to justify the interference of the House with the choice of the constituency. To use the words of Mr. Thomas Pitt, on page 350 of Cavendish, words endorsed by the House itself, "Nothing but a positive law can enable you to circumscribe the electors in their choice of a representative, however, indiscreet they may be in their choice." I consider now on what grounds is it claimed that the House of Commons has the right and jurisdiction, following the words of reference, to refuse to allow me to take and subscribe the Oath? Is it for a disqualification or ineligibility existing prior to my election and continuing down to the time of my election—I mean a disqualification or ineligibility created by Statute or existing at common law? No such disqualification is even pretended. Is it for a disqualification or ineligibility of like legal character arising since my election? No such disqualification is pretended. Is it for conduct not amounting to absolute disqualification legally, but conduct for which the House has in its discretion exercised its rights and jurisdictions by expelling a Member? It must be this, or it is nothing. If there is neither legal disqualification prior to my election, nor legal disqualification subsequent to my election, then there must be such conduct not amounting to absolute legal disqualification as would, were I a sitting Member, justify the House in using its discretion to expel a Member. But if that conduct be prior to the election, then I submit that the constituency is the sole and sovereign judge of the fitness of the candidate, such candidate not being legally disqualified, and that where the chosen and duly returned candidate is ready to perform his duties, this House has neither the right nor the jurisdiction to revoke the decision of the constituency; and that in the only case in which the House did so interfere it afterwards solemnly recorded that its conduct was illegal, as being subversive of the rights of the whole body of the electors of this kingdom. If the complaint against me is for conduct arising since my election, then I submit that even if such matters justify my expulsion as a Member, the point could only be raised after

I had been heard in my place against the Resolution, and that the matter could not arise until I have taken the Oath and become entitled to speak, sit, and vote. Manifestly this must be so, as otherwise it would always be in the power of a majority to exclude from coming to take his seat any Member to whom they might have an objection; and although such a thing is, luckily, not probable now, there have been times, even in the history of the House of Commons, when a majority, even of election committees, as I read in the Records of the House, have sought by mere prejudice to exclude Members. It is, therefore, the more necessary that at any rate a Member should have the right to be heard in his own defence. I submit that there is no precedent whatever for preventing a Member from taking his seat and the Oath, on the ground of conduct not amounting to absolute legal disqualification. There is no such precedent to be found at all, and I have searched very carefully indeed. I put the question to Sir Erskine May lest anything should have escaped me, and I say absolutely there is no precedent. Then I submit that it would not be consistent with the dignity of the House to examine any statement made by any Member outside the House, as to any of its procedure, and that in fact the House has firmly refused to allow a Member to be challenged as to whether or not some of his extra-Parliamentary utterances were inconsistent with his Oath of Allegiance; and here I should like the Committee to come to a decision, because it would alter and abridge my argument. If the Committee thought (I will put a suppositious case) that, say there were some document that they thought they had the right to take into consideration here, then while I should object to that, I should like to have the opportunity of addressing the Committee as to that. So far as the evidence has gone, I have not heard of any, except the mere statement in the House, only I judged from a question put by an honorable and learned Member that something was passing in his mind (which, by the way, did not seem to me to be the fact) justifying a question put to Sir Thomas Erskine May as to whether the Oath could be administered to a man who had done something either actually or by implication repudiating the effect of that Oath. I have heard nothing in the evidence, so far as it has gone, giving the slightest color or warranty for

such a question. If there are any facts to be dealt with by this Committee other than that, then I should like to know the facts, and to argue upon them; but it would be only wasting the time of the Committee to address argument to any point which the Committee would not think it right to consider; and I should be glad if, before going further into my statement, the Committee thought it right to intimate to me their view upon that.

The Committee deliberated.

87. CHAIRMAN: I think the Committee would like to understand from you the kind of objection that you are anticipating before you proceed with your argument; as I understood you, you took this kind of objection: "I wish to know whether the Committee are going into any proceedings external to the proceedings which took place in the House, or will entertain the consideration of those questions," and that if they did so you would wish to be heard upon that point; I understood you also to say that beyond that general question as to any proceedings which may have taken place as part of the transaction in any other place than the House itself, you wish to know whether the Committee would take such matter into their consideration; am I right in supposing that to be the character of your objection?—Not quite. Practically my question is this: Will this Committee take any facts into consideration other than those of which I have heard evidence given, and those which have been stated by myself in the course of my argument? If so, I should like to know, because I understood the permission of the Committee to be that I should address them at the close of the case before their deliberations, and I should submit with all respect that the Committee would not take one matter of fact into their consideration to influence them in their deliberations which I had not the opportunity of addressing them upon. If they have finished, and if there are no facts except those which I have heard to be dealt with, it enables me to turn out and eliminate a portion of the argument which I have prepared.

The Committee deliberated.

88. CHAIRMAN: The Committee have considered the matter which you have submitted to them, and they request me to inform you that members of the Committee do propose, after your statement is concluded, to ask some questions of

you; but I have to inform you, at the same time, that you will be invited, and are invited, to state any objections that you may entertain to any such questions when put, and that you shall have a full opportunity of addressing the Committee after they have heard your answers to the questions so put?—That will enable me to eliminate a portion of my argument. I wish to submit to the Committee one observation on the precedent of Daniel O'Connell, and that is that, as a matter of fact, the evidence of Sir Thomas Erskine May shows that he misapprehended that precedent. It was a refusal by Daniel O'Connell to take the Oaths by law required of a member at the date of his election. Between the date of his election and the date of his refusal the law had changed, but it had not changed (so the House interpreted the Statute, or so the Statute ran, I do not know which) at the date of his election. So that I submit that Daniel O'Connell's case is a case of a Member refusing to take the Oath by law required; and I further submit that the Parliamentary Debates will show that the words which appear as being used by Mr. O'Connell on the 19th of May, sufficiently expressed his reason for refusing to take the Oath of Supremacy some days at least before the House asked him again to take it. Then I have only two other matters which I should wish to submit to the Committee.' One is that I have, neither directly nor indirectly, obtruded upon the House, since I have been a Member, any of my utterances or publications upon any subject whatever; that there is no precedent, except in the case of John Wilkes, for any reference on the part of any opposing Member to such publications by any Member prior to the taking of his seat; and that the ultimate decision of the House in John Wilkes's case is directly against the introduction by any Member hostile to me of any such matter as a reason for my not being allowed to take my seat. Finally, I most respectfully submit that I have grave matter of complaint that my privileges as a Member of the House of Commons have been seriously infringed, and that the rights of the electors, my constituents, have been ignored in the attacks made upon me without previous notice to me; attacks to which I had no opportunity of making a dignified reply; attacks which, if the newspaper reports be accurate, were in many instances based upon absolute misapprehension or

misquotation of my publications, and in one instance at any rate, based upon the most extreme misrepresentation of my conduct. I thank the Committee for listening to me, and I regret if my want of knowledge of the forms of the House has involved my saying anything in a manner in which the Committee would prefer that I should not have said it.

89. That is all you wish to state at present?—That is all I wish to state at present upon the evidence as taken by the Committee. If fresh evidence should be taken, I should ask the permission of the Committee to have the right of addressing them upon that.

90. The Committee will now proceed to examine you.—Before any question is put to me, will you, Sir, tell me when is the proper time to object to any question which I may think I have the right to object to?

91. When the question is put, before answering it?—

Mr. Attorney General: You will understand that I am not in any sense cross-examining you, but merely to clear up what took place in the House.

I am entirely in the hands of the Committee.

92. We know from the Proceedings of the House that you did at the table of the House make a claim, in the first instance, to make affirmation instead of taking the oath?—Yes.

93. And we understand that you did so on the ground that you were a person entitled to make affirmation within the terms of the Evidence Amendment Acts of 1869 and 1870?—That was then my impression of the law, and that was the claim which I made.

94. And I presume, of course, that at the time when you made that claim you founded it upon the belief that you were entitled to make affirmation in the House of Commons?—I made that claim solely upon my belief that the law entitled me to make it.

95. Then as regards your power to give evidence under the Evidence Amendment Acts in courts both civil and criminal, you of course put it before the House of Commons, as a fact, that you were a person entitled in those courts to make affirmation?—Yes.

96. And I presume that you were acquainted with the terms of those Acts, the subject interesting you?—Quite.

97. Were you aware that if you yourself were called as

a witness, it would be necessary before you were allowed to make affirmation in a court, either civil or criminal, under the Acts of 1869 and 1870, that two things should be established; first, that you yourself objected to take the oath, or that your right to take it was objected to by some one else; and then, secondly, that the judge would be required to satisfy himself that the taking of an oath by you would have no binding effect upon your conscience?—No, that is not my interpretation of the Statute, nor do I think it has always been (although I think it has sometimes been) the interpretation of the judge or other presiding officer dealing with it.

98. Would you kindly explain your own view as to the sense in which you read the statute of 1869, which says that the judge must satisfy himself that the oath is not binding upon the conscience of the person wishing to affirm, the words being, "If any person called to give evidence in any court of justice, whether in a civil or criminal proceeding, shall object to take an oath, or shall be objected to as incompetent to take an oath, such person shall, if the presiding judge is satisfied that an oath would have no binding effect on his conscience, make the following promise and declaration"?—My interpretation is that upon certain answers being given by the witness, the judge is bound to take his affirmation, even supposing that the judge himself should not be of opinion that the oath is not binding upon him; and it has been decided so by the Court of Queen's Bench. In the case of *ex parte* Lennard *v.* Woolrych, a man tendered his affirmation at the Westminster Police Court, and the magistrate asked him (I am repeating from memory, but repeating perfectly accurately the substance of what appears in the affidavits filed in the Court of Queen's Bench), "Why do you object?" He said, "I am an Atheist." The magistrate refused to allow him to give evidence upon affirmation, and the court held that upon hearing that answer there was enough under the Act, and that the magistrate was bound to take the man's evidence, and issued a mandamus to compel him.

99. You will not suppose that I am arguing with you, but as I understand that case the witness who tendered himself having said he was an Atheist, the court held that the magistrate was bound to draw the inference from that

assertion that the oath was not binding, and therefore to let him make the affirmation?—That is so. Whether the presiding officer did draw the inference or not, the court held that he was bound to.

100. Then I do not think that there is much difference between us; but I assume that when you come to the table of the House of Commons, and asked leave to make affirmation instead of taking the Oath, you were a person, as I understand it, who, if you had gone into a court of justice and made the same request, would have been held by the presiding judge to be one upon whom the oath would have no binding effect?—I did think so when I applied to affirm. I do not think so since the Report of your Committee, for your Committee has reported that the two oaths are entirely different.

101. It is a question for you: do you draw any distinction between the binding effect upon your conscience of the Assertory Oath, as it is called, and the Promissory Oath?—Most certainly I do. The Testimony Oath is not binding upon my conscience, because there is another form which the law has provided which I may take, which is more consonant with my feelings. The Promissory Oath is and will be binding upon my conscience if I take it, because the law, as interpreted by your Committee, says that it is the form which I am to take, and the Statute requires me to take it.

102. Pray do not answer this question unless you like: am I to understand you that the binding effect upon your conscience of the Oath depends upon whether there is an alternative method of taking that which is to you equivalent to the oath?—No, most certainly not. Any form that I went through, any oath that I took, I should regard as binding upon my conscience in the fullest degree. I would go through no form, I would take no oath, unless I meant it to be so binding.

103. Pray object if you do not wish to answer this question: By virtue of what do you regard that assertion which you make within the Oath as binding?—I have not caught your question, if you will pardon me for saying so.

104. By virtue of what portion of what is contained in the Oath do you feel that your conscience is bound; is it by the mere fact that you repeat the words therein contained, or is it by that which is contained in the form of the Oath?

—Those words, "I do swear that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to her Majesty Queen Victoria, her heirs and successors, according to law," are to me, binding in the most full and complete and thorough degree on my conscience.

105. If you read a promise out of any book or paper, and said, "I promise so to do," is there more binding effect in those words that you have read than in the mere ordinary assertion of a promise?—Yes, because this reading is by law, and by the decision of your Committee intended to be the form in which I pledge my allegiance as a Member.

106. Then if it were a form sanctioned by law, as in the case of an affirmation, is there any more effect upon your mind if you take it in the form of what we call an oath than if you took it simply by words of affirmation or promise?—If the form sanctioned by law ran "I affirm," or "I declare and affirm," or "I solemnly and sincerely declare and affirm that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to her Majesty Queen Victoria, her heirs and successors, according to law," that would be equally binding upon my conscience.

107. Do you attach any express or particular meaning to the words "I swear"?—The meaning that I attach to them is that they are a pledge upon my conscience to the truth of the declaration which I am making.

108. But a pledge given, may I ask, to whom?—A pledge given to the properly constituted authorities, whomsoever they may be, who are entitled to receive it from me.

109. Do you attribute any more meaning to those words than a pledge to human beings around you?—I attach no more meaning to those words than I do to a pledge to human beings authorised by law to take such a pledge from me under similar solemn circumstances.

110. But the solemn circumstances, I suppose, are the mere mundane circumstances?—The statutory circumstances. I meant "solemn" simply in the sense of being the statutory circumstances; I meant to distinguish between that and mere conversation.

111. I think we understand from your answers that you do not attribute any more weight to the use of the words "I swear," and to the words "So help me God," than you would to an ordinary promise if it were given under the

same circumstances as those under which you gave that promise in the House of Commons?—I conceive myself entitled by law to distinguish, and I beg therefore to object to so much of the question as deals with the words "So help me God," my objection being founded on the case of Miller *v.* Salomons, in the 17th Jurist, and the case of the Lancaster and Carlisle Railway Company *v.* Heaton in the 4th Jurist, new series.

112. I presume by that answer you mean that "So help me, God" is no part of the oath or promise, but merely the form in which it is taken?—That is so; it is merely a form of asseveration.

113. Will you confine yourself, then, to the words "I swear"?—I will.

114. Do you attribute any greater weight or any meaning to the words "I swear," and to the fact of kissing the book, beyond the words of ordinary promise?—Not beyond the words of ordinary promise made under statutory obligation.

115. Then what greater weight do you attach to a promise made under statutory obligation than to an ordinary promise?—I would prefer not making any promise that I did not intend to keep; but the law has attached a weight to statutory promises, and a penalty and disgrace on the breaking of them.

116. That is a consequence resulting from human action; you do not attribute any other weight to such a promise beyond what results from such penalties?—I object to that question.

117. I will now go to another point. How lately is it that you have claimed a right to affirm in a court of law?—In a superior court or in an inferior court?

118. In any court where you have taken an oath?—Recently in an inferior court, within a few days.

119. How lately prior to your claim in the House of Commons?—Prior to my claim in the House of Commons, about 12 months.

120. You had made a claim on several occasions, I suppose, prior to the period which you have just mentioned?—Yes.

121. What steps, if any, were taken by the judge on such occasions to arrive at the conclusion that the oath would have no binding effect?—On the last occasion, by Mr.

Justice Lindley, none. I presume he thought my claim to affirm well founded, and he simply bowed his head, and the clerk administered the affirmation after looking to him.

122. I suppose you made a claim to affirm?—When the clerk brought the Testament to the witness-box I said, "I desire to affirm," and the clerk looked at Mr. Justice Lindley, who just bowed his head (he happened to be the presiding judge), and I did affirm.

123. Had you reason to think that Mr. Justice Lindley was acquainted with any previous applications by you to affirm?—I should think it possible, because the claim to affirm has been the subject of considerable litigation by myself in the courts.

124. Upon any occasion upon which the judge did make inquiry, what was the nature of the inquiry?—The present Lord Justice Brett, whom I remember distinctly challenging me upon it when he was Mr. Justice Brett, said: "Why do you claim, Mr. Bradlaugh?" and I perfectly remember my answer, but I am just thinking whether I am not entitled to say this: that happened seven years ago; I do not intend to imply that there is any change or anything since, but I think I am entitled to say to this Committee that it is hardly within the limits of their reference to inquire into something that happened in a law court between myself and a judge seven years ago.

125. I should not have asked the question, but you have stated in the House of Commons yourself, in order to support your claim to make affirmation, that you have frequently been permitted to affirm?—That is so.

126. And I think you gave the last nine or ten years?—Yes, and Mr. Justice Brett's question came within that time. I hope you will not consider that I am putting the objection unfairly. What I want to put is this: that the conversation which took place on the occasion of my having affirmed (and I repeat that I have affirmed before different judges) being more or less informal, ought not to be the subject of inquiry by this Committee. The fact is of record. Those were all at *Nisi Prius*.

127. It was before a judge who would have to administer an oath?—Quite so.

128. If you state that you really entertain an objection to the question, I do not wish to press it myself personally?—

I have no objection to answering, except that I have purposely tried to keep out of this discussion any question of my views; otherwise I am quite in the hands of the Committee, and if the Committee are disposed to press the question I will give the answer, having made my objection.

129. I do not wish to go into the views generally entertained by you, except so far as expressed by you that the Testimony Oath had no binding effect upon your conscience?—My answer applied to the Assertory or Testimony Oath.

130. I am asking you what you stated when a Testimony Oath was being administered to you; but if you desire not to answer the question, so far as I, an individual member of the Committee, am concerned, I do not wish to put it to you?—I take the objection.

131. Mr. GIBSON: Can you recall whether within any time since your right to affirm was first recognised in courts of justice, you have taken the Oath?—Never; that is to say, the oath as a witness.

132. Have you ever taken any oath since your right to affirm was first admitted in courts of justice?—It only has been my right to affirm as a witness that has been admitted in a court of justice; I have under cover of that Act, but I think illegally, affirmed as foreman of a special jury, but I have considerable doubt whether the Act covered my affirmation as a juryman.

133. With that knowledge now present to your mind, is it the fact that the oath which you seek to take at the table of the House is, if you are permitted to take it, the first oath that you will have taken since you were permitted to affirm in courts of justice?—It is the first occasion upon which there has been any reason for my taking or not taking the Oath of Allegiance since I have been permitted to affirm.

134. Or any other form of oath?—My memory is not quite clear upon that; I am not sure. There was a case in which I took evidence as a Commissioner from America, and I am not at all sure whether the completion of that Commission was before or after the passing of the Affirmation Act.

135. But since the passing of the Act?—I cannot quite pledge my mind as to that; but except in that case in which

I was a Commissioner for taking some evidence in relation to an American process, in which I may have done so, I certainly have not.

136. Then am I to understand that you seek now to take this oath with exactly the same meaning in your mind as you would take the affirmation?—Which affirmation?

137. The affirmation which you originally sought to take at the table of the House, the Promissory Affirmation?—I seek to take the Oath of Allegiance just as I should seek to take the Affirmation of Allegiance.

138. And do you attach in your mind no different meaning to the word "swear" than you would to the word "affirm?"—The law does not.

139. Do you, in your own mind, attach any difference to the sanction?—I object that the question put to me asks me to make a distinguishment which the law does not make.

140. I do not wish to press anything to which you object; do you desire to tell the Committee that, in your own mind, there is no distinction drawn when you use the word "affirm" and when you use the word "swear"?—To me, on the Statute they have the same meaning; that is, they are a pledge that what I put after those words is binding upon me in the most complete degree.

141. I suppose you are aware of all the ordinary definitions of an oath contained in the law books?—I am afraid that would be saying more than I have any right to say. I am fairly well read, but not sufficiently to say that I know them all.

142. You know a great many of them, I suppose?—I have learnt a few.

143. You said to my honorable and learned friend, the Attorney General, that you regarded the word "swear" as a pledge given to a properly constituted authority, and that that was the meaning you attached to the word "swear"; what do you mean by the "properly constituted authority" that you referred to in that answer?—Whatever may be the authority established by Statute for the purpose of taking such an oath.

144. A human authority?—All authorities established by Statute for the taking of oaths are human authorities

Any authority outside a Statute is illegal, and any person administering such an oath is indictable.

145. You are aware of the meaning of the expression "sanction of an oath"; what do you consider would be the sanction of the Oath if you took it?—I am not sure that I apprehend the meaning that is in your mind when you use the words "sanction of an oath."

146. I will read the definition which is contained in Mr. Baron Martin's judgment in the case of Miller *v.* Salomon's, where it refers to the case of Omichund *v.* Barker, as reported in the "Law Journal": "The doctrine laid down by the Lord Chancellor (Hardwicke) (Omichund *v.* Barker), and all the other judges, was that the essence of an oath was an appeal to a Supreme Being in whose existence the person taking the oath believed, and whom he also believed to be a rewarder of truth and an avenger of falsehood, and that the form of taking an oath was a mere outward act, and not essential to the oath which might be administered to all persons according to their own peculiar religious opinions, and in such manner as most affected their consciences." You have listened to that statement?—Yes; and I have also read the judgment of the Court of Error in the following year, in which they say that the essential words of the oath are those without the appeal, and that the words "So help me, God" are words of asseveration, the manner of taking the oath; but the words preceding them are, it appears to me, an essential part of the oath; and in the case of the Lancaster and Carlisle Railway Company *v.* Heaton, it was held that the oath was completely taken without the addition of that appeal.

147. I am not at all upon the words "So help me, God," which are the words referred to in the last case to which you referred. I am now upon what contains a promise that an oath is being taken when a man uses the word "swear"; do you object to the definition which I have read?—I object to that definition as overruled by the Court of Error in its final decision in error, confirmed by a subsequent decision of Lord Campbell in the Lancaster and Carlisle Railway Company *v.* Heaton, when it was held that the appeal was not a part of the oath.

148. CHAIRMAN: In both those cases I think the judges in holding that view had reference simply to the words

"So help me, God"?—Simply to the words "So help me, God.

149. I think we are a little misunderstanding each other? —I hope not; I want to be candid with the Committee.

150. Mr. GIBSON: I am not at all on the words which that case went on of "So help me, God," but I am on what must be the essential distinction between an oath and an affirmation; what, I ask you now, do you conceive to be the essential distinction between an oath and an affirmation?— Following the judgment of the Court of Error, repeated in the other judgment which I quoted, I regard the essential words of the oath as beginning with "I swear," and ending with "according to law." I submit that it is no part of my duty to draw any distinction, if distinction exists, between the value of that and the value of an affirmation, because the Statute has declared that they both have the same value.

151. Do you consider that the taking of an oath implies in the person taking it the existence of a belief in God, and that he will reward and punish us according to our deserts? —That depends upon the form of the oath; and since the decision you quoted very many forms of oath have been entirely changed by the Legislature.

152. Do you consider that if you use the word "swear," you appeal to a God?—I consider that I take an oath which is binding upon my honor and conscience.

153. Without any reference to God?—I consider that I take an oath which is binding upon my honor and conscience.

154. And supposing that you break that oath, what what would be the consequences which you consider would result to you?—I am not aware that the Statute has provided that I shall declare my opinion upon those consequences.

155. Am I to understand that you decline to answer?—I am objecting that the question is one which would not be put in a court of law, and therefore, much more, should not be put here.

156. In answer to the Attorney General, and in your statement also, you used the words "essential part of the Oath," and the words of the Oath are, "I do swear that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty

Queen Victoria, her heirs and successors, according to law;" do you consider that all the words there present to your mind are equally definite and clear meaning?—I consider that the whole of those words are essential; I hold them to be essential, and I submit myself to the construction which the Court has put upon them.

157. Is there any word in the Oath in the Statute which does not convey to your mind any clear and definite meaning?—There is no word in that which does not convey to me a clear and definite meaning.

158. And do you regard the words at the end of it, "So help me, God," as conveying any definite meaning, or merely as a useless addendum to the promise?—I object that this Committee will not ask me my opinion upon those words, because they have been held by the highest court of law in this realm, subject to appeal, to be no necessary part of the Oath.

159. Sir HENRY JACKSON: If your counsel were here I should put to him this question, which do not answer if you object; I will treat you as if you were your own counsel; I understand your view to be that the Act of 1866 or the Act of 1868, gives you two alternative methods of taking your seat, the one of affirmation and the other of oath, and that it is open to you to take whichever of the two you prefer; you prefer the affirmation, but it having been decided not to be competent for you to make the affirmation, you now propose to take the Oath?—That is exactly my construction.

160. Now I will tell you my doubt, and perhaps you will be good enough to tell me what you say upon it. It occurs to me that these two alternatives are what lawyers call true alternatives; that is to say, that each excludes the other, and that the Committee having decided (perhaps you will say erroneously) that you cannot affirm, you have by your claim to affirm excluded yourself from the alternative claim to take the Oath; are not the two mutually exclusive?—No; the House of Commons decided that, fortunately for me, and that saves me the trouble of thinking on it for myself. When John Archdale applied to affirm, the House held that he could not affirm, and they ordered him to take the Oath.

161. Was that under the Statute which regulates the

present procedure?—No, but it was under the claim of a man who thought that he had alternative courses, and who refused to take the Oath.

162. That is the answer which you give to my doubt?—I am not sure whether I have answered fully.

163. You do not condescend to any argument upon the Statute, but you think that the one alternative is not exclusive of the other?—I thought then, and subject to the Report of the Committee against me, which I presume binds me, I should still think that I have the right to affirm, and if there were any way in which I thought I could legally raise the question, I should try to do so.

164. But on the hypothesis that the decision of the Committee was right, have you anything except the Archdale precedent, from which you would argue that these two Acts of Parliament do not create two mutually exclusive alternatives?—I should simply reply that if that be so, and you told me that I did not come within the one, I must come within the other.

165. Mr. Staveley Hill: I wish to ask you one question with reference to what took place before Lord Justice Brett (then Mr. Justice Brett), and, of course, if you think proper, you will take the objection as you did to what the Attorney General asked you: when Mr. Justice Brett admitted you to affirm, what steps did he take with a view to satisfy himself that an oath would not be binding upon your conscience?—He put to me the question, "Why?" and I gave to him three words as an answer, and these three words apparently satisfied him, and he directed the clerk to allow me to affirm. He put no question to me as to whether the oath was binding upon me or not.

166. Have you any objection to tell the Committee what those three words were?—The question put by Mr. Justice Brett was, "Why?" I object to tell the answer, because it would be an inquiry into a man's religious opinions, and Sir George Grey, in introducing the Parliamentary Oaths Act in 1866, under which I claim, said, "We will make no inquiry into any man's religious opinions; let the constituencies be the judges of that."

167. But those three words, whatever they were, satisfied Mr. Justice Brett that an oath would not be binding upon your conscience?—I cannot say that, but they satisfied him

sufficiently that he gave the clerk directions to allow me to affirm.

168. When did that take place?—About eight years ago, speaking roughly; it may be six or seven years, but I am not certain about the time.

169. Was it reported in the newspapers, and is it generally known?—I am not sure; there have been cases reported.

170. Mr. PEMBERTON: I wish to ask whether, since you were returned as a Member of this House, and since the Report of the last Committee, you authorised the publication of a letter which appeared in the newspapers of the 21st of May in reference to the proceedings which have taken place on this matter?—I ask that the question may not be put to me, because I say that the House has already decided that they will not put any inquiry to a member as to what happens outside the House to determine what was consistent with the Oath, or not.

171. Of course I do not press the question more than to remind you that it had reference to proceedings which have taken place in this House, and in a Committee of this House?—Many things I have read (I do not know whether they are accurate or inaccurate), speeches made by Members referring to proceedings in this House, and to that Committee in relation to this matter. To put it roughly, I should submit that this Committee should not examine me as to extra-Parliamentary utterances in reply to extra-Parliamentary utterances. For example, one honorable Member, Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, made a speech at Chichester——

172. Lord HENRY LENNOX: Not at Chichester?—The papers said so; they may be very likely wrong, only it shows still more, I submit, the force of the objection that extra-Parliamentary publications in reply to extra-Parliamentary utterances should not be the subject of questions before this Committee.

173. Mr. PEMBERTON: I will only again point out that it was not in reply to an extra-Parliamentary utterance, but had reference to proceedings in this House?—That assumes what would be passing in the mind of the writer and what he had in view in assuming it, and I decline to discuss any subject of that kind.

174. I am to take it that you decline to answer the question?—No, I object to answer it. If the Committee think that I ought to answer it I will answer it. I do not take a legal objection. You quite understand that if the Committee think I ought to answer it, I will answer it at once.

The Committee deliberated.

CHAIRMAN: The Committee have come unanimously to the conclusion that the question put by the honorable Member for East Kent ought to be answered; but, in arriving at that conclusion, I am requested to inform you what I will now read: "That the Committee think Mr. Bradlaugh should answer the question put to him by Mr. Pemberton, on the ground that it refers to matters written by him directly in relation to the question involved in the order of reference to the Committee, and for the purpose of expressing his views on such questions since the claim was made by him to make the affirmation, and before the appointment of the Committee."

175. Mr. PEMBERTON: I wish to ask whether, since you were returned as a Member of this House, and since the Report of the last Committee, you authorised the publication of a letter which appeared in the newspapers of the 21st May, in reference to the proceedings which have taken place on this matter, such letter being signed in your name?—I think one of the members of the Committee has a copy, which I handed to him; I have not seen the print; and as I sent to all the newspapers a lithographed copy, I prefer, for greater accuracy, to ask him to return it to me. I hold in my hand a copy which I have no doubt is the same.

176. CHAIRMAN: Do you object to that letter being put in?—The moment the Committee decided that I ought to answer that question, I had no reserve in saying that I left myself in the hands of the Committee on it. I shall take the liberty of wishing to address a word or two to the Committee presently upon it. *(The letter was handed in.)*

177. Mr. WATKIN WILLIAMS: Do you propose to take the Oath in the form given in the Statute of 1868, which I will read to you: "I., A. B., do swear that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to her Majesty Queen

Victoria, her heirs and successors, according to law. So help me, God?"—I do, that being the form in the Statute.

178. If you are permitted to take that oath, do you intend the Committee to understand and believe that it will be binding upon your conscience as an oath?—Yes.

179. In taking such oath, do you consider yourself as appealing to some Supreme Being as a witness that you are speaking the truth?—I submit that having said that I regard the oath as binding upon my conscience, this Committee has neither the right nor the duty to further interrogate my conscience.

180. Sir RICHARD CROSS: You know of course that in taking the oath in the form prescribed by the Statute, and according to the custom of taking oaths, you will have to kiss the Testament: do you attach the smallest weight to the kissing of that book?—I attach the weight attached by the law to the whole of the formula.

181. Do you attach the smallest weight to the kissing of the book; do you think that the kissing of that book adds in the slightest degree to the weight upon your conscience of the words which you have already spoken without kissing the book?—The law has said that the whole of that is to be complete; I have not the right, therefore, to form an opinion, or to formulate an opinion as to how much of that I would leave out had I any choice in the matter.

182. Then do you attach any further importance to the word "swear" in the oath itself, and to the fact of the kissing of the book than if the word "swear" were written "affirm," and no kissing of the book were required?—I have already said that I attach to the complete affirmation the most complete binding effect on my conscience. If I were allowed a preference, I would and still prefer the affirmation. The law says that the oath is the form, and I shall regard that form as in all its respects binding upon my conscience.

183. Do you look upon the kissing of that particular book as adding any more sanction than the kissing of any other book?—I decline to do that which the law has not done; the law has not split up the formula into parts, and expressed an opinion upon each part separately, and I deny the right of the Committee to ask me to do that which the law has not done.

184. I will ask you one other question; do not answer it unless you like?—I will not.

185. Do you think that the fact of the kissing of that book has any relation to an appeal to a Supreme Being, that you will, before Him, perform the oath which you have taken?—The law has not required me, in any case, to express an opinion as to that by itself. As to the whole Oath I have expressed an opinion.

186. As regards the kissing of that book, would you look upon that, so far as your conscience is concerned, as an idle form?—The law has not required me to look upon it by itself, and I dispute the right of the Committee to divide the Oath into parts, and to take one part by itself without the other. I have already answered that the whole of the Oath when taken by me, and if taken by me, will be binding upon my conscience.

187. But still you consider that a certain part of that Oath, which the Statute imposes upon you the necessity to take, is an idle, and empty, and meaningless form?—I have never said so at any time.

188. But do you consider it so?—Most certainly I do not consider the most considerable portion of it an idle and empty form.

189. Some portion of it, I said?—I consider no portion of the essential Oath an idle and empty form.

190. That is to say, that you would take the Oath because the Statute says you must do so in order to take your seat?—That is not so. I take the Oath because the Statute says that I must do so, intending to be bound in my honor and conscience by the oath I take. Every Member takes the Oath because he must do so in order to take his seat, and he could not take it without it.

191. But you do not think that the forms of the Oath, as settled by law, adds anything to the binding of your conscience further than saying "I solemnly affirm"?—Your question presumes a form of thought which I have not enunciated.

192. Mr. JOHN BRIGHT: Do I understand you aright that you have never said that the oath, as you propose to take it, is less binding upon your conscience than it is supposed to be on the consciences of other men?—I have never said so; and in 1868, when I stood for election, there being

then no form of affirmation possible for me, I had gravely considered the question.

193. It is within your knowledge that some men, and not a few men, who do not absolutely refuse to take an oath, still greatly prefer to make an affirmation?—If it would not be impertinent to say it, many Members of the House have told me so since this question has been pending.

194. CHAIRMAN: I think you said, when I informed you that the Committee thought that the letter should be put in, that it was a subject upon which you wished to make an observation?—I wish just to make the slightest observation upon that, and upon one or two points that arose in questions that have been put to me. If the Committee would allow me to think for a moment I believe I can compress it within very slight limits.

195. Sir GABRIEL GOLDNEY: Your statement to Mr. Justice Brett, I understood, you would think over?—No, that my answer did not apply to. If the Committee think that I ought to answer that question in the same way, the question as to the three words, or rather four words, that I answered to Mr. Justice Brett, I am quite in the hands of the Committee, and Ishould not decline to answer them.

196. Mr. STAVELEY HILL: The reason why I asked you what they were, and where they were to be found if you did not answer the question, was on purpose that one might look for them, because it must be a matter of public notoriety what the words were?—I should think it very possible. I have taken my objection, and if there is even a thought in the Committee that I had better answer the question, I should not object to do so.

197. CHAIRMAN: What are the observations which you wish to offer in consequence of your examination?—As the House will now have before it the statement, I ask the Committee in examining it to take it complete, not to separate one or two words in it and to take those without the countervailing words, and to remember that in this letter I declare that the oath, if I take it, would bind me, and I now repeat that in the most distinct and formal manner; that the Oath of Allegiance, viz.: "I do swear that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to her Majesty Queen Victoria, her heirs and successors, according to law," will, when I take it, be most fully, completely, and unreservedly binding upon

my honor and conscience; and I crave leave to refer to the unanimous judgment of the full Court of the Exchequer Chamber, in the case of Miller *v.* Salomons, 17th Jurist, page 463, and to the case of the Lancaster and Carlisle Railway Company *v.* Heaton, 4th Jurist, new series, page 708, for the distinguishment between the words of asseveration and the essential words of an oath. But I also desire to add, and I do this most solemnly and unreservedly, that the taking and subscribing, or repeating of those words of asseveration, will in no degree weaken the binding effect of the oath on my conscience. I should like, finally, simply to submit to the Committee, and especially to the honorable and learned gentleman on the left of the Chairman, that there has not been from the beginning to the end of this matter, any declaration, either distinct or implied, that the Oath if taken by me would be less binding upon me than upon him; and I do submit to this Committee that this House has never sought to inquire or to distinguish in any fashion as to the religious views of its Members, except so far as any of them have found themselves obliged by their conscience to refuse to comply with some form that the House has put before them. On the contrary, in the Lords' protest on the discussion of the Promissory Oaths Municipal Bill, Lord Holland and other Lords put it in the most distinct fashion that no sort of inquisition and no sort of inquiry ought to be tolerated involving any examination of a man's theological views. Lord Holland added, in words better than I can command: "That there is no tribunal which he knows competent to make that examination, and that the purely secular and political duties called upon to be performed were not such as to entitle that examination to be made." I thank the Committee for having listened to me, and I submit myself to their decision.

198. CHAIRMAN: You mentioned some precedents which you thought might usefully be added to the list of precedents which we have already had: could you conveniently add those cases?—Yes, I will do so.

Monday, 7th June 1880.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. Attorney General.	Mr. Hopwood.
Mr. John Bright.	Lord. Henry Lennox
Mr. Secretary Childers.	Sir Henry Jackson.
Mr. Chaplin.	Mr. Massey.
Sir Richard Cross.	Major Nolan.
Mr. Gibson.	Mr. Pemberton.
Mr. Grantham.	Mr. Serjeant Simon.
Mr. Staveley Hill.	Mr. Solicitor General.
Sir John Holker.	Mr. Trevelyan.
Mr. Beresford Hope.	Mr. Walpole.

The Right Honorable SPENCER HORATIO WALPOLE, in the Chair.

Mr. CHARLES BRADLAUGH, a member of the House; further Examined.

199. CHAIRMAN: There was some reference, I think, made to you by Mr. Whitbread, with regard to which you desire to make some observations?—There was a point urged by Mr. Whitbread upon the first Committee. I do not know whether I should be in order in referring to it. I thought it had been sufficiently covered by what I had said, until I reflected upon it, and then I thought it had not. I wish to submit to this Committee that it ought not to consider that I claimed to affirm because I regarded the oath as not binding upon my conscience, under the spirit of the Evidence Further Amendment Act, 1869, for that Statute runs: "If any one shall object to take an oath, or be objected to as incompetent to take an oath;" and that it is quite possible (perhaps wrongly, and undoubtedly wrongly, as the Committee have so decided) that I might claim to affirm, objecting to take the oath, and that the Committee have not on the evidence here either the right or the duty to assume anything more as against me in dealing with it now. That is all I wish to put before the Committee.

APPENDIX.

Appendix No. 1.

PRECEDENTS RELATIVE TO PARLIAMENTARY OATHS.

PRECEDENT of a MEMBER disabled for having sat in the House without taking the Oath.

Sir JOHN LEEDES hath been in the House and not taken the Oath.

Sir John Leedes not to come into the House till further Order.

Sir E. COKE: That by the law Sir J. Leedes is disabled to serve this Parliament, and therefore ought to be discharged, and a new Writ.

Mr. PAWLETT, accordant.

Sir J. STRANGWAYS: Can pretend no ignorance, for a Member of the House last Parliament.

Mr. CREW, for Sir J. Leedes: No question but he is incapable. 2. He is to be punished.

Resolved, Sir J. Leedes incapable of being a Member of this House, as if never returned.

Mr. HACKWYLL: To have him removed; a Writ for a new choice; and to punish him, by sending him to the Tower.

Sir G. MOORE: To have no question made, but where it is questioned.

Mr. SECRETARY: The fault great, especially because of last Parliament. To order, he shall be discharged now, and to serve no more this Parliament.

Sir J. Leedes, brought to the Bar, confesseth he was of the House last meeting in Parliament; and that he hath sit this Parliament in the House, and hath not taken his Oath.

Mr. T. FANSHAW: That he must be punished as one that hath come into the House, not being chosen.

Sir E. SANDES: To pay the Serjeant his fees, and no further punishment; because, but negligence, no presumption, and is willing to take the Oath.

Mr. CHIDLEY: To have an order to disable him for this Parliament.

A Warrant for a new Writ in his room.

PRECEDENT of a MEMBER Admitted to sit without taking the OATHS of ALLEGIANCE and SUPREMACY.

Ordered, That WILLIAM AYRES, Esquire, being legally elected and returned a Member of this House, his election being returned and remitted of Record, shall be admitted to sit in this House, without taking the Oaths of Supremacy and Allegiance.

Ordered, That an Ordinance be brought in by Mr. Lisle, to-morrow morning, for repealing that clause in the Act of * * That no person be admitted to sit as a Member of this House, before he hath taken the Oath of Allegiance and Supremacy.

Ordered, That all and every the Sheriffs of the respective counties in England and Wales do henceforth execute their several places and offices of Sheriffs of their several and respective counties, according to the duty of their said office, without taking the Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy.

PRECEDENT of a MEMBER Discharged for declining to take the OATHS.

The House being informed, that Sir HENRY MOUNSON attended, according to the Order on Saturday last;

Resolved, That he be called in, and tendered the Oaths and Declaration directed to be taken, made, repeated, and subscribed by the Members of the House.

He was called in accordingly; and came up to the table: And Mr. Speaker acquainted him, That the House had taken notice that he had been about the town a considerable time; but yet did not attend the service of the House: And that he had directions to tender him the Oaths and the Declarations.

Whereupon, Sir Henry Mounson said: That he was sorry

that for some reasons he could not comply to qualify himself to sit in the House: But that those reasons would no way incline him to disturb the Government; and that he submitted himself to the House.

And then withdrew.

Resolved, That Sir Henry Mounson be discharged from being a Member of the House.

New Writ Ordered.

PRECEDENT of a MEMBER Discharged for declining to take the OATHS.

The House being informed, That the Lord FANSHAW attended at the door, according to the order of Saturday last.

Resolved, That he be called in, and tendered the Oaths and Declaration, directed to be taken, made, repeated, and subscribed by the Members of the House.

He was called in accordingly; and came up to the table: And Mr. Speaker acquainted him, That the House had taken notice that he had been about the town a considerable time; but yet did not attend the Service of the House; and that he had direction to tender him the Oaths and Declaration.

Whereupon the Lord Fanshaw said, that it was true, he had been about town a great while indeed; but had been in the country, if his health would have permitted him; but that he had been in a strict course of physick, and was in the same condition still of physick and diet; but, however, that since he was absent there was an Act of Parliament passed for taking the Oaths; and he was not qualified to sit in the House, in regard he was not satisfied to take the Oaths; and therefore he could not appear.

And then withdrew.

Resolved, That the Lord Fanshaw be discharged from being a Member of the House.

And there being a Petition in, touching the Election, the granting a new Writ was respited.

PRECEDENT of a MEMBER Committed to the TOWER for declining to take the OATHS.

The House being acquainted, that Mr. CHOLMLY attended according to their order of Tuesday last;

He was called in, and came up to the table: And Mr Speaker, by the direction of the House, acquainted him to this effect, viz., That the House had taken notice of his being absent from their service a considerable time, and that now he was come he was to tender him, and accordingly did tender him, the Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy appointed to be taken by the Members of the House, according to an Act of this present Parliament.

To which Mr. Cholmly replied, That as to his absence, both when he was in the country and since he came to town, he had been infirm and lame, and had been under the doctor's hands, and could not as yet recover himself. And that he had endeavored to qualify himself to be a sitting Member of the House, by taking the Oaths, as the House expects, but that he could not as yet do it: And therefore humbly submitted himself to the House; and that he did it not out of any wilful humor.

Upon which he was commanded to withdraw.

And being withdrawn accordingly;

Resolved, That Francis Cholmly, Esquire, a Member of this House, for his contempt in refusing to take the Oaths, * * , be committed Prisoner to the Tower of London.

Ordered, That the Serjeant-at-Arms attending this House do take into his custody the said Mr. Cholmly, and convey him to the Tower: And that Mr. Speaker do issue his Warrant for that purpose.

PRECEDENT of a MEMBER, being a QUAKER, refusing to take the OATH.

House called over,

And the name of John Archdale, Esquire, a burgess for the borough of Chipping Wicomb, in the county of Bucks, being called over a second time:

Mr. Speaker acquainted the House that Mr. Archdale had been with him this morning, and delivered him a letter sealed, which Mr. Speaker presented to the House.

And the same was opened and read, and is as followeth, viz.:—

"London, the 3rd of the 11th month, called January 1698—9.

"Sir.

"Upon the call of the House it will appear that I am duly chosen and returned to serve in Parliament for the borough of Chipping Wycomb, in the county of Bucks; and, therefore, I request of thee to acquaint the honorable House of Commons the reason I have not as yet appeared, which is, that the burgesses being voluntarily inclined to elect me, I did not oppose their inclinations, believing that my declarations of fidelity, etc., might, in this case, as in others, where the law requires an oath, be accepted, I am, therefore, ready to execute my trust if the House think fit to admit of me thereupon; which I do humbly submit to their wisdom and justice; and shall acquiesce with what they will be pleased to determine therein: This being all at present, I remain,

"Thy real and obliged friend,

"JOHN ARCHDALE."

Day appointed for considering the contents of the said letter.

Mr. Archdale ordered to attend.

The House being informed, that Mr. Archdale attended according to order;

His letter to Mr. Speaker was again read;

And the several statutes qualifying persons to come into and sit and vote in this House were read, viz., of the 30 Car. II., 1 Will. and Mariæ, and 7 and 8 Will. and Mariæ.

And then the said Mr. Archdale was called in,

And he came into the middle of the House, almost to the table;

And Mr. Speaker, by direction of the House, asked him whether he had taken the Oaths or would take the Oaths, appointed to qualify himself to be a member of this House; To which he answered, That in regard to a principle of his religion he had not taken the Oaths, nor could take them.

And then he withdrew.

A new Writ ordered.

PRECEDENT of a MEMBER expelled for absconding, and not taking the OATHS.

The House was called over according to order.

And the names of such as made default to appear were taken down.

Ordered, That the names of such as made default be now called over.

And they were called over accordingly.

And several of them appeared, and others were excused upon account of their being ill, some in the country, some in town; and others upon account of their being in the country upon extraordinary occasions; and some as being upon the road.

Upon calling over the names of * * LEWIS PRICE, Esquire, * * they were not excused.

Several Members sent for.

Ordered, That Lewis Price, Esquire, be sent for, in custody of the Serjeant-at-Arms attending this House.

The Serjeant-at-Arms being called upon to give the House an account of what he had done in relation to Lewis Pryse, Esquire, who was, the 8th of August last, ordered to be sent for in custody, for not attending the Service of the House; he acquainted the House, That the messenger he sent to bring up Mr. Pryse, had been at his house at Gargathen, but that he was not there; nor could the messenger have any intelligence where he was.

Ordered, That Lewis Pryse, Esquire, do surrender himself into the custody of the Serjeant-at-Arms attending this House, by this day month at the farthest, upon pain of occurring the farther displeasure of this House, and of being proceeded against with the utmost severity.

The order of the 2nd of February last being read requiring Lewis Pryse, Esquire, to surrender himself into the custody of the Serjeant-at-Arms attending this House by that day month at farthest;

The Serjeant was called upon to know whether he had heard from the said Mr. Pryse, and he acquainted the House, That he had not heard from him.

Mr. Speaker acquainted the House, that he had received a letter from the said Mr. Pryse, and he delivered the same

to the Clerk to be read; and the same was read accordingly, and is as follows, viz.:

"Sir,

"'Tis with pleasure that I embrace every opportunity of returning you my acknowledgments for the good offices you have done me, as often as the case of my unavoidable absence has come under debate in the House. The repeated experience I have had of your friendship in this point, encourages me to hope for the continuance of them, which I shall not offer to desire longer than the reasonableness of my case shall appear to deserve them.

"I beg leave once more to represent it to you; and through your assistance to the honorable House; whose displeasure as it is a very sensible affliction to me, I should be glad by any means in my power to remove. That as it is impracticable for me to attend by the time appointed, because of a very severe fit of the gout which I am now afflicted with, and thereby give satisfaction to the House in the method they have insisted on; I hope they will accept of such as is in my power, and give me a favorable hearing when I represent to them, that I was chose knight of the shire of Cardigan when I was at 100 miles distant from it, and had been absent thence for ten months before the time of my election; which I was so far from seeking, that I never asked a vote for it, and was chose even against my inclinations.

"I know not how far a man is obliged to stand to the choice a county makes of him. Sure I am that I have reason to complain of a force that has administered the occasion of my disobliging the honorable House, by an absence caused by infirmities, under which I labored at the time of my choice, and which have continued upon me ever since with the greatest severity, and with little or no intermission.

"In these circumstances I would fain hope that the honorable House will rather blame the country's choice than him who has been unwillingly forced into a post, and lies under the misfortune (for I flatter myself 'twill not be thought a crime) of not being able to attend the business of it; and will therefore lay aside their displeasure, and remit the sentence ordered against me.

"And I am the rather encouraged to hope this, because

Mr. Prynne, in his comment on the fourth book of Sir Edward Coke's Institutes, shows, from various records, that incurable distempers have been constantly allowed by the House for a just excuse of non-attendance; and upon debates in such cases, no other punishment has been inflicted than excusing the service of the Member, and ordering a new writ for electing a person duly qualified, and capable of attending the business of the House. This being the course of Parliamentary proceedings in such cases as mine, which I have now truly represented to you, and can produce hundreds of witnesses to confirm, I hope that the unhappy incapacity I am under of attending the service of the House, will be thought to deserve no severer treatment than has been usual in the like cases; and that my ready submission to the honorable House's pleasure in this point, will be a means to restore me to their favorable opinion, and engage you to promote the request of

"Your most obliged and obedient humble servant,

"LE PRYSE.

"Aberllefenny, 18th February, 1715.

"I know not how far the House in their last order about me, might be influenced by any report of the messenger who came down to my house; but to prevent misrepresentation I think it proper to assure you, that within three days after a very dangerous fit of the gout suffered me to come downstairs, I came from thence hither to my father-in-law's, eighteen miles in my way to London. But the motion of even so small a journey brought another fit upon me immediately, with which I have been laid up here ever since, and not having been yet so much as able to return to my own house."

Then the journal of the * day of May, 1689, in the case of Mr. Cholmondley was read.

(House interrupted—Conference.)

The House resumed the consideration of the matter relating to Mr. Pryse.

Resolved, That Lewis Pryse, Esquire, a Member of this House, having been sent for in custody of the Serjeant-at-Arms attending this House, the 8th day of August last, for not attending the service of this House, and having never qualified himself as a Member of this House, by taking the oaths at the table, be forthwith brought up in custody

The Messenger gives the House an account of what he had done pursuant to the order of the House.

Resolved, That Lewis Pryse, Esquire, a Member of this House, having been sent for in custody of the Serjeant-at-Arms attending this House, the 8th day of August last, for not attending the service of this House, and having never qualified himself as a Member of this House by taking the Oaths at the table; and having been on the 2nd of February last summoned to surrender himself into custody of the Serjeant-at-Arms, upon pain of being proceeded against with the utmost severity, and he having absconded, and peremptorily refused to surrender himself into custody, be, for the same contempt, expelled this House.

PRECEDENT of a MEMBER refusing to take the OATH of SUPREMACY.

DANIEL O'CONNELL, Esq., professing the Roman Catholic religion, returned Knight of the Shire for the County of Clare, being introduced in the usual manner, for the purpose of taking his seat, produced at the table a certificate of his having been sworn before two of the deputies appointed by the Lord Steward, whereupon the clerk tendered to him the Oaths of Allegiance, Supremacy, and Abjuration; upon which Mr. O'Connell stated, that he was ready to take the Oaths of Allegiance and Abjuration, but that he could not take the Oath of Supremacy, and claimed the privilege of being allowed to take the Oath set forth in the Act passed in the present Session of Parliament "for the Relief of his Majesty's Roman Catholic Subjects;" whereupon the Clerk having stated the matter to Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker informed Mr. O'Connell that, according to his interpretation of the law, it was incumbent on Mr. O'Connell to take the Oaths of Allegiance, Supremacy, and Abjuration, and that the provisions of the new Act applied only to Members returned after the commencement of the said Act, except in so far as regarded the repeal of the Declaration against transubstantiation; and that Mr. O'Connell must withdraw unless he were prepared to take the Oaths of Allegiance, Supremacy, and Abjuration.

Whereupon Mr. O'Connell withdrew.

Motion, That Mr. O'Connell be called back and heard at the table. Debate arising.

A Member stated that he was requested by Mr. O'Connell to desire that he might be heard.

Debate adjourned.

Resolved, That Mr. O'Connell, the Member for Clare, be heard at the Bar, by himself, his counsel or agents, in respect of his claim to sit and vote in Parliament without taking the Oath of Supremacy.

Mr. O'Connell was called in, and heard accordingly: And being withdrawn;

Resolved, That it is the opinion of this House, that Mr. O'Connell having been returned a Member of this House before the commencement of the Act passed in this Session of Parliament "for the Relief of his Majesty's Roman Catholic Subjects," is not entitled to sit or vote in this House unless he first take the Oath of Supremacy.

Ordered, That Mr. O'Connell do attend the House this day, and that Mr. Speaker do then communicate to him the said resolution, and ask him whether he will take the Oath of Supremacy.

And the House being informed that Mr. O'Connell attended at the door, he was called to the Bar, and Mr. Speaker communicated to him the resolution of the House of yesterday, and the order thereupon, as followeth:—

Resolved, That it is the opinion of this House, that Mr. O'Connell having been returned a Member of this House before the commencement of the Act passed in this Session of Parliament, "for the Relief of his Majesty's Roman Catholic Subjects," is not entitled to sit or vote in this House unless he first take the Oath of Supremacy.

Ordered, That Mr. O'Connell do attend the House this day, and that Mr. Speaker do then communicate to him the said resolution, and ask him whether he will take the Oath of Supremacy.

And then Mr. Speaker, pursuant to the said order, asked Mr. O'Connell whether he would take the said Oath of Supremacy? Whereupon Mr. O'Connell requested to see the said Oath, which being shown to him accordingly, Mr. O'Connell stated that the said Oath contained one proposition which he knew to be false, and another proposition

which he believed to be untrue; and that he therefore refused to take the said Oath of Supremacy.

And then Mr. O'Connell was directed to withdraw; and he withdrew accordingly.

Ordered, That Mr. Speaker do issue his warrant to the Clerk of the Crown in Ireland to make out (subject to the provisions of an Act passed in this Session of Parliament, intituled, "An Act to amend certain Acts of the Parliament of Ireland relative to the election of Members to serve in Parliament, and to regulate the qualification of persons to vote at the election of Knights of the Shire of Ireland") a new writ for the electing of a Knight of the Shire to serve in this present Parliament for the County of Clare, in the room of Daniel O'Connell, Esq., who, having been returned a Member of this House before the commencement of an Act passed in this Session of Parliament "for the Relief of his Majesty's Roman Catholic Subjects," has refused to qualify himself to sit and vote as a Member of this House, by taking the Oath of Supremacy.

PRECEDENT of a MEMBER being a QUAKER, claiming to make an AFFIRMATION.

Several Members attended at the table to take the Oaths; and Joseph Pease, Esquire, returned for the Southern Division of the County of Durham, having stated that, being one of the people called Quakers, he claimed the privilege of making an Affirmation, instead of taking the Oaths; whereupon he was desired by Mr. Speaker to retire until the sense of the House could be taken upon his claim; and he retired accordingly.

Ordered, That a Select Committee be appointed to search the Journals of the House, and to report to the House such precedents, and such Acts or parts of Acts of Parliament as relate to the right of the people called Quakers to take their seats in Parliament, and to the privilege conferred upon them to make their solemn Affirmation in Courts of Justice, and other places where by law an Oath is allowed, authorised, or required to be taken.

Report:—

Resolved, That it appears to this House, that Joseph Pease is entitled to take his seat upon making his solemn Affirmation

and Declaration to the effect of the Oaths directed to be taken at the table of this House.

The Counsel and Agents in the case of the Coleraine Election, being returned to the bar, the Clerk appointed to attend the said Committee delivered into the House a reduced List; and the same was called over, and is as follows:—

* * * * *

And the Members of the Committee being as usual, come to the Table to be sworn, and Joseph Pease, Esquire, a Quaker, being one of the said Members, Mr. Speaker submitted to the House whether Mr. Pease was capable of serving on the said Election Committee without having been sworn.

* * * * *

And the House being unanimously of opinion, That Mr. Pease was capable of serving on the said Committee;

The rest of the Committee were sworn, and Mr. Pease made his solemn Affirmation, as follows:

* * * * *

PRECEDENT of a MEMBER omitting the words in the OATH of ABJURATION "On the true Faith of a Christian."

The Baron LIONEL NATHAN DE ROTHSCHILD, returned as one of the members for the City of London, came to the table to be sworn; and being asked by the Clerk what Oath he wished to take, the Protestant or the Roman Catholic Oath, he replied, "I desire to be sworn upon the Old Testament."

Whereupon the Clerk having stated the matter to Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker directed Baron Rothschild to withdraw.

[Debate on Question relative to the matter adjourned.]

Ordered, That Baron Lionel Nathan de Rothschild, one of the Members for the City of London, having demanded to be sworn on the Old Testament, be called to the table, and that Mr. Speaker do ask him why he has demanded to be sworn in that form.

Whereupon Baron Lionel Nathan de Rothschild, having come to the Table, was asked by Mr. Speaker—

"Baron de Rothschild, you have demanded to be sworn

on the Old Testament, and I am directed by the House to ask you why you have demanded to be sworn in that form?"

To which Baron Lionel Nathan de Rothschild replied:

"Because that is the form of swearing that I declare to be most binding on my conscience."

And then Mr. Speaker directed him to withdraw.

Ordered, That Baron Lionel Nathan de Rothschild, one of the Members for the City of London, having presented himself at the table of the House, and having previously to taking the Oaths, requested to be sworn on the Old Testament (being the form which he has declared at the table to be most binding on his conscience), the Clerk be directed to swear him on the Old Testament accordingly.

The Baron Lionel Nathan de Rothschild, having come to the table, Mr. Speaker acquainted him that the House had made the following Order:

"That Baron Lionel Nathan de Rothschild, one of the Members for the City of London, having presented himself at the table of the House, and having previously to taking the Oaths, requested to be sworn on the Old Testament (being the form which he has declared at the table to be most binding on his conscience), the Clerk be directed to swear him on the Old Testament accordingly."

Whereupon the Clerk handed to him the Old Testament, and tendered him the Oaths; and he accordingly took the Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy, repeating the same after the Clerk; the Clerk then proceeded to administer the Oath of Abjuration, which the Baron de Rothschild repeated after the Clerk so far as the words "upon the true faith of a Christian," but upon the Clerk reading those words, the Baron de Rothschild said, "I omit those words as not binding on my conscience;" he then concluded with the words "So help me, God" (the Clerk not having read those words to him), and kissed the said Testament:—Whereupon he was directed to withdraw.

Question for a new writ negatived.

Resolved, That the Baron Lionel Nathan de Rothschild is not entitled to vote in this House, or to sit in this House during any debate, until he shall take the Oath of Abjuration in the form appointed by law.

Resolved, That this House will, at the earliest opportunity in the next Session of Parliament, take into its serious con-

sideration the form of the Oath of Abjuration, with a view to relieve her Majesty's subjects professing the Jewish religion.

[The House refuses to hear Petitioners by Counsel in favour of a resolution admitting Baron Lionel de Rothschild.]

[*See* case of David Salomons, Esq., July, 1851, *infra.*]

Bill to provide for the relief of her Majesty's subjects professing the Jewish Religion. Brought from the Lords, 13th July. Royal assent, 23rd July, 1858.

[Oaths Bill Passed: By the Lords with Amendments; Lords' Amendments disagreed to; Lords insist, and assign reasons.]

Resolved, That this House does not consider it necessary to examine the reasons offered by the Lords for insisting upon the exclusion of Jews from Parliament, as by a Bill of the present Session, intituled, "An Act to provide for the relief of her Majesty's subjects professing the Jewish Religion," their Lordships have provided means for the admission of persons professing the Jewish Religion to seats in the Legislature.

Resolved, That this House doth not insist upon its disagreement with the Lords in their Amendments to the said Bill.

Baron Lionel Nathan de Rothschild, returned as one of the Members for the City of London, came to the table to be sworn; and stated that, being a person professing the Jewish religion, he entertained a conscientious objection to take the Oath which, by an Act passed in the present Session, has been substituted for the Oaths of Allegiance, Supremacy, and Abjuration, in the form therein required. Whereupon the Clerk reported the matter to Mr. Speaker, who desired Baron Lionel Nathan de Rothschild to withdraw, and he withdrew accordingly.

Resolved, That it appears to this House that Baron Lionel Nathan de Rothschild, a person professing the Jewish religion, being otherwise entitled to sit and vote in this House, is prevented from so sitting and voting by his conscientious objection to take the oath which, by an Act passed in the present Session of Parliament, has been substituted for the Oaths of Allegiance, Supremacy, and Abjuration, in the form therein required.

Resolved, That any person professing the Jewish religion may henceforth, in taking the oath prescribed in an Act of the present Session of Parliament to entitle him to sit and vote in this House, omit the words "and I make this declaration upon the true faith of a Christian."

Baron Lionel Nathan de Rothschild having again come to the table, desired to be sworn on the Old Testament, as being binding on his conscience.

Whereupon the Clerk reported the matter to Mr. Speaker, who then desired the Clerk to swear him upon the Old Testament.

Baron Lionel Nathan de Rothschild was sworn accordingly, and subscribed the Oath at the table.

[*See* case of Baron Mayer Amschel de Rothschild, 15th Feb., 1859, *infra.*]

Parliament dissolved, 23rd April, 1859; met, 31st May, 1859.

Baron Lionel Nathan de Rothschild, Member for the City of London, came to the table to be sworn, and stated that being a person professing the Jewish religion, he had a conscientious objection to take the oath in the form required by the Act 22 Vict. c. 48. The Clerk having reported the circumstance to Mr. Speaker, Baron Lionel Nathan de Rothschild was directed to withdraw, and he withdrew accordingly.

Resolved, That it appears to this House that Baron Lionel Nathan de Rothschild, a person professing the Jewish religion, being otherwise entitled to sit and vote in this House, is prevented from so sitting and voting by his conscientious objection to take the oath, which by an Act passed in the 22nd year of her Majesty has been substituted for the Oaths of Allegiance, Supremacy, and Abjuration in the form therein required.

Resolved, That any person professing the Jewish religion may henceforth in taking the oath prescribed in an Act passed in the twenty-second year of her Majesty to entitle him to sit and vote in this House, omit the words "and I make this declaration upon the true faith of a Christian."

Whereupon Baron Lionel Nathan de Rothschild, Alderman David Salomons, and Baron Mayer Amschel de Rothschild, being Members professing the Jewish religion, having come to the table, were sworn upon the Old Testa-

ment, and took the oath, omitting the words "and I make this declaration upon the true faith of a Christian," and subscribed the same.

PRECEDENT of a MEMBER omitting the words in the OATH OF ABJURATION, "on the true faith of a Christian."

DAVID SALOMONS, Esq., returned as one of the Members for the borough of Greenwich, came to the table to be sworn; and being tendered the New Testament by the Clerk, stated that he desired to be sworn on the Old Testament: Whereupon the Clerk reported the matter to Mr. Speaker, and Mr. Speaker asked him why he desired to be sworn on the Old Testament; he answered, because he considered it binding on his conscience; Mr. Speaker then desired the Clerk to swear him upon the Old Testament; the Clerk handed to him the Old Testament, and tendered him the oaths; and he took the Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy, repeating the same after the Clerk. The Clerk then proceeded to administer the Oath of Abjuration, which Mr. Salomons read as far as the words "upon the true faith of a Christian," which he omitted, concluding with the words "So help me, God. And the Clerk having reported to Mr. Speaker that Mr. Salomons had omitted to repeat the words "upon the true faith of a Christian," Mr. Speaker desired Mr. Salomons to withdraw. He thereupon retired from the table and sat down upon one of the lower benches, upon which Mr. Speaker informed him that, not having taken the Oath of Abjuration in the form prescribed by the Act of Parliament, and in the form in which the House had upon a former occasion expressed its opinion that it ought to be taken, he could not be allowed to remain in the House, but must withdraw. And he withdrew accordingly.

Motion for new writ withdrawn.

The House resumed the further proceedings.

Mr. Alderman Salomons entered the House, and took his seat within the Bar: Whereupon Mr. Speaker said that he saw that a Member had taken his seat without having taken the Oaths required by law; and that he must therefore desire that the honorable Member do withdraw.

Mr. Alderman Salomons continued in the seat within the Bar.

Ordered (after Debate), That Mr. Alderman Salomons do now withdraw.

Whereupon Mr. Speaker stated that the honorable Member for Greenwich had heard the decision of the House, and hoped that the honorable Member was prepared to obey it.

Mr. Alderman Salomons continuing to sit in his seat, Mr. Speaker directed the Serjeant-at-Arms to remove him below the Bar.

Whereupon Mr. Serjeant-at-Arms having placed his hand on Mr. Alderman Salomons, he was conducted below the Bar.

[The House refuses to hear Petitioners by Counsel at the Bar of the House in defence of their right to elect their own Representative.]

Resolved (after Debate), That David Salomons, Esq., is not entitled to vote in this House, or to sit in this House, during any debate, until he shall take the Oath of Abjuration in the form appointed by law.

PRECEDENT of a MEMBER stating that he had a conscientious objection to take the OATH.

Baron MAYER AMSCHEL DE ROTHSCHILD, returned for the town and port of Hythe, came to the table to be sworn, and stated that, being a person professing the Jewish religion, he entertained a conscientious objection to take the oath, which by an Act passed in the last Session has been substituted for the Oaths of Allegiance, Supremacy, and Abjuration, in the form therein required. Whereupon the Clerk reported the matter to Mr. Speaker, who desired Baron Mayer Amschel de Rothschild to withdraw; and he withdrew accordingly.

Resolved, That it appears to this House that Baron Mayer Amschel de Rothschild, a person professing the Jewish religion, being otherwise entitled to sit and vote in this House, is prevented from so sitting and voting by his conscientious objection to take the oath, which by an Act passed in the last Session of Parliament has been substituted for the Oaths of Allegiance, Supremacy, and Abjuration in the form therein required.

Resolved, That any person professing the Jewish religion may henceforth, in taking the oath prescribed in an Act of the last Session of Parliament to entitle him to sit and vote in this House, omit the words "and I make this declaration upon the true faith of a Christian."

Baron Mayer Amschel de Rothschild, being again come to the table, desired to be sworn on the Old Testament as binding on his conscience.

Whereupon the Clerk reported the matter to Mr. Speaker, who then desired the Clerk to swear him upon the Old Testament.

Baron Mayer Amschel de Rothschild was sworn accordingly, and subscribed the oath at the table.

Appendix No. 2.

PAPER handed in by Mr. Bradlaugh, 2nd June, 1880.

PRECEDENTS RELATING TO PARLIAMENTARY OATHS.

CASE of Attorney General Sir FRANCIS BACON, Commons Journals, Vol. 1, page 459, 11th April, 1614, continued from page 456, 8th April.

ELIGIBILITY of the Attorney General to sit in Parliament. By 46 Edward III., 1372, no practising barrister could be Knight of the Shire.

Page 459.—"The precedents to disable him ought to be showed on the other side."

Page 460.—"Their Oath their own consciences to look unto, not we to examine it."

At that date each Member had to make Oath that he was duly qualified.

1. Question whether he shall for this Parliament remain of the House or not:—*Resolved*, He shall.

2. Question.—Whether any Attorney General shall after this Parliament serve as a Member of this House:—*Resolved*, No.

CASE of JOHN WILKES, Esquire, Commons Journal, 38, page 977, 3rd May, 1782.

THE House was moved, that the entry in the Journal of the House, of the 17th day of February, 1769, of the Resolution, "That John Wilkes, Esquire, having been in this Session of Parliament expelled this House, was and is incapable of being elected a Member to serve in this present Parliament," might be read, and the same being read accordingly;

A motion was made, and the question being put, That the said resolution be expunged from the Journals of this House, as being subversive of the rights of the whole body of electors of this Kingdom.

The House divided.

The Yeas went forth.

Tellers for the Yeas, Sir Philip Jennings Clarke and Mr. Byng, 115.

Tellers for the Noes, Mr. John St. John and Sir William Augustus Cunynghame, 47,

So it was resolved in the affirmative.

And the same was expunged by the Clerk at the table, accordingly.

Ordered, That all Declarations, Orders, and Resolutions of this House, respecting the election of John Wilkes, Esquire, for the county of Middlesex, as a void election, the true and legal election of Henry Lawes Luttrell, Esquire, into Parliament for the said county, and the incapacity of John Wilkes, Esquire, to be elected a Member to serve in the said Parliament, be expunged from the Journals of this House as being subversive of the rights of the whole body of electors of this Kingdom.

By Cavendish's Parliamentary Debates, Vol. I., page 73, 24th November, 1768, it appears that *inter alia* were used to justify the original and subsequently expunged Resolutions—first. "the copy of the record of the proceedings, on an information in the Court of King's Bench, against John Wilkes, Esquire, for blasphemy"—page 123; "three obscene and impious libels"; "an impious libel with intent to blaspheme the Almighty God."

CASE of Mr. JOHN HORNE TOOKE, Parliamentary History, Vol. 35, page 956, 16th February, 1801.

Mr. John Horne Tooke took the Oaths and his seat for Old Sarum. He was introduced by Sir Francis Burdett and Mr. Wilson. This being done, Earl Temple rose and said, he had observed a gentleman who had just retired from the table, after having taken the Oaths, whom he conceived to be incapable of a seat in that House, in consequence of his having taken priest's orders and been inducted into a living. He would wait the allotted time of fourteen days to see whether there was any petition presented against his return; if not he should then move that the return for Old Sarum be taken into consideration.

Page 1323, 10th March, 1801.—Earl Temple moved that Mr. Boucher, Deputy Registrar of Salisbury, be called in to prove that Mr. Horne Tooke, being a priest in orders, was not eligible to a seat in that House. After debate, in which Mr. John Horne Tooke spoke—Amendment and Division—Motion agreed to (page 1342),—Select Committee appointed (page 1343). Two reports given, pages 1343 to 1349, were made, giving all the cases of "any of the clergy" returned to Parliament.

4th May, 1801.—Earl Temple moved (pages 1349 to 1374), "That Mr. Speaker do issue his warrant to the clerk of the Crown in Great Britain, to make out a new writ for the election of a burgess to serve in this present Parliament for the Borough of Old Sarum, in the county of Wilts, in the room of the Rev. John Horne Tooke, who being at the time of his election in priest's orders, was and is incapable of sitting in this House." A debate took place in which Mr. John Horne Tooke spoke (pp. 1350 to 1402), division, and the motion negatived.

Jurist, Vol. 17, Page 463.—Exchequer Chamber; Error from the Court of Exchequer: Coram, Lord Campbell, Chief Justice, and Coleridge, Cresswell, Wightman, Williams, and Crompton, J.

One judgment by Lord Chief Justice Campbell for the whole Court.

Lord Campbell (page 464).—The words "so help me, God," are words of asseveration, and of the manner of taking the oath; but the words preceding them are, it appears to me, an essential part of the oath.

Fisher's Digest, Vol. 3, page 6179.—By a private Act, no person appointed to act as tithe valuer shall be capable of acting until he shall have taken and subscribed an oath in the words following: "I, A. B., do swear that I will faithfully, etc., execute, etc.; so help me, God." Held, that the oath had nevertheless been properly administered according to the Statute, for the words omitted were no part of the oath, but only an indication of the manner of administering it. Lancaster and Carlisle Railway Company *v.* Heaton, 8 El. & Bl., 952; 4 Jur., N. S., 707; 27 L. J., Q. B., 195."

Appendix No. 3.

PAPER handed in by Mr. BRADLAUGH, 2nd June, 1880.

STATEMENT on the OATH QUESTION by Mr. BRADLAUGH.

20, Circus Road, St. John's Wood, London, N.W.,
20th May, 1880.

WHEN elected as one of the Burgesses to represent Northampton in the House of Commons, I believed that I had the legal right to make affirmation of allegiance in lieu of taking the oath, as provided by section 4 of the Parliamentary Oaths Act, 1866. While I considered that I had this legal right, it was then clearly my moral duty to make the affirmation. The oath, although to me including words of idle and meaningless character, was, and is, regarded by a large number of my fellow countrymen as an appeal to Deity to take cognizance of their swearing. It would have been an act of hypocrisy to voluntarily take this form if any other had been open to me, or to take it without protest, as though it meant in my mouth any such appeal. I, therefore, quietly and privately notified the Clerk of the House of my desire to affirm. His view of the law and practice differing from my own, and no similar case having theretofore arisen, it became necessary that I should tender myself to affirm in a more formal manner, and this I did at a season deemed convenient by those in charge of the business of the

House. In tendering my affirmation, I was careful when called on by the Speaker to state my objection, to do nothing more than put in the fewest possible words my contention that the Parliamentary Oaths Act, 1866, gave the right to affirm in Parliament to every person for the time being by law permitted to make an affirmation in lieu of taking an oath, and that I was such a person, and therefore claimed to affirm. The Speaker neither refusing, nor accepting my affirmation, referred the matter to the House, which appointed a Select Committee to report whether persons entitled to affirm under the Evidence Amendment Acts, 1869 and 1870, were, under Section 4 of the Parliamentary Oaths Act, 1866, also entitled to affirm as Members of Parliament. This Committee, by the casting-vote of its Chairman, has decided that I am not entitled to affirm. Two courses are open to me, one of appeal to the House against the decision of the Committee; the other, of present compliance with the ceremony, while doing my best to prevent the further maintenance of a form which many other Members of the House think as objectionable as I do, but which habit, and the fear of exciting prejudice, has induced them to submit to. To appeal to the House against the decision of the Committee would be ungracious, and would certainly involve great delay of public business. I was present at the deliberations of the Committee, and while naturally I cannot be expected to bow submissively to the statements and arguments of my opponents, I am bound to say that they were calmly and fairly urged. I think them unreasonable; but the fact that they included a legal argument from an earnest Liberal deprives them even of a purely party character. If I appealed to the House against the Committee, I, of course, might rely on the fact that the Attorney General, the Solicitor General, Sir Henry Jackson, Q.C., Watkin Williams, Q.C., and Mr. Serjeant Simon are reported in the *Times* to have interpreted the law as I do; and I might add that the Right Honorable John Bright and Mr. Whitbread are in the same journal arrayed in favor of allowing me to affirm. But even then the decision of the House may endorse that of the Committee, and should it be in my favor it could only, judging from what has already taken place, be after a bitter party debate, in which the Government specially and the Liberals generally would be sought to be

burdened with my anti-theological views, and with promoting my return to Parliament. As a matter of fact, the Liberals of England have never in any way promoted my return to Parliament. The much-attacked action of Mr. Adam had relation only to the second seat, and in no way related to the one for which I was fighting. In 1868, the only action of Mr. Gladstone and of Mr. Bright was to write letters in favor of my competitors; and since 1868 I do not believe that either of these gentlemen has directly or indirectly interfered in any way in connection with my Parliamentary candidature. The majority of the electors of Northampton had determined to return me before the recent union in that borough, and while pleased to aid their fellow Liberals in winning the two seats, my constituents would have at any rate returned me had no union taken place. My duty to my constituents is to fulfil the mandate they have given me, and if to do this I have to submit to a form less solemn to me than the affirmation I would have reverently made, so much the worse for those who force me to repeat words which I have scores of times declared are to me sounds conveying no clear and definite meaning. I am sorry for the earnest believers who see words sacred to them used as a meaningless addendum to a promise, but I cannot permit their less sincere co-religionists to use an idle form in order to prevent me from doing my duty to those who have chosen me to speak for them in Parliament. I shall, taking the oath, regard myself as bound, not by the letter of its words, but by the spirit which the affirmation would have conveyed had I been permitted to use it. So soon as I am able, I shall take such steps as may be consistent with Parliamentary business to put an end to the present doubtful and unfortunate state of the law and practice on oaths and affirmations. Only four cases have arisen of refusal to take the oath except, of course, those cases purely political in their character; two of those cases are those of the Quakers John Archdale and Joseph Pease. The religion of these men forbade them to swear at all, and they nobly refused. The sect to which they belonged was outlawed, insulted and imprisoned; they were firm, and one of that sect sat on the very committee, a member of her Majesty's Privy Council, and a member of the actual Cabinet. I thank him gratefully that, valuing

right so highly, he cast his vote so nobly for one for whom I am afraid he has but scant sympathy. No such religious scruple prevents me from taking the oath as prevented John Archdale and Joseph Pease. In the case of Baron Rothschild and Alderman Salomons the words "upon the true faith of a Christian" were the obstacle. To-day the oath contains no such words. The Committee report that I may not affirm, and protesting against a decision which seems to me alike against the letter of the law and the spirit of modern legislation, I comply with the forms of the House.

CHARLES BRADLAUGH.

MR. BRADLAUGH'S SPEECHES.

MR. BRADLAUGH'S First Speech at the Bar of the House of Commons, delivered June 23rd, 1880.

SIR,—I have to ask the indulgence of every member of this House while, in a position unexampled in the history of this House, I try to give one or two reasons why the resolution which you have read to me should not be enforced. If it were not unbecoming I should appeal to the traditions of the House against the House itself, and I should point out that in none of its records, so far as my poor reading goes, is there any case in which this House has judged one of its members in his absence, and taken away from that member the constitutional right he has (hear, hear). There have been members against whom absolute legal disqualification has been urged. No such legal disqualification is ventured to be urged by any member of this House against myself. But even those members have been heard in their places; those members have been listened to before the decision was taken against them; and I ask that this House to myself shall not be less just than it has always been to every one of its members (hear, hear). Do you tell me I am unfit to sit amongst you? (hear, hear, and Order, order.) The more reason, then, that this House should show the generosity which judges show to a criminal, and allow every word he has to say to be heard. But I stand here, Sir, as no

criminal. I stand here as the chosen of a constituency of this country, with my duty to that constituency to do. I stand here, Sir—if it will not be considered impertinent to put it so—with the most profound respect for this House, of which I yet hope and mean to form a part, and on whose traditions I should not wish to cast one shadow of reproach. I stand here returned duly; no petition against my return; no impeachment of that return. I stand here returned duly, ready to fulfil every form that this House requires, ready to fulfil every form that the law permits this House to require, ready to do every duty that the law makes incumbent upon me. I will not in this presence argue whether this House has or has not the right to set its decision against the law, because I should imagine that even the rashest of those who spoke against me would hardly be prepared to put in the mouth of one whom they consider too advanced in politics an arguments so dangerous as that might become. I speak within the limits of the law, asking for no favor from this House for myself or for my constituents, but asking the merest justice which has always been accorded to a member of the House (hear, hear, and Order.) I have to ask indulgence lest the memory of some hard words which have been spoken in my absence should seem to give to what I say a tone of defiance, which it is far from my wish should be there at all; and I am the more eased because although there were words spoken which I had always been taught English gentlemen never said in the absence of an antagonist without notice to him, yet there were also generous and brave words said for one who is at present, I am afraid, a source of trouble and discomfort and hindrance to business. I measure the generous words against the others, and I will only make one appeal through you, Sir, which is, that if the reports be correct that the introduction of other names came with mine in the heat of passion and the warmth of debate, the gentleman who used those words, if such there were, will remember that he was wanting in chivalry, because, while I can answer for myself, and am able to answer for myself, nothing justified the introduction of any other name beside my own to make a prejudice against me (cheers and cries of Question and Order.) I fear lest the

strength of this House, judicially exercised as I understand it to be—with infrequency of judicial exercise—that the strength of this House makes it forget our relative positions. At present I am pleading at its bar for justice. By right it is there I should plead. [The hon. member pointed to the seats.] It is that right I claim in the name of those who sent me here. No legal disqualification before my election, or it might have been made the ground of petition. No legal disqualification since my election—not even pretended. It is said: "You might have taken the oath as other members did." I could not help when I read that, Sir, trying to put myself in the place of each member who said it. I imagined a member of some form of faith who found in the oath words which seemed to him to clash with his faith, but still words which he thought he might utter, but which he would prefer not to utter if there were any other form which the law provided him, and I asked myself whether each of those members would not then have taken the form which was most consonant with his honor and his conscience. If I have not misread, some hon. members seem to think that I have neither honor nor conscience. Is there not some proof to the contrary in the fact that I did not go through the form, believing that there was another right open to me? (hear, hear, and Order.) Is that not some proof that I have honor and conscience? Of the gentlemen who are now about to measure themselves against the rights of the constituencies of England I ask what justification had they for that measurement? They have said that I thrust my opinions on the House. I hold here, Sir, the evidence of Sir Thomas Erskine May, and I can find no word of any opinion of mine thrust upon the House at all. I have read—it may be that the reports misrepresent—that the cry of "Atheist" has been raised from that side. [The hon. member pointed to the Opposition side.] No word of all mine before the committee put in any terms those theological or anti-theological opinions in evidence before the House. I am no more ashamed of my own opinions, which I did not choose, opinions into which I have grown, than any member of this House is ashamed of his; and much as I value the right to sit here, and much as I believe that the justice of this House will accord it to me before the struggle is finished, I would

rather relinquish it for ever than it should be thought that by any shadow of hypocrisy I had tried to gain a feigned entrance here by pretending to be what I am not (cheers, and cries of Order.) On the report of the committee as it stands, on the evidence before the House, what is the objection to either my affirming or taking the oath? It is said I have no legal right to affirm. I will suppose that to be so. It is the first time that the House has made itself a court of law from which there may be no appeal, and deprived a citizen of his constitutional right of appeal to a court of law to make out what the statute means in dealing with him. There is no case in which this House has overridden everything, and put one of its members where he had no chance of battling for his right at all. Take the oath. It is possible that some of the lawyers, who have disagreed among themselves even upon that (the Opposition) side of the House, may be right, and that I may be wrong in the construction I have put upon the oath, but no such objection can come. There is no precedent—there is, I submit respectfully, no right—in this House to stand between me and the oath which the law provides for me to take, which the statute, under penalty even upon members of this House themselves if they put me out from my just return, gives me the right to take. What kind of a conflict is provoked here if this resolution be enforced? Not a grave conflict in a court of law, where the judges exclude passion, where they only deal with facts and evidence. I do not mean that these gentlemen do not deal with facts; but, if I am any judge of my own life's story, there have been many things which I can hardly reckon in the category of facts put against myself. I don't mean that they are not right, for hon. members may know more of myself than I do myself; but, judging myself as I know myself, some of the members who have attacked me so glibly during the last few days must have been extraordinarily misinformed, or must have exceedingly misapprehended the matters they alleged. It has been said that I have paraded and flaunted some obnoxious opinions. I appeal to your justice, sir, and to that of the members of this House, to say whether my manner has not been as respectful as that of man could be—whether in each case I have not withdrawn when you told me. If I now come here with even the appearance of self-assertion,

it is because I would not be a recreant and a coward to the constituency that sent me to represent them; and I mean to be as members have been in the best history of this assembly. I ask the House, in dealing with my rights, to remember how they are acting. It is perfectly true that by a majority they may decide against me now. What are you to do then? Are you going to declare the seat vacant? First, I tell you that you have not the right. The moment I am there—[the hon. member pointed inside the House]—I admit the right of the House, of its own good will and pleasure, to expel me. As yet I am not under your jurisdiction. As yet I am under the protection of the law. A return sent me to this House, and I ask you, sir, as the guardian of the liberties of this House, to give effect to that return. The law says you should, and that this House should. And naturally so; because, if it were not so, any time a majority of members might exclude anyone they pleased. What has been alleged against me? Politics? Are views on politics urged as a reason why a member should not sit here? Pamphlets have been read—I won't say with accuracy, because I will not libel any of the hon. members who read them; but, surely, if they are grounds for disqualification they are grounds for indictment to be proved against me in a proper fashion. There is no case in all the records of this House in which you have ransacked what a man has written and said in his past life and then challenged him with it here. My theology? It would be impertinent in me, after the utterances of men so widely disagreeing from me that have been made on the side of religious liberty during the past two nights—it would be impertinent in me to add one word save this. It is said that you may deal with me because I am isolated. I could not help hearing the ring of that word in the lobby as I sat outside last night. But is that a reason, that, because I stand alone the House are to do against me what they would not do if I had 100,000 men at my back? (cries of Oh). That is a bad argument which provokes a reply inconsistent with the dignity of this House and which I should be sorry to give. I have not yet used—I hope no passion may tempt me to be using—any words that would seem to savor of even a desire to enter into conflict with this

House. I have always taught, preached, and believed the supremacy of Parliament, and it is not because for a moment the judgment of one Chamber of Parliament should be hostile to me that I am going to deny the ideas I have always held; but I submit that one Chamber of Parliament—even its grandest Chamber, as I have always held this to be—had no right to override the law. The law gives me the right to sign that roll, to take and subscribe the oath, and to take my seat there [pointing to the benches]. I admit that the moment I am in the House, without any reason but your own good will, you can send me away. That is your right. You have full control over your members, but you cannot send me away until I have been heard in my place, not a suppliant as I am now, but with the rightful audience that each member has always had. There is one phase of my appeal which I am loth indeed to make. I presume you will declare the seat vacant. What do you send me back to Northampton to say? I said before, and I trust I may say again, that this assembly was one in which any man might well be proud to sit—prouder I that I have not some of your traditions and am not of your families, but am of the people, the people that sent me here to speak for them. Do you mean that I am to go back to Northampton as to a court, to appeal against you? that I am to ask the constituency to array themselves against this House? I hope not. If it is to be, it must be. If this House arrays itself against an isolated man—its huge power against one citizen—if it must be, then the battle must be too. But it is not with the constituency of Northampton alone—hon. members need not mistake—that you will come into conflict if this appeal is to go forward, if the House of Commons is to override the statute law to get rid of even the vilest of members. Had you alleged against me even more than against one man whose name was mentioned in this House last night, I should still have held that the House cannot supersede the rights of the people. But not as much is alleged against me as was alleged against that man, in whose case the House itself said that its conduct had been subversive of the rights of the people. I beg you, for your own sakes, don't put yourselves in that position. I have no desire to wrestle with you for justice. I admit that I have

used hard words in my short life, giving men the right in return to say hard things of me; but is it not better that I should have the right to say them to your faces? If they are within the law, let the law deal with me fairly and properly; but if they are without the law, not unfairly, as I submit you are doing now. You have the power to send me back, but in appealing to Northampton I must appeal to a tribunal higher than yours—not to courts of law, for I hope the days of conflict between the assembly which makes the law and the tribunals which administer it are passed. It must be a bad day for England and for Great Britain, if we are to be brought again to the time when the judges and those who make the law for the judges are in rash strife as to what they mean. But there is a court to which I shall appeal—the court of public opinion, which will have to express itself. You say it is against me. Possibly; but if it be so, is it against me rightly or wrongly? I am ready to admit, if you please, for the sake of argument, that every opinion I hold is wrong and deserves punishment. Let the law punish it. If you say the law cannot, then you admit that you have no right, and I appeal to public opinion against the iniquity of a decision which overrides the law and denies me justice. I beg your pardon, Sir, and that of the House too, if in this warmth there seems to lack respect for its dignity; and as I shall have, if your decision be against me, to come to that table when your decision is given, I beg you, before the step is taken in which we may both lose our dignity—mine is not much, but yours is that of the Commons of England—I beg you, before the gauntlet is fatally thrown—I beg you, not in any sort of menace, not in any sort of boast, but as one man against six hundred, to give me that justice which on the other side of this hall the judges would give me were I pleading there before them (loud cheers and cries of Order, amid which Mr. Bradlaugh again bowed and retired).

Mr. Bradlaugh's Second Speech at the Bar of the House of Commons, delivered April 28th, 1881.

Mr. Speaker,—I have again to ask the indulgence of the House while I submit to it a few words in favor of my claim to do that which the law requires me to do. Perhaps the House will pardon me if I supply an omission, I feel unin-

tentionally made, on the part of the hon. member for Chatham in some words which have just fallen from him. I understood him to say that he would use a formal statement made by me to the Committee against what the Chancellor of the Duchy had said I had said. I am sure the hon. and learned member for Chatham, who has evidently read the proceedings of the Committee with care, would, if he had thought it fair, have stated to the House that the statement only came from me after an objection made by me—a positive objection on the ground that it related to matters outside this House, and that the House in the course of its history had never inquired into such matters; but I can hardly understand what the member for Chatham meant when he said that he contrasted what I did say with what the Chancellor of the Duchy said I said, for it is not a matter of memory, it is on the proceedings of this House, that being examined formally before the Committee, I stated: "That the essential part of the oath is in the fullest and most complete degree binding upon my honor and conscience, and that the repeating of the words of asseveration does not in the slightest degree weaken the binding of the allegiance on me." I say now I would not go through any form—much as I value the right to sit in this House, much as I desire and believe that this House will accord me that right—that I did not mean to be binding upon me without mental reservation, without equivocation. I would go through no form unless it were fully and completely and thoroughly binding upon me as to what it expressed or promised. Mine has been no easy position for the last twelve months. I have been elected by the free votes of a free constituency. My return is untainted. There is no charge of bribery (cheers), no charge of corruption, nor of inducing men to come drunken to the polling booth. I come here with a pure untainted return—not won by accident. For thirteen long years have I fought for this right—through five contested elections, including this. It is now proposed to prevent me from fulfilling the duty my constituents have placed upon me. You have force—on my side is the law. The hon. and learned member for Plymouth spoke the truth when he said he did not ask the House to treat the matter as a question of law, but the constituencies ask me to treat it as a question of law. I, for them, ask you to treat it as a question of law.

I could understand the feeling that seems to have been manifested were I some great and powerful personage. I could understand it had I a huge influence behind me. I am only one of the people, and you propose to teach them that on a mere technical question you will put a barrier in the way of my doing my duty which you have never put in the way of anyone else. The question is, has my return on the 9th of April, 1881, anything whatever to impeach it? There is no legal disqualification involved. If there were it could be raised by petition. The hon. member for Plymouth says the dignity of this House is in question. Do you mean that I can injure the dignity of this House? This House which has stood unrivalled for centuries? This House supreme among the assemblies of the world? This House, which represents the traditions of liberty? I should not have so libelled you. How is the dignity of this House to be hurt? If what happened before the 9th of April is less than a legal disqualification, it is a matter for the judgment of the constituency and not for you. The constituency has judged me; it has elected me. I stand here with no legal disqualification upon me. The right of the constituency to return me is an unimpeachable right. I know some gentlemen make light of constituencies; yet without the constituencies you are nothing. It is from them you derive your whole and sole authority. The hon. and learned member for Plymouth treats lightly the legal question. It is dangerous to make light of the law—dangerous because if you are only going to rely on your strength of force to override the law, you give a bad lesson to men whose morality you impeach as to what should be their duty if emergence ever came (hear, hear). Always outside the House I have advocated strenuous obedience to the law, and it is under that law that I claim my right. It is said by the right hon. baronet who interposes between me and my duty that this House has passed some resolution. First, I submit that that resolution does not affect the return of the 9th April. The conditions are entirely different, there is nothing since the date of that return. I submit next that if it did affect it the resolution was illegal from the beginning. In the words of George Grenville, spoken in this House in 1769, I say if your resolution goes in the teeth of the law—if against the statute—your reso-

lution is null and void. No word have I uttered outside these walls which has been lacking in respect to the House. I believe the House will do me justice, and I ask it to look at what it is I claim. I claim to do that which the law says I must. Frankly, I would rather have affirmed. When I came to the table of the House I deemed that I had a legal right to do it. The courts have decided against me, and I am bound by their decision. I have the legal right to do what I propose to do. No resolution of yours can take away that legal right. You may act illegally and hinder me, and unfortunately I have no appeal against you. "Unfortunately" perhaps I should not say. Perhaps it is better that the Chamber which makes the law should never be in conflict with the courts which administer the laws that the Chamber makes. I think the word "unfortunately" was not the word I ought to have used in this argument. But the force that you invoke against the law to-day may to-morrow be used against you, and the use will be justified by your example. It is a fact that I have no remedy if you rely on your force. I can only be driven into a contest, wearying even to a strong man well supported, ruinous and killing to one man standing by himself—a contest in which if I succeed it will be injurious to you as well as to me. Injurious to me because I can only win by lessening your repute which I desire to maintain. The only court I have the power of appealing to is the court of public opinion, which I have no doubt in the end will do me justice. The hon. member for Plymouth said I had the manliness on a former occasion to make an avowal of opinions to this House. I did nothing of the kind. I have never, directly or indirectly, said one word about my opinions, and this House has no right to inquire what opinions I may hold outside its walls, the only right is that which the statute gives you; my opinions there is no right to inquire into. I shelter myself under the laws of my country. This is a political assembly, met to decide on the policy of the nation, and not on the religious opinions of the citizens (cheers). While I had the honor of occupying a seat in the House when questions were raised which touched upon religious matters, I abstained from uttering one word. I did not desire to say one word which might hurt the feelings of even the most tender (hear).

But it is said, why not have taken the oath quietly? I did not take it then because I thought I had the right to do something else, and I have paid the penalty. I have been plunged in litigation fostered by men who had not the courage to put themselves forward (loud cheers below the gangway). I, a penniless man, should have been ruined if it had not been that the men in workshop, pit, and factory had enabled me to fight this battle (interruption). I am sorry that hon. members cannot have patience with one pleading as I plead here. It is no light stake, even if you put it on the lowest personal grounds, to risk the ambition of a life on such an issue. It is a right ambition to desire to take part in the councils of the nation, if you bring no store of wisdom with you, and can only learn from the great intellects that we have (hear, hear). What will you inquire into? The right hon. baronet would inquire into my opinions. Will you inquire into my conduct, or is it only my opinions you will try here? The hon. member for Plymouth frankly puts it opinions. If opinions, why not conduct? Why not examine into members' conduct when they come to the table, and see if there be no members in whose way you can put a barrier? (Hear, hear.) Are members, whose conduct may be obnoxious, to vote my exclusion because to them my opinions are obnoxious? As to any obnoxious views supposed to be held by me, there is no duty imposed upon me to say a word. The right hon. baronet has said there has been no word of recantation. You have no right to ask me for any recantation. Since the 9th April you have no right to ask me for anything. If you have a legal disqualification, petition, lay it before the the Judges. When you ask me to make a statement, you are guilty of impertinence to me, of treason to the traditions of this House, and of impeachment of the liberties of the people. My difficulty is that those who have made the most bitter attacks upon me only made them when I was not here to deal with them. One hon. and gallant member recently told his constituents that this would be made a party question, but that the Conservative members had not the courage to speak out against me. I should have thought, from reading "Hansard," not that they wanted courage, but that they had cultivated a reticence that was more just. I wish to say a word or two on the attempt which has been

made to put on the Government of the day complicity in my views. The Liberal party has never aided me in any way to this House. (Oh, from the Opposition.) Never. I have fought by myself. I have fought by my own hand. I have been hindered in every way that it was possible to hinder me, and it is only by the help of the people, by the pence of toilers in mine and factory, that I am here to-day, after these five struggles right through thirteen years. I have won my way with them, for I have won their hearts, and now I come to you. Will you send me back from here? Then how? You have the right, but it is the right of force, and not of law. When I am once seated on these benches, then I am under your jurisdiction. At present I am under the protection of the writ from those who sent me here. I do not want to quote what has happened before, but if there be one lesson which the House has recorded more solemnly than another, it is that there should be no interference with the judgment of a constituency in sending a man to this House against whom there is no statutory disqualification. Let me appeal to the generosity of the House as well as to its strength. It has traditions of liberty on both sides. I do not complain that members on that (the Conservative) side try to keep me out. They act according to their lights, and think my poor services may be injurious to them. (Cries of No.) Then why not let me in? (Cheers.) It must be either a political or a religious question. I must apologise to the House for trespassing upon its patience. I apologise because I know how generous in its listening it has been from the time of my first speech in it till now. But I ask you now, do not plunge with me into a struggle I would shun. The law gives me no remedy if the House decides against me. Do not mock at the constituencies. If you place yourselves above the law, you leave me no course save lawless agitation instead of reasonable pleading. It is easy to begin such a strife, but none knows how it would end. I have no court, no tribunal to appeal to; you have the strength of your votes at the moment. You think I am an obnoxious man, and that I have no one on my side. If that be so, then the more reason that this House, grand in the strength of its centuries of liberty, should have now that generosity in dealing with one who to-morrow may be forced into a struggle for public opinion against it (cheers).

Mr. Bradlaugh's Third Speech at the Bar of the House of Commons, delivered February 7th, 1882.

Sir,—In addressing the House for the third time from this position, I feel the exceeding difficulty of dealing fairly with myself without dealing unfairly with the House. If I were to follow the hon. member who has just sat down into his errors of law, of history, and of memory, into his reckless misconceptions as to what are the views I hold and write about, I should only be giving pain to numbers of members here, and departing from that mandate with which my constituents have trusted me. It is—I say it with all respect—not true that I done anything more with reference to the succession than maintain the right of Parliament, meaning by Parliament both Houses, to control it; and any member who pretends that I done anything else, either does it, not having read what I have written, or heard what I have said, or having forgotten entirely what I have written or said, and being extremely careless in representing my views to the House. I regret that the hon. member should have imported into the discussion some fact supposed to have occurred in a police-court since I stood here before. I can only give the House my positive assurance that the hon. member is perfectly inaccurate in his representation of what took place. It is exceedingly painful to bandy words in this way. The hon. member was good enough to say he did not hear—he could not well have heard, for the magistrate did not refuse my affirmation at all. I happened to have been before Sir J. Ingham before, and he knew me, and knew the particular form of affirmation, and when the clerk read it to me no discussion took place on the subject. I hope the House will forgive me for contradicting such a small thing, but small things are sometimes much used. They have been used to work my ruin since I stood here before, and I regret that the shame of reticence did not at least keep it from this House, that the hon. member thought it his duty, by a common informer, to attempt to drive me into the Bankruptcy Court, and outside this House has boasted that the question would be solved in that way. It may be a brave boast, it may be consonant with piety from the hon. member's point of view, but I believe that every other gentleman's sense of piety would revolt against the notion of driving a single man into

bankruptcy, and then canvassing for subscriptions—(hear, hear)—for the "bold and vigorous, and patriotic and noble conduct," as the advertisement said, which consisted in hurrying in a cab to find the common informer to issue a writ against me. I dismiss that, however. I ask the House to pardon me for having wasted its time on this poor thing. I do not hope, I dare not think, that any word I may say here will win one vote; and I would have let this go silently against me, were it not that I owe a duty to the constituency that has twice entrusted me with its suffrages, a duty to every constituency right through the land in time to come—(hear, hear)—whose representative may be challenged as Northampton's has been. (Hear, hear, and No.) Some gentlemen say "No," but where is the challenge to stop? (Hear.) It is not simply theology, it is politics too (hear, hear). It is not simply theology that is brought before the House, but the wild imaginings of some member who, with the nightmare of panic upon him, and a wild imagining of the French Revolution clothed in terrors of which I know nothing, comes here to tell you of mighty Russia successful, and of the unfortunate United States with its Presidents assassinated because of religious and political opinions. Panic of that kind is not evidence as to my opinions. If this House intends to try me for my opinions, let it do it reasonably, and at least have the evidence before it. I would show you how unfair it is to trust to memory of words. The hon. member was good enough to tell the House that I had declared to a Committee of the House that certain words were meaningless. I hold in my hand the report of the Committee and the minutes of evidence, and no such words exist in any declaration of mine. (Hear, hear. Mr. Newdegate shook his head.) The hon. member does not believe me. I cannot make more than facts. I cannot make the comprehension which should distinguish when prejudice has determined that nothing shall be right that is put. The only way in which it can be pretended that anything of the kind in reference to the oath can be brought in is by taking my letter of the 20th of May, written outside the House, which does not contain a specific declaration the hon. member has put into it, which letter I protested ought not to be brought before the Committee at all, which I never

volunteered to the Committee—(Opposition laughter)—which I objected to the Committee having before them. (Oh, and laughter from the Opposition.) The gentlemen who laugh, laugh because the laugh is the only answer that could be given. No reason can be given in reply, no facts can be quoted; and I ask hon. members who laugh to remember that I am pleading as though a quasi-criminal at this bar, and that I have a right to an audience from them, and I appeal to the House at least to give me a silent hearing. Judges do that. If you are unfit to be judges, then do not judge (hear, hear). It shows, at least, the difficulty of dealing with a question like this, when those who are to judge have come to a judgment already, not upon any facts, but upon what they think ought to be the facts. I ask the House to deal legally and fairly with me. Legally you are bound to deal; fairly, as an assembly of English gentlemen, you ought to deal with me, even if you have differences with me, even if you think my opinions so obnoxious, even if you think that the politics with which you identify me in your minds are dangerous to you (oh, oh). If I am not dangerous, why not let me speak there? (pointing to the seat he occupied last Session.) If there is no danger, why strain the law? If there is no danger, why disobey the law? It is put by the hon. gentleman who spoke last that there are certain words of the oath which the courts of law have declared essential, The courts of law have declared the exact opposite. So far as a decision has been given, the very report of the Committee shows that the highest court of judicature in this realm has decided the words are not essential to the oath at all. I ask the House to deal with me with some semblance and show of legality and fairness, and first I say that they ought not to go behind my election of the 9th of April, 1881, and that the House ought to reject the resolution moved by the right hon. gentleman, because it deals with matters which antedate my election, and because the House has nothing to do with me before the 9th of April, 1881. That is the return of which the Clerk at the table has the certificate. That is my only authority for being here. If I did aught before that rendered me unworthy to sit here, why did the House let me sit here from the 2nd of July to the 29th of March? If what I did entitles the House not to receive me, why has

not the House had the courage of its opinions and vacated the seat? Either the seat is mine in law, and in law I claim it from you, or I am unworthy to hold it, and then why not vacate the seat and let the constituency express its opinion again? But my return is unimpeached, it is unimpeachable, and there has been no petition against me. The hon. member who went into back alleys for common informers could not find a petitioner to present a petition against it. If I speak with temper—(Opposition laughter)—the House, I trust, will pardon me. I have read within the last few days words spoken, not by members of no consequence, but by members occupying high position in this House, which make me wonder if this is the House of Commons to which I aspired so much. I have read that one right hon. member, the member for Whitehaven—(laughter from the Ministerial side)—was prompted to say to his constituents that I was kicked down stairs last Session, and that he hoped I should be again. If it were true that I was kicked downstairs I would ask members of the House of Commons on whom the shame, on whom the disgrace, on whom the stigma? I dare not apply this, but history will when I have mouldered, and you too, and our passions are quite gone. But it is not quite true that I was kicked downstairs, and it is a dangerous thing to say that I was, for it means that hon. members who should rely on law rely on force. It is a dangerous provocation to conflict to throw to the people. If I had been as wicked in my thought as some members are reported to have been in their speech, this quarrel, not of my provoking, would assume a future to make us all ashamed. I beg this House to believe, and I trust, Sir, that you at least will believe me, that I have tried as much as man might to keep the dignity of this House. I submitted last Session, and the Session before, to have had things said against me without one word of reply, because having had your good counsel, I felt it might provoke discussion upon matters which this House would willingly not have speech upon, and that I had far better rest under some slight stigma than occupy the House with my personality. I appeal to the recollection of every member of the House whether from the moment of my entering into it I did not utterly disregard everything that took place prior to my coming into it, and direct myself to the business for which

my constituents sent me here. The most extraordinary statements are made as to my views, statements as inaccurate as those which have fallen, no doubt unconsciously, from the hon. member who has last addressed the House. One noble lord in a great London gathering convoked against me, a gathering which was not as successful as some that have taken place in my favor, denounced me as a Socialist. I do not happen to be one. I happen to think that Socialists are the most unwise and illogical people you can happen to meet. But the noble lord knew that I ought to be something (laughter). I am a red rag to a wild Conservative bull, and it must rush at me and call me Socialist. I ask this House to be more fair and just. If I am to be tried, at least let me be tried for the opinions I hold and the views I express. Why, there are members who have soiled their tongues with words about social relations and marriage for which I have no proper reply in this House, as unfortunately the forms of the House do not permit me to use the only fitting answer, and perhaps it is as well. But I ask the House, Do not let this be the kind of weapon with which a return is met. Deal with me as the law directs, and in no other way. It is said "You have brought this upon yourself" (hear, hear). One baronet who has spoken of me with a kindness more than I deserve, in the very borough which I represent said I had brought it upon myself, because when I originally came to the House I flaunted and most ostentatiously put my opinion upon the House (hear, hear). Well, not one word of that is true. Not a shadow of it is true. I hold in my hand the sworn evidence of Sir Erskine May. I do not ask gentlemen to take my word, for it is clear they will not, but that of their own officer. And when the right hon. baronet said I claimed under the statute, and drew an inference from it, he knows that my claim contained no such words until the clerk at the table of the House challenged me as to the law under which I claimed. I do not quarrel with him, but I submit that the Clerk of the House had no right to put that question to me. I submit that the House had nothing whatever to do with it—that it certainly is no ostentatious flaunting by me. I submit, that at any rate, that it is prior to the 9th of April, 1881, and the House had no right to revive it against me. I ask the House to try and deal with me with some show

of fairness. They will find when I was before the Committee, instead of obtruding my opinions, I said I had never directly or indirectly obtruded upon the House any of my utterances or publications upon any subject whatever, and when pressed by one of the members sitting on that (the Opposition) side of the House as to certain opinions I was supposed to hold, by asking me particular words I was supposed to have used in a judicial proceeding, I said that if the Committee wished I would answer, but that I objected to answer, because I had carefully refrained from saying any word which would bring my opinions before the House. I ask, therefore, the House whether it is not monstrously unfair to say that I have obtruded any opinions here when I have expressly, carefully, and thoroughly kept them from the House? But it is said by the right hon. baronet that it would be a profanation to allow me to take the oath, and that the House would be no party to such a profanation (Opposition cheers). Does the House mean that it is a party to each oath taken? (hear.) There was a time when most clearly it was not so a party. There was a time when the oath was not even taken in the presence of members at all. But does the House mean it is a party now? Was it a party the Session before last? Was it a party when Mr. Hall walked up to that table, cheered by members on the other side who knew his seat was won by deliberate bribery? (loud Opposition cries of Order.) Bribery sought to be concealed by the most corrupt perjury. Did the House join in it? (renewed cries of Order.) If the House did not join in it, why did you cheer so that the words of the oath were drowned? But was the House a party when John Stuart Mill sat in this House? (hear, no.) A member who is, I think, now within the walls of the House—the hon. member for Greenwich—in addressing his constituents, said that Mr. Bradlaugh's opinions were hardly more objectionable than those of some other members of the House. If the hon. member knew that, then he was a party to the profanation of the oath: but perhaps they were on his own side, and he did not feel the profanation so acutely (hear, hear, and laughter). But it is said, "Our real objection is that you have declared that the oath is not binding upon you" (hear, hear, from Mr. Alderman Fowler). That is exactly the opposite

of what I did declare. The hon. member whose voice I hear now, I unfortunately heard on the 3rd of August; and heard so that I shall never forget it. (Mr. Bradlaugh here looked towards Alderman Fowler and paused.) The hon. member admits that is the point—that I have declared the oath is not binding upon my conscience; but, unfortunately, all the print goes the other way. I am asked by the Committee who sat as to whether the oath is binding, and on page 15 I reply.: "Any form that I went through, any oath that I took, I shall regard as binding upon my conscience in the fullest degree, and I would go through no form and take no oath unless I meant it to be so binding." Again, I am asked as to the word "swear." I say: "I consider when I take an oath it is binding upon my honor and upon my conscience"; and with reference to the words of asseveration to which the hon. member for North Warwickshire referred, he would at least have been more generous towards myself, if generosity be possible with him, if he had said: "I desire to add—and I do this most solemnly and unreservedly—that the taking, and subscribing, and repeating these words of asseveration will in no degree weaken the binding effect of the oath upon my conscience." I say here, Sir, before you, with all the solemnity man can command, that I know the words of the oath the statute requires me to take, that I am ready to take that oath according to law, and that I will not take an oath without intending it to be binding upon me, and that if I do take the oath it will be binding upon my honor and conscience. (Conservative cries of "Oh! oh!") Members of the House who are ignorant of what is honor and conscience——(Loud cries of "Order," "Oh, oh," and "Withdraw," from the Opposition.) If members will allow me to finish my sentence——(Cries of "Withdraw.") Members of this House who are ignorant of what is——(Renewed cries from the Opposition of "Withdraw.") These (Mr. Bradlaugh pointing to the Opposition benches) are my judges. Members of this House who are ignorant of what is the honor and conscience of the man who stands before them—(Oh," and laughter from the Opposition)—have a right to shout "Withdraw;" but they must beware lest a greater voice outside—("Oh, oh," and laughter from the Opposition) —at the ballot-box, where it has a right to express it,

may not only say "withdraw," but make withdraw all those who infringe the constitutional rights of the nation, as they seek to infringe them now. If I knew any kind of word which might convince members whom I desire to convince that I would take no pledge that I did not mean to be binding, I would use that form of words. But I have found myself so harshly judged, so unfairly dealt with, that one feels a difficulty in understanding whether any form of words, however often repeated, would convey any kind of conviction to some minds. I presume that this House will repeat its vote of April 26th. What then? Will it have the courage of its opinions, and vacate my seat? (Hear, hear.) If it does not, this House leaves me in an unfair position before the law. I am bound to come to this table, and will come to this table, as long as the mandate of my constituents sends me here, unless the House vacates the seat. If my seat be vacated, it is my duty to bow to the House, and appeal to my constituents again; and then the verdict rests with them. But to take away part of the right, and deal with it in this fashion, leaving me with the full legal responsibility and no kind of legal authority, I submit is not generous. Well, will this House repeat its vote of 9th May? Will it substitute force for law? At present the law is on my side (No, no, and hear, hear). If not, let me sit and sue me (hear, hear). If not, try by petition. If not, bring an action. But shouting "No" won't decide the law, even with the united wisdom of the members of this House who shout it. I know that no man is a good advocate for a great principle unless he himself be worthy of the principle he advocates, and I have felt acutely the judgment properly passed upon me by many members of this House, who, knowing their superiority to me, say how unworthy I am that this question should be fought in my person. I admit I am unworthy, but it is not my fault that I have this fight to make. I remind you of the words of one of the greatest statesmen who sat in this House more than a hundred years ago, that whenever an infringement of the constitutional right was attempted, it was always attempted in the person of some obnoxious man (hear, hear). I ask the House for a moment to carry its mind to the 3rd of August last. I do that because either I do not understand what took place then, or my memory

has failed me, as the memory of other hon. members sometimes does, or things happened without my consciousness. I thought I had stood aside until Parliament had dealt with the pressing business of the nation. I thought that had been recognised by this House. I thought I only came saying at the very door of the House that I was ready to obey its lawful orders, and I thought I was then seized by force while saying it. My memory may not serve me well on that, but I think it does. There were plenty of witnesses to the scene. I saw one hon. member climb on to a pedestal to see how fourteen men could struggle with one. It was hardly generous, hardly brave, hardly worthy of the great House of Commons, that those sending out to the whole world lessons of freedom, liberty, and law, should so infringe and so stamp them under foot. I had no remedy in any court, or I would have taken it. With all respect to you, Sir, and the officers of this House, if there had been any possibility of trying at law against the mighty privilege of this House, I would have appealed to that possibility. Let me now, before I finish, ask the ear of the House for one moment. It is said it is the oath and not the man; but others, more frank, say it is the man and not the oath. Is it the oath and not the man? I am ready to stand aside, say for four or five weeks, without coming to that table, if the House within that time, or within such time as its great needs might demand, would discuss whether an Affirmation Bill should pass or not. I want to obey the law, and I tell you how I might meet the House still further, if the House will pardon me for seeming to advise it. Hon. members have said that would be a Bradlaugh Relief Bill (hear, hear). Bradlaugh is more proud than you are (hear, hear). Let the Bill pass without applying to elections that have taken place previously, and I will undertake not to claim my seat, and when the Bill has passed I will apply for the Chiltern Hundreds (cheers.) I have no fear. If I am not fit for my constituents, they shall dismiss me, but you never shall. The grave alone shall make me yield (hear, hear, and "Oh").

A CARDINAL'S BROKEN OATH.

A Letter

TO HIS EMINENCE HENRY EDWARD, CARDINAL-ARCHBISHOP OF WESTMINSTER.

BY

CHARLES BRADLAUGH.

[EIGHTH THOUSAND.]

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To his Eminence

HENRY EDWARD,

CARDINAL-ARCHBISHOP OF WESTMINSTER.

Three times your Eminence has—through the pages of the *Nineteenth Century*—personally and publicly interfered and used the weight of your ecclesiastical position against me in the Parliamentary struggle in which I am engaged, although you are neither voter in the borough for which I am returned to sit, nor even co-citizen in the state to which I belong. Your personal position is that of a law-breaker, one who has deserted his sworn allegiance and thus forfeited his citizenship, one who is tolerated by English forbearance, but is liable to indictment for misdemeanor as "member of a society of the Church of Rome." More than once, when the question of my admission to the House of Commons has been under discussion in that House, have I seen you busy in the lobby closely attended by the devout and sober Philip Callan, or some other equally appropriate Parliamentary henchman. Misrepresenting what had taken place in the House of Commons when I took my seat on affirmation in July, 1880, your Eminence wrote in the *Nineteenth Century* for August, 1880, that which you were pleased to entitule "An Englishman's Protest" against my being allowed to sit in the Commons' House, to which the vote of a free constituency had duly returned me. In that protest you blundered alike in your law and in your history. You gave

the Tudor Parliamentary oath Saxon and Norman antiquity. You spoke of John Horne Tooke as having had the door of the House shut against him by a by-vote, no such by-vote having been carried, and the statute which disabled clergymen in the future not affecting John Horne Tooke's seat in that Parliament. You declared that in the French Revolution the French voted out the Supreme Being; there is no record of any such vote. In March, 1882, when the House had expelled me for my disobedience of its orders in complying with the law, and taking my seat, you again used the *Nineteenth Century*. This time for a second protest, intended to prevent my re-election. You, in both your articles, reminded the bigots that I might be indicted for blasphemy. Your advice has since been followed. Persecution is a "two-edged sword," and I return the warning you offer to Lord Sherbrooke. When I was in Paris some time since, and was challenged to express an opinion as to the enforcement of the law against the religious orders in France, I, not to the pleasure of many of my friends, spoke out very freely that in matters of religion I would use the law against none; but your persecuting spirit may provoke intemperate men even farther than you dream. In this country, by the 10th George IV., cap. 7, secs. 28 and 29, 31, 32 and 34, you are criminally indictable, Cardinal-Archbishop of Westminster. You only reside here without police challenge by the merciful forbearance of the community. And yet you parade in political contest your illegal position as "a member of a religious order of the Church of Rome," and have the audacity to invoke outlawry and legal penalty against me. Last month, in solemn state, you, in defiance of the law, in a personal and official visit to the borough of Northampton itself, sought to weaken the confidence of my

constituents; and you were not ashamed, in order to injure me, to pretend friendship with men who have for years constantly and repeatedly used the strongest and foulest abuse of your present Church. An amiable but ignorant Conservative mayor, chief magistrate of the borough, but innocent of statutes, was misled into parading his official robe and office while you openly broke the law in his presence. In the current number of the *Nineteenth Century* you fire your last shot, and are coarse in Latin as well as in the vulgar tongue. Perhaps the frequenting Philip Callan has spoiled your manners. It else seems impossible that one who was once a cultured scholar and a refined gentleman could confuse with legitimate argument the abuse of his opponents as "cattle." But who are you, Henry Edward Manning, that you should throw stones at me, and should so parade your desire to protect the House of Commons from contamination? At least, first take out of it the drunkard and the dissolute of your own Church. You know them well enough. Is it the oath alone which stirs you? Your tenderness on swearing comes very late in life. When you took orders as a deacon of the English Church, in presence of your bishop, you swore "so help me, God," that you did from your "heart abhor, detest and abjure," and, with your hand on the "holy gospels," you declared "that no foreign prince, person, prelate, state, or potentate hath, or ought to have, any jurisdiction, power, superiority, pre-eminence, or authority, ecclesiastical or spiritual, within this realm." You may now well write of men "whom no oath can bind." The oath you took you have broken; and yet it was because you had, in the very church itself, taken this oath, that you for many years held more than one profitable preferment in the Established Church of England.

You indulge in inuendoes against my character in order to do me mischief, and viciously insinuate as though my life had in it justification for good men's abhorrence. In this you are very cowardly as well as very false. Then, to move the timid, you suggest "the fear of eternal punishment," as associated with a broken oath. Have you any such fear? or have you been personally conveniently absolved from the "eternal" consequences of your perjury? Have you since sworn another oath before another bishop of another church, or made some solemn vow to Rome, in lieu of, and in contradiction to, the one you so took in presence of your bishop, when, "in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost," that bishop of the church by law established in this country accepted your oath, and gave you authority as a deacon in the Church you have since forsaken. I do not blame you so much that you are forsworn: there are, as you truly say, "some men whom no oath can bind;" and it has often been the habit of the cardinals of your Church to take an oath and break it when profit came with breach; but your remembrance of your own perjury might at least keep you reticent in very shame. Instead of this, you thrust yourself impudently into a purely political contest, and shout as if the oath were to you the most sacred institution possible. You say "there are happily some men who believe in God and fear him." Do you do either? You, who declared, "So help me, God" that no foreign "prelate . . . . ought to have any jurisdiction or authority ecclesiastical or spiritual within this realm." And you—who in spite of your declaration on oath have courted and won, intrigued for and obtained, the archbishop's authority and the cardinal's hat from the Pope of Rome—you rebuke Lord Sherbrooke for using the

words "sin and shame" in connexion with oath-taking; do you hold now that there was no sin and no shame in your broken oath? None either in the rash taking or the wilful breaking? Have you no personal shame that you have broken your oath? Or do the pride and pomp of your ecclesiastical position outbribe your conscience? You talk of the people understanding the words "so help me, God." How do you understand them of your broken oath? Do they mean to you: "May God desert and forsake me as I deserted and forsook the Queen's supremacy, to which I so solemnly swore allegiance"? You speak of men being kept to their allegiance by the oath "which binds them to their sovereign." You say such men may be tempted by ambition or covetousness unless they are bound by "the higher and more sacred responsibility" involved in the "recognition of the lawgiver in the oath." Was the Rector of Lavington and Graffham covetous of an archbishopric that he broke his oath? Was the Archdeacon of Chichester ambitious of the Cardinal's hat that he became so readily forsworn? Lord Archbishop of Westminster, had you, when you were apostate, remained a poor and simple priest in poverty and self-denial, although your oath would have still been broken, yet you might have taunted others more profited by their perjuries. But you, who have derived profit, pride, and pomp from your false swearing—you, who sign yourself "Henry Edward, Cardinal-Archbishop" by favor of the very authority you abjured in the name of God—it is in the highest degree indecent and indecorous for you to parade yourself as a defender of the sanctity of the oath. As a prince-prelate of the Church of Rome you have no right to meddle with the question of the English Parliamentary oath.

Your Church has been the foe of liberty through the world, and I am honored by your personal assailment. But you presume too much on the indifference of the age when, in this free England, you so recklessly exhibit as weapons in an election contest the outward signs of the authority the Vatican claims, but shall never again exercise, in Britain.

CHARLES BRADLAUGH.

NORTHAMPTON AND THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN

CHARLES BRADLAUGH, M.P.,

AND THE RIGHT HON.

SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE, M.P.

LONDON:
FREETHOUGHT PUBLISHING COMPANY,
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63, FLEET STREET, E.C.

NORTHAMPTON

AND THE

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

20, Circus Road, St. John's Wood, London, N.W.,
March 1*st*, 1884.

To the Right Hon. Sir Stafford H. Northcote, M.P., G.C.B.

Sir,—If, on either of the occasions when recently moving against me in the House of Commons, you had accorded or claimed for me opportunity of speech in self-defence, I might have been spared the need for this letter.

Apparently your view is that a member unfortunate enough to have the majority of the House against him need not have even the semblance of fairness shown him—that you, being strong, need not be troubled with scruples, and that the mere fact that the member is, like yourself, the chosen member of a constituency does not entitle him to the smallest courtesy or consideration.

You have taught me, Sir, many lessons during the past four years. Some of these I trust to remember and profit by in the future. You have taught me that a temporary majority of the House may, year after year, exclude any member of Parliament from his seat, although he has strictly obeyed every Standing Order—and this without vacating that seat—that it may so exclude the member although he has been a decent and orderly member of the

House, attending regularly for months to all its duties, and one against whom no charge or pretence of Parliamentary misconduct was made whilst he so served in it.

You have taught me, Sir, that the leader of a great party may sit silent, and acquiesce in it by his support, while the law-abiding electors of a great constituency are called "mob," "dregs," and "scum"—that such a leader may permit his followers to openly accuse two of the highest judges of our country of having judicially decided unfairly from corrupt party motives—that he may even, without dishonor, keep silence whilst it is suggested that the whole judicial bench is so corrupt that it will be ready to decide unjustly at the bidding of a government—and that the first law officer of the Crown is ready to be fraudulently collusive with myself. Did you believe these things, Sir, when they were stated and loudly cheered by those who sit around you on your side of the House? If yes, I am glad that your experience of humanity has been less fortunate than my own. I have regarded our judges as at least striving to be just and independent. You seem to think it nothing that the highest judges should, in your presence, be charged with judging unjustly from favoritism for the government of the day.

You have encouraged and practised deliberate violation of the law, and, to cover this law-breaking, you have connived at, and been party to, the basest insinuations against those whose duty it is to judicially pronounce on matters of legal dispute. You have, without rebuke, permitted your followers to declare that if the High Court of Judicature declared the law to be in my favor, that then they and you still intended to defy and disobey the law.

The first resolution you moved against me, on the 11th

February, was worse than futile, for it forbade me to do that which I had already done, and which you well knew that I had so done, in order to compel the submission to the judgment of a competent tribunal of the legality of my act.

The ridiculous form of your resolution arose because you—having bargained with me in writing through Mr. Winn that I should come to the table immediately after questions, and not before—intended to interpose ere I could reach the table. This would have been a dishonest trick had you succeeded; it became contemptibly ridiculous when you failed; but it is a lesson to me that I must be careful, indeed, when English gentlemen of name and family make treaties with me.

Your second resolution, on February 11th, was a spiteful, paltry, and cowardly insult to myself and to my constituents, for it was pressed by you despite that my colleague offered for me the express undertaking that you pretended you wished to secure, and was still pressed by you though Mr. Burt offered for me that I would at once personally give such undertaking, These two resolutions, utterly illegal and dangerous to Parliamentary repute, you have renewed on Thursday, the 21st, although you had heard read by Mr. Speaker an undertaking from me to the House that I would not attempt to take my seat until the judicial interpreters of the law had given formal judgment. And they are very cowardly and inexcusable resolutions, spiteful in excess of any ever passed in previous years. They exclude me, not only from the House, but from the reading-room, library, tea-room, dining-rooms, and exterior lobbies, though there is not the faintest suggestion that I have used my right to go to those places

to enable me to disturb the House. If I had not taken the precaution to anticipate your malice, I should actually have been hindered by force from going to the proper officer to obtain the certificate of my return. Yours is a mean and spiteful act, Sir, unworthy an English gentleman. And I admit that you have inconvenienced me, for you have deprived me of access to the library of the House, and you may thus put me to some expense and annoyance in the procurement of law books and Parliamentary records in the litigation in which I am involved in defending the rights of my constituents.

It is too much that, in 1884, a duly-elected and properly-qualified burgess of Parliament should be shut outside by such votes.

To repeat to you words signed, in September, 1656, by your own ancestor, Sir John Northcote, M.P. for the County of Devon: "we who have been duly chosen to be members of the Parliament, have an undoubted right to meet, sit, and vote in Parliament," and "no part of the representative body are trusted to consent to anything in the nation's behalf if the whole have not their free liberty of debating and voting in the matters propounded." To continue the language of your sturdy ancestor, you have "now declared that the people's choice cannot give a man a right to sit in Parliament, but the right must be derived from *your* gracious will and pleasure." You reply that you have the force on your side; but Sir John Northcote declared that: "The violent exclusion of any of the people's deputies from doing their duties and executing their trust freely in Parliament doth change the state of the people from freedom into a mere slavery;" and if you tell me that the majority of the present members of the House are

with you in what you do, I recall Sir John Northcote's protest: "That all such chosen members for Parliament as shall take upon them to approve of the forcible exclusion of other chosen members, or shall sit, vote, and act by the name of the Parliament of England while, to their knowledge, any of the chosen members are so by force shut out, we say such ought to be reputed betrayers of the liberties of England."

You cannot now pretend with any hope that sane men will believe you, that you desire "to prevent the profanation of the oath." In 1880 you prevented the second reading of the Affirmation Bill, introduced by my colleague, Mr. Labouchere, under the pretext that such a measure ought to be introduced by the Government. In 1881, after you yourself had said the matter should be dealt with by legislation, you prevented the Government from introducing it. In 1882 your friends blocked the Affirmation measure again proposed by my colleague, and in 1883 you exerted every influence to defeat, and successfully defeated, the Affirmation Bill brought forward by the Government.

If you had really believed the oath profaned by me, you would have been one of the first to aid in removing the possible profanation by substituting the right of affirmation. In Ulster you took credit for keeping an Atheist out of Parliament, but it was not my Atheism you kept out, for I actually sat with you day by day, speaking, voting, and serving, from the beginning of July, 1880, until the end of March, 1881. And, during the whole of that time, my care was to be at least as good and loyal a member of that House as any sitting within its walls I do not plead my conduct there, whilst using all my right, as anything on my behalf, for I at most could do no more

than my duty; but at least I have the right to say that it was never suggested that I was other than a good working member of the House, strict in my attendance at and during every one of its sittings. It cannot be pretended that I used my right of speech to force upon the House one word which did not relate to the business then being dealt with, or that in any fashion I obtruded upon what should be a purely political assembly any views of mine on matters of religion.

You have permitted in public my conduct to be misstated in your presence, and utterances in Parliament to be attributed to me which are none of mine, and you have done this because you hoped that, by exciting religious and social prejudice against me, you might weaken the Government, and crawl back into office. To injure the Liberal party, you have allowed words which you pretend are sacred to be used as party cries, and you have made hundreds of thousands examine into and declare in favor of my opinions and expressions on religious questions who but for you might perhaps have never even known my name. You have allied yourself at Westminster with men whom you denounced in Ireland as "traitors and disloyal," in order that, with their help, you might insult an English constituency; and you have succeeded in bringing Parliamentary Government into contempt by parading the House of Commons as the chief law-breaking assembly in the world. In four years against me you have done your worst to destroy me; with your own purse you have helped the various projects to ruin me; and you have so failed that clergymen and Nonconformist ministers have been driven to support me from very indignation against the injury you have done to the cause of religion. Your

Conservative associations have flooded the country with leaflets containing garbled and misleading extracts from my speeches and writings, and have thus excited the curiosity of many whom I could have never reached. These, procuring my works, and finding that my words have been distorted and taken out of context, give a favor to me that I should perhaps have never otherwise won.

Few believe that you are moved by religious motives. Mr. Newdegate is regarded as sincere, though his sanity is doubted; but when men recollect the past and even present lives of many of those around you, whose tongues so loudly declare their piety, they come, not unnaturally, to the conclusion that he is the worst infidel who trails the banner of his church in the mire of political warfare, and permits the votes of the drunken, the dissolute, the dishonest, and the disloyal to be canvassed by his whips so that they may be counted on the side which he parades as that of the pure and the holy.

On the 7th February, 1882, I told you and your majority: "If I am not fit for my constituents, they shall dismiss me, but you never shall." I have gone since voluntarily to my constituents—to those from whom you presented a petition with 10,400 mock signatures upon it. The answer has come at the ballot-box. My constituents bid me resist you, and I will. They trust me to defeat you, and I will. The law is on my side, and you fear its pronouncement. You kept me from the possibility of obtaining a decision as long as you could, but on the 11th February I broke through your barriers. Then you fruitlessly tried to erase all trace of my voting, and when you found that I beat you on this by adding a new vote as you rubbed out the vote before, then, in malicious spite, you

shut me out of the tea-room, dining-room, cloak-room, and library. For shame, Sir Stafford Northcote! This was worthy of "O'Donnell," but not of the leader of a great party. You wear knightly orders. You should be above a knave's spitefulness.

My turn is coming. You have won sympathy for me throughout the land; you have made Northampton men stand by me closer than ever; you are now awaking the country to stand by Northampton. Mr. Justice Stephen says that the appeal is to the constituencies, and I appeal. In the name of justice, by the hope of liberty, in memory of English struggles for freedom, I appeal, and I hear the answer growing as you shall hear it, too, on the day when, from my place in the House, I move: "That all the resolutions respecting Charles Bradlaugh, member for Northampton, hindering him from obeying the law, and punishing him for having obeyed the law, be expunged from the Journals of this House as being subversive of the rights of the whole body of electors of this kingdom."

CHARLES BRADLAUGH.

30, St. James' Place, S.W.

March 4th, 1884.

SIR,—There are some points in the letter you have addressed to me, which I am unwilling to pass over in silence lest I should be taken to admit your assertions.

In the first place, it is necessary that I should point out to you that the action of the House of Commons with respect to yourself has not been arbitrary or capricious,

but has been founded on principles deliberately adopted by a large majority of its members of various political opinions, to which principles they have steadily adhered, and which they have always been prepared to justify.

In the second place it should be clearly understood that in all the steps which we have taken with respect to yourself, including some which we took with the greatest reluctance, we were acting on the defensive, in consequence of your repeated attempts to override or to evade the repeated decisions of the House of Commons.

The brief history of your case is this. You were duly elected member for Northampton at the General Election of 1880. On presenting yourself to take your seat you tendered an affirmation instead of an oath, and supported your claim to affirm by reference to the fact that you had been permitted to do so in a court of law under the E idence Amendment Acts of 1869 and 1870. That claim at once, and necessarily, brought under the notice of the House that you must either yourself have objected in a court of law to take an oath, or must have been objected to as incompetent to do so, and that the presiding judge must have been satisfied that the taking of an oath would have no binding effect upon your conscience.

That being so, a Committee was appointed by the House to consider whether the Evidence Amendment Acts were applicable to the case of a member of the House of Commons desiring to take his seat and to comply with the necessary conditions.

It was held by the Committee that they were not so applicable, and this finding of the Committee was subsequently confirmed by the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

Upon being refused permission to affirm, you immediately

came to the table of the House and offered to take the oath. This proceeding was objected to, and the majority of the House (still, as theretofore, composed of members of different shades of politics) refused to allow you to go through the form of taking an oath, which, by the hypothesis on which your original claim to affirm was founded, as well as by the evidence afforded by a letter of your own, they held you to be incompetent really to take, and which they considered it would be a profanation to allow you to pretend to take.

That was the ground taken by the House on the 23rd June, 1880, and it is the ground which it has maintained ever since.

You have, since the adoption of that resolution, made various attempts to force the House to admit you to a seat, while still maintaining its objection; and those attempts have, on more than one occasion, led to scenes of a very indecent and disorderly character. In its anxiety to prevent the recurrence of such scenes, the House has felt itself obliged to adopt measures of rigid exclusion, which it would gladly have avoided.

I do not think it necessary to enter into the details of these scenes.

I am, however, obliged to take notice of your allegation that my action on the 11th February involved a breach of an arrangement previously made through Mr. Winn.

The arrangement which I authorised Mr. Winn to make in my name, and which he did make in a letter to Mr. Labouchere, was as follows:

"If Mr. Bradlaugh will write you a letter to the effect that he will not go up to the table to take the oath, nor make any other move with regard to his seat until Monday, February

11th, and will do so on that day, say immediately after questions, I am quite sure that Sir Stafford will neither move anything himself respecting Mr. Bradlaugh's seat, nor employ anyone else to do so, *previous to that day*."

The meaning of this is perfectly obvious, and it was in strict conformity with it that I myself abstained, and urged my friends to abstain, from taking any step whatever in relation to Mr. Bradlaugh until the day named. When, upon that day, you came forward in defiance of the Speaker's repeated calls to order, and began to go through the form of taking the oath, I had no option but to support the Chair, and to support also the repeatedly pronounced resolutions of the House in former sessions.

I do not take notice of other passages in your letter reflecting on the course of the majority, and more particularly of myself.

But I will add, in conclusion, what your letter does not show, that your exclusion from the precincts of the House is terminable at any moment when you may be willing to undertake not to disturb the proceedings of the House. The inconveniences of which you complain are inconveniences which you might, if you chose, put an end to to-morrow.

I have the honor to remain,

Your obedient servant,

STAFFORD H. NORTHCOTE.

C. BRADLAUGH, Esq., M.P.

23, Circus Road, St. John's Wood, London, N.W.,
March 7th, 1884.

To the Right Hon. Sir Stafford Northcote, Bart, M.P.

Sir,—In reply to your favor of the 4th instant, in which you say that the House held me to be incompetent to take the oath, will you permit me to answer: 1. That the question of competence or incompetence to take the oath is one of law, fit only for the decision of a judicial tribunal, to which tribunal I have always desired and endeavored to refer such question. 2. That if the "principle deliberately adopted" by a large majority of the members of the House of Commons had been that they desired to prevent "a profanation of the oath," then they ought, during the sessions of 1882—1883, to have gladly facilitated the passage of the Affirmation Bill, which would have prevented the necessity for the fulfilling by me of that which you describe as profanation, but which I contend is the duty imposed on me by law.

In your very temperate historic narrative, you omit the fact that when the House passed its resolution of the 23rd June, 1880, it had before it my declaration, made three weeks earlier, in answer to question 102 of the second Select Committee:

"Any form that I went through, any oath that I took, I should regard as binding upon my conscience in the fullest degree. I would go through no form, I would take no oath, unless I meant it to be so binding."

And as you refer to my letter of the 20th May, printed in the report of that committee, it is also fair to recall my answer thereon on the same day to question 197:

"I ask the Committee in examining it to take it complete,

not to separate one or two words in it and to take those without the countervailing words, and to remember that in this letter I declare that the oath, if I take it, would bind me, and I now repeat that in the most distinct and formal manner; that the Oath of Allegiance, viz.: 'I do swear that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to her Majesty Queen Victoria, her heirs and successors, according to law," will, when I take it, be most fully, completely, and unreservedly binding upon my honor and conscience; and I crave leave to refer to the unanimous judgment of the full Court of the Exchequer Chamber, in the case of Miller *v.* Salomons, 17th Jurist, page 463, and to the case of the Lancaster and Carlisle Railway Company *v.* Heaton, 4th Jurist, new series, page 708, for the distinguishment between the words of asseveration and the essential words of an oath. But I also desire to add, and I do this most solemnly and unreservedly, that the taking and subscribing, or repeating of those words of asseveration, will in no degree weaken the binding effect of the oath on my conscience."

In your reference to my attempts to take the seat to which I am by law entitled, you have omitted to state that on the 27th April, 1881, you personally advised me to wait for legislation, and that when I did so wait, your friends of the majority and yourself prevented such legislation.

In recalling the arrangement made by Mr. Winn on your behalf, you have omitted his most explicit and latest letter:

"Nostell Priory, Wakefield,
"January 28th, 1884.

"Dear Mr. Labouchere,—On the distinct understanding and agreement that Mr. Bradlaugh does not come to the table to take the oath, or adopt any other course with reference to his seat in the House of Commons, until immediately after questions on Monday, the 11th of February next, and that he will on that day and time come to the table, as he has intimated his intention of doing, I am prepared to say that Sir Stafford Northcote will not previous to Monday the 11th make

any motion hostile to Mr. Bradlaugh, nor support any motion coming from any of our independent friends on the subject.

"I am, yours very truly,

"ROW. WINN.

"H. Labouchere, Esq., M.P."

My charge against you is that, despite this agreement, you had gone down to the House with a resolution prepared beforehand, and by its wording showing that it was intended to be moved before I should be able to get near the table to which you had made me specifically agree then to come.

You conclude by saying that I can put an end to any personal inconvenience by undertaking not to disturb the proceedings of the House. I gave such an undertaking last year in express words; it is printed in the journals of the House, and you did not accept it. Immediately before you moved your resolution of 21st February, you heard Mr. Speaker read my undertaking to do nothing until a legal decision was obtained. This you refused, and I have no reason to suppose that any second offer from me would be accepted. If what you really desire is that, if the law decides in my favor, I shall none the less join in your insult to my constituents by refusing to try to serve in the Parliament to which they have lawfully returned me, I can only say that I will never give such an undertaking.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your most obedient Servant,

C. BRADLAUGH.

THE LATEST

CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE:

A REGISTER OF EVENTS

Which have occurred since April 2nd, 1880.

BY

W. MAWER.

"No, not an oath. . . . . .
Swear priests, and cowards, and men cautelous,
Old feeble carrions and such suffering souls
That welcome wrongs; unto bad causes swear
Such creatures as men doubt; but do not stain
The even virtue of our enterprise,
Nor the insuppressive metal of our spirits,
To think that or our cause or our performance
Did need an oath."—*Julius Cæsar*, Act II., Scene 1.



LONDON:
FREETHOUGHT PUBLISHING COMPANY
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1883.

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PRINTED BY ANNIE BESANT AND CHARLES BRADLAUGH,
63, FLEET STREET E.C.

THE LATEST

CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE.

1880.

April 2nd.—After twelve years' fight and three repulses, Mr. Charles Bradlaugh is elected member of Parliament for Northampton. The polling was as follows:—

Labouchere (L.)	....	....	....	....	4,158
Bradlaugh (R.)	....	....	....	....	3,827
Phipps (C.)	....	....	....	....	3,152
Merewether (C.)	....	....	....	....	2,826

The *Weekly Dispatch* said: Mr. Bradlaugh's achievement of the position he has been aiming at so long and so zealously is a notable sign of the times. Whatever his critics may think of him, he will enter Parliament as the representative of a vastly larger constituency than the whole electorate or the whole population of Northampton.

The *Birmingham Daily Mail:* Mr. Bradlaugh holds extreme views on some subjects, but he will none the less be a useful man in Parliament, his unflinching courage in the exposure of abuses being unquestionable.

The *Standard:* Mr. Bradlaugh, now that he has got to the House of Commons, is not likely to efface himself in speechless obscurity.

The *Southampton Times:* The most signal and portentous triumph is that which has been achieved by Mr. Bradlaugh. His election shows what the unity of the Liberal party must have been.

The *Christian World:* His contributions to the discussions of the House may not be without value.

During the election Mr. Samuel Morley telegraphed to Mr. Labouchere as follows: I strongly urge necessity of united effort in all sections of Liberal party, and the sinking of minor and personal questions, with many of which I deeply sympathise, in

order to prevent the return, in so pronounced a constituency as Northampton, of even one Conservative.

April 15th.—Mr. S. Morley, speaking at Bristol, said, respecting his telegram to Northampton: He made no reference to candidates, nor did the friend who wrote the telegram go into detail, but he advised union. Those who had known him all his life would believe that he viewed with the intensest repugnance the supposed opinions, both social and religious, of one of the candidates. Afterwards, writing to the *Record*, Mr. Morley said he deeply regretted his telegram.

The *Weekly Dispatch*, commenting on Mr. Morley's conduct, said: Let the bigots who have taken him to task for his temporary aberration from the path of pharisaism make what they can of his pitiful excuse. Other people can only regret that a man so useful in many ways, both as a politician and a philanthropist, should show himself so narrow-minded.

The *Edinburgh Evening News:* In their disappointment, the defeated party have eagerly caught at the election of Mr. Bradlaugh as supplying the most pungent taunt that can be thrown at their victorious opponents.

The *Sheffield Telegraph:* Bradlaugh is an M.P. . . . . the bellowing blasphemer of Northampton.

Mr. Bradlaugh announces that he considers he is legally entitled to avail himself of the Freethinkers' affirmation, and that there is some reason to hope that other members will join him in that course.

April 17th.—*Sheffield Independent's* "London Correspondent" says: Tenets which constitute the religious faith of Mr. Bradlaugh are understood to constitute an insuperable difficulty in the way of his being sworn a member of "the faithful Commons."

April 29th.—Parliament opens.

May 3rd.—At the table of the House Mr. Bradlaugh handed in a written paper to the Clerk of the House; on this were written the words: "To the Right Honorable the Speaker of the House of Commons. I, the undersigned Charles Bradlaugh, beg respectfully to claim to be allowed to affirm, as a person for the time being by law permitted to make a solemn affirmation or declaration, instead of taking an oath. Charles Bradlaugh." Asked if he desired to state anything to the House, Mr. Bradlaugh said: I have to submit that the Parliamentary Oaths Act, 1866, gives the right to affirm to every person for the time being permitted by law to make affirmation. I am such a person; and under the Evidence Amendment Act, 1869, and the Evidence Amendment Act, 1870, I have repeatedly, for nine years past, affirmed in the highest courts of jurisdiction in this realm. I am ready to make the declaration or affirmation of allegiance.

At the request of the Speaker Mr. Bradlaugh then withdrew, in order that the House might consider the claim, and Lord F.

Cavendish, urging that it would be manifestly inconvenient that when any hon. member had applied to take his seat in the House, any unnecessary delay should intervene, moved the appointment of a committee of inquiry which should lay before the House the material on which the House itself should found its decision. Sir Stafford Northcote seconded. Several other members spoke, and Mr. Beresford Hope said that the grievance of one man was very little compared with a great principle; at present the House of Commons was only a half-hatched chicken. The committee was then agreed to.

May 11th.—Appointment of committee carried by 171 votes against 74, after a two hours' debate.

May 20th.—The committee report: "that in the opinion of the committee, persons entitled under the provisions of 'the Evidence Amendment Act, 1869,' and 'the Evidence Amendment Act, 1870,' to make a solemn declaration instead of an oath in courts of justice, can not be admitted to make an affirmation or declaration instead of an oath in the House of Commons, in persuance of the Acts 29 and 30 Vict., c. 19, and 31 and 32 Vict., c. 72."

The draft report, proposed by the Attorney-General, was to the effect that "persons so admitted," etc, *may be* admitted, etc. This was lost by the casting vote of the chairman (Mr. Walpole), the other members of the committee voting as follows. Ayes: Mr. Whitbread, Mr. John Bright, Mr. Massey, Mr. Sergeant Simon, Sir Henry Jackson, Mr. Attorney-General, Mr. Solicitor-General, Mr. Watkin Williams. Noes: Sir John Holker, Lord Henry Lennox, Mr. Staveley Hill, Mr. Grantham, Mr. Pemberton, Mr. Hopwood, Mr. Beresford Hope, Mr. Henry Chaplin.

Mr. Bradlaugh makes a public statement of his position with regard to the oath. He considered he had a legal right to choose between the alternatives of making an affirmation or taking the oath, and he felt it clearly his moral duty, in that case, to make an affirmation. The oath included words which, to him, were meaningless, and it would have been an act of hypocrisy to voluntarily take this form if any other had been open to him. He should, taking the oath, regard himself as bound not by the letter of its words, but by the spirit which the affirmation would have conveyed, had he been allowed to make it, and as soon as he might be able he should take steps to put an end to the present doubtful and unfortunate state of the law and practice on oaths and affirmations.

May 21st.—Amid a tumult of cries from the Conservative benches Mr. Bradlaugh goes to the table for the purpose of being sworn. Sir H. D. Wolff objecting, the Speaker requested Mr. Bradlaugh to withdraw. He (the Speaker) was bound to say he knew of no instance in which a member who had offered to take the oath in the usual form was not allowed by the House to do

so. Sir H. D. Wolff then moved that Mr. Bradlaugh should not be allowed to take the oath, alleging against Mr. Bradlaugh his repute as an Atheist, and his authorship of "The Impeachment of the House of Brunswick." Mr. Alderman Fowler seconded the motion, stating that he held in his hand a petition praying the House not to alter the law and the custom of the realm for the purpose of admitting an Atheist to Parliament. Mr. Gladstone, in the course of replying, said: "it was not in consequence of any regulation enforced by the authority of this House—of a single branch of the legislature, however complete that authority may be over the members of this House, that the hon. member for Northampton presents himself to take the oath at the table. He presents himself in pursuance of a statutory obligation to take the oath in order that he may fulfil the duty with which, as we are given to understand, in a regular and formal manner, his constituents have entrusted him. That statutory obligation implied a statutory right." He moved that it be referred to a select committee to consider and report for the information of the House whether the House has any right to prevent a duly-elected member, who is willing to take the oath, from doing so. A long debate ensued, characterised by the fierceness with which Mr. Bradlaugh's admission to Parliament was opposed. Mr. John Bright, however, asked if the House were entitled thus to obstruct what he called the right of a member to take his seat on account of his religious belief, because it happened that his belief or no belief had been openly professed, what reason was there that any member of the House should not be questioned as to his beliefs, and if the answer were not satisfactory that the House should not be at liberty to object to his taking his seat? After two or three adjournments of the debate the Premier's amendment was virtually withdrawn, and a motion by the Attorney-General was carried to the effect that a committee should be appointed to report whether it was competent to the House to prevent Mr. Bradlaugh, by resolution, from taking the oath.

May 28th.—Committee nominated—twenty-three members.

Mr. Labouchere gives notice to ask leave to bring in a Bill to amend the law of Parliamentary Oaths, to provide that any member may, if he desire, make a solemn affirmation in lieu of taking the oath.

June 2nd.—Mr. Bradlaugh gives evidence before Select Committee, in the course of which he said: "I have never at any time refused to take the oath of allegiance provided by statute to be taken by members; all I did was, believing as I then did that I had the right to affirm, to claim to affirm, and I was then absolutely silent as to the oath; that I did not refuse to take it, nor have I then or since expressed any mental reservation, or stated that the appointed oath of allegiance would not be binding

upon me; that, on the contrary, I say, and have said, that the essential part of the oath is in the fullest and most complete degree binding upon my honor and conscience, and that the repeating of words of asseveration does not in the slightest degree weaken the binding effect of the oath of allegiance upon me." [It had been persistently represented that Mr. Bradlaugh had refused to take the oath.] "Any form that I went through, any oath that I took, I should regard as binding upon my conscience in the fullest degree."

June 16th.—The committee report that the compliance by Mr. Bradlaugh with the form used when an oath is taken would not be the taking of the oath within the true meaning of the statutes; that if a member make and subscribe the affirmation in place of taking the oath it is possible by means of an action in the High Court of Justice, to test his legal right to do so; and that the committee recommend that should Mr. Bradlaugh again seek to make and subscribe the affirmation he be not prevented from so doing. (Majority in favor of his being allowed to affirm—four.)

June 21st.—Mr. Labouchere moved in the House of Commons that Mr. Bradlaugh be admitted to make an affirmation instead of taking the oath, seconded by Mr. M'Laren. Sir H. Giffard moved a resolution seeking to debar Mr. Bradlaugh from both oath and affirmation. Alderman Fowler seconded, a man who did not believe in a God was not likely to be a man of high moral character. The majority of the people were opposed to an Atheist being admitted to Parliament. Many other members spoke. General Burnaby said the making of the affirmation by Mr. Bradlaugh would pollute the oath. Mr. Palmer said Mr. Bradlaugh had a legal right with which the House had no power to interfere. The Attorney-General said he had come to the conclusion that Mr. Bradlaugh could not take the oath, chiefly on the consideration that he was a person entitled to affirm. Mr. John Bright said it was certainly open to any member to propose to take either oath or affirmation; probably if Mr. Bradlaugh had had any suspicion that the affirmation would have been refused him, he would have taken the oath as other members take it—very much, he was afraid, as a matter of form. Debate adjourned.

June 22nd.—Mr. Gladstone said that the House, by agreeing to the amendment, would probably be entering on the commencement of a long, embarrassing, and a difficult controversy, not perhaps so much within as beyond the limits of the House, perhaps with the result of ultimate defeat of the House. The more he looked at the case the stronger appeared the arguments which went to prove that in the essence of the law and the constitution the House had no jurisdiction. In interfering between a member and what he considered his statutory duty,

the House might find itself in conflict with either the courts of law or the constituency of Northampton. No doubt an action could not be brought against the House, but he was not so clear that an action could not be brought against the servants of the House. He was still less willing to face a conflict with the constituency. The House had commonly been successful in its controversies with the Crown or House of Lords, but very different was the issue of its one lamentable conflict with a constituency.—Sir Henry Tyler, with execrable taste, dragged in the name of a lady with whom Mr. Bradlaugh is associated in business. At last, by a majority of 45—the numbers voting being 275 and 230—another triumph against liberty was scored.

The *Christian World* regretted that some Nonconformists helped to swell the Tory majority.

The *Jewish World* held it as a reproach to Judaism, that members of their community should have gone over to the party which once strove to detain them in bondage.

In 1851, Mr. Newdegate protested against the idea "that they should have sitting in the House, an individual who regarded our redeemer as an impostor," and yet Baron de Worms voted with Mr. Newdegate for the exclusion of a man with whose tenets he disagreed.

The *Whitehall Review* headed an article "God *v.* Bradlaugh," and said the majority had "protected God from insult."

June 23rd.—Mr. Bradlaugh again claimed at the table of the House of Commons to take the oath, and the Speaker having informed him of the resolution passed the previous evening, requested his withdrawal. Mr. Bradlaugh thereupon asked to be heard, and after some debate the demand was complied with.

Mr. Bradlaugh spoke from the bar of the House, asking no favor, but claiming his right, and warning hon. members against a conflict with public opinion.

Mr. Labouchere moved, and Mr. Macdonald seconded, the rescindment of the resolution of the 22nd, which was lost on division.

Mr. Bradlaugh was then recalled and requested to withdraw from the House. Standing by the table, he said: "I respectfully refuse to obey the order of the House, because the order is against the law." The raging of the bigots and Tories recommenced. Mr. Gladstone declined to help them out of the pit into which they had leapt: "Those who were responsible for the decision might carry it out as they chose." After a sharp discussion Mr. Bradlaugh was, on the motion of Sir Stafford Northcote, "committed to the Clock Tower." In the division the numbers were 274 for and 7 against, the Radicals having left the House.

June 24th.—On the motion of Sir Stafford Northcote, Mr. Bradlaugh is released from custody, "not upon apology, or reparation, or promise not to repeat his offence, but with the full

knowledge and clear recollection of his announcement that the offence would be repeated *toties quoties* till his object was effected."

June 25th.—Mr. Labouchere gives notice of motion to rescind the resolution of the 22nd, and Government agreed to give an early day for the discussion of the same.

June 28th.—Baron de Ferrieres announced his intention to move that the seat for Northampton be declared vacant, and that a Bill be brought in providing for the substitution of an affirmation for the oath at the option of members. Mr. Wyndham (Conservative) asked Mr. Gladstone whether the Government would bring in a Bill to remove all doubts as to the legal right of members to make a solemn affirmation. Mr. Gladstone said the Government did not propose to do so, and gave notice for Thursday (1st July) to move as a standing order that members-elect be allowed, subject to any liability by statute, to affirm at their choice. Mr. Labouchere then said he would not proceed with his motion. On another motion, however, by the same member, leave was given to bring in a Bill for the amendment of the Parliamentary Oaths and Affirmations, which was read a first time.

July 1st.—After a futile attempt made by Mr. Gorst to show that Mr. Gladstone's resolution was a disorderly one, the Premier, in moving it said, in the course of an extremely fair speech, that the allegation of members that Mr. Bradlaugh had thrust his opinions upon the House was untrue. His (Mr. Bradlaugh's) reference to the Acts under which he claimed to affirm had only been named in answer to a question from the clerk of the House. Sir Erskine May, in his evidence before the recent committee, stated that Mr. Bradlaugh simply claimed to affirm.

Sir Stafford Northcote admitted that when Mr. Bradlaugh was called upon to affirm he was not disrespectful, but firm. He opposed the resolution as humiliating to the House. Several members protested against any course for facilitating the admission of Mr. Bradlaugh. General Burnaby stated that in order to obtain "authoritative" opinions on the matter he had obtained letters or telegrams from the Moravian body, the Bishop of London, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Ossory, the Bishop of Ratho, the Archbishop of Dublin, the Bishop of Galway, and the Bishop of Argyle and the Isles, and the Secretary of the Pope of Rome, all of whom expressed themselves in the strongest terms against the admission of an Atheist into Parliament. Mr. Spurgeon, who was unfortunately from home, had expressed his opinion strongly adverse to it, and the Chief Rabbi—(loud laughter)—although refusing to interfere with political questions, felt very deeply on the subject. (Laughter, and cries of "the Sultan," and "Shah.")

When the House divided the numbers were 303 for, and 249 against.

July 2nd.—Mr. Bradlaugh takes the affirmation of allegiance, and his seat.

During the struggle several hundreds of indignation meetings were held in London and the provinces, and petitions, letters, telegrams, etc., in immense numbers, poured in upon the Government and the House, in favor of Mr. Bradlaugh's rights.

July 2nd.—Mr. Bradlaugh gives his first vote, and was thereupon served with a writ to recover against him a penalty of £500 for having voted and sat without having made and subscribed the oath, the plaintiff being one Henry Lewis Clarke, who, as subsequently appeared, was merely the tool of the actual common informer, Charles Newdigate Newdegate, M.P. This writ was ready so quickly that, if not issued actually before Mr. Bradlaugh had taken his seat, it must have been prepared beforehand.

July 8th.—Mr. Norwood asks the first Lord of the Treasury whether, considering the Government declined to introduce a bill to amend the Oaths Act, it would instruct the law officers of the Crown to defend the junior member for Northampton against the suit of the common informer. Mr. Callan asked whether the Government would remit the penalty. Mr. Gladstone said no application had been received for remission of the penalties, and that his reply to Mr. Norwood must be in the negative.

July 14th.—Read first time in the House of Commons, a bill "to incapacitate from sitting in Parliament any person who has by deliberate public speaking, or by published writing, systematically avowed his disbelief in the existence of a supreme being." It was prepared and introduced by Sir Eardley Wilmot, Mr. Alderman Fowler and Mr. Hicks. Owing to an informality the Bill could not come on for second reading.

The Rev. Canon Abney, of Derby, speaks of Mr. Bradlaugh as "the apostle of filth, impurity, and blasphemy."

July 16th.—Parliament indemnifies Lord Byron against an action, he having sat and voted without being sworn.

July 20th.—Sir Eardley Wilmot gives notice of moving that it is repugnant to the constitution for an Atheist to become a member of "this Honorable House." He afterwards postponed his motion.

At a meeting of the Dumfries Town Council, a member said: "If the law courts should decide that it was legal for an Atheist to sit in the House of Commons, he should feel it is duty to give notice of petition to Parliament to have the law altered; he would not allow Mr. Bradlaugh to go into a hundred acre field beside cattle, let alone the House of Commons."

The Rev. Chas. Voysey writes, that he feels disgraced by the

people of Northampton electing Mr. Bradlaugh, and declares that "most of the speeches in the Bradlaugh case in favor of his exclusion, strike me as singularly good, wholesome and creditable." He repeats the myth of Mr. Bradlaugh forcing his objections to the oath upon the House.

July 21st.—Sir John Hay, M.P., speaking about Mr. Bradlaugh at New Galloway, made a most infamous, cowardly, and uncalled for attack on Mrs. Besant. The *Scotsman* refused to print the remarks, as "the language was so coarse that it could hardly have dropped from a Yahoo."

Aug. 1st.—The *Nineteenth Century* prints "An Englishman's Protest," written by Cardinal Manning, personally directed against Mr. Bradlaugh.

Aug. 24th.—Mr. Bradlaugh gives notice that early next session he will call attention to perpetual pensions.

Sept. 7th.—Parliament prorogued. Hansard credits Mr. Bradlaugh with about twenty speeches during the Session. (Mr. Newdegate told the Licensed Victuallers that Mr. Bradlaugh "had made one speech, and proved himself a second or third-rate speaker.")

1881.

Jan. 6th.—Parliament reopens. Mr. Bradlaugh renews his notice as to perpetual pensions. Great interest in the question throughout the kingdom.

Jan. 24th.—Mr. Bradlaugh makes a speech in the House of Commons against Coercion in Ireland.

Jan. 31st.—Mr. Newdegate, speaking in the House, described Northampton as an "oasis in the Midland Counties."

Feb. 4th.—Mr. Bradlaugh makes a speech against the second reading of the Coercion Bill, and concluded by moving that it be read that day six months.

Feb. 15th.—Date of motion for inquiry into perpetual pensions fixed for March 15th. (When the day arrived Mr. Bradlaugh, on an appeal from Mr. Gladstone, allowed the motion to be postponed, in order to allow supply to be taken. 848 petitions had been presented to the House, with 251,332 signatures in favor of the motion.)

Feb. 17th.—Mr. Dawson, M.P. for Carlow, said that Irish members were much indebted to Mr. Bradlaugh for what he had done on the Coercion Bill.

Feb. 25th.—Mr. Bradlaugh made final speech against third reading of the Coercion Bill.

March 7th.—The case of Clarke v. Bradlaugh heard by Mr. Justice Mathew.

March 10th.—Mr. Bradlaugh brought before the House the case of the imprisoned Maoris.

March 11th.—Judgment in the case given, which was for the plaintiff, that he was entitled to recover the penalty, subject to appeal. Mr. Bradlaugh gave notice of appeal.

Mr. Gorst gave notice to move that Mr. Speaker issue his warrant for new writ for the borough of Nottingham [!].

March 14th.—Upon Mr. Bradlaugh rising to present petitions against perpetual pensions, signed by over 7,000 persons, Mr. Gorst rose to order, on the ground that the seat for Northampton was vacant. After discussion the Speaker called upon Mr. Bradlaugh to proceed with the presentation of his petitions.

March 15th.—At request of Mr. Gladstone, Mr. Bradlaugh postponed his motion for enquiry into perpetual pensions.

March 23rd.—Mr. Bradlaugh moved the Court of Appeal to expedite the hearing of his appeal, and also to expedite the trial of the issues in fact. The Court gave the appeal priority over other cases.

March 28th.—Mr. Bradlaugh made his last speech in the House against flogging in the Army.

March 30th.—Appeal heard.

March 31st.—Judgment given against the defendant. Plaintiff not yet entitled to execution, but seat vacated, Mr. Bradlaugh undertaking not to appeal so far as the affirmation was concerned.

Mr. Bradlaugh again seeks the suffrages of the electors of Northampton.

April 6th.—The Tories serve notice on the Mayor not to accept Mr. Bradlaugh's nomination, which the Mayor disregarded. Mr. Edward Corbett nominated by Tories.

April 9th.—Mr. Bradlaugh re-elected by 3,437 votes to Corbett 3,305.

April 26th.—Mr. Bradlaugh, accompanied by Mr. Labouchere and Mr. Burt, came to the table of the House, and, "the book" having been handed to him, was about to take the oath when Sir Stafford Northcote interposing, he was requested to withdraw, in order that the House might consider the new conditions under which the oath was proposed to be taken. Mr. Bradlaugh withdrew to the bar of the House, and Sir Stafford Northcote moved that he be not allowed to go through the form of taking the oath. Mr. Davey moved and Mr. Labouchere seconded an amendment to the effect that where a person who had been duly elected presented himself at the table to take the oath he ought not to be prevented from doing so by anything extraneous to the transaction. Other members spoke, and Mr. Bright regretted "the almost violent temper with which some hon. gentlemen came to the consideration of the question."

Mr. Bradlaugh, speaking at the bar, claimed that his return

was untainted, that it had not been brought about by the Liberal party, but by the help of the people, by the pence of toilers in mine and factory. He begged the House not to plunge into a struggle with him, which he would shun. Strife was easy to begin, but none knew where it would end. There was no legal disqualification upon him, and they had no right to impose a disqualification which was less than legal.

Mr. Gladstone made a lengthy and fine speech in favor of Mr. Bradlaugh, the text of which was Mr. Bradlaugh's own words given above as to imposition of a new disqualification; on a division, however, the bigots again had it.

Mr. Bradlaugh again stepped to the table, and demanded the administration of the oath, refusing to obey the Speaker's order to withdraw. Sir Stafford Northcote asked the Prime Minister whether he proposed to offer the House any counsel. Mr. Gladstone said he should leave it to the majority to carry out the effects of their vote. Eventually the Speaker called upon the Sergeant-at-Arms to remove Mr. Bradlaugh, who during the debate had been standing at the table. Mr. Bradlaugh withdrawing with the Sergeant three times to the bar, as often returned to the table. After further passages at arms between Mr. Gladstone and Sir Stafford Northcote, the House adjourned.

April 27th.—Mr. Bradlaugh again found at the table of the House claiming to be allowed to take the oath. At the bidding of the Speaker the Sergeant-at-Arms again caused Mr. Bradlaugh to withdraw to the bar, where he remained during the discussion which followed.

Mr. Labouchere asked the Prime Minister whether he would give him reasonable facilities to introduce his Affirmation Bill, if so Mr. Bradlaugh would not interfere with the resolution passed last night.

Mr. Gladstone said the giving facility for that purpose, meant the postponement of very serious and very urgent business, and he had no assurance as to the disposition of the House. He could not see his way to consent if it was to be an opposed Bill. After further discussion, however, Mr. Gladstone said it might be possible to test the feeling of the House by one or more morning sittings.

April 29th.—Mr. Gladstone announces the intention of the Government of bringing in a bill amending the Parliamentary Oaths Act.

May 2nd.—The Attorney-General moved that the House resolve itself into committee with a view of his asking leave to introduce the Bill. Debate on motion adjourned to the 5th with the view of fixing the time on the 6th, when the discussion should be resumed.

Mr. MacIver gave notice to ask the Prime Minister whether he was prepared to reconsider his decision of last session, and will

introduce "a short measure" for the partial disfranchisement of Northampton. (The question was never put.)

May 6th.—Further obstruction of the Bigots.

May 10th.—After 1.15 a.m. the Government proposed a morning sitting for that day (Tuesday), to discuss the introduction of their Bill. Further obstruction, wrath, and bitterness, and the Government abandoned the intention to hold a morning sitting.

At the afternoon sitting a resolution was arrived at, which authorised the Sergeant-at-Arms to prevent Mr. Bradlaugh from entering the House.

Lord Selborne (Lord Chancellor) in reply to a letter relative to Mr. Bradlaugh and the oath, says equal justice is due to Christian and infidel; he saw no possibility of refusing to afford by legislation to all who scruple to take the oath, the same option in Parliament as they have in courts of law, to make an affirmation.

May 25th.—Mr. Newdegate formally blocked the Bill, of which Mr. Labouchere gave notice, for indemnifying Mr. Bradlaugh against penalties for having sat and voted on affirmation.

June 19th and 20th.—The common informer's action tried at *Nisi prius* before Mr. Justice Grove. Verdict against Mr. Bradlaugh for penalty and costs.—*Rule nisi* for new trial afterwards, granted by Justices Grove and Lindley; this rule was made absolute by Justices Denman and Hawkins, but was set aside by Lords Justices Brett, Cotton and Holker.

Mr. Bradlaugh appeals to the country. The country answers.

Aug. 3rd.—Mr. Bradlaugh, acting on his right to enter the House of Commons, is seized at the door of the House by fourteen men, police and ushers (Inspector Denning said ten), and roughly hustled out into Palace Yard, Mr. Bradlaugh protesting against such treatment as illegal. "In the passage leading out to the yard Mr. Bradlaugh's coat was torn down on the right side; his waistcoat was also pulled open, and otherwise his toilet was much disarranged. The members flocked down the stairs on the heels of the struggling party, but no pause was made until Mr. Bradlaugh was placed outside the precincts and in Palace Yard."—*Times*. Alderman Fowler was heard to call, "Kick him out." This he afterwards denied, but there is evidence that he did so. (Mr. Bradlaugh suffered the rupture of the small muscles of both his arms, and erysipelas ensued).

Many thousands of people went up to the House with petitions, urging the House to do justice to Northampton and Mr. Bradlaugh.

In the House Mr. Labouchere moved a resolution condemning, as an interference with the privilege of members, the action of the authorities in expelling Mr. Bradlaugh from the lobby.

This was rejected by 191 votes against 7, and a motion of Sir Henry Holland, declaring the approval of the House of the course taken by the Speaker, was agreed to without controversy.

At a crowded meeting at the Hall of Science the same evening Mr. Bradlaugh stated that he had told Inspector Denning in Palace Yard that he could come back with force enough to gain admittance, but that he had no right to risk the lives and liberties of his supporters.

Aug. 4th.—The *Times* declares, in an article favorable on the whole to Mr. Bradlaugh's claims, that the House of Commons was yesterday the real sufferer in dignity, authority, and repute. It says: "the question contains within itself the baleful germ of a grave constitutional contest between the House of Commons and any constituency in the land;" and "such a conflict can but have one conclusion, as all history shows."

The *Daily News*, in a similar article, concludes thus: "Sooner or later it will be generally acknowledged that Mr. Bradlaugh's exclusion was one of the most high-handed acts of which any legislative body has ever been guilty."

The following unique paragraph from *The Rock* is worth preserving in its original form: "The question now is whether the Christian people of this realm will quietly allow clamorous groups of infidels, Radicals, and seditionists, by organised clamor, bluster, and menace, to overawe the legislature, and by exhibitions of violence—not at all unlikely, if permitted to develop into outrage and riot—to cause an organic and vital change to be made in our Constitution and laws, in order that brazen-faced Atheism might display itself within the walls of the British Parliament."

Mr. E. D. Girdlestone writes: "If the present Cabinet does not secure your admission to the House in some way or other, I can only wish they may soon be turned out of office. I don't know what more I can do than say, 'Go on! and go in!'"

Aug. 5th.—Mr. Bradlaugh's application at Westminster Police Court for summons against Inspector, for having assaulted him at the House of Commons on the 3rd inst., refused.

Mr. Bradlaugh confined to the House with severe erysipelas in both arms, resulting from the injuries inflicted. Attended by Drs. Ramskill and Palfrey. The latter, on August 12th, ordered his immediate removal from town, to prevent yet more dangerous complications.

Aug. 13th.—Mr. Bradlaugh went to Worthing to recruit his health. Outside the station there, weary and exhausted, both arms in a sling, he was rudely stared at by a clergyman, who, having satisfied himself as to Mr. Bradlaugh's identity, walked away saying loudly: "There's Bradlaugh; I hope they'll make it warm for him yet."

The *Northern Star* (a Tory paper) suggested that Mr. Bradlaugh was malingering—"simply carrying on the showman business."

Aug. 24th.—Sir Henry Tyler, in the House of Commons, attempts to discredit the South Kensington department for allowing science and art classes at the Hall of Science. Mr. Mundella gives those classes great credit.

Aug. 27th.—Parliament prorogued.

Further appeal to England.

1882.

Jan. 9th.—The Earl of Derby, in a speech at the Liverpool Reform Club, says: "For my part I utterly disbelieve in the value of political oaths. . . . I should hope that if Mr. Bradlaugh again offers to take the oath, as he did last year, there will be no further attempt to prevent him."

Feb. 7th.—Reopening of Parliament. Mr. Bradlaugh again attended at the table to take the oath, and Sir Erskine May, the clerk of the House, was about to administer the same when Sir Stafford Northcote, interposing, moved that Mr. Bradlaugh be not allowed to go through the form. Sir W. Harcourt, in moving the previous question, said the Government held the view that the House had no right to interpose between a duly-elected member and the oath.

Mr. Bradlaugh, addressing the House from the bar for the third time, begged the House to deal with him with some semblance and show of legality and fairness. He concluded: "I want to obey the law, and I tell you how I might meet the House still further, if the House will pardon me for seeming to advise it. Hon. members had said that an Affirmation Bill would be a Bradlaugh Relief Bill. Bradlaugh is more proud than you are. Let the Bill pass without applying to elections that have taken place previously, and I will undertake not to claim my seat, and when the Bill has passed I will apply for the Chiltern Hundreds. I have no fear. If I am not fit for my constituents they shall dismiss me, but you never shall. The grave alone shall make me yield."

When a division was taken there were for the previous question 228, against 286. Mr. Samuel Morley voted with the majority against the Government. Sir Stafford Northcote's motion was then agreed to without a division.

Feb. 8th.—Mr. Labouchere, in committee of the whole House, proposed for leave to bring in a Bill to amend the law of Parliamentary Oaths and Affirmations. The Bill was afterwards formally blocked by Mr. Molloy.

Feb. 17th.—Mr. Labouchere asked the Attorney-General whether the resolution of Feb. 7th had not vacated the seat. Sir Henry James answered that it had not.

Feb. 18th.—Mr. Gladstone writes Mr. Bradlaugh that the Government have no measure to propose with respect to his seat.

Feb. 21st.—Mr. Bradlaugh of himself takes and subscribes the oath, and takes his seat.

Feb. 22nd.—Mr Bradlaugh expelled the House of Commons.

Mar. 2nd.—Re-elected for Northampton. For Bradlaugh, 3,796; for Corbett, 3,688.

Mar. 6th.—On the motion of Sir Stafford Northcote, the House reaffirms its motion of the 7th Feb., Mr. Gladstone supporting an amendment moved by Mr. Marjoribanks, by which the House would have declared the desirability of legislation, for the purpose of giving members an option between oath and affirmation.

Mar. 7th.—Lord Redesdale introduces in the House of Lords a Bill, requiring every peer and every member of the House of Commons before taking the oath or making the affirmation, to declare and affirm his belief in Almighty God. The Bill, introduced "from a sense of what was due to Almighty God," was afterwards withdrawn "in deference to Lord Salisbury."

To this date, 317 petitions with 62,168 signatures had been presented against Mr. Bradlaugh being allowed to take his seat; while in favor of the same 1,051, with 250,833 signatures, had been presented.

Mr. Labouchere's Affirmation Bill blocked by Earl Percy.

1883

Jan. 11th.—Mr. Justice Field gave judgment that the privileges of the House of Commons prevented Mr. Bradlaugh from obtaining any redress for the assault upon him on August 3rd, 1881.

Feb. 15th.—Great demonstration in Trafalgar Square; from eighty to one hundred thousand people present. (*Evening Standard* says 30,000; *Daily News*, 50,000 an hour before the meeting.) Mr. Adams, chairman; Rev. W. Sharman, Jos. Arch, and Mr. Bradlaugh, speakers.

Opening of Parliament. (Mr. Gladstone at Cannes.) Government give notice for to-morrow for leave to introduce bill to amend the Oaths Act, 1866. Sir R. Cross gives notice of opposition on second reading of same. Mr. Bradlaugh consents, with the approval of his constituents, expressed on the 13th inst., to await the fate of the measure.

Feb. 16th.—Sharp succession of frantic speeches in the House of Commons by Mr. Newdegate, Alderman Fowler, Mr. Warton, Mr. Henry Chaplin, Mr. Onslow, Mr. Grantham, Mr. Beresford Hope, Lord H. Lennox, Lord C. Hamilton, Mr. A. Balfour, Mr. Ashmead Bartlett, and Mr. A. O'Connor. Divisions: from two to three to one for Government. The Marquis of Hartington consents to adjourn the motion for Bill until Monday at twelve.

Feb. 18th.—The *Observer* says that when Conservatives ask Liberals whether they really mean to alter the law for the purpose of admitting Mr. Bradlaugh, it is fair for Liberals in turn to ask Conservatives whether they really mean to maintain an admitted abuse and injustice for the mere purpose of excluding Mr. Bradlaugh.

Feb. 19th.—First reading of Bill carried on division by 184 votes to 53; second reading formally fixed for that night week.

Feb. 20th.—*Daily News* says Bill will be carried by large majorities, and will be regarded by the House and the country as the appropriate settlement of an unfortunate controversy.

The *Times* says the leaders of the opposition will not succeed in finally preventing the Bill from becoming law. Its real concern is that Mr. Bradlaugh has been substantially in the right; that he has been unjustly excluded from taking the seat which belongs to him.

The *Morning Advertiser* thinks the Government may yet find it difficult to persuade the House to adopt the Bill.

The *Morning Post* justifies the irregular opposition to the first reading of the Bill, and thinks notice of the measure should have been given in the Queen's Speech. No measure had created more excitement or raised more indignation in the country, which desired to see it rejected by a decisive majority.

March 5th.—Appeal case Bradlaugh v. Clarke part heard before the House of Lords.

March 6th.—Case concluded; judgment deferred.

March 9th.—Action for maintenance—Bradlaugh v. Newdegate—tried before Lord Coleridge and a special jury. Henry Lewis Clarke, the common informer, swore that he had not the means to pay the costs, and would not have brought the action if he had not been indemnified by Mr. Newdegate. Case adjourned for argument of legal points.

March 17th.—Maintenance action argued; four counsel appearing for Mr. Newdegate. Lord Coleridge reserved judgment.

March 20th.—The Solicitors to the Treasury compelled Mr. Bradlaugh to pay the costs of the House of Commons in the action against the deputy Sergeant-at-Arms.

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THE FREETHINKER'S

TEXT-BOOK.

[1876]

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OR,

REVEALED & REAL SCIENCE IN CONFLICT.

BY C. BRADLAUGH.

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EDITED BY

CHARLES BRADLAUGH, ANNIE BESANT, AND CHARLES WATTS.

PART I., SECTION I.

BY CHARLES BRADLAUGH

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THE FREETHINKER'S TEXT-BOOK.

PART I.

MAN: WHENCE AND HOW?

OR,

REVEALED AND REAL SCIENCE IN CONFLICT.

BY CHARLES BRADLAUGH.

Is it true, as alleged by the Hebrew chronology, that about 6,000 years back from the present date one man (Adam) and one woman (Eve) were created, and that these were the first of the human family on earth, and that from them were descended the entire human race? The answer to this question touches the very root of the Christian religion. If Adam and Eve were not the first parents of the whole human race, then the gospel of Christianity is a false pretence. If Adam was not the first man, then his fall, by disobedience, in Eden's Garden, did not bring death and sin as heritage for all human kind. To re-quote the words of the pious and erudite Sir William Jones: "Either the first eleven chapters of Genesis, all due allowances being made for a figurative Eastern style, are true, or the whole fabric of our national religion is false." (Essay on the Gods of Greece, Italy, and India; "Asiatic Researches," vol. i., p. 225.) The task in these pages shall be to show that no portion of the Genesaic story of man's creation, fall, and dispersion on the earth can be regarded as historic.

As it is sometimes disputed—by clergymen, Scripture-readers, and other persons unacquainted with the contents of the Bible—that any such limitation as 6,000 years is made to man's existence on earth, I shall first present the exact proof, by chapter and verse, of this allegation. In the orthodox chronologies used in the English schools and colleges the date of the creation of the world itself was fixed at about 4,004 years before the Christian era. First, I direct attention to the Bible account of man, as given in the Hebrew, Septuagint, and, so far as the Pentateuch is concerned, Samaritan versions. The credibility of these versions will be dealt with, after examining their several testimonies, before presenting the evidence offered by History, Ethnology, Anthropology, and Geology against the Bible.

Luke Burke, in the *Ethnological Journal*, page 17, prepared a "chronological arrangement of the Patriarchal ages, from the creation to the birth of Abraham, according to the Hebrew, Samaritan, and Septuagint versions of the Old Testament." To this are now added the chapters and verses from the ordinary orthodox version, to make the evidence complete at a glance :—

	Before Generation.			After Generation.			Total Ages.		
	Heb.	Sam.	Sep.	Heb.	Sam.	Sep	Heb.	Sam.	Sep.
Adam (Gen. v. 3, 4, 5)	130	130	230	800	800	700	930	930	930
Seth (6, 7, 8)	105	105	205	807	807	707	912	912	912
Enos (9, 10, 11)	90	90	190	815	815	715	905	905	905
Cainan (12, 13, 14)	70	70	170	840	840	740	910	910	910
Mahalaleel (15, 16, 17)	65	65	165	830	830	730	895	895	895
Jared (18, 19, 20)	162	62	162	800	785	800	962	847	962
Enoch (21, 22, 23)	65	65	165	300	300	200	365	365	365
Methuselah (25, 26, 27)	187	67	167	782	653	802	969	720	969
Lamech (28, 30, 31)	182	53	188	595	600	565	777	653	753
Noah (32)	500	500	500						
Added century to Deluge (vii. 11)	100	100	100						
Date of Deluge ...	1656	1307	2242						

These totals show the exact period of the Noachian Deluge after the creation of Adam, and are exactly agreed with by Samuel Sharpe, in his "Translation of the Hebrew Scriptures," page 8. The generations after the Deluge are :—

	Before Generation.			After Generation.			Total Ages.		
	Heb.	Sam.	Sep.	Heb.	Sam.	Sep.	Heb.	Sam.	Sep.
Shem (Gen. xi. 10, 11)	2	2	2	500	500	500	600	600	600
Arphaxad (12, 13)	35	135	135	403	303	400	438	438	535
Cainan (omitted in the orthodox Genesis, but inserted in Luke iii. 36)			130			330			460
Salah (14, 15)	30	130	130	403	303	330	433	433	460
Eber (16, 17)	34	134	134	430	270	270	464	404	404
Peleg (18, 19)	30	130	130	209	109	209	239	239	339
Reu (20, 21)	32	132	132	207	107	207	239	239	339
Serug (22, 23)	30	130	130	200	100	200	230	230	330
Nahor (24, 25)	29	79	179	119	69	125	148	148	304
Terah (26, 32)	70	70	70	135	75	135	205	145	205
From alleged date of Deluge to birth of Abraham ...	292	942	1172						

Making, from the creation of Adam to the birth of Abraham, 1,948 years according to the authorised orthodox English version which follows the Hebrew, according to the Samaritan 2,249, and according to the Septuagint 3,414. That these versions contradict one another is no help to the defender of the Bible. They are his witnesses. Nor is it honest to teach the first version to children as truth, and then to fly for help, against grown men, to the longer chronologies in the Samaritan and Septuagint, when the falsity of the shorter chronology has been demonstrated. Yet this is precisely what has been done by many of the clergy, and notably by the Rev. Canon Rawlinson, Professor of Ancient History at Oxford, when, as mouthpiece of the Christian Evidence Society, he sought, in stumbling words, to explain away the chronological difficulties of Genesis. The learned and reverend professor says, on pages 8 and 9 of his lecture, delivered under the auspices of the Christian Evidence Society: "We possess the Pentateuch in three very ancient forms—in Hebrew, in the Greek version known as the Septuagint, and in Samaritan. Our English numbers represent those of the Hebrew text. The numbers of the Septuagint and the Samaritan version are different. Those of the Samaritan version extend the period between the Deluge and the birth of Abraham from the 292 years of the Hebrew text to 942 years—an addition of six centuries and a half—while those of the Septuagint, according to some copies,

give 1,072 years as the interval, according to others 1,172 years, thus increasing the period between the Deluge and Abraham by a space of nearly eight, or nearly nine, centuries. Now, if the Greek, or even if the Samaritan, numbers are the right ones; if they represent, that is, the original text, it may be questioned whether anything more is wanted. It may be questioned whether a term of from six to eight centuries is not enough for the production of that state of things which we find existing in Babylonia and in Egypt when the light of history first dawns upon them, whether within that space might not have been produced such a state of civilisation, so much progress in art, such differences of physical type, and such diversities of language as appear to have existed at that period.....If, however, the ultimate verdict of calm reason, and rigid scientific inquiry, should be against this view; if more time seem to be absolutely wanted for the development of settled government, of art, science, language, ethnical diversities, varieties of physical type, and the like, than even the enlarged chronology of the Septuagint allows, then I should not be afraid to grant that the original record of Scripture on this point may have been lost, and that, as it is certain that we cannot possess the actual chronological scheme of Moses in more than one of the three extant versions of his words which have come to us with almost equal authority, so it is quite possible that we may not possess his real scheme in any. Nothing in ancient MSS. is so liable to corruption from the mistakes of copyists as the numbers; the original mode of writing them appears, in all countries of which we have any knowledge, to have been by signs not very different from one another; the absence of any context determining in favour of one number rather than another, where the copy is blotted or faded, increases the chance of error; and thus it happens that in almost all ancient works the numbers are found to be deserving of very little reliance. Where they to any extent check one another, they are generally self-contradictory; where they do not, they are frequently in the highest degree improbable." That is, Professor Rawlinson really abandons the whole of the Bible chronologies, but lacks the candour to put his abandonment into plain language. If the reader thinks this impeachment of the Rev. Professor's candour harsh, he is referred to another controversial essay from the Professor's pen, entitled "Historical Illustrations of the Old Testament."

Dr. Kalisch, who rejects the Septuagint and Samaritan as "intentionally corrupt," gives the following chronological table on page 8 of his introduction to "Genesis:"—

A.M.	B.C.	Events and their computation according to years of the world.
	4160	Adam created.
130	4030	Seth born (Genesis v. 3).
235	3925	Enos born (v. 6; 130+105=235).
325	3835	Cainan born (v. 9; 235+90—325).
395	3765	Mahalaleel born (v. 12; 325+70=395).
460	3700	Jared born (v. 15; 395+65=460).
622	3538	Enoch born (v. 18; 460+162=622).
687	3473	Methuselah born (v. 21; 622+65=687).
874	3286	Lamech born (v. 25; 687+187=874).
1056	3104	Noah born (v. 28; 874+182=1056).
1556	2604	Shem born (v. 32; 1056+500=1556).
1656	2504	The Deluge began (vii. 11; 1056+600=1656).
1657	2503	The Deluge ceased (viii. 14).
1659	2501	Arphaxad born (xi. 10; two years after the Flood).
1694	2466	Salah born (xi. 12; 1659+35=1694).
1724	2436	Eber born (xi. 14; 1694+30=1724).
1758	2402	Peleg born (xi. 16; 1724+34=1758).
1788	2372	Reu born (xi. 18; 1758+30=1788).
1820	2340	Serug born (xi. 20; 1788+32=1820).
1850	2310	Nahor born (xi. 22; 1820+30=1850).
1879	2281	Terah born (xi. 24; 1850+29=1879).
1949	2211	Abraham born (xi. 26; 1879+70=1949).
1959	2201	Sarah born (xvii. 17; 1949+10=1959).
2024	2136	Abraham emigrated from Haran (xii. 4; 1949+75=2024).
2035	2125	Ishmael born (xvi. 16; 1949+86=2035).
2048	2112	Covenant and Circumcision of Abraham and Ishmael (xvii. 24; 1949+99=2048).
2049	2111	Isaac born (xxi. 5; 1949+100=2049).
2084	2076	Terah died (xi. 32; 1879+205=2084).
2086	2074	Sarah died (xxiii. 1; 1959+127=2086).
2089	2071	Isaac married Rebekah (xxv. 20; 2049+40=2089).
2109	2051	Jacob and Esau born (xxv. 26; 2049+60=2109).
2124	2036	Abraham died (xxv. 7; 1949+175=2124).
2149	2011	Esau married (xxvi. 34; 2109+40=2149).
2172	1988	Ishmael died (xxv. 17; 2035+137=2172).
2193	1966	Jacob married Leah and Rachel (2109+84=2193).
2200	1960	Joseph born (xxx. 25; 2193+7=2200).
2217	1943	Joseph sold into Egypt (xxxvii. 2; 2200+17=2217).
2229	1931	Isaac died (xxxv. 28; 2049+180=2229).
2230	1930	Joseph appt. Viceroy of Egypt (xli. 46; 2200+30=2230).
2239	1921	Jacob & family settled in Egypt (xlvii. 9; 2109+130=2239).
2256	1904	Jacob died (xlvii. 28; 2239+17=2256).
2310	1850	Joseph died (l. 22, 26; 2256+54=2310).
2669	1491	Exodus of the Israelites from Egypt (Exodus xii. 40; 2239+430=2669).

This statement shows practically the same date to the birth

of Abraham, and gives us 2,669 years from the creation of Adam to the Exodus. This takes the stay of the Israelites in Egypt at 430 years.

Bishop Colenso ("Pentateuch," part i., page 92) urges that, according to Exodus vi. 16—20, no more than 350 years, on the most extravagant supposition, can be accorded for the sojourn of the Israelites in Egypt from Jacob to the Exodus. He says :—

"Now, supposing that Kohath was only an *infant* when brought down by his father to Egypt with Jacob (Genesis xlvi. 11), and that he begat Amram at the very end of his life, when 133 years old, and that Amram, in like manner, begat Moses when he was 137 years old, still these two numbers added to 80 years, the age of Moses at the time of the Exodus (Exodus vii. 7), would only amount to 350 years, instead of 430.

"It is stated that 'Amram took him Jochebed, his father's sister'—Kohath's sister, and, therefore, Levi's daughter—'to wife.' And we read, Numbers xxvi. 59 : 'The name of Amram's wife was Jochebed, *the daughter of Levi, whom (her mother) bare to him in Egypt.*'

"Now, Levi was one year older than Judah, and was, therefore, 43 years old when he went down with Jacob into Egypt, and he was 137 years old when he died.

"Joseph was 30 years old when he 'stood before Pharaoh,' as governor of the land of Egypt (Genesis xli. 46), and from that time nine years elapsed (seven of plenty, and two of famine) before Jacob came down to Egypt. At that time, therefore, Joseph was 39 years old. But Judah was about three years older than Joseph; for Judah was born in the *fourth* year of Jacob's marriage (Genesis xxix. 35), and Joseph in the *seventh* (Genesis xxx. 24—26, xxxi. 41). Hence Judah was 42 years old when Jacob went down to Egypt.

"Levi, therefore, must have lived, according to the story, 94 years in Egypt. Making here again the extreme supposition of his begetting Jochebed in the last year of his life, she may have been an infant 94 years after the migration of Jacob and his sons into Egypt. Hence it follows that, if the sojourn in Egypt was 430 years, Moses, who was 80 years old at the time of the Exodus, must have been born 350 years after the migration into Egypt, when his mother, even on the above extravagant supposition, must have been at the very least 256 years old."

If the arguments of Bishop Colenso are accepted as valid, the effect will be to still further abridge the Biblical Chronology.

If the twentieth verse of Acts xiii. be true, the period of the Judges was 450 years, to which must be added 40 years for the wilderness wandering, making, in all, 490 years, to the time of Samuel. It is evident, however, that if 1 Kings vi. 1 be accurate, that then Paul or the author of the Acts blundered, as 476 years from the Exodus are precisely fixed to the date of Solomon's accession to the throne, which would then be 3,145 years from the date of the creation of Adam. From Solomon to the Captivity is as follows:—

1. Solomon	(1 Kings	xi. 42)	reigned	40	years.
2. Rehoboam	,,	xiv. 21	,,	17	,,
3. Abijam	,,	xv. 2	,,	3	,,
4. Asa	,,	xv. 10	,,	41	,,
5. Jehoshaphat	,,	xxii. 42	,,	25	,,
6. Jehoram	(2 Kings	viii. 17)	,,	8	,,
7. Ahaziah	,,	viii. 26	,,	1	,,
8. Athaliah	,,	xi. 3	,,	6	,,
9. Jehoash	,,	xii. 1	,,	40	,,
10. Amaziah	,,	xiv. 2	,,	29	,,
11. Azarrah or Uzziah.	,,	xv. 2		52	,,
12. Jotham	,,	xv. 33	,,	16	,,
13. Ahaz	,,	xvi. 2	,,	16	,,
14. Hezekiah	,,	xviii. 2	,,	29	,,
15. Manasseh	,,	xxi. 1	,,	55	,,
16. Amon	,,	xxi. 19	,,	2	,,
17. Josiah	,,	xxii. 1	,,	31	,,
18. Jehoahaz	,,	xxiii. 31	,,	3	months.
19. Jehoiakim	,,	xxiii. 36	,,	11	years.
20. Jehoiakin	,,	xxiv. 8	,,	3	months.
21. Zedekiah	,,	xxiv. 18	,,	11	years.

Making, from Solomon to the Babylonian Captivity, 433 years, 6 months, or 3,578 years and 6 months, from the creation of Adam, or, as the marginal chronology of the Bible makes it, 590 years B.C. The Captivity lasts until the accession of Cyrus, King of Persia (Ezra i. 1), who, according to Ctésias, was born B.C. 599, being the son of Cambyses, and who conquered Babylon B.C. 536, or, according to the Bible chronology, exactly 3,622 years after the creation of Adam. We have now historic dates, and need no further texts; this makes about 4,158 years to the date fixed for the alleged birth of Jesus—viz., 1,875 years ago, or 5,933 from

the creation of Adam to the present date. Doubtless these figures are incorrect; but up to the Captivity they are carefully taken from the English Bible, on which all blame of error must rest.

Thus it is clear that the Hebrew text and our English Bible teach in express terms that the first man (Adam) was created less than 6,000 years ago. Dr. John Lightfoote, in his "Harmony of the Old Testament," published 238 years since, had no doubt on this point, and three years earlier had expressly calculated "5,572 years since the creation." For almost 200 years more nine out of every ten clergymen of the Established Church taught the doctrine that man had only existed about 6,000 years. The last forty years have made a great change; but even to-day—while many, very many, clergymen of the Church of England know that the statement is not true—they are reticent; they keep the knowledge to themselves, and give no help to clear away the falsehood.

In truth, our orthodox version and the Hebrew Bible alike agree in making the whole universe older than the first man only by five clear days of twenty-four hours each. Many efforts have been made to evade this conclusion, but these efforts have been all miserably weak. Dr. Harold Browne, Bishop of Ely, in the Speaker's Commentary, that latest effort of pious weakness, tries the reconciliation of truth, as shown by science, and falsehood, as told by Genesis. The learned Bishop, aided by the counsel of other prelates and divines, says: "Countless ages *may have elapsed* between what is recorded in verse 1, and what is stated in verse 2," of the first chapter of Genesis. Yes, but they *may not have* elapsed. Supposition against supposition, and the Genesis story is not improved. In fact, there is no break in the Hebrew narrative for these "countless ages" between verses 1 and 2. The state of the earth, as given in verse 2, is evidently intended as its earliest state, immediately consequent on the creation; and no one dreamed of this non-natural reading of the text until the demands of science for a longer chronology became too imperative to be resisted. And even if, without any warranty, and only to evade the objection, you inserted the "countless ages" between those verses, it would not improve the story. You would equally need more "countless ages" between other verses to account for the time required for later changes in the earth's surface. Changes which have gone slowly on

since the heat had so radiated off as to permit seas and lands to mark the earth. Long changes after these, vast in their lengths, and yet brief measured by the preceding enormous periods. Ages during which the flora of the world crept out, struggled into growth, and flourished in its richest luxuriance. Ages still, during which life-conditions gradually grow. Ages more, while the fauna of the earth were evolved from the merest sign of animal vitality to the huge monster, life-devouring, who roamed the forests or traversed the seas. And there are no verses in the Bible story between which you, by any pious hocus-pocus, or philosophic legerdemain, can insert these "countless ages."

An able writer in the orthodox *British Quarterly Review*, vol. xliii., pp. 120, 121, Egyptian Antiquities, says: "We are accustomed to suppose that we possess an undoubted canon of ancient chronology in the Holy Scriptures; but perhaps next to a clear acquaintance with what the sacred volume does undoubtedly contain, the most valuable knowledge is of what it does not. In the Universal History, above one hundred and twenty dates are given for the creation, most of them made out by persons who regard with most sincere reverence, and derive their arguments from, the sacred writings. The first of these places that event B.C. 6984; the last, 3616; differing by the moderate amount of more than three thousand years. The period of the Deluge is fixed with no greater uniformity. The Septuagint gives B.C. 3246; the Hebrew text (according to Usher) 2348. We shall add, as more connected with our subject, the extreme dates assigned to the Exodus, which is fixed by Josephus (according to Dr. Hales, nearly the same with Des Vignolles) B.C. 1648; by the English Bible (on the authority of Usher) 1491; by the vulgar Jewish chronology 1312. Our concern, however, is merely to show that the best Scripture chronology affords ample space for the highest antiquity which the great Egyptian kingdom can fairly claim. For the period between the Flood and the first connection of sacred history with Egypt we have four distinct authorities—the version of the LXX.; the Samaritan; Josephus, who professes to have adhered faithfully to the sacred volume; and the Hebrew chronology adopted in our Bibles. None of these, strictly speaking, agree, but the three first concur in assigning a much longer period between the Deluge and the birth of Abraham—the LXX. 1070 years, the Hebrew only 292. If it should be urged

that the translators of the Septuagint, environed on all sides by Egyptian antiquities, and standing in awe of Alexandrian learning, endeavoured to conform their national annals to the more extended chronological system; and that Josephus, either influenced by their authority, or actuated by the same motives, may have adopted the same views, yet the ancient Samaritan text still remains, an unexceptionable witness to the high antiquity of the more extended period. In fact, we are, perhaps, wasting our time in contesting this point, as we may fairly consider the Hebrew chronology of this period almost exploded."

Ordinarily, it is possible to check the chronological periods of nations by monuments, or later, by writings. Unfortunately for the student, neither the good nor bad qualities of the Jews provoked notice in any extant writer, outside their own nation, prior to 400 B.C. Much as has been done to discover evidences in Egypt, neither papyrus, pyramid, nor obelisk say aught about the 600,000 armed Jews who left the land of the Nile, laden with spoil, under Moses. Prior to David, all the Jewish chronology is the purest conjecture, and the conjecture is embarrassed by the mass of fabrication to be cleared away before real investigation becomes possible. The conquest of Judea, under Rehoboam (1 Kings xiv. 25), by Shiskak, or Sheshonk, King of Egypt, is the earliest ascertained and vouched period of contact between the Jews and other nations. Much stir has been made by the clergy, now and then, upon finding partial corroboration of names or dates occurring subsequently to Solomon, in the Old Testament. No necessity arises for the unbeliever to challenge the muster-roll of Jewish kings, from Solomon to the Captivity. There are blunders of names and dates, and facts, and unhistoric statements interwoven, but the list of kings is, probably, in the main part, correct; many of the reigns are probably fairly stated, and some of the wars referred to in Kings and Chronicles, doubtless, took place. What is needed to be remembered is, that verifying the names of some kings after Solomon does not prove the exactness of the chronology prior to David. Bunsen, so lauded as a Christian, says: "As regards the Jewish computation of time, the study of Scripture had long convinced me that there is, in the Old Testament, no connected chronology prior to Solomon." ("Egypt's Place in Universal History," vol. i., Preface.) And again (vol. iii., page 247) he affirms that

the Hebrew tradition of earlier times "contains no chronology whatever."

G. R. Gliddon, in his archæological introduction to the tenth chapter of Genesis ("Types of Mankind," p. 627), gives five periods as specially marking changes in the Hebrew text, viz. :—

"First period, B.C.—'In most ancient times, the Hebrew text was corrupt;' and the Codex (says, 'Fragmentary Books') used by the Greek interpreters of the Old Testament, at Alexandria, was undoubtedly Hebrew, but a copy not sufficiently emended. Even Buxtorf is obliged to admit—'Judaos a tempore Esdra negligentiores fuisse circa textum Hebraum, et non curiosos circa lectionem veram'—the Jews in the time of Esdra neglected the Hebrew text, and were indifferent as to the true reading. The numerals were expressed by *letters;* the five *final* letters (ך ם ן ף ץ) had not then been invented; the words were still *undivided.*

"Second period, A.D. down to 500.—The texts were more corrupt in the time of Philo and Josephus. Neither in their day, nor in that of Origen, third century, were the *Commandments* (Exod. xx., 3—17) divided into ten, in the manner they are now. In Philo the division is *quinary,* after the fashion of Pythagoreans. About the latter epoch commences the Talmudic *Mishna;* and, in the fifth century, the *Gemara;* each of which books proves the increase of textual errors. So do the writings of the Fathers during all this age—notably St. Jerome; while the apostolic books demonstrate that the *Greek* differed, more or less, from the Hebrew original.

"Third period, A.D. 500 to 1000.—Aside from the later and less reliable Fathers, two Hebraical works establish that no expurgations of error had been made in the text, viz., the *Robboth,* after A.D. 700, and the *Pirke Eliezar,* after 800. About the sixth century, the Rabbis of Tiberias commenced the 'Masora;' a labour that would not have been undertaken but for the reasons above given, and the wretched condition of the text in their time; as proved by the multitudes of *Keri velo Kethib* (the read, but not the written) or *Kethib velo Keri* (the written, but not the read).

"Fourth period, A.D. 1000 to 1450.—The Jewish schools of Babylonia seek refuge in Spain about 1040; between which era and 1240 flourished the four great Rabbis. Their works prove not merely different readings,

but absolute mistakes in copies of the text. Things then existing in manuscripts of the Old Testament now exist no longer, and *vice versâ;* while the 'Masora' itself, already in confusion inextricable, only rendered matters worse. It is of this age alone that we possess those Hebrew manuscripts by us called *ancient*—not one 900 years old!

"Fifth period, A.D. 1450 to 1750.—Printing invented; the art was first applied to *Psalms* in the year 1477; and to the whole Hebrew text in 1488; that entire edition, save one-third of a copy, being immediately by Neapolitan Jews. But here, upon editions now following each other with rapid succession, the Rabbis begin their restorations and their lamentations. Continental scholars now set to work upon *Hebrew* in earnest, without professorships; whilst, in England, King James's version is a splendid record of Professors without Hebraism, during the years 1603—1611. Fifty years later, Walton redeems the shame of Oxford; and yet, one hundred years later still, Kennicott himself chronicles: 'the reader will be *pleased* to observe, that as the study of the Hebrew language has only been *reviving* during the last one hundred years:' to end which sentence logically, we ourselves consider that there could be no 'revival' where, in 1600, there was scarcely a *beginning;* and, *ergo*, that the Doctor's attestation must refer to incipient efforts, in his century commencing, to resuscitate the *Hebrew tongue* after twenty centuries of burial."

The Rev. Dr. Porter, Professor of Biblical Criticism at Belfast, says: "Scientific teaching does not come within the province of revelation.....Revelation does not give a scientific cosmology. That lies outside its province..... Revelation does not touch on geology; but it leaves room for the fullest development of the successive strata of the earth's crust, even though it could be proven that millions of years had been occupied in their formation. 'In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth.' No date is given." ("Science and Revelation: a Review of Tyndall, Huxley, Darwin, and Herbert Spencer," p. 35.) Professor Porter says no date is given. What meaning then does he attach to Exodus xx. 11, "In six days the Lord made heaven and earth, and all that in them is?" Genesis i. says that man was made on the sixth day. Where is there the fullest, or any room, for the "millions of years?" That Genesis does not give us a scientific cosmology is clear. But as it does give a cosmology full of details, as what kind of

a cosmology would the learned Professor describe it? No date given. What, then, but dates are the added ages of Adam and his successors? Professor Porter says that "the historical record of creation seems to have a scientific basis, as if the writer, by a divine prescience, had anticipated the results of modern research." But if Genesis is God's revealed word, the writer would record actual facts not *foreknown*, but then known to God. But which part of Genesis i. has a scientific basis? Is it the creation of the firmament to divide the upper and lower waters? The firmament in which windows existed at the time of the deluge. Windows which God opened to let the waters down (vii. 11). A firmament in which God set the sun, moon, and stars. Has this firmament a scientific basis? Is there any scientific basis for the existence of seas on the earth's surface before the creation of the sun and moon? Where is the scientific basis for the earth bringing forth grass, herb, with seed, and fruit tree yielding fruit before there was yet sun to encourage and ripen vegetation?

But says Mr. Goodwin, in the famous "Essays and Reviews:" "It can scarcely be said that this chapter is not intended in part to teach and convey at least some physical truth, and taking its words in their plain sense it manifestly gives a view of the universe adverse to that of modern science. It represents the sky as a watery vault, in which the sun, moon, and stars are set. But the discordance of this description with facts does not appear to have been so palpable to the minds of the seventeenth century as it is to us. The mobility of the earth was a proposition startling not only to faith but to the senses. The difficulty involved in this belief having been successfully got over, other discrepancies dwindled in importance. The brilliant progress of astronomical science subdued the minds of men; the controversy between faith and knowledge gradually fell to slumber: the story of Galileo and the Inquisition became a school commonplace, the doctrine of the earth's mobility found its way into children's catechisms, and the limited views of the nature of the universe indicated in the Old Testament ceased to be felt as religious difficulties.

"The school books of the present day, while they teach the child that the earth moves, yet assure him that it is a little less than six thousand years old, and that it was made in six days. On the other hand, geologists of all

religious creeds are agreed that the earth has existed for an immense series of years—to be counted by millions rather than by thousands; and that indubitably more than six days elapsed from its first creation to the appearance of man upon its surface."

Luke Burke, *Ethnological Journal* (p. 14), annihilates alike the chronologies of the Hebrew and other versions: "All careful investigation of the facts of natural history, will, he argues, "prove that there are determinate relations between the period of puberty and the total duration of life. In birds, the multiple is sometimes very high; in fishes, still more so; but in the mammalia generally, and especially in man, it will be found that the highest possible duration of life is seven times the age of finished puberty. Few human beings, especially in civilised life, ever reach this period; none, we believe, have ever exceeded it. The age of puberty greatly varies in different races of men, and the natural duration of their lives is longer or shorter accordingly. As, at the present day, all civilised and partially civilised nations are composed of an amalgamation of various primitive races, we find the period of puberty varying even in individuals in the same family; but still the law will be found equally applicable, in these individual cases, as when applied to the whole races of men. Now the chronology before us is at utter variance with this great law of nature. Mahalaleel begot Jared at the age of sixty-five, and lived 895 years afterwards, more than thirteen times the period of complete puberty. This is the same as saying that a person at the present day, whose natural life would extend to 80, 90, or 100 years, might be a man, and have children, at the age of six, seven, or eight years. In the postdiluvian period we have even a higher multiple than this. Sala begot Eber in his thirtieth year, and yet lived 433 years; more than fourteen times the age at which his son was born. Several other patriarchs have ages assigned to them ten, eleven, twelve, and thirteen times longer than the period of perfect puberty. Ought we not, then, to require that numbers which so directly contradict the known laws of nature, should come to us supported by evidence of a most unquestionable character? And what evidence is there in favour of these numbers, except that they, at present, form part of a treatise generally supposed to be of divine revelation? All genuine history is entirely opposed to the admission of such extreme longevity. Neither

in ancient or modern times is there one authenticated instance of any human being having reached the age of 200 years, to say nothing of such enormous periods as 969 years." The believer is, by Luke Burke, placed in a worse strait than ever, for if the ages of the patriarchs are shortened to reasonable periods, another reduction will have to be made from the already too short chronology of 6000 years.

Dr. Kalisch, in his introduction to his "Commentary on Genesis" (p. 2) thus states the chronological difficulty:— "According to chronological computations based on the Old Testament, the earth, as a part of the universe, was created B.C. 4160, or about six thousand years hence. Even the larger chronologies of the Septuagint, Hales and others fix this date not further back than between seven and eight thousand years. But the researches of the natural sciences, especially geology, lead to widely different conclusions; they prove an antiquity of the earth of such vastness, that our imagination fails to conceive, and our numbers are almost unable to express it." And from the verified discoveries of Geologists he thus states the facts warranting the conclusions hostile to Genesis (p. 8): "The old red sandstone includes the fossils of zoophytes, conchifera, some tribes of fish, some traces of land plants; perhaps, also, the first perfect birds, some of small, others of gigantic size; and the foot-prints of those batrachians which have attracted the most zealous attention, and to which we shall later have occasion to allude in a very curious connection. But both in the new red sandstone, and still more in the subsequent oolitic strata, occur in great abundance the huge lizard-like animals, of extraordinary size, power, and armature; the voracious *ichthyosaurus*, of the length of a young whale, fitted both to live in the water and to breathe the atmosphere; of the general form of a fish, to which, however, were added the teeth and breast-bone of a lizard, the paddles of the whale tribes, the beak of a porpoise, and the teeth of a crocodile; the *plesiosaurus*, of similar bulk and equal rapacity, with a turtle-like body and paddles, a serpent neck, terminating in a formidable lizard head, and most extensively preying upon the finny tribes; further the *megalosaurus*, an enormous lizard, forty-five feet long, a carnivorous land creature; the *pterodactylus*, or *flying saurian*, a lizard with bat-like wings; *crocodiles*, some of which were herbivorous, as, for instance, the iguanodon, reaching the amazing length of a hundred

feet, or twenty times the size of the iguana of the Ganges, its present representative. Strongly, indeed, do these monstrous and terrible forms remind us of those strange creatures of fancy popular in ancient times and in the middle ages, the winged dragons and griffins, the gorgons, hydras, and chimeras; their huge jaws threatened with fearful teeth; their necks were almost equal in length to half that of the entire body of the boa-constrictor; they had enormous, mail-like impenetrable bodies, and terrific claws; and all darted upon their prey with irresistible vehemence. The oolitic beds contain, further, the remains of about twelve hundred other astonishing species and forms, the first specimens of insects, and about fifty plants.

"But only in deposits above the chalk formations do we meet with mammifers. About four thousand forms, all different from the present species, are found in the tertiary strata; some of them are most remarkable for their size and form, as the palæotherium, the ponderous dinotherium, with the bent tusks in its lower jaw, and many other thick-skinned animals *(pachydermata)*, like the hippopotamus and rhinoceros. Some of the species of elephants were of enormous magnitude; the mastodon, with his tusks projecting from both upper and under jaw, reached the height of twelve feet; the mammoth, the megatherium, with claw-armed toes more than two feet in length, and the megalonyx, were of gigantic proportions and iron-like organisation; we find, further, the bear, the horse, and the dog, seals, dolphins, and whales; massive oxen, camels, and other ruminants; the majestic Irish elk, with its broad plank-like horns; and even several felinæ or carnivora, and traces of monkeys (quadrumana): till at last the older creatures became extinct, and were succeeded by the existing occupants of the land and the water.

"Now, we ask, if the earth was created within six days, how, and for what conceivable purpose were these numberless, and often huge and appalling, forms of being, *exhibiting every stage of growth*, embedded in the different strata of the earth? We believe there is scarcely any man preposterous or blasphemous enough to impute to the Deity such planless and reckless destruction in the midst of his majestic acts of creation. Many species, and even many distinct genera, have thus entirely disappeared; they are no longer represented on the earth. Generally, even the organic beings of one formation exist no more in the next higher group of rocks.

Do not these circumstances compel us to suppose an indefinite antiquity of the earth's crust? Many have certainly ascribed all those destructions to the influence of the Noachian Deluge; they advance, that first submarine volcanoes, by ejecting their molten masses through different successive explosions, formed the massive layers below; and that then the land-floods, sweeping away the islands and continents, with their organic creations, produced the second or higher formations. But, besides failing entirely to account for the production of the tertiary strata, this theory introduces the agency of *fire* also in the Deluge, of which we read nothing in the Biblical record; it assumes a series of volcanic eruptions of such rapid succession as could only be caused by a miraculous intervention, of which nothing is mentioned; and it starts from the objectionable supposition, that strata, demonstrably separated from each other by immense periods, were formed within the space of a few months. For the facts, that very different fossils are found in the same formations, and that the same petrified species occur in different layers, cannot overthrow the general theory of slow successive stratification; the vast climatic changes which our planet has undergone, and the great variety in the internal structure of the various organic beings, are sufficient, together with other obvious circumstances, to account for these facts."

The argument from the fauna of the world is thus admirably summarised (p. 10): "Hitherto about 3,000 genera of fossil plants have been discovered in the beds of the earth; and this number is considered insignificant, compared with the probable real amount of vegetable life in the preceding conditions of our earth. Although some plants are less capable of resisting the action of water than others, and some are even totally decomposed if for some time immersed in that element, especially the simplest forms of flowerless (cryptogamic) vegetation; the proportion of the different families found in a fossil state leads, on the whole, to a safe conclusion with regard to the primitive flora of the earth; the plants which have been preserved are in themselves amply sufficient to serve as a basis for such conclusions. Now those vegetable remains—it is remarkable to observe—have more or less a *tropical* character, which is a sure proof of the higher temperature of our planet in former epochs; they show a surprising uniformity of plants over the whole earth, with but very little local difference, though

they bear a different character in different periods, and consist, in each individual epoch, of but a very limited number of species, which are as many witnesses for the former more equal distribution of heat on the earth. It is most interesting to observe that every later period shows the *prevalence* of a more perfect genus of plants than the preceding one, so that the different epochs might be almost described by their predominant vegetation. The profoundest botanists have arrived at the conclusion that the earlier flora contained the same principal classes and families, though not all the minor species, of the present flora, but that the former possessed the simpler forms of vegetation in the highest possible perfection, whilst the latter only produced the higher and more complicated genera, *so that a successive and ascending development in the vegetable kingdom, which is still in endless progress, is manifest from the remotest periods; that the number of species has during the succeeding geological epochs steadily increased.*"

Dr. Kalisch, it is true, as a pious Theist, looks for some "supernatural cause" to account for all this; but, adopting the words of John Stuart Mill, the reader will be asked throughout this volume to understand by Nature "the aggregate of all powers and properties," "the sum of all phenomena, together with the causes which produce them, including not only all that happens, but all that is capable of happening." We here do no injustice to Dr. Kalisch in continuing to state his summary:—

"It appears that many of the plants are 'hereditary' through various geological epochs, and that certain species have traversed many thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands, of years, in spite of the local and successive revolutions on the earth's surface. For submarine forests in several parts of the globe consist of trees which still cover the neighbouring continents, though the *animals* found in the same localities in a petrified state have ceased to exist, and many species of plants are not found in regions where they might thrive perfectly well, according to their structure, or to the present condition of the globe. They seem to be absent from such countries only because they did not exist there in former geological epochs. Ligneous plants existed formerly in many parts where the soil is at present not capable of producing them; the middle tertiary rocks present a mixture of exotic forms now peculiar to warm climates, together with others equally characteristic of tem-

perate countries; the conditions of the earth and the atmosphere must, therefore, before the creation of man, have been more favourable, especially as regards the proportions of temperature. Sometimes islands and their neighbouring continents, at present insurmountably separated from them by the sea, contain the same species. It appears, therefore, that at a primitive epoch they joined together, and formed one continent. Summits of mountains very distant from each other offer the same species, and the same aquatic plants are found in very different countries; the transport which, in the present condition of the earth, is perfectly impossible, must have taken place at an anterior period. For, on the other hand, frequently countries very near each other offer very little resemblance, and often great difference, in their vegetable productions. All the plants did not proceed from one limited portion of the earth, for instance, the Paradise (as Linné maintained); nor did they gradually spread from the Polar region southwards, in proportion as the globe cooled down (as Buffon asserted); nor did they first appear on the mountains, and thence extend to the lower parts of the earth as the waters receded; but the different species are aboriginal in numerous different regions, although these centres of creation cannot be indicated with certainty, in consequence of the vast changes which the surface of our planet has suffered. The production of the various species was probably progressive, ascending from the less to the more perfect plants; and every species has most likely commenced with a multiplicity of individuals. It is certain, both from ocular evidence and from inductive conclusions, that most of the animals discovered as fossils in the strata of the earth have died in a natural course on the spot where they enjoyed life. Now, as many of them are creatures of long life, and many reached an age far beyond the time now allotted to the creatures of the earth, it is impossible that they should have accomplished the full circle of their existence in a few days." And yet Exodus says: "In six days the Lord made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that in them is, and rested the seventh day."

The answer by defenders of the Bible is, that the word day used in the first chapter of Genesis, does not mean a period of twenty-four hours, but really represents an indefinite period of time, so that each day stands for a vast age. Dr. Kalisch says, p. 43: "In order to gain scope for the geological epochs, many critics have proposed to interpret the term 'day' יוֹם

as a *period*, or an *indefinite epoch*. But this is equally inadmissible. In our plain, purely historical, and calm narrative, this metaphorical use of the word is rendered impossible by the repeated phrase, 'And evening was, and morning was,' both forming one natural day. Nor can the circumstance, that on the fourth day only the sun was created to divide the day from the night, prove that the word 'day' denotes, in the preceding verses at least, an unlimited time; if it means *day* in one verse, it has the same signification throughout the whole narrative, or we should be obliged to take the day of Sabbath likewise as 'a period of rest.'

"The word ביום 'in the day,' is sometimes used as a conjunction of time, in the general sense of *when;* but יום alone is in no prosaical part of the Scriptures applied in a similar signification.

"Hugh Miller once believed that the 'six days' were ordinary days of twenty-four hours each, and that the latest of the geologic ages was separated by a great chaotic gap from our own. But at that time his labours, as a practical geologist, had been restricted to the palaeozoic and Secondary Rocks; later, however, he directed his attention to the more recent formations also, and studied their peculiar organisms; and his unavoidable conclusions were, that 'for many ages ere man was ushered into being, not a few of his humble contemporaries of the fields and woods enjoyed life in their present haunts, and that for thousands of years anterior to even *their* appearance, many of the existing molluscs lived in our seas;' and, consequently, he *since then accepted the six days of creation as vastly extended periods*, perhaps 'millenniums of centuries.' We have introduced this opinion as a type of many similar views. It is perfectly unworthy of Biblical science, constantly to modify the interpretation according to the successive and varying results of other sciences, just as if the Biblical text were composed of indefinite and vague hieroglyphics, capable of every possible construction; it is a most objectionable practice to make the Hebrew narrative subservient to all the fluctuating movements of heterogeneous studies, which are based upon premises perfectly different from the Biblical notions, and which, as systematic sciences, neither derive support from them, nor require their authority and sanction. Scientific honesty and manly firmness prescribe a far different conduct, at once more simple and more decided. Let the true and authentic senses of the Biblical narrative

be ascertained with all possible assistance of learning and philological knowledge: independently of this, let the other sciences bearing on the subject be zealously studied; and then let the results of both researches be compared, without bias and without anxious timidity. If careful geological studies press upon the mind the conviction, that even the present epoch commenced many ages before the appearance of man on earth; let it be admitted, without unavailing reluctance, that the Mosaic record speaks of a creation in six days, which is irreconcilable with those investigations, since it is philologically impossible to understand the word 'day' in this section in any other sense but a period of twenty-four hours.

"The device that the days denote epochs, is not only arbitrary, but ineffective; for the six 'epochs' of the Mosaic creation correspond in no manner with the gradual formation of the cosmos. More than one attempt has, however, been made to show this agreement; but they crumble into nothing at the slightest touch."

Before dealing with the authorised English and accepted Hebrew versions, I will present a few conflicting opinions on the value of the Samaritan and Septuagint texts, each of which I shall then take leave to dismiss as utterly valueless in the present inquiry.

The Reverend Dr. Irons, in dealing with the popular theory on the Bible, thus refers to the Septuagint version: "The striking fact, however, which confronts us is, that in the first century the Greek translation of the Old Testament was more in use among the *Jews* also than the Hebrew; and that this had possibly been the case for generations. It seemed even to be thought by some, that this Greek version fixed the sense of some passages of the Hebrew. Anyhow, this version lies in the pathway of the investigation, which evidently cannot be avoided, between the first century and the times of the old Prophets ending with Malachi. What is this Greek version, or 'Septuagint,' as it is called? Who made it? From what originals was it made? And when? And why? And what is its present state?

"It must be owned that we have here come to a somewhat difficult parenthesis—if it may be so termed—in our examination of the Old Testament of the Hebrew Prophets. The story used to be believed, however, that 270 years, or more, before Christ, some seventy Jews were employed by

Ptolemy Philadelphus to translate 'the Jewish Scripture' into Greek: Josephus says, that it was the Pentateuch. An account of the miraculous agreement of these seventy translators, working in seventy separate cells, is found in the letter of Aristæus to Philocrates. It has been respectfully referred to by Christian writers of such high name as Tertullian and St. Jerome (and our esteem for their sagacity cannot thereby be increased). Bellarmine, however, no more rejects it than did Josephus and Philo. It has been thought not unworthy of being 'done into English,' by Dr. Donne, Dean of St. Paul's. But this letter cannot be regarded in the nineteenth century (any more than the Talmud was) as 'historical.' We may pass it.

"Strictly speaking, no one knows who made the Septuagint. No one knows from what copies of the originals any parts of that version were made. It appears to be a growth of at least two generations; and, as might be expected, the style is not the same throughout. Has it, then, no authority at all, it may be asked? Was it not used by the Jews themselves, and bequeathed in fact by the Jewish Church to the Christian? Yes. That, such as it is, is the ground of its authority, for all purposes of practical edification. But this does not assist our investigation as to the literary condition of the Hebrew Scriptures at that time; unless we are to assume that the Septuagint corrects the sense of ancient Hebrew manuscripts now lost? Few would think, however, of thus setting aside the present Hebrew text in favour of the Septuagint, in those places where they now differ. The state of the text of the Septuagint itself is far, also, from satisfactory; and if it is to be set up as the principal authority for the Old Testament, the historical continuity of the originally Written Word is given up." ("The Bible and its Interpreters," p. 25).

He also says, "Versions in other tongues will not settle the Hebrew text," and that "the character which is used in the Hebrew Bible is thought by most learned men to be not the character used by Moses or the prophets."

It used to be pretended that the Septuagint version was made by seventy-two persons, shut up in the Island of Pharos, under Ptolemy Philadelphus; but as Hartwell Horne (vol. ii., pt. 1, cap. 5, sect. 1 § 2) admits that "the majority of the learned in our own time are fully agreed in considering the story as fictitious," there is no necessity for further comment. Justin Martyr, a pious Christian, improved the story

by shutting up each translator in a separate cell, where each executed a distinct version, making the whole of their work agree word for word. Epiphanius, another pious Christian, in the fourth century, finding this story too much for his credulity, reduced the cells to thirty-six, and shut up the translators two and two.

The case in favour of the Septuagint is perhaps put most forcibly by a writer in the *Quarterly Review*, vol. xxiii., p. 321, which is here reproduced, that the reader may have both statements before him. The business of this work is not to occupy itself with the Septuagint, but rather to demolish the Hebrew record, which limits man's origin to one pair, and brings that pair into being less than 6,000 years from the present date:—

"According to all historical evidence, to the united testimony both of Jews and Christians, and the full belief of all competent judges, the Septuagint version, as it was carefully made for the use of Jews who spoke the Greek language, was, from its first formation, generally received by them, and publicly read in their synagogues, as a true, faithful, and accurate version of Scripture. Scaliger says that it was read in the synagogues through the whole of Asia, Greece, and Egypt. '*All persons*,' says Walton, '*agree in this*, that it was used, especially among the Hellenistic Jews, *ab ultima antiquitate*, both in public and in private, whence R. Azarias assures us that the interpretation of the Greeks was confirmed by the whole assembly of the Israelites.' The inspired Evangelists and Apostles often quoted from the Septuagint; this fact alone, if every other testimony were wanting, proves incontestably not only that they believed and knew it to represent Scripture faithfully, but also that it was familiarly used and received by the Jews as Scripture at that time.

"As to the assertion that our present Septuagint is not substantially the same with that originally designated by that name, it is borne down by such overwhelming proofs to the contrary, that it is perfectly astonishing how anyone could dare to make it. The general historical evidence of its identity may probably of itself be deemed sufficient; but this evidence applies with much greater force in the case of the Septuagint than in that of the works of any ancient author, from its having been publicly read as Scripture in many ancient churches, and therefore guarded with the most scrupulous care, the most sacred reverence. Nor is this

all. The Apostles and the Evangelists undoubtedly quoted in many passages from different parts of the Septuagint; and the very passages which they quoted from the version as it existed in their day, remain in that version as it exists in ours. Again, many of the ancient Fathers, whose works have come down to us, have written commentaries on different books of Scripture, which they read according to the Septuagint; for instance, Augustin on the Psalms, Cyril on Isaiah, with many others; and any person comparing their commentaries with the text we now possess, must immediately perceive that it is substantially the same with that which they illustrated. Many of the early Fathers again have made direct quotations from the Septuagint, which appear in our present copies of that version; some have even incidentally remarked on passages in it, to which there are none corresponding in the Hebrew, and *vice versâ;* and the very same discrepancies which are noted by them are found to the present day."

Having thus given a very orthodox and one-sided plea for the Septuagint, it may be well to add one more reverend if not orthodox witness against it. The Rev. R. G. Browne, Vicar of Alnwick ("Mosaic Cosmogony," page 108), says :— "To think of the Septuagint version as an inspired or as a Divinely-preferred work is a perpetuation of the folly of Aristæus, and an erection of a superstructure of puerile conceits upon a fable and an imposition. It was, as is every translation, a merely human operation, bearing in its history and in its texture an endless tissue of human error and human inconsistency. We can never come to a true notion of God's ancient, and that his only genuine, word from the Septuagint version."

Luke Burke, in the *Ethnological Journal* (p. 23), says: "It must be evident, at the first glance, that the Samaritan chronology, taken as a whole, cannot be the original one. It is as inconsistent with itself as it is untrue to nature. At a time when it makes the duration of life from 230 to 438 years, it makes the generations twice as long as when men lived eight or nine hundred years. Nothing so absurd as this could ever have been drawn up by the writer of the book of Genesis, nor by any person, as an original draft. Such contradictions could only have arisen from the perversions and patchwork of subsequent times." Samuel Sharpe says, in his "Hebrew Nation and its Literature" (p. 265): "The Samaritan Pentateuch is not a version into a language dif-

ferent from the Hebrew. It is merely a transcript, which professes to make no change in the words, but to give the Hebrew words in the Samaritan letters. The Hebrew square characters declare their high antiquity by their pictorial form, and by their close resemblance to the Egyptian hieroglyphics, from which they seem to be copied. Moreover, it is very improbable that the Jews, reverencing their books so highly, should have ever ventured to change the characters in which they were first written. The Samaritans, on the other hand now (perhaps B.C. 480), for the first time building a temple, and proposing to have a priesthood of the line of Aaron, would naturally wish for a transcript of the sacred books, if the characters in which the Jews had written them were not so well understood on Mount Gerizim. The argument that the Samaritan letters are the oldest, because no Hebrew monuments can now be shown that are as old as the Samaritan letters on the Maccabee coins, is of little weight, because those coins are too modern to have much bearing in the controversy. Upon the whole it seems probable that the Hebrew Scriptures were in Jerusalem always written in square characters, much the same as those in which we now read them, and that the Samaritan transcript of the Pentateuch was made from the square characters soon after the time of Nehemiah. The Samaritan Bible does not reach beyond the Pentateuch, which circumstance alone should settle that it is a transcript, having no claim to be the original. The Samaritans seem never to have taken the trouble to complete the task."

The Rev. Dr. Wall, who was more favourable to the Samaritan codex, says ("Grounds for a Revision of the Authorised Version," p. 607): "The Samaritan Pentateuch was brought under notice and referred to by a series of Christian writers, extending from Eusebius, in the beginning of the fourth century, to Georgius Syncellus, about the end of the eighth; after which it was lost sight of in Christendom till the year 1631, when Father Morin, of the Oratory in Paris, published an account of two copies then recently brought from the East, which were purchased, one of them at Constantinople, by M. de Sancy, the French Ambassador there, and afterwards Archbishop of St. Maloes; and the other at Damascus, by Pietro della Valle, a Roman knight."

Noticing that Benjamin is written in "pure Hebrew" in the Samaritan Pentateuch, and in the orthodox Hebrew version only appears in "its Chaldaic corruption," Dr. Wall argues

that: "It would appear, as far as a valid inference can be drawn from a single example, that, as the Samaritan characters approach nearer than the Jewish ones to the oldest known shapes of the Hebrew letters, so likewise, in the few instances in which the termination of corresponding words in the two editions differ, the Samaritan endings are those of greater antiquity."

The best that can be said for the Samaritan Pentateuch on the orthodox side is given in "Horne's Introduction" (part 1, chap. i., sect. 2); but as this admits a space "upwards of 1000 years," during which there is no trace of this Samaritan version, its evidence is not very valuable. There are two versions of this Samaritan Pentateuch, one being in Arabic, the other in Aramæn. It must not be supposed that the MSS. of these versions go anywhere near the date given by Mr. Sharpe, of 408 years B.C. The Darghestan roll of the Pentateuch is claimed by Mr. Forsyth, Q.C., to be the most ancient MS. of the Old Testament, and this dates only to A.D. 580, even if that date be conceded. This would leave a blank of centuries in which there is no record. Many critics would put the Darghestan roll as considerably more modern. Bishop Colenso commences part 4 of the Pentateuch with an essay on the Samaritan text, for which he fixes as a highly probable date, an epoch more modern by 200 to 250 years than that above stated by Mr. Sharpe.

But it is not simply a question of versions; the genuineness and authenticity of the whole text is challenged. Spinoza considered it "clear as the noonday light" that Moses was not the author of any part of the Pentateuch; and urges, that which to-day nearly all competent Biblicists admit, viz., that nothing is known as to when, where, or by whom the Book of Genesis was penned, or by whom it was preserved ("Tractatus Theologico-Politicus," caps. vii., viii., and ix.). He declares that many blemishes have crept into the Hebrew text itself, and that even the most ancient Jewish writers have animadverted on various doubtful readings and on several imperfect and truncated passages. He also urges that our Hebrew canon rests upon the decision of the Pharisees of the second Temple, who, on grounds to us unknown, selected the Books we have from amongst a great number, and that their decision was far from unanimous; one book (Ezekiel) becoming the Word of God, through the support given to it by Neghunja, the son of Hiskias; and another (Ecclesiastes) narrowly escaping suppression,

because objected to by certain learned persons referred to in the Talmud, by Rabbi Jehuda, surnamed Rabi ("Tractatus Sabbathi," cap. ii., fol. 30, p. 2). These persons, he says, also desired to suppress the Book of Proverbs. Rabbi Jacob ben Chajim admits in his "Introduction to the Rabbinical Bible" (sec. 5) that "Some of the later great sages of blessed memory" taught that "during the Babylonish captivity, when the sacred books were lost and scattered about, and those wise men who were skilled in the Scriptures were dead, the men of the great synagogue found different readings in the sacred books; and in every place where they met with a doubtful or perplexing case, they wrote down a word in the text, but did not put the vowels to it, or wrote in the margin and left it out in the text, not being sure what they found." And yet this is pretended to be God's infallible message to human kind. The same writer (sec. 10) quotes Ephodi as authority for a statement that Ezra, and the scribes who followed him, made the Keri and Kethiv (*i.e.*, various readings of words read but not written, and written but not read), "in every passage in which they met with some obliterations and confusion, not being sure what the precise meaning was." The word Ephodi is made of the initials of a phrase-signature used by Isaac Ha-Levi, a writer against Christianity about 470 years ago. Jacob ben Chajim (sec. 11) declares himself surprised that so holy a man as Rabbi Kimchi (who wrote at the end of the twelfth and the beginning of the thirteenth centuries) should say that "It appears that these marginal and textual readings originated because the sacred books were lost and scattered about during the Babylonian captivity, and the sages who were skilled in the Scriptures were dead."

In 1820, Mr. Whittaker, of St. John's College, Cambridge, writing then to defend the authorised version against Mr. Bellamy, says: "There are many passages, particularly in the Old Testament, of such acknowledged difficulty, that learned men never did, and perhaps never will, agree about them." And yet reverend men without hesitation circulate these as God's message to his creatures.

It is surprising, in the face of the researches of the most erudite Biblicists, that any educated men should maintain that the original Hebrew text of God's revelation to mankind has been preserved by the Jewish Rabbis uncorrupted, and without loss or variation of a single letter or word. And why do they speak of the original Hebrew in which

Moses wrote? It can hardly be pretended that the Deity selected the Hebrew for its flexibility and capacity for expressing his meaning. On the contrary, the Greek far excels the Hebrew as a written tongue. Nor is the Hebrew the most ancient written language. The construction of the various Hebrew roots affords reason to the contrary, and it is absolutely certain that the whole of the vowel-points (which in many cases entirely change the meaning of the text) are of comparatively modern date, say, from the second to the fifth century of the present era—probably not earlier than A.D. 450. The present square-letter form of Hebrew, and the twenty-two letter alphabet, are also of limited antiquity. The Hebrew Scriptures are neither the most ancient nor the most perfect of Scriptures. That the Hebrew text of Genesis has been corrupted there can be no doubt whatever; and that the authorised translation, circulated broadcast by the Bible Society as God's Word, is imperfect is admitted by the Church sanction to the revision now going on. Luke Burke, referring to the comparative merits of the Samaritan, Hebrew, and Septuagint versions, says: "The Jew naturally prefers the reading which exists in his own version, the Samaritan contends for the superiority of his copy, and the generality of Christians prefer of course the Septuagint [this refers to the first few centuries of our era]. Each party accuses the other of wilful corruption of the text, and some at least of these accusations must be true" (*Ethnological Journal*, p. 19). Dr. Wall speaks of the "blemishes in the existing condition of the Hebrew text," some of which he attributes to fraud, and others to gross ignorance ("Grounds for Revision of the Hebrew Bible," pp. 102 and 545); and it is declared by competent critics that the Hebrew text, even after the Masoretic correction and purification, was "deficient, imperfect, interpolated, and full of errors." Before the Christian era there were no divisions between words of the Hebrew text, and the five final letters were not invented. From then till A.D. 1000 the texts of the various codices were not only in a most corrupt and unreliable state, but nearly all the early fathers were unable to read the Hebrew character. The English translation (authorised version) is wretchedly imperfect. Errors abound in it, and some of them are of a most laughable description. On this account great calls have been made for the new translation, which is now in the course of manufacture, and also for a new

edition of the Hebrew, which no one is competent to undertake; but neither a new translation nor a new Hebrew text will remove the difficulties developed during the last fifty years. Science has rendered the objections to the narrative insurmountable. The pretended revelation must in the end succumb before the scientific advocates it so long impeded.

Spinoza, treating of the true method of interpreting Scripture, says: "The first great 'difficulty' connected with our method arises from the consummate knowledge of the Hebrew tongue which its due application implies. But whence is this now to be obtained? The ancient masters of the Hebrew tongue have left nothing to posterity on the elements and principles of the language; we, at all events, have little or nothing of theirs—no dictionary, no grammar, no syntax. The Hebrew nation has lost all that it ever had of the elegances and ornaments of life (nor is this wonderful after such long ages of depression, disaster, and persecution), and has preserved nothing but a few fragments of its language and its literature. Then the meaning of many nouns and verbs which are met with in the Bible is either entirely unknown or is a subject of dispute. With all this, when we apply ourselves to study the syntax of this language, a matter of much moment, and seek to discover the idioms and modes of expression peculiar to the Hebrew people, we find that time, the consumer, has blotted them almost all from the memory of man. We shall, therefore, not be able, as we would wish, to determine the precise meaning of every passage which the common uses of the language would permit, and we shall come upon many sentences which, although expressed in words extremely well-known, are nevertheless of meaning most obscure, and are sometimes incomprehensible. To these difficulties must be added those which arise from the constitution and nature of the language itself, which occasion so many ambiguities that it is impossible to find such a method as shall assuredly teach us how to investigate the true sense of all the expressions of Scripture." After pointing out that doubt and obscurity result from the use of one letter in lieu of another, from the various meanings attaching to conjunctions and adverbs, and from the imperfections of the verb, Spinoza adds: "Besides the three causes of obscurity now noted in the Hebrew language, there yet remain to be mentioned two others, each of much more moment than all the rest. The first of these is that the Hebrew has no vowels; the second that

it is without spaces between the words and sentences, and has no accents to indicate the proper pronunciation; and although these two deficiencies—viz., the vowels and signs of accentuation, are wont to be supplied by points, it is impossible that we should acquiesce in the sufficiency of these, inasmuch as they are the invention and resource of men of these later times, whose authority can have no weight with us. The ancient Hebrews wrote without points (*i.e.*, without vowels and accents), as appears from the most ample testimony. The moderns supplied vowel-points and accents, as it seemed good to them that the Bible should be interpreted; wherefore they are to be regarded as mere interpretations of yesterday, and deserve no greater faith, as they have no higher authority, than the lucubrations of ordinary commentators" ("Tractatus Theologico-Politicus," cap. vii., p. 156). Gesenius admits that the ancient translators of the Hebrew, "evidently often translated by conjecture only" ("Hebrew Lexicon," by Leo, p. 17).

The learned Irenæus gives us a statement on the Hebrew, which shows either that he was utterly ignorant on the subject, or that since his time (A.D. 160) the language has entirely changed. He says ("Against Heresies," book 2, cap. xxiv., sec. 2): "For these ancient, original, and generally called sacred letters of the Hebrews, are ten in number (but they are written by means of fifteen), the last letter being joined to the first. And thus they write some of these letters according to their natural sequence, just as we do, but others in a reverse direction, from the right hand towards the left, thus tracing the letters backwards."

Bishop Colenso believes that he succeeds in identifying the work of at least four several authors in the Book of Genesis, and these he describes as 1st Elohist, 2nd Elohist (that is, two writers who respectively use the word Elohim אלהים ALEIM for God); 1st Jehovist, 2nd Jehovist (two writers who respectively use the word Jehovah יהוה IEUE for God); and Deuteronomist. Elohist No. 2 is supposed by the Bishop not to be a different writer from the 1st Jehovist, but to represent an earlier stage of the Jehovist's literary activity. In a synoptical table in Part V. of the Pentateuch the Bishop presents the results of the critical analysis of the Book of Genesis, and apportions the 1,533 verses of the Book of Genesis as follows: To the 1st Elohist, 336 verses; to the 2nd, 106 verses; to the 1st Jehovist, 1,028 verses; to the 2nd, 24 verses; and to the

Deuteronomist, 39 verses. The word Deuteronomist is used by Dr. Colenso for the later editor of the Pentateuch, and is fixed at about the time of King Josiah. These points are none of them material to the case to be made out in this volume, and are only given to show that modern Biblical criticism utterly rejects the notion of the Hebrew Pentateuch as the work of one pen.

The question of disputed authorship is not confined to the problem as to who wrote the first Book, or the first five Books, but extends to the whole Bible. Spinoza says ("Tractatus Theologico-Politicus," p. 158; Latin edition, cap. vii., sec. 58): "Of the authors—or, if you please, writers—of many of the Books, we either know almost nothing, or we entertain grave doubts as to the correctness with which the several Books are ascribed to the parties whose names they bear. Then we neither know upon what occasion, nor at what time, those Books were indited, the writers of which are unknown to us. Further, we know nothing of the hands into which the Books fell; nor of the codices which have furnished such a variety of readings, nor whether perchance there were not many other variations in other copies."

Peyrere followed Spinoza, and said: "God suffered the autographs to perish, and only very imperfect copies to come down to us" (De Wette, vol. i., dio. 1, sec. 84). In the Apocryphal Book of Esdras, it is distinctly stated that in consequence of the "law being burnt" (Esdras, cap. xiv., v. 31), Esdras took five rapid writers, and shut himself up forty days, so that they might "write all that had been done in the world since the beginning;" and it is alleged that these, having "understanding given them by the highest," wrote in forty days 204 books of things, "which they knew not." Eusebius, after speaking of the wonderful unanimity of the translators of the Septuagint, who, as before noticed, were alleged to have been shut up in seventy-two separate cells, and without intercourse with each other, to have made the whole translation in just the same words and letters, quoted from Irenæus. "Neither was it anything extraordinary that God should have done this, who, indeed, in the captivity under Nebuchadnezzar, *when their Scripture had been destroyed*, and the Jews returned to their country after seventy years, in the time of Artaxerxes, King of the Persians, *inspired Esdras, the priest of the tribe of Levi, to compose anew all the discourses of the ancient prophets, and to restore to*

the people the laws given them by Moses." ("Ecclesiastical History," book 5, cap. viii., Cruse's translation, p. 171.)

Bishop Colenso says: "It is quite possible—and, indeed, so far as our present inquiries have gone, highly probable—that Moses may be a historical character, that is to say, it is probable that legendary stories, connected with his name, of some remarkable movement in former days, may have existed among the Hebrew tribes, and these legends may have formed the foundation of the narrative. But this is merely conjectural. The result of our inquiries, as far as we have proceeded, is that such a narrative as that contained in the Pentateuch could not have been written in the age of Moses, or for some time afterwards."

Sharp says of Genesis ("Historic Notes on the Old and New Testaments," Moxon, 1854, p. 6): "We have no account of when this first of the Hebrew Books was written, or by whom. It has been called one of the Books of Moses, and some small part of it may have been written by that great law-giver, and leader of the Israelites. But it is the work of various authors and of various ages."

Michel Nicolas says ("Etudes Critiques sur la Bible, Ancien Testament," p. 2), quoting as his authorities Esdras, Irenæus, Jerome, and Augustine, "that there was a tradition generally received amongst the Israelites, that Esdras has been the restorer of the Mosaic writings, which had suffered great damage at the destruction of the Jewish kingdom, and which writings, according to some, had even been totally destroyed.....St. Jerome held it indifferent to regard the Pentateuch as the work of Moses, or as retouched and put in order by Ezra." Nicolas adds that, although the Protestants have more firmly insisted on Moses as the author of the five Books than have their Catholic brethren, yet it is amongst the Protestants that the first doubts were raised amongst the Christian public as to the authorship.

Kurtz ("Colenso," part iv., p. 15), writing to prove that the whole Pentateuch as at present existing is from the hand of Moses, at last admits that the results of his examination have convinced him that several authors have taken part in the composition of the Pentateuch. Ewald, who commenced by asserting one author for Genesis, now admits that more than one hand may be traced in the Book. Delitzch, while contending for Moses, admits other authors, and the employment of pre-existing documents. Spinoza distinctly

declares that the original writings of Moses [if they ever existed] are no longer extant, and that the present Books of the Old Testament are a selection from a greater number finally put together, and approved by a Council of Pharisees, so that it depended on the votes of certain Rabbis whether or no a particular Hebrew Book was or was not God's revelation to his people. It is quite certain that, if Moses wrote the Pentateuch, he did not write it in the square-letter Hebrew, which is comparatively a modern language, and which did not exist in his time. It is not contended that any other language was used by Moses, and there is no pretence for carrying modern Hebrew, or any proof in favour of carrying ancient Hebrew, as a language with written characters to such a period as that assigned to Moses. It is hardly possible that any work so voluminous as the Pentateuch could have been graven on stone in hieroglyph, and carried about on the Levites' shoulders in the ark, yet this is the only depository assigned to the Mosaic Books.

De Wette says: "Without doubt, it [the ancient Hebrew] originated in the land [of Canaan], or was still further developed therein after the Hebrew and other Canaanitish people had migrated thither from the mother country." (De Wette on the "Old Testament," part ii., secs. 30 and 35.) And he regards Hebrew, Arabic, and Aramean as branches from a common stem. In what language, then, is Moses to be supposed to have written? Some of the Talmudists taught that the ancient Hebrew language became entirely extinct during the captivity. Genesis itself does not speak of writing amongst the patriarchs; on the contrary, remarkable events were chronicled by the help of heaps of stones, trees, altars, &c., which were named after the events. The first allegation of writing is on the tables of stone; but surely this, if written, was not in Hebrew characters. The Hebrews had been slaves to the Egyptians, and might have gathered from them some of the hieroglyph lore of that age; but surely nothing more can be claimed for the ignorant slaves than was in use amongst their educated masters. De Wette says ("Book of Moses," sec. 163): "The opinion that Moses composed these Books is not only opposed by all the signs of a later date, which occur in the Book itself, but also by the entire analogy of the history of Hebrew literature and language."

The conclusions founded on the foregoing statements are very clear and simple.

1. The Bible alleges that man has existed on this earth not more than 6,000 years, and that all humankind are descended from one pair.

2. There is no corroboration to the Bible story, either in the character of its chronology or the coherence of its narrative.

3. The Bible itself is an unvouched and untrustworthy witness, its real authorship unknown, and with the additional disadvantage that authors have been claimed for parts of the Hebrew Bible who cannot by possibility have penned a word of it.

As some aid to modern divines in estimating the value of the Bible history, I quote the words of an early Father of the Church—Origen, who flourished in the third century; the "pious" Origen, the "illustrious" Origen, the "devout" Origen, for these and a score of like prefixes are given to him by good Christians. The extract is from "De Principiis," book 4, cap. i, sec. 16:—

"For who that has understanding will suppose that the first, and second, and third day, and the evening and the morning, existed without a sun, and moon, and stars? and that the first day was, as it were, also without a sky? And who is so foolish as to suppose that God, after the manner of a husbandman, planted a paradise in Eden, towards the east, and placed in it a tree of life, visible and palpable, so that one tasting of the fruit by the bodily teeth obtained life? and, again, that one was a partaker of good and evil by masticating what was taken from the tree? And if God is said to walk in the paradise in the evening, and Adam to hide himself under a tree, I do not suppose that any one doubts that these things figuratively indicate certain mysteries, the history having taken place in appearance, and not literally. Cain also, when going forth from the presence of God, certainly appears to thoughtful men as likely to lead the reader to inquire what is the presence of God, and what is the meaning of going out from him. And what need is there to say more, since those who are not altogether blind can collect countless instances of a similar kind recorded as having occurred, but which did not literally take place? Nay, the Gospels themselves are filled with the same kind of narratives—*e.g.*, the Devil leading Jesus up into a high mountain, in order to show him from thence the kingdoms of the whole world, and the glory of them. For who is there among those who do not read such accounts

carelessly that would not condemn those who think that with the eye of the body—which requires a lofty height, in order that the parts lying [immediately] under and adjacent may be seen—the kingdoms of the Persians, and Scythians, and Indians, and Parthians, were beheld, and the manner in which their princes are glorified among men? And the attentive reader may notice in the Gospels innumerable other passages like these, so that he will be convinced that in the histories that are literally recorded, circumstances that did not occur are inserted."

That which the pious, illustrious, and devout Origen wrote more than 1,600 years ago is repeated by a living Bishop of the Church of England, who says (Colenso on "Pentateuch," part 4, cap. xi.):—

"The statements in Genesis i., if regarded as statements of historical matter-of-fact, are directly at variance with some of the plainest facts of natural science, as they are now brought home, by the extension of education, to every village—almost, we might say, to every cottage—in the land. It is idle for any minister of religion to attempt to disguise this palpable discordance. To do so is only to put a stumbling-block in the way of the young—at all events, of those of the next generation—who, well-instructed themselves in these things, and having their eyes open to the real facts of the case, may be expected either to despise such a teacher as ignorant, or to suspect him as dishonest, and, in either case, would be very little likely to attach much weight to his instructions in things of highest moment."

In part 2, cap. iii, page 186, the same writer says:—

"It should be noticed that the Books of the Pentateuch are never ascribed to Moses in the inscriptions of Hebrew manuscripts, or in printed copies of the Hebrew Bible. Nor are they styled the 'Books of Moses' in the Septuagint or Vulgate, but only in our modern translations, after the example of many eminent Fathers of the Church, who, with the exception of Jerome, and, perhaps, Origen, were, one and all of them, very little acquainted with the Hebrew language, and still less with its criticism.

"The Jews do not speak of the first, second, &c., Book of Moses, but designate each Book by the first word which occurs in it in Hebrew, except that for Numbers they employ במדבר 'In the wilderness,' which word occurs in the first verse, and is probably chosen as more expressive than the

first word וידבר 'And he said,' which was used in the days of Jerome."

The Rev. Dr. Rowland Williams, in his "Rational Godliness," page 294, says: "The Scriptural writers, after all, were men, and the condition of mankind is imperfection. They spake of old; but all old times represent, as it were, the childhood of the human race, and therefore had childish things, which we must put away." And yet it is this collection of childish things, bound in one volume, and labelled "The Holy Bible," which is to be taught to-day to little children in our schools. If, by the admission of so high an authority, grown men are to put away the Bible as unfit for the knowledge of the present age, why should the clergy of the same Church persist in forcing the very Book on our schools as part of the every-day instruction of our boys and girls?

Having dealt with the case presented by the Bible, we now turn to the sciences of ethnology, anthropology, and geology, to see what aid they can give us in our inquiry.

"Ethnology," says Luke Burke (*Ethnological Journal*, page 1), "is a science which investigates the mental and physical differences of mankind, and the organic laws upon which they depend; and which seeks to deduce from these investigations principles for human guidance in all the important relations of social existence. Ethnology divides itself into two principal departments, the scientific and the historic. Under the former is comprised everything connected with the natural history of man, and the fundamental laws of living organisms; under the latter, every fact in civil history which has any important bearing, directly or indirectly, upon the question of races."

Anthropology was defined by my friend, the late Dr. James Hunt, as "the science of the whole nature of man." Mr. C. S. Wake says ("Aim and Scope of Anthropology," *Anthropological Journal*, July, 1870, pages 3 and 4):—"Mr. Bendyshe defines anthropology as that which 'deals with all phenomena exhibited by collective man, and by him alone, which are capable of being reduced to law;' while Dr. Broca declares it to be 'that science which has for its object the study of the human group, considered in its *ensemble*, in its details, and in its relations to the rest of nature.' Anthropology has relation chiefly to mankind *as a whole*, and is concerned with individual man only so far as he forms part of that whole. Of course, as Dr. Broca

observes, 'a collection of individuals cannot be studied in its *ensemble*, if we do not commence with the study of the individual type which forms the unit of the number.' The latter study, however, has more especial reference to the *differences* which characterise man when compared with other natural objects; the identification of these differences resulting in the determinate idea of 'man' in his individual aspect. Anthropology, on the other hand, has rather to do with *resemblances*—its general aim being the generalisation of the phenomena which are displayed by mankind as a whole, so as to discover the laws of human being, in relation to its continued activity—past, present, and future—as well as, if possible, to define the nature of that being itself. When 'man,' as distinguished from other organic existences, has been clearly defined, the idea thus obtained requires to be extended, so as to embrace all those who answer to the definition. We have here the starting point of anthropology."

Here it is now proposed to show—by the aid of the sciences of Ethnology and Anthropology—the diversity existing of human type; and—by the aid of History and Anthropology—it is proposed to demonstrate:—first, that these diverse types of mankind can be traced back to a date prior to the Noachian deluge; and, next, by the additional aid of geology, it is intended to prove man's existence on earth long prior to the alleged creation of Adam.

"One feature," says Agassiz ("Types of Mankind," page 58), "in the physical history of mankind is the natural relations between the different types of man and the animals and plants inhabiting the same regions. The sketch here presented is intended to show, as far as it is possible in a mere outline delineation, that *the boundaries, within which the different natural combinations of animals are known to be circumscribed upon the surface of our earth, coincide with the natural range of distinct types of man.* Such natural combinations of animals circumscribed within definite boundaries are called *faunæ*, whatever be their home—land, sea, or river. Among the animals which compose the fauna of a country we find types belonging exclusively there, and not occurring elsewhere; such are, for example, the ornithorhynchus of New Holland, the sloths of America, the hippopotamus of Africa, and the walruses of the Arctics: others, which have only a small number of representatives beyond the fauna which they specially characterise, as, for instance,

the marsupials of New Holland, of which America has a few species, such as the opossum; and, again, others which have a wider range, such as the bears—of which there are distinct species in Europe, Asia, or America—or the mice and bats, which are to be found all over the world, except in the Arctics. That fauna will, therefore, be most easily characterised which possesses the largest number of distinct types, proper to itself, and of which the other animals have little analogy with those of neighbouring regions, as, for example, the fauna of New Holland.

"The inhabitants of fresh water furnish also excellent characters for the circumscription of faunæ. The fishes, and other fluviatile animals from the larger hydrographic basins, differ no less from each other than the mammalia, the birds, the reptiles, and the insects of the countries which these rivers water. Nevertheless, some authors have attempted to separate the fresh-water animals from those of the land and sea, and to establish distinct divisions for them, under the name of fluviatile faunæ. But the inhabitants of the rivers and lakes are too intimately connected with those of their shores to allow of a rigorous distinction of this kind. Rivers never establish a separation between terrestrial faunæ. For the same reason, the faunæ of the inland seas cannot be completely isolated from the terrestrial ones, and we shall see hereafter that the animals of southern Europe are not bound by the Mediterranean, but are found on the southern shore of that sea, as far as the Atlas. We shall, therefore, distinguish our zoological regions according to the combination of species which they enclose, rather than according to the element in which we find them.

"If the grand divisions of the animal kingdom are primordial and independent of climate, this is not the case with regard to the ultimate local circumscription of species: these are, on the contrary, intimately connected with the conditions of temperature, soil, and vegetation. A remarkable instance of this distribution of animals with reference to climate may be observed in the Arctic fauna, which contains a great number of species common to the three continents converging towards the North Pole, and which presents a striking uniformity, when compared with the diversity of the temperate and tropical faunæ of those same continents.

"The Arctic fauna extends to the utmost limits of the cold and barren regions of the North. But from the moment that forests appear, and a more propitious soil permits a

larger development of animal life and of vegetation, we see the fauna and flora, not only diversified according to the continents on which they exist, but we observe also striking distinctions between different parts of the same continent; thus, in the Old World, the animals vary, not only from the Polar circle to the equator, but also in the opposite direction —those of the western coast of Europe are not the same as those of the basin of the Caspian Sea, or of the eastern coast of Asia, nor are those of the eastern coast of America the same as those of the western.

"The first fauna, the limits of which we would determine with precision, is the Arctic. It offers, as we have just seen, the same aspects in three parts of the world, which converge towards the North Pole. The uniform distribution of the animals by which it is inhabited forms its most striking character, and gives rise to a sameness of general features which is not found in any other region. Though the air-breathing species are not numerous here, the large number of individuals compensates for this deficiency, and among the marine animals we find an astonishing profusion and variety of forms.

"In this respect the vegetable and animal kingdoms differ entirely from each other, and the measure by which we estimate the former is quite false as applied to the latter. Plants become stunted in their growth or disappear before the rigours of the climate, while, on the contrary, all classes of the animal kingdom have representatives, more or less numerous, in the Arctic fauna.

"Neither can they be said to diminish in size under these influences; for, if the Arctic representatives of certain classes, particularly the insects, are smaller than the analogous types in the tropics, we must not forget, on the other hand, that the whales and larger cetacea have here their most genial home, and make amends, by their more powerful structure, for the inferiority of other classes. Also, if the animals of the North are less striking in external ornament—if their colours are less brilliant—yet we cannot say that they are more uniform, for though their tints are not so bright, they are none the less varied in their distribution and arrangement.

"The limits of the Arctic fauna are very easily traced. We must include therein all animals living beyond the line where forests cease, and inhabiting countries entirely barren. Those which feed upon flesh seek fishes, hares, or lemmings,

a rodent of the size of our rat. Those which live on vegetable substances are not numerous. Some gramineous plants, mosses, and lichens, serve as pasture to the ruminants and rodents, while the seeds of a few flowering plants, and of the dwarf birches, afford nourishment to the little granivorous birds, such as linnets and buntings. The species belonging to the sea-shore feed upon marine animals, which live, themselves, upon each other, or upon marine plants.

"The larger mammalia which inhabit this zone are—the white bear, the walrus, numerous species of seal, the reindeer, the musk ox, the narwal, the cachalot, and whales in abundance. Among the smaller species we may mention the white fox, the polar hare, and the lemming. The birds are not less characteristic. Some marine eagles, and wading birds in smaller number, are found; but the aquatic birds of the family of palmipedes are those which especially prevail. The coasts of the continents and of the numerous islands in the Arctic seas are peopled by clouds of gannets, of cormorants, of penguins, of petrels, of ducks, of geese, of mergansers, and of gulls, some of which are as large as eagles, and, like them, live on prey. No reptile is known in this zone. Fishes are, however, very numerous, and the rivers especially swarm with a variety of species of the salmon family. A number of representatives of the inferior classes of worms, of crustacea, of mollusks, of echinoderms, and of medusæ, are also found here.

"Within the limits of this fauna we meet a peculiar race of men, known in America under the name of Esquimaux, and under the names of Laplanders, Samojedes, and Tchuktshes in the north of Asia. This race, so well known since the voyage of Captain Cook and the Arctic expeditions of England and Russia, differs alike from the Indians of North America, from the whites of Europe, and the Mongols of Asia, to whom they are adjacent. The uniformity of their characters along the whole range of the Arctic seas forms one of the most striking resemblances which these people exhibit to the fauna with which they are so closely connected.

"The semi-annual alternation of day and night in the Arctic regions has a great influence upon their modes of living. They are entirely dependent upon animal food for their sustenance, no farinaceous grains, no nutritious tubercles, no juicy fruits, growing under those inhospitable latitudes. Their domesticated animals are the reindeer in Asia, and a

peculiar variety of dog, the Esquimaux dog, in North America, where even the reindeer is not domesticated.

"Though the Arctic fauna is essentially comprised in the Arctic circle, its organic limit does not correspond rigorously to this line, but rather to the isotherme of thirty-two degrees Fahr., the outline of which presents numerous undulations. This limit is still more natural when it is made to correspond with that of the disappearance of forests. It then circumscribes those immense plains of the North, which the Samoyedes call *tundras*, and the Anglo-Americans, *barren lands*.

"The naturalists, who have overlooked this fauna, and connected it with those of the temperate zone, have introduced much confusion in the geographical distribution of animals, and have failed to recognise the remarkable coincidence existing between the extensive range of the Arctic race of men, and the uniformity of the animal world around the Northern Pole.

"The types which characterise best this fauna, are the white or Polar bear, the walrus, the seal of Greenland, the reindeer, the right whale, and the eider duck. The vegetation is represented by the so-called reindeer moss, a lichen which constitutes the chief food of the herbivorous animals of the Arctics and the high Alps during winter.

"To the glacial zone, which encloses a single fauna, succeeds the temperate zone, included between the isothermes of thirty-two degrees and seventy-four degrees Fahr., characterised by its pine forests, its amentacea, its maples, its walnuts, and its fruit trees, and from the midst of which arise, like islands, lofty mountain chains, or high table-lands, clothed with a vegetation which, in many respects, recalls that of the glacial regions. The geographical distribution of animals in this zone forms several closely-connected, but distinct, combinations. It is the country of the terrestrial bear, of the wolf, the fox, the weasel, the marten, the otter, the lynx, the horse and the ass, the boar, and a great number of stags, deer, elk, goats, sheep, bulls, hares, squirrels, rats, &c.; to which are added southward, a few representatives of the tropical zone.

"Wherever this zone is not modified by extensive and high table-lands and mountain chains, we may distinguish in it four *secondary* zones, approximating gradually to the character of the tropics, and presenting, therefore, a greater diversity in the types of its southern representation than we

find among those of its northern boundaries. We have first, adjoining the Arctics, a *Sub-Arctic* zone, with an almost uniform appearance in the Old, as well as the New World, in which pine forests prevail, the home of the moose; next a *cold temperate zone*, in which amentaceous trees are combined with pines, the home of the fur animals; next, a *warm temperate zone*, in which the pines recede, whilst to the prevailing amentaceous trees a variety of evergreens are added, the chief seat of the culture of our fruit trees, and of the wheat; and a *sub-tropical zone*, in which a number of tropical forms are combined with those characteristics of the warm temperate zone. Yet there is, throughout the whole of the temperate zone, one feature prevailing; the repetition, under corresponding latitudes, but under different longitudes, of the same genera and families, represented in each botanical or zoological province by distinct so-called *analogous, or representative species*, with a very few subordinate types, peculiar to each province; for it is not until we reach the tropical zone that we find distinct types prevailing in each fauna and flora.

"Again, owing to the inequalities of the surface, the secondary zones are more or less blended into one another, as for instance, in the table-lands of Central Asia, and Western North America, where the whole temperate zone preserves the features of a cold temperate region; or the colder zones may appear like islands rising in the midst of the warmer ones, as the Pyrenees, the Alps, &c., the summits of which partake of the peculiarities of the Arctic and sub-Arctic zones, whilst the valleys at their base are characterised by the flora and fauna of the cold or warm temperate zones. It may be proper to remark, in this connection, that the study of the laws regulating the geographical distribution of natural families of animals and plants upon the whole surface of our globe, differs entirely from that of the associations and combinations of a variety of animals and plants within definite regions, forming peculiar faunæ and flora.

"Considering the whole range of the temperate zone from east to west, we may divide it in accordance with the prevailing physical features into—1st, an *Asiatic* realm, embracing Mantchuria, Japan, China, Mongolia, and passing through Turkestan into—2nd, the *European* realm, which includes Iran as well as Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, Northern Arabia, and Barbary, as well as Europe, properly so-called; the western parts of Asia, and the northern parts of Africa

being intimately connected by the geological structure with the southern parts of Europe; and—3rd, the *North American* realm, which extends as far south as the table-land of Mexico.

"With these qualifications, we may proceed to consider the faunæ which characterise these three realms. But, before studying the organic characters of this zone, let us glance at its physical constitution. The most marked character of the temperate zone is found in the inequality of the four seasons, which give to the earth a peculiar aspect in different epochs of the year, and in the gradual, though more or less rapid, passage of these seasons into each other. The vegetation particularly undergoes marked modification; completely arrested, or merely suspended, for a longer or shorter time, according to the proximity of the Arctic or the tropical zone, we find it by turns in a prolonged lethargy, or in a state of energetic and sustained development. But in this respect there is a decided contrast between the cold and warm portions of the temperate zone. Though they are both characterised by the predominance of the same families of plants, and in particular by the presence of numerous species of the coniferous and amentaceous plants, yet the periodical sleep which deprives the middle latitudes of their verdure, is more complete in the colder region than in the warmer, which is already enriched by some southern forms of vegetation, and where a part of the trees remain green all the year. The succession of the seasons produces, moreover, such considerable changes in the climatic conditions in this zone, that all the animals belonging to it cannot sustain them equally well. Hence a large number of them migrate at different seasons from one extremity of the zone to the other, especially certain families of birds. It is known to all the world that the birds of Northern Europe and America leave their ungenial climate in the winter, seeking warmer regions as far as the Gulf of Mexico and the Mediterranean, the shores of which, even those of the African coasts, make a part of the temperate zone. Analogous migrations take place also in the north of Asia. Such migrations are not, however, limited to the temperate zone; a number of species from the Arctic regions go for the winter into the temperate zone, and the limits of these migrations may aid us in tracing the natural limits of the faunæ, which thus link themselves to each other, as the human races are connected by civilisation.

"The temperate zone is not characterised, like the Arctic, by one and the same fauna; it does not form, as the Arctic does, one continuous zoological zone around the globe. Not only do the animals change from one hemisphere to another, but those differences exist even between various regions of the same hemisphere. The species belonging to the western countries of the Old World are not identical with those of the eastern countries. It is true that they often resemble each other so closely that until very recently they have been confounded. It has been reserved, however, for modern zoology and botany to detect these nice distinctions. For instance, the conifera of the Old World, even within the sub-Arctic zone, are not identical with those of America. Instead of the Norway and black pine, we have here the balsam and white spruce; instead of the common fir, the *Pinus rigida;* instead of the European larch, the hacmatac, &c.; and farther south the differences are still more striking. In the temperate zone proper, the oaks, the beeches, the birches, the hornbeams, the hophornbeams, the chestnuts, the buttonwoods, the elms, the linden, the maples, and the walnuts, are represented in each continent by peculiar species differing more or less. Peculiar forms make, here and there, their appearance, such as the gum-trees, the tulip-trees, the magnolias. The evergreens are still more diversified; we need only mention the camellias of Japan, and the kalmias of America, as examples. Among the tropical forms extending into the warm temperate zone, we notice particularly the palmetto in the southern United States, and the dwarf chamærops of southern Europe. The animal kingdom presents the same features. In Europe we have, for instance, the brown bear, in North America the black bear, in Asia the bear of Tubet: the European stag and the European deer are represented in North America by the Canadian stag, or wapiti, and the American deer; and in eastern Asia by the musk deer. Instead of the monflon, North America has the big-horn or mountain sheep, and Asia the argali. The North American buffalo is represented in Europe by the wild anerochs of Lithuania, and in Mongolia by the yak; the wild cats, the martens and weasels, the wolves and foxes, the squirrels and mice (excepting the imported house-mouse), the birds, the reptiles, the fishes, the insects, the mollusks, &c., though more or less closely allied, are equally distinct specifically. The types peculiar to the Old or New World are few; among

them may be mentioned the horse, the ass, and the dromedary of Asia, and the opossum of North America; but upon this subject more details may be found in every text-book of zoology and botany. We would only add that in the present state of our knowledge we recognise the following combinations of animals within the limits of the temperate zone, which may be considered as so many distinct zoological provinces or faunæ:—

"In the *Asiatic realm*—1st, a north-eastern fauna, the *Japanese fauna*—2nd, a south-eastern fauna, the *Chinese fauna*, and a central fauna, the *Mongolian fauna*, following westwards by the *Caspian fauna*, which partakes partly of the European zoological character; its most remarkable animal, antelope saiga, ranging west as far as Southern Russia. The Japanese and Chinese fauna stand to each other in the same relation as Southern Europe and North Africa, and it remains to be ascertained by farther investigations whether the Japanese fauna ought not to be sub-divided into a more eastern insular fauna, the *Japanese fauna proper*, and a more western continental fauna, which might be called the *Mandshurian*, or *Tongonsian* fauna. But since it is not my object to describe separately all faunæ, but chiefly to call attention to the coincidence existing between the natural limitation of the races of man, and the geographical range of the zoological provinces, I shall limit myself here to some general remarks respecting the Mongolian fauna, in order to show that the Asiatic zoological realm differs essentially from the European and the American. The most remarkable animals of this fauna are the bear of Tubet (ursus thibetanus), the musk-deer (moschus moschiferus), the Tzeiran (antilope gutturosa), the Mongolian goat (capra sibirica), the argali (ovis argali), and the yak (bos grunniens). This is also the home of the Bactrian, or double-hunched camel, and of the wild horse (equus caballus), the wild ass (equus onager), and another equine species, the Dtschigetai (equus hemionus). The wide distribution of the musk-deer in the Altai, and the Himalayan and Chinese Alps, shows the whole Asiatic range of the temperate zone to be a most natural zoological realm, sub-divided into distinct provinces by the greater localisation of the largest number of its representatives.

"If we now ask, what are the nations of the men inhabiting those regions, we find that they all belong to the so-called Mongolian race, the natural limits of which

correspond exactly to the range of the Japanese, Chinese, Mongolian, and Caspian faunæ, taken together, and that peculiar types, distinct nations of this race, cover respectively the different faunæ of this realm. The Japanese inhabiting the Japanese zoological province; the Chinese, the Chinese province; the Mongols, the Mongolian province; and the Turks, the Caspian province; eliminating, of course, the modern establishment of Turks in Asia Minor and Europe.

"The unity of Europe (exclusive of its Arctic regions), in connection with south-western Asia and northern Africa, as a distinct zoological realm, is established by the range of its mammalia and by the limits of the migration of its birds, as well as by the physical features of its whole extent. Thus we find its deer and stag, its bear, its hare, its squirrel, its wolf and wild-cat, its fox and jackal, its otter, its weasel and marten, its badger, its bear, its mole, its hedgehogs, and a number of bats, either extending over the whole realm in Europe, western Asia, and north Africa, or so linked together as to show that in their combination with the birds, reptiles, fishes, etc., of the same countries, they constitute a natural zoological association analogous to that of Asia, but essentially different in reference to species.

"Like the eastern realm, this European world may be subdivided into a number of distinct faunæ, characterised each by a variety of peculiar animals. In western Asia we find, for instance, the common camel, instead of the Bactrian, whilst Mount Sinai, Mounts Taurus and Caucasus have goats and wild sheep, which differ as much from those of Asia as they differ from those of Greece, of Italy, of the Alps, of the Pyrenees, of the Atlas, and of Egypt. Wild horses are known to have inhabited Spain and Germany; and a wild bull extended over the whole range of central Europe, which no longer exists there. The Asiatic origin of our domesticated animals may, therefore, well be questioned, even if we were still to refer western Asia to the Asiatic realm; since the ass, and some of the breeds of our horse, only belong to the table-lands of Iran and Mongolia, whilst the other species, including the cat, may all be traced to species of the European realm. The domesticated cat is referred by Rüppell to *felis maniculata* of Egypt; by others, to *felis catus ferus* of Central Europe; thus, in both cases, to an animal of the European realm. Whether the dog be a species by itself, or its varieties derived from several species

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Autobiography of Mr. Bradlaugh.

[*Reprinted from the "National Reformer", August 31st, 1873.*]

At the request of many friends, and by way of farewell address on leaving for America, I, for the first time in my life, pen a partial autobiographical sketch. I do not pretend that the narrative will be a complete picture of my life: I only vouch the accuracy of the facts so far as I state them. I have not the right in some cases to state political occurrences in which others now living are involved, nor have I the courage of Jean Jacques Rousseau, to photograph my inner life. I shall therefore state little the public may not already know.

I was born on the 26th September, 1833, in a small house in Bacchus Walk, Hoxton. My father was a solicitor's clerk with a very poor salary, which he supplemented by law writing. He was an extremely industrious man, and a splendid penman. I never had the opportunity of judging his tastes or thoughts, outside his daily labours, except in one respect, in which I have followed in his footsteps. He was passionately fond of angling.

Until 1848 my life needs little relation. My schooling, like that of most poor men's children,

was small in quantity, and, except as to the three R's, indifferent in quality. I remember at seven years of age being at a national school in Abbey Street, Bethnal Green; between seven and nine I was at another small private school in the same neighborhood; and my "education" was completed before I was eleven years of age, at a boy's school in Coal-harbor Street, Hackney Road.

When about twelve years of age I was first employed as errand lad in the solicitor's office where my father remained his whole life through. After a little more than two years in this occupation, I became wharf clerk and cashier to a firm of coal merchants in Britannia Fields, City Road. While in their employment the exitement of the Chartist movement was at its height in England, and the authorities, frightened by the then huge continental revolution wave, were preparing for the prosecution of some of the leaders amongst the Chartists. Meetings used to be held almost continuously all day on Sunday, and every week-night in the open air on Bonner's Fields, near where the Consumption Hospital now stands. These meetings were in knots of from fifty to five hundred, sometimes many more, and were occupied chiefly in discussions on theological, social, and political questions, any bystander taking part. The curiosity of a lad took me occasionally in the week evenings to the Bonner's Fields gatherings. On the Sunday I, as a member of the Church of England, was fully occupied as a Sunday-school teacher.

This last-named fashion of passing Sunday was

broken suddenly. The Bishop of London was announced to hold a confirmation in Bethnal Green. The incumbent of St. Peter's, Hackney Road, the district in which I resided, was one John Graham Packer; and he, desiring to make a good figure when the Bishop came, pressed me to prepare for confirmation, so as to answer any questions the Bishop might put. I studied a little the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England, and the four Gospels, and came to the conclusion that they differed. I ventured to write the Rev. Mr. Packer a respectful letter, asking him for aid and explanation. All he did was to denounce my letter to my parents as Atheistical, although at that time I should have shuddered at the notion of becoming an Athiest; and he suspended me for three months from my office of Sunday-school teacher. This left me my Sundays free, for I did not like to go to church while suspended from my teacher's duty; and I went instead to Bonner's Fields, at first to listen, but soon to take part in some of the discussions which were then always pending there.

At the commencement I spoke on the orthodox Christian side; but after a debate with Mr. J. Savage, in the Warner Place Hall, in 1849, on the "Inspiration of the Bible", I found that my views were getting very much tinged with Freethought, and in the winter of that year, at the instigation of Mr. Packer, to whom I had submitted the "Diegesis" of Robert Taylor, I—having become a teetotaler, which in his view brought out my infidel tendencies still more vigorously—had three days given me by my employers, after consultation

with my father, to "change my opinions or lose my situation". I am inclined to think now that the threat was never intended to have been enforced, but was used to terrify me into submission. At that time I hardly knew what, if any, opinions I had, but the result was that, sooner than make a show of recanting, I left home and situation on the third day, and never returned to either.

I was always a very fluent speaker, and now lectured frequently at the Temperance Hall, Warner Place, Hackney Road, at the small Hall in Philpot Street, and in the open air in Bonner's Fields, where, at last, on Sunday afternoons, scores or hundreds congregated to hear me. My views were then Deistical, but rapidly tending to the more extreme phase into which they ultimately settled. I now took part in all the gatherings held in London on behalf of the Poles and Hungarians, and actually fancied that I could write poetry on Kossuth and Mazzini.

It was at this time I made the acquaintance of my friend and co-worker, Mr. Austin Holyoake, at his printing office in Queen's Head Passage, and I remember him taking me to John Street Institution, where, at one of the pleasant Saturday evening gatherings, I met the late Mrs. Emma Martin. At Mr. Austin Holyoake's request, Mr. George Jacob Holyoake, to my great delight, presided at one of my lectures in Philpot Street, and I felt special interest in the number of the *Reasoner* which contained a brief reference to myself and that lecture.

I wrote my first pamphlet, "A Few Words on the Christian's Creed," about the middle of 1850, and was

honored by Dr. Campbell of the *British Banner* with a leading article vigorously assailing me for the lectures I had then delivered.

After leaving home I was chiefly sheltered by Mrs. Sharples Carlile, with whose children, Hypatia, Theophila, and Julian, I shared such comforts as were at her disposal. Here I studied hard everything which came in my way, picking up a little Hebrew and an imperfect smattering of other tongues. I tried to earn my living as a coal merchant, but at sixteen, and without one farthing in my pocket, the business was not extensive enough to be profitable. I got very poor, and at that time was also very proud. A subscription offered me by a few Freethinkers shocked me, and awakened me to a sense of my poverty; so, telling no one where I was going, I went away, and on the 17th of December, 1850, was, after some difficulty, enlisted in the Seventh Dragoon Guards. With this corps I remained until October, 1853, being ultimately appointed orderly-room clerk; the regiment, during the whole of the time I remained in it, being quartered in Ireland. While I was in the regiment I was a teetotaler, and used often to lecture to the men in the barrack-room at night; and I have more than once broken out of Portobello barracks to deliver teetotal speeches in the small French Street Hall, Dublin. Many times have I spoken there in my scarlet jacket, between James Haughton and the good old father, the Rev. Dr. Spratt, a Roman Catholic priest, then very active in the cause of temperance. While I was in the regiment my father died, and in the summer of 1853 an aunt's death left me

a small sum, out of which I purchased my discharge, and returned to England, to aid in the maintenance of my mother and family.

I have now no time for the full story of my army life, which, however, I may tell some day. Before I left the regiment I had won the esteem of most of the privates, and of some of the officers. I quitted the regiment with a "very good character" from the Colonel; but I am bound to add that the Captain of my troop would not have concurred in this character had he had any voice in the matter. The Lieutenant-Colonel, C. P. Ainslie, earned an eternal right to grateful mention at my hands by his gentlemanly and considerate treatment. I cannot say the same for my Captain, who did his best to send me to gaol, and whom I have not yet quite forgiven.

On returning to civilian life, I obtained employment in the daytime with a solicitor named Rogers, and in the evening as clerk to a Building Society. Soon after entering this employ I began again to write and speak; and it was then, to avoid in some degree the efforts which were afterwards made to ruin me, I took the name of "Iconoclast", under which all my anti-theological work down to 1868 was done. I give Mr. Rogers' name now, for he is dead, and malice cannot injure him. Many anonymous letters were sent to him to warn him of my irreligious opinions; he treated them all with contempt, only asking me not to let my propaganda become an injury to his business.

Soon after my discharge from the army I had a curious adventure. While I was away a number of poor men had subscribed their funds together and had

erected a Working Man's Hall, in Goldsmith's Row, Hackney Road. Not having any legal advice, it turned out that they had been entrapped into erecting their building on freehold ground without any lease or conveyance from the freeholder, who asserted his legal right to the building. The men consulted me, and finding that under the Statute of Frauds they had no remedy, I recommended them to offer a penalty rent of £20 a year. This being refused, I constituted myself into a law court; and without any riot or breach of the peace, I, with the assistance of a hundred stout men, took every brick of the building bodily away, and divided the materials, so far as was possible, amongst the proper owners. I think I can see now the disappointed rascal of a freeholder when he only had his bare soil left once more. He did not escape unpunished, for, to encourage the others to contribute, he had invested some few pounds in the building. He had been too clever: he had relied on the letter of the law, and I beat him with a version of common-sense justice.

I lectured once or twice a week in the small Philpot Street Hall; very often then in the Hall of Science, City Road; and then in the old John Street Institution, until I won myself a name in the party and through the country.

In 1855 I had my first notable adventure with the authorities in reference to the right of meeting in Hyde Park, and subsequently gave evidence before the Royal Commission ordered by the House of Commons, presided over by the Right Hon. Stuart Wortley. I was very proud that day at Westminster, when, at

the conclusion of my testimony against the authorities, the Commissioner publicly thanked me, and the people who crowded the Court of Exchequer cheered me, for the manner in which I denied the right of Sir Richard Mayne, the then Chief Commissioner of Police, to issue the notices forbidding the people to meet in the Park. This was a first step in a course in which I have never flinched or wavered.

In 1856 I undertook, with others, the publication of a series of papers entitled "Half-hours with Free-thinkers," the late John Watts being one of my co-workers. I also by myself commenced the publication of my "Commentary on the Pentateuch", which has since been entirely re-written, and now forms my "Bible: what it is."

During the autumn of 1857 I paid my first lecturing visit to Northampton.

Early in 1858, when Mr. Edward Truelove was suddenly arrested for publishing the pamphlet "Is Tyrannicide Justifiable?", I became Honorary Secretary to the Defence, and was at the same time associated with the conduct of the defence of Simon Bernard, who was arrested at the instigation of the French Government for alleged complicity in the Orsini tragedy. It was at this period I gained the friendship of poor Bernard, which, without diminution, I retained until he died; and also the valued friendship of Thomas Allsop, which I still preserve. My associations were thenceforward such as to encourage in me a strong and bitter feeling against the late Emperor Napoleon. Whilst he was in power I hated him, and never lost an opportunity

of working against him until the *échéance* came. I am not sure now that I always judged him fairly; but nothing, I think, could have tempted me either to write or speak of him with friendliness or kindliness during his life. *Le sang de mes amis était sur son âme.* Now that the tomb covers his remains, my hatred has ceased; but no other feeling has arisen in its place. Should any of his family seek to resume the Imperial purple, I should remain true to my political declarations of sixteen years since, and should exert myself to the uttermost to prevent France falling under another Empire. I write this with much sadness, as the years 1870 to 1873 have dispelled some of my illusions, held firmly during the fifteen years which preceded. I had believed in such men as Louis Blanc, Ledru Rollin, Victor Hugo, as possible statesmen for France. I was mistaken. They were writers, talkers, and poets; good men to ride on the stream, or to drown in honest protest, but lacking force to swim against, or turn back, the tide by the might of their will. I had believed too in a Republican France, which is yet only in the womb of time, to be born after many pangs and sore travailing.

In 1859 I saw Joseph Mazzini for the first time, and remained on terms of communication with the great Italian patriot until the year 1869, from time to time bringing him correspondence from Italy, where my business sometimes took me. After 1869 we found ourselves holding diverse opinions on the Franco-Prussian question—Mazzini went for Prussia, I for France—and I never saw him again.

In June, 1858, I held my first public formal theo-

logical debate with the Rev. Brewin Grant, B.A., at that time a Dissenting Minister at Sheffield. Mr. Grant was then a man of some ability, and if he could have forgotten his aptitudes as a circus jester, would have been a redoubtable antagonist. During this year I was elected President of the London Secular Society, in lieu of Mr. George Jacob Holyoake, who had theretofore led the English Freethought party, but who has of late years devoted himself more completely to general journalistic work.

In November, 1858, I commenced editorial duties with the *Investigator*, formerly conducted by the late Robert Cooper, which I continued until August, 1859. It had but a small circulation, and was financially a very great failure.

For the encouragement of young propagandists, I may here insert a little anecdote of my early lecturing experience. I had lectured in Edinburgh in mid-winter; the audience was small, the profits microscopical. After paying my bill at the Temperance Hotel, where I then stayed, I had only a few shillings more than my Parliamentary fare to Bolton, where I was next to lecture. I was out of bed at five on a freezing morning, and could have no breakfast, as the people were not up. I carried my luggage (a big tin box, corded round, which then held books and clothes, and a small black bag), for I could not spare any of my scanty cash for a conveyance or porter. The train from Edinburgh being delayed by a severe snow-storm; the corresponding Parliamentary had left Carlisle long before our arrival. In order to reach Bolton in time for

my lecture, I had to book by a quick train, starting in about three-quarters of an hour, but could only book to Preston, as the increased fare took all my money, except 4½d. With this small sum I could get no refreshment in the station, but in a little shop in the street outside I got a mug of hot tea and a little hot meat pie. From Preston I got with great difficulty on to Bolton, handing my black bag to the station-master there, as security for my fare from Preston, until the morning. I arrived in Bolton about a quarter to eight; the lecture commenced at eight, and I, having barely time to run to my lodgings, and wash and change, went on to the platform cold and hungry. I shall never forget that lecture; it was in an old Unitarian Chapel. We had no gas, the building seemed full of a foggy mist, and was imperfectly lit with candles. Everything appeared cold, cheerless, and gloomy. The most amusing feature was that an opponent, endowed with extra piety and forbearance, chose that evening to specially attack me for the money-making and easy life I was leading. Peace to that opponent's memory: I have never seen him since. It was while in Scotland on this journey I made the acquaintance, and ultimately won the friendship, of the late Alexander Campbell, of Glasgow—a generous, kindly-hearted old Socialist Missionary, who, at a time when others were hostile, spoke encouragingly to me, and who afterwards worked with me for a long period on the *National Reformer*.

Occasionally, the lectures were interfered with by the authorities, but this happened oftener in the provinces than in London. In March, 1859, I was to have

lectured in the Saint Martin's Hall on "Louis Napoleon," but the Government—on a remonstrance by Count Walewski, as to language used at a previous meeting, at which I had presided for Dr. Bernard—interfered; the hall was garrisoned by police, and the lecture prevented. Mr. Hullah, the then proprietor, being indemnified by the authorities, paid damages for his breach of contract, to avoid a suit which I at once commenced against him.

Later in the same month I held a debate in Northampton with Mr. John Bowes, a rather heavy but well-meaning old gentleman, utterly unfitted for platform controversy. The press now began to deal with me tolerably freely, and I find "boy", "young man", and "juvenile appearance" very frequent in the comments. My want of education was an especial matter for hostile criticism, more particularly so when the writer had neither heard nor seen me.

Discussions now grew on me so thick and fast that even some of the most important debates may perhaps escape notice in this imperfect chronicling. At Sheffield I debated with a Reverend Dr. Mensor, who styled himself a Jewish Rabbi. He was then in the process of gaining admission to the Church of England, and had been put forward to show my want of scholarship. We both scrawled Hebrew characters for four nights on a black board, to the delight and mystification of the audience, who gave me credit for erudition, because I chalked the square letter characters with tolerable rapidity and clearness. At Glasgow I debated with a Mr. Court, representing the Glasgow Protestant

Association, a glib-tongued missionary, who has since gone to the bad; at Paisley with a Mr. Smart, a very gentlemanly antagonist; and at Halifax with the Rev. T. D. Matthias, a Welsh Baptist Minister, unquestionably very sincere. All these were formal debates, and were reported with tolerable fulness in the various local journals.

In the early part of 1860 I, aided by my friends at Sheffield, Halifax, and other parts of England, projected the *National Reformer* in small shares. Unfortunately, just after the issue of its prospectus, Joseph Barker returned from America, and was associated with me in the editorship. The arrangement was peculiar, Mr. Barker editing the first half of the paper and I the second. It was not precisely a happy union, and the unnatural alliance came to an end in a very brief period. In August, 1861, I officially parted company with Joseph Barker as editor. We had been practically divorced for months before: the first part of the paper usually contained abuse of those who wrote in the second half. He came to me originally at Sheffield, pretending to be an Atheist and a Republican, and soon after pretended to be a Christian, and spoke in favor of slavery. I am sometimes doubtful as to how far Mr. Barker deluded himself as well as others, in his various changes of theological and political opinions. If he had had the slightest thoroughness in his character, he would have been a great man; as it is, he is only a great turn-coat.

In June 1860, I debated again with the Reverend Brewin Grant, every Monday for four weeks, at Brad-

ford, and during this debate had a narrow escape of my life. In one of my journeys to London, the Great Northern train ran through the station at King's Cross, and many persons were seriously injured. I got off with some trifling bruises and a severe shaking.

Garibaldi having at this time made his famous Marsala effort, I delivered a series of lectures in his aid, and am happy to be able to record that, though at that time very poor, I sent him one hundred guineas as my contribution by my tongue. This money was chiefly sent through W. H. Ashurst, Esq., now Solicitor to the General Post Office, and amongst the few letters I preserve I have one of thanks from "G. Garibaldi", for what I was then doing for Italy.

In this year I debated for four nights with Dr. Brindley, an old antagonist of the Socialists, at Oldham; for two nights with the Rev. Dr. Baylee, the President of St. Aidan's College, at Birkenhead, where a Church of England curate manufactory was for some time carried on; and for two nights with the Rev. Dr. Rutherford, of Newcastle. Dr. Rutherford has since so identified himself with the cause of the Tyneside workers, that I read with regret any harsh words that escaped me in that debate. Although during late years I have managed to keep all my meetings free from violence or disorder, this was not always so.

In October, 1860, I paid my first visit to Wigan, and certainly lectured there under considerable difficulty, and incurred personal danger, the resident clergy actually inciting the populace to physical violence, and

part destruction of the building I lectured in. I, however, supported by one courageous woman and her husband, persevered, and, despite bricks and kicks, visited Wigan again and again, until I had, *bon gré mal gré*, improved the manners and customs of the people, so that I am now a welcome speaker there. I could not improve the morals of the clergy, as the public journals have recently shown, but that was their misfortune, not my fault. In the winter of 1860, I held two formal debates in Wigan, all of which were fully reported in the local journals; one with Mr. Hutchings, a respectable Nonconformist layman, and the other with the Rev. Woodville Woodman, a Swedenborgian divine.

Early in 1861 I visited Guernsey in consequence of an attempt made by the Law Courts of the Island to enforce the Blasphemy Laws against a Mr. Stephen Bendall, who had distributed some of my pamphlets to the Guernseyites, and had been condemned to imprisonment in default of finding sureties not to repeat the offence. Not daring to prosecute me, although challenged in writing, the authorities permitted drink and leave of absence to be given to soldiers in the garrison, on condition they should try to prevent the lecture; and the house in which I lectured was broken into by a drunken and pious mob, shouting "Kill the Infidel". My antagonists were, fortunately, as cowardly as they were intolerant, and I succeeded in quelling the riot, delivering my lecture in spite of all opposition, although considerable damage was done to the building.

Shortly after this I visited Plymouth, where the Young Men's Christian Association arranged to prosecute me. They were, however, a little too hasty, and had me arrested at an open air meeting when I had scarcely commenced my speech, having only uttered the words—"Friends, I am about to address you on the Bible". Having locked me up all night, and refused bail, it was found by their legal adviser that a blunder had been committed, and a charge of "exciting a breach of the peace, and assaulting the constable in the execution of his duty," was manufactured. It was tolerably amusing to see the number of dinners, suppers, and breakfasts, all accompanied with pots or cups of Devonshire cream, sent in to the Devonport Lock-up, where I was confined, by various friends who wanted to show their sympathy. The invented charge, though well sworn to, broke down after two days' hearing, under the severe cross-examination to which I subjected the witnesses. I defended myself; two lawyers appeared against me; and seven magistrates sat on the bench, predetermined to convict me. Finding that the evidence of the whole of the witnesses whom I wished to call was to be objected to because unbelievers in hell were then incompetent as witnesses according to English law, I am pleased to say that several Nonconformists, disgusted with the bigotry and pious perjury of my prosecutors, came forward. The result was a triumphant victory, and a certificate of dismissal which I wrung from the reluctant bench of great unpaid.

I was not yet satisfied; some of the magistrates had

tried to browbeat me, and I announced in court that I would deliver the lecture I had been prevented from delivering to an audience assembled in the borough, and that I should sue at law the Superintendent of Police who had arrested me. The first portion of my defiance was the most difficult to give effect to; not a hall could be hired in Devonport, and nearly all the convenient open land being under military jurisdiction, it was impossible to procure the tenancy of a field for an open-air meeting. I, however, fulfilled my promise, and, despite the police and military authorities combined, I delivered my lecture to an audience assembled in their very teeth. Devonport, Stonehouse, and Plymouth form one garrisoned and fortified town, divided by the River Tamar. All the water to the sea is under the separate jurisdiction of Saltash, some miles distant. I obtained a large boat on which a temporary platform was built, and this boat was quietly moored in the River Tamar on the Devonport side, about two fathoms from the shore. Placards were issued stating that, acting under legal advice, I should address the meeting and deliver the prevented lecture "near to the Devonport Park Gates." Overwhelming force was prepared by the Devonport authorities, and having already erred by too great haste, this time they determined to let me fairly commence my lecture before they arrested me. To their horror I quietly walked past the Park Gates where the crowd was waiting, and passing down a by-lane to the river-side, stepped into a little boat, was rowed to the large one, and then delivered my lecture, the audience who

had followed me standing on an open wharf, all within the jurisdiction of the Borough of Devonport, and I being about nine feet outside the borough. The face of the Mayor ready to read the riot act, the superintendent with twenty-eight picked policemen to make sure of my arrest, and a military force in readiness to overawe any popular demonstration—all these were sights to remember. I am afraid the Devonport Young Men's Christian Association did not limit themselves to prayers and blessings on that famous Sunday.

As I had promised, the authorities refusing any apology for the wrongful arrest, I commenced an action against Superintendent Edwards, by whom I had been taken into custody. The borough magistrates indemnified their officer and found funds to resist me. I fought with very little help save from one tried, though anonymous, friend, for Joseph Barker, my co-editor, but not co-worker, in our own paper discouraged any pecuniary support. The cause was made a special jury one, and came on for trial at Exeter Assizes. Unfortunately I was persuaded to brief counsel, and Sir Robert Collier, my leader, commenced his speech with an expression of sorrow for my opinions. This damaged me very much, although I won the case easily after a long trial. The jury, composed of Devonshire landowners, only gave me a farthing damages, and Mr. Baron Channell refused to certify for costs. I was determined not to let the matter rest here, and myself carried it to the Court *in banco*, where I argued it in person, for two whole days, before Lord Chief Justice Erle and a full bench of Judges.

Although I did not succeed in improving my own position, I raised public opinion in favor of free speech; and the enormous costs incurred by the borough authorities, and which they had to bear, have deterred them from ever again interfering either with my lectures or those of any other speaker; and I now have crowded audiences in the finest hall whenever I visit the three towns. These proceedings cost me several hundred pounds, and burthened me with a debt which took long clearing off.

In 1862 I held a four nights' discussion with a Dissenting clergyman, the Rev. W. Barker. My opponent was probably one of the most able and straightforward amongst my numerous antagonists. About this time a severe attack of acute rheumatism prostrated me; and having soon after to visit Italy, I, at first under medical advice, adopted the habit of drinking the light Continental wines; and although continuing an advocate of sobriety, I naturally ceased to take part in any teetotal gatherings.

In the struggle between the Northern and Southern States of America, my advocacy and sympathies went—with what I am glad to say was the feeling of the great mass of the English people—in favor of the North; and my esteemed friend and then contributor, W. E. Adams, furnished most valuable aid with his pen in the enlightenment of public opinion, at a time when many of our aristocracy were openly exulting in what they conceived to be the probable break-up of the United States Republic. During the Lancashire Cotton Famine I lectured several times in aid of the fund.

I began now also to assume a much more prominent position in the various English political movements, and especially to speak on the Irish Church and Irish Land questions. On the Irish question, I owe much to my late co-worker and contributor, poor Peter Fox André, a thoroughly honest and whole-souled man, whose pen was always on the side of struggling nationalities.

One of the disadvantages connected with a public career is, that every vile scoundrel who is too cowardly to face you openly can libel you anonymously. I have had, I think, my full share of this kind of annoyance. Most of the slanders I have treated with utter contempt, and if I had alone consulted my own feelings, I should probably never have pursued any other course. Twice, however, I have had recourse to the judgment of the law—once in the case of a clergyman of the Church of England, who indulged in a foul libel affecting my wife and children. This fellow I compelled to retract every word he had uttered, and to pay £100, which, after deducting the costs, was divided amongst various charitable institutions. The reverend libeller wrote me an abject letter, begging me not to ruin his prospects in the Church by publishing his name; I consented, and he has since repaid my mercy by losing no opportunity of being offensive. He is a prominent contributor to the *Rock*, and a fierce ultra-Protestant. He must have greater confidence in my honor than in his own, or fear of exposure would compel him to greater reticence. The other case arose during the election, and will be dealt with in its proper order.

It was my fortune to be associated with the Reform League from its earliest moments until its dissolution. It is hardly worth while to repeat here the almost stereotyped story of the successful struggle made by the League for Parliamentary Reform. E. Beales, Esq., was the President of the League, and I was one of its Vice-Presidents, and continued nearly the whole time of its existence a member of its executive. The whole of my services and journeys were given to the League without the slightest remuneration, and I repeatedly, and according to my means, contributed to its funds. When I resigned my position on the executive I received from Mr. George Howell, the Secretary, and from Mr. Beales, the President, the most touching and flattering letters as to what Mr. Beales was pleased to describe as the loyalty and utility of my services to the League. Mr. George Howell concluded a long letter as follows:—"Be pleased to accept my assurance of sincere regards for your manly courage, consistent and honorable conduct in our cause, and for your kindly consideration for myself as secretary of this great movement on all occasions". These letters have additional value from the fact that Mr. Beales, whom I sincerely respect, differs widely from me in matters of faith, and Mr. Howell is, unfortunately, far from having any friendly feelin towards me. It was while on the Executive of this League that I first became intimately acquainted with Mr. George Odger, and had reason to be pleased with the straightforward course he pursued, and the honest work he did as one of the Executive Committee. Mr.

John Baxter Langley and Mr. R. A. Cooper were also amongst my most prominent co-workers.

My sympathy with Ireland, and open advocacy of justice for the Irish, nearly brought me into serious trouble. Some who were afterwards indicted as the chiefs of the so-called Fenian movement, came to me for advice. So much I see others have written, and the rest of this portion of my autobiography I may write some day. At present there are men not out of danger whom careless words might imperil, and as regards myself I shall not be guilty of the folly of printing language which a Government might use against me. My pamphlet on the Irish question, published in 1866, won a voluntary letter of warm approval from Mr. Gladstone, the only friendly writing I ever received from him in my life.

At Huddersfield, the Philosophical Hall having been duly hired for my lectures, pious influence was brought to bear on the lessee to induce him to break his contract. Fortunately, what in law amounted to possession had been given, and on the doors being locked against me, I broke them open, and delivered my lecture to a crowded and most orderly audience. I was arrested, and an attempt was made to prosecute me before the Huddersfield magistrates; but I defended myself with success, and defeated with ease the Conservative solicitor, N. Learoyd, who had been specially retained to ensure my committal to gaol.

In 1868 I entered into a contest with the Conservative Government, which, having been continued by the Gladstone Government, finished in 1869 with a complete

victory for myself. According to the then law every newspaper was required to give sureties to the extent of £800 against blasphemous or seditious libel. I had never offered to give these sureties, as they would have probably been liable to forfeiture about once a month. In March 1868, the Disraeli Government insisted on my compliance with the law. I refused. The Government then required me to stop my paper. I printed on the next issue, "Printed in Defiance of Her Majesty's Government". I was then served with an Attorney-General's information, containing numerous counts, and seeking to recover enormous penalties. I determined to be my own barrister, and while availing myself in consultation of the best legal advice, I always argued my own case. The interlocutory hearings before the Judges in Chambers were numerous, for I took objection to nearly every step made by the Government, and I nearly always succeeded. I also brought the matter before Parliament, being specially backed in this by Mr. Milner Gibson, Mr. John Stuart Mill, and Mr. E. H. J. Craufurd. When the information was called on for trial in a crowded court before Mr. Baron Martin, the Government backed out, and declined to make a jury: so the prosecution fell to the ground. Strange to say, it was renewed by the Gladstone Government, who had the coolness to offer me, by the mouth of Attorney-General Collier, that they would not enforce any penalties if I would stop the paper and admit that I was in the wrong. This I declined, and the prosecution now came on for trial before Baron Bramwell and a special jury. Against

me were the Attorney-General, Sir R. Collier; the Solicitor-General, Sir J. D. Coleridge; and Mr. Crompton Hutton. I found that these legal worthies were blundering in their conduct of the trial, and at *nisi prius* I let them obtain a verdict, which, however, I reversed, on purely technical grounds, after a long argument, which I sustained before Lord Chief Baron Kelly and a full court sitting *in banco*. Having miserably failed to enforce the law against me, the Government repealed the statute, and I can boast that I got rid of the last shackle of the obnoxious English press laws. Mr. J. S. Mill wrote me: "You have gained a very honorable success in obtaining a repeal of the mischievous Act by your persevering resistance". The Government, although beaten, refused to reimburse me any portion of the large outlay incurred in fighting them.

It has always been my ambition to enter Parliament, and, at the General Election for 1868, I for the first time entered the arena as a candidate. I was beaten: but this is scarcely wonderful. I had all the journals in England except three against me. Every idle or virulent tale which folly could distort or calumny invent was used against me. Despite all, I polled nearly 1,100 votes, and I obtained, unasked, but not ungratefully listened to, the public acknowledgments from the Mayor of the borough, also from one of my competitors, Mr. Charles Gilpin, as to the loyal manner in which I had fought the contest through.

During the election struggle, libels rained from all sides. One by the late Mr. Capper, M.P., seeking re-election at Sandwich, was the monstrous story, that,

in the open square at Northampton, I had taken out my watch and defied God to show his power by striking me dead in five minutes. Challenged for his authority, Mr. Capper pretended to have heard the story from Mr. C. Gilpin, M.P., who indignantly denied being any party to the falsehood. I insisted on an apology from Mr. Capper, which being refused, I sued him, but he died soon after the writ was served. The story was not an original invention by Mr. Capper; it had been reported of Abner Kneeland thirty years before, and is still a favorite one with pious missionaries at street corners. A still more outrageous slander was inserted in the *Razor*, a pseudo-comic weekly. I compelled this journal to give a full apology, but not until after two years' litigation, and a new trial had been ordered. When obliged to recant, the Christian proprietor became insolvent, to avoid payment of the costs. Unfortunately, born poor, my life had been one continued struggle, and the burden of my indebtedness was sorely swollen in this and similar contests.

Probably the most severe, and to me certainly the most costly, struggle has been that on the oath question. Formerly it was a fatal objection against the competency of a witness that he did not believe in a Deity and in a future state of rewards and punishments. Several attempts had been made to alter the law, but they had all failed; and, indeed, Sir J. Trevelyan's measures only provided for affirmation, and did not even seek to abolish the incompetency. In a case in which I was

plaintiff in the Court of Common Pleas, my evidence was objected to, and I determined to fight the matter through every possible court, and to get the law changed if possible. I personally argued the case before Lord Chief Justice Bovill and a full Bench, in the Court of Common Pleas; and with the aid of the present Mr. Justice Denman and the late Lord Chancellor Hatherly, the law was twice altered in Parliament. Before victory was ultimately obtained I had to carry the case into the Court of Error, and I prepared and sent out at my own cost more than two hundred petitions to Parliament. Ultimately, the Evidence Amendment Act, 1869, and the Evidence Further Amendment Act, 1870, gave Freethinkers the right to enter the witness box, and I won my suit. The Christian defendant finished by becoming bankrupt, and I lost a terribly large sum in debt and costs. The original debt and interest were over £300, and the costs of the various proceedings were very heavy.

In the winter of 1870 the Mirfield Town Hall, which had been properly taken and paid for for two nights' lectures, was refused by the proprietors, who barricaded the hall and obtained a great force of police from the neighborhood. In order that the law might be clearly settled on this matter, I brought an action to try the question, and although the late Mr. Justice Willes expressed himself strongly in my favor, it was held by Mr. Justice Mellor at *nisi prius* that nothing, except a deed under seal or an actual demise, would avail. A mere agreement for a user of a hall was a license revo-

cable at will, even when for a valuable consideration. This convinced me that when hall proprietors break their contracts, I must myself enforce my rights as I did at Huddersfield and have done in other places.

During the Franco-Prussian struggle I remained neutral until the 4th of September. I was against Bismarck and his blood-and-iron theory, but I was also utterly against the Empire and the Emperor; so I took no part with either. I was lecturing at Plymouth the day the *déchéance* was proclaimed, and immediately after wrote my first article in favor of Republican France. I now set to work, and organised a series of meetings in London and the provinces, some of which were co-operated in by Dr. Congreve, Professor Beesly, and other prominent members of the Positivist party. These meetings exercised some little effect on the public opinion in this country, but unfortunately the collapse on the part of France was so complete, and the resources commanded by Bismarck and Moltke so vast, that except as expressing sympathy the results were barren. In October, 1870, without any previous communication from myself to them, I received from the Republican Government at Tours a long and flattering letter, signed by Léon Gambetta, Adolphe Cremieux, Al Glais Bizoin, and Admiral Fourichon, declaring that they, as members of the "Gouvernement de la Defense Nationale, réunis en délégation à Tours," "tiennent à honneur de vous remercier chalereusement du noble concours que vous apportez à la cause de la France." On the 2nd of February, 1871, M. Tissot, the Chargé

d'Affaires of France in England, wrote me: "Quant à moi, mon cher ami, je ne puis que constater ici, comme je l'ai déjà fait, comme je le ferai en toute occasion, la dette que nous avons contractée envers vous. Vous nous avez donné votre temps, votre activité, votre éloquence, votre âme, la meilleure partie de vous meme, en un mot; la France que vous avez été seule à defendre ne l'oubliera jamais." This is probably a too flattering estimate of my services to France, but coming from the official representative of the French Republic, I feel entitled to insert it. In September, 1871, Monsieur Emmanuel Arago, member of the Provisional Government of the 4th of September wrote the following words upon the letter which had been sent me, as above mentioned, in October, 1870, by the Delegate Government of Tours: "En lisant cette lettre, j'éprouve très vivement le regret de n'avoir pu, enfermé dans Paris, joindre ma signature à celles de mes collègues de la délégation de Tours. Mr. Bradlaugh est et sera tojours dans la République notre concitoyen."

During 1870, 1871, and 1872, I held several debates with the Rev. A. J. Harrison, formerly of Huddersfield. The first, at Newcastle, in the splendid Town Hall of that place, was attended by about 5,000 persons. The second debate at Bristol was notable from being presided over by Professor Newman. The third discussion was at Birmingham, and was an attempt at the Socratic method, and the last platform encounter was in the New Hall of Science, London. Of the Rev. Mr. Harrison it is enough I should say that, a few weeks

since, when rumor put my life in danger, he was one of the first to write a kindly and unaffected letter of sympathy to Mrs. Bradlaugh.

When the great cry of thanksgiving was raised for the recovery of the Prince of Wales, I could not let it pass without protest. While he lay dangerously ill I had ceased to make any attack on himself or family, but I made no pretence of a grief I did not feel. When the thanksgiving day was fixed, and tickets for St. Paul's were sent by the Lord Chamberlain to working men representatives, I felt it right to hold a meeting of protest, which was attended by a crowded audience in the New Hall of Science.

The "right of meeting" has given me three important occasions of measuring swords with the Government during the last few years, and each time defeat has attended the Government. The first was the Hyde Park meeting, where I acted in accord with Mr. Beales, to whom as chief, let the honor go of this conflict. The second was on the 31st July, 1871, under the following circumstances. A meeting had been held by Mr. G. Odger and some of his friends in Hyde Park, on Sunday the 30th of July, to protest against the grant to Prince Arthur; this meeting was adjourned until the following evening. Late on the Sunday afternoon, the adjourned meeting was forbidden by the Government. Early on Monday morning Mr. Odger applied to me to give the friends the benefit of my legal knowledge and personal influence. I consented, and the Government persevering, I took my share of the responsibility of the

gathering, and signed, with Mr. Odger, a new notice convening the meeting. The Home Office not only served us also with a written prohibition, but threatened and prepared to use force. I immediately gave Mr. Bruce notice that the force would be illegal, and that it would be resisted. At the last moment, and in fact only some half hour before the meeting commenced, the Government abandoned its prohibition, and an enormous meeting of a most orderly character was held in absolute defiance of the authorities.

The more recent case was in December, 1872, when, finding that Mr. Odger, Mr. Bailey, and others, had been prosecuted under some monstrous and ridiculous regulations invented by Mr. Ayrton, I, on my own responsibility, determined to throw down the gauntlet to the Government. I did this most successfully, and soon after the opening of Parliament the obnoxious regulations were annulled.

It is at present too early to speak of the Republican movement in England, which I have sought, and not entirely without success, to organise on a thoroughly legal basis. It is a fair matter for observation that my lectures on "The Impeachment of the House of Brunswick," have been delivered to crowded audiences assembled in some of the finest halls in England and Scotland, notably the Free Trade Hall, Manchester, the Town Hall, Birmingham, the Town Hall, Northampton, and the City Hall, Glasgow. It is, as far as I am aware, the first time any English citizen has, without tumult or disorder, and in buildings belonging to

various Municipalities, directly challenged the hereditary right of the reigning family.

In penning the foregoing sketch I had purposely to omit many facts connected with branches of Italian, Irish, and French politics. I have also entirely omitted my own struggles for existence. The political parts are left out because there are secrets which are not my own alone, and which may not bear full telling for many years to come. The second, because I hope that another year or two of hard work may enable me to free myself from the debt load which for some time has hung heavily round me.

ANNOUNCEMENTS.

There will shortly be published one or more volumes of

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Including his papers entitled "DOUBTS IN DIALOGUE"; Open Letters to Clergymen and others on Religious Questions; and other critical and expository papers.

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HAS MAN A SOUL?

BY C. BRADLAUGH.

[This lecture was originally delivered to the Sheffield Secular Society, and was printed from the reporter's notes without efficient correction from myself, I, at that time, suffering under a severe attack of acute rheumatism. The lecture has since been often re-delivered; and three editions having been exhausted, I have again corrected and revised the present edition. It is not intended as an answer to the question which forms the title, but it is intended to provoke thought upon this important subject.]

—o—

What do you mean by soul? What is the soul? Is it I? Is it the body? Is it apart from the body? Is it an attribute of the body? Has it a separate and distinct existence from the body? What is the soul? If I ask one of those who claim to be considered orthodox men, they will tell me that the soul is a spirit—that the soul lives after the body is dead. They will tell me that the soul is immortal, and that the body is mortal; that the soul has nothing whatever in common with the body; that it has an existence entirely independent of the body. They will tell me that after the body has decayed—after the body has become re-absorbed in the universe, of which it is but a part, that the soul still exists. Is there any proof of the existence of the same individual soul apart from all material conditions? I have endeavoured to examine this subject, and, up to the present time, I have not found one iota of proof in support of the positions thus put forward. I have no idea of any existence except that of which I am part. I AM. Of my own existence I am certain. I think. I am. But what is it that thinks? Is it my soul? Is it "me," and yet distinct

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from me? I am but a mode of existence. I am only part of the great universe. The elements of which I am composed are indissolubly connected with that great existence which is around me and within me, and which I help to make up. If men tell me I am a compound, and not a compound—a mixture, and not a mixture—a joining together, and not a joining together—of two entirely different existences, which they call "matter" and "spirit," I am compelled to doubt those men. The ability to think is but an attribute of a certain modification of existence. Intelligence is a word by which we express the sum of certain abilities, always attending a certain mode of existence. I find intelligence manifested so far as organisation is developed. I never find intelligence without animal organisation. I find intelligence manifested in degree, only so far as I find a higher or lower type of organisation—that is, I find man's intellectual faculties limited by his organisation But the orthodox tell me that my soul has an immaterial existence, independent of all organisation—independent of all climatic conditions—independent of all education. Is that so? When does the soul come into man? When does it go out of man? If the soul is immortal, why is it that standing here, in the prime of health and strength, if part of that roof should fall fracturing my skull, and pressing upon my brain—how is it, if my soul is not subject to material conditions, that it then ceases to act? Is the plaster roof more powerful than my immortal soul? Or is it that intelligence is the necessary result of a certain condition of existence, and that the moment you destroy that condition—the moment you destroy the organisation—the result ceases to be realisable? By the course of reasoning you adopt (says the orthodox objector) you reduce man to the same level as the beasts. And why not? I stand on the river's bank, I see there a man full grown, possessed of the physical figure of man, but an idiot—an idiot from his birth upward—one who could not, even if he would, think and act as other men. A little child is there playing on the bank, and the idiot, having large destructive propensities, has thrust the child into the water, and he stands there jabbering and gesticulating while the little child is drowning in the river. And see how half-vacantly, half-triumphantly, he points to the helpless child. A Newfoundland dog has come to the bank; it jumps in and brings the little child out and saves its life. Yet theologians tell me that the idiot has a soul, and that the Newfoundland

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dog has not one. I cannot understand these nice distinctions, which make the man so superior to the beast in matters in which he is positively inferior. Man has doubtless an organisation on the whole far superior intellectually to that of any other animal, but he is only superior by virtue of his superior organisation and its consequent susceptibility for development or education. Many brutes can see more clearly than man; but they possess not the capability for the manufacture of telescopes to aid their vision. Many brutes can run more swiftly, but they manifest no capacity for the subjugation of a steam power which far outstrips their speed. But man himself, a well-organised, thoughtful, intelligent, well-educated man, by a fall from a horse, by a tile from a roof, may receive an injury to his nervous encephalic apparatus, and may be, even while a man in shape, as low as the brute in the imbecility of his reason, and inferior to the brute in physical strength. There is as much difference between different races of men, there is, in fact, more difference between a pure Caucasian and a Sahara negro, than between the Sahara negro and the infant chimpanzee.

When did the soul come into the body? Has it been waiting from all eternity to occupy each body the moment of birth? Is this the theory that is put forward to man—that there are many millions of souls still waiting, perhaps, in mid air, 'twixt heaven and earth, to occupy the still unborn babes? Is that the theory? Or do you allege that God specially creates souls for each little child at the moment it is born or conceived? Which is the theory put forward? Is it that the soul being immortal—being destined to exist for ever, has existed from all eternity? If not, how do you know that the soul is to exist for ever, when it only comes into existence with the child? May not that which has recently begun to be, soon cease to be? In what manner does the soul come into the child? Is it a baby's soul, and does it grow with the child? or, does it possess its full power the moment the child is born? When does it come into the child? Does it come in the moment the child begins to form, or is it the moment the child is born into the world? Whence is it this soul comes? Dr. Cooper, quoting Lawrence on the "Functions of the Brain," says:—"Sir Everard Home, with the assistance of Mr. Bauer and his microscope, has shown us a man eight days old from the time of conception, about as broad and a little longer than a pin's head. He satisfied himself that the brain of this

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homunculus was discernible. Could the immaterial mind have been connected with it at this time? Or was the tenement too small even for so etherial a lodger? Even at the full period of uterogestation, it is still difficult to trace any vestiges of mind; and the believers in its separate existence have left us quite in the dark on the precise time when they suppose this union of soul and body to take place." Many of those who tell me that man has a soul, and that it is immortal—that man has a soul, and that the beast has not one—forget or ignore that at a very early stage in the first month of the formation of the brain, of the state of the brain, corresponds to that of the avertebrated animal, or animal that is without vertebra. If the brain had stopped in its first month's course of formation, would the child have had a soul? If it would have had a soul, then have avertebrated animals souls also? if you tell me it would not have had a soul, then I ask—How do you know it? and I ask you what ground you have for assuming that the soul did not begin to form with the formation of the brain? I ask you whether it was pre-existing, or at what stage it came? In the second month this brain corresponds then to the brain of an osseous fish. Supposing the development of the child had been then stopped, had it a soul at that time? If so, have fishes souls? Again, if you tell me that the child has not a soul, then, I ask, why not? How do you know it had not? What ground have you for alleging that the soul did not exist in the child? We go on still further, and in the third month we find that brain corresponds then to that of a turtle, and in the fourth to that of a bird; and in the fifth month, to an order termed *rodentia;* sixth, to that of the *ruminantia;* seventh, to that of the *digitigrada;* eighth, to that of the *quadrumana;* and not till the ninth month does the brain of the child attain a full human character. I, of course, here mean to allege no more than Dr. Fletcher, who says, in his "Rudiments of Physiology," quoted by the author of the "Vestiges of Creation"—"This is only an approximation to the truth; since neither is the brain of all osseous fishes, of all turtles, of all birds, nor of all the species of any of the above order of mammals, by any means precisely the same; nor does the brain of the human fœtus at any time precisely resemble, perhaps, that of any individual whatever among the lower animals. Nevertheless it may be said to represent, at each of the above-named periods, the aggregate, as it were, of the

brains of each of the tribes stated." Now, should a birth have taken place at any of the eight stages, would the child thus prematurely born have had a soul? That is the question I propose to you. You who affirm that man has a soul, it lies upon you, here, without charging me with blasphemy—without charging me with ignorance—without charging me with presumption—it lies upon you who affirm, to state the grounds for your belief. At which stage, if at any, did the soul come into the child? At the moment of the birth? Why when a child is born into the world it can scarcely see—it cannot speak—it cannot think—but after a short time I jingle my keys, and it begins to give faint smiles; and after a few weeks, it is pleased with the jingling of my keys. Is it the soul which is learning to appreciate the sound of the jingling keys, and pleased with them? Is it the immaterial and immortal soul amused and pleased with my bundle of keys? Where is the soul? How is it that the soul cannot speak the moment the child is born—cannot even think? How is it, that if I keep that child without telling it any thing of its soul until it become fourteen or fifteen years of age, it would then speak and think as I had taught it to speak and think; and if I kept it without the knowledge of a soul, it would have no knowledge of a soul at that age? How is that? Rajah Brooke, at a missionary meeting at Liverpool, told his hearers there, that the Dyaks, a people with whom he was connected, had no knowledge of a God, of a soul, or of any future state. How is it that the Dyaks have got this soul, and yet live knowing nothing whatever about it? And the Dyaks are by no means the only people who live and die knowing nothing of any immortal and immaterial soul. Again you tell me that this soul is immortal. Do you mean that it has eternally existed—has never been created? If so, you deny a God who is the creator of all things. If the soul began at some time to exist, where is the evidence that it will not also at some time cease to exist? If it came into existence with the body's birth, why not cease with the body's death? You say the soul is immaterial, do you mean that it is susceptible to material conditions, or do you not? If susceptible to material conditions, what do you mean by its being immortal and immaterial? If not susceptible to material conditions, then explain to me how it is that under good conditions it prospers and advances, and under bad conditions deteriorates and recedes. If a child is born in some

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of the back streets of our city, and lives on bad food in a wretched cellar, it grows up a weak and puny pale-faced child. If allowed to crawl into existence on the edge of a gutter, imperfectly educated, in fact mis-educated, it steals—steals, perhaps, to live—and it becomes an outcast from society. Is this immortal soul affected by the bodily conditions? or is the soul originally naturally depraved? And if the soul is primarily naturally depraved, why is God so unjust as to give a naturally depraved soul to anybody? If not, how is it that this immortal soul, when the body is kept without food, permits the man without money to buy food, to steal to satisfy his hunger? You allege that the soul moves my body. You assert that matter is inert, unintelligent; that it is my active, intelligent soul that moves and impels my inert and non-intelligent body. Is my immortal soul hindered and controlled by the state of my body's general health? Does my soul feel hungry and compel my body to steal? Some theologians declare that my soul is immaterial—that there is no means by which I can take any cognisance whatever of it. What does that mean, except that they know nothing whatever about it? Sir W. Hamilton admits that we are entirely ignorant as to the connection between soul and body. Yet many who in so many words admit that they have no knowledge, but only faith in the soul's existence, are most presumptuous in affirming it, and in denouncing those who dispute their affirmation. It is an easy method to hide ignorance, by denouncing your opponent as an ignorant blasphemer.

Joseph Priestley in his book upon matter and spirit, quotes from Hallet's discourses, as follows:—"I see a man move and hear him speak for some years. From his speech I certainly infer that he thinks as I do. I then see that man is a being, who thinks and acts. After some time the man falls down in my sight, grows cold and stiff, and speaks and acts no more. Is it not then natural to conclude that he thinks no more; as the only reason I had to believe that he did think was his motion and his speech? And now that his motion and speech have ceased, I have lost the only way of proving that he had the power of thought. Upon this sudden death, one visible thing, the one man, has greatly changed. Whence could I infer also, the same being consisted of two parts, and that the inward part continues to live and think, and flies away from the body? When the outward part ceases to live and move, it looks as if the whole

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man was gone, and that he, with all his powers, ceases at the same time. His motion and thought both die together, as far as I can discern. The powers of thought, of speech and motion, equally depend upon the body, and run the same fate in case of declining old age. When a man dies through old age, I perceive his powers of speech, motion, and thought decay and die together, and by the same degrees. That moment he ceases to move and breathe, he appears to cease to think, too. When I am left to my reason, it seems to me that my power of thought depends as much upon the body as my sight and hearing. I could not think in infancy; my power of thought, of sight, and of feeling are equally liable to be obstructed by the body. A blow on the head has deprived a man of thought, who could yet see, and feel, and move; so naturally the power of thinking seems as much to belong to the body as any power of man whatsoever. Naturally there appears no more reason to suppose that a man can think out of the body than he can hear sounds and feel cold out of the body."

What do those mean who say that man is made up of two parts—matter and mind? I know of only one existence. I find that existence manifested variously, each mode having certain variations of attributes by which it is cognised. One of these attributes, or a collection of certain attributes, I find in, or with, certain modifications of that existence, that is, in or with animal life—this attribute, or these attributes, we call intelligence. In the same way that I find upon the blade of a knife brightness, consequent upon a certain state of the metal, so do I find in man, in the beast, different degrees, not of brightness, but of intelligence, according to their different states of organisation. I am told that the mind and the body are separate from one another. Are the brightness and steel of the knife separate? Is not brightness the quality attaching to a certain modification of existence—steel? Is not intelligence a quality attaching to a certain modification of existence—man? The word brightness has no meaning, except relating to some bright thing. The word intelligence, no meaning, except as relating to some intelligent thing. I take some water and drop it upon the steel, in due course the process of oxidation takes place and the brightness is gone. I drop into man's brain a bullet, the process of destruction of life takes place, and his intelligence is gone. By changing the state of the steel we destroy its brightness, and by disorganising the man destroy

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his intelligence. Is mind an entity or a result? an existence or a condition? Surely it is but the result of organic activity, a phenomenon of animal life. Dr. Engledue says:—"In the same way as organism generally has the power of manifesting, when the necessary stimuli are applied, the phenomena which are designated life; so one individual portion—brain, having peculiar and distinct properties, manifests on the application of its appropriate stimuli a peculiar and distinct species of action. If the sum of all bodily function—life, be not an entity, how can the product of the action of one portion of the body—brain, be an entity? Feeling and intelligence are but fractional portions of life." I ask those who are here to prove that man has a soul, to do so apart from revelation. If the soul is a part of ourselves, we require no supernatural revelation to demonstrate its existence to us. D'Holbach says:—"The doctrine of spirituality, such as it now exists, affords nothing but vague ideas; it is rather a poisoner of all ideas. Let me draw your attention to this:—The advocates of spirituality do not tell you anything, but in fact prevent you from knowing anything. They say that spirit and matter have nothing in common, and that mortal man cannot take cognisance of immortality. An ignorant man may set himself up as an orator upon such a matter. He says you have a soul—an immortal soul. Take care you don't lose your soul. When you ask him what is my soul, he says he does not know—nobody knows—nobody can tell you. This is really that which they do. What is this doctrine of spirituality? What does it present to the mind? A substance unsubstantial that possesses nothing of which our senses enable us to take cognisance." Theologians urge that each of us has a soul superior to all material conditions, and yet a man who speaks cannot communicate by his speaking soul so freely with that man who is deaf and dumb; the conditions cramp that which is said to be uncontrolled by any conditions. If you cut out a man's tongue, the soul no longer speaks. If you put a gag in his mouth, and tie it with a handkerchief, so that he cannot get it out, his soul ceases to speak. The immaterial soul is conquered by a gag, it cannot utter itself, the gag is in the way. The orthodox say that the soul is made by God; and what do you know about God? Why just as much as we know about the soul. And what do you know about the soul? Nothing whatever. How is it that if the soul is immaterial, having nothing in

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common with matter, that it only is manifest by material means? and how is it that it is encased and enclosed in my material frame? They affirm that my soul is a spirit—that I received the same spirit from God. How is it that my spirit is now by myself, and by my mortal body, denying its own existence? Is my mortal soul acting the hypocrite, or is it ignorant of its own existence, and cannot help itself to better knowledge? And if it cannot help itself, why not, if it is superior to the body? and if you think it a hypocrite, tell me why. What is meant by the declaration that man is a compound of matter and spirit?—things which the orthodox assert have nothing in common with one another. Of the existence of what you call matter you are certain, because you and I, material beings, are here. Are you equally certain of the existence of mind, as an existence independent and separate from matter? and if you are, tell me why. Have you ever found it apart from matter? If so, when and where? Have you found that the mind has a separate and distinct existence? if so, under what circumstances? and tell me—you who define matter as unintelligent, passive, inert, and motionless—who talk of the *vis inertiæ* of matter—tell me what you mean when you give these definitions to it? You find the universe, and this small portion of it on which we are, ceaselessly active. Why do you call it passive, except it be that you want courage to search for true knowledge, as to the vast capabilities of existence, and, therefore, invent such names as God and Soul to account for all difficulties, and to hide your ignorance? What do you mean by passive and inert matter? You tell me of this world—part of a system—that system part of another—that of another—and point out to me the innumerable planets, the countless millions of worlds, in the universe. You, who tell me of the vast forces of the universe; what do you mean by telling me that that is motionless? What do you mean by yet pointing to the unmeasurable universe and its incalculably mighty forces, and affirming that they are incapable of every perceptible effect? You, without one fact on which to base your theory, strive to call into existence another existence which must be more vast, and which you allege produces this existence and gives its powers to it. Sir Isaac Newton says:—"We are to admit no more causes of things than are sufficient to explain appearances." What effect is there which the forces of existence are incapable of producing?

Why do you come to the conclusion that the forces of the

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universe are incapable of producing every effect of which I take cognisance? Why do you come to the conclusion that intelligence is not an attribute—why? What is there which enables you to convert it into a separate and distinct existence? Is there anything? Is it spirit? What is spirit? That of which the mortal man can know nothing, you tell me—that it is nothing which his senses can grasp—that is, no man, but one who disregards his senses, can believe in it, and that it is that which no man's senses can take cognisance of. If a man who uses his senses can never by their aid take cognisance of spirit, then as it is through the senses alone man knows that which is around him, you can know nothing about spirit until you go out of your senses. When I speak of the senses, I do not limit myself to what are ordinarily termed man's five senses—I include all man's sensitive faculties, and admit that I do not know the extent of, and am not prepared to set a limit to, the sensitive capabilities of man. I have had personal experience in connection with psycho-magnetic phenomena of faculties in man and woman not ordinarily recognised, and am inclined to the opinion that many men have been made converts to the theories of spiritualism, because their previous education had induced them to set certain arbitrary limits to the domains of the natural. When they have been startled by phenomena outside these conventional limitations, they at once ascribed them to supernatural influences, rather than reverse their previous rules of thinking.

Some urge that the soul is life. What is life? Is it not the word by which we express the aggregate normal functional activity of vegetable and animal organisms, necessarily differing in degree, if not in kind, with each different organisation? To talk of immortal life and yet to admit the decay and destruction of the organisation, is much the same as to talk of a square circle. You link together two words which contradict each other. The solution of the soul problem is not so difficult as many imagine. The greatest difficulty is, that we have been trained to use certain words as "God," "matter," "mind," "spirit," "soul," "intelligence," and we have been further trained to take these words as representatives of realities, which, in fact, they do not represent. We have to unlearn much of our school lore. We have specially to carefully examine the meaning of each word we use. The question lies in a small compass. Is there one existence or more? Of one existence I am conscious,

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because I am a mode of it. I know of no other existence. I know of no existence but that existence of which I am a mode. I hold it to be capable of producing every effect. It is for the man who alleges that there is another, to prove it. I know of one existence. I do not endeavour to demonstrate to you my existence, it needs no demonstration—I am. My existence is undeniable. I am speaking to you. You are conscious of my existence. You and I are not separate entities, but modes of the same existence. We take cognisance of the existence which is around us and in us, and which is the existence of which we are modes. Of the one existence we are certain. It is for those who affirm that the universe is "matter," and who affirm that there also exists "spirit," to remember that they admit the one existence I seek to prove, and that the onus lies on them to demonstrate a second existence—in fact, to prove there is the other existence which they term spiritual. There cannot exist two different substances or existences having the same attributes or qualities. There cannot be two existences of the same essence, having different attributes, because it is by the attributes alone that we can distinguish the existences. We can only judge of the substance by its modes. We may find a variety of modes of the same substance, and we shall find points of union which help to identify them, the one with the other—the link which connects them with the great whole. We can only judge of the existence of which we are a part (in consequence of our peculiar organisation), under the form of a continuous chain of causes and effects—each effect a cause to the effect it precedes, each cause an effect of the causative influence which heralded its advent. The remote links of that line are concealed by the darkness of the far-off past. Nay, more than this, the mightiest effort of mind can never say—*This is the first cause.* Weakness and ignorance have said it—but why? To cloak their weakness, to hide their ignorance. Knaves have said it—but why? To give scope to their cunning, and to enable them to say to the credulous, "Thus far shalt thou go and no farther." The termination is in the as yet unknowable future; and I ask you, presumptuous men, who dare to tell me of God and soul, of matter and creation—when possessed you the power to sunder links of that great chain and write, "In the beginning?" I deny that by the mightiest effort of the strongest intellect man can ever say of any period, at this point substance began to be—before this existence was not.

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Has man a soul? You who tell me he has a soul, a soul independent of material conditions, I ask you how it is that these immortal souls strive with one another to get mortal benefits? Has man a soul? If man's soul is not subject to material conditions, why do I find knavish souls?—Why slavish souls?—tyrannous souls? Your doctrine that man has a soul prevents him from rising. When you tell him that his soul is not improvable by material conditions, you prevent him from making himself better than he is. Man's intelligence is a consequence of his organisation. Organisation is improvable, the intelligence becomes more powerful as the organisation is fully developed, and the conditions which surround man are made more pure. And the man will become higher, truer, and better when he knows that his intelligence is an attribute, like other attributes, capable of development, susceptible of deterioration, he will strive to effect the first and to guard against the latter.

Look at a number of people putting power into the hands of one man, because he is a lord—surely they have no souls. See the mass cringing to a wretched idol—surely these have no souls. See men forming a pyramid of which the base is a crushed and worn-out people, and the apex a church, a throne, a priest, a king, and the frippery of a creed;—have those men souls? Society should not be such a pyramid, it should be one brotherly circle, in which men should be linked together by a consciousness that they are only happy so linked, conscious that when the chain is broken, then the society and her peace is destroyed. What we teach is not that man has a soul apart and independent of the body, but that he has an ability, an intelligence, an attribute of his body, capable of development, improvable, more useful, according as he elevates himself and his fellows. Give up blind adhesion to creeds and priests, strive to think and follow out in action the result of your thoughts. Each mental struggle is an enlargement of your mind, an addition to your brain power, an increase of your soul—the only soul you have.

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The Impeachment of the House of Brunswick

Charles Bradlaugh

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THE

IMPEACHMENT

OF THE

HOUSE OF BRUNSWICK.

G.B.

BY

CHARLES BRADLAUGH.

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

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PREFACE

TO

FIFTH AND AMERICAN EDITION.

THE kindly reception given to me personally throughout those portions of the United States it has yet been my good fortune to visit, tempts me to comply with the request of many friends, that I should issue here an edition of my impeachment of the reigning family in England. The matter contained in these pages has been delivered orally throughout Great Britain, and, with one exception, no reply has been offered to it. Abuse has been plentiful, and threats of prosecution not infrequent; but although at least one hundred and fifty thousand persons have listened to the lectures, and four editions of the pamphlet have been exhausted in England, only one attempt was made, in the *Gentleman's Magazine*, to advance any kind of reply. And even in this case, when a formal written discussion had been commenced, the editor of the *Gentleman's Magazine* refused to allow any rejoinder to his second paper.

It is sometimes alleged against me that the pamphlet is a too personal criticism; my answer is that in every case the points dealt with have affected our national honor, or augmented our national taxation.

This pamphlet is not a Republican one; it is only an indictment alleging the incapacity and viciousness of the House of Brunswick, and a statement of the legal right of the British people to dethrone the succession on a vacancy arising.

That I am a Republican is perfectly true; that I believe a Republican form of government to be possible, by peaceful means in England, is well-known to those who have heard my lectures; and, in issuing this essay to American readers, I desire to show that there are no reasons of personal loyalty, there is no plea of gratitude for personal service, which ought to be urged on behalf of George I. and his descendants.

English by birth, by hope and in ambition, I seek to win from the descendants of those who broke loose from the Brunswicks nearly a century ago, sympathy for those who work with me now to a like end. If I fail, the fault is in the weakness of my tongue and pen, and not from any defects in the cause I advocate.

The more than fair hearing given to my voice emboldens me to hope a patient investigation of the case my pen presents; and should a verdict be given on this great continent unfavorable to me, I feel confident the jury of my readers will patiently weigh my statements before delivering their judgment.

CHARLES BRADLAUGH.

IMPEACHMENT

OF THE

HOUSE OF BRUNSWICK.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY.

By statutes of the 12 and 13 Will. III., and 6 Anne c. 11, Article 2, the British Parliament, limiting the monarchy to members of the Church of England, excluded the Stuarts, and from and after the death of King William and the Princess Anne without heirs, contrived that the Crown of this kingdom should devolve upon the Princess Sophia, Duchess Dowager of Hanover, and the heirs of her body, being Protestants. Heirs failing to Anne, although seventeen times pregnant, and Sophia dying about seven weeks before Anne, her son George succeeded under these Acts as George I. of England and Scotland.

It is said, and perhaps truly, that the German Protestant Guelph was an improvement on the Catholic Stuart, and the Whigs take credit for having effected this change in spite of the Tories. This credit they deserve; but it must not be forgotten that it was scarce half a century before that the entire aristocracy, including the patriotic Whigs, coalesced to restore to the throne the Stuarts, who had been got rid of under Cromwell. If this very aristocracy, of which the Whigs form part, had never assisted in calling back the Stuarts in the person of Charles II., there would have been no need to thank them for again turning that family out.

The object of the present essay is to submit reasons for the repeal of the Acts of Settlement and Union, so far as the succession to the throne is concerned, after the abdication or demise of the present monarch. It is of course assumed, as a point upon which all supporters of the present Royal Family will agree, that the right to deal with the throne is inalienably vested in the English people, to be exercised by them through their representatives in Parliament. The right of the members of the House of Brunswick to succeed to the throne is a right accruing only from the acts of Settlement and Union, it being clear that, except from this statute, they have no claim to the throne. It is therefore submitted, that should Parliament in its wisdom see fit to enact that after the death or abdication of her present Majesty, the throne shall no longer be filled by a member of the House of Brunswick, such an enactment would be perfectly within the competence of Parliament. It is further submitted that the Parliament has full and uncontrollable authority to make any enactment, and to repeal any enactment heretofore made, even if such new statute, or the repeal of any old statute, should in truth change the constitution of the Empire, or modify the character and powers of either Parliamentary Chamber. The Parliament of the English Commonwealth, which met on April 25th, 1660, gave the Crown to Charles II., and the Parliament of the British Monarchy has the undoubted right to withhold the Crown from Albert Edward, Prince of Wales. The Convention which assembled at Westminster on January 22d, 1688, took away the crown from James II., and passed over his son, the then Prince of Wales, as if he had been non-existent. This Convention was declared to have all the authority of Parliament — *ergo*, Parliament has admittedly the right to deprive a living King of his Crown,

and to treat a Prince of Wales as having no claim to the succession.

In point of fact two of the clauses of the Act of Settlement were repealed in the reign of Queen Anne, and a third clause was repealed early in the reign of George I., showing that this particular statute has never been considered immutable or irrepealable. It is right to add that the clauses repealed were only of consequence to the nation, and that their repeal was no injury to the Crown. The unbounded right of the supreme Legislature to enlarge its own powers was contended for and admitted in 1716, when the duration of Parliament was extended four years, a triennial Parliament declaring itself and all future Parliaments septennial. Furthermore, it has been held to be sedition to deny the complete authority of the Irish Parliament to put an end to its own existence.

It has been admitted to be within the jurisdiction of Parliament to give electoral privileges to citizens theretofore unenfranchised; Parliament claims the unquestioned right to disfranchise persons, hitherto electors, for misconduct in the exercise of electoral rights, and in its pleasure to remove and annul any electoral disability. The right of Parliament to decrease or increase the number of representatives for any borough has never been disputed, and its authority to decrease the number of Peers sitting and voting in the House of Lords was recognized in passing the Irish Church Disestablishment Bill, by which several Bishops were summarily ejected from amongst the Peers. It is now submitted that Parliament possesses no Legislative right but what it derives from the people, and that the people are under no irrevocable contract or obligation to continue any member of the House of Brnnswick on the throne. In order to show that this is not a solitary opinion, the following Parlimentary *dicta* are given: —

The Honorable Temple Luttrell, in a speech made in the House of Commons, on the 7th November, 1775, showed "that of thirty-three sovereigns since William the Conqueror, thirteen only have ascended the throne by divine hereditary right. . . . The will of the people, superseding any hereditary claim to succession, at the commencement of the twelfth century placed Henry I. on the throne," and this subject to conditions as to laws to be made by Henry. King John was compelled "solemnly to register an assurance of the ancient rights of the people in a formal manner;" and this necessary work was accomplished by the Congress at Runnymede, in the year 1115. "Sir, in the reign of Henry III. (about the year 1223), the barons, clergy and freeholders, understanding that the King, as Earl of Poictou, had landed some of his continental troops in the western ports of England, with a design to strengthen a most odious and arbitrary set of ministers, they assembled in a Convention or Congress, from whence they despatched deputies to King Henry, declaring that if he did not immediately send back those Poictouvians, and remove from his person and councils evil advisers, they would place upon the throne a Prince who should better observe the laws of the land. Sir, the King not only hearkened to that Congress, but shortly after complied with every article of their demand, and publicly notified his reformation. Now, Sir, what are we to call that assembly which dethroned Edward II. when the Archbishop of Canterbury preached a sermon on this Text, '*The voice of the people is the voice of God'?*" "A Prince of the house of Lancaster was invited over from banishment, and elected by the people to the throne" on the fall of Richard II. "I shall next proceed to the general Convention and Congress, which, in 1461, enthroned the Earl of March by the name of Edward IV., the Primate of all England collecting the suf-

frages of the people." "In 1659, a Convention or Congress restored legal Monarchy in the person of Charles II."

William Pitt, on the 16th December, 1788, being then Chancellor of the Exchequer, contended that "the right of providing for the deficiency of Royal authority rested with the two remaining branches of the Legislature;" and again, "on the disability of the Sovereign, where was the right to be found? It was to be found in the voice, in the sense of the people; with them it rested." On the 22d December, Mr. Pitt said that Mr. Fox had contended that "the two Houses of Parliament cannot proceed to legislate without a King." His (Mr. Pitt's) answer was: "The conduct of the Revolution had contradicted that assertion; they had acted legislatively, and, no King being present, they must, consequently, have acted without a King."

Mr. Hardinge, a barrister of great repute, and afterwards Solicitor-General and Judge, in the same debate, said: "The virtues of our ancestors and the genius of the Government accurately understood, a century ago, had prompted the Lords and Commons of the realm to pass a law without a King; and a law which, as he had always read it, had put upon living record this principle: 'That whenever the supreme executive hand shall have lost its power to act, the people of the land, fully and freely represented, can alone repair the defect.'"

On the 26th December, in the House of Lords, discussing the power to exclude a sitting Monarch from the throne, the Earl of Abingdon said: "Will a King exclude himself? No! no! my Lords, that exclusion appertains to us and to the other House of Parliament exclusively. It is to us it belongs; it is our duty. It is the business of the Lords and Commons of Great Britain, and of us alone, as the trustees and representatives of the nation." And following up this

argument, Lord Abingdon contended that in the contingency he was alluding to, "the right to new model or alter the succession vests in the Parliament of England without the King, in the Lords and Commons of Great Britain solely and exclusively."

Lord Stormont, in the same debate, pointed out that William III. "possessed no other right to the throne than that which he derived from the votes of the two Houses."

The Marquis of Lansdowne said: "One of the best constitutional writers we had was Mr. Justice Foster, who, in his book on the 'Principles of the Constitution,' denies the right even of hereditary succession, and says it is no right whatever, but merely a political expedient. . . . The Crown, Mr. Justice Foster said, was not merely a descendable property like a laystall, or a pigstye, but was put in trust for millions, and for the happiness of ages yet unborn, which Parliament has it always in its power to mould, to shape, to alter, to fashion, just as it shall think proper. And in speaking of Parliament," his Lordship said, "Mr. Justice Foster repeatedly spoke of the two Houses of Parliament only."

My object being to procure the repeal of the only title under which any member of the House of Brunswick could claim to succeed the present sovereign on the throne, or else to procure a special enactment which shall for the future exclude the Brunswicks, as the Stuarts were excluded in 1688 and 1701, the following grounds are submitted as justifying and requiring such repeal or new enactment: —

1st. That during the one hundred and fifty-seven years the Brunswick family have reigned over the British Empire, the policy and conduct of the majority of the members of that family, and especially of the various reigning members, always saving and excepting her present Majesty, have been hostile to the welfare of the mass of the people. This

will be sought to be proved at length by a sketch of the principal events in the reign of each monarch, from August 1st, 1714, to the present date.

2d. That during the same period of one hundred and fifty-seven years, fifteen-sixteenths of the entire National Debt have been created, and that this debt is in great part the result of wars arising from the mischievous and pro-Hanoverian policy of the Brunswick family.

3d. That in consequence of the incompetence or want of desire for governmental duty on the part of the various reigning members of the House of Brunswick, the governing power of the country has been practically limited to a few families, who have used government in the majority of instances as a system of machinery for securing place and pension for themselves and their associates; while it is submitted that government should be the best contrivance of national wisdom for the alleviation of national suffering and promotion of national happiness. Earl Grey even admits that "Our national annals, since the Revolution of 1688, present a sad picture of the selfishness, baseness and corruption of the great majority of the actors on the political stage."

4th. That a huge pension list has been created, the recipients of the largest pensions being in most cases persons who are already members of wealthy families, and who have done nothing whatever to justify their being kept in idleness at the national expense, while so many workers in the agricultural districts are in a state of semi-starvation; so many toilers in large works in Wales, Scotland, and some parts of England, are in constant debt and dependence; and while large numbers of the Irish peasantry — having for many generations been denied life at home — have until lately been driven to seek those means of

existence across the sea which their own fertile land should have amply provided for them.

5th. That the monarchs of the Brunswick family have been, except in a few cases of vicious interference, costly puppets, useful only to the governing aristocracy as a cloak to shield the real wrong doers from the just reproaches of the people.

6th. That the Brunswick family have shown themselves utterly incapable of initiating or encouraging wise legislation. That George I. was shut out practically from the government by his utter ignorance of the English language, his want of sympathy with British habits, and his frequent absences from this country. A volume of history, published by Messrs. Longmans in 1831, says that "George I. continued a German princeling on the British throne — surrounded still by his petty Hanoverian satellites, and so ignorant even of the language of his new subjects, that his English minister, who understood neither French nor German, could communicate with him only by an imperfect jargon of barbarous Latin." He "discarded his wife, and had two mistresses publicly installed in their Court rights and privileges." Earl Grey declares that "the highly beneficial practice of holding Cabinet Councils without the presence of the sovereign arose from George the First's not knowing English." Leslie describes George I. as altogether ignorant of our language, laws, customs and constitution. Madame de Maintenon writes of him as disgusted with his subjects. That George II. was utterly indifferent to English improvement, and was mostly away in Hanover. Lord Hervey's "Memoirs" portray him as caring for nothing but soldiers and women, and declare that his highest ambition was to combine the reputation of a great general with that of a successful libertine. That George III. was repeatedly insane, and that in his officially lucid moments

his sanity was more dangerous to England than his madness. Buckle says of him that he was "despotic as well as superstitious. . . . Every liberal sentiment, everything approaching to reform, nay, even the mere mention of inquiry, was an abomination in the eyes of that narrow and ignorant prince." Lord Grenville, his Prime Minister, said of him: "He had perhaps the narrowest mind of any man I ever knew." That George IV. was a dissipated, drunken debauchee, bad husband, unfaithful lover, untrustworthy friend, unnatural father, corrupt regent, and worse king. Buckle speaks of "the incredible baseness of that ignoble voluptuary." That William IV. was obstinate, but fortunately fearful of losing his crown, gave way to progress with a bad grace when chicanery was no longer possible, and continued resistance became dangerous.

7th. That under the Brunswick family, the national expenditure has increased to a frightful extent, while our best possessions in America have been lost, and our home possession, Ireland, rendered chronic in its discontent by the terrible misgovernment under the four Georges.

And 8th. That the ever increasing burden of the national taxation has been shifted from the land on to the shoulders of the middle and lower classes, the landed aristocracy having, until very lately, enjoyed the practical monopoly of tax-levying power.

CHAPTER II.

THE REIGN OF GEORGE I.

On August 1st, 1714, George Lewis, Elector of Hanover, and great-grandson of James I., of England, succeeded to the throne; but being apparently rather doubtful as to the

reception he would meet in this country, he delayed visiting his new dominions until the month of October. In April, 1714, there was so little disposition in favor of the newly-chosen dynasty, that the Earl of Oxford entreated George not to bring any of his family into this country without Queen Anne's express consent. It seems strange to read in the correspondence of Madame Elizabeth Charlotte, Duchesse d'Orleans, her hesitation "to rejoice at the accession of our Prince George, for she had no confidence in the English;" and her fears "that the inconstancy of the English will in the end produce some scheme which may be injurious to the French monarchy." She adds: "If the English were to be trusted, I should say that it is fortunate the Parliaments are in favor of George, but the more one reads the history of English revolutions, the more one is compelled to remark the eternal hatred which the people of that nation have had towards their kings, as well as their fickleness." To-day it is the English who charge the French with fickleness. Thackeray says of George I. that "he showed an uncommon prudence and coolness of behavior when he came into his kingdom, exhibiting no elation; reasonably doubtful whether he should not be turned out some day; looking upon himself only as a lodger, and making the most of his brief tenure of St. James's and Hampton Court, plundering, it is true, somewhat, and dividing amongst his German followers; but what could be expected of a sovereign who at home could sell his subjects at so many ducats per head, and make no scruple in so disposing of them?" At the accession of George I. the national debt of this country, exclusive of annuities, was about £36,000,000; after five Brunswicks have left us, it is £800,000,000 for Great Britain and Ireland, and much more than £110,000,000 for India. The average annual national expenditure under the rule of

George I. was £5,923,079 ; to-day it is more than £70,000,000, of which more than £20,000,000 have been added in the last twenty years. During the reign of George I. land paid very nearly one-fourth the whole of the taxes ; to-day it pays less than one-seventieth part ; and yet, while its proportion of the burden is so much lighter, its exaction from labor in rent is ten times heavier.

George I. came to England without his wife, the Princess of Zelle. Years before, he had arrested her and placed her in close confinement in Ahlden Castle, on account of her intrigue with Philip, Count Konigsmark, whom some say George I. suspected of being the actual father of the Electoral Prince George, afterwards George II. To use the language of a writer patronized by George, Prince of Wales, in 1808, "The coldness between George I. and his son and successor, George II., may be said to have been *almost coeval with the existence* of the latter." Our King, George I., described by Thackeray as a "cold, selfish libertine," had Konigsmark murdered in the palace of Heranhausen ; confined his wife, at twenty-eight years of age, in a dungeon, where she remained until she was sixty ; and when George Augustus, Electoral Prince of Hanover, tried to get access to his mother, George Lewis, then Elector of Hanover, arrested Prince George also, and it is said, would have put him to death if the Emperor of Germany had not protected him as a Prince of the German Empire. During the reign of George II., Frederick, Prince of Wales, whom his father denounced as a "changeling," published an account of how George I. had turned Frederick's father out of the palace. These Guelphs have been a loving family. The *Edinburgh Review* declares that "the terms on which the eldest sons of this family have always lived with their fathers have been those of distrust, opposition, and hostility." Even after George Lewis had ascended the throne of England,

his hatred to George Augustus was so bitter, that there was some proposition that James, Earl Berkeley and Lord High Admiral, should carry off the Prince to America and keep him there.

Thackeray says: "When George I. made his first visit to Hanover, his son was appointed regent during the Royal absence. But this honor was never again conferred on the Prince of Wales; he and his father fell out presently. On the occasion of the christening of his second son, a Royal row took place, and the Prince, shaking his fist in the Duke of Newcastle's face, called him a rogue, and provoked his august father. He and his wife were turned out of St. James's, and their princely children taken from them, by order of the Royal head of the family. Father and mother wept piteously at parting from their little ones. The young ones sent some cherries, with their love, to papa and mamma, the parents watered the fruit with their tears. They had no tears thirty-five years afterwards, when Prince Frederick died, their eldest son, their heir, their enemy."

A satirical ballad on the expulsion of Prince George from St. James's Palace, which was followed by the death of the newly-christened baby Prince, is droll enough to here repeat: —

The King then took his gray goose quill,
And dip't it o'er in gall;
And, by Master Vice Chamberlain,
He sent to him this scrawl:

"Take hence yourself, and eke your spouse,
Your maidens and your men;
Your trunks, and all your trumpery,
Except your chil-de-ren."

. . . . . .

The Prince secured with nimble haste
The Artillery Commission;
And with him trudged full many a maid,
But not one politician.

Up leapt Lepel, and frisked away,
As though she ran on wheels;
Miss Meadows made a woful face,
Miss Howe took to her heels.

But Belenden I needs must praise,
Who, as down stairs she jumps,
Sang "O'er the hills and far away,"
Despising doleful dumps.

Then up the street they took their way,
And knockt up good Lord Grant-ham;
Higgledy-piggledy they lay,
And all went *rantam scantam.*

Now sire and son had played their part,
What could befall beside?
Why, the poor babe took this to heart,
Kickt up its heels, and died.

Mahon, despite all his desire to make out the best for the Whig revolution and its consequences, occasionally makes some pregnant admissions: "The jealousy which George I. entertained for his son was no new feeling. It had existed even at Hanover, and had since been inflamed by an insidious motion of the Tories that out of the Civil List £100,000 should be allotted as a separate revenue for the Prince of Wales. This motion was overruled by the Ministerial party, and its rejection offended the Prince as much as its proposal had the King. . . . In fact it is remarkable . . . that since that family has reigned, the heirs-apparent have always been on ill terms with the sovereign. There have been four Princes of Wales since the death of Anne, and all four have gone into bitter opposition." "That family," said Lord Carteret one day in full Council, "always has quarrelled, and always will quarrel, from generation to generation."

"Through the whole of the reign of George I., and through nearly half of the reign of George II.," says Lord Macaulay, "a Tory was regarded as the enemy of the reigning house, and was excluded from all the favors of the Crown. Though most of the country gentlemen were Tories, none but Whigs were appointed deans and bishops. In every County, opulent and well-descended Tory squires complained that their names were left out of the Commission of the Peace, while men of small estate and of mean birth, who were for toleration and excise, septennial parliaments and standing armies, presided at Quarter Sessions, and became deputy-lieutenants."

In attacking the Whigs, my object is certainly not to write in favor of the Tories, but some such work is needful while so many persons labor under the delusion that the Whigs have always been friends to liberty and progress.

Although George I. brought with him no wife to England, he was accompanied by at least two of his mistresses, and our peerage roll was enriched by the addition of Madame Kielmansegge as Countess of Darlington, and Mademoiselle Erangard Melosine de Schulenberg as Duchess of Kendal and Munster, Baroness of Glastonbury, and Countess of Feversham. These peeresses were received with high favor by the Whig aristocracy, although the Tories refused to countenance them, and "they were often hooted by the mob as they passed through the streets." The *Edinburgh Review* described them as "two big blowsy German women." Here I have no room to deal fairly with Charlotte Sophia, Baroness of Brentford and Countess of Darlington; her title is extinct, and I can write nothing of any good or useful act to revive her memory. Lord Chesterfield says of George I.: "No woman came amiss to him, if she were only very willing and very fat." John Heneage Jesse, in his "Memoirs of the Court of England" — speak-

ing of the Duchess of Kendal, the Countess Platen (the co-partner in the murder of Konigsmark), afterwards Countess of Darlington, and many others less known to infamy — says that George I. "had the folly and wickedness to encumber himself with a seraglio of hideous German prostitutes." The Duchess of Kendal was for many years the chief mistress of George, and being tall and lean was caricatured as the Maypole or the Giraffe. She had a pension of £7,500 a year, the profits of the place of Master of the Horse, and other plunder. The Countess of Darlington's figure may be judged from the name of Elephant or Camel, popularly awarded to her. Horace Walpole says of her: "I remember as a boy being terrified at her enormous figure. The fierce black eyes, large and rolling, between two lofty-arched eyebrows, two acres of cheeks spread with crimson, an ocean of neck that overflowed, and was not distinguished from the lower part of her body, and no part restrained by stays. No wonder that a child dreaded such an ogress." She died 1724. Mahon says: "She was unwieldy in person, and rapacious in character."

Phillimore declares that "George I. brought with him from Hanover mistresses as rapacious, and satellites as ignoble, as those which drew down such deserved obloquy on Charles II., Bothman, Bernstoff, Robethon, and two Turks — Mustapha and Mahomet, — meddled more with public affairs, and were to the full as venal as Chiffin, Pepys and Smith." Mahon, who calls Robethon "a prying, impertinent, venomous creature," adds that "coming from a poor electorate, a flight of hungry Hanoverians, like so many famished vultures, fell with keen eyes and bended talons on the fruitful soil of England."

One of the earliest acts of the Whig aristocracy, in the reign of George I., was to pass a measure through Parliament, lengthening the existence of that very Parliament to

seven years, and giving to the King the power to continue all subsequent Parliaments to a like period. The Triennial Parliaments were thus lengthened by a corrupt majority. For the committal of the Septennial Bill there was a majority of 72 votes, and it is alleged by the *Westminster Review*, "that about 82 members of the honorable house had either fingered Walpole's gold, or pocketed the bank-notes which, by the purest accident, were left under their plates. . . . In the ten years which preceded the Septennial Act, the sum expended in Secret Service money was £337,960. In the ten years which followed the passing of the Septennial Act, the sum expended for Secret Service was £1,453,400." The same writer says: "The friends and framers of the Triennial Bill were for the most part Tories, and its opponents for the most part Whigs. The framers and friends of the Bill for long Parliaments were all Whigs, and its enemies all Tories." When the measure came before the Lords, we find Baron Bernstoff, on the King's behalf, actually canvassing Peers' wives, with promises of places for their relatives, in order to induce them to get their husbands to vote for the Bill. Another of the early infringements of public liberty by the Whig supporters of George I., was the passing (1 George I., c. 5) the Riot Act, which had not existed from the accession of James I. to the death of Queen Anne. Sir John Hinde Cotton, a few years afterwards, described this Act, which is still the law of England, as "An Act by which a little dirty justice of the peace, the meanest and vilest tool a minister can use, had it in his power to put twenty or thirty of the best subjects of England to immediate death, without any trial or form, but that of reading a proclamation." In order to facilitate the King's desire to spend most of his time in Hanover, the third section of the Act of Settlement was repealed.

Thackeray says: "Delightful as London city was, King

George I. liked to be out of it as much as ever he could, and when there, passed all his time with his Germans. It was with them as with Blucher one hundred years afterwards, when the bold old Reiter looked down from St. Paul's and sighed out, 'Was fur plunder!' The German women plundered, the German secretaries plundered, the German cooks and intendants plundered; even Mustapha and Mahomet, the German negroes, had a share of the booty. Take what you can get, was the old monarch's maxim."

There was considerable discontent expressed in the early years of George's reign. Hallam says: "Much of this disaffection was owing to the cold reserve of George I., ignorant of the language, alien to the prejudices of his people, and continually absent in his electoral dominions, to which he seemed to sacrifice the nation's interest. . . . The letters in Coxe's Memoirs of Walpole, abundantly show the German nationality, the impolicy and neglect of his duties, the rapacity and petty selfishness of George I. The Whigs were much dissatisfied, but the fear of losing their places made them his slaves." In order to add the duchies of Bremen and Verden to Hanover, in 1716, the King, as Elector, made a treaty with Denmark against Sweden, which treaty proved the source of those Continental wars, and the attendant system of subsidies to European powers, which have, in the main, created our enormous National Debt. Bremen and Verden being actually purchased for George I. as the Elector of Hanover, with English money, Great Britain in addition was pledged by George I. to guarantee Sleswick to Denmark. Sweden and Denmark quarrelling — and George I. as Elector of Hanover having, without the consent of the English Parliament, declared war against Sweden — an English fleet was sent into the Baltic to take up a quarrel with which we had no concern. In addition we were in-

volved in a quarrel with Russia, because that power had interfered to prevent Mecklenburg being added to George's Hanoverian estates. The chief mover in this matter was the notorious Baron Bernstoff, who held some village property in Mecklenburg. In all these complications, Hanover gained, England lost. If Hanover found troops, England paid for them, while the Electorate solely reaped the benefit. Every thoughtful writer admits that English interests were always betrayed to satisfy Hanoverian greed.

The King's fondness for Germany provoked some hostility, and amongst the various squibs issued, one in 1716, from the pen of Samuel Wesley, brother of John Wesley, is not without interest. It represents a conversation between George and the Duchess of Kendal: —

"As soon as the wind it came fairly about,
That kept the King in and his enemies out,
He determined no longer confinement to bear,
And thus to the Duchess his mind did declare:

"Quoth he, 'My dear Kenny, I've been tired a long while,
With living obscure in this poor little isle,
And now Spain and Pretender have no more mines to spring,
I'm resolved to go home and live like a King."

The Duchess approves of this, describes and laughs at all the persons nominated for the Council of Regency, and concludes: —

"On the whole, I'll be hanged if all over the realm
There are thirteen such fools to be put to the helm;
So for this time be easy, nor have jealous thought,
They ha'n't sense to sell you, nor are worth being bought."

"'Tis for that (quoth the King, in very bad French),
I chose them for my regents, and you for my wench,
And neither, I'm sure, will my trust e'er betray,
For the devil won't take you if I turn you away."

It was this same Duchess of Kendal who, as the King's mistress, was publicly accused of having received enormous sums of money from the South Sea Company for herself and the King, in order to shield from justice the principal persons connected with those terrible South Sea frauds, by which, in the year 1720, so many families were reduced to misery.

In 1717, Mr. Shippen, a member of the House of Commons, was committed to the Tower, for saying in his place in the House, that it was the "infelicity of his Majesty's reign that he is unacquainted with our language and constitution." Lord Macaulay tells us how Lord Carteret, afterwards Earl Granville, rose into favor. The King could speak no English; Carteret was the only one of the Ministry who could speak German. "All the communication that Walpole had with his master was in very bad Latin." The influence Carteret wielded over the King did not extend to every member of the Royal Family. The Princess of Wales afterwards described the Lords Carteret and Bolingbroke as two she had "long known to be two as worthless men of parts as any in the country, and who I have not only been often told are two of the greatest liars and knaves in any country, but whom my own observation and experience have found so."

Under George I. our standing army was nearly doubled by the Whig Ministry, and this when peace would rather have justified a reduction than an increase. The payments to Hanoverian troops commenced under this king, a payment which William Pitt afterwards earned the enmity of George II. by very sharply denouncing, and which payment was but a step in the system of continental subsidies which have helped to swell our national debt to its present enormous dimensions.

In this reign the enclosure of waste lands was practically

commenced, sixteen enclosure Acts being passed, and 17,660 acres of land enclosed. This example, once furnished, was followed in the next reign with increasing rapidity, 226 enclosure Acts being passed in the reign of George II., and 318,778 acres of land enclosed. As Mr. Fawcett states, up to 1845, more than 7,000,000 acres of land, over which the public possessed invaluable rights, have been gradually absorbed, and individuals wielding legislative influence have been enriched at the expense of the public and the poor.

Within six years from his accession, the King was about £600,000 in debt, and this sum was the first of a long list of debts discharged by the nation for these Brunswicks. When our ministers to-day talk of obligations on the part of the people to endow each additional member of the Royal Family, the memory of these shameful extravagances should have some effect. George I. had a civil list of £700,000 a year; he received £300,000 from the Royal Exchange Assurance Company, and £300,000 from the London Assurance Companies, and had one million voted to him in 1726 towards payment of his debts.

When the "South Sea Bill" was promoted in 1720, wholesale bribery was resorted to. Transfers of stock were proved to have been made to persons high in office. Two members of the Whig Ministry, Lord Sunderland and Mr. Aislabie, were so implicated that they had to resign their offices, and the last-named, who was Chancellor of the Exchequer, was ignominiously expelled the House of Commons. Royalty itself, or at least, the King's sultanas, and several of his German household, shared the spoil. £30,000 were traced to the King's mistresses, and a select committee of the House denounced the whole business as "a train of the deepest villany and fraud with which hell ever contrived to ruin a nation." Near the close of the reign, Lord

Macclesfied, Lord Chancellor and favorite and tool of the King, was impeached for extortion and abuse of trust in his office, and, being convicted, was sentenced to pay a fine of £30,000. In 1716, Mademoiselle Schulenberg, then Duchess of Munster, received £5,000 as a bribe for procuring the title of Viscount for Sir Henry St. John. In 1724, the same mistress, bribed by Lord Bolingbroke, successfully used her influence to pass an act through Parliament restoring him his forfeited estates. Mr. Chetwynd, says my Lady Cowper, in order to secure his position in the Board of Trade, paid to another of George's mistresses £500 down, agreed to allow her £200 a year as long as he held the place, and gave her also the fine, brilliant ear-rings she wore.

In 1724 there appeared in Dublin, the first of the famous "Drapier Letters," written by Jonathan Swift against Wood's coinage patent. A patent had been granted to a man named Wood for coining half-pence in Ireland. This grant was made under the influence of the Duchess of Kendal, the mistress of the King, and on the stipulation that she should receive a large share of the profits. These "Drapier Letters" were prosecuted by the Government, but Swift followed them with others; the grand juries refused to find true bills, and ultimately the patent was cancelled. Wood, or the Duchess, got as compensation a grant of a pension of £3,000 a year for eight years.

George died at Osnabruck, on his journey Hanover-wards, in June, 1727, having made a will by which he disposed of his money in some fashion displeasing to his son George II.; and as the *Edinburgh Review* tells us, the latter "evaded the old king's directions, and got his money by burning his will." In this, George II. only followed his royal father's example. When Sophia Dorothea died, she left a will bequeathing her property in a fashion displeasing

to George I., who, without scruple, destroyed the testament and appropriated the estate. George I. had also previously burned the will of his father-in-law, the Duke of Zell. At this time the destruction of a will was a capital felony in England.

In concluding this rough sketch of the reign of George I., it must not be forgotten that his accession meant the triumph of the Protestant caste in Ireland, and that under his rule much was done to render permanent the utter hatred manifested by the Irish people to their English conquerors, who had always preferred the policy of extermination to that of conciliation. Things were so sad in Ireland at the end of this reign, that Dean Swift, in bitter mockery, "wrote and published his 'Modest Proposal' for relieving the miseries of the people, by cooking and eating the children of the poor;" "a piece of the fiercest sarcasm," says Mitchell, "steeped in all the concentrated bitterness of his soul." Poor Ireland, she had, at any rate, nothing to endear to her the memory of George I.

CHAPTER III.

THE REIGN OF GEORGE II.

When George I. died there was so little interest or affection exhibited by his son and successor, that Sir Robert Walpole, on announcing to George II. that by the demise of his father he had succeeded to regal honors, was saluted with a volley of oaths, and "Dat is one big lie." No pretence even was made of sorrow. George Augustus had hated George Lewis during life, and at the first council, when the will of the late King was produced by the Archbishop of Canterbury, the new monarch simply took it up

and walked out of the room with the document, which was never seen again. Thackeray, who pictures George II. as "a dull, little man, of low tastes," says that he "made away with his father's will under the astonished nose of the Archbishop of Canterbury." A duplicate of this will having been deposited with the Duke of Brunswick, a large sum of money was paid to that Prince nominally as a subsidy by the English Government for the maintenance of troops, but really as a bribe for surrendering the document. A legacy having been left by this will to Lady Walsingham, threats were held out in 1733 by her then husband, Lord Chesterfield, and £20,000 was paid in compromise.

The eldest son of George II. was Frederick, born in 1706, and who up to 1728 resided permanently in Hanover. Lord Hervey tells us that the King hated his son Frederick, and that the Queen Caroline, his mother, abhorred him. To Lord Hervey the Queen says: "My dear Lord, I will give it you under my hand, if you are in any fear of my relapsing, that my dear first-born is the greatest ass, and the greatest liar, and the greatest *canaille*, and the greatest beast in the whole world; and that I most heartily wish he were out of it." This is a tolerably strong description of the father of George III. from the lips of his own mother. Along with this description of Frederick by the Queen, take Thackeray's character of George II.'s worthy father of worthy son: "Here was one who had neither dignity, learning, morals, nor wit—who tainted a great society by a bad example; who in youth, manhood, old age, was gross, low, and sensual."

In 1705, when only Electoral Prince of Hanover, George had married Caroline, daughter of the Margrave of Anspach, a woman of more than average ability. Thackeray describes Caroline in high terms of praise, but Lord Chesterfield says that "she valued herself upon her skill in

simulation and dissimulation. . . . Cunning and perfidy were the means she made use of in business." The Prince of Anspach is alleged by the *Whisperer* to have raised some difficulties as to the marriage, on account of George I. being disposed to deny the legitimacy of his son, and it is further pretended that George I. had actually to make distinct acknowledgment of his son to King William III. before the arrangements for the Act of Settlement were consented to by that King. It is quite clear from the diary of Lady Cowper, that the old King's feeling towards George II. was always one of the most bitter hatred.

The influence exercised by Queen Caroline over George II. was purely political; and Lord Hervey declares that "wherever the interest of Germany and the honor of the Empire were concerned, her thoughts and reasonings were as German and Imperial as if England had been out of the question."

A strange story is told of Sir Robert Walpole and Caroline. Sir Robert, when intriguing for office under George I., with Townshend, Devonshire, and others, objected to their plans being communicated to the Prince of Wales, saying, "The fat b——h, his wife, would betray the secret and spoil the project." This courtly speech being made known by some kind friend to the Princess Caroline, considerable hostility was naturally exhibited. Sir Robert Walpole, who held the doctrine that every person was purchasable, the only question being one of price, managed to purchase peace with Caroline when Queen. When the ministry suspended, "Walpole not fairly out, Compton not fairly in," Sir Robert assured the Queen that he would secure her an annuity of £100,000 in the event of the King's death, Sir Spencer Compton, who was then looked to as likely to be in power, having only offered £60,000. The Queen sent back word, "Tell Sir Robert the fat b——h has forgiven

him," and thenceforth they were political allies until the Queen's death in 1737.

The domestic relations of George II. were marvellous. We pass with little notice Lady Suffolk, lady-in-waiting to Queen and mistress to the King, who was sold by her husband for a pension of £12,000 a year, paid by the British tax-payers, and who was coarsely insulted by both their Majesties. It is needless to dwell on the confidential communications, in which "that strutting little sultan George II.," as Thackeray calls him, solicited favors from his wife for his mistress, the Countess of Walmoden; but to use the words of the cultured *Edinburgh Review*, the Queen's "actual intercession to secure for the King the favors of the Duchess of Modena precludes the idea that these sentiments were as revolting to the royal Philaminte as they would nowadays be to a scavenger's daughter. Nor was the Queen the only lady of the Royal Family who talked openly on these matters. When Lady Suffolk was waning at court, the Princess Royal could find nothing better to say than this: 'I wish with all my heart that he (*i. e.*, the King) would take somebody else, that Mamma might be relieved from the *ennui* of seeing him forever in her room.'"

Lady Cowper in her diary tells us that George II., when Prince of Wales, intrigued with Lady Walpole, not only with the knowledge of the Princess Caroline, but also with connivance of the Prime Minister himself. Lord Hervey adds that Caroline used to sneer at Sir Robert Walpole, asking how the poor man — "*avec ce gros corps, ces jambes enflées et ce villain ventre*" — could possibly believe that any woman could love him for himself. And that Sir Robert retaliated, when Caroline afterwards complained to him of the King's cross temper, by telling her very coolly that "it was impossible it could be otherwise, since the

King had tasted better things," and ended by advising her to bring pretty Lady Tankerville *en rapport* with the King.

In 1727 an Act was passed, directed against workmen in the woollen trade, rendering combination for the purpose of raising wages unlawful. Some years afterwards, this Act was extended to other trades, and the whole tendency of the Septennial Parliament legislation manifests a most unfortunate desire on the part of the Legislature to coerce and keep in subjection the artisan classes.

In February, 1728, the celebrated "Beggar's Opera," by Gay, was put on the stage at the Lincoln's Inn Fields Theatre, and, being supposed to contain some satirical reflections on court-corruption, provoked much displeasure on the part of Royalty. The Duchess of Queensborough, who patronized Gay, being forbidden to attend court, wrote thus: "The Duchess of Queensborough is surprised and well pleased that the King has given her so agreeable a command as forbidding her the court. . . . She hopes that, by so unprecedented an order as this, the King will see as few as she wishes at his court, particularly such as dare speak or think truth."

In 1729, £115,000 was voted by Parliament for the payment of the King's debts. This vote seems to have been obtained under false pretences, to benefit the King, whose "cardinal passion," says Phillimore, "was avarice."

The *Craftsman*, during the first decade of the reign, fiercely assailed the Whig ministry for "a wasteful expenditure of money in foreign subsidies and bribes;" and in his place in the House of Commons William Pitt, "the great Commoner," in the strongest language attacked the system of foreign bribery by which home corruption was supplemented.

The rapidly increasing expenditure needed every day increased taxation, and a caricature published in 1732 marks

the public feeling. A monster (Excise), in the form of a many-headed dragon, is drawing the minister (Sir Robert Walpole) in his coach, and pouring into his lap, in the shape of gold, what it has eaten up in the forms of mutton, hams, cups, glasses, mugs, pipes, etc.

"See this dragon Excise
Has ten thousand eyes,
And five thousand mouths to devour us;
A sting and sharp claws,
With wide gaping jaws,
And a belly as big as a store-house."

Beginning with wines and liquors,—

"Grant these, and the glutton
Will roar out for mutton,
Your beef, bread, and bacon to boot;
Your goose, pig, and pullet,
He'll thrust down his gullet,
Whilst the laborer munches a root."

In 1730 Mr. Sandys introduced a Bill to disable pensioners from sitting in Parliament. George II. vigorously opposed this measure, which was defeated. In the King's private notes to Lord Townshend, Mr. Sandys' proposed act is termed a "villanous measure," which should be "torn to pieces in every particular."

It was in 1732 that the Earl of Aylesford, a Tory peer, declared that standing armies in time of peace were "against the very words of the *Petition of Rights*," and that "all the confusions and disorders which have been brought upon this kingdom for many years, have been all brought upon it by means of standing armies." In 1733 Earl Strafford affirmed that "a standing army" was "always inconsistent with the liberties of the people;" and urged that "where the people have any regard for their

liberties, they ought never to keep up a greater number of regular forces than are absolutely necessary for the security of the Government." Sir John Barnard declared that the army ought not to be used on political questions. He said: "In a free country, if a tumult happens from a just cause of complaint, the people ought to be satisfied; their grievances ought to be redressed; they ought not surely to be immediately knocked on the head because they may happen to complain in an irregular way." Mr. Pulteney urged that a standing army is "a body of men distinct from the body of the people; they are governed by different laws; blind obedience and an entire submission to the orders of their commanding officer is their only principle. The nations around us are already enslaved by those very means; by means of their standing armies they have every one lost their liberties; it is indeed impossible that the liberties of the people can be preserved in a country where a numerous standing army is kept up."

In 1735 sixteen Scottish peers were elected to sit in the House of Lords, and in a petition to Parliament it was alleged, that the whole of this list of sixteen peers was elected by bribery and corruption. The petition positively asserted "that the list of sixteen peers for Scotland had been formed by persons high in trust under the crown, previous to the election itself. The peers were solicited to vote for this list without the liberty of making any alteration, and endeavors were used to engage peers to vote for this list by promise of pensions and offices, civil and military, to themselves and their relations, and by actual promise and offers of sums of money. Several had received money, and releases of debts owing to the crown were granted to those who voted for this list. To render this transaction more infamous, a battalion of troops occupied the Abbey Court of Edinburgh, and continued there dur-

ing the whole time of the election, while there was a considerable body lying within a mile of the city ready to advance on the signal." This petition, notwithstanding the gravity of its allegations, was quietly suppressed.

Lady Sundon, Woman of the Bedchamber and Mistress of the Robes to Queen Caroline, received from Lord Pomfret jewelry of £1,400 value, for obtaining him the appointment of Master of the Horse.

With a Civil List of £800,000 a year, George II. was continually in debt, but an obedient Ministry and a corrupt Parliament never hesitated to discharge his Majesty's obligations out of the pockets of the unrepresented people. Lord Carteret, in 1733, speaking of a Bill before the House for granting the King half a million out of the Sinking Fund, said: "This Fund, my Lords, has been clandestinely defrauded of several small sums at different times, which indeed together amount to a pretty large sum; but by this Bill it is to be openly and avowedly plundered of £500,000 at once."

On the 27th of April, 1736, Prince Frederick was married to the Princess Augusta, of Saxe Gotha, whom King George II. afterwards described as "*cette diablesse Madame la Princesse.*" In August of the same year, a sharp open quarrel took place between the Prince of Wales and his parents, which, after some resumptions of pretended friendliness, ended, on September 10, 1737, in the former being ordered by the King to quit St. James's palace, where he was residing. On the 22d of the preceding February, Pulteney had moved for an allowance of £100,000 a year to Prince Frederick. George II. refused to consent, on the ground that the responsibility to provide for the Prince of Wales rested with himself, and that "it would be highly indecorous to interfere between father and son." On the Prince of Wales taking up his residence at Norfolk House,

"the King issued an order that no persons who paid their court to the Prince and Princess should be admitted to his presence." An official intimation of this was given to foreign ambassadors.

On the 20th of November, 1737, Queen Caroline died, never having spoken to her son since the quarrel. "She was," says Walpole, "implacable in hatred even to her dying moments. She absolutely refused to pardon, or even to see, her son." The death-bed scene is thus spoken of by Thackeray: "There never was such a ghastly farce;" and as sketched by Lord Hervey, it is a monstrous mixture of religion, disgusting comedy, and brutishness. "We are shocked in the very chamber of death by the intrusion of egotism, vanity, buffoonery, and inhumanity. The King is at one moment dissolved in a mawkish tenderness, at another sunk into brutal apathy. He is at one moment all tears for the loss of one who united the softness and amiability of one sex to the courage and firmness of the other; at another all fury because the object of his regrets cannot swallow, or cannot change her posture, or cannot animate the glassy fixedness of her eyes; at one moment he begins an elaborate panegyric on her virtues, then breaks off into an enumeration of his own, by which he implies that her heart has been enthralled, and her intelligence awed. He then breaks off into a stupid story about a storm, for which his daughter laughs at him, and then while he is weeping over his consort's death-bed, she advises him to marry again; and we are — what the Queen was not — startled by the strange reply, '*Non, j'aurai des maîtresses*,' with the faintly moaned out rejoinder, '*Cela, n'empêche pas.*'" So does the Edinburgh reviewer, following Lord Hervey, paint the dying scene of the Queen of our second George.

After the death of the Queen, the influence of the King's

mistresses became supreme, and Sir R. Walpole, who, in losing Queen Caroline had lost his greatest hold over George, paid court to Lady Walmoden, in order to maintain his weakened influence. In the private letters of the Pelham family, who succeeded to power soon after Walpole's fall, we find frequent mention of the Countess of Yarmouth as a power to be gained, a person to stand well with. "I read," says Thackeray, "that Lady Yarmouth (my most religious and gracious King's favorite) sold a bishopric to a clergyman for £5,000. (He betted her £5,000 that he would not be made a bishop, and he lost, and paid her.) Was he the only prelate of his time led up by such hands for consecration? As I peep into George II.'s St. James's, I see crowds of cassocks rustling up the back-stairs of the ladies of the Court; stealthy clergy slipping purses into their laps; that godless old King yawning under his canopy in his Chapel Royal, as the chaplain before him is discoursing."

On the 23d of May, 1738, George William Frederick, son of Frederick, and afterwards George III., was born.

In 1739 Lady Walmoden, who had up to this year remained in Hanover, was brought to England, and formally installed at the English Court. In this year we bound ourselves by treaty to pay 250,000 dollars per annum for three years to the Danish Government. "The secret motive of this treaty," says Mahon, "as of too many others, was not English, but Hanoverian; and regarded the possession of a petty castle and lordship called Steinhorst. This castle had been bought from Holstein by George II. as Elector of Hanover, but the Danes claiming the sovereignty, a skirmish ensued. . . . The well-timed treaty of subsidy calmed their resentment, and obtained the cession of their claim." Many urged, as in truth it was, that Steinhorst was bought with British money, and Boling-

broke expressed his fear "that we shall throw the small remainder of our wealth where we have thrown so much already, into the German Gulf, which cries Give! Give! and is never satisfied."

On the 19th of May, 1739, in accordance with the wish of the King, war was declared with Spain, nominally on the question of the right of search, but when peace was declared at Aix-la-Chapelle, this subject was never mentioned. According to Dr. Colquhoun, this war cost the country, £46,418,680.

George II. was, despite the provisions of the Act of Settlement, continually in Hanover. From 1729 to 1731, again in 1735 and 1736, and eight times between 1740 and 1755. In 1745 he wished to go, but was not allowed.

On the 2d of October, 1741 (the Pelham family having managed to acquire power by dint, as Lord Macaulay puts it, of more than suspected treason to their leader and colleague), the Duke of Newcastle, then Prime Minister, wrote his brother, Henry Pelham, as follows: "I must freely own to you, that I think the King's unjustifiable partiality for Hanover, to which he makes all other views and considerations subservient, has manifested itself so much that no man can continue in the active part of the administration with honor." The Duke goes on to describe the King's policy as "both dishonorable and fatal;" and Henry Pelham, on the 8th of October, writes him back that "a partiality to Hanover is general, is what all men of business have found great obstructions from, ever since this family have been upon the throne." Yet these are amongst the most prominent of the public defenders of the House of Brunswick, and a family which reaped great place and profit from the connection.

Of the Duke of Newcastle, Lord Macaulay says: "No man was so unmercifully satirized. But in truth he was

himself a satire ready made. All that the art of the satirist does for other men, nature had done for him. Whatever was absurd about him stood out with grotesque prominence from the rest of the character. He was a living, moving, talking caricature. His gait was a shuffling trot, his utterance a rapid stutter; he was always in a hurry; he was never in time; he abounded in fulsome caresses and in hysterical tears. His oratory resembled that of Justice Shallow. It was nonsense, effervescent with animal spirits and impertinence. Of his ignorance many anecdotes remain, some well authenticated, some probably invented at coffee-houses, but all exquisitely characteristic. 'Oh, yes, yes, to be sure! Annapolis must be defended; troops must be sent to Annapolis. Pray, where is Annapolis?' 'Cape Breton an island! Wonderful! show it me in the map. So it is, sure enough. My dear sir, you always bring us good news. I must go and tell the King that Cape Breton is an island.' And this man was, during near thirty years, Secretary of State, and during near ten years First Lord of the Treasury! His large fortune, his strong hereditary connection, his great Parliamentary interest, will not alone explain this extraordinary fact. His success is a signal instance of what may be effected by a man who devotes his whole heart and soul without reserve to one object. He was eaten up by ambition. His love of influence and authority resembled the avarice of the old usurer in the 'Fortunes of Nigel.' It was so intense a passion that it supplied the place of talents, that it inspired even fatuity with cunning. 'Have no money dealings with my father,' says Martha to Lord Glenvarloch, 'for, dotard as he is, he will make an ass of you.' It was as dangerous to have any political connection with Newcastle as to buy and sell with old Trapbois. He was greedy after power with a greediness all his own. He was jealous of all colleagues, and

even of his own brother. Under the disguise of levity, he was false beyond all example of political falsehood. All the able men of his time ridiculed him as a dunce, a driveller, a child who never knew his own mind for an hour together; and he overreached them all round."

In 1742, under the opposition of Pulteney, the Tories called upon Paxton, the Solicitor to the Treasury, and Scrope, the Secretary to the Treasury, to account for the specific sum of £1,147,211, which it was proved they had received from the minister. No account was ever furnished. George Vaughan, a confidant of Sir Robert Walpole, was examined before the Commons as to a practice charged upon that minister, of obliging the possessor of a place or office to pay a certain sum out of the profits of it to some person or persons recommended by the minister. Vaughan, who does not appear to have ventured any direct denial, managed to avoid giving a categorical reply, and to get excused from answering on the ground that he might criminate himself. Agitation was commenced for the revival of Triennial Parliaments, for the renewal of the clause of the Act of Settlement, by which pensioners and placemen were excluded from the House of Commons, and for the abolition of standing armies in time of peace. The Whigs, however, successfully crushed out the whole of this agitation. Strong language was heard in the House of Commons, where Sir James Dashwood said that "it was no wonder that the people were then unwilling to support the Government, when a weak, narrow-minded prince occupied the throne."

A very amusing squib appeared in 1742, when Sir Robert Walpole's power was giving way, partly under the bold attacks of the Tories, led by Cotton and Shippen; partly before the malcontent Whigs under the guidance of Carteret and Pulteney; partly before the rising power of the

young England party led by William Pitt; and somewhat from the jealousy, if not treachery, of his colleague, the Duke of Newcastle. The squib pictures the King's embarrassment and anger at being forced to dismiss Walpole, and to Carteret whom he has charged to form a ministry: —

"Quoth the King: 'My good lord, perhaps you've been told
That I used to abuse you a little of old,
But now bring whom you will, and eke turn away,
Let but me and my money at Walmoden stay."

Lord Carteret, explaining to the King whom he shall keep of the old ministry, includes the Duke of Newcastle: —

"Though Newcastle's false, as he's silly I know,
By betraying old Robin to me long ago,
As well as all those who employed him before,
Yet I leave him in place, but I leave him no power.

"For granting his heart is as black as his hat,
With no more truth in this than there's sense beneath that,
Yet, as he's a coward, he'll shake when I frown;
You called him a rascal, I'll use him like one.

"For your foreign affairs, howe'er they turn out,
At least I'll take care you shall make a great rout;
Then cock your great hat, strut, bounce, and look bluff,
For, though kick'd and cuff'd here, you shall there kick and cuff.

"That Walpole did nothing they all used to say,
So I'll do enough, but I'll make the dogs pay;
Great fleets I'll provide, and great armies engage,
Whate'er debts we make, or whate'er wars we wage!

"With cordials like these the monarch's new guest
Reviv'd his sunk spirits, and gladdened his breast;
Till in rapture he cried, 'My dear Lord, you shall do
Whatever you will — give me troops to review.'"

In 1743, King George II. actually tried to engage this country, by a private agreement, to pay £300,000 a year to

the Queen of Hungary, "as long as war should continue, or the necessity of her affairs should require." The King, being in Hanover, sent over the treaty to England, with a warrant directing the Lords Justices to "ratify and confirm it," which, however, they refused to do. On hearing that the Lord Chancellor refused to sanction the arrangement, King George II. threatened, through Earl Granville, to affix the Great Seal with his own hand. Ultimately the £300,000 per annum was agreed to be paid so long as the war lasted, but this sum was in more than one instance exceeded.

Although George II. had induced the country to vote such large sums to Maria Therese, the Empress-Queen, he nevertheless abandoned her in a most cowardly manner when he thought his Hanoverian dominions in danger, and actually treated with France without the knowledge or consent of his ministry. A rhyming squib, in which the King is termed the "Balancing Captain," from which we present the following extracts, will serve to show the feeling widely manifested in England at that time: —

"I'll tell you a story as strange as 'tis new,
Which all who're concerned will allow to be true,
Of a Balancing Captain, well known hereabouts,
Returned home (God save him) a mere king of clouts.

"This Captain he takes in a *gold* ballasted ship,
Each summer to *terra damnosa* a trip,
For which he begs, borrows, scrapes all he can get,
And runs his poor *owners* most vilely in debt.

"The last time he set out for this blessed place,
He met them, and told them a most piteous case,
Of a sister of his, who, though bred up at court,
Was ready to perish for want of support.

"This *Hung'ry* sister he then did pretend,
Would be to his owners a notable friend,

If they would at that critical juncture supply her;
They did — but, alas! all the fat's in the fire!"

The ballad then suggests that the King, having got all the money possible, made a peace with the enemies of the Queen of Hungary, described in the ballad as the sister: —

"He then turns his sister adrift, and declares
Her most mortal foes were her father's right heirs:
'G—d z—ds!' cries the world, 'such a step was ne'er taken!'
'Oh, oh!' says Moll Bluff, 'I have saved my own bacon.

"'Let France damn the Germans, and undamn the Dutch,
And Spain on old England pish ever so much;
Let Russia bang Sweden, or Sweden bang that,
I care not, by *Robert, one kick of my hat!*

"'Or should my chous'd owners begin to look sour,
I'll trust to *mate Bob* to exert his old power,
Regit animos dictis, or *numis* with ease
So, spite of your growling, I'll act as I please!'"

The British Nation, described as the owners, are cautioned to look into the accounts of their Captain, who is bringing them to insolvency: —

"This secret, however, must out on the day
When he meets his poor owners to ask for his pay;
And I fear, when they come to adjust the account,
A zero for balance will prove their amount."

The final result of all these subsidy votes was to increase our national debt, up to the signing of the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, to £76,000,000; while the seven years' war, which came later, brought the debt to £133,000,000, not including in this the capitalized value of the terminable annuities.

On November 22d, 1743, a caricature was published, which had a wide sale, and which represented the King as

a fat Hanoverian white horse riding to death a nearly starved British lion.

In 1744, £200,000 was voted, which King George and Lord Carteret, who was called by William Pitt, his "Hanoverian troop minister," had agreed to give the King of Sardinia. £40,000 was also voted for a payment made by the King to the Duke of Arenberg. This payment was denounced by Mr. Lyttelton as a dangerous misapplication of public money.

The votes for foreign subsidies alone, in 1744, were £691,426, while the Hanoverian soldiers cost us £393,773. The King actually tried in addition, in the month of August, to get a further subsidy for his friend, the Elector of Saxony, and another for the King of Poland, and this when Englishmen and Irishmen were lacking bread. Nor was even a pretence made in some instances of earning the money. £150,000 was paid this year to keep Prince Charles in Alsace, and the moment Austria got the money, Prince Charles was withdrawn, and Henry Pelham, writing to the Duke of Newcastle, says, "The same will be the case with every sum of money we advance. The allies will take it, and then act as suits their convenience and security." In the four years from 1744 to 1747, both included, we paid £4,342,683 for foreign troops and subsidies, not including the Dutch and Hessians, whom we hired to put down the rebellion of 1745. In the case of the whole of this war, in which we subsidized all our allies except the Dutch, it is clear that the direct and sole blame rests upon the King, who cared nothing for English interests in the matter. When firmly remonstrated with by Lord Chancellor Hardwicke, his reply was what the Duke of Newcastle describes as "almost sullen silence."

For the rebellion of 1745 — which came so near being successful, and which would have thoroughly succeeded had

the Pretender's son possessed any sort of ability as a leader — there is little room to spare here. The attempt to suppress it in its early stages is thus described in a Jacobite ballad: —

"Horse, foot, and dragoons, from lost Flanders they call,
With Hessians and Danes, and the devil and all;
And hunters and rangers led by Oglethorpe;
And the Church, at the bum of the Bishop of York.
And pray, who so fit to lead forth this parade,
As the babe of Tangier, my old grandmother Wade?
Whose cunning's so quick, but whose motion's so slow,
That the rebels marched on, while he stuck in the snow."

The hideously disgusting cruelties and horrible excesses committed by the infamous Duke of Cumberland, and the Hessians and Hanoverians under his command, in suppressing the rebellion after the battle of Culloden, are, alas! too well known. Duncan Forbes, Lord President of the Court of Session, and a warm supporter of the Brunswicks, remonstrating with the Duke as to the latter's disregard of the laws of the country, his Royal Highness of Cumberland replied with an oath: "The laws of my country, my lord; I'll make a brigade give laws." Scotland has many reasons for loving the House of Brunswick. Lord Waldegrave, who strove hard to whitewash the Duke of Cumberland, says that "Frederick Prince of Wales gave too much credit to the most malignant and groundless accusations, by showing favor to every man who aspersed his brother's character."

In 1747, £456,733 was voted by Parliament for the payment of the King's debts.

In 1748, considerable difficulty arose in consequence of the King's intrigues to obtain, at the expense of England, the Bishopric of Osnaburg as a princely establishment for his favorite son, the Duke of Cumberland, that pious prince,

much esteemed in Scotland as "the butcher." The most open hostility subsisted between the Duke of Cumberland and Prince Frederick, and pamphleteering attacks on the former, for his brutality and excesses, were supposed to be encouraged by the Leicester House party.

Amongst the curious scandals of 1749, it is stated that the King — being present at a masked ball, at which Elizabeth Chudleigh, afterwards Duchess of Kingston, figured as "La Belle Sauvage" in a close-fitting dress of flesh-colored silk, requested permission to place his hand on Miss Chudleigh's breast. The latter replied that she would put the King's hand on a still softer place, and immediately raised it to his own royal forehead.

On the 20th March, 1751, Frederick, Prince of Wales, died. The King, who received the news while playing cards with his mistress, Lady Yarmouth, and who had not spoken to his son for years, merely said, "Freddy is dead." On this subject Thackeray preserves for us the following epitaph: —

"Here lies Fred,
Who was alive, and is dead.
Had it been his father,
I had much rather.
Had it been his brother,
Still better than another.
Had it been his sister,
No one would have missed her.
Had it been the whole generation,
Still better for the nation.
But since 'tis only Fred,
Who was alive, and is dead,
There's no more to be said."

In 1755 there was the second war, estimated to have cost £111,271,996. In this George II. pursued exactly the opposite course of policy to that taken by him in the pre-

vious one. The war during the years following 1739 was for the humiliation of the King of Prussia; the policy in the last war was to prevent his humiliation. Mr. Baxter estimates the debt (exclusive of annuities) at £133,000,000; Dr. Colquhoun, adding the value of the annuities, makes it £146,682,843 at the conclusion of this war.

Towards the close of the reign of George II., who died on October 25th, 1760, his Royal Highness the Duke of Cumberland, by an exhibition of great strategy, combined with much discretionary valor, succeeded in making peace on terms which ensured the repose of himself and his Hanoverian forces during the remainder of the war. At home his Royal Highness was much attacked, some venturing to describe his personal conduct as cowardly, and his generalship as contemptible. It is a sufficient refutation of such a calumny to say that the Duke of Cumberland was as brave a soldier and as able a general as our present Commander-in-Chief, his Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge.

Lord Waldegrave, who wrote in favor of George II., admits that the King "is accused by his ministers of being hasty and passionate when any measure is proposed which he does not approve of." That "too great attention to money seems to be his capital failing." And that "his political courage seems somewhat problematical." Phillimore says: "In public life he was altogether indifferent to the welfare of England, except as it affected his Electorate's or his own. Always purchasing concubines, he was always governed by his wife. In private life he was a gross lover, an unreasonable master, a coarsely unfaithful husband, an unnatural parent, and a selfish man."

No more fitting conclusion can be found to this chapter than the following pregnant words from the pen of Lord Macaulay: "At the close of the reign of George II. the

feeling of aversion with which the House of Brunswick had long been regarded by half the nation had died away; but no feeling of affection to that house had yet sprung up. There was little, indeed, in the old King's character to inspire esteem or tenderness. He was not our countryman. He never set foot on our soil till he was more than thirty years old. His speech bewrayed his foreign origin and breeding. His love for his native land, though the most amiable part of his character, was not likely to endear him to his British subjects. He was never so happy as when he could exchange St. James's for Heranhausen. Year after year our fleets were employed to convoy him to the Continent, and the interests of his kingdom were as nothing to him when compared with the interests of his Electorate. As to the rest, he had neither the qualities which make dulness respectable, nor the qualities which make libertinism attractive. He had been a bad son and a worse father, an unfaithful husband and an ungraceful lover. Not one magnanimous or humane action is recorded of him; but many instances of meanness, and of a harshness which, but for the strong constitutional restraints under which he was placed, might have made the misery of his people."

CHAPTER IV.

THE REIGN OF GEORGE III.

When George II. died, his grandson and successor, George III., was twenty-two years of age. The Civil List of the new King was fixed at £800,000 a year, "a provision," says Phillimore, in his "History of England," "that soon became inadequate to the clandestine purposes of George III., and for the purchase of the mercenary depend-

ents, on the support of whom his unconstitutional proceedings obliged him to depend." The Civil List of George III. was not, however, really so large as that of her present Majesty. The Civil List disbursements included such items as Secret Service, now charged separately; pensions and annuities, now charged separately; diplomatic salaries, now forming distinct items; fees and salaries of ministers and judges, now forming no part of the charge against the Civil List. So that though £924,041 was the Civil List of George III. four years after he ascended the throne, in truth to-day the Royal Family alone get much more than all the great offices and machinery of State then cost. The Royal Family at the present time get from the country, avowedly and secretly, about one million sterling a year.

"At the accession of George III.," says Thackeray, "the Patricians were yet at the height of their good fortune. Society recognized their superiority, which they themselves pretty calmly took for granted. They inherited not only titles and estates, and seats in the House of Peers, but seats in the House of Commons. There were a multitude of Government places, and not merely these, but bribes of actual £500 notes, which members of the House took not much shame in assuming. Fox went into Parliament at twenty, Pitt was just of age, his father not much older. It was the good time for Patricians."

A change of political parties was imminent; Whig rule had lasted seventy years, and England had become tolerably disgusted with the consequences.

"Now that George II. was dead," says Macaulay, "a courtier might venture to ask why England was to become a party in a dispute between two German powers. What was it to her whether the House of Hapsburg or the House of Brandenburg ruled in Silesia? Why were the best English regiments fighting on the Maine? Why were the

Prussian battalions paid with English gold? The great minister seemed to think it beneath him to calculate the price of victory. As long as the Tower guns were fired, as the streets were illuminated, as French banners were carried in triumph through London, it was to him matter of indifference to what extent the public burdens were augmented. Nay, he seemed to glory in the magnitude of those sacrifices which the people, fascinated by his eloquence and success, had too readily made, and would long and bitterly regret. There was no check on waste or embezzlement. Our commissaries returned from the camp of Prince Ferdinand, to buy boroughs, to rear palaces, to rival the magnificence of the old aristocracy of the realm. Already had we borrowed, in four years of war, more than the most skilful and economical government would pay in forty years of peace."

The Church allied itself with the Tories, who assumed the reins of government, and thenceforth totally forgot the views of liberty they had maintained when in opposition. The policy of all their succeeding legislation was that of mischievous retrogression; they sought to excel the old Whigs in their efforts to consolidate the aristocracy at the expense of the people,

"This reactionary movement," says Buckle, "was greatly aided by the personal character of George III.; for he, being despotic as well as superstitious, was equally anxious to extend the prerogative, and strengthen the Church. Every liberal sentiment, everything approaching to reform, nay, even the mere mention of inquiry, was an abomination in the eyes of that narrow and ignorant Prince. Without knowledge, without taste, without even a glimpse of one of the sciences, or a feeling for one of the fine arts, education had done nothing to enlarge a mind which nature had more than usually contracted. Totally ignorant of the history

and resources of foreign countries, and barely knowing their geographical position, his information was scarcely more extensive respecting the people over whom he was called to rule. In that immense mass of evidence now extant, and which consists of every description of private correspondence, records of private conversation, and of public acts, there is not to be found the slightest proof that he knew any one of those numerous things which the governor of a country ought to know; or, indeed, that he was acquainted with a single duty of his position, except the mere mechanical routine of ordinary business, which might have been effected by the lowest clerk in the meanest office in his kingdom.

"He gathered round his throne that great party, who, clinging to the tradition of the past, have always made it their boast to check the progress of their age. During the sixty years of his reign, he, with the sole exception of Pitt, never willingly admitted to his councils a single man of great ability: not one whose name is associated with any measure of value, either in domestic or foreign policy. Even Pitt only maintained his position in the State by forgetting the lessons of his illustrious father, and abandoning those liberal principles in which he had been educated, and with which he entered public life. Because George III. hated the idea of reform, Pitt not only relinquished what he had before declared to be absolutely necessary, but did not hesitate to persecute to death the party with whom he had once associated in order to obtain it. Because George III. looked upon slavery as one of those good old customs which the wisdom of his ancestors had consecrated, Pitt did not dare to use his power for procuring its abolition, but left to his successors the glory of destroying that infamous trade, on the preservation of which his royal master had set his heart. Because George III. detested the French,

of whom he knew as much as he knew of the inhabitants of Kamschatka or Thibet, Pitt, contrary to his own judgment, engaged in a war with France, by which England was seriously imperilled, and the English people burdened with a debt that their remotest posterity will be unable to pay. But, notwithstanding all this, when Pitt, only a few years before his death, showed a determination to concede to the Irish a small share of their undoubted rights, the King dismissed him from office, and the King's friends, as they were called, expressed their indignation at the presumption of a minister who could oppose the wishes of so benign and gracious a master. And when, unhappily for his own fame, this great man determined to return to power, he could only recover office by conceding that very point for which he had relinquished it; thus setting the mischievous example of the minister of a free country sacrificing his own judgment to the personal prejudices of the reigning sovereign. As it was hardly possible to find other ministers who to equal abilities would add equal subservience, it is not surprising that the highest offices were constantly filled with men of notorious incapacity. Indeed, the King seemed to have an instinctive antipathy to everything great and noble. During the reign of George II. the elder Pitt had won for himself a reputation which covered the world, and had carried to an unprecedented height the glories of the English name. He, however, as the avowed friend of popular rights, strenuously opposed the despotic principles of the Court; and for this reason he was hated by George III. with a hatred that seemed barely compatible with a sane mind. Fox was one of the greatest statesmen of the 18th century, and was better acquainted than any other with the character and resources of those foreign nations with which our interests were intimately connected. To this rare and important knowledge he added a sweet-

ness and amenity of temper which extorted the praises even of his political opponents. But he, too, was the steady supporter of civil and religious liberty; and he, too, was so detested by George III., that the King, with his own hand, struck his name out of the list of Privy Councillors, and declared that he would rather abdicate the throne than admit him to a share in the government.

"While this unfavorable change was taking place in the sovereign and ministers of the country, a change equally unfavorable was being effected in the second branch of the imperial legislature. Until the reign of George III. the House of Lords was decidedly superior to the House of Commons in the liberality and general accomplishments of its members. It is true that in both Houses there prevailed a spirit which must be called narrow and superstitious if tried by the larger standard of the present age.

"The superiority of the Upper House over the Lower was, on the whole, steadily maintained during the reign of George II., the ministers not being anxious to strengthen the High Church party in the Lords, and the King himself so rarely suggesting fresh creations as to cause a belief that he particularly disliked increasing their numbers. It was reserved for George III., by an unsparing use of his prerogative, entirely to change the character of the Upper House, and thus lay the foundation for that disrepute into which, since then, the peers have been constantly falling. The creations he made were numerous beyond all precedent, their object evidently being to neutralize the liberal spirit hitherto prevailing, and thus turn the House of Lords into an engine for resisting the popular wishes, and stopping the progress of reform. How completely this plan succeeded is well known to the readers of our history; indeed, it was sure to be successful considering the character of the men who were promoted. They consisted almost entirely of

two classes: of country gentlemen, remarkable for nothing but their wealth, and the number of votes their wealth enabled them to control; and of mere lawyers, who had risen to judicial appointments partly from their professional learning, but chiefly from the zeal with which they repressed the popular liberties, and favored the royal prerogative.

"That this is no exaggerated description may be ascertained by any one who will consult the lists of the new peers made by George III.

"Here and there we find an eminent man, whose public services were so notorious that it was impossible to avoid rewarding them; but, putting aside those who were in a manner forced upon the sovereign, it would be idle to deny that the remainder, and of course the overwhelming majority, were marked by a narrowness and illiberality of sentiment which, more than anything else, brought the whole order into contempt. No great thinkers, no great writers, no great orators, no great statesmen, none of the true nobility of the land, were to be found among the spurious nobles created by George III."

In the early part of his reign, George III. (whom even the courtly Alison pictures as having "little education and no great acquired information") was very much under the influence of his mother, who had, previously to his being King, often spoken of her son with contempt. The Princess of Wales, in turn, was almost entirely guided by Lord Bute, represented by scandal, says Macaulay, as "her favored lover." "Of this attachment," says Dr. Doran, "the Prince of Wales himself is said to have had full knowledge, and did not object to Lord Bute taking solitary walks with the Princess, while *he* could do the same with Lady Middlesex." The most infamous stories were circulated in the *Whisperer*, and other journals of the time, as to the nature of the association between the Scotch Peer

and the King's mother, and its results. Phillimore regards the Princess of Wales as "before and after her husband's death the mistress of Lord Bute." The Princess Dowager seems to have been a hard woman. Walpole tells us how, when the Princess Dowager reproved one of her maids of honor for irregular habits, the latter replied, "*Madame, chacun a son But.*" "Seeing," says Thackeray, "the young Duke of Gloucester silent and unhappy once, she sharply asked him the cause of his silence. 'I am thinking,' said the poor child. 'Thinking, sir! and of what?'—'I am thinking if ever I have a son, I will not make him so unhappy as you make me.'"

John Stuart, Earl of Bute, shared with William Pitt and John Wilkes the bulk of popular attention during the first ten years of the King's reign. Bute had risen rapidly to favor, having attracted the attention of the Princess Dowager at some private theatricals, and he became by her influence Groom of the Stole. His poverty and ambition made him grasp at power, both against the great Commoner and the Pelham faction; and a lady observer described the great question of the day, in 1760, as being whether the King would burn in his chamber *Scotch* coal, *Newcastle* coal, or *Pitt* coal. Macaulay, who seems to have followed Lord Waldegrave's "Memoirs," says of Bute: "A handsome leg was among his chief qualifications for the stage. . . . His understanding was narrow, his manners cold and haughty." His qualifications for the part of a statesman were best described by Prince Frederick, who often indulged in the unprincely luxury of sneering at his dependents. "Bute," said his Royal Highness, "you are the very man to be envoy at some small proud German Court, where there is nothing to do." Phillimore speaks of Lord Bute as "a minion raised by Court favor to a post where

his ignorance, mean understanding, and disregard of English honor, became national calamities."

The King's speech on his accession is said to have been drawn up by Bute, who did not then belong to the Council, but the terms being vehemently objected to by Pitt, it was actually altered after delivery, and before it found its way to the printer.

Whatever were the relations between Lord Bute and the Princess Dowager, it is quite certain that on more than one occasion George III. condescended not only to prevaricate, but to lie as to the influence exercised by Lord Bute. It is certain, from the "Memoirs" of Earl Waldegrave, and other trustworthy sources, that the Scotch Earl, after being hissed out of office by the people, was still secretly consulted by the King, who, like a truly Royal Brunswick, did not hesitate to use falsehood on the subject even to his own ministers. Phillimore, in remarkably strong language, describes George III. as "an ignorant, dishonest, obstinate, narrow-minded boy, at that very moment the tool of an adulteress and her paramour." The Duke of Bedford has put upon record, in his correspondence, not only his conviction that the King behaved unfaithfully to his ministers, but asserts that he told him so to his face.

In 1759, George was married to Hannah Lightfoot, a Quakeress, in Curzon Street Chapel, May Fair, in the presence of his brother, Edward, Duke of York. Great doubt has, however, been cast on the legality of this marriage, as it would, if in all respects valid, have rendered null as a bigamous contract the subsequent marriage entered into by the King. Dr. Doran says that the Prince of Wales, afterwards George IV., when needing money in later years, used this Lightfoot marriage as a threat against his royal parents — that is, that he threatened to expose his mother's shame and his own illegitimacy if the Queen

would not use her influence with Pitt. Glorious family, these Brunswicks! Walpole affirms that early in his reign George III. admitted to his uncle, the Duke of Cumberland, "that it had not been common in their family to live well together."

On the 18th of September, 1761, George was married to the Princess Charlotte Sophia, of Mecklenburgh Strelitz, Hannah Lightfoot being still alive. Of the new Queen, Phillimore says: "If to watch over the education of her children and to promote their happiness be any part of a woman's duty, she has little claim to the praises that have been so lavishly bestowed on her as a model of domestic virtue. Her religion was displayed in the scrupulous observance of external forms. Repulsive in her aspect, grovelling in her instincts, sordid in her habits; steeped from the cradle in the stupid pride which was the atmosphere of her stolid and most insignificant race; inexorably severe to those who yielded to temptation from which she was protected, not more by her situation and the vigilance of those around her, than by the extreme homeliness of her person; bigoted, avaricious, unamiable to brutality, she added dulness and gloom even to the English court."

In 1761, the Duke of Bedford was Lord Lieutenant of Ireland; that unfortunate country, for centuries governed by men who tried to exterminate its natives, and which was used under the first three reigns of the House of Brunswick as a sponge out of which, regardless of much bloodshed and more misery, gold could be squeezed for the dependents and relatives of aristocrats in office. His reign of office in Ireland was brief. Walpole says that "the ill-humor of the country determined the Duke of Bedford to quit the Government, after having amply gratified his family and dependents with pensions." It was this Duke of Bedford who consented that the Princess of Hesse should have a

pension of £6,000 a year out of the Irish revenues, and who gave to his own relative, the Lady Betty Waldegrave, £800 a year from the same source. Shortly after this, Prince Charles, of Strelitz, the Queen's brother, received £30,000 towards the payment of the debts he owed in Germany. This £30,000 was nominally given by the King out of the Civil List, but was really paid by the nation when discharging the Civil List debts which it increased. On the motion of Lord Barrington, £400,000 subsidy was granted this year to the Landgrave of Hesse, under a secret treaty made by George II., without the knowledge or consent of Parliament, and £300,000 was also voted to the Chancery of Hanover for forage for Hanoverian, Prussian, and Hessian Cavalry.

On August 12th, 1762, George, Prince of Wales, was born; and in the same year, with the direct connivance of George III., the peace of Paris was made; a peace as disgraceful to England, under the circumstances, as can possibly be imagined. Lord Bute, who was roundly charged with receiving money from France for his services, and this with the knowledge of the mother of George III., most certainly communicated to the French minister "the most secret councils of the English Cabinet." This was done with the distinct concurrence of George III., who was himself bribed by the immediate evacuation of his Hanoverian dominions. In the debate in the Lords on the preliminaries of peace, Horace Walpole tells us that "the Duke of Grafton, with great weight and greater warmth, attacked them severely, and looking full on Lord Bute, imputed to him corruption and worse arts." Count Virri, the disreputable agent employed in this matter by the King and Lord Bute, was rewarded under the false name of George Charles with a pension of £1,000 a year out of the Irish revenues. Phillimore may well declare that Lord Bute was "a minion,

raised by court favor to a post where his ignorance, mean understanding, and disregard of English honor, became national calamities." To carry the approval of this peace of Paris through the Commons, Fox, afterwards Lord Holland, was purchased with a most lucrative appointment, although only shortly before he had published a print of George, with the following lines, referring to the Princess Dowager and Lord Bute, written under the likeness: —

"Son of a ———
I could say more."

To gain a majority in the House of Commons, Walpole tells us "that a shop was publicly opened at the pay office, whither the members flocked and received the wages of their venality in bank bills even to so low a sum as £200, for their votes on the treaty. £25,000 was thus issued in one morning." Lord Chesterfield speaks of the large sums disbursed by the King "for the hire of Parliament men."

As an illustration of the unblushing corruption of the age, the following letter from Lord Saye and Sele to Mr. Grenville, then Prime Minister of England, tells its own terrible tale: —

"November 26th, 1763.

"Honored Sir: — I am very much obliged to you for that freedom of converse you this morning indulged me in, which I prize more than the lucrative advantage I then received. To show the sincerity of my words (pardon, sir, the over-niceness of my disposition), I return enclosed the bill for £300 you favored me with, as good manners would not permit my refusal of it when tendered by you.

"Your most obliged and obedient servant,

"Saye and Sele.

"As a free horse needs no spur, so I stand in need of no

inducement or douceur to lend my small assistance to the King or his friends in the present Administration."

That this was part of the general practice of the Government under George III. may be seen by the following extract from an infamous letter written about fifteen years later by the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland: "No man can see the inconvenience of increasing the Peers more forcibly than myself, but the recommendation of many of those persons submitted to his Majesty for that honor, arose from the engagements taken up at the press of the moment to rescue questions upon which the English Government were very particularly anxious. My sentiments cannot but be the same with reference to the Privy Council and pensions, and I had not contracted any absolute engagements of recommendations either to peerage or pension, till difficulties arose which necessarily occasioned so much anxiety in his Majesty's Cabinet, that I must have been culpable in neglecting any possible means to secure a majority in the House of Commons."

A good story is told of the great Commoner Pitt's repartee to Fox (afterwards Lord Holland), in one of the debates of this period. "Pitt," says the *London Chronicle*, "in the heat of his declamation, proceeded so far as to attack the personal deformity of Fox; and represented his gloomy and lowering countenance, with the penthouse of his eyebrows, as Churchill phrases it, as a true introduction of his dark and double mind. Mr. Fox was nettled at this personal reflection, and the more so, perhaps, that it was as just as it was cutting. He therefore got up, and after inveighing bitterly against the indecency of his antagonist, in descending to remark on his bodily defects, observed that his figure was such as God Almighty had made it, and he could not look otherwise; and then, in a tone between

the plaintive and indignant, cried out, 'How, gentlemen, shall I *look?*' Most of the members, apprehending that Mr. Pitt had gone rather too far, were inclined to think that Mr. Fox had got the better of him. But Mr. Pitt started up, and with one of those happy turns, in which he so much excels, silenced his rival, and made him sit down with a countenance, if possible more abashed than formerly. '*Look!* Sir,' said he — '*look* as you *cannot* look, if you *would* — *look* as you *dare* not look, if you *could* — *look* like an *honest man.*'"

In the *London Chronicle* for March, 1763, we find bitter complaints that since 1760, "every obsolete, useless place has been revived, and every occasion of increasing salaries seized with eagerness," and that a great Whig leader "has just condescended to stipulate for an additional salary, without power, as the price of his support to the Tory Government."

In March, 1763, George III. gave four ships of war to the King of Sardinia at the national expense, and in August appears to have given a fifth vessel.

On the 23d of April, 1763, No. 45 of the *North Briton*, a journal which had been started in opposition to Lord Bute's paper, the *Briton*, was published, severely criticising the King's speech, and warmly attacking Lord Bute. This issue provoked the ministers to a course of the utmost illegality. A *general warrant* to seize all persons concerned in the publication of the *North Briton*, without specifying their names, was immediately issued by the Secretary of State, and a number of printers and publishers were placed in custody, some of whom were not at all concerned in the obnoxious publication. Late on the night of the 29th of April, the messengers entered the house of John Wilkes, M.P. for Aylesbury (the author of the article in question), and produced their warrant, with which he refused to com-

ply. On the following morning, however, he was carried before the Secretary of State, and committed a close prisoner to the Tower, his papers being previously seized and sealed, and all access to his person strictly prohibited. The warrant was clearly an illegal one, and had only been previously resorted to in one or two instances, and under very extraordinary circumstances, of which there were none in the present case. Wilkes's friends immediately obtained a writ of habeas corpus, which the ministers defeated by a mean subterfuge; and it was found necessary to obtain a second before they could bring the prisoner before the Court of King's Bench, by which he was set at liberty, on the ground of his privilege as a Member of Parliament. He then opened an angry correspondence, followed by actions at law, against the Secretaries of State, on the seizure of his papers, and for the wrongful arrest. These actions abated, although in the one for the seizure of the papers a verdict was given for £1,000 damages and costs. But in the mean time the Attorney-General had been directed to institute a prosecution against Wilkes, in the King's Bench, for libel, and the King had ordered him to be deprived of his commission as Colonel in the Buckinghamshire Militia. The King further exhibited his resentment by depriving Lord Temple of the Lord-Lieutenancy of the same county, and striking his name out of the Council-book, for an expression of personal sympathy which had fallen from him. Worse than all, this King George III. actually deprived General A'Court, M.P. for Heytesbury, of his commission as colonel of the 11th Dragoons, for having voted that the arrest of Wilkes was a breach of privilege. He also caused it to be intimated to General Conway, "that the King cannot trust his army in the hands of a man who votes in Parliament against him."

The House of Commons ordered the *North Briton* to be

burned by the common hangman; but when the authorities attempted to carry out the sentence, the people assembled, rescued the number, and burned instead a large jack-boot, the popular hieroglyphic for the unpopular minister.

Amongst the many rhymed squibs the following is worth repetition: —

> "Because the *North Briton* inflamed the whole nation,
> To flames they commit it to show detestation;
> But throughout old England how joy would have spread,
> Had the real North Briton been burnt in its stead!"

The North Briton of the last line is, of course, the Scotch Earl Bute.

As an illustration of the then disgraceful state of the English law, it is enougth to notice that Lord Halifax, the Secretary of State, by availing himself of his privileges as a peer, managed to delay John Wilkes in his action from June, 1763, to November, 1764; and then, Wilkes having been outlawed, the noble Earl appeared and pleaded the outlawry as a bar to further proceedings. Ultimately, after five years' delay, Wilkes annulled the outlawry, and recovered £4,000 damages against Lord Halifax. For a few months Wilkes was the popular idol, and, had he been a man of real earnestness and integrity, might have taken a permanently leading position in the State.

In August, 1763, Frederick, Duke of York, was born. He was created Prince Bishop of Osnaburg before he could speak. The King and Queen were much dissatisfied because the clergy of the diocese, who did not dispute the baby bishop's ability to attend to the souls of his flock, yet refused to entrust to him the irresponsible guardianship of the episcopal funds. This bishopric had actually been kept vacant by the King nearly three years, in order that he

might not give it to the Duke of York or Duke of Cumberland. The income was about £25,000 a year, and it was to secure this Prince Bishopric for the Duke of Cumberland that George II. burdened the country with several subsidies to petty European sovereigns.

The King's sister, Augusta, was, like the rest of the Brunswick family, on extremely bad terms with her mother, the Princess of Wales. The Princess Augusta was married on January 16th, 1764, to the hereditary Prince of Brunswick, who received £80,000, besides £8,000 a year for becoming the husband of one of our Royal Family. In addition to this, George III. and Queen Charlotte insulted the newly-married couple, who returned the insult with interest. Pleasant people, these Brunswicks!

In March, 1764, the first steps were taken in the endeavor to impose taxes on the American colonies, an endeavor which at length resulted in their famous rebellion. The commanders of our ships of war on the American coast were sworn in to act as revenue officers, the consequence of which was the frequently illegal seizures of ships and cargoes without any means of redress for the Americans in their own colony. As though to add to the rising disaffection, Mr. Grenville proposed a new stamp-tax. As soon as the Stamp Act reached Boston, the ships in the harbor hung their colors half-mast high, the bells were rung muffled, the Act of Parliament was reprinted with a death's head for title, and sold in the streets as the "Folly of England and Ruin of America." The Americans refused to use stamped paper. The Government distributors of stamps were either forced to return to England, or were obliged to renounce publicly and upon oath their official employment; and, when the matter was again brought before the English House of Commons, Pitt denied the right of Parliament to levy taxation on persons who had no right

to representation, and exclaimed: "I rejoice that America has resisted; three millions of people so dead to all feelings of liberty as voluntarily to submit to be slaves, would have been fit instruments to make slaves of all the rest." The supporters of the Government actually advanced the ridiculously absurd and most monstrous pretension that America was in law represented in Parliament as part of the manor of East Greenwich.

The Earl of Abercorn and Lord Harcourt appear to have been consulted by the Queen as to the effect of the previous marriage of George III. with Hannah Lightfoot, who seems to have been got rid of by some arrangement for a second marriage between her and a Mr. Axford, to whom a sum of money was paid. It is alleged that this was done without the knowledge of the King, who entreated Lord Chatham to discover where the Quakeress had gone. No fresh communication, however, took place between George III. and Hannah Lightfoot; and the King's first attack of insanity, which took place in 1764, is strongly suggested to have followed the more than doubts as to the legality of the second marriage and the legitimacy of the Royal Family. Hannah Lightfoot died in the winter of 1764, and in the early part of the year 1765, the King being then scarcely sane, a second ceremony of marriage with the Queen was privately performed by the Rev. Dr. Wilmot at Kew palace. Hannah Lightfoot left children by George III., but of these nothing is known.

In the winter of 1764, and spring of 1765, George III. was, in diplomatic language, laboring under an indisposition; in truth, he was mad. Her present Gracious Majesty often labors under an indisposition, but no loyal subject would suggest any sort of doubt as to her mental condition. A Bill was introduced in 1764 in the House of Lords, to provide for a Regency in case of the recurrence of any

similar attack. In the discussion on this Bill, a doubt arose as to who were to be regarded as the Royal Family; fortunately, the Law Lords limited it to the descendants of George II. If a similar definition prevailed to-day, we should, perhaps, not be obliged to pay the pensions to the Duke of Cambridge and Princess Mary, which they at present receive as members of the Royal Family.

On the 30th of October, 1765, William, Duke of Cumberland, the King's uncle, died. Dr. Doran says of him: "As he grew in manhood, his heart became hardened; he had no affection for his family, nor fondness for the army, for which he affected attachment. When his brother (Prince Frederick) died, pleasure, not pain, made his heart throb, as he sarcastically exclaimed, 'It's a great blow to the country, but I hope it will recover in time.' He was the author of what was called 'the bloody mutiny act.' 'He was dissolute and a gambler.' After the 'disgraceful surrender of Hanover and the infamous convention of Kloster-seven,' his father George II. said of him, 'Behold the son who has ruined me, and disgraced himself.'" His own nephew, George III., believed the Duke to be capable of murder. The Dukes of Cumberland in this Brunswick family have had a most unfortunate reputation.

In 1766, William Henry, Duke of Gloucester, brother of the King, married Maria, Countess-Dowager of Waldegrave. This marriage was at the time repudiated by the rest of the Royal Family.

In October of the same year Caroline Matilda, the King's sister, married Christian, King of Denmark, an unfeeling, dissolute brute. Our Princess, who lived very unhappily, was afterwards accused of adultery, and rescued from punishment by a British man-of-war.

In the autumn of 1766, in consequence of the high price of provisions and taxes, large gatherings took place in

many parts of the kingdom; these assemblages were dispersed with considerable loss of life, of course by the military, which the House of Brunswick was not slow to use in checking political manifestations. At Derby the people were charged by the cavalvy, at Colton eight were shot dead, in Gloucestershire many lives were lost; in fact, from Exeter to Berwick-on-Tweed there was one ferment of discontent and disaffection. The people were heavily taxed, the aristocracy corrupt and careless. As an instance of the madness of the governing classes, it is sufficient to point out that in 1767, while taxation was increasing, the landed gentry, who were rapidly appropriating common lands under Private Enclosure Acts, most audaciously reduced the land tax by one-fourth. During the first thirty-seven years of the reign of George III., there were no less than 1,532 Enclosure Acts passed, affecting in all 2,804,197 acres of land filched from the nation by a few families. Wealth took and poverty lost; riches got land without burden, and labor inherited burden in lieu of land. It is worth notice that in the early part of the reign of George III., land yielding about a sixth or seventh of its present rental, paid the same nominal tax that it does to-day, the actual amount paid at the present time being however smaller through redemption; and yet then the annual interest on the National Debt was under £4,500,000, while to-day it is over £26,000,000. Then the King's Civil List covered all the expenses of our State ministers and diplomatic representatives; to-day, an enormous additional sum is required, and a Prime Minister professing economy, and well versed in history, has actually the audacity to pretend that the country gains by its present Civil List arrangement.

In 1769 George III. announced to his faithful Commons he owed half a million. John Wilkes and a few others protested, but the money was voted.

In 1770 King George III. succeeded in making several buttons at Kew, and as this is, as far as I am aware, the most useful work of his life, I desire to give it full prominence. His son, afterwards George IV., made a shoebuckle. No other useful product has resulted directly from the efforts of any male of the family.

In 1770 Henry, Duke of Cumberland, the King's brother, was sued by Lord Grosvenor for crim. con., and had to pay £10,000 damages. This same Henry, in the following year, went through the form of marriage with a Mrs. Horton, which marriage, being repudiated by the Court, troubled him but little, and in the lifetime of the lady contracted a second alliance, which gave rise to the famous Olivia Serres legitimacy issue.

The Royal Marriage Act, a most infamous measure for ensuring the perpetuation of vice, and said to be the result of the Lightfoot experience, was introduced to Parliament by a message from George III., on the 20th February, 1772, twelve days after the death of the Princess-Dowager, of Wales. George III. wrote to Lord North on the 26th February: "I expect every nerve to be strained to carry the Bill. It is not a question relating to the Administration, but personally to myself, therefore I have a right to expect a hearty support from every one in my service, and I shall remember defaulters."

In May, 1773, the East India Company, having to come before Parliament for borrowing powers, a select committee was appointed, whose inquiries laid open cases of rapacity and treachery involving the highest personages, and a resolution was carried in the House of Commons affirming that Lord Clive had dishonorably possessed himself of £234,000 at the time of the deposition of Surajah Dowlah, and the establishment of Meer Jaffier. Besides this, it was proved that Lord Clive received several other large sums in suc-

ceeding years. Phillimore describes this transaction, in terrific language, as one of "disgusting and sordid turpitude," declaring that "individual members of the English Government were to be paid for their treachery by a hire, the amount of which is almost incredible." A few years after this exposure, Lord Clive committed suicide.

On the 18th of December, 1773, the celebrated cargoes of tea were thrown over in Boston Harbor. The tea duty was a trifling one, but was unfortunately insisted upon by the King's Government as an assertion of the right of the British Parliament to tax the unrepresented American colonies, a right the colonists strenuously and successfully denied.

The news of the firm attitude of the Bay State colonists arrived in England early in March, 1774, and Lord North's Government, urged by the King, first deprived Boston of her privileges as a port; secondly, took away from the State of Massachusetts the whole of the executive powers granted by the charter of William III., and vested the nomination of magistrates of every kind in the King, or royally-appointed Governor; and thirdly, carried an enactment authorizing persons accused of political offences committed in Boston to be sent home to England to be tried.

These monstrous statutes provoked the most decided resistance; all the other American colonists joined with Boston, and a solemn league and covenant was entered into for suspending all commercial incercourse with Great Britain until the obnoxious acts were repealed. On the 5th of Sept., 1774, a congress of fifty-one representatives from twelve old colonies assembled in Philadelphia. The instructions given to them disclaimed every idea of independence, recognized the constitutional authority of the mother country, and acknowledged the prerogatives of the crown; but unanimously declared that they would never give up the rights and liberties derived to them from their ancestors as

British subjects, and pronounced the late acts relative to the colony of Massachusetts Bay to be unconstitutional, oppressive and dangerous. The first public act of the congress was a resolution declarative of their favorable disposition towards the colony above mentioned; and, by subsequent resolutions, they formally approved the opposition it had given to the obnoxious acts, and declared that, if an attempt were made to carry them into execution by force, the colony should be supported by all America.

The following extract is from the "Address of the Twelve United Provinces to the Inhabitants of Great Britain," when force was actually used: — "We can retire beyond the reach of your navy, and, without any sensible diminution of the necessaries of life, enjoy a luxury, which from that period you will want — *the luxury of being free.*"

On the 16th of November, 1775, Edmund Burke proposed the renunciation on the part of Great Britain of the exercise of taxation in America, the repeal of the obnoxious duty on tea, and a general pardon for past political offenders. This was directly opposed by the King, who had lists brought to him of how the members spoke and voted, and was negatived in the House of Commons by 210 votes against 105. On the 20th November, after consultation with George III., Lord North introduced a Bill by which all trade and commerce with the thirteen United colonies were interdicted. It authorized the seizure, whether in harbor or on the high seas, of all vessels laden with American property, and by a cruel stretch of refined tyranny it rendered all persons taken on board American vessels liable to be entered as sailors on board British ships of war, and to serve (if required) against their own countrymen. About the same time, as we learn by a "secret" dispatch from Lord Dartmouth to General Howe, the King had been unmanly enough to apply to the Czarina of Rus-

sia for the loan of 20,000 Russian soldiers to enable him to crush his English subjects in the American colonies. As yet the Americans had made no claim for independence. They were only petitioners for justice.

In order to crush out the spirit of liberty in the American colonies, the Government of George III., in February, 1776, hired 17,000 men from the Landgrave and Hereditary Prince of Hesse Cassel, and from the Duke of Brunswick. Besides these, there were levies of troops out of George III.'s Hanoverian dominions, and that nothing might be wanting to our glory, the King's agents stirred up the Cherokee and Creek Indians to scalp, ravish, and plunder the disaffected colonists. Jesse says: "The newly arrived troops comprised several thousand kidnapped German soldiers, whom the cupidity of the Duke of Brunswick, of the Landgrave of Hesse Cassel, and other German Princes, had induced to let out for hire to the British Government. . . . Frederick of Prussia not only denounced the traffic as a most scandalous one, but wherever, it is said, the unfortunate hirelings had occasion to march through any part of his dominions, used to levy a toll upon them, as if they had been so many head of bullocks. . . . They had been sold, he said, as cattle, and therefore he was entitled to exact the toll."

The consequence of all this was, on the 4th of July, 1776, the famous declaration of the American Congress. "The history of the reigning sovereign, they said, was a history of repeated injuries and usurpations. So evidently was it his intention to establish an absolute despotism, that it had become their duty, as well as their right, to secure themselves against further aggressions. . . . In every stage of these oppressions," proceeds the Declaration, "we have petitioned for redress in the most humble terms. Our petitions have been answered only by repeated injuries.

A Prince, whose character is thus marked by every act which may define a tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a free people." And the United Colonies solemnly declare themselves to be "free and independent States."

In 1777, during this American war, Earl Chatham, in one of his grand speeches, after denouncing "the traffic and barter driven with every little pitiful German Prince that sells his subjects to the shambles of a foreign country," adds: "The mercenary aid on which you rely, irritates to an incurable resentment the minds of your enemies, whom you overrun with the sordid sons of rapine and of plunder, devoting them and their possessions to the rapacity of hireling cruelty! If I were an American, as I am an Englishman, while a foreign troop was landed in my country, I never would lay down my arms, never! never! never!" In reply to Lord Suffolk, who had said, in reference to employing the Indians, that "we were justified in using all the means which God and nature had put into our hands," "I am astonished," exclaimed Lord Chatham, as he rose, "shocked, to hear such principles confessed, to hear them avowed in this House, or in this country; principles equally unconstitutional, inhuman, and un-Christian. *That God and Nature put into our hands!* I know not what idea that Lord may entertain of God and Nature, but I know that such abominable principles are equally abhorrent to religion and humanity. What! attribute the sacred sanction of God and nature to the massacres of the Indian scalping-knife, to the cannibal savage, torturing, murdering, roasting, and eating; literally, my Lords, eating the mangled victims of his barbarous battles!"

And yet even after this we find George III. writing to Lord North, on the 22d of June, 1779: "I do not yet despair that, with Clinton's activity, and the Indians in their rear, the provinces will soon now submit."

Actually so late as the 27th of November, 1781, after the surrender of Cornwallis, we find George III. saying that "retaining a firm confidence in the wisdom and protection of Divine Providence," he should be able "by the valor of his fleets and armies to conquer America." Fox, in the House of Commons, denounced this speech of the King's as one "breathing vengeance, blood, misery, and rancor;" and "as containing the sentiments of some arbitrary, despotic, hard-hearted, and unfeeling monarch, who, having involved his subjects in a ruinous and unnatural war, to glut his feelings of revenge, was determined to persevere in it in spite of calamity." "Divest the speech," said he, "of its official forms, and what was its purport? 'Our losses in America have been most calamitous; the blood of my subjects has flowed in copious streams; the treasures of Great Britain have been wantonly lavished; the load of taxes imposed on an over-burthened country is become intolerable; my rage for conquest is unquenched; my revenge unsated; nor can anything except the total subjugation of my American subjects allay my animosity.'"

The following table shows what this disastrous war ultimately cost this country in mere money; no table can efficiently show its cost in blood and misery: —

Year.	Taxation.	Loans.
1775	£10,138,061	—
1776	10,265,405	£2,000,000
1777	10,604,013	5,500,000
1778	10,732,405	6,000,000
1779	11,192,141	7,000,000
1780	12,255,214	12,000,000
1781	12,454,936	12,000,000
1782	12,593,297	13,500,000
1783	11,962,718	12,000,000
1784	12,905,519	12,879,341
1785	14,871,520	10,990,651
Total	£129,975,229	£93,869,992

The American war terminated in 1783; but as the loans of the two following years were raised to wind up the expenses of that struggle, it is proper they should be included. The total expense of the American war will stand thus: —

Taxes	£129,975,229
Loans	93,869,992
Advances by the Bank of England	110,000
Advances by the East India Company	3,200,000
Increase in the Unfunded Debt	5,170,273
Total	232,325,494
Deduct expense of a peace establishment for eleven years, as it stood in 1774	113,142,403
Net cost of the American war	£119,183,091

In addition to this must be noted £1,340,000 voted as compensation to American loyalists in 1788, and £4,000 a year pension since, and even now, paid to the descendants of William Penn, amounting, with compound interest, to an enormous additional sum, even to the present date, without reckoning future liability. And this glorious colony parted from us in blood and shame, in consequence of a vain attempt to gratify the desire of the House of Brunswick to make New England contribute to their German greed as freely and as servilely as Old England had done.

Encouraged by the willingness with which his former debts had been discharged, George III., in 1777, sent a second message, but this time for the larger sum of £600,000, which was not only paid, but an additional allowance of £100,000 a year was voted to his Majesty, and £40,000 was given to the Landgrave of Hesse.

As an illustration of the barbarity of our laws, it is enough to say that, in 1777, Sarah Parker was burnt for counterfeiting silver coin. In June, 1786, Phœbe Harris was burnt for the same offence. And this in a reign when

persons in high position, accused of murder, forgery, perjury, and robbery, escaped almost scot free.

In April, 1778, £60,000 a year was settled on the six younger princes, and £30,000 a year on the five princesses. These pensions, however, were professedly paid out of the King's Civil List, not avowedly in addition to it, as they are to-day. The Duke of Buckingham stated that in 1778, and again in 1782, the King threatened to abdicate. This threat, which, unfortunately, was never carried out, arose from the King's obstinate persistence in the worse than insane policy against the American colonies.

In December, 1779, in consequence of England needing Irish soldiers to make war on America, Ireland was graciously permitted to export Irish woollen manufactures. The indulgences, however, to Ireland — even while the Ministers of George III. were trying to enlist Irishmen to kill the English, Scotch, and Irish in America — were made most grudgingly. Pious Protestant George III. would not consent that any Irish Catholic should own one foot of freehold land; and Edmund Burke, in a letter to an Irish peer, says that it was "pride, arrogance, and a spirit of domination" which kept up "these unjust legal disabilities."

On the 8th February, 1780, Sir G. Savile presented the famous Yorkshire petition, signed by 8,000 freeholders, praying the House of Commons to inquire into the management and expenditure of public money, to reduce all exorbitant emoluments, and to abolish all sinecure places and unmerited pensions. Three days later, Edmund Burke proposed a reduction of the national taxation (which was then only a sixth part of its amount to-day), and a diminution of the power of the Crown. Burke was defeated, but shortly after, on the motion of Mr. Dunning, the House of Commons declared, by a majority of 18 against the

Government, "That the influence of the Crown has increased, is increasing, and ought to be diminished."

On the 20th March, 1782, Lord North, in consequence of the impossibility of subduing the American colonies, determined to resign. The King opposed this to the last, declaring that no difficulties should induce him to consent to a peace acknowledging the Independence of America. "So distressing," says Jesse, "was the conflict which prevailed in the mind of George III., that he not only contemplated abandoning the Crown of England for the Electorate of Hanover, but orders had actually been issued to have the royal yacht in readiness for his flight." What a blessing to the country if he had really persevered in his resolution!

Charles James Fox, who now came into power for a brief space, had, says Jesse, "taught himself to look upon his sovereign as a mere dull, obstinate, half-crazed, and narrow-minded bigot; a Prince whose shallow understanding had never been improved by education, whose prejudices it was impossible to remove, and whose resentments it would be idle to endeavor to soften."

In 1784, George, Prince of Wales, was over head and ears in debt, and the King, who appears to have hated him, refusing any aid, he resorted to threats. Dr. Doran says: "A conversation is spoken of as having passed between the Queen and the Minister, in which he is reported as having said, 'I much fear, your Majesty, that the Prince, in his wild moments, may allow expressions to escape him that may be injurious to the Crown.' — 'There is little fear of that,' was the alleged reply of the Queen; 'he is too well aware of the consequences of such a course of conduct to himself. As regards that point, therefore, I can rely upon him.'"

Jesse says of the Prince of Wales, that between eighteen

and twenty, "to be carried home drunk, or to be taken into custody by the watch, were apparently no unfrequent episodes in the career of the Heir to the Throne. Under the auspices of his weak and frivolous uncle, the Duke of Cumberland, the Prince's conversation is said to have been a compound of the slang of grooms and the wanton vocabulary of a brothel." "When we hunt together," said the King to the Duke of Gloucester, "neither my son nor my brother speak to me; and lately, when the chase ended at a little village where there was but a single post-chaise to be hired, my son and brother got into it, and drove off, leaving me to go home in a cart, if I could find one." And this is the family Mr. Disraeli holds up for Englishmen to worship!

In July, 1782, Lord Shelburne came into office; but he "always complained that the King had tricked and deserted him," and had "secretly connived at his downfall." He resigned office on the 24th February, 1783. An attempt was made to form a Coalition Ministry, under the Duke of Portland. The King complained of being treated with personal incivility, and the attempt failed. On the 23d March, the Prince of Wales, at the Queen's Drawing-room, said: "The King had refused to accept the coalition, but by God he should be made to agree to it." Under the great excitement the King's health gave way. The Prince, says Jesse, was a member of Brooks's Club, where, as Walpole tells us, the members were not only "strangely licentious" in their talk about their sovereign, but in their zeal for the interests of the heartless young Prince "even wagered on the duration of the King's reign." The King repeated his threat of abandoning the Throne, and retiring to his Hanoverian dominions; and told the Lord-Advocate, Dundas, that he had obtained the consent of the Queen to his taking this extraordinary step. Young William Pitt refusing twice to accept the Premiership, Fox and Lord

North came again into power. £30,000 was voted for the Prince of Wales's debts, and a similar sum to enable him to furnish his house. The "unnatural" Coalition Ministry did not last long. Fox introduced his famous India Bill. The King, regarding it as a blow at the power of the Crown, caballed and canvassed the Peers against it. "The welfare of thirty millions of people was overlooked in the excitement produced by selfish interests, by party zeal, and officious loyalty." "Instantly," writes Lord Macaulay, "a troop of Lords of the Bedchamber, of Bishops who wished to be translated, and of Scotch peers who wished to be re-elected, made haste to change sides." The Bill had passed the Commons by large majorities. The King opposed it like a partisan, and when it was defeated in the Lords, cried, "Thank God! it is all over; the House has thrown out the Bill, so there is an end of Mr. Fox." The Ministers not resigning, as the King expected they would, his Majesty dismissed them at once, sending to Lord North in the middle of the night for his seals of office.

On the 19th December, 1783, William Pitt, then twenty-four years of age, became Prime Minister of England. The House of Commons passed a resolution, on the motion of Lord Surrey, remonstrating with the King for having permitted his sacred name to be unconstitutionally used in order to influence the deliberations of Parliament. More than once the Commons petitioned the King to dismiss Pitt from office. Pitt, with large majorities against him, wished to resign; but George III. said, "If you resign, Mr. Pitt, I must resign too," and he again threatened, in the event of defeat, to abandon England, and retire to his Hanoverian dominions. Now our monarch, if a king, would, have no Hanoverian dominions to retire to.

In 1784, £60,000 was voted by Parliament to defray the King's debts. In consequence of the large debts of the

Prince of Wales, an interview was arranged at Carlton House, on the 27th April, 1785, between the Prince and Lord Malmesbury. The King, the Prince said, had desired him to send in an exact statement of his debts; there was one item, however, of £25,000, on which the Prince of Wales would give no information. If it were a debt, argued the King, which his son was ashamed to explain, it was one which he ought not to defray. The Prince threatened to go abroad, saying, "I am ruined if I stay in England. I shall disgrace myself as a man; my father hates me, and has hated me since I was seven years old. . . . We are too wide asunder to ever meet. The King has deceived me; he has made me deceive others. I cannot trust him, and he will not believe me." And this is the Brunswick family to which the English nation are required to be blindly loyal!

In 1785, George, Prince of Wales, was married to a Roman Catholic lady, Mrs. Fitzherbert, a widow. It is of course known that the Prince treated the lady badly. This was not his first experience, the history of Mary Robinson forming but one amongst a long list of shabby *liaisons*. A question having arisen before the House of Commons, during a discussion on the debts owing by the Prince, Charles James Fox, on the written authority of the Prince, denied that any marriage, regular or irregular, had ever taken place, and termed it an invention. . . . destitute of the slightest foundation." Mr. Fox's denial was made on the distinct written authority of the Prince, who offered, through Fox, to give in the House of Lords the "fullest assurances of the utter falsehood" of the allegation; although not only does everybody know to-day that the denial was untrue, but in point of fact the fullest proofs of the denied marriage exist at this very moment in the custody of Messrs. Coutts, the bankers. Out of all the Brunswicks England has been cursed with, George I. is the only one against

whom there is no charge of wanton falsehood to his ministers or subjects, and it is fairly probable that his character for such truthfulness was preserved by his utter inability to lie in our language.

Not only did George, Prince of Wales, thus deny his marriage with Mrs. Fitzherbert, but repeated voluntarily the denial after he became King George IV. Despite this denial, the King's executors, the Duke of Wellington and Sir William Knighton, were compelled by Mrs. Fitzherbert to admit the proofs. The marriage took place on the 21st December, 1785, and Mrs. Fitzherbert being a Roman Catholic, the legal effect was to bar Prince George and prevent him ever becoming the lawful King of England. The documents above referred to as being at Coutts's include — 1. The marriage certificate. 2. A letter written by the Prince of Wales acknowledging the marriage. 3. A will, signed by him, also acknowledging it, and other documents. And yet George, our King, whom Mr. Disraeli praises, authorized Charles James Fox to declare the rumor of his marriage "a low, malicious falsehood;" and then the Prince went to Mrs. Fitzherbert, and, like a mean, lying hypocrite as he was, said, "O Maria, only conceive what Fox did yesterday; he went down to the House and denied that you and I were man and wife."

Although when George, Prince of Wales, had attained his majority, he had an allowance of £50,000 a year, £60,000 to furnish Carlton House, and an additional £40,000 for cash to start with, yet he was soon after deep in debt. In 1787, £160,000 was voted, and a portion of the Prince's debts was paid. £20,000 further was added as a vote for Carlton House. Thackeray says: "Lovers of long sums have added up the millions and millions which in the course of his brilliant existence this single Prince consumed. Besides his income of £50,000, £70,000, £100,000, £120,-

000 a year, we read of three applications to Parliament; debts to the amount of £160,000, of £650,000, besides mysterious foreign loans, whereof he pocketed the proceeds. What did he do for all this money? Why was he to have it? If he had been a manufacturing town, or a populous rural district, or an army of five thousand men, he would not have cost more. He, one solitary stout man, who did not toil, nor spin, nor fight — what had any mortal done that he should be pampered so?"

The proposed impeachment of Warren Hastings, which actually commenced on February 13th, 1788, and which did not conclude until eight years afterwards, excited considerable feeling, it being roundly alleged that Court protection had been purchased by the late Governor-General of India, by means of a large diamond presented to the King. The following rhymed squib tells its own story. It was sung about the streets to the tune of "Derry Down": —

"I'll sing you a song of a diamond so fine,
That soon in the crown of the monarch will shine;
Of its size and its value the whole country rings,
By Hastings bestowed on the best of all Kings.
Derry down, &c.

"From India this jewel was lately brought o'er,
Though sunk in the sea, it was found on the shore,
And just in the nick to St. James's it got,
Convey'd in a bag by the brave Major Scott.
Derry down, &c.

"Lord Sydney stepp'd forth, when the tidings were known —
It's his office to carry such news to the throne; —
Though quite out of breath, to the closet he ran,
And stammer'd with joy ere his tale he began.
Derry down, &c.

"'Here's a jewel, my liege, there's none such in the land;
Major Scott, with three bows, put it into my hand:

And he swore, when he gave it, the wise ones were bit,
For it never was shown to Dundas or to Pitt.'
Derry down, &c.

"'For Dundas,' cried our sovereign, 'unpolished and rough,
Give him a Scotch pebble, it's more than enough.
And jewels to Pitt, Hastings justly refuses,
For he has already more gifts than he uses.
Derry down, &c.

"'But run, Jenky, run!' adds the King in delight,
'Bring the Queen and Princesses here for a sight;
They never would pardon the negligence shown,
If we kept from their knowledge so glorious a stone.
Derry down, &c.

"'But guard the door, Jenky, no credit we'll win,
If the Prince in a frolic should chance to step in:
The boy to such secrets of State we'll ne'er call,
Let him wait till he gets our crown, income, and all.'
Derry down, &c.

"In the Princesses run, and surprised cry, 'O la!
'Tis big as the egg of a pigeon, papa!'—
'And a pigeon of plumage worth plucking is he,'
Replies our good monarch, 'who sent it to me.'
Derry down, &c.

"Madame Schwellenberg peep'd through the door at a chink,
And tipp'd on the diamond a sly German wink;
As much as to say, 'Can we ever be cruel
To him who has sent us so glorious a jewel?'
Derry down, &c.

"Now God save the Queen! while the people I teach,
How the King may grow rich while the Commons impeach;
Then let nabobs go plunder, and rob as they will,
And throw in their diamonds as grist to his mill.
Derry down, &c."

It was believed that the King had received not one diamond, but a large quantity, and that they were to be the

purchase-money of Hastings's acquittal. Caricatures on the subject were to be seen in the window of every print-shop. In one of these Hastings was represented wheeling away in a barrow the King, with his crown and sceptre, observing, "What a man buys, he may sell;" and, in another, the King was exhibited on his knees, with his mouth wide open, and Warren Hastings pitching diamonds into it. Many other prints, some of them bearing evidence of the style of the best caricaturists of the day, kept up the agitation on this subject. It happened that there was a quack in the town, who pretended to eat stones, and bills of his exhibition were placarded on the walls, headed, in large letters, "The great stone-eater!" The caricaturists took the hint, and drew the King with a diamond between his teeth, and a heap of others before him, with the inscription, "The greatest stone-eater!"

We borrow a few sentences from Lord Macaulay to enable our readers to judge, in brief space, the nature of Warren Hastings's position, standing impeached, as he did, on a long string of charges, some of them most terrible in their implication of violence, falsehood, fraud, and rapacity. Macaulay thus pictures the situation between the civilized Christian and his tributaries: "On one side was a band of English functionaries, daring, intelligent, eager to be rich. On the other side was a great native population, helpless, timid, and accustomed to crouch under oppression." When some new act of rapacity was resisted there came war; but "a war of Bengalees against Englishmen was like a war of sheep against wolves, of men against demons." There was a long period before any one dreamed that justice and morality should be features of English rule in India. "During the interval, the business of a servant of the Company was simply to wring out of the natives a hundred or two hundred thousand pounds as speedily as pos-

sible, that he might return home before his constitution had suffered from the heat, to marry a peer's daughter, to buy rotten boroughs in Cornwall, and to give balls in St. James's Square." Hastings was compelled to turn his attention to foreign affairs. The object of his diplomacy was at this time simply to get money. The finances of his government were in an embarrassed state, and this embarrassment he was determined to relieve by some means, fair or foul. The principle which directed all his dealings with his neighbors is fully expressed by the old motto of one of the great predatory families of Teviotdale: "Thou shalt want ere I want." He seems to have laid it down, as a fundamental proposition which could not be disputed, that, when he had not as many lacs of rupees as the public service required, he was to take them from anybody who had. One thing, indeed, is to be said in excuse for him. The pressure applied to him by his employers at home was such as only the highest virtue could have withstood, such as left him no choice except to commit great wrongs, or to resign his high post, and with that post all his hopes of fortune and distinction. Hastings was in need of funds to carry on the government of Bengal, and to send remittances to London; and Sujah Dowlah had an ample revenue. Sujah Dowlah was bent on subjugating the Rohillas; and Hastings had at his disposal the only force by which the Rohillas could be subjugated. It was agreed that an English army should be lent to Nabob Vizier, and that for the loan he should pay four hundred thousand pounds sterling, besides defraying all the charge of the troops while employed in his service. "I really cannot see," says Mr. Gleig, "upon what grounds, either of political or moral justice, this proposition deserves to be stigmatized as infamous." If we understand the meaning of words, it is infamous to commit a wicked action for hire, and it is

wicked to engage in war without provocation. In this particular war, scarcely one aggravating circumstance was wanting. The object of the Rohilla war was this, to deprive a large population, who had never done us the least harm, of a good government, and to place them, against their will, under an execrably bad one. . . . The horrors of Indian war were let loose on the fair valleys and cities of Rohilcund. The whole country was in a blaze. More than a hundred thousand people fled from their homes to pestilential jungles, preferring famine, and fever, and the haunts of tigers, to the tyranny of him to whom an English and a Christian government had, for shameful lucre, sold their substance, and their blood, and the honor of their wives and daughters. . . . Mr. Hastings had only to put down by main force the brave struggles of innocent men fighting for their liberty. Their military resistance crushed, his duties ended; and he had then only to fold his arms and look on, while their villages were burned, their children butchered, and their women violated. . . . We hasten to the end of this sad and disgraceful story. The war ceased. The finest population in India was subjected to a greedy, cowardly, cruel tyrant. Commerce and agriculture languished. The rich province which had tempted the cupidity of Sujah Dowlah became the most miserable part even of his miserable dominions. Yet is the injured nation not extinct. At long intervals gleams of its ancient spirit have flashed forth; and even at this day valor, and self-respect, and a chivalrous feeling rare among Asiatics, and a bitter remembrance of the great crime of England, distinguish that noble Afghan race."

Partly in consequence of the proposed legislation by Fox on the affairs of the East India Company, and partly from personal antagonism, members of the Indian Council hostile to Governor-General Hastings were sent out to India.

Amongst his most prominent antagonists was Francis, the reputed author of Junius's Letters. It was to Francis especially that the Maharajah Nuncomar of Bengal addressed himself. "He put into the hands of Francis, with great ceremony, a paper containing several charges of the most serious description. By this document Hastings was accused of putting offices up to sale, and of receiving bribes for suffering offenders to escape. In particular, it was alleged that Mahommed Reza Khan had been dismissed with impunity, in consideration of a great sum paid to the Governor-General. . . . He stated that Hastings had received a large sum for appointing Rajah Goordas treasurer of the Nabob's household, and for committing the care of his Highness's person to Munny Begum. He put in a letter purporting to bear the seal of the Munny Begum, for the purpose of establishing the truth of his story."

Much evidence was taken before the Indian Council, where there was considerable conflict between the friends and enemies of Hastings. "The majority, however, voted that the charge was made out; that Hastings had corruptly received between thirty and forty thousand pounds; and that he ought to be compelled to refund."

Now, however, comes an item darker and more disgraceful, if possible than what had preceded.

"On a sudden, Calcutta was astounded by the news that Nuncomar had been taken up on a charge of felony, committed, and thrown into the common jail. The crime imputed to him was, that six years before he had forged a bond. The ostensible prosecutor was a native. But it was then, and still is, the opinion of everybody, idiots and biographers excepted, that Hastings was the real mover in the business." The Chief-Justice Impey, one of Hastings's creatures, pushed on a mock trial; "a verdict of Guilty was returned, and the Chief-Justice pronounced sentence of death

on the prisoner. . . . Of Impey's conduct it is impossible to speak too severely. He acted unjustly in refusing to respite Nuncomar. No rational man can doubt that he took this course in order to gratify the Governor-General. If we had ever had any doubts on that point, they would have been dispelled by a letter which Mr. Gleig has published. Hastings, three or four years later, described Impey as the man 'to whose support he was at one time indebted for the safety of his fortune, honor, and reputation.' These strong words can refer only to the case of Nuncomar; and they must mean that Impey hanged Nuncomar in order to support Hastings. It is therefore our deliberate opinion that Impey, sitting as a judge, put a man unjustly to death in order to serve a political purpose."

Encouraged by success, a few years later, Hastings, upon the most unfair pretext, made war upon and plundered the Rajah of Benares, and a little later subjected the eunuchs of the Begums of Oude to physical torture, to make them confess where the royal treasure was hidden.

It is evident from Miss Burney's diary that the King and Queen warmly championed the cause of Warren Hastings, who, after a wearisome impeachment, was acquitted.

In 1788, the King's insanity assumed a more violent form than usual, and on a report from the Privy Council, the subject was brought before Parliament. In the Commons, Pitt and the Tory party contended that the right of providing for the government of the country in cases where the monarch was unable to perform his duties, belonged to the nation at large, to be exercised by its representatives in Parliament. Fox and the Whigs, on the other hand, maintained that the Prince of Wales possessed the inherent right to assume the government. Pitt, seizing this argument as it fell from Fox, said, at the moment, to the

member seated nearest to him, "I'll unwhig the gentleman for the rest of his life."

During the discussions on the Regency Bill, Lord Thurlow, who was then Lord Chancellor, acted the political rat, and coquetted with both parties. When the King's recovery was announced by the royal physicians, Thurlow, to cover his treachery, made an extravagant speech in defence of Pitt's views, and one laudatory of the King. After enumerating the rewards received from the King, he said, "and if I forget the monarch who has thus befriended me, may my great Creator forget me." John Wilkes, who was present in the House of Lords, said, in a stage aside, audible to many of the peers, "Forget you! he will see you damned first." Phillimore, describing Lord Chancellor Thurlow, says that he — "either from an instinctive delight in all that was brutal" (which did not prevent him from being a gross hypocrite), "or from a desire to please George III. — supported the Slave Trade, and the horrors of the Middle Passage, with the uncompromising ferocity of a Liverpool merchant or a Guinea captain."

It appears that the Prince of Wales and the Duke of York exhibited what was considered somewhat indecent eagerness to have the King declared irrecoverably insane, and on more than one occasion the Queen refused to allow either of these Royal Princes access to the King's person, on the ground that their violent conduct retarded his recovery. The Prince of Wales and Duke of York protested in writing against the Queen's hostility to them, and published the protest. Happy family, these Brunswicks! Dr. Doran declares: "There was assuredly no decency in the conduct of the Heir-apparent, or of his next brother. They were gaily flying from club to club, party to party, and did not take the trouble even to assume the sentiment which they could not feel. 'If we were together,' says Lord Granville,

in a letter inserted in his Memoirs, 'I would tell you some particulars of the Prince of Wales's behavior to the King and Queen, within these few days, that would make your blood run cold.' It was said that if the King could only recover and learn what had been said and done during his illness, he would hear enough to drive him again into insanity. The conduct of his eldest sons was marked by its savage inhumanity." Jesse says: "The fact is a painful one to relate, that on the 4th December — the day on which Parliament assembled, and when the King's malady was at its worst — the graceless youth (the Duke of York) not only held a meeting of the opposition at his own house, but afterwards proceeded to the House of Lords, in order to hear the depositions of the royal physicians read, and to listen to the painful details of his father's lunacy. Moreover the same evening we track both the brothers (the Prince of Wales and the Duke of York) to Brooks's, where in a circle of boon companions, as irreverent as themselves, they are said to have been in the habit of indulging in the most shocking indecencies, of which the King's derangement was the topic. On such occasions, we are told, not only did they turn their parents into ridicule, and blab the secrets of the chamber of sickness at Windsor, but the Prince even went to such unnatural lengths as to employ his talents for mimicry, in which he was surpassed by few of his contemporaries, in imitating the ravings and gestures of his stricken father. As for the Duke of York, we are assured that 'the brutality of the stupid sot disgusted even the most profligate of his associates.'" Even after the King's return to reason had been vouched by the physicians, William Grenville, writing to Lord Buckingham, says that the two princes "amused themselves with spreading the report that the King was still out of his mind." When the great thanksgiving for the King's recovery took place at

Saint Paul's, the conduct of the Prince of Wales and the Duke of York, in the Cathedral itself, is described "as having been in the highest degree irreverent, if not indecent." Sir William Young writes to Lord Buckingham, "The day will come when Englishmen will bring these Princes to their senses." Alas for England, the day has not yet come!

In 1789, a great outcry was raised against the Duke of York on account of his licentiousness. In 1790, the printer of the *Times* newspaper was fined £100 for libelling the Prince of Wales, and a second £100 for libelling the Duke of York. It was in this year that the Prince of Wales, and the Dukes of York and Clarence, issued joint and several bonds to an enormous amount — it is said, £1,000,000 sterling, and bearing 6 per cent. interest. These bonds were taken up chiefly abroad; and some Frenchmen who subscribed, being unable to obtain either principal or interest, applied to the Court of Chancery, in order to charge the revenues of the Duchy of Cornwall. Others of the foreign holders of bonds had recourse to other proceedings to enforce their claims. In nearly every case the claimants were arrested by the Secretary of State's order, and sent out of England under the Alien Act, and when landed in their own country were again arrested for treasonable communication with the enemy, and perished on the scaffold. MM. De Baume, Chaudot, Mette, Aubert, Vaucher, and others, all creditors of the Prince, were thus arrested under the Duke of Portland's warrant, and on their deportation re-arrested for treason, and guillotined. Thus were some of the debts of the Royal Family of Brunswick settled, if not paid. Honest family, these Brunswicks!

George, Prince of Wales, and the Duke of York were constant patrons of prize fights, races, and gambling tables, largely betting, and not always paying their wagers when

they lost. In the autumn of 1791 a charge was made against the Prince of Wales that he allowed his horse Escape to run badly on the 20th of October, and when heavily betted against caused the same horse to be ridden to win. A brother of Lord Lake, who was friendly to the Prince, and who managed some of his racing affairs, evidently believed there was foul play, and so did the Jockey Club, who declared that if the Prince permitted the same jockey, Samuel Chiffney, to ride again, no gentleman would start against him. A writer employed by George, Prince of Wales, to defend his character, says: "It may be asked, why did not the Prince of Wales declare upon his honor, that no foul play had been used with respect to Escape's first race? Such a declaration would at once have solved all difficulties, and put an end to all embarrassments. But was it proper for the Prince of Wales to have condescended to such a submission? Are there not sometimes suspicions of so disgraceful a nature afloat, and at the same time so improbable withal, that if the person, who is the object of them, condescends to reply to them, he degrades himself? Was it to be expected of the Prince of Wales that he should purge himself by oath, like his domestic? Or, was it to be looked for, that the first subject in the realm, the personage whose simple word should have commanded deference, respect, and belief, was to submit himself to the examination of the Jockey Club, and answer such questions as they might have thought proper to have proposed to him?"

This, coming from a family like the Brunswicks, and from one of four brothers who, like their highnesses of Wales, York, Kent, and Cumberland, had each in turn declared himself upon honor not guilty of some misdemeanor or felony, is worthy a note of admiration. George, Prince of Wales, declared himself not guilty of bigamy; the Duke

of York declared himself not guilty of selling promotion in the army. Both these Princes publicly declared themselves not guilty of the charge of trying to hinder their royal father's restoration to sanity. The Duke of Kent, the Queen's father, declared that he was no party to the subornation of witnesses against his own brother. The Duke of Cumberland pledged his oath that he had never been guilty of sodomy and murder.

In September, 1791, the Duke of York was married to the Princess Frederica, daughter of the King of Prussia, with whom he lived most unhappily for a few years. The only effect of this marriage on the nation was that £18,000 a year was voted as an extra allowance to his Royal Highness, the Duke of York. This was in addition to 100,000 crowns given out of the Civil List as a marriage portion to the Princess. Dr. Doran says of the Duchess of York: "For six years she bore with treatment from the 'Commander-in-Chief' such as no trooper under him would have inflicted on a wife equally deserving. At the end of that time the ill-matched pair separated." Kind husbands, these Brunswicks!

In a print published on the 24th May, 1792, entitled "Vices Overlooked in the New Proclamation," *Avarice* is represented by King George and Queen Charlotte, hugging their hoarded millions with extreme satisfaction, a book of interest tables lying at hand. This print is divided into four compartments, representing: 1. Avarice; 2. Drunkenness, exemplified in the person of the Prince of Wales; 3. Gambling, the favorite amusement of the Duke of York; and 4. Debauchery, the Duke of Clarence and Mrs. Jordan — as the four notable vices of the Royal family of Great Britain. If the print had to be re-issued to-day, it would require no very vivid imagination to provide materials from

the living members of the Royal Family to refill the four compartments.

Among various other remarkable trials occurring in 1792, those of Daniel Holt and William Winterbottom are here worthy of notice, as illustrating the fashion in which the rule of the Brunswick monarchy has trenched on our political liberties. The former, a printer of Nottingham, was convicted and sentenced to two years' imprisonment for re-publishing, verbatim, a political tract, originally circulated without prosecution by the Thatched House Tavern Association, of which Mr. Pitt and the Duke of Richmond had been members. The other, a dissenting minister at Plymouth, of virtuous and highly respectable character, was convicted of sedition, and sentenced to four years' imprisonment in the jail of Newgate, for two sermons preached in commemoration of the revolution of 1688. The indictment charged him with affirming, "That his Majesty was placed upon the throne on condition of keeping certain laws and rules, and if he does not observe them, he has no more right to the crown than the Stuarts had." All the Whigs in the kingdom might, doubtless, have been comprehended in a similar indictment. And if the doctrine affirmed by the Rev. Mr. Winterbottom be denied, the monstrous reverse of the proposition follows, that the King is bound by no conditions or laws; and that, though resistance to the tyranny of the Stuarts might be justifiable, resistance under the same circumstances to the House of Brunswick is not. This trial, for the cruelty and infamy attending it, has been justly compared to the celebrated one of Rosewell in the latter years of Charles II., to the events of which those of 1792 exhibit, in various respects, a striking and alarming parallel.

Before his election to the National Convention, Thomas Paine published the second part of his "Rights of Man,"

in which he boldly promulgated principles which, though fiercely condemned at the date of their issue, are now being gradually accepted by the great mass of the people. Paine's work was spread through the kingdom with extraordinary industry, and was greedily sought for by people of all classes. Despite the great risk of fine and imprisonment, some of the most effective parts were printed on pieces of paper, which were used by Republican tradesmen as wrappers for their commodities. Proceedings were immediately taken against Thomas Paine as author of the obnoxious book, which was treated as a libel against the government and constitution, and on trial Paine was found guilty. He was defended with great ability by Erskine, who, when he left the court, was cheered by a crowd of people who had collected without, some of whom took his horses from his carriage, and dragged him home to his house in Serjeant's Inn. The name and opinions of Thomas Pain were at this moment gaining influence, in spite of the exertions made to put them down. From this time for several years it is almost impossible to read a weekly journal without finding some instance of persecution for publishing Mr. Paine's political views.

The trial of Thomas Paine was the commencement of a series of State prosecutions, not for political offences, but for political designs. The name of Paine had caused much apprehension, but many even amongst the Conservatives dreaded the extension of the practice of making the publication of a man's abstract opinions criminal, when unaccompanied with any direct or open attempt to put them into effect. In the beginning of 1793 followed prosecutions in Edinburgh, where the ministerial influence was great, against men who had associated to do little more than call for reform in Parliament; and five persons, whose alleged crimes consisted chiefly in having read Paine's

"Rights of Man," and in having expressed either a partial approbation of his doctrines, or a strong declaration in favor of Parliamentary reform, were transported severally: Joseph Gerrald, William Skirving, and Thomas Muir for fourteen, and Thomas Fyshe Palmer and Maurice Margarot for seven years! These men had been active in the political societies, and it was imagined that, by an exemplary injustice of this kind, these societies would be intimidated. Such, however, was not the case, for, from this moment, the clubs in Edinburgh became more active than ever, and they certainly took a more dangerous character; so that, before the end of the year, there was actually a "British Convention" sitting in the Scottish capital. This was dissolved by force at the beginning of 1794, and two of its members were added to the convicts already destined for transportation. Their severe sentences provoked warm discussions in the English Parliament, but the ministers were inexorable in their resolution to put them in execution.

The extreme severity of the sentences passed on the Scottish political martyrs, even as judged by those admitting the legality and justice of their conviction, was so shameful as to rouse general interest. Barbarous as the law of Scotland appeared to be, it became a matter of doubt whether the Court of Justiciary had not exceeded its power, in substituting the punishment of transportation for that of banishment, imposed by the Act of Queen Anne, for the offence charged on those men.

In 1794, the debts of the Prince of Wales then amounting to about £650,000, not including the amounts due on the foreign bonds, a marriage was suggested in order to give an excuse for going to Parliament for a vote. This was at a time when the Prince was living with Mrs. Fitzherbert as his wife, and when Lady Jersey was his most

prominent mistress. The bride selected was Caroline of Brunswick. A poor woman for a wife, if Lord Malmesbury's picture is a true one, certainly in no sense a bad woman. But her husband our Prince! When she arrived in London, George was not sober. His first words, after greeting her, were to Lord Malmesbury, "Get me a glass of brandy." Tipsy this Brunswicker went to the altar on the 8th of April, 1794; so tipsy that he got up from his knees too soon, and the King had to whisper him down, the Archbishop having halted in amaze in the ceremony. Here there is no possibility of mistake. The two Dukes who were his best men at the wedding had their work to keep him from falling; and to one, the Duke of Bedford, he admitted that he had had several glasses of brandy before coming to the chapel.

Thackeray says, "What could be expected from a wedding which had such a beginning — from such a bridegroom and such a bride? Malmesbury gives us the beginning of the marriage story — how the prince reeled into chapel to be married; how he hiccupped out his vows of fidelity — you know how he kept them; how he pursued the woman whom he had married; to what a state he brought her; with what blows he struck her; with what malignity he pursued her; what his treatment of his daughter was; and what his own life. *He*, the first gentleman of Europe!"

The Parliament not only paid the Prince of Wales's debts, but gave him £28,000 for jewels and plate, and £26,000 for the furnishing of Carlton House.

On the 12th of May, Mr. Henry Dundas brought down on behalf of the government, a second message from the King, importing that seditious practices had been carried on by certain societies in London, in correspondence with other societies; that they had lately been pursued with increasing activity and boldness, and had been avowedly

directed to the assembling of a pretended National Convention, in contempt and defiance of the authority of Parliament, on principles subversive of the existing laws and the constitution, and tending to introduce that system of anarchy prevailing in France; that his Majesty had given orders for seizing the books and papers of those societies, which were to be laid before the House, to whom it was recommended to pursue measures necessary to counteract their pernicious tendency. A large collection of books and papers was, in consequence, brought down to the House; and, after an address had been voted, a resolution was agreed to, that those papers should be referred to a committee of secrecy. A few days after the King's message was delivered, the following persons were committed to the Tower on a charge of high treason: Mr. Thomas Hardy, a shoemaker in Piccadilly, who officiated as secretary to the London Corresponding Society; Mr. Daniel Adams, secretary to the Society for Constitutional Information; Mr. John Horne Tooke; Mr. Stewart Kyd; Mr. Jeremiah Joyce, preceptor to Lord Mahon, eldest son of the Earl of Stanhope; and Mr. John Thelwall, who had for some time delivered lectures on political subjects in London.

Under the influence of excitement resulting from the Government statement of the discovery of a plot to assassinate the King, and which plot never existed outside the brains of the Government spies, a Special Commission of Oyer and Terminer was issued on the 10th of September, 1794, for the trial of the State prisoners confined in the Tower on a charge of high treason. On the 2d of October, the Commission was opened at the Sessions House, Clerkenwell, by Lord Chief Justice Eyre, in an elaborate charge to the grand jury. Bills were then found against all who had been taken up in May, except Daniel Adams. Hardy was first put on his trial at the Old Bailey. The trial com-

menced on the 28th of October, and continued with short adjournments until the 5th of November. Mr. Erskine was counsel for Hardy, and employed his great talents and brilliant eloquence with the most complete success. After consulting together for three hours, the jury, who, though the avowed friends of the then administration, were men of impartiality, intelligence, and of highly respectable characters, returned a verdict of Not Guilty. There has seldom been a verdict given in a British court of justice which afforded more general satisfaction. It is doubtful whether there has been a verdict more important in its consequences to the liberties of the English people. On the 17th of November, John Horne Tooke was put on his trial. The Duke of Richmond, Earl Camden, Mr. Pitt, and Mr. Beaufoy, were subpœnaed by the prisoner; and the examination of William Pitt by Mr. Tooke and his counsel formed the most important feature in the trial, as the evidence of the Prime Minister tended to prove that, from the year 1780 to 1782, he himself had been actively engaged with Mr. Tooke and many others in measures of agitation to procure a Parliamentary reform, although he now not only deemed the attempt dangerous and improper, but sought to condemn it as treasonable, or at least as seditious. Mr. Erskine, who was counsel for Mr. Tooke also, in a most eloquent and powerful manner contended that the conduct of his client was directed only to the same object as that previously sought by Pitt himself, and that the measures resorted to, so far from being criminal, were perfectly constitutional. Mr. Pitt was extremely guarded in his replies, and professed very little recollection of what passed at the meetings which he attended. A letter he had written to Mr. Tooke at that time on the subject was handed to him, which he pretended he could scarcely recognize, and which the judge would not permit to be read. Mr. Sheridan, who

was likewise engaged in the agitation for political reform, and subpœnaed by Mr. Tooke, gave unqualified evidence in favor of Mr. Tooke respecting the proceedings at those meetings. The trial continued till the Saturday following, when the jury were out of court only six minutes, and returned a verdict of Not Guilty!

The opening of Parliament was looked forward to with great anxiety, on account of the extreme distress under which the country was laboring. As the time approached, popular meetings were held in the metropolis, and preparations were made for an imposing demonstration. During the morning of the 29th of October, the day on which the King was to open the session in person, crowds of men continued pouring into the town from the various open spaces outside, where simultaneous meetings had been called by placards and advertisements; and before the King left Buckingham House, on his way to St. James's, the number of people collected on the ground over which he had to pass is admitted in the papers of the day to have been not less than two hundred thousand. At first the state carriage was allowed to move on through this dense mass in sullen silence, no hats being taken off, nor any other mark of respect being shown. This was followed by a general outburst of hisses and groans, mingled with shouts of "Give us peace and bread!" "No war!" "No King!" "Down with him! down with George!" and the like; and this tumult continued unabated until the King reached the House of Lords, the Guards with much difficulty keeping the mob from closing on the carriage. As it passed through Margaret Street the populace seemed determined to attack it, and when opposite the Ordnance Office a stone passed through the glass of the carriage window. A verse published the following day says: —

"Folks say it was lucky the stone missed the head,
When lately at Cæsar 'twas thrown;
I think very different from thousands indeed,—
'Twas a lucky escape for the stone."

The demonstration was, if anything, more fierce on the King's return, and he had some difficulty in reaching St. James's Palace without injury; for the mob threw stones at the state carriage and damaged it considerably. After remaining a short time at St. James's, he proceeded in his private coach to Buckingham House, but the carriage was stopped in the Park by the populace, who pressed round it, shouting, "Bread, bread! Peace, peace!" until the King was rescued from this unpleasant situation by a strong body of the Guards.

Treason and sedition Acts were hurried through Parliament to repress the cries of the hungry for bread, whilst additional taxes were imposed to make the poor poorer.

That the terrible French war — of which it is impossible to give any account in the limits of this essay, a war which cost Great Britian at least £1,000,000,000 in hard cash, without reckoning the hundreds of thousands of killed, wounded, and pauperized, and which Buckle calls "the most hateful, the most unjust, and the most atrocious war England has ever waged against any country" — directly resulted from our government under the Brunswick family is a point on which it is impossible for any one who has examined the facts to have a serious doubt. Sir Archibald Alison tells us that, early in 1791, "The King of England took a vivid interest in the misfortunes of the Royal Family of France, promising, as Elector of Hanover, to concur in any measure which might be deemed necessary to extricate them from their embarrassments; and he sent Lord Elgin to Leopold, who was then travelling in Italy, to concert measures for the common object." It was as

Elector of Hanover also that his grandfather, George II., had sacrificed English honor and welfare to the personal interest and family connections of these wretched Brunswicks. It is certain too, that, after years of terrible war, on one of the occasions of negotiation for peace, hindrances arose because our Government insisted on describing George III., in the preliminaries, as "King of France." The French naturally said, first, your King George never has been King of any part of France at any time; and next, we, having just declared France a Republic, cannot in a solemn treaty recognize the continued existence of a claim to Monarchy over us.

The following table, which we insert at this stage to save the need for further reference, shows how the labor of the British nation was burdened for generations to come, by the insane affection of the House of Brunswick for the House of Bourbon: —

Years.	Taxes.	Loans.
1793	£17,656,418	£25,926,526
1794	17,170,400	——
1795	17,308,411	51,705,698
1796	17,858,454	56,945,566
1797	18,737,760	25,350,000
1798	20,654,650	35,624,250
1799	30,202,915	21,875,300
1800	35,229,968	29,045,000
1801	33,896,464	44,816,250
1802	35,415,296	41,489,438
1803	37,240,213	16,000,000
1804	37,677,063	18,200,000
1805	45,359,442	39,543,124
1806	49,659,281	29,880,000
1807	53,304,254	18,373,200
1808	58,390,255	13,693,254
1809	61,538,207	21,278,122
1810	63,405,294	19,811,108

Years.	Taxes.	Loans.
1811	66,681,366	29,244,711
1812	64,763,870	40,743,031
1813	63,169,845	54,780,324
1814	66,925,835	63,645,030
1815	69,684,192	70,888,402
Total	£981,929,853	£768,858,934

After making some deductions on account of the operations of the *loyalty loan*, and the transfer of annuities, the total debt contracted from 1793 to 1815 amounts to £762,537,445. If to this sum be added the increase in the unfunded debt during that period, and the additional sums raised by taxes in consequence of hostilities, we shall have the total expenditure, owing to the French war, as follows: —

Debt contracted from 1793 to 1815	£762,537,445
Increase in the Unfunded Debt	50,194,060
War Taxes	614,488,459
Total	1,427,219,964
Deduct sum paid to the Commissioners for reduction of the National Debt	173,309,383
Total cost of the French war	£1,253,910,581

Lord Fife, in the House of Lords, said that "in this horrid war had he first witnessed the blood and treasure of the nation expended in the extravagant folly of secret expeditions, which had invariably proved either abortive or unsuccessful. Grievous and heavy taxes had been laid on the people, and wasted in expensive embassies, and in subsidizing proud, treacherous, and useless foreign princes."

In 1795 King George and his advisers tried by statute to put a stop forever in this country to all political or religious discussion. No meeting was to be held, except on five

days' duly advertised notice, to be signed by householders; and if for lectures or debates, on special license by a magistrate. Power was given to any magistrate to put an end in his discretion to any meeting, and to use military force in the event of twelve persons remaining one hour after notice. If a man lent books, newspapers, or pamphlets without license, he might be fined twenty pounds for every offence. If he permitted lectures or debates on any subject whatever, he might be fined one hundred pounds a day. And yet people dare to tell us that we owe our liberties to these Brunswicks!

On the 1st of June, 1795, Gillray, in a caricature entitled "John Bull Ground Down," had represented Pitt grinding John Bull into money, which was flowing out in an immense stream beneath the mill. The Prince of Wales is drawing off a large portion, to pay the debts incurred by his extravagance; while Dundas, Burke, and Loughborough, as the representatives of ministerial pensioners, are scrambling for the rest. King George encourages Pitt to grind without mercy. Another caricature by Gillray, published on the 4th of June, represents Pitt as Death on the White Horse (the horse of Hanover), riding over a drove of pigs, the representatives of what Burke had termed the "swinish multitude."

On the 7th of January, 1796, the Princess Charlotte of Wales was born, and on the 30th of April, George, Prince of Wales, wrote to the Princess Caroline, stating that he did not intend to live with her any more. The Prince had some time previously sent by Lord Cholmondeley a verbal message to the same effect, which, however, the Princess had refused to accept. The mistress reigning over the Prince of Wales at this time was Lady Jersey.

No impeachment of the House of Brunswick would be even tolerably supported which did not contain some refer-

ence to the terrible misgovernment of Ireland under the rule of this obstinate and vicious family; and yet these few pages afford but little space in which to show how beneficent the authority of King George III. has proved to our Irish brethren.

During the war, when there were no troops in Ireland, and when, under Flood and Grattan, the volunteers were in arms, some concessions had been made to the Irish people. A few obnoxious laws had been repealed, and promises had been held out of some relaxation of the fearfully oppressive laws against the Catholics. From the correspondence of Earl Temple, it is clear that in 1782 not only was the King against any further concession whatever, but that his Majesty and Lord Shelburne actually manœuvred to render the steps already taken as fruitless as possible. We find W. W. Grenville admitting, on the 15th December, 1782, "that the [Irish] people are really miserable and oppressed to a degree I had not at all conceived." The Government acted dishonestly to Ireland. The consequence was, continued misery and disaffection; and I assert, without fear of contradiction, that this state of things is directly traceable to the King's wilfulness on Irish affairs. As an illustration of the character of the Government, it is worth notice that Lord Temple, when Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, wrote to his brother in cipher, because his letters were opened in the Post Office by Lord Shelburne. The Parliament of Ireland was in great part owned by absentee peers, and each change of Lord-Lieutenancy was marked by heavy addition to the Pension List. The continuance of the Catholic disabilities rendered permanent quiet impossible. Three-fourths of the nation were legally and socially almost outlawed. The national discontent was excited by the arbitrary conduct of the authorities, and hopes of successful revolution were

encouraged, after 1789, by the progress of the Revolution in France.

About 1790, the "United Irishmen" first began to be heard of. Their object was "a complete reform in the legislature, founded on the principles of civil, political and religious liberty." The clubs soon became secret associations, and were naturally soon betrayed. Prosecutions for sedition in 1793 were soon followed by military repression.

Lord Moira, in the House of Lords in 1797, in a powerful speech, which has remained without any refutation, described the Government of Ireland as "the most absurd, as well as the most disgusting, tyranny that any nation ever groaned under." He said: "If such a tyranny be persevered in, the consequence must inevitably be the deepest and most universal discontent, and even hatred to the English name. I have seen in that country a marked distinction made between the English and Irish. I have seen troops that have been sent full of this prejudice — that every inhabitant in that kingdom is a rebel to the British Government. I have seen the most wanton insults practised upon men of all ranks and conditions. I have seen the most grievous oppressions exercised, in consequence of a presumption that the person who was the unfortunate object of such oppression was in hostility to the Government; and yet that has been done in a part of the country as quiet and as free from disturbance as the city of London." His lordship then observed that, "from education and early habits, the *curfew* was ever considered by Britons as a badge of slavery and oppression. It was then practised in Ireland with brutal rigor. He had known instances where the master of a house had in vain pleaded to be allowed the use of a candle, to enable the mother to administer relief to her daughter struggling in convulsive fits. In former times, it had been the custom for English-

men to hold the infamous proceedings of the Inquisition in detestation. One of the greatest horrors with which it was attended was that the person, ignorant of the crime laid to his charge, or of his accuser, was torn from his family, immured in a prison, and kept in the most cruel uncertainty as to the period of his confinement, or the fate which awaited him. To this injustice, abhorred by Protestants in the practice of the Inquisition, were the people of Ireland exposed. All confidence, all security, were taken away. When a man was taken up on suspicion, he was put to the torture; nay, if he were merely accused of concealing the guilt of another. The rack, indeed, was not at hand; but the punishment of picqueting was in practice, which had been for some years abolished as too inhuman, even in the dragoon service. He had known a man, in order to extort a confession of a supposed crime, or of that of some of his neighbors, picqueted till he actually fainted — picqueted a second time till he fainted again, and as soon as he came to himself, picqueted a third time till he once more fainted; and all upon mere suspicion! Nor was this the only species of torture. Men had been taken and hung up till they were half dead, and then threatened with a repetition of the cruel treatment, unless they made confession of the imputed guilt. These were not particular acts of cruelty, exercised by men abusing the power committed to them, but they formed part of our system. They were notorious, and no person could say who would be the next victim of this oppression and cruelty, which he saw others endure. This, however, was not all: their lordships, no doubt, would recollect the famous proclamation issued by a military commander in Ireland, requiring the people to give up their arms. It never was denied that this proclamation was illegal, though defended on some supposed necessity; but it was not surprising that some reluctance

had been shown to comply with it by men who conceived the Constitution gave them a right to keep arms in their houses for their own defence; and they could not but feel indignation in being called upon to give up their right. In the execution of the order the greatest cruelties had been committed. If any one was suspected to have concealed weapons of defence, his house, his furniture, and all his property were burnt; but this was not all. If it were supposed that any district had not surrendered all the arms which it contained, a party was sent out to collect the number at which it was rated; and, in execution of this order, thirty houses were sometimes burnt down in a single night. Officers took upon themselves to decide discretionally the quantity of arms; and upon their opinions the fatal consequences followed. These facts were well-known in Ireland, but they could not be made public through the channel of the newspapers, for fear of that summary mode of punishment which had been practised towards the *Northern Star*, when a party of troops in open day, and in a town where the General's head-quarters were, went and destroyed all the offices and property belonging to that paper. It was thus authenticated accounts were suppressed."

Can any one wonder that the ineffectual attempt at revolution of 1798 followed such a state of things? And when, in the *London Chronicle* and *Cambridge Intelligencer*, and other journals by no means favorable to Ireland or its people, we read the horrid stories of women ravished, men tortured, and farms pillaged, all in the name of law and order, and this by King George's soldiers, not more than seventy years ago, can we feel astonishment that the Wexford peasants have grown up to hate the Saxon oppressor? And this we owe to a family of kings who used their pretended Protestantism as a cloak for the ill-treatment of our Catholic brethren in Ireland. In impeach

ing the Brunswicks, we remind the people of proclamations officially issued in the King's name, threatening to burn and devastate whole parishes, and we allege that the disaffection in Ireland at the present moment is the natural fruit of the utter regardlessness, on the part of these Guelphs, for human liberty, or happiness, or life. The grossest excesses were perpetrated in Ireland by King George III.'s foreign auxiliaries. The troops from Hesse Cassel, from Hesse Darmstadt, and from Hanover, earned an unenviable notoriety by their cruelty, rapacity, and licentiousness. And these we owe entirely to the Brunswicks.

A letter from the War Office, dated April 11th, 1798, shows how foreigners were specially selected for the regiments sent over to Ireland. Sir Ralph Abercromby publicly rebuked the King's army, of which he was the Commander-in-Chief, for their disgraceful irregularities and licentiousness. Even Lieutenant-General Lake admits that "the determination of the troops to destroy every one they think a rebel is beyond description, and needs correction."

In 1801, it was announced that King George III. was suffering from severe cold and sore throat, and could not therefore go out in public. His disease, however, was more mental than bodily. Her present Majesty has also suffered from severe cold and sore throat, but no allegation is ventured that her mental condition is such as to unfit her for her Royal duties.

On March 29, 1802, the sum of £990,053 was voted for payment of the King's debts.

In 1803, the Prince of Wales being again in debt, a further vote was passed of £60,000 a year for three years and a half. Endeavors were made to increase this grant, but, marvellous to relate, the House of Commons actually acted

as if it had some slight interest in the welfare of the people, and rejected a motion of Mr. Calcraft for a further vote of money to enable his Royal Highness to maintain his state and dignity. The real effect of the vote actually carried, was to provide for £800,649 of the Prince's debts, including the vote of 1794.

On July 21, 1763, £60,000 cash, and a pension of £16,000 a year, were voted to the Prince of Orange.

In 1804, King George was very mad, but Mr. Addington explained to Parliament, that there was nothing in his Majesty's indisposition to prevent his discharging the Royal functions. Mr. Gladstone also recently explained to Parliament, that there would be no delay in the prorogation of Parliament in consequence of her gracious Majesty's indisposition and absence.

In 1805, the House of Commons directed the criminal prosecution of Lord Melville, for corrupt conduct and embezzlement of public money, as first Lord of the Admiralty. For this, however, impeachment was substituted, and, on his trial before the House of Peers, he was acquitted, as out of 136 peers, only 59 said that they thought him guilty, although he had admitted the misapplication of £10,000.

On the 29th of March, 1806, a warrant was signed by King George III., directed to Lord Chancellor Erskine, to Lord Grenville, the Prime Minister, to Lord Ellenborough, then Lord Chief Justice of England, and to Earl Spencer, commanding them to inquire into the conduct of Her Royal Highness the Princess of Wales. Before these Lords, Charlotte Lady Douglas swore that she had visited the Princess, who confessed to having committed adultery, saying "that she got a bedfellow whenever she could, that nothing was more wholesome." Lady Douglas further swore to the Princess's pregnancy, and evidence was given to prove that she had been delivered of a male child. The

whole of this evidence was found to be perjury, and Lady Douglas was recommended for prosecution. The only person to be benefited was George Prince of Wales, who desired to be divorced from his wife, and it is alleged that he suborned these witnesses to commit perjury against her. At this time the Prince of Wales himself had just added Lady Hertfort to the almost interminable muster-roll of his loves, and was mixed up in a still more strange and disgraceful transaction, in which he used his personal influence to canvass Peers — sitting as the highest law court in the realm — in order to induce them to vote the guardianship of Miss Seymour, a niece of Lady Hertfort, to Mrs. Fitzherbert. Spencer Percival, who acted for the Princess of Wales, being about to publish the whole of the proceedings of the Royal Commissioners, with the evidence and their verdict, his book was quietly suppressed, and he received a reward — a post in the Cabinet. It is said that George III. directed the report of the Commissioners to be destroyed, and every trace of the whole affair to be buried in oblivion.

For some years rumors had been current of corruption in the administration of military promotion under the Duke of York, just as for some time past rumors have been current of abuse of patronage under his Royal Highness the present Duke of Cambridge. A Major Hogan, in 1808, published a declaration that he lost his promotion because he had refused to give the sum of £600 to the Duke of York's "Venus."

On the 27th January, 1809, Colonel Wardle — who is said to have been prompted to the course by his Royal Highness the Duke of Kent — rose in his place in the House of Commons, and formally charged his Royal Highness Frederick Duke of York with corruption in the administration of army patronage.

It is difficult to determine how far credit should be given to the statements of Mrs. Clarke, who positively alleges that she was bribed to betray the Duke of York by his brother, the Duke of Kent, the father of her present Majesty. It is quite certain that Major Dodd, the private secretary of the Duke of Kent, was most active in collecting and marshalling the evidence in support of the various charges made in the Commons against the Duke of York. The Duke of Kent, however, after the whole business was over, formally and officially denied that he was directly or indirectly mixed up in the business. It is clear that much bitter feeling had for some time existed between the Dukes of York and Kent. In a pamphlet published about that time, we find the following remarkable passages relating to the Duke of Kent's removal from his military command at Gibraltar: — "It is, however, certain that the creatures whom we could name, and who are most in his [the Duke of York's] confidence, were, to a man, instructed and industriously employed in traducing the character and well-merited fame of the Duke of Kent, by misrepresenting his conduct with all the baseness of well-trained sycophants. Moreover, we need not hesitate in saying that this efficient Commander-in-Chief, contrary to the real sentiments of his Majesty, made use of his truly dangerous and undue influence with the confidential servants of the Crown to got his brother recalled from the Government of Gibraltar, under a disingenous pretext, and at a risk of promoting sedition in the army."

In another pamphlet, dated 1808, apparently printed on behalf of the Duke of Kent, we find it suggested that the Duke of York had used Sir Hew Dalrymple as a spy on his brother the Duke of Kent at Gibraltar. Whether the Duke of York slandered the Duke of Kent, and whether the Queen's father revenged himself by getting up the case

for Colonel Wardle, others must decide. The following extracts from this gentleman's address to the House of Commons are sufficient to put the material points before our readers: —

"In the year 1803, his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief took a handsome house, set up a full retinue of servants and horses, and also a lady of the name of Clarke. Captain Tonyn, of the 48th Regiment, was introduced by Captain Sandon, of the Royal Wagon Train, to this Mrs. Clarke, and it was agreed that, upon his being promoted to the majority of the 31st Regiment, he should pay her £500. The £500 lodged with Mr. Donovan by Captain Sandon, was paid by him to Mrs. Clarke. The difference between a company and a majority is £1,100; this lady received only £500, while the half-pay fund lost the whole sum, for the purpose of putting £500 into the pocket of Mrs. Clarke. This £500 was paid by Mrs. Clarke to Mr. Perkins, a silversmith, in part payment for a service of plate; that the Commander-in-Chief made good the remainder, and that the goods were sent to his house in Gloucester Place. From this I infer, first, that Mrs. Clarke possesses the power of military promotion; secondly, that she received a pecuniary consideration for such promotion; and thirdly, that the Commander-in-Chief was a partaker in the benefit arising from such transactions. In this case, there are no less than five different persons as witnesses, viz., Major Tonyn, Mrs. Clarke, Mr. Donovan, Captain Sandon, and the executor of Mr. Perkins, the silversmith.

"The next instance is of Lieutenant Colebrook, of the 56th Regiment. It was agreed that Mrs. Clarke should receive £200 upon Lieutenant Colebrook's name appearing in the *Gazette*, for promotion. At that moment, this lady was anxious to go on an excursion into the country, and she stated to his Royal Highness that she had an

opportunity of getting £200 to defray the expenses of it, without applying to him. This was stated upon a Thursday, and on the Saturday following, this officer's name appeared in the *Gazette*, and he was accordingly promoted; upon which Mr. Tuck waited on the lady and paid her the money. To this transaction the witnesses are Lieutenant Colebrook, Mr. Tuck, and Mrs. Clarke."

After instancing further cases, Colonel Wardle stated that: —

"At this very hour there is a public office in the city where commissions are still offered at the reduced prices which Mrs. Clarke chooses to exact for them. The agents there have declared to me that they are now employed by the present favorite, Mrs. Carey. They have not only declared this as relative to military commissions, but they have carried it much farther; for, in addition to commissions in the army, places of all descriptions, both in Church and State, are transacted at their office; and these agents do not hesitate to give it under their own hands, that they are employed by many of the first officers in his Majesty's service."

On the examination of witnesses, and general inquiry, which lasted seven weeks, the evidence was overwhelming; but the Duke of York, having written a letter, pledged his honor as a Prince that he was innocent, was acquitted, although at least one hundred and twelve members of Parliament voted for a verdict of condemnation. In the course of the debate Lord Temple said that "he found the Duke of York deeply criminal in allowing this woman to interfere in his official duties. The evidence brought forward by accident furnished convincing proofs of this crime. It was evident in French's levy. It was evident in the case of Dr. O'Meara, this minister of purity, this mirror of virtue, who, professing a call from God, could so

far debase himself, so far abuse his sacred vocation, as to solicit a recommendation from such a person as Mrs. Clarke, by which, with an eye to a bishopric, he obtained an opportunity of preaching before the King. What could be said in justification of his Royal Highness for allowing this hypocrite to come down to Weymouth under a patronage, unbecoming his duty, rank, and situation?"

Mr. Tierney — in reply to a taunt of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that Colonel Wardle had been tutored by "cooler heads" — said: "He would state that the Duke of York had got his letter drawn up by weaker heads; he would, indeed, add something worse, if it were not unparliamentary to express it. The Duke of York was, he was persuaded, too manly to subscribe that letter, if he were aware of the base, unworthy, and mean purposes to which it was to be applied. It was easy to conceive that his Royal Highness would have been prompt to declare his innocence upon a vital point; but why declare it upon the 'honor of a Prince,' for the thing had no meaning?"

Mr. Lyttleton declared that "if it were in the power of the House to send down to posterity the character of the Duke of York unsullied — if their proceedings did not extend beyond their journals, he should be almost inclined to concur in the vote of acquittal, even in opposition to his sense of duty. But though the House should acquit his Royal Highness, the proofs would still remain, and the public opinion would be guided by them, and not by the decision of the House. It was in the power of the House to save its own character, but not that of the Commander-in-Chief."

It is alleged that the Queen herself by no means stood with clean hands; that in connection with Lady Jersey and a Doctor Randolph, her Majesty realized an enormous sum by the sale of cadetships for the East Indies.

On the 31st May, 1810, London was startled by the narrative of a terrible tragedy. His Royal Highness Ernest Augustus, Duke of Cumberland, afterwards King of Hanover, and who, while King of Hanover, drew £24,000 a year from the pockets of English taxpayers, was wounded in his own room in the dead of night, by some man whom he did not see, although the room was lighted by a lamp, and although his Royal Highness saw "a letter" which lay on a night table, and which letter was "covered with blood." The wounds are said to have been sword wounds inflicted with an intent to assassinate, by Joseph Sellis, a valet of the Duke, who is also said to have immediately afterwards committed suicide by cutting his own throat. General Sir B. Stephenson, who saw the body of Sellis, but who was not examined at the inquest, swore that "the head was nearly severed from the body." Sellis's cravat had been cut through and taken off his neck. Sir Everard Home and Sir Henry Halford were the physicians present at St. James's Palace the day of this tragedy, and two surgeons were present at the inquest, but no medical or surgical evidence was taken as to whether or not the death of Sellis was the result of suicide or murder; but a cheesemonger was called to prove that twelve years before he had heard Sellis say, "Damn the King and the Royal Family;" and a maid servant was called to prove that fourteen years before Sellis had said, "Damn the Almighty." Despite this conclusive evidence, many horrible rumors were current, which, at the time, were left uncontradicted; but on the 17th April, 1832, his Royal Highness the Duke of Cumberland made an affidavit in which he swore that he had not murdered Sellis himself, and that "in case the said person named Sellis did not die by his own hands," then that he, the Duke, "was not any way, in any manner, privy or accessory to his death." His Royal Highness also swore

that "he never did commit, nor had any intention of committing, the detestable crime," which it had pretended Sellis had discovered the Duke in the act of committing. This of course entirely clears the Queen's uncle from all suspicion. Daniel O'Connell, indeed, described him as "the mighty great liar;" but with the general character for truthfulness of the family, it would be in the highest degree improper to suggest even the semblance of a doubt. It was proved upon the inquest that Sellis was a sober, quiet man, in the habit of daily shaving the Duke, and that he had never exhibited any suicidal or homicidal tendencies. It therefore appears that he tried to wound or kill his Royal Highness without any motive, and under circumstances in which he knew discovery was inevitable, and that he then killed himself with a razor, cutting his head almost off his body, severing it to the bone. When Matthew Henry Graslin first saw the body, he "told them all that Sellis had been murdered," and although he was called on the inquest he does not say one word as to the condition of Sellis's body, or as to whether or not he believes it to have been a suicide. Of all the persons who saw the body of Sellis, and they appear to be many, only one, a sergeant in the Coldstreams, gave the slightest evidence as to the state in which the body was found, and no description whatever was given, on the inquest, of the nature of the fearful wound which had nearly severed Sellis's head from his body; nor, although it was afterwards proved by sworn evidence that Sellis's cravat "was cut through the whole of the folds, and the inside fold was tinged with blood," was any evidence offered as to this on the inquest, although it shows that Sellis must have first tried to cut his throat through his cravat and that having partially but ineffectively cut his throat, he then took off his cravat and gave himself with tremendous force the gash which caused his

death. It is said that the razor with which Sellis killed himself was found two feet from the bed, and on the left-hand side; but although it was stated that Sellis was a left-handed man, no evidence was offered of this, and on the contrary, the bloody hand marks, said to have been made by Sellis on the doors, were all on the right hand. It is a great nuisance when people you are mixed up with commit suicide. Undoubtedly, Sellis must have killed himself. The journals tell us how Lord Graves killed himself long years afterward. The Duke of Cumberland and Lady Graves, the widow, rode out together very shortly after the suicide.

In the Rev. Erskine Neale's Life of the Duke of Kent it is stated that a surgeon of note, who saw Sellis after his death, declared that there were several wounds on the back of the neck which it was physically impossible Sellis could have self-inflicted. In a lecture to his pupils the surgeon repeated this in strong language, declaring that "no man can behead himself."

The madness of George III. having become too violent and too continual to permit it to be any longer hidden from the people, the Prince of Wales was, in 1811, declared Regent, with limited powers, and £70,000 a year additional was voted for the Regent's expenses, and a further £10,000 a year also granted to the Queen as custodian of her husband. The grant to the Queen was the more outrageous, as her great wealth and miserly conduct were well known. When the Regent was first appointed, he authorized the Chancellor of the Exchequer to declare officially to the House of Commons, that he would not add to the burdens of the nation; and yet, in 1812, the allowance voted was made retrospective, so as to include every hour of his office.

In the discussion in Parliament on the proposed Regency, it appeared that the people had been for a considerable

period utterly deceived on the subject of the King's illness; and that, although his Majesty had been for some time blind, deaf, and delirious, the Ministry, representing the King to be competent, had dared to carry on the Government whilst George III. was in every sense incapacitated. It is worthy of notice that the Right Honorable Benjamin Disraeli, the leader of the great Conservative party in this country, publicly declared on September 26th, 1871, that her present Majestry, Queen Victoria, was both "physically and morally" incapable of performing her regal functions. One advantage of having the telegraph wires in the hands of Government is shown by the fact that all the telegraphic summaries omitted the most momentous words of Mr. Disraeli's speech. During the debate in the session of 1811, it was shown that when the King was mad in the month of March, 1804, he had on the 4th been represented by Lord Eldon as if he had given his assent to a bill granting certain lands to the Duke of York, and on the 9th as if he had signed a commission.

Earl Grey stated that it was notorious that on two occasions the Great Seal had been employed as if by his Majesty's command, while he was insane. The noble earl also declared that, in 1801, the King was mad for some weeks, and yet during that time councils were held, members sworn to it, and acts done requiring the King's sanction. Sir Francis Burdett said, "that to have a person at the head of affairs who had long been incapable of signing his name to a document without some one to guide his hand; a person long incapable of receiving petitions, of even holding a levee, or discharging the most ordinary functions of his office, and now afflicted with this mental malady, was a most mischievous example to the people of this country, while it had a tendency to expose the Government to the contempt of foreign nations."

One of the earliest acts of the Prince Regent was to re-appoint his brother, the Duke of York, to the office of Commander-in-Chief. A motion was proposed by Lord Milton, in the House of Commons, declaring this appointment to be "highly improper and indecorous." The Ministry were, however, sufficiently powerful to negative this resolution by a large majority. Though His Royal Highness had resigned his high office when assailed with charges of the grossest corruption, he was permitted to resume the command of the army without even a protest, save from a minority of the House of Commons, and from a few of the unrepresented masses. The chief mistress of the Prince Regent at this time was the Marchioness of Hertford; and the *Courier*, then the ministerial journal, had the cool impudence to speak of her as "Britain's guardian angel,' because her influence had been used to hinder the carrying any measure for the relief of the Irish Catholics. Amongst the early measures under the Regency, was the issue in Ireland of a circular letter addressed to the Sheriffs and Lord Lieutenants of the counties, forbidding the meetings of Catholics, and threatening all Catholic committees with arrest and imprisonment. This, however, was so grossly illegal, that it had shortly after to be abandoned, a Protestant jury having refused to convict the first prisoners brought to trial. It is curious to read the arguments against Catholic Emancipation pleaded in the *Courier*, one being that during the whole of his reign, George III. "is known to have felt the most conscientious and irrevocable objections" to any such measure of justice to his unfortunate Irish subjects.

In 1812 we had much poverty in England; and though this was not dealt with by Parliament, £100,000 was granted to Lord Wellington, and £200,000 voted for Russian sufferers by the French war. We had a few months

previously voted £100,000 for the relief of the Portuguese against the French. On a message from the Prince Regent, annuities of £9,000 each were also granted to the four Princesses, exclusive of £4,000 from the Civil List. The message from the Prince Regent for the relief of the "Russian sufferers" was brought down on the 17th of December; and it is a curious fact that while Lord Castlereagh and Lord Liverpool were eulogizing the Russians for their "heroic patriotism" in burning Moscow, the Russians themselves were declaring in the *St. Petersburgh Gazette* that the deed was actually committed by "the impious French," on whose heads the *Gazette* invoked the vengeance of God.

In 1812, the Prince Regent gave a sinecure office, that of Paymaster of Widows' Pensions, to his "confidential servant," Colonel Macmahon. The nature of the sort of private services which had been for some years performed by this gallant colonel for this virtuous Prince may be better guessed than described. Mr. Henry Brougham declared the appointment to be an insult to Parliament. It was vigorously attacked indoors and out of doors, and, in obedience to the voice of popular opinion, the Commons voted the immediate abolition of the office. To recompense Colonel Macmahon for the loss of his place, he was immediately appointed Keeper of the Privy Purse and Private Secretary to the Prince Regent. This appointment was also severely criticised; and although the Government were sufficiently powerful to defeat the attack in the Commons, they were yet compelled, by the strong protest made by the public against such an improper appointment, to nominally transfer the salary to the Regent's privy purse. The transfer was not real, as, the Civil List being always in debt, the nation had in fact ultimately to pay the money.

In 1813, foreign subsidies to the amount of £11,000,000,

and 100,000 stand of arms, were voted by the English Parliament. Out of the above, Portugal received £2,000,000, Sicily, £400,000, Spain, £2,000,000, Sweden, £1,000,000, Russia and Prussia, £3,000,000, Austria, £1,000,000, besides stores sent to Germany to the amount of £2,000,000 more.

This year his Royal Highness the Prince Regent went to Ascot races, where he was publicly dunned by a Mr. Vauxhall Clarke for a betting debt incurred some years before, and left unpaid.

Great excitement was created in and out of Parliament by the complaint of the Princess of Wales that she was not allowed to see her daughter, the Princess Charlotte. The Prince Regent formally declared, through the Speaker of the House of Commons, that he would not meet, on any occasion, public or private, the Princess of Wales (whom it was urged that "he had been forced to marry"); while the Princess of Wales wrote a formal letter to Parliament complaining that her character had been "traduced by suborned perjury." Princess Charlotte refused to be presented at Court except by her mother, who was not allowed to go there. In the House of Commons, Mr. Whitbread charged the Lords Commissioners with unduly straining the evidence by leading questions; and Lord Ellenborough, in his place in the House of Peers, declared that the accusation was "as false as hell." Ultimately, it was admitted that the grave charges against the Princess of Wales were groundless, and £35,000 a year was voted to her, she agreeing to travel abroad. Mr. Bathurst, a sinecurist pensioner, pleading on behalf of the Prince Regent that the House of Commons ought not to interfere, urged that it was no unusual thing to have dissensions in the Royal Family, and that they had been frequent in the reigns of George I. and George II. Mr. Stuart Wortley, in the course of a severe speech in reply to Lord Castlereagh, de-

clared that "we had a Royal Family which took no warning from what was said or thought about them, and seemed to be the only persons in the country who were wholly regardless of their own welfare and respectability."

The Princess Charlotte of Wales was at this time residing in Warwick House, and some curiosity was aroused by the dismissal, by order of the Prince Regent, of all her servants. This was immediately followed by the flight of the Princess from the custody of her father to the residence of her mother, the Princess of Wales. Persuaded to return to the Prince Regent by her mother, Lord Eldon, and others, she appears to have been really detained as a sort of prisoner, for we find the Duke of Sussex soon after complaining in the House of Lords that he was unable to obtain access to the Princess, and asking by whose authority she was kept in durance. Happy family, these Brunswicks!

In 1814, £100,000 further was devoted to the Duke of Wellington, together with an annuity of £10,000 a year, to be at any time commuted for £300,000. The income of the Duke of Wellington, from places, pensions, and grants, amounted to an enormous sum. At present we pay his heir £4,000 a year for having inherited his father's riches.

During the year 1814, £118,857 was voted for payment of the Civil List debts.

The Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia, after the restoration of Louis XVIII., visited the Prince Regent in this country, when the following squib was published: —

"There be princes three,
Two of them come from a far countrie,
And for valor and prudence their names shall be
Enrolled in the annals of glorie.
The third is said at a bottle to be
More than a match for his whole armie,

And fonder of fur caps and fripperie
Than any recorded in storie.
Those from the North great warriors be,
And warriors have in their companie,
But he of the South must stare to see
Himself in such goodly companie.
For to say what his usual consorts be,
Would make but a pitiful storie."

On the 12th of August, 1814, the Princess of Wales quitted England, and it is alleged that, on the evening prior to her departure, the Prince Regent, having as usual drank much wine, proposed a toast, "To the Princess of Wales' damnation, and may she never return to England." Whether this story, which Dr. Doran repeats, be true or false, it is certain that the Prince Regent hated his wife with a thoroughly merciless hatred. When the death of Napoleon was known in Ennland, a gentleman, thinking to gain favor with George IV., said, "Your Majesty's bitterest enemy is dead." The "first gentleman of Europe" thought only of his wife, and replied, "Is she, by God!"

The highly esteemed and virtuous Duke of Cumberland was married at Berlin to the Princess of Salms, a widow who had been twice married, once betrothed, and once divorced. The lady was niece to the Queen of England, who refused to receive her publicly or privately. On this refusal being known, a letter was published in the newspapers, written and signed by the Queen herself, to her brother the Duke of Mecklenburgh-Strelitz, the father of the bride, in which letter the Queen gave assurances of a kind reception to the bride on her arrival in England. The Queen's friends replied that the Queen's letter was only written to be shown to the German Courts on the condition that the Duchess should not come to England. Curious

notions of truth and honor seem current among these Brunswicks!

On the 27th of June, the Lords, on a message from the Prince Regent, voted an additional allowance of £6,000 a year to the Duke of Cumberland in consequence of the marriage. In the House of Commons, after a series of very warm debates, in which Lord Castlereagh objected to answer "any interrogatories tending to vilify the Royal Family," the House ultimately refused to grant the allowance by 126 votes against 125.

One historian says: "The demeanor of the Duchess of Cumberland in this country has been, to say the least, unobtrusive and unimpeached; but it must be confessed that a disastrous fatality — something inauspicious and indescribable — attaches to the Prince, her husband.

This year £200,000 further was voted to the Duke of Wellington, for the purchase of an estate, although it appeared from one Member of Parliament's speech that the vote should rather have been to the Prince Regent. "Who," he asked, "had rendered the army efficient? The Prince Regent — by restoring the Duke of York to the Horse Guards. Who had gained the Battle of Waterloo? The Prince Regent — by giving the command of the army to the Duke of Wellington!!" The Prince Regent himself had even a stronger opinion on the matter. Thackeray says: "I believe it is certain about George IV. that he had heard so much of the war, knighted so many people, and worn such a prodigious quantity of marshal's uniforms, cocked hats, cocks' feathers, scarlet and bullion in general, that he actually fancied he had been present at some campaigns, and under the name of General Brock led a tremendous charge of the German legion at Waterloo."

In 1816, Prince Leopold of Coburg Saalfeld, a very petty German Prince, without estate or position, married the

Princess Charlotte of Wales, as if he were a Protestant, although he most certainly on other occasions acted as if he belonged to the Catholic Church. A grant of £60,000 a year was made to the royal couple; £60,000 was given for the wedding outfit, and £50,000 secured to Prince Leopold for life, in the event of his surviving the Princess. And although this was done, it was well known to the Prince Regent and the members of the Government, that on the 2d January of the previous year, a marriage ceremony, according to the rites of the Roman Catholic Church, had been performed, by which the Prince Leopold was united to the Countess of Cohaky. Bigamy appears to be a fashionable vice, and one to which these Brunswicks never raise any objection.

On the 9th December, the City of London presented an address to the Prince Regent, in which they complained of "immense subsidies to foreign powers to defend their own territories, or to commit aggressions on those of their neighbors," of an unconstitutional and unprecedented military force in time of peace, of the unexampled and increasing magnitude of the Civil List, of the enormous sums paid for unmerited pensions and sinecures, and of a long course of the most lavish and improvident expenditure of the public money throughout every branch of the Government." This address appears to have deeply wounded the Regent, and the expressions of stern rebuke he used in replying, coupled with a rude sulkiness of manner, were ungracious and unwarrantable. He emphasized his answer with pauses and frowns, and turned on his heel as soon as he had delivered it. And yet at this moment hundreds of thousands in England were starving. Kind monarchs these Brunswicks!

Early in 1817, the general distress experienced in all parts of England, and which had been for some time on the

increase, was of a most severe character. Meetings in London and the provinces grew frequent, and were most numerously attended, and on February 3d, in consequence of a message from the Prince Regent, Committees of Secrecy were appointed by the Lords and Commons, to inquire into the character of the various movements. The Government was weak and corrupt, but the people lacked large-minded leaders, and the wide-spread discontent of the masses of the population rendered some of their number easy victims to the police spies who manufactured political plots.

On the 6th of November, 1817, Princess Charlotte of Wales died. Complaints were raised that the Princess had not been fairly treated, and some excitement was created by the fact that Sir Richard Croft, the doctor who attended her, soon after committed suicide, and that the public and the reporters were not allowed to be present at the inquest. No notice whatever of the Princess's death was forwarded to her mother, the Princess of Wales. In a letter to the Duke of Buckingham, Mr. Wynn speaks of this as "the most brutal omission I ever remember, and one which would attach disgrace in private life." At this very time a large sum of money was being wasted in the employment of persons to watch the Princess of Wales on her foreign travels. In her correspondence we find the Princess complaining that her letters were opened and read, and that she was surrounded with spies. From the moment that George III. was declared incurable, and his death approaching, there seems little doubt that desperate means were resorted to to manufacture evidence against the Princess to warrant a divorce.

On July 13th, 1818, his Royal Highness the Duke of Clarence married Adelaide, Princess of Saxe Meiningen, and his Royal Highness the Duke of Kent married her

Serene Highness Victoria, Princess of Leiningen. The Duke of Clarence, of course, had voted to him an additional allowance of £6,000 a year on entering the married state, although he was already receiving from the country more than £21,000 a year in cash, and a house rent free. It is highly edifying to read that during the debates in Parliament, and when some objection was raised to the extra sums proposed to be voted to one of the Royal Dukes, Mr. Canning pleaded, as a reason for the payment, that his Royal Highness was not marrying "for his own private gratification, but because he had been advised to do so for the political purposes of providing succession to the throne." Pleasant this for the lady, and glorious for the country—Royal breeding machines! The Duke of Kent, who had the same additional vote, had about £25,000 a year, besides a grant of £20,000 towards the payment of his debts, and a loan of £6,000 advanced in 1806, of which up to the time of his marriage only £1,000 had been repaid.

Of Edward Augustus, Duke of Kent, father of her present Majesty, it is only necessary to say a few words. The fourth son of George III. was somewhat better than his brothers, and perhaps for this very reason he seems always to have been disliked, and kept at a distance by his father, mother, and brothers. Nor was the Duke of Kent less disliked amongst the army, which he afterwards commanded. Very few of the officers loved him, and the bulk of the privates seem to have regarded him with the most hostile feelings. Kept very short of money by his miserly father and mother, he had, even before his majority, incurred considerable debts; and coming to England in 1790, in order to try and induce the King to make him some sufficient allowance, he was ordered to quit England in ten days. While allowances were made to all the other sons of George, the Duke of Kent had no Parlimentary vote until he was

thirty-three years of age. In 1802 he was appointed Governor of Gibraltar, where a mutiny took place, and the Duke had a narrow escape of his life. The Duke of Kent's friends allege that this mutiny was encouraged by officers of the highest rank, secretly sustained by the Duke of York. The Duke of York's friends, on the contrary, maintain that the overbearing conduct of the Duke of Kent, his severity in details, and general harshness in command, alone produced the result. The Duke of Kent was recalled from the Government of Gibraltar, and for some months the pamphleteers were busy on behalf of the two Dukes, each seeking to prove that the royal brother of his royal client was a dishonorable man. Pleasant people, these Brunswicks! If either side wrote the truth, one of the Dukes was a rascal. If neither side wrote the truth, both were. The following extract from a pamphlet by Mary Anne Clarke, mistress of the Duke of York, will serve to show the nature of the publications I refer to: "I believe there is scarcely a military man in the kingdom who was at Gibraltar during the Duke of Kent's command of that fortress but is satisfied that the Duke of York's refusal of a court martial to his royal brother *afforded an incontestible proof* of his *regard* for the *military* character and honor of the Duke of Kent; for if a court martial had been granted to the Governor of Gibraltar, I always understood there was but *one* opinion as to what would have been the *result;* and *then* the Duke of Kent would have lost several thousands a year, and incurred such public reflections that would, most probably, have been painful to his *honorable* and *acute* feelings. It was, however, this *act of affection for* the Duke of Kent that laid the foundation of that *hatred* which has followed the Commander-in-Chief up to the present moment; and to this *unnatural feeling* he is solely indebted for all the misfortunes and disgrace to which he has been introduced. In one of

the many conversations which I had with Majors Dodd and Glennie, upon the meditated ruin of the Duke of York, they informed me that their royal friend had made every endeavor in his power to *poison* the *King's ear* against the Commander-in-Chief, but as Colonel Taylor was so much about the person of his Majesty, all his efforts had proved ineffectual; and to have *spoken his sentiments* before Colonel Taylor would have been very injudicious, as he would immediately have communicated them to the Commander-in-Chief, who, though he knew this time (said these *confidential* and *worthy* patriots) that the Duke of Kent was *supporting* persons to *write* against *him*, and that some parliamentary proceedings were upon the eve of bursting upon the public attention, yet deported himself towards his royal brother as if they lived but for each other's honor and happiness; and the Duke of Kent, to *keep up appearances*, was more particular in his attentions to the Duke of York than he had ever been before."

Despite the Duke of Kent's recall, he continued to receive salary and allowances as Governor. After the celebration of the marriage, he resided abroad, and was on such unfriendly terms with his family that when he returned from Amorbach to England, it was against the express orders of the Prince Regent, who, shortly after meeting his brother at the Spanish Ambassador's, took not the slightest notice of him.

On the 17th November, 1818, the Queen died, and the custody of the body of the mad, deaf, and blind monarch of England was nominally transferred to the Duke of York, who was voted an extra £10,000 a year for performing the duty of visiting his royal father twice a week. Objection was ineffectually raised that his Royal Highness had also his income as Commander-in-Chief and General Officer, and it might have also been added, his pensions and his

income as Prince Bishop of Osnaburg. Mr. Curwen said: "Considering how complete the revenue of his Royal Highness was from public emoluments, he could not consent to grant him one shilling upon the present occasion."

In 1819, the Duke of Kent tried to get up a lottery for the sale of his Castlebar estate, in order to pay his debts, which were then about £70,000, but the project, being opposed by the Prince Regent, fell to the ground.

On the 24th of May, 1819, her present Majesty was born; and on the 23d of January, 1820, the Duke of Kent, her father, died.

On the 29th of January, 1820, after a sixty years' reign — in which debt, dishonor, and disgrace accrued to the nation he reigned over — George III. died. The National Debt at the date of his accession to the throne was about £150,000,000; at his death it was about £900,000,000.

Phillimore asks: "Had it not been for the unlimited power of borrowing, how many unjust and capricious wars would have been avoided! How different would be our condition, and the condition of our posterity! If half the sum lavished to prevent any one bearing the name of Napoleon from residing in France, for replacing the Bourbons on the thrones of France and Naples, for giving Belgium to Holland, Norway to Sweden, Finland to Russia, Venice and Lombardy to Austria, had been employed by individual enterprise, what would now be the resources of England?"

An extract, giving Lord Brougham's summary of George III.'s life and character, may, we think, fairly serve to close this chapter: "Of a narrow understanding, which no culture had enlarged; of an obstinate disposition, which no education perhaps could have humanized; of strong feelings in ordinary things, and a resolute attachment to all his own opinions and predilections, George III. possessed

much of the firmness of purpose which, being exhibited by men of contracted mind without any discrimination, and as pertinaciously when they are in the wrong as when they are in the right, lends to their characters an appearance of inflexible consistency, which is often mistaken for greatness of mind, and not seldom received as a substitute for honesty. In all that related to his kingly office he was the slave of deep-rooted selfishness; and no feeling of a kindly nature ever was allowed access to his bosom whenever his power was concerned."

CHAPTER V.

THE REIGN OF GEORGE IV.

THE wretched reign of George IV. commenced on the 30th January, 1820. Mr. Buckle speaks of "the incredible baseness of that ignoble voluptuary who succeeded George III. on the throne." The coronation was delayed for a considerable period, partly in consequence of the hostility between the King and his unfortunate wife, and partly because of the cost. We find the Right Hon. Thomas Grenville writing of the coronation: "I think it probable that it will be put off, because the King will not like it unless it be expensive, and Vansittart knows not how to pay for it if it is." Generous monarchs, these Brunswicks! Thousands at that moment were in a state of starvation in England, Scotland, and Ireland. Lord Cassilis writes: "There seems nothing but chaos and desolation whatever way a man may turn himself . . . the lower orders existing only from the circumstance of the produce of the land being unmarketable. . . The weavers are certainly employed, but they cannot earn more than from six to eight

shillings a week. Such is our state." When the coronation did ultimately take place, some strange expenses crept in. Diamonds were charged for to the extent, it is said, of £80,000, which found their way to one of the King's favored mistresses. The crown itself was made up with hired jewels, which were kept for twenty-one months after the coronation, and for the hire of which alone the country paid £11,000. The charge for coronation robes was £24,000. It was in consequence of Sir Benjamin Bloomfield having to account for some of the diamonds purchased that he resigned his position in the King's household. Rather than be suspected of dishonesty, he preferred revealing that they had reached the hands of Lady Conyngham. Sir George Naylor, in an infamously servile publication, for which book alone the country paid £3,000, describes "the superb habiliments which his Majesty, not less regardful of the prosperity of the people than of the splendor of his throne, was pleased to enjoin should be worn upon the occasion of his Majesty's sacred coronation."

Sir William Knighton declares that on the news of the King's death reaching the Prince Regent, "the fatal tidings were received with a burst of grief that was very affecting." The King had been mad and blind and deaf for ten years, and the Queen, years before, had complained of the Prince's conduct as unfilial, if not inhuman. With the Prince Regent's known character, this sudden burst of grief is really "very affecting."

On the 23d of February, London was startled with the news of what since has been described as the Cato Street Conspiracy. The trial of Arthur Thistlewood and his misguided associates is valuable for one lesson. The man who found money for the secret conspirators, and who incited them to treason and murder, was one George Edwards. This Edwards was well described by one of the

journals of the period, "as neither more nor less than the confidential agent of the original conspirators, to hire for them the treasons they have a purpose in detecting." By original conspirators were meant Lord Castlereagh and Lord Sidmouth. In the House of Commons, Mr. Alderman Wood moved formally, "That George Edwards be brought to the bar of the House on a breach of privilege. He pledged himself, if he had this incendiary in his hands, to convict him of the crimes imputed; he hoped he had not been suffered to escape beyond seas; otherwise there were honorable gentlemen who were in possession of him, so that he might be produced" — meaning by this that he was kept out of the way by the Government. "He regarded him as the sole author and contriver of the Cato Street plot. It was strange how such a man should be going about from public house to public house, nay, from one private house to another, boldly and openly instigating to such plots; and, in the midst of this, should become, from abject poverty, suddenly flush with money, providing arms, and supplying all conspirators." Mr. Hume seconded the motion. "It appeared by the depositions, not of one person only, but of a great many persons, that the individual in question had gone about from house to house with hand-grenades, and, up to twenty-four hours only preceding the 23d of February, had been unceasingly urging persons to join with him in the atrocious plot to assassinate his Majesty's Ministers. All of a sudden he became quite rich, and was buying arms in every quarter, at every price, and of every description; still urging a variety of persons to unite with him. Now, it was very fitting for the interest of the country, that the country should know who the individuals were who supplied him with the money."

As a fair specimen of the disposition of the King in dealing with his Ministry, I give the following extract from

a memorandum of Lord Chancellor Eldon, dated April 26th, 1820: "Our royal master seems to have got into temper again, so far as I could judge from his conversation with me this morning. He has been pretty well disposed to part with us all, because we would not make additions to his revenue. This we thought conscientiously we could not do in the present state of the country, and of the distresses of the middle and lower orders of the people — to which we might add, too, that of the higher orders. My own individual opinion was such that I could not bring myself to oppress the country at present by additional taxation for that purpose."

On the 23d of March, Henry Hunt, John Knight, Joseph Johnson, Joseph Healey, and Samuel Bamford were, after six days' trial at York, found guilty of unlawfully assembling. Lord Grenville feared that, if acquitted, Peterloo might form a terrible bill of indictment against the Ministry. His Lordship writes on March 29th, to the Marquis of Buckingham: "It would have been a dreadful thing if it had been established by the result of that trial that the Manchester meeting was under all its circumstances a legal assembly." His Lordship knew that the magistrates and yeomanry cavalry might have been indicted for murder had the meeting been declared legal. Sir C. Wolseley and the Rev. J. Harrison were at this time being prosecuted for seditious speaking, and were ultimately found guilty on April 10th. In May the state of the country was terrible; even Baring, the Conservative banker, on May 7th, described the "state of England" to a full House of Commons, "in the most lamentable terms." On the 8th we find Mr. W. H. Fremantle saying of the King, "His language is only about the Coronation and Lady Conyngham [his then favorite sultana]; very little of the state of the country." Early in June, it being known that Queen

Caroline was about to return to England, and that she intended to be present at the Coronation, the King offered her £50,000 a year for life to remain on the Continent, and forbear from claiming the title of Queen of England. This Caroline indignantly refused. The Queen's name had, by an order in Council, and on the King's direction, been omitted from the Liturgy as that of a person unfit to be prayed for, and on the 6th of July a bill of pains and penalties was introduced by Lord Liverpool, alleging adultery between the Queen and one Bartolomeo Bergami. To wade through the mass of disgusting evidence offered by the advisers of the King in support of the bill is terrible work. It seems clear that many of the witnesses committed perjury. It is certain that the diplomatic force of England was used to prevent the Queen from obtaining witnesses on her behalf. Large sums of the taxpayers' money were shown to have been spent in surrounding the Princess of Wales with spies in Italy and Switzerland. Naturally the people took sides with the Queen. To use the language of William Cobbett: "The joy of the people, of all ranks, except nobility, clergy, and the army and the navy, who in fact were theirs, was boundless; and they expressed it in every possible way that people can express their joy. They had heard rumors about a lewd life, and about an adulterous intercourse. They could not but believe that there was some foundation for something of this kind; but they, in their justice, went back to the time when she was in fact turned out of her husband's house, with a child in her arms, without blame of any sort ever having been imputed to her. They compared what they had *heard* of the wife with what they had *seen* of the husband, and they came to their determination accordingly. As far as related to the question of guilt or innocence they cared not a straw; they took a large view of the matter;

they went over her whole history; they determined that she had been wronged, and they resolved to uphold her."

On the 6th of August, the Duchess of York died. Dr. Doran thus writes her epitaph: "Her married life had been unhappy, and every day of it was a disgrace to her profligate, unprincipled, and good-tempered husband."

In the month of September Lord Castlereagh was compelled to admit that the expenses incurred in obtaining evidence from abroad, against the Queen, had been defrayed out of the Secret Service money. The trial of Queen Caroline lasted from the 17th of August until the 10th of November, when, in a house of two hundred and seven peers, the Queen was found guilty by a majority of nine votes. On this, Lord Liverpool said that "as the public sentiment had been expressed so decidedly against the measure," he would withdraw the bill. Amongst those who voted against the Queen, the names appear of Frederick Duke of York and William Henry Duke of Clarence. They had been most active in attacking the Queen, and now were shameless enough to vote as her judges. While the trial was proceeding, the Duke of York's private conversation "was violent against the Queen." He ought surely, for very shame's sake, this Prince-Bishop, to have remembered the diamonds sent by the King his father to Princess Caroline Amelia Elizabeth, of Brunswick. Being the bearer of the jewels, his Royal Highness the Duke of York and Prince-Bishop of Osnaburg, stole them, and presented them to Mrs. Mary Anne Clarke. Mr. Denman, the Queen's Solicitor-General, was grandly audacious in his indictment of the King's brothers for their cowardly conduct. In the presence of the assembled Lords, he, without actually referring to him by name, denounced the Duke of Clarence as a calumniator. He called on the Duke to come forward openly, saying,

"Come forth, thou slanderer!" And this slanderer was afterwards our King! The Queen, in a protest against the bill, declared that "those who avowed themselves her prosecutors have presumed to sit in judgment upon the question between the Queen and themselves. Peers have given their voices against her, who had heard the whole evidence for the charge, and absented themselves during her defence. Others have come to the discussion from the Secret Committee with minds biased by a mass of slander, which her enemies have not dared to bring forward in the light." Lord Dacre, in presenting the protest to the assembled peers, added: "Her Majesty complained that the individuals who formed her prosecutors in this odious measure, sat in judgment against her. My Lords, I need not express an opinion upon this complaint; delicacy alone ought to have, in my opinion, prevented their becoming her accusers, and also her judges."

George IV. was guilty of the vindictive folly of stripping Brougham of his King's Counsel gown, as a punishment for his brilliant defence of the Queen.

While the trial of the Queen was going on, it might have been thought that the King would at any rate affect a decency of conduct. But these Brunswicks are shameless. Speaking of the cottage at Windsor, on August 11th, Mr. Fremantle says: "The principal object is of course the Lady Conyngham, who is here. The King and her always together, separated from the rest, they ride every day or go on the water, and in the evening sitting alone. . . . . The excess of his attentions and *enjouement* is beyond all belief." On December 17th, Mr. Fremantle finds the King ill and says: "The impression of my mind is that the complaint is in the head." Most of the Brunswicks have been affected in the head. Either George I. was insane, or George II. was not his son. George II. himself had cer-

tainly one or two delusions, if not more. George III.'s sanity is not affirmed by any one. It may be a question whether or not any allegation of hereditary affection is enough, however, to justify an appeal to Parliament for a rearrangement of the succession to the throne.

On the 9th of January, 1821, King George IV. wrote a private letter to Lord Chancellor Eldon, in the "double capacity as a friend and as a minister," in order to influence the proceedings then pending in the law courts "against vendors of treason and libellers."

On the 8th of June, on the motion of Lord Londonderry, and after an ineffectual opposition by Mr. Hume, £6,000 a year additional was voted to the Duke of Clarence. The vote was made retrospective, and thus gave the Duke £18,000 extra in cash. Besides this, we find a charge of £9,166 for fitting up the Duke's apartments.

On the 5th of July, Mr. Scarlett moved the court on behalf of Olivia Wilmot Serres, claiming to be the legitimate daughter of the Duke of Cumberland, who was brother of George III. Mr. Scarlett submitted that he had documents proving the accuracy of the statement, but on a technical point the matter was not gone into.

In August, 1821, King George IV. visited Ireland. Knowing his habits, and the customs of some other members of the family, it excites little surprise to read that, on the voyage to Dublin, "his Majesty partook most abundantly of goose pie and whiskey," and landed in Ireland "in the last stage of intoxication." And this was a king! This journey to Ireland cost the country £58,261. In a speech publicly made by the King in Ireland, within a few hours after receiving the news of Queen Caroline's death, the monarch said: "This is one of the happiest days of my life."

On the 7th of August Queen Caroline died. In Thel-

wall's *Champion* there is a full account of the disgraceful conduct of the King's Government with reference to the funeral. On the morning of the 14th, after a disgusting contest between her executors and the King's Government for the possession of her remains, they were removed from Brandenburgh House towards Harwich, on their way to interment at Brunswick. The ministers, to gratify personal feelings of unworthy rancor beyond the grave, gave orders that the funeral should take a circuit, to avoid manifestations of sympathy from the Corporation and the people along the direct route through London. At Kensington, the procession found every road but that of London barricaded by the people, and was constrained to take the forbidden route, with the intention of passing through Hyde Park into the northern road. The Park gate was closed and barricaded, but was forced by the military. The upper gate was also barricaded. Here a conflict took place between the military and the people, and two persons were shot by the soldiers. The procession moved on, the conflict was renewed, the people triumphed, and the corpse was borne through the city. Sir Robert Wilson remonstrated with some soldiers and an officer on duty; but his humane interference caused his removal from the army. In return, a large sum was subscribed by the public to compensate Sir Robert Wilson for his loss. The directing civil magistrate present, for having consulted his humanity in preference to his orders, and to prevent bloodshed yielded to the wishes of the multitude, was also deprived of his commission. On the inquest on the body of one of the men shot, the coroner's jury, vindicating the rights of the people, returned a verdict of "Wilful murder" against the Life Guardsman who fired.

While the King was in Ireland he paraded his connection with the Marchioness of Conyngham in the most glar-

ing manner. Fremantle says: "I never in my life heard of anything to equal the King's infatuation and conduct towards Lady Conyngham. She lived exclusively with him during the whole time he was in Ireland, at the Phœnix Park. When he went to Slane, she received him dressed out as for a drawing-room. He saluted her, and they then retired alone to her apartments."

If it be objected that I am making too great a feature of the Marchioness of Conyngham's connection with the King, I plead my justification in Henry W. Wynn's declaration of "her folly and rapacity," affirming that this folly and rapacity have left their clear traces on the conduct of affairs, and in the increase of the national burdens. Her husband, as a reward for her virtue, was made an English peer in 1821. Lord Mount Charles, his eldest son, was made Master of the Robes, Groom of his Majesty's Bedchamber, and ultimately became a member of the Government. On this, Bulwer said: "He may prove himself an admirable statesman, but there is no reason to suppose it."

In order that the student of history may fairly judge the account of the rapturous reception given to the King in Ireland, it is needful to add that political discontent was manifest on all sides. Poverty and misery prevailed in Limerick, Mayo, Cavan, and Tipperary, which counties were proclaimed, and occupied by a large military force. Executions, imprisonments, and tumults filled the pages of the daily journals.

In the autumn of 1821, King George IV. visited Hanover, and if the Duke of Buckingham's correspondence be reliable, "Lord Liverpool put a final stop to the visit by declaring that no more drafts could be honored, except for the direct return home."

On the 12th of August, 1822, Castlereagh, the most noble the Marquis of Londonderry, sent himself to heaven, from

North Cray Farm, Bexley, at the age of fifty-three. He was buried in Westminster Abbey. Meaner clay would have been got rid of at some cross roads.

"The death," says Wallace, "of a public man in England—especially a death so sudden and lamentable—greatly assuages the political resentments against him in his life; and there was a reaction in aristocratic circles in favor of Lord Londonderry when he ceased to live. His servile complaisance to despots abroad, his predilection for the worst engines of government at home, were for a moment forgotten. But the honest hatred of the populace, deep-rooted, sincere, and savage, remained untouched, and spoke in a fearful yell of triumphant execration over his remains whilst his coffin was descending into the grave in Westminster Abbey."

No language could do fitting justice to Robert Stewart, Marquis of Londonderry. Words would be too weak to describe Castlereagh's cruelty and baseness towards his own countrymen, or his infernal conduct in connection with the Government of England. All that can be fittingly said is, that he was pre-eminently suited to be Minister of State under a Brunswick.

In 1823 the thanks of Parliament were presented to George IV. for "having munificently presented to the nation a library formed by George III." Unfortunately, the thanks were undeserved. George IV. was discreditable enough to accept thanks for a donation he had never made. The truth is, says the *Daily News*, "that the King being, as was his wont, in urgent need of money, entertained a proposal to sell his father's library to the Emperor of Russia for a good round sum. The books were actually packed up, and the cases directed in due form, when representations were made to Lord Sidmouth, then Home Secretary, on the subject. The minister resolved, if possible, to hinder

the iniquity from being perpetrated. Accordingly, he represented his view of the matter to the King. George IV. graciously consented, after a good deal of solicitation, to present the library to the nation, conditionally on his receiving in return the same sum as he would have received had the sale of it to the Emperor of Russia been completed. What the nation did was, firstly, to pay the money; secondly, to erect a room for the library at the cost of £140,000; and thirdly, to return fulsome thanks to the sovereign for his unparalleled munificence."

On the 25th of April, 1825, the Duke of York spoke in the House of Lords against Catholic Emancipation. His speech was made, if not by the direction, most certainly with the consent, of the King. George IV.'s reluctance to Catholic Emancipation was deep-rooted and violent. The bare mention of the subject exasperated him. He was known to say, and only in his milder mood, "I wish those Catholics were damned or emancipated." The angered despotism of this alternative still afforded the hope that his intolerance might be overcome by his selfish love of ease. The Duke of York's address to his brother peers closed with the declaration that he would, to the last moment of his life, whatever his situation, resist the emancipation of the Catholics, "so help him God!" All tyrants think themselves immortal; the Catholics and their cause outlived the Duke of York, and triumphed. His speech, however, coming from the presumptive heir to the Crown, had a great share in deciding the majority of the Lords against the measure; and acted with great effect upon the congenial mass of brute ignorance and bigotry which is found ready to deny civil rights to all outside the pale of their own church.

On the 5th of January, 1827, the Duke of York died. Wallace, in his "Life of George IV.," says: "Standing in the

relation of heir-presumptive to the throne; obstinately and obtusely fortified against all concession to the Catholics; serving as a ready and authorative medium of Toryism and intolerance to reach, unobserved, the royal ear — his death had a great influence upon the state of parties, and was especially favorable to the ascendancy of Mr. Canning. He, some weeks only before he died, and when his illness had commenced, strenuously urged the King to render the Government uniform and anti-Catholic; in other words, to dismiss Mr. Canning; and, had he recovered, Mr. Canning must have ceased to be Foreign Minister, or the Duke to be Commander-in-chief. The Duke of York was not without personal good qualities, which scarcely deserved the name of private virtues, and were overclouded by his private vices. He was constant in his friendships: but who were his friends and associates? Were they persons distinguished in the State, in literature, in science, in arts, or even in his own profession of arms? Were they not the companions and sharers of his dissipations and prodigalities? He did not exact from his associates subserviency or form; but it was notorious that, from the meanness of his capacity, or the vulgarity of his tastes, he descended very low before he found himself at his own social level. His services to the army as Commander-in-chief were beyond all measure overrated. Easy access, diligence, a mechanical regularity of system, which seldom yielded to solicitation, and never discerned merit; an unenvying, perhaps unscrupulous, willingness to act upon the advice and appropriate the measures of others more able and informed than himself, — these were his chief merits at the Horse Guards. But, it will be said, he had un uncompromising, conscientious fidelity to his public principles; this amounts to no more than that his bigotry was honest and unenlightened. His death, perhaps, was opportune; his non-accession fortunate for the peace of the country

and the stability of his family on the Throne. Alike incapable of fear and foresight, he would have risked the integrity of the United Kingdom rather than concede the Catholic claims; and the whole Monarchy rather than sanction Reform. It would be easy to suggest a parallel, and not always to his advantage, between the constitution of his mind and that of James, Duke of York, afterwards James II., whose obstinate bigotry forced the nation to choose between their liberties and his deposition from the Throne."

In 1827, the Duke of Clarence obtained, after much opposition, a further vote of £8,000 a year to himself, besides £6,000 a year to the Duchess. The Duke of Clarence also had £3,000 a year further, consequent on the death of the Duke of York, making his allowance £43,000 a year.

In April, 1829, the infamous Duke of Cumberland had stated, that if the King gave his assent to the Catholic Emancipation Bill, he (the Duke) would quit England never to return to it. The Right Honorable Thomas Grenville says, in a letter dated April 9th: "There is some fear that a declaration to that effect may produce a very general cheer even in the dignified assembly of the House of Lords." How loved these Brunswicks have been even by their fellow-peers!

On the 10th of April, the Roman Catholic Emancipation Bill passed the House of Lords, the Duke of Wellington confessing that civil war was imminent, if the relief afforded by the measure was longer delayed.

On June 26th, 1830, the royal physicians issued a bulletin, stating that "it has pleased Almighty God to take from this world the King's most excellent majesty." Most excellent majesty!! A son who threatened his mother to make public the invalidity of her marriage; a lover utterly regardless of the well-being of any of his mistresses; a bigamous husband, who behaved most basely to his first

wife, and acted the part of a dishonorable scoundrel to the second; a brother at utter enmity with the Duke of Kent; a son who sought to aggravate the madness of his royal father; a cheat in gaming and racing. He dies because lust and luxury have, through his lazy life, done their work on his bloated carcass, and England sorrows for the King's "most excellent majesty!"

George IV. was a great King. Mrs. J. R. Greer, in her work on "Quakerism," says that he once went to a woman's meeting in Quaker dress. "His dress was all right; a gray silk gown, a brown cloth shawl, a little white silk handkerchief with hemmed edge round his neck, and a very well-poked Friend's bonnet, with the neatly-crimped border of his clear muslin cap tied under the chin, completed his disguise." Royal George was detected, but we are told that the Quakers, who recognized their visitor, were careful to treat him with courtesy and deference!

In the ten years' reign, the official expenditure for George IV. and his Royal Family was at the very least £16,000,000 sterling. Windsor Castle cost £894,500, the Pavilion at Brighton is said to have cost a million, and another half-million is alleged to have been expended on the famous "Cottage." After the King's death his old clothes realized £15,000.

Thackeray says of him that he "never resisted any temptation; never had a desire but he coddled it and pampered it; if he ever had any nerve, he frittered it away among cooks, and tailors, and barbers, and furniture-mongers, and opera-dancers. . . . all fiddling, and flowers, and feasting, and flattery, and folly. . . . a monstrous image of pride, vanity, and weakness."

Wallace says: "Monarchy, doubtless, has its advantages; but it is a matter of serious reflection that under a government called free, among a people called civilized,

the claims of millions, and the contingent horrors of a civil war, should be thus dependent upon the distempered humors and paramount will of a single unit of the species."

CHAPTER VI.

THE REIGN OF WILLIAM IV.

William Henry, Duke of Clarence, Admiral of the Fleet, and third son of George III., born August 21st, 1765, succeeded his brother George IV. as King of England, on the 26th of June, 1830. The new King was then 65 years of age, and had been married, July 11th, 1818, to Adelaide Amelia Louisa Teresa Caroline, Princess of Saxe-Meiningen. Mrs. Dorothy Jordan, with whom William had lived, and who had borne him ten children, had fled to France to avoid her creditors, and had there died, neglected by the world, deserted by William, and in the greatest poverty. This Mrs. Jordan was sold to William by one Richard Ford, her former lover, who, amongst other rewards of virtue, was created a Knight, and made Police Magistrate at Bow Street. Mrs. Jordan's children bore the name of "Fitzclarence," and great dissatisfaction was expressed against the King, who, too mean to maintain them out of his large income, contrived to find them all posts at the public cost. At the date of William IV.'s accession, the imperial taxation was about £47,000,000; to-day it has increased at least £25,000,000.

The annual allowances to the junior branches of the Royal Family in 1830, formerly included in the Civil List, and now paid separately, were as follows:—

The Duke of Cumberland £21,000. He had no increase on his marriage; the House of Commons rejected a motion

to that effect; but an allowance of £6,000 a year for his son, Prince George, had been issued to him since he became a resident in this country. This is the Duke of Cumberland, who so loved his brother, William IV., that he intrigued with the Orangemen to force William's abdication, and to get made King in his stead.

The Duke of Sussex received £21,000.

The Duke of Cambridge, father of the present Duke, had £27,000. He obtained an increase on his marriage of £6,000 a year. This Prince was charged with the government of the family territory, the kingdom of Hanover, and consequently resided but little in England.

Princess Augusta, £13,000.

The Princess Elizabeth of Hesse Homburg, £13,000.

Princess Sophia, £13,000.

The Duchess of Kent, including the allowance granted in 1831, for her daughter, the Princess Victoria, heir-presumptive to the Throne, £22,000.

The Duke of Gloucester, including £13,000 which he received as the husband of the Princess Mary, £27,000.

The Princess Sophia of Gloucester, his sister, £7,000.

Queen Adelaide had £100,000 a year, and the residence at Bushey granted to her for life.

Mrs. Fitzherbert, as the widow of George IV., was in receipt of £6,000 a year, and the ten Fitzclarences also enjoyed places and pensions.

The Duke of Wellington and Sir Robert Peel were the King's Ministers; and, although there was some personal hostility between William and the Iron Duke, they were at first his willing coadjutors in opposing either reduction of expenditure, or any kind of political or social reform. The quarrel between William as Duke of Clarence and the Duke of Wellington had arisen when William was Lord High Admiral. William had given improper orders to a

military officer, named Cockburn, which the latter had refused to obey. The Duke of Wellington refused to sacrifice Cockburn, and ultimately the Duke of Clarence resigned his office as Lord High Admiral, for which, says the Rev. Mr. Molesworth, "he was ill-qualified, and in which he was doing great mischief."

In November, 1830, Earl Grey, Lord Brougham, Lord Melbourne, and Lord Althorp came into office as leaders of the Whig party. With slight exception, in 1806, the Whigs had not been before in office during the present century, and very little indeed since 1762. The Whigs encouraged the Radical Reformers so far as to insure their own accession to power; but it is evident that the Whig Cabinet only considered how little they could grant, and yet retain office. In finance, as well as reform, they were disloyal to the mass of the people who pushed them into power.

The Duke of Wellington and his Ministry resigned office in November, 1830, because the House of Commons wished to appoint a Select Committee to examine the Civil List. King William IV., according to the words of a letter written by him to Earl Grey, on December 1st, 1830, felt considerable "alarm and uneasiness" because Joseph Hume and other Radical members wished to put some check on the growing and already extravagant royal expenditure. He objects "most strenuously," and says, referring in this especially to the Duchy of Lancaster: "Earl Grey cannot be surprised that the King should view with jealousy any idea of Parliamentary interference with the only remaining pittance of an independent possession, which has been enjoyed by his ancestors, during many centuries, as their *private* and *independent estate*, and has now, as such, lawfully devolved upon him in right of succession. That he should feel that any successful attempt to deprive the Sovereign of this independent posses-

sion will be to lower and degrade him into the state and condition of absolute and entire dependence, as a pensioner of the House of Commons; to place him in the condition of an individual violating or surrendering a trust which had been held sacred by his ancestors, and which he is bound to transmit to his successors. The King cannot indeed conceive upon what plea such a national invasion of the *private* rights, and such a seizure of the private estates, of the Sovereign could be justified."

William IV. reminds Earl Grey, that the Chancellor of the Duchy is sworn to do all things "for the weal and profit of the King's Highness. And his Majesty has fair reason to expect that a pledge so solemnly taken will be fulfilled, and that he will be supported in his assertion of these *private* rights, not only of himself, but of his heirs and successors, as they have devolved upon him, *separate* from all other of his possessions *jure coronæ*, and consequently, as his separate personal and private estate, vested in his Majesty, by descent from Henry VII. in his body *natural*, and not in his body *politic* as King."

Earl Grey naturally promised to prevent Radical financial reformers from becoming too annoying to Royalty. The Whigs love to talk of economy out of office, and to avoid it when in place.

Daniel O'Connell appears to have much troubled the King. Directly after the Dublin meeting in December, 1830, Sir Henry Taylor says: "The King observed, that he would have been better pleased if this assembly of people had not dispersed quietly *at his bidding*, as the control which he has successfully exercised upon various occasions in this way, appears to his Majesty the most striking proof of the influence he has acquired over a portion of the lower classes in Ireland."

It is pretended in the *Cabinet Register* for 1831, and was

stated by Lord Althorp in Parliament, that his Majesty most nobly and patriotically declined to add to the burdens of his people by accepting an outfit for his royal consort, though £54,000 had been granted by Parliament to the Queen of George III., as an outfit to purchase jewels, etc." This is so little true, that it appears from the correspondence between the King and Earl Grey, that a grant for the Queen's outfit had been agreed to by the outgoing Tories, and would have been proposed by the new Whig Government, had not one of the Cabinet (probably Lord Brougham) decidedly objected, on the ground "that proposing a grant for this purpose would have a bad effect on the House of Commons, and on public opinion;" and by a letter dated February 4th, 1831, from the King, it is clear that he only abandoned the claim when he found he could not get it. There is not a word about "the burdens of the people," although many at that time were in a starving condition. On the contrary, the secretary of the King says on the 6th of February, that "the disinclination shown in the House of Commons" to grant the outfit had "produced a very painful impression on his Majesty."

The King, afraid of the spread of Reform opinions, says that he "trusts that the Lord-Lieutenants and Deputy-Lieutenants of counties will be cautioned to scrutinize the ballots for the militia as far as possible, so as to endeavor to exclude from its ranks men of dangerous and designing character, whose influence might prove very pernicious upon newly-established corps, and before they shall have acquired habits of discipline and subordination." And to show his desire for Reform, he urges the Ministers to check the public gatherings, saying, "I am ignorant to what extent it may be in contemplation to increase the military means, either by calling out the militia partially, or by any addition to the regular force; but I am convinced that the latter

would be not only the most efficient, but the cheapest; and it would have the advantage of being applicable to all purposes."

The Reformer King — for this pretence has been made — in another letter says: "His Majesty is satisfied that he may rely upon Earl Grey's strenuous support in his determination to resist all attempts which may be made to sap the established rights of the Crown, and to destroy those institutions under which this country has so long prospered, while others have been suffering so severely from the effects of revolutionary projects, and from the admission of what are called Radical remedies . . . He is induced thus pointedly to notice the proposal of introducing *Election by Ballot*, in order to declare that nothing should ever induce him to yield to it, or to sanction a practice which would, in his opinion, be a protection to concealment, would abolish the influence of fear and shame, and would be inconsistent with the manly spirit and the free avowal of opinion which distinguish the people of England. His Majesty need scarcely add that his opposition to the introduction of another, yet more objectionable, proposal, the adoption of *Universal Suffrage*, one of the wild projects which have sprung from revolutionary speculation, would have been still more decided."

How William IV. could ever have been suspected of being favorable to Reform is difficult to comprehend. As Duke of Clarence he had spoken in favor of the Slave Trade, and had declared that "its abolition should meet with his most serious and most unqualified opposition." When the Reform Bill actually became law, although William IV. did not dare to veto it, he refused to give the royal assent in person.

In this chapter there is not space enough to go through the history of the Reform agitation of 1832. In Molesworth's "History of the Reform Bill," and Roebuck's ac-

count of the "Whig Ministry," the reader will find the story fully told. It is not enough to say here that the King not only hindered Reform until Revolution was imminent, and the flames of burning castles and mansions were rising in different parts of England, but it may be stated that he condescended to deceive his Ministers; that he allowed his children to canvass peers against the bill, and would have resorted to force to crush the Birmingham Political Union, if he could have thrown the responsibility of this tyranny upon the Cabinet. In the King's eyes the people were "the rabble." We find him "impatient" for the return of the Tories to power, and bitterly discontented when the orderly character of popular demonstrations rendered the employment of the military impossible.

The Earl of Munster, one of the King's ten children by Mrs. Jordan, and who was Governor of Windsor Castle, Colonel in the Army, Aide-de-Camp to the King, Lieutenant of the Tower, Tory and State prisoner, being charged with having "unhandsomely intrigued against Earl Grey's Government," made the curious defence "that for six months before and for twenty-four hours after the resignation" of the Grey Government, "it was from certain circumstances out of his power to act in the matter imputed to him."

It is worthy of notice, as against Mr. Frederic Harrison's opinion, that no English monarch could now really interfere with the course of government in Great Britain, that in April, 1832, William IV. gave written directions to Earl Grey, "that no instructions should be sent" to foreign ambassadors until they had "obtained his previous concurrence." And it is clear, from a letter of the King's private secretary, that William gave these orders because he was afraid there was a "disposition . . . to unite with France in support of the introduction of liberal opinions and measures agreeably to the spirit of the times." Although the

newspapers praised William, he does not seem to have been very grateful in private. In 1832, he declared to his confidential secretary that he had "long ceased to consider the press (the newspaper family) in any other light than as the vehicle of all that is false and infamous."

In January, 1833, in a speech, not written for him, but made extemporaneously after dinner, William IV. said, to compliment the American Ambassador, "that it had always been a matter of serious regret to him that he had not been born a free, independent American." We regret that the whole family have not long since naturalized themselves as American citizens. But such a sentiment from the son of George III., from one who in his youth had used the most extravagant phraseology in denunciation of the American rebels!!

The family insanity, shown in the case of George II. by his persistence in wearing his Dettingen old clothes; more notorious and less possible of concealment in that of George III.; well known to all but the people as to George IV., who actually tried to persuade the Duke of Wellington that he (George) had led a regiment at Waterloo, was also marked in William IV. In April, 1832, the King's own secretary admits "distressing symptoms" and "nervous excitement," but says that the attack "is now subsiding." Raikes, a Tory, and also a king-worshipper, in his "Diary," under date May the 27th, 1834, says, after speaking of the King's "excitement" and "rather extraordinary" conduct, that "at the levée a considerable sensation was created the other day by his insisting that an unfortunate wooden-legged lieutenant should kneel down." On June 11th, visiting the Royal Academy, the President showed the King, amongst others, the portrait of Admiral Napier, and was astonished to hear his Majesty at once cry out: "Captain Napier may be

damned, sir, and you may be damned, sir; and if the Queen was not here, sir, I would kick you downstairs, sir." The King's brother, his Royal Highness the Duke of Gloucester, died November 20th, 1834. Raikes says of him: "He was not a man of talent, as may be inferred from his nickname of Silly Billy." This is the Royal Family, the head of which, according to Mr. Disraeli, was "physically and mentally incapable of performing the regal functions," and which yet, according to the brilliant statesman, so fitly represents the intelligence and honor of Great Britain!

In 1836, Sir William Knighton died. He had been made private secretary to the late King, and had made his fortune by means of some papers which Colonel Macmahon, confidant of George IV., had when dying, and which came into Knighton's hands as medical attendant of the dying man. Sir W. Knighton was made a "Grand Cross," not for his bravery in war, or intelligence in the State, but for his adroit manipulation of secrets relating to Lady Jersey, Mrs. Fitzherbert, and the Marchioness of Conyngham. Sir William Knighton and the latter lady were supposed to have made free with £300,000; but great larcenies win honor, and Sir W. Knighton died respected.

In August, 1836, William — hearing that the Duke of Bedford had helped O'Connell with money — ordered the Duke's bust, then in the Gallery at Windsor, to be taken down, and thrown in the lime-kilns.

On June 20th, 1837, William IV. died. Ernest, Duke of Cumberland, by William's death, became King of Hanover, and was on the same day publicly hissed in the Green Park. Naturally, in this loving family there was considerable disagreement for some time previous to the King's death between his Majesty and the Duchess of Kent.

The *Edinburgh Review*, soon after the King's death,

while admitting that "his understanding may not have been of as high an order as his good nature," says: "We have learned to forget the faults of the Duke of Clarence in the merits of William IV." Where were these merits shown? Was it in "brooding" — (to use the expression of his own private secretary) — over questions of whether he could, during the commencement of his reign, personally appropriate sums of money outside the Civil List votes? Was it in desiring that Colonel Napier might be "struck off the half-pay list," for having made a speech at Devizes in favor of Parliamentary Reform? Was it when he tried to persuade Earl Grey to make Parliament pay Rundell and Bridge's bill for plate — and this when the masses were in a starving condition? Was it when he declared that he was by "no means dissatisfied" that a proposed meeting was likely to be so "violent, and in other respects so objectionable," as it would afford the excuse for suppressing by force the orderly meetings which, says his secretary, "the King orders me to say he cannot too often describe as being, in his opinion, far more mischievous and dangerous" than those of "a more avowed and violent character"?

CHAPTER VII.

THE PRESENT REIGN.

Her present Majesty, Alexandrina Victoria, was born May 24th, 1819, and ascended the throne June 20th, 1837, as representing her father, the Duke of Kent, fourth son of George III. On February 10th, 1840, it being the general etiquette for the Brunswick family to intermarry amongst themselves, she was married to her cousin, Prince Albert

of Saxe Coburg, who received an allowance from the nation of £30,000, to compensate him for becoming the husband of his wife. The Queen, more sensible than others of the arduous position of a Prince Consort, wished her loyal husband to have £100,000 a year. The Government reduced this to £50,000; Joseph Hume and the Radicals reduced it still further to £30,000. For this annual payment the Prince undertook to submit to naturalization, to be the first subject in England, to reside rent free in the Royal Palaces repaired at the cost of the nation. He also, on his own account, and for his own profit, attended to various building speculations at the West End of London, and died very rich. He is known as Prince Albert the Good. His goodness is marked — not by parks given to the people, as in the case of Sir Francis Crossley; not by improved dwellings for the people, as in the case of George Peabody; not by a large and costly market place, freely given, as in the case of Miss Burdett Coutts — Peeress without her patent of Baroness; — but by statues erected in his honor in many cities and boroughs by a loyal people. As an employer of labor, the Prince's reputation for generosity is marked solely by these statues. As a Prince, he felt in his lifetime how much and how truly he was loved by his people; and at a dinner given to the Guards, Prince Albert, in a speech probably not revised beforehand, told the household troops how he relied on them to protect the throne against any assaults. The memory of the Prince is dear to the people; he has left us nine children to keep out of the taxpayers' pockets, his own large private accumulations of wealth being inapplicable to their maintenance.

When her Majesty ascended the throne, poor rates averaged 5s. 4½d. per head per annum; to-day they exceed 7s. During the last fifteen years alone there has been an in-

crease of more than 250,000 paupers in England and Wales, and one person out of every twenty-two is in receipt of workhouse relief. Everybody, however, agrees that the country is prosperous and happy. In Scotland there has been an increase of 9,048 paupers in the last ten years. Two out of every fifty-three Scotchmen are at this moment paupers. In Ireland in the last ten years the out-door paupers have increased 19,504. As, however, we have, during the reign of her present most gracious Majesty, driven away the bulk of the Irish population, there are considerably fewer paupers in Ireland than there are in Scotland. The average Imperial taxation during the first ten years of her Majesty's reign was under £50,000,000 a year. The average taxation at the present day is over £72,000,000 a year. Pauperism and local and Imperial taxation are all on the increase, and, despite agricultural laborers' outcries and workmen's strikes, it is agreed that her Majesty's reign has brought us many blessings.

On March 20th, 1842, the Earl of Munster, eldest son of William IV., and who had been made Constable of Windsor Castle by her Majesty, committed suicide. Although the eldest son of the late King, his position as a natural child excluded him from heaven, according to the Bible, and from all right to the Throne, according to our law.

Her Majesty's eldest daughter, the Princess Royal, Victoria Adelaide Mary Louisa, is married to the Prince Imperial, Frederick William, of Germany, and, as it would have been manifestly unreasonable to expect either the Queen or the Prince Consort, out of their large private fortunes, to provide a dowry for their daughter, the English nation pays £8,000 a year to the Princess.

Her Majesty's eldest son, Albert Edward, Prince of Wales, Duke of Saxony, Cornwall, and Rothesay, and Earl of Dublin, has earned already so wide a fame that

notice here is almost needless. As a writer, his letters — a few of which have been published by the kind permission of Sir Charles Mordaunt — illustrate the grasp of mind peculiar to the family, and mark in strong relief the nobility of character of the Royal author. As a military chieftain, the Autumn Manœuvres of 1871 demonstrated the tact and speed he could display in a strategic movement of masterly retreat. As an investigator of social problems, he has surpassed the Lords Townshend and Shaftesbury, and at Mabille and in London has, by experience, entitled himself to speak with authority. As a pigeon-shooter, he can only be judged by comparison with the respectable ex-bush-ranger now claiming the Tichborne estates. Here, it is true, the latter is a man of more weight. The Prince of Wales receives £40,000 a year, and we give his wife £10,000 a year as a slight acknowledgment for the position she has to occupy as Princess of Wales. With the history of the wives of the two last Princes of Wales to guide them, it is almost wonderful that the advisers of the Princess did not insist on a much higher premium against the risks of the position. When his Royal Highness came of age, he found accumulations of the Duchy of Cornwall approaching a million sterling, which, invested in Consols, would bring him in at least a further £40,000 per annum. His Royal Highness also has the income of the Duchy of Cornwall, amounting net to about £75,000 a year. In addition to this, the Prince of Wales is entitled to military salary as Colonel of the Rifle Brigade and 10th Hussars. Last year — conscious that it is unfair to expect a Prince to live upon £153,000 a year — £7,600 were voted by Parliament for the repair of the house in which he sometimes resides when in London.

A few years ago his Royal Highness was in Paris, and certain scurrilous foreign prints pretended that on the

Boulevard des Italiens, in the face of France, he had forgotten that one day he would seek to be King of England. It is written, "*In vino veritas*," and if the proverb hold, the Prince is more than half his time a man remarkable for his truthfulness. Some time later, the *Royal Leamington Chronicle*, which, in his mercy, the Prince of Wales never prosecuted, coupled his reputation with infamy. Later, his Royal Highness was ill, and the nation wept. Then came recovery and Thanksgiving at St. Paul's.

"So when the devil was sick,
The devil a saint would be;
When the devil got well again,
The devil a saint was he."

The Prince of Wales has since been to Paris, and, according to *La Liberté*, has honored Mabille with his Royal presence.

Her Majesty's second son is Alfred Ernest, Duke of Edinburgh. His Royal Highness, when serving on board the Galatea, had leave to go on shore at Marseilles. Journeying to Paris, he overstayed his leave, refused to return when summoned, and stayed there, so Paris journals said, till his debts were thousands. Any other officer in the navy would have been cashiered; his Royal Highness has since been promoted. The Duke of Edinburgh visited our Colonies, and the nation voted about £3,500 for presents made by the Prince. The presents the Prince received were, of course, his own, and the vote enabled the Duke to do justice to the generous sentiments of his family. The Colonists pretended at the time that some of the presents were not paid for by the Duke of Edinburgh; nay, they went so far as to allege that some of the Duke's debts had to be discharged by the Colonist Reception Committee. Representing the honor of England, his Royal Highness earned himself a fame and a name by the associates he chose. In

visiting India, a special sum of, we believe, £10,000 was taken from the Indian revenues and handed to the Duke, so that an English Prince might be liberal in his gifts to Indians at their own cost. The Duke of Edinburgh has £25,000 a year. Five years ago he borrowed £450 from the pay-chest of the Galatea. I have no means of knowing whether it has since been paid back; all I can affirm is, that the country made up the deficient sum in the pay-chest without a word from any M. P. Had the borrower been a pay-sergeant, he would have been sent to a District Military Prison; if a commissioned officer, other than a Royal one, he would have been dismissed the service. The difference between the Prince of Wales and the Duke of Edinburgh is this: in the first case, the virtues of the Prince equal his intelligence; in the second case, the intelligence of the Duke is more developed than are his virtues.

In the case of Broadwood *vs.* the Duke of St. Albans, both the Royal brothers were permitted to guard a pleasant incognito. The Judge who allowed this concealment was soon afterwards created a Peer of the Realm.

Our army and navy, without reckoning the Indian Establishment, cost more to-day, by about £9,000,000 a year, than when her Majesty ascended the throne. Her Majesty's cousin, George William Frederick, Duke of Cambridge, is Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and for this service receives £4,432 per annum. His Royal Highness also receives the sum of £12,000 in consequence of his being a cousin of the Queen. His Royal Highness is also Field-Marshal, and Colonel of four distinct regiments, for which he gets more than £5,000 annually. Naturally, in the Duke is found embodied the whole military talent of the Royal Family. His great-uncle, the Duke of Cumberland, carved "Klosterseven" on the Brunswick monuments. Frederick Duke of York, the uncle of the Duke of Cam-

bridge, recalled from the field of battle, that he might wear in peace at home the laurels he had won abroad, added "Clarke" and "Tonyn" as names to vie with Cressy or Waterloo. The present Duke of Cambridge was, when Prince George, stationed in Yorkshire, in the famous "plug plot" times, and his valiancy then threatened most lustily what he would do against the factory "turnouts," poor starved wretches clamoring for bread. In the army, the normal schoolmasters can tell how this brave Brunswicker rendered education difficult, and drove out, one by one, many of the best teachers. Soldiers who think too much, make bad machines. It was the father of the present Duke of Cambridge who publicly expressed his disbelief, in 1844 — 5, of the failure of the potato crop in Ireland, "because he had always found the potatoes at his own table very good!"

For many years her Majesty's most constant attendant has been a Scotsman, John Brown. This person so seldom leaves her Majesty that it is said that some years since the Queen insisted on his presence when diplomatic communications were made to her Majesty; and that, when escorting the Queen to Camden House, on a visit to the ex-Emperor Napoleon, Mr. Brown offered her his arm from the carriage to the door. Afterwards, when an idiotic small boy — armed with a broken pistol, loaded with red flannel, and without gunpowder — made a sham attack on her Majesty, Mr. Brown courageously rushed to the Queen's aid, and has since received a medal to mark his valor.

For many years her Majesty has taken but little part in the show ceremonials of State. Parliament is usually opened and closed by commission — a robe on an empty throne, and a speech read by deputy, satisfying the Sovereign's loyal subjects. It is, however, the fact that in real State policy her interference has been most mischievous, and this

especially where it affected her Prusso-German relatives. In the case of Denmark attacked by Prussia and Austria, and in the case of the Franco-Prussian War, English Court influences have most indecently affected our foreign relations.

Her Majesty is now enormously rich, and — as she is like her Royal grandmother — grows richer daily. She is also generous, Parliament annually voting her moneys to enable her to be so without touching her own purse.

It is charged against me that I have unfairly touched private character. In no instance have I done so, except as I have found the conduct of the individuals attacked affecting the honor and welfare of the nation. My sayings and writings are denounced in many of the journals, and in the House of Lords, as seditious, and even treasonable. My answer is, that, fortunately, Hardy, Tooke, and Thelwall heard "Not Guilty" given as the shield against a criticism which dared to experiment on persecution. In case of need, I rely on a like deliverance. I do not pretend here to have pleaded for Republicanism; I have only pleaded against the White Horse of Hanover. I admire the German intellect, training the world to think. I loathe these small German breast-bestarred wanderers, whose only merit is their loving hatred of one another. In their own land they vegetate and wither unnoticed; here we pay them highly to marry and perpetuate a pauper prince-race. If they do nothing, they are "good." If they do ill, loyalty gilds the vice till it looks like virtue.

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Bradlaugh, Charles
The impeachment of the
House of Brunswick

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

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IS THE BIBLE DIVINE?

A SIX NIGHTS' DISCUSSION

BETWEEN

MR. CHARLES BRADLAUGH,

OF LONDON, (EDITOR OF THE *National Reformer*,)

AND

MR. ROBERT ROBERTS,

OF BIRMINGHAM, (EDITOR OF *The Christadelphian*, AND AUTHOR OF *Twelve Lectures*),

IN LEICESTER AND BIRMINGHAM,

ON JUNE 13th, 14th, 15th, 20th, 21st and 22nd, 1876.

PROPOSITION:—"*That the Scriptures are the reliable and authentic record of Divine revelation.*"
MR. ROBERTS *affirms*; MR. BRADLAUGH *denies*.

TOGETHER WITH

A REVIEW OF THE DISCUSSION,

BY MR. ROBERTS.

LONDON: F. PITMAN, 20, PATERNOSTER ROW.
BIRMINGHAM: ROBERT ROBERTS, ATHENÆUM ROOMS, TEMPLE ROW.

1876.

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PREFACE.

It is an unusual and unsatisfactory circumstance for a discussion to be divided up into two parts between two separate towns. The reader will naturally be curious to know, not only how the discussion came about, but also how it came to assume this extraordinary and inconvenient shape, from which, however, with the whole discussion in his hands, he will not be a sufferer. His curiosity cannot be more effectually gratified than by placing before him the correspondence which led to the holding of it. It is as follows:

64, Belgrave Road, Birmingham,
18*th February*, 1876.

Mr. Charles Bradlaugh. Dear Sir.—You may be aware that the desirability of a meeting in debate between yourself and me has been for a considerable time urged by many persons who know us both. I believe the matter was verbally mentioned to you some months ago by Mr. Arthur Andrew, of London; and you were good enough to express your willingness to hold the proposed meeting.

I now write for the purpose of putting the proposal into formal shape. I will undertake, for six nights—spread over two weeks—three successive nights in each week, to affirm that the Scriptures are the authentic and genuine records of Divine revelation. I leave you to choose whether the debate shall be by ordinary speeches, or by the Socratic mode, or a mixture of both, merely expressing my opinion that the latter is, perhaps, on the whole, best calculated to put the matter in debate to a thorough test.

As to the place where the debate should take place, the majority of my friends are in favour of Birmingham. I presume Birmingham will not be unacceptable to you. We should, probably, have a larger audience there than anywhere else.

As to the date, it will probably suit the state of your engagements, as it will mine, if I name a somewhat distant day, say the autumn of the present year; by which time, the Town Hall, Birmingham, will be re-opened after alterations and repairs. The disposal of the surplus, if any, after the payment of expenses, I would leave to your proposal, subject to mutual agreement.

If these proposals are agreeable to you, you could, probably, name a local committee for the execution of arrangements in detail. Respectfully yours,

ROBERT ROBERTS.

"The National Reformer," 29, Turner Street, Commercial Road, London, E.,
21*st February*, 1876.

Dear Sir,—I have handed your letter to Mr. W. H. Holyoak, Belgrave Gate, Leicester, who will write you, and who has my full authority to arrange. Yours respectfully,

C. BRADLAUGH.

Robert Roberts, Esq., 64, Belgrave Road, Birmingham.

45, Humberstone Gate, Leicester,
February 25th, 1876.

To Robert Roberts, Esq. Dear Sir,—I write on behalf of Mr. Charles Bradlaugh. He has left to me the arrangement of the debate between you and him.

Please consider that it is settled to come off. The time we prefer is during the month of April or the beginning of May.

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The place, Leicester Temperance Hall, for, say three nights. Mr. B. will not object to three nights in Birmingham as well if you wish. The mode of debate: we assent with you to the mixed, viz., question and answer and ordinary speeches.

We trust you will see your way to this earlier date; for the date you name appears to us so remote, that a thousand events may occur between now and then to prevent its ever taking place. Trusting, however, that you will see your way, and waiting your reply, I am, Sir, yours sincerely,

WILLIAM HENRY HOLYOAK.

64, BELGRAVE ROAD, BIRMINGHAM,

26th February, 1876.

MR. HOLYOAK. DEAR SIR.—Thanks for yours of the 25th inst., according to Mr. Bradlaugh's promise to me.

Your proposals, however, are not quite acceptable in some details. The date is too early. It is a matter of impossibility for me to take part much sooner than the time I mentioned to Mr. Bradlaugh. Mr. Collyer, your townsman, will be able to inform you of one reason, sufficient of itself. I admit my time is somewhat remote; but this need not be a disadvantage. As for the uncertainties, they would apply with nearly equal force to an earlier date, and must be submissively encountered.

As to the place, I presume Mr. Bradlaugh can have no personal choice, as his friends will be as numerous in Birmingham as in Leicester; therefore, I must ask your consent to Birmingham. It would be a great disappointment to the majority of my friends if it were not to take place there, and would, to some extent, frustrate the object I have in view in consenting to encounter a man of Mr. Bradlaugh's calibre and reputation. I can understand your preference for Leicester, and do not quarrel with it. To have the debate there would also be in accordance with the wishes of many in that town whom I should greatly desire to gratify. Nevertheless, the preponderance of reasons from my point of view, is sufficiently in favour of Birmingham to justify me in pressing for it. If you feel it would be conceding an advantage to me, you have also to remember that you can well afford to concede any advantage to one who will figure so small in collision with so popular a man and a cause.

Three nights is an utterly inadequate time for the argument I have to submit. Twelve nights would not be too long. It will be necessary for you to consent to six nights, and these must, of course, be in one place; for it would place both speakers in an awkward position to have a new audience for the second half of the debate

Regretting my inability to return a simple affirmative to your proposals, and looking for your reply, respectfully yours,

ROBERT ROBERTS.

45, HUMBERSTONE GATE,

Feb. 28th, 1876.

TO ROBERT ROBERTS, Esq. DEAR SIR.—Yours of the 26th inst, I have forwarded to Mr. Bradlaugh, along with a copy of what follows; not seeing what I can have to do with arranging for a debate to come off in Birmingham.

I should have been pleased to be instrumental in bringing it about in Leicester; but in Birmingham, the Birmingham friends had better be consulted. It seems to me they are the parties to move in the matter, and not I. You will please reply, advising me of your opinion. I am, dear sir, yours truly,

WILLIAM HENRY HOLYOAK.

45, HUMBERSTONE GATE,

TO ROBERT ROBERTS, Esq. DEAR SIR.—Mr. Bradlaugh writes me as follows:—

"DEAR SIR.—As the challenge was given by Mr. Roberts's friends in Leicester, and as the Leicester friends first asked me to meet Mr. Roberts there, a debate in Leicester must take precedence of any other debate with Mr. Roberts; therefore, I return you his letter, and you had better send a copy of mine to you. I do not mean this as an objection to meet Mr. Roberts

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in Birmingham; but I do mean that I think it would be a slight on the Leicester Secular Society if I passed that town over. I nevertheless leave myself entirely in the hands of the Leicester friends. Yours truly,

C. BRADLAUGH."

I might say that we in Leicester quite concur with the view Mr. B. takes.

I am, Sir, yours respectfully, WILLIAM HENRY HOLYOAK.

64, BELGRAVE ROAD, BIRMINGHAM.

2nd March, 1876.

Mr. HOLYOAK. DEAR SIR.—I am in receipt of yours, without date, but presumably of to-day.

Mr. Bradlaugh leaves himself entirely in your hands. I cannot quite comprehend why a man of his independence should do this instead of dealing directly with me, and shaping his own course. Nevertheless, he having done so, with you will rest the responsibility of preventing the discussion, if you insist upon a condition needless on your side, and on my side inconsistent with the object of the discussion.

I cannot recognise the claim, or at least the ground of the claim put forward on behalf of Leicester. It is not true that the "challenge" was given by my friends in Leicester. The "challenge" has been given by me, at the instigation of friends in Birmingham, London, Leicester, and other places; and therefore Leicester has nothing to do with fixing the place. Mr. Bradlaugh may have heard of it first at Leicester; but this does not confer the right in question I named Birmingham in my first letter, pressed for it in my second, and you will pardon me if I insist upon it in my third.

If a second debate should seem desirable to all parties, I promise it shall be in Leicester, so far as I am concerned; but the first encounter must take place in the metropolis of the Midlands.

Mr. Bradlaugh says he has no objection to meet me in Birmingham, and although he says in the beginning of his letter, that Leicester must take the precedence, by the last sentence he leaves the decision with you. To you, therefore, I appeal, to waive the objection and to allow the arrangements for the discussion to proceed. Respectfully yours,

ROBERT ROBERTS.

45, HUMBERSTONE GATE, LEICESTER,

3rd March 1876.

ROBERT ROBERTS, Esq. DEAR SIR.—Yours of yesterday is to hand. Mr. Bradlaugh has left the arrangement of bringing about a debate with you in my hands. With the reason why I imagine we are not concerned. I take it that what we have to do with is the fact. And the responsibility you name, I accept. You say, "It is not true that the challenge was given by my friends in Leicester." That, sir, is a positive statement. Let us see upon what basis it rests, and whether that little word *not* is not a mistake on your part. The date of your first to Mr. Bradlaugh is February the 18th, 1876, but on January the 30th, 1876, a gentleman made a statement in the Lecture Hall of the Temperance Hall, Leicester, before a large audience, to the effect that Mr. Roberts *was* prepared to meet either Mr. Holmes or Mr. Bradlaugh in public debate on the question—"Is the Bible true?" I see no reason why I should not give the gentleman's name; it was Mr. Vicars Collyer, who, I believe, is a friend of yours; and with the view of testing that statement, I waited upon him during the week, and on February 4th, I advised Mr. Bradlaugh of the statement publicly made by Mr. V. C.; and Mr. B. replied by saying that he only knew Mr. Roberts as a Christadelphian; that he knew nothing against him, and wished to be informed of the terms of the challenge, and whether he had a respectable committee in Leicester, saying, I shall, probably, be governed by my friends there. How, sir, you can reconcile this by saying "It is not true," I do not see. On that point, I beg to differ from you in thinking that Leicester has nothing to do with it.

To second promises I cannot attend until the first statement be verified. It is with that I have to do, and to that I confine myself. I am, Sir, yours respectfully,

WILLIAM HENRY HOLYOAK.

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64, Belgrave Road, Birmingham,
4th March, 1876.

Mr. Holyoak. Dear Sir.—The circumstance you mention, which had escaped my memory, explains your view and Mr. Bradlaugh's as to the origin of the challenge. I cannot admit, however, that it gives the real foundation for the facts as they stand.

Mr, Collyer's intimation of my willingness to debate, (which he made of his own motion in response to some challenge from the platform), was merely the declaration of a privately-known fact, and not a challenge in the sense of carrying with it the local obligations now sought to be deduced from it. I was not aware of the incident till after it happened, and it made so little impression on me that I had forgot it. I admit it is open to the construction you and Mr. Bradlaugh have put upon it, and that, therefore, you are free from the imputation you seem to see in my denial; but you must be too experienced in such matters, to confound an unofficial intimation of willingness to debate with the formal thing implied in a "challenge."

The "challenge" is contained in my letter of the 18th ult., and with that as such, my Leicester friends had nothing to do. That challenge, as I said in my last, is the result of the expressed wishes of friends in divers places.

To free the matter from the complications arising from the intervention of third parties, I hereby renew the challenge, to meet Mr. Bradlaugh in Birmingham for six nights, for the discussion of the subject proposed in my first letter. Yours respectfully,

ROBERT ROBERTS.

45, Humberstone Gate, Leicester,
6th March, 1876.

To Robert Roberts, Esq. Dear Sir.—Your acknowledgment of your memory having been refreshed as to the origin of this correspondence, and the contemplated debate between yourself and Mr. C. Bradlaugh, is very honourable to you. And although you cannot admit that we in Leicester have the strongest claim for the debate to take place here, it is satisfactory to know that you do not deny that we in Leicester were the first movers in this matter.

The facts I named in my last I repeat. Mr. V. Collyer said you were prepared to debate, and I with a view of testing that statement, waited upon him to accept and arrange. Ever since I have been trying to bring you and Mr. B. together; but now I begin to fear that my efforts will be fruitless.

I should have been glad if it could have been arranged, but you seem to stick fast to Birmingham, for what reason I cannot tell, but I can tell I have nothing to do with Birmingham, and am not interested in any way of its taking place there.

The facts are very simple: you were either prepared or you were not.

The statement was plain, as plain could be, and now I think we in Leicester cannot be charged with neglecting it; and besides according to your letters you will not be prepared until towards the end of the year. If so, it appears to me that there can be no use in talking about it so very long before-hand. It will be soon enough in September to re-open the correspondence. I am Sir, yours respectfully,

WILLIAM HENRY HOLYOAK.

Sea Side,
10th March, 1876.

Mr. Holyoak. Dear Sir.—Your letter of the 6th inst. has been forwarded to me from Birmingham, and as it is calculated to create an artificial version of the facts, I cannot refrain from making the following remarks.

1.—I have not acknowledged that "my memory has been refreshed as to the origin of this correspondence, and the contemplated debate." The refreshment of my memory related to an incident which explained how you could take such a view of the origin of the debate as you did; but which had nothing to do with its real origin. The origin of the correspondence, is my own letter to Mr. Bradlaugh of the 18th ult. The origin of that letter was of many

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months' previous date, in conversations at different places. The letter itself contains evidence of this. The second sentence refers to the matter having been mentioned months before, by Mr. A. Andrew of London. I have merely been waiting for such prospects of health as would justify me in venturing upon the strain of a debate with Mr. Bradlaugh.

Please, therefore, to understand that my acknowledgment of refreshment of memory refers to the origin of your misconception, and not to the origin of the proposed debate; also that I do deny that you in Leicester were the first movers in the matter. I am the first mover in the matter, as the result of the suggestions spread over a considerable antecedent period. You have come to consider yourselves as the first movers, by an incident which I have admitted excuses you; but which I deny constitutes the origin of the matter.

2.—It strikes me as somewhat absurd, for you to talk of ineffectual attempts to bring Mr. Bradlaugh and me together, seeing that I have offered to meet Mr. Bradlaugh in Birmingham, and that Mr. Bradlaugh has left it with you to decide whether the meeting shall be there or not. You have simply to decide to bring us together in Birmingham, and the thing is done. Your saying you have nothing to do with Birmingham, does not dispose of the fact that Mr. Bradlaugh has left the decision in your hands.

3.—The facts are, as you say, exceedingly simple. I am prepared to meet Mr. Bradlaugh in Birmingham and have sent him a proposal to that effect. Mr. Bradlaugh says he leaves it with you, and you interpose yourself as an obstacle. If I could be sure you are in this acting by Mr. Bradlaugh's instructions, I should be tempted to doubt Mr. Bradlaugh's reputation for courage; but having no evidence that it is so, I refrain from drawing a conclusion.

4.—The lateness of the date proposed by me, is no reason for deferring the decision. That lateness is a necessity, apart from the condition of my health. My engagements are generally filled-up six months in advance; and if we don't arrange now, it will be difficult for me to arrange at the time you mention. Another consideration is, that the Birmingham Town Hall is so well occupied that we should stand a poor chance of engaging it, unless we did so several months ahead.

But you say you "have nothing to do with Birmingham." Consequently, early or late, we could have no object in re-opening the correspondence with reference to a discussion to take place in that town. I must, therefore, appeal direct to Mr. Bradlaugh, which I do by this post.

Respectfully yours,

ROBERT ROBERTS.

SEA SIDE,

10th March, 1876.

MR. BRADLAUGH. DEAR SIR.—In a final letter forwarded from Birmingham, Mr. Holyoak writes me that he has nothing to do with Birmingham, and no interest in the discussion taking place there. This compels me to appeal direct to yourself in the matter.

My proposal for the debate with you had reference to Birmingham, and I must ask you to nominate some gentleman in that place who will be interested in forwarding arrangements on your behalf; unless you would prefer to communicate directly with me yourself, which would be more satisfactory. Yours respectfully,

ROBERT ROBERTS.

HUMBERSTONE GATE, LEICESTER,

19th March, 1876.

ROBERT ROBERTS, Esq. DEAR SIR.—Mr. Bradlaugh has forwarded me your letter of the 10th inst. And lest you should deem me wanting in courtesy, I acknowledge yours of the 10th inst to myself, and in doing so, take the opportunity of reviewing the case as it stands, or as it appears to me.

I was anxious, upon hearing it announced publicly before a large audience here "that you were prepared to meet Mr. Bradlaugh in public debate, upon the question, 'Is the Bible true?'" to bring about such debate if possible, and I waited upon the gentleman who made the announcement, for that purpose. This, sir, I take to be the first action in this matter. This was in January, and on the 31st Mr. B. communicated to me his consent.

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Your first letter upon the subject bears date February 18th, in which you state in reference to the place where the debate should take place, "the majority of my friends would prefer Birmingham: I presume this would not be objectionable to you, but in this you will speak your mind." Mr. Bradlaugh has spoken his mind—and having left the matter in my hands, I—being the first who communicated with him upon the subject, do most decidedly object to your presumption in fixing upon Birmingham.

I acknowledge that I may—and I think rightly—be an "obstacle" in the way of the debate taking place in any town, until we have had the satisfaction or opportunity of hearing it in the town where the announcement was made. If anything can be done towards this end, I will willingly work. If not I will have nothing to do with it, and can only conclude that you were not prepared. But if you say "I shall be prepared between now and the end of the year to meet Mr. Bradlaugh in Leicester," I will consider it settled, and shall be glad to be informed thereof. I am, Sir, yours respectfully,

WILLIAM HENRY HOLYOAK.

SEA SIDE,

24th March, 1876.

Mr. HOLYOAK, DEAR SIR.—Yours is forwarded to me. I have already expressed my mind on the contents of your note. Having nothing to add, our correspondence must now close.

I address Mr. Bradlaugh direct by this post. Respectfully yours,

ROBERT ROBERTS.

64, BELGRAVE ROAD, BIRMINGHAM,

25th March, 1876.

Mr. BRADLAUGH. DEAR SIR.—I pray you to pardon me for troubling you again, but it seems necessary.

My correspondence with Mr. Holyoak has become inextricably complicated by the unofficial action of one of my friends having associated Leicester with my proposal of debate with you. I have, therefore, closed the correspondence, and begin *de novo*, by placing directly before you the proposal I make, which I beg the favour of your accepting or declining directly to myself as the laws of courtesy require.

I offer to meet you in Birmingham for six nights, in support of the affirmation that the Bible is the authentic and reliable record of Divine revelation.

Until you accept the proposal in this general form, I need not say more, but remain, Yours respectfully,

ROBERT ROBERTS.

P.S.—I am at the sea-side, at this writing, but head my letter with my permanent address, which will always find me.

To this letter no answer was received.

The following note meanwhile appeared on the cover of the *Christadelphian*. It is re-published here as presenting Mr. Roberts' reason for pressing for Birmingham.

"N.—The discussion with Bradlaugh seems likely to fall through owing to that gentleman's refusal, by his agent, Mr. Holyoak, to hold the discussion in Birmingham. He insists on Leicester, where his friends are numerous. This interposes a barrier on our part, since one principal object in consenting to challenge Bradlaugh was to make a discussion with him useful in delivering the truth from the imputation of infidelity, in a town where the truth is better known than in any other, as the result of many years' proclamation, but in which nevertheless, it has that prejudice to encounter. A discussion with Bradlaugh would be a great effort for our peculiar physical liabilities; and we should not feel justified in venturing upon it without some commensurate object such as we have mentioned. In any other town but Birmingham, unless it be London, we should fail to realise sufficient incentive; for we have no hope of benefiting the class of minds who have embraced Secularism. Our aim would be to serve the truth. Having to serve it in many ways we cannot afford to incur the physical risk of an encounter with Bradlaugh without

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tangible prospect of good service. Hence our proposal for Birmingham, which Mr. Holyoak declines. If the proposal fall through, we may publish the correspondence."

The following note appeared in the *National Reformer*, of March 26th, among "Answers to Correspondents."

"R. Roberts, Birmingham.—Having in consequence of the action of your own friend placed the matter in the hands of the Leicester Secular Society, we decline to withdraw our authority. Our health does not permit us to engage personally in a lengthy correspondence."

To this, the following answer was sent:—

64, BELGRAVE ROAD, BIRMINGHAM,
6th April, 1876.

MR. BRADLAUGH. DEAR SIR.—I have only seen for the first time to-day your note in the *National Reformer*, in answer to my letter. I am not a reader of the *Reformer*, but a friend has handed me the issue of March 26th, containing the note in question.

I write to say that I do not propose a correspondence, lengthy or otherwise. I wish you merely to say "Yes" or "No:" will you meet me for a six nights' debate in Birmingham or London on the subject named? Your friends in Birmingham can arrange the details. Awaiting your answer, respectfully yours,

ROBERT ROBERTS.

To this letter, Mr. Bradlaugh sent no reply, but inserted the following note in the *Reformer*.—"R. Roberts, Birmingham.—We really cannot take the matter out of the hands of the Leicester Secular Society."

Mr. Bradlaugh was advertised to lecture in Birmingham on Sunday, April 9th. On that date, Mr. F. Hodgkinson of Peterboro', visiting Birmingham, and observing the fact, expressed a curiosity to see and hear Mr. Bradlaugh. This led to conversation which resulted in a proposal, accepted by Mr. Hodgkinson, that he should attend Mr. Bradlaugh's meeting, and if an opportunity offered, propose a six nights' discussion in Birmingham. Mr. Hodgkinson did so, and at the close of the meeting, being invited to the platform, he read the following written authority:

64, BELGRAVE ROAD, BIRMINGHAM,
9th April, 1876.

I hereby authorise Mr. Frank Hodgkinson, the bearer of this note, to state in Mr. Bradlaugh's meeting this afternoon, that I am willing to meet Mr. Bradlaugh in Birmingham for six night's debate on the subject:

"Are the Scriptures the Authentic and Reliable Records of Divine Revelation?"

ROBERT ROBERTS.

Mr. Bradlaugh said the challenge having first been delivered in Leicester, he was in duty bound not to disappoint the people there; but he was willing to make this compromise - to have two nights in Leicester and four nights in Birmingham. After the meeting, Mr. Hodgkinson communicated with Mr. Roberts, and sent the following letter to Mr. Bradlaugh, having it placed, by a messenger, in the hands of the chairman of Mr. Bradlaugh's evening meeting, the same day.

64, BELGRAVE ROAD, BIRMINGHAM,
9th April, 1876.

C. BRADLAUGH, Esq. DEAR SIR.—Mr. Roberts accepts your compromise, but with regret that you insist upon a division. Will you inform Mr. Holyoak, and also appoint someone here with whom the arrangements in detail can be made for the two nights in Leicester and four nights in Birmingham? Mr. Roberts accedes to this plan reluctantly, but submits rather than the discussion should fall through. Please reply to me at "Norman Cross, Peterborough."

Yours truly,
FRANK HODGKINSON.

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"THE NATIONAL REFORMER," 29, TURNER STREET, COMMERCIAL ROAD, LONDON, E.

10th April, 1876.

FRANK HODGKINSON, Esq. DEAR SIR.—Mine is not a compromise; it is an insistance of right. I did not challenge at Leicester; I was challanged there. Mr. W. H. Holyoak will arrange for the two nights' debate at Leicester, and when the dates for these are fixed, Mr. C. C. Cattell, 29, Snow Hill, Birmingham, will be authorised by me to arrange for four further nights at Birmingham. One thing tell Mr. Roberts, that I cannot have a long date. I am ready to debate in May, June, or July. If Mr. Roberts is engaged for these months let him renew his challenge later. I always make lectures give way to debates, but I will not fix a far off date as I might find it bind me inconveniently.

Any further correspondence please address to W. H. Holyoak, as I have not the leisure to make any personal arrangements. Yours sincerely,

C. BRADLAUGH.

Forwarded by W. H. Holyoak, 45, Humberstone Gate, Leicester.

On the receipt of this letter, Mr. Hodgkinson and Mr. Bradlaugh's agents went to work, and arrangements were finally made for the holding of the discussion, in the Temperance Halls of Leicester and Birmingham, on June 13th, 14th, 15th; 20th, 21st and 22nd.

The discussion was largely attended throughout. The report is from the notes of short-hand writers who were engaged for the discussion—revised by the speakers.

Towards the close of the discussion Mr. Bradlaugh sold his interest in the report to Mr. Hodgkinson, who now publishes the same, in conjunction with Mr. Roberts, who avails himself of the opportunity thus secured, of adding a review of the discussion, for the notice of some things in Mr. Bradlaugh's speeches there was no time to notice during the discussion, and for the supply of some things on the affirmative side, he was obliged from the same cause to omit. That the cause of impartiality may not suffer, Mr. Roberts will offer Mr. Bradlaugh the opportunity of writing a rejoinder to his review, for publication in the same pamphlet.

Readers will be in a better position to judge of the debate than hearers. Mr. Bradlaugh's loud voice and animated delivery, made an impression which it may be found his arguments fail to sustain On the other hand, the arguments on behalf of the Bible may be found to have more weight than they seemed to have in the heat of controversy.

The issue debated is the most important of the questions that engage public attention. The discussion is published, not as an exhaustive, or even a moderately thorough canvass of the subject, but merely as a passing contribution to its consideration, which may help to draw to the subject some of the attention which it ought to receive at the hands of rational men.

Birmingham, 27*th June*, 1876. ROBERT ROBERTS.

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SIX NIGHTS' DISCUSSION.

First Night,

TUESDAY, 13th JUNE, 1876,

IN THE TEMPERANCE HALL, LEICESTER.

THE CHAIR WAS OCCUPIED BY MR. W. STANYON OF LEICESTER.

THE CHAIRMAN having stated the order of proceedings, and asked the meeting to restrain the manifestation of their feelings, he called upon Mr. Roberts to open the Debate.

Mr. ROBERTS: Mr. Chairman, Ladies, and Gentlemen,—I would not have been so bold as to encounter a man of Mr. Bradlaugh's ability had it not been for two things—a persuasion of the invulnerable strength of the cause which I have to maintain this evening, and a deep sense of the unspeakable consequence of the matter to be debated; and perhaps I ought to add a third—a conception of the duty that rests upon everybody holding the convictions which I represent, to avail themselves of every opportunity of impressing those convictions upon others. With regard to the first of these points, there may, probably, be a great many here present who will not agree with me; with regard to the second, I should scarcely think there can be present one who will say that it is unimportant whether or no there be a hope of a better life for mankind than they have now, whether there is or is not ever to be a better state of things upon the earth than there is at the present time. I will not waste much time in discussing that point: all will agree that the question is one of vital moment, and, if my side of the question be the right one, then we have a good matter to realise—a matter so good as to justify the rapturous exclamation which we find in the Scriptures, "How beautiful are the feet of them that preach the gospel of peace!" while, if the position represented by Mr. Bradlaugh be the right one, the skull, cross-bones, coffins, dust, corruption, despair, brood over the entire prospects of every man who has ever lived upon earth, or ever will live. The real question to which I have to address myself is the first one—the question as to whether or no the position I represent, be of the invulnerable strength which I assert it to be; and upon that I feel no quailing. There is no test that can be applied to the Scriptures but will yield the one result which I shall seek to make manifest to your understanding, whether we regard it in the light of the circumstances that ought to exist in the world if the Bible be true; or with respect to the historic harmony that ought to subsist between this book, if it be true, and the records of mankind; or in the light of its intrinsic character; whether we consider the character of its histories; whether we consider the nature of its prophecies in relation to the accomplished history of man; whether we consider it with regard to the sentiment that animates it from begining to end, we cannot fail, by a logical construction of the facts of the case, to arrive at the conclusion that the Bible is no human production. Upon all these points I have every confidence in being able to make manifest the justice of my contention—that is, that these Scriptures are the authentic and the reliable records of Divine revelation.

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But we must proceed by stages. I have but one fear—and perhaps before the discussion is concluded you will see how well-founded that fear is—that I shall be unable to crowd into a six nights' debate the host of arguments, the mass of evidence, which I can adduce in support of the proposition which I stand here to affirm. I must be content to do what is possible, and, in a hurried, condensed, and sketchy way, to rehearse before you the reasons, which I am convinced must be regarded as conclusive in favour of my affirmation by any logical mind acquainted with all the facts, and taking time enough, under a sense of the importance characterising the subject, to consider those facts. I shall divide the argument into six sections, corresponding with the six nights during which we shall be together. I shall contend to-night that the state of affairs now existing in the world is in harmony with the view that the Bible is the Word of God, and inconsistent with the notion that it is the production of ignorant and fanatical men. Further, to-night I will try to show that, if there is a book circulating among men whose authenticity can be demonstrated, it is this entire volume. I confine not my remarks to the writings of the apostles. I apply it also to the writings of the prophets and Moses himself, notwithstanding all the perverse erudition that has been brought to bear in our age to try to displace Moses from the confidence of the people. But I will say, and perhaps ought to say, before proceeding, that while entertaining that strong view, there is some pity to be entertained for men in Mr. Bradlaugh's position, because there are circumstances that justify, or appear upon the surface to justify, the conclusion to which they have come. There is a dark, a corrupt, an inhuman, a degraded, a dreadful, history to look back upon during the past eighteen centuries, and, if you make the Bible responsible for that history, you have a good argument against it; but it will not require a very extensive argument to show that there is no connection between the corruptions of Papal domination in Europe and these holy oracles. There is also extant in the world, and established under many circumstances of influence and importance, a set of docrines which, if true—which, if the teaching of the Bible, I grant would also constitute a difficulty in receiving them, and might justify the unbelievers in the position which they have assumed. I will then, on the second night—which will be to-morrow night—contend that the unquestionable facts connected with the establishment of Christianity in the world in the first century, including the history and the character of Christ, are incapable of being explained on any rational principle, if Christ did not rise from the dead, and if the apostles were impostors. On the third night I will contend that the single case of the apostle Paul, when all the facts of his unimpeachable history are distinctly realised and logically construed, is sufficient of itself to prove the divinity of Christ, and, therefore, of the whole of the Scriptures of which the record of his case constitutes a part. On the fourth night I will contend that the literary and moral peculiarities of the Bible, the character of its sentiments, so entirely alien to the universal tendencies of human nature, Jew and Gentile; its clear, chaste, vigorous, and concise diction; its agreement one part with another throughout, notwithstanding the great intervals of time at which its different parts were composed; its perfectly artless candour in the record of facts, irrespective of the bearing of those facts for or against its main contention, are totally at variance with the supposition that the book is the production of ignorant and designing men, and proves that its production is due to that divine guidance and initiative in the writers to which both Paul and Peter, and others as well, attribute it. On the fifth night I will contend that the history of the Jewish race, particularly as involving the character and career of Moses, cannot be explained on the Freethinker's hypothesis of the Bible; but, on the contrary, is an irrefragable proof of its Divine character and authorship. On the last night I will contend that the prophecies of the Bible—so explicit, so sober, so useful in their character, being in this respect so unlike the vague, incoherent, irrational predictions of the Greek augurs and other contemporary pretenders—are an evidence of the divinity of the authorship of the Bible, an evidence which becomes simply overwhelming when we consider their fulfilment in the accomplished history of mankind.

I am not about to deny that there are difficulties; I will not deny that there are obscurities; but I do contend that those difficulties, and those obscurities, are not

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inconsistent with the main conclusion deducible from those extensive premisses which I have indicated in that synopsis of the argument for this six nights' debate. I contend that those are rather in the nature of the apparent inconsistencies which arise in all cases, and in every matter, for there is no argument, there is no question, there is no character, there is no book, there is no case, in connection with which a hostile ingenuity is not able to create apparent discrepancies, and to lay hold of, perhaps, real discrepancies on the surface, and to make an apparently successful use of them in an antagonistic sense; but I will admit this, that in all true cases the apparent anomalies, and contradictions, and discrepancies, ought to be capable of reconciliation with the main drift of the proof. In fact, this is the sort of test in every case that comes before a court of law. There are always two sides to every case, and, when argued by capable men, the argument on each side is so plausible as to bewilder the jury and disqualify them for coming to a confident conclusion; but a judicial analysis of the evidence, is able to point out that the positive proof points one way, and that the other, which points in the opposite way, can be explained in harmony with the positive evidence, though it may appear to be in contradiction to it; whereas, the other side of the question, when sifted in the same judicial and impartial manner by the judge, cannot be so explained or reconciled in harmony with the bulk of the evidence. And that is the nature of the case to-night, and throughout this entire debate, that the positive evidence is all one way. There are points of difficulty and there are obscurities, but there are no points of difficulty, there are no obscurities, which I am afraid to face. There are things which appear to be difficulties, but which, nevertheless, disappear upon a thorough examination.

I will begin the argument to-night, that is to say, at the point at which we now stand—1876. If the Bible is true, there ought to be Jews; if the Bible is true, there ought to be a corrupt Christianity as the basis of the political system of Europe. If Mr. Bradlaugh should afterwards ask me to prove these two propositions, I will; but, meanwhile, I will take them for granted: they are so self-evident to those who know the Scriptures; and, therefore, I will simply ask, Are there Jews? Is there a political Christianity in the world? With regard to the first item, at all events, no one will hesitate in the answer; the Jews exist everywhere throughout the world, in all civilised countries. You will see the importance of that point if you consider with what pointed effect Mr. Bradlaugh might have asked this question; had there been no Jews, he might have said: "In the prophecies of Jeremiah it is said, God will never make an end of the Jewish nation;" and he might have said, Where are the Jews?" The Bible does say that, and there the Jews are. So far, therefore, I contend that the state of facts is in harmony with the hypothesis that the Bible is true. And I will also contend that the continued existence of the Jewish race under the terrible circumstances which have characterised their history during the past 1,800 years was a greatly improbable thing; that a race without national organisation, without a capital, and scattered among every nation under heaven, should have continued to retain its racial identity, what a highly improbable thing! The existence of corrupt Christianity, foretold in the Scriptures, is the great fact in the European system of the present day, for what is the most conspicuous feature of that system but the one against which Mr. Bradlaugh, and many others in this country, are now directing their energies—the union of Church and State? They are aiming to procure the separation of Church and State. Why, that very endeavour is evidence of the correspondence between the theory of the Bible's truth and the existing state of facts, in so far as the Bible's prophecies require such a system to exist in the present day. We may at a later stage of the discussion, have to look at this matter a little more closely; but meanwhile, it is sufficient as a starting point to show that the existing state of things in the world is such as it ought to be on the hypothesis of the Bible being the Word of God.

Let us now go backwards, and ask whether there is evidence of the authenticity of these books; and I will take the last part of the Bible in the first part of the argument, because, if I establish the argument with regard to the last part, I establish it with regard to the first, though I will argue the first also upon its separate merits. The writings of the apostles: are they the writings of the apostles? I do not know exactly what position Mr. Bradlaugh will take upon this question; and, therefore, so far as he is concerned, I must argue somewhat in the

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dark; but nevertheless, with regard to the main question, there need be no difficulty; and there is none. The evidence is so extensive upon the point, that it is difficult to condense it into the few sentences that remain of my half-hour. Nevertheless, it is capable of being condensed in a forcible manner. I will not waste time in arguing that the Bible was not produced last century, or a thousand years ago. Mr. Bradlaugh—or, at all events, the party he represents—have abandoned their first theory of the question, that is to say they now no longer contend that the Bible is a monkish production of the fourth and fifth centuries, for literary labours have exhumed book after book, document after document, and the investigation of them has been conducted with such complete effect as to dissipate the possibility of such a theory being sustained, and to prove that the second part of the Bible was produced in the beginning of the Christian era, and the first part in the ages antecedent to that, at the several times at which it professes to have been produced. Let me give you a specimen of the kind of evidence I am referring to. There are the writings of Tertullian, a writer of the second century. In the middle of the second century, he takes cognisance of the fact that these books were in circulation at that time, under the several names which they now bear, and among the people to whom they purport to have been originally addressed. He says:

"Come now, thou who desirest better to exercise thy curiosity in that which relates to thy salvation. Go through the apostolic churches, in which the chairs of the apostles preside in their places, in which their authentic letters are recited, resounding the voice and representing the face of each one. Is Achaia near thee? thou hast Corinth. If thou art not far from Macedonia, thou hast Philippi, thou hast Thessalonica. If thou canst direct thy course into Asia, thou hast Ephesus. But if thou art near Italy, thou hast Rome, whence authority is ready at hand for us also."

Now, that takes you back to the middle of the second century—that is to say, if you credit Tertullian, as I presume you will, for I do not suppose that Mr. Bradlaugh will call in question the authenticity of that deliverance of Tertullian written in the second century; I say that it takes us back to that period of time from which we look back to an even earlier time, when it was a matter of common notoriety that there were present at Philippi, Corinth, and other cities, where they were then in circulation, letters of Paul which were at that time recognised as having been written by Paul. But we can go further back than that, for there is a genuine letter extant of one Clement of Rome, who is claimed by the Roman Catholic Church to have been the first Pope; we need not consider that, because Clement did not consider himself a Pope, and he was not one. But he wrote a letter to the Corinthian Church. These were troublous times for those who professed the faith of Christ; it subjected them to all the evils to which men can possibly be subjected; and the Corinthians, suffering also from disagreements amongst themselves, wrote to Clement of Rome, the Clement referred to by Paul in his letter to the Romans, asking his advice how they should do. Now, in his letter—which I have with me here, if it be at all doubted, and I think the date of this letter of Clement's is somewhere about the end of the first century; I do not remember the year exactly, but it was before the century was out—he says to the Corinthians, "Ye have Paul's letter; ye know what he says there," and he also makes a quotation from the letter to the Romans, which Paul addressed to that community. That is to say, within forty years of the time that Paul is alleged to have written the letters, these documents are, by the evidence I am now adducing, proved to have been in circulation amongst those to whom they profess to have been written, and to have been owned by them as the production of the apostle Paul. Now, the force of that argument will be very apparent to those who are acquainted with the nature of the epistle to the Corinthians particularly, for it is a document in which Paul does not speak very complimentarily about them. In it, he tells them they are carnal and walking as men.—(1 Cor. iii. 3.) He says to them in 1st Corinthians xi. 22: "What? have ye not houses to eat and to drink in? or despise ye the Church of God, and shame them that have not? What shall I say to you? shall I praise you in this? I praise you not." And in his second epistle to the same Church he speaks to them in the same terms of disagreeable admonition: "Have I committed an offence in abasing myself that ye [Corinthians] might be exalted, because I have preached to you the gospel of God freely? I robbed other churches, taking wages of them, to do

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you service. And when I was present with you, and wanted, I was chargeable to no man; for that which was lacking to me the brethren which came from Macedonia supplied; and in all things I have kept myself from being burdensome unto you, and so will I keep myself."—(2 Corinthians xi. 7-9.) Now, the fact that a letter to a community that is condemned in it is still owned by that community as an authentic document, written to them by the alleged writer, is the strongest proof that it is authentic. Imagine a parallel case: suppose Mr. Bradlaugh writes a letter to some Secularist Society, blowing them up for some course they are taking, and they treasure this letter amongst their archives as a thing precious to be preserved, and forty years afterwards it is found in their hands, every member of them consenting to the proposition that that was Mr. Bradlaugh's letter; would that not be evidence of the fact that Mr. Bradlaugh had written it? This is the kind of evidence that exists in this particular case, as applicable not only to this letter to the Corinthians, but to the other letters of the apostles. The authenticity of the Four Gospels is proved in the same way. I think it is Justin Martyr, in a book addressed to the Roman Emperor of the day, in his *Apology* for Christianity, that alludes to them in a form of speech, which clearly identifies the Four Gospels as being that to which he is alluding. Origen, I think, also alludes to the Four Gospels. There are other contemporary allusions of the same description, which I refer to merely to show this—that the gospels have a sufficient contemporary recognition to commend them to our confidence, so far as such recognition can do so; for when we come to the merits of the thing itself, when we come to look into the constitution of the New Testament, we do not require any outside evidence whatever. I require it not for my own individual conviction, but nevertheless people are generally more susceptible to impression from these foreign sources than from the nature of the thing itself. The allusions I am now referring to are evidence that in the beginning of the Christian era the letters of Paul and the Four Gospels were in circulation amongst those who knew whether or no they were authentic documents.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: The proposition which Mr. Roberts has undertaken to prove in this debate is, that "the Scriptures are the authentic and reliable records of Divine revelation;" and, so far as this debate is concerned, you have nothing whatever to do with what persons of Mr. Bradlaugh's class may have urged at some other time, the more especially as there would be probably great difference of opinion as to who were the proper people to put in under that designation, and we should only be entering into a collateral debate, which would have nothing to do with the real question at issue. I will ask Mr. Roberts to be kind enough, in every text he quotes, to give me chapter and verse, because it will be convenient both to myself and to the audience. We have only had one loose reference to Jeremiah, and I have been wandering a little through the book, finding some things, perhaps, Mr Roberts won't think applicable, but which I shall have to use, if they suit me, in the course of this debate. Then I ask him also, if he quotes an author outside the Bible, to be good enough not to say "abont" the time he lived, because on that we shall have great difference of opinion, but to state the time he thinks he did live, and the authorities upon which he bases that statement, because it is for him to produce his witnesses, and for him to verify them. Next I will ask him when he says Justin Martyr says this, or Origen says that, to be kind enough to refer me to the particular work, to the particular book, to the particular chapter, and, if it have sections, to the particular section; and, if it be a book that don't happen to be translated in English, to the particular version, because there will be a misfortune about some of his witnesses, that they don't always say the same things in different versions and languages; and, if he is right in his representation of Justin Martyr, I am most unfortunate, because no edition of Justin Martyr I have ever read has got a solitary word capable of the construction he has put upon it. Of course, it is possible that Mr. Roberts may quote to me some particular book of Justin Martyr's that I have overlooked, and it would be my duty to look it up in such a case; but if he simply uses round words, without giving express statements, I must say that his witnesses are too general even to be touched; and, when he talks of "contemporary writers," will he permit me to suggest that Clement of Rome, Origen, and Justin Martyr are very awkward instances of contemporary authors? Now, these are only little points; but still, if we understand what we mean about them as we go along, it will very

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much clear the way. Now the burden of the proof lies upon Mr. Roberts. He has not told us—although what he has undertaken to prove is that the Scriptures are the authentic and reliable records of Divine revelation—even what he means by the Scriptures. I shall assume, for the purposes of this debate, that he means the ordinary authorised English version, beginning with the Book of Genesis, and ending with the Book of Revelation; and supposing that should not happen to be right—because it may turn out to be wrong—then I will ask my antagonist, Mr. Roberts, to kindly explain to us what else he means; and, if he means anything else but this, why he means something else, and why we are to reject this version, and why we should take something else. I heard him say something about "perverse erudition," but as I make no pretensions to special learning, I shall, therefore, try to confine myself as nearly as I can to authors that are entirely within the reach of all of us; but I ask Mr. Roberts not to refrain, on account of my ignorance, from going to any learned author he likes. It is my duty to be prepared to examine every witness he offers. Then having assumed that those (pointing to the English Bible) are the Scriptures, I will ask what is meant—because he did not tell us—by the words "Divine Revelation," and I may say at once that I have never contended, that I do not contend, and I do not know any decently-educated man who does contend, that the whole of this Bible is the work either of "ignorant and fanatical" men, or, to use his other phrase, of "ignorant and designing" men. On the contrary, the contention that I should submit to you would be that the Bible, like many other books, is a collection of the works of different men in different ages, many of the earlier books in it being simply collections of, or collections founded on the works of still earlier writers, differing with the ages out of which they grew and with the men whose ideas more or less accurately we get in some of them; added to, curtailed, interlined, abbreviated, augmented, according to the fashions and whims and myths and superstitions of the different ages through which they have come down to us; and I do not pretend that at any particular date some class of ignorant and designing men forged a whole book, which they called the Bible, for the purpose of deceiving the people; such would simply be an absurd contention. If Mr. Roberts will address himself to the proving what lies on him, and not to the answering of what I do not urge, it will save a great deal of time. Now, the question assumes the existence of a Deity capable of making a revelation; and if I were not content, for the purpose of this debate, to assume this, I should not be here; but, as I happen to be an Atheist—although for the purposes of this debate I am quite content to assume a divinity capable of making a revelation—it is necessary I should be told what attributes are claimed for that Deity. Now, Mr. Roberts has refrained from saying a word on that subject. While he alleges that it is Divine revelation, he has not told us what he means by "Divinity," and clearly all people do not agree on that; the Mahomedans and Buddhists have a different view from Mr. Roberts. It is not simply myself, but out of the fourteen hundred millions of people in the world, probably thirteen hundred millions, and some ninety-nine millions and a few odd thousands, would have a different view from that put forward by Mr. Roberts, so that it is necessary that he should tell us what attributes he attributes to the Deity; and I shall, for the purpose of this debate, attribute to the Deity the following attributes; and if Mr. Roberts objects to any of them, he is perfectly entitled to strike any of them out if he will kindly say why, and give you the attributes he prefers—omnipotence, all-goodness, omnipresence, omniscience, including in this foreknowledge, immutability, infinity, eternity, personality. Now, if any of those attributes are objectionable, I shall be glad to hear Mr. Roberts strike out those he thinks wrong. I should not have ventured to state them at all if Mr. Roberts had fulfilled his duty at the commencement. And then I say, that that book cannot be a divine revelation which in any of its contents contradicts any one of those attributes. I say, if I find within the four corners of this book anything contradicting specifically any one of those attributes, I say that then the book as a whole—because it is as a whole that we are dealing with it—ceases to be capable of proof by Mr. Roberts as the divine revelation he pretends. I am not using the word "pretend" in any unfair sense, but simply as meaning the contention he is bound to maintain. Then I say that a divine revelation ought not to be self-contradictory, and if in addition, or if, having failed in showing that it contradicts the attributes, I show that the book is in any

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portion of it self-contradictory, I say that then I destroy its claim to be considered a divine revelation. Now, on this, it is possible that the contention Mr. Roberts foreshadowed may arise. He says he will admit, if I understood him rightly, that hostile ingenuity may perhaps lay hold of real contradictions on the surface. Well, now, I should submit to you that, *primâ facie*, that book cannot be a revelation from God to man, from which hostile ingenuity to a simple mind may show what would be by that hostile ingenuity sufficient contradiction to compel the simple mind to reject it; I say that it ought not to need the acute brain of a gentleman like Mr. Roberts to explain God's revelation; that God Himself ought to have made it quite clear if He intended its reception, and that there ought not to be any contradictions either on the surface or anywhere else. Well, then, I submit to you that contradiction on the surface is a contradiction, and that adding the words "on the surface" do not make it any less a contradiction; and, then, if I should be told that that simply means that it is a contradiction on the surface of the English, but if you go to some other language it is to be explained away, then I will ask Mr. Roberts whether any sort of penalty attaches in his mind to the reception or rejection of divine revelation, and, if so, in what language the penalty is going to be inflicted? because it is extremely awkward; take it that there are are in the world some eighty millions of people, in round numbers, speaking English; supposing it requires a knowledge of some other language instead of English to comprehend the revelation, and to get rid of the inconsistencies, it is extremely awkward for those who have been born to speak English, and that would of itself seem a fatal objection against the possibility of the book being a revelation; that God should have sent it in one language, while He requires it to be believed in another. And I will ask Mr. Roberts also to tell us—because he has, although telling us to-night he should deal with the present time, he has gone 1,600 or 1,700 years back in a jump—I will ask him to tell us, for my guidance, what he considers to be the original language of each of the books; the date at which he considers each of the books respectively to have been revealed, and to whom, and the evidence in support of each of those propositions. Then I will urge to you, supposing we get over those little points, that a Divine revelation ought not to be inconsistent with itself, and ought not to be inconsistent with science, and that such inconsistencies exist will be the case that I shall try to make out. Now, in the speech which we have just listened to, there are one or two points, not of argument, because it appears to me that my friend had overlooked, so far as the opening speech was concerned, what was the subject of debate. He addressed some few words, which might have been appropriate (supposing they had been substantiated) to the question. Did the Four Gospels and the writings of the apostles exist in the second century? But I heard nothing that was appropriate to anything else, and that would only be a very limited stage of the inquiry. He said something about "If Mr. Bradlaugh's views be correct, skull, crossbones, and corruption brood over everybody." Well, now, that solemn absurdity scarcely frightened me. At first I did not know which of my views Mr. Roberts was referring to, for I have expressed views on a great many subjects. I have some views on politics, I have some views on political economy, and it did occur to me that what we were to debate was, not what are Mr. Bradlaugh's views in general, but the proposition: "Are the Scriptures the Authentic and Reliable Records of Divine Revelation?" So that although the skull, and crossbones, and corruption, may have some remote reference to Mr. Bradlaugh's views when they are under debate, I will submit to you the only views of Mr. Bradlaugh that Mr. Roberts has a right to deal with in this discussion, are those I put forward on this platform, and no others. Mr. Roberts has been good enough to state, and I thank him for the frankness of the admission, that there should be historic harmony, if the Bible be true, between records purporting to be historic in this book, and the records, so far as we can get them, of humanity; and I shall ask Mr. Roberts to show that there is such harmony especially in relation to the records of the Egyptians; and I will ask him whether it is not admitted, by nearly every person with a pretence to scholarship, that the Hebrew chronology is so sadly deficient that it does not make allowance within many centuries for the period necessary for verified Egyptian civilization. This is one point to which I will ask Mr. Roberts to direct his attention. Then Mr. Roberts appeals to the sentiment which, he says, animates the book from

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beginning to end. Will he kindly tell me what that sentiment is, for I avow I do not know. I am ready to show that there are, at least, fifty contradictory sentiments. I will show you a sentiment of mercy, a sentiment of cruelty, a sentiment of love, a sentiment of hatred, a sentiment of freedom, a sentiment of slavery, a sentiment in favour of monarchy, and a sentiment against it; and I ask, therefore, for some kind of clue to what Mr. Roberts means. I do not pretend that he has not got a clear meaning in his own mind; I only want to know what it is, so that I may fairly reply to it. Mr. Roberts says that his reasons are such as ought to convince any logical mind. Well, that is a great comfort, because there are certainly some logical minds in the audience, and when we hear the reasons, you will be able to judge them. And then he occupied some time about what he was going to do during the six nights. I shall confine myself to that alone to-night, because it will save us a considerable waste of time; and what he undertook to prove to-night was that the state of affairs now existing in the world is consistent with the view that the Bible is a revelation from God, and not the work of ignorant and fanatical men. Now, I do not contend it is the work of ignorant and fanatical men. And, next I contend that the whole of the rest is utterly irrelevant until Mr. Roberts has explained to us what he means by divine revelation, and all about it. Then Mr. Roberts says there is some pity to be felt for me in my position. Well, now that is very kind. I always like a nice feeling to exist with anybody with whom I come in contact. It is the first time I have met with Mr. Roberts. Pity is akin to love, and no one knows but what the extension of the feeling of pity may so influence him that he may become a member of the National Secular Society. But an ounce of evidence is worth two tons of pity, and we have not yet had the ounce. And then he says that certain things are not explicable on the Freethinker's hypothesis. It will be time enough for Mr. Roberts to take the Freethinker's hypothesis from me in this debate, and not manufacture a man of straw for the purpose of killing it; it will save a great waste of time. Then he urges that there are difficulties and obscurities which may exist. "Difficulties and obscurities" in God's revelation to human kind! Could God have prevented those difficulties and obscurities, and made them clearer, or could He not? And, then, I will also ask him, so that I may not be misled, chapter and verse, to kindly give me a list of the difficulties and obscurities. I will then not need to press upon them at all. I am sure, with that frankness which characterises every one who wants to believe in the Bible as a Divine revelation, now that Mr. Roberts has told you there are difficulties and obscurities, he will have no hesitation in giving a list of them. Then I will ask him, when he has given that list, to tell us in each case whether he could have made it more clear. If he cannot, then I will ask him whether that is not a fatal difficulty at once; and if he says "Yes," I will ask him how he holds that an All-wise and Omnipotent God has given us an obscure revelation, which he (Mr. Roberts) could have made clearer. Then he says that the positive evidence is all one way; with that I am quite agreed; the only difficulty is, we are disagreed as to on which side that evidence is to be found. And then there is another difficulty, that we do not understand the word "evidence" in the same way. Mr. Roberts, having to prove something about the state of affairs now existing, quotes, with extreme looseness, Tertullian, and Clement of Rome, and Justin Martyr. Well, that may be some evidence when we get to what it is. But if he were to confine himself to-night to the state of affairs now existing, I don't know what relation it bears to the matter. Then, he says, the Jews exist, and Jeremiah says something about them; Jeremiah says a good many things about them; he says something about the prophets prophesying falsely and telling lies. In the 23rd of Jeremiah you will find a great deal about the prophets lying. Will my friend tell me how much of the prophecies are lies, and how I am to distinguish the lies from the truth, and separate them? Well, then, I want to know why the Jews existing should be more evidence to the truth of the Bible, than the Mahomedans existing to the truth of the Koran, or the Brahmins existing for their sacred books, or the Buddhists for theirs. I do not say that the argument is utterly irrelevant, but fail to appreciate its relevancy for the moment. Well, then, he says, if the Bible be true, there ought to be corrupt Christians. Well, I shall be obliged if he will give me the exact chapter and verse on which he relies, show me the exact date at which he thinks that

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chapter and verse came out, and then leave me to deal with them. And then he talks about the writings of the apostles? and says "Are they the writings of the apostles? and says Mr. Bradlaugh's class have abandoned their first contention, that the book is a monkish production of the fourth and fifth centuries. Well, I never made that contention yet. I will tell you what I have said: that, as far as the Hebrew Bible is concerned, the whole work of the Massorah, which gives the Bible its meaning in that language to-day, cannot be carried back to a date earlier than about that period. But that is a very different thing from saying that the whole Bible is a monkish production of the fourth and fifth centuries; and I have never abandoned that, and scholarship has never refuted it, and I am ready to prove it. But there is a great deal to be done before we get to that; Mr. Roberts has got to make out some revelation to be challenged, and he has not yet presented any at all. Then he has vaguely referred you to Tertullian. Now I object to vague references, because I am prepared to show you, from the writings of Origen, which have been quoted in the same loose fashion, that, if Origen be true, the Scriptures cannot be true, for that Origen makes statements with reference to Bible facts which are not to be found in any page of the Bible at all. I did not dream that we were to have the apostolic fathers to-night; but I may also say that we have not had them, for the references have been so funny, that I have been puzzled as to what was meant. For example, the letter of Clement of Rome has been put to you. Why, Mr. Roberts well knows that the whole of the writings attributed to Clement of Rome, whether his first epistle or second, have all been challenged; that, instead of being able to identify the author of what is called the first epistle of Clement with the person who is claimed to have been the Bishop of Rome, that there is the utmost uncertainty about it; and that in an edition of the Nicene Fathers published in the present day, that very statement is made by the editors of it. Now, I tell Mr. Roberts that I have at least taken the pains to learn the A B C of this argument; therefore, I ask him to give the chapter and verse of every author he quotes. I do not know that there is contemporary evidence of the existence of the four gospels in the alleged writings of the apostle Paul; and I say that, if there were ever so much evidence, you would not be one step nearer proving the question, "Are these Scriptures the authentic record of the Divine revelation?" You would not be near it at all; it is with the contents you have got to deal, the contents of which you have got to examine their teachings. But I urge to you that the whole of the times between the date of the alleged appearance of the writings attributed to Clement and the writings attributed to Origen are simply filled up with hosts of forgeries, are filled up with hosts of frauds, the bulk of which have had to be abandoned; and I say that state of things could not possibly have existed had there been the real and true evidence which Mr. Roberts would like to have to quote. Now, I will give him just one or two texts, and I will ask him whether, referring to Ex. xxxii. 7-14, I am to find there a fair representation of the character of Deity. The historian there states that God, having chosen Aaron as His priest, while God was choosing him, Aaron made another god for the Jews to worship; that God became angry about it, said to Moses, "Let me alone, that my wrath may wax hot against them, and that I may destroy this people;" that Moses remonstrated with God, and argued Him out of it, and then God plagued the people for making the calf that Aaron had made (verse 35). And I say again, look at chap. xxviii., verses 1, 2 and 3, and tell me whether I am to take that as a fair representation of the character of Deity; and, then, at Numb. xxiii. 19, at Sam. xv. 29, at Mal. iii. 6, which represents that God cannot repent and cannot change; and then I will draw his attention to 2 Kings xx. 1; 2 Sam. xxiv. 15, 16; Gen. vi. 6; 1 Sam. xv. 11, which show that God did repeatedly repent and change. Now, the chairman warns me that I have just got to the end of my time, and I submit to you, in concluding, that, up to the present moment, there has not been a particle of evidence of any kind advanced by Mr. Roberts in support of his proposition, nor has he given us such an explanation of it as will enable us to understand what he meant by it.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and gentlemen, I have now great pleasure in calling upon Mr. Roberts to occupy a quarter of an hour, adopting, if he likes, the Socratic method, and putting questions to Mr. Bradlaugh, and Mr. Bradlaugh at once to reply.

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MR. ROBERTS QUESTIONS MR. BRADLAUGH.

Mr. Bradlaugh, do you believe that there ever existed such a man as Jesus Christ?—I do not believe that there ever existed such a man as Jesus Christ, with the history recorded of him in the Four Gospels. It is quite possible that a man named Jesus, not having such history, may have existed.

Then, do I understand you to say that the Christ, who is the subject of the Four Gospels and of Paul's letters, is a historical myth?—I say that that which is represented as the history of Jesus in the Four Gospels and the Epistles is not the history of a real man.

Then I return to my question: do you believe that the man spoken of by Paul, for instance, who says he saw him and laid down his life for him, never existed?—Will you refer me to the exact chapter and verse?

1st Cor. xv. 8, "Last of all he was seen of me also."—I have no means of judging whether Paul wrote that or not; therefore cannot answer as to Paul.

That is the chapter and verse you asked for?—You ask me as to Paul's evidence. My answer is, that I have no means of judging whether Paul wrote that or not.

Then, do you say that the Christ Paul spoke about is a historical myth?—I don't know that I have any evidence that Paul spoke of any Christ at all. If you will refer to Corinthians, and, instead of saying Paul, say the writer of the epistle to the Corinthians, I will answer your question.

Do you believe in the authenticity of the history written by Eusebius?—I believe that Eusebius did live and write, and wrote a great many falsehoods.

Do you admit that he was the writer of the history we now have as the history of Eusebius?—Are you speaking of the volume known as Eusebius's *Ecclesiastical History?*"

I speak of his works.—Then I will ask you to specify particularly which of the works.

For my question it is not necessary to speak of any work in particular.—Then I decline to answer a general question. I will answer specifically as to each work of Eusebius I am asked about; my reason for refusing to answer generally is, that in the whole of those centuries, forged writings abounded, and I must confine my answer to the evidence that is presented.

Mr. Bradlaugh, you have admitted that Eusebius wrote?—I never denied it; it is not a question of admitting it: I believe Eusebius did live and did write.

That is my question and the answer to it. Please define to me in a sentence the principle upon which you are persuaded that Eusebius ever lived and ever wrote?—Only that in examining ordinary events, my confidence is given to the best experience of the best men, and that in the case of Eusebius I have no reason to doubt from their investigation that a man named Eusebius did live and did write, and that, in addition, he often forged.

Then I wish to ask whether the reason which you deem sufficient to justify you in believing in Eusebius and his writings does not exist as strongly, and more strongly, in the case of Paul?—No.

Do you mean to say that there is less contemporary evidence to the fact that Paul's writings were received as a literary production?—Which do you call Paul's writings?

I am now speaking of the portion of his epistles included in our common Bible?—I will ask you, then, to specify them by name.

Then I will take the first of Corinthians, for example, and I ask whether there is not the same evidence, and more evidence, in proof of the fact that Paul wrote the 1st of Corinthians than there is in proof that Eusebius wrote his "History?"—No.

What evidence have you that Eusebius wrote his "History?"—I am not here to prove that Eusebius wrote his "History;" if I were, I should be prepared to prove it.

You have admitted that you believe it; I ask you the reason of your belief?—I have told you that on all ordinary matters I am in the habit of placing my confidence in the best experience of the best men capable of judging of those occurrences, and that I have done so in the case of Eusebius.

Do you mean to say that there are no men capable of judging the same question

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with regard to Paul?—That is a very loose question. Do you mean men now or men then?

Men now and men then?—Men then I knew nothing about, and men now I refuse to accept as infallible judges.

Then whose judgment do you accept in the case of Eusebius?—I accept a fairly unbroken line of reference in writers era by era, from the time of Eusebius down to the present time for the opinion I have expressed; but my duty is not to prove that Eusebius wrote, and, therefore, I do not pretend that that which is sufficient now for my belief is sufficient testimony for other people's.

Is there not a fairly unbroken line of references to Paul from the very age of his writing?—No; there are plenty of forgeries from the earlier times which have had to be abandoned.

Will you please say what you mean by a fairly unbroken line of references?—I cannot make it any clearer.

You do not, of course, mean a reference every day?—I did not say so.

Every year?—If I had meant "every year" I should have said so. When I said "fairly unbroken," I meant allowing for the fact that, in some ages, men wrote very little, especially when Christianity was triumphant.

Then you would accept an occasional—and, comparatively speaking, remote—reference in that case?—I have not said so.

You have said that you accept Eusebius on that line of evidence; that there were intervals during which there was little writing, and yet you accept it, and, therefore, you must admit that you accept occasional references in some cases?—Of course it means occasional references.

Then say "Yes."—I am not going to say "Yes" to words you put into my mouth which I do not utter.

It describes what I mean.—But it does not describe what I mean.

You have denied that there is a fairly unbroken line of reference to the apostle Paul?—Oh no; I have denied that there is a fairly unbroken line of reference to the writings which you say are Paul's.

Then do I understand from that answer that you believe that possibly Paul wrote some other writings than these?—I do not know that my belief as to what Paul may possibly have done elsewhere has anything to do with the question.

Your belief is what I am testing.—You have a right to test my belief so far as it affects the question, and not a bit outside it.

Precisely; and that is just what I am doing; and I ask whether, in your opinion, possibly Paul wrote other writings which are not here?—I have not an opinion on the matter.

Do you mean to say that you have come to so grave a conclusion that these are not Paul's writings without forming an opinion on such a point as that?—I have not even advanced that conclusion, I think. The burden of proof lies on you. I have only to deny. I deny that you have advanced any evidence of it.

Then I ask whether you believe or deny that the 1st epistle to the Corinthians was written by the apostle Paul?—I have no evidence connecting the person whom you call the apostle Paul with that epistle.

Have you a conviction on the subject one way or other?—As a mere matter of conviction, there were so many forgeries that I am inclined to believe he had nothing to do with it; but I do not want to deny that which I have not sufficient evidence to entitle me to deny. What I do deny is, that you can bring the epistle you call the Epistle to the Corinthians within one hundred years of the date at which you say Paul lived.

Then do you mean to say that possibly we are right in believing this to have been written by Paul?—I do not know what evidence you believe it upon.

That is not my question?—I have nothing to do with the possibilities of your being right or not. What you have to do here is to prove your case.

My question is this: Is your conviction with regard to the subject of so loose a character, or are your convictions so indefinite, that possibly we may be right in believing that these are the writings of Paul?—On the contrary, my conviction is that you are entirely wrong.

Then do you deny that this was written by the apostle Paul?—I deny that I have yet

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seen any evidence to warrant me in coming to the conclusion that the person you call the apostle Paul had anything to do with it.

Have you a definite opinion on it?—If that is not definite enough I do not know the meaning of the English language.

"Yes" or "No" would be definite, and I ask yes or no, do you believe that Paul wrote the 1st epistle to the Corinthians?—No, I do not, as a mere matter of belief.

Are you in doubt about it?—No.

You have said that you are not aware of any allusion to the apostle Paul's 1st epistle to the Corinthians by any writer within a hundred years of Paul's day. I will now read you an allusion, and ask your opinion upon it. I quote from the first letter of Clement, which all competent critics admit to be genuine, though abandoning his second epistle.—I utterly deny that all competent critics admit it to be a genuine letter, and I refuse to answer a question to which that is introduced, because it is utterly untrue.

Well, it is not essential to my question; so I will not repeat it. I will read you this from a letter that is admitted by competent critics to have been written by Clement of Rome.—I beg your pardon; in my speech I positively did deny that. I said not only that there was no evidence of its having been written by Clement of Rome, but that that was practically admitted by the editors of the Ante-Nicene Fathers.

Then I read from this Letter, written, I think, about the year 83.—Will you give me the evidence that it was written about 83? I decline to answer a question which involves a date for which I have no evidence.

Then it comes to this: Mr. Bradlaugh asks me to produce an unbroken line, and when I produce it, he asks me to prove each link. Are you prepared to do that with regard to—?—With regard to everything I advance.

The allusion by Clement in the year 83 to the 1st epistle of Corinthians is as follows: "Why, then, do we rend and tear in pieces the body of Christ, and raise seditions against our own body? Your schism has perverted many; it has discouraged many; it caused diffidence in many and grief in us all, and yet the sedition continues still. *Take the epistle of the blessed Paul the apostle into your hands;* what did he first write to you in the beginning of the gospel? The truth he wrote to you by the Spirit, concerning himself and Cephas, and Apollos, because that even then ye had made divisions among yourselves." That is a correct description of the epistle as we have it.—And I deny that that is admitted by competent critics; I say part of the two epistles attributed to Clement only exist in one manuscript; that the second is abandoned by nearly all competent critics as a forgery, and that the existing evidence is the same for both.

MR. BRADLAUGH QUESTIONS MR. ROBERTS.

Do you mean by "the Scriptures," or by "these Scriptures," the authorised English version of the Bible, commencing with Genesis, and ending with Revelations?—Yes.

Do you agree that the attributes I stated in my speech for Deity are fair attributes?—Not as to one item, with the construction you put upon it.

Which is that?—All-goodness.

You think Deity is not all-good.—In the sense contended for by you, I think He is not.

Will you tell me the sense, if any, in which you would use the word "all-good?"—That His designs, judged by the long run of the thing, are "all-good," but that in the realisation of those all-good designs, there may be many measures of extremity and severity.

Do you mean for "goodness" as applied to God the same as "goodness" as applied to man?—If you will define goodness as applied to man, I will be in a position to answer.

I mean by goodness applied to man that that is good which tends to the greatest happiness of mankind, with the least injury to any of mankind.—I do not admit that definition as applicable to God.

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What definition of the word "good" will you give me, then, that is applicable to God?—The development ultimately of the highest good, He only being the judge of what that is.

Do you know what is meant by good?—I have some slight conception; but I don't govern God by my slight conceptions.

Will you give me your slight conception of it?—That He will ultimately upon the earth develop complete well-being for every person that will finally be alive, on the basis of complete obedience to and honour of Him.

Do you think He could have done that before now?—Not upon the principle He has been pleased to adopt in the development of it, which is a principle requiring the free agency of man.

On any principle could God have done that which you define as "good" before now? Yes or no? on any principle?—It is not for me to say what God could do or could not do; I merely contend for what He has done.

Do you hold that He is all-powerful?—I do.

Do you hold that He is all-wise?—I do.

Do you hold that He knew how to do what was good?—I do.

Do you hold that He could have done what was good?—I won't answer that, because it implies a case that I don't recognise.

Will you kindly give me one of the points which you consider a surface contradiction in the Bible?—Well, Solomon in the Proverbs says: "Answer not a fool according to his folly, lest thou be like unto him;" and adds immediately: "Answer a fool according to his folly, lest he be wise in his own conceit."

Will you kindly give me the evidence to connect the person you call Solomon with the book you call Proverbs?—Yes; I produce Josephus.

Which of Josephus's works are you quoting—his "*Antiquities*" or his "*Wars?*"—Both.

Do you know that Josephus, in his references to Bible matters, states many facts which are not in our Bible at all?—In matters of detail, that is correct.

Do you consider Josephus trustworthy or not?—Where he is a personal witness I consider he is.

Do you think he was a personal witness to Solomon writing the Proverbs?—He was a personal witness to the evidence which proved Solomon to have been the writer.

Will you give me a statement of the evidence which Josephus personally witnessed?—He is a witness to the fact that the book constituting the Scriptures—

That is not the question.—You don't know till I have completed my answer.

My question is: what is the evidence of which Josephus was a personal witness in relation to Solomon and the Proverbs?—My answer is: the evidence of a nation's history, of which he was a personal witness, being himself an official person in that nation before its nationality was broken up.

Are you prepared with the evidence from Josephus which verifies that he is a personal witness of any such evidence?—If you deny it, I will perhaps prove it.

Will you undertake to produce that in your first speech to-morrow night?—It may interfere with my argument.

Will you to-morrow night—Yes or no?—Oh! I have my evidence here; I do not need to wait till to-morrow night.

Will you produce it now, then?—Yes.

Then I will ask you to refer to book and section. Mind, my question is not to show that the Jews accepted the Book of Proverbs, but the evidence which you say he was a personal witness of, to justify him in making that statement.—In *Josephus against Apion*, 1st bk., 8th section, he says:—"We have not an innumerable multitude of books amongst us, disagreeing from and contradicting one another, as the Greeks have, but only twenty-two books, which contain the records of all the past times, which are justly believed to be divine, and of them, five belong to Moses, which contain his laws and the tradition of the origin of mankind till his death. This interval of time was little short of 3,000 years; but as to the time from the death of Moses to the reign of Artaxerxes, King of Persia, who reigned after Xerxes, the prophets who were after Moses wrote down what was done in their times in thirteen books. The remaining four books contain hymns to God and precepts for the conduct of human life" (including, of course, Proverbs.) "It is true our history

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hath been written since Artaxerxes very particularly, but hath not been esteemed of the like authority with the former by our forefathers, because there hath not been an exact succession of prophets since that time; and how firmly we have given credit to those books of our own nation is evident by what we do, for *during so many ages that have already past, no one has been so bold as either to add anything to them, or take anything from them, or to make any change in them.*"

Will you kindly give me that for a moment? Now, will you find me a word there which says, first, that Solomon wrote Proverbs? and next, the evidence on which Josephus makes the statement?—Solomon's name is not there, the word Proverbs is not there, but the book is there.

Now, I ask you whether you did not tell me that you had the evidence there that Josephus said that Solomon wrote Proverbs, and that Josephus was a personal witness of the evidence?—I did not say so; I said Josephus was a witness of the evidence on which that fact stands.

Then I will ask you to find from Josephus the fact that Solomon wrote Proverbs?—I produce that evidence in what I have read.

It is not in what you have read?—I will show it you. I have admitted that the name of Solomon and Proverbs is not there.

Then do you mean when a man does not mention another man, it is evidence that he thinks he wrote something?—No, I do not. The Book of Proverbs is included there.

What I have denied and what you have said was there, are two things. First, you said that Josephus was witness that Solomon wrote Proverbs: that I did not care about; next, you said that Josephus was a witness on evidence of which he had personal witness. I ask you to prove both those statements, and you prove neither. Do you abandon them or confirm them?—No, indeed, I do not abandon them; I do not affirm what you have put in my mouth.

Do you think that, although neither Proverbs nor Solomon are named in the extract, there is positive evidence, in what you have read from *Apion*, of what you said?—Yes.

That is your sort of positive evidence. Well, will you kindly now give me another instance of a contradiction which you consider a contradiction on the surface?—I did not come prepared with a list of these.

Then may I ask you whether you know anything at all of Egyptian chronology?—I know a little about it, not so much as I know about the Bible.

Do you know that the contention of Bunsen, in his *Egypt's Place in the History of the World*, and of Lepsius, and of Champollion Figeac, is that the Hebrew chronology, as contained in the authorised version, does not allow sufficient time for the proved civilisation of Egypt?—I am aware that this is the contention of those writers.

Do you know that Professor Rawlinson, lecturer for the Christian Evidence Society, has admitted that the Hebrew chronology does not allow sufficient time for civilisation?—I am not aware of it, but I am disposed to accept it on your declaration.

Is it your opinion that the Hebrew chronology does or does not allow sufficient time?—I think it allows sufficient time in view of a circumstance which has not been taken sufficiently into account by those authorities you refer to, and that is, the far greater capacities of men in these ages, as evidenced by the erection of the Pyramids, and sundry other things, to turn to account the forces of nature, steam excepted. In view of that, I think there is ample time allowed in the Hebrew chronology for the civilisation of Egypt.

Do you know that Sir J. Gardner Wilkinson carries the era of Menes in Egypt to within twenty-eight years of the Deluge?—I do not know that as a fact, but if you declare it to be so, I accept it.

Do you know that he says that he hesitates to carry the date farther back for fear of interfering with the deluge of Noah?—As his opinion does not bear on the question, I do not concern myself with it one way or another.

But do you know that he says so?—I am not aware of the fact.

Do you deny that that is so?—I prefer dealing with the first records, the first evidences.

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Tell me what book you should consider the best authority for me to take against you as an authority on Egyptian chronology?—I am not prepared to give you an opinion.

Do you know a book which is a good authority on Egyptian chronology?—Generally, I do

Which one?—Particularly, I do not.

Give me a general one?—I am simply aware of the existence of such books and of the general tenor of their arguments, but I am not familiar in that particular way which your question wishes to commit me to.

But name me some one of them whom you have read and think I may fairly take?—My attention has been devoted to the first authorities, and not to the secondary.

But give me a first authority.—I am prepared to debate the question on the first principles of the thing.

Give me what you consider a first authority upon Egyptian chronology.—Egyptian chronology is presented to my mind in a sufficiently satisfactory form in the Hebrew Scriptures.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen.—Mr. Roberts will now have a quarter of an hour in which to address you.

Mr. ROBERTS: Mr. Bradlaugh's opening remarks, in his speech in reply to mine, addressed themselves to a matter which afforded me a little surprise, though perhaps I need not have been surprised, and that is his challenging me to the production of the particular authorities upon which I rested those general statements concerning the evidence upon which the authenticity of the New Testament is based. I thought that those matters were so well known to, and accepted by, all educated men that it would only be a waste of time to resort to the technicalities into which he sought to draw me. But, nevertheless, I am not unprepared to give the references which he has demanded. I have given one reference, or was in the act of giving one reference, when my turn for questioning came to a close; and that is the 1st epistle of Clement, the 20th chapter, the 20th and 21st verses. He says he was unaware of any expression of Justin Martyr's which made mention of the Four Gospels. I will read him an extract from Justin Martyr's "*Apology of the Emperor*," in which he will find that the expression occurs which he denied. This is Justin Martyr's description of Christian worship in the second century, in his "Apology."

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Will you kindly quote book, section, and page?

Mr. ROBERTS: I am not prepared with a reference to the section, but I will get it if you desire it.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: In this debate we shall never end if we don't, because, in the case of Justin Martyr, the only place in which the phrase translated "Acts of the Apostles" occurs, it is challenged as a forgery, and therefore it is necessary that any quotations should be specifically made.

Mr. ROBERTS: I will supply the references afterwards.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: I object to any quotations from Justin Martyr. We have six nights, and it can be supplied when my friend is ready.

The CHAIRMAN: I think it will be as well, and perfectly more in order, if Mr Roberts is allowed to occupy his fifteen minutes, and then for Mr. Bradlaugh, have his fifteen minutes, just to say what he likes. I think it best for each to occupy their position—one the speaker, the other to sit and listen.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: On the question of order, Mr. Chairman, I ask leave to address you.

The CHAIRMAN: According to my judgment, it will be a deal better for Mr. Roberts to take his fifteen minutes.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: But you have not heard my point of order. On a question of order, I ask your leave to address you.

The CHAIRMAN: If I have my way, I think it advisable, without any question being put by Mr. Bradlaugh, that Mr. Roberts should occupy his fifteen minutes. I think it will be better; that is my judgment.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: You don't allow me, then, to state my point of order?

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The CHAIRMAN: Not while Mr. Roberts is speaking.

Mr. ROBERTS: This is an extract from the writings of Justin Martyr, and if Mr. Bradlaugh denies the correctness of it, I will supply him with the exact reference; and if he finds out that the reference does not justify what I now allege, it will be a damaging thing to me for him to supply that to the meeting afterwards. In his first "Apology," addressed to the Emperor Antoninus Pius, and written in the second century, he describes the worship of the Christians, and after having mentioned what he says, was "written by the apostles in *the memorials which they have made*, WHICH ARE CALLED GOSPELS," he says: "On the day called Sunday, there is an assembly in one place of all who dwell in the cities or in the countries, and memorials of the apostles or the writings of the prophets, are read as time may permit. Afterwards, when he who reads has ended, he who presides admonishes and exhorts by word to imitate these good things." I will not read the whole of the extract, because it proceeds to deal with matters that have no immediate and direct reference to the particular point for which I cite the quotation—the object of the citation of the quotation being to show that there was an allusion by Justin Martyr to the fact that at the meetings of Christians in the second century, there were books that were read that passed current under the general designation of *Memorials of the Apostles*—that is to say, the writings of histories; and here we have such writings which have been received from that day down to ours; and if these be not those writings, is Mr. Bradlaugh prepared to show what they are to which Justin Martyr here makes reference?

But I will now finish the part of the argument which I was obliged to break off in my opening address, and that was an undertaking, on my part, to prove also the authenticity of the books that constitute the Old Testament. The nature of the evidence upon that point is this. Some may say: "What evidence have we that there existed before the days of Christ a compilation of works such as that which now constitutes that part of the Bible called the Old Testament?" That evidence I produce first from the New Testament; and the evidence here is exceedingly extensive, far more extensive than I shall be justified, in the limited time at my disposal, in placing before you; but I will refer to such general features as this: we have it recorded in the Acts of the Apostles, the 17th chapter, that "Paul, as his manner was, went into the synagogue, and reasoned with them out of *the Scriptures*," the writings. If we ask what writings, we find the question answered in the last chapter of the Acts of the Apostles, the 23rd verse: When they (the Jews) had appointed him a day, there came many to him into his lodging, to whom he expounded and testified the kingdom of God, persuading them concerning Jesus, both *out of the law of Moses, and out of the Prophets*, from morning till evening." Therefore, in Paul's day the law of Moses was known as a standard of reference accepted among the Jews, and also the writings of the prophets. Then I will bring the testimony of Christ, concerning whom I hope to have much to say upon another evening, and whose case is far removed from the mythical region to which Mr. Bradlaugh's contention compels him to relegate him. Indeed, it is the fact that the more educated class of unbelievers have now one and all abandoned the theory of a mythical invention, and admit that Jesus Christ was a historic personage, who actually appeared among the Jews, and the record of whose life as recorded by the apostles, is in the main historic. I say, when we come to consider Christ, we see in his life evidence of the prior existence of a compilation of writings accepted amongst the Jews as a standard of reference and knowledge in divine things; for consider that touching incident connected with the events that happened on the third day after his crucifixion, when the women went to the tomb and found it empty, and when that same day, two of his disciples were going on a distant errand, and were sad concerning the circumstances that had just transpired, and were ignorant of the fact that he had arisen; and Christ drew near to them and said, "What manner of communications are these that ye have one to another as ye walk and are sad?" And they said, "Art thou only a stranger in Jerusalem, and hast not known the things which are come to pass there in these days?" And he said unto them, "What things?" And they sai him, "Concerning Jesus of Nazareth, a prophet mighty in deed and word God and all the people"—in the 24th chapter of Luke you will find it, Mr. Bra

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—and they expressed their great bewilderment with regard to the fact of his crucifixion, and Christ said: "O fools, and slow of heart to believe all that the prophets have spoken: Ought not Christ to have suffered these things, and to enter into his glory? And beginning at *Moses and all the prophets*, he expounded unto them *in all the Scriptures* the things concerning himself."

I have given a specimen of the kind of evidence that proves that the New Testament was in circulation throughout the Christian community towards the close of the first century, and I shall have more to say about that to-morrow night in a different connection. But observe that, if that argument be established, then the authenticity, or at all events the prior existence of Moses and the prophets as a national accepted standard of reference is also proved, and is proved in even a more conclusive manner than that, though not more conclusive in a logical sense, perhaps, but more conclusive as regards the common conceptions of people. I refer to what I have read, for instance, from the writings of Josephus, whose writings cannot be inpugned, whose book was written, before the first century was over, by an eye-witness of the destruction of Jerusalem; and he in the words I have read this evening, in answer to a question by Mr. Bradlaugh, gives you the testimony of an official Jew of these writings having been in circulation among the Jews for ages, and accepted by them all; and Josephus's declaration on that point is collaterally confirmed by a circumstance of the most specific and decisive character. What is that? Ptolemy Philadelphus, a literary King of Egypt—one of the distinguishing features of whose reign was that he made a collection of all the books that he could collect in the wide-world—finally decided to obtain a copy of a book he was *told was in* circulation among the Jews; and he communicated with the high priest *of Jerusalem*—at that time, I think, Jonathan, the brother of Judas Maccabæus—and requested him to send these books in the proper custody, that they might be translated into the Greek language, so as to be open to the reference of the world in general in the library that he established; and they did it, and we have that translation of theirs existing and current in the present day, and accepted and recognised by all educated men. I refer to the Septuagint, which is the Greek translation of the Hebrew Scriptures effected about 300 years before Christ; and, therefore, in that, we have a demonstration of the sort which I undertook to produce, namely that not only were the writings of the New Testament current among all the Christian community throughout the world—for, mind you, it is not one part of the world: there is Clement of Alexandria, Irenæus in France, Clement at Rome, three widely separated parts of the world in these comparatively barbarous ages. At all these places the same New Testament Scriptures were in circulation, and were quoted as commonly by the writers in those days, as the New Testament is quoted by ministers in the present day. I say that, having proved the circulation of the New Testament at that early period, I have upon the foundation of that proof also proved that the books of the Old Testament existed for at least three centuries previously, indeed more than that; for what was it that incited Ptolemy Philadelphus to obtain that translation? Was it not the wide-spread knowledge that there was, and had been for ages, in the hands of the Jews this volume? Therefore the resolution of Ptolemy Philadelphus to obtain that translation is of itself evidence of the previous existence of those documents for a good while before at least; and we can carry the argument much further back than that by a process which will, perhaps, be better exemplified on some of the other evenings, when we come to substantiate some of the other propositions. The Chairman calling my attention to the time, has broken the line of my argument, and therefore I will leave Mr. Bradlaugh to take his turn.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: First, the evidence as to the Septuagint is exactly the opposite of the statement Mr. Roberts has made, and it shows, therefore, the misfortune in conducting this debate without giving authorities as we go on. Mr. Roberts—and I am quite sure that he means to tell you, at least I think so, what he believes to be true—Mr. Roberts must be utterly unacquainted with all the criticism on the subject, or he would know, when he says that it is accepted and recognised by all educated men, that one of the very latest amongst orthodox writers, the Rev. Dr. Irons, one of the officials of St. Paul's at the present moment, in his book, entitled *The Bible and its Interpreters*, says no man knows when the Septuagint was translated, who translated it, where the

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version was made, or how it was made; and I will undertake to prove to you that the balance of criticism is utterly against your view; so that it shows that, in these kind of statements, you want to know the evidence on which your antagonists rely. I do not want to be in the painful position of telling Mr. Roberts each time, Your statement is not true. I want him to give me the evidence on which he relies, and then I will show him where the supposed evidence is no evidence at all; but if he simply makes general statements, and tells you that it is accepted and recognised by all educated men, when a statement of that kind simply means that he has not read what educated men have written about it; and when he tells you that it is the Greek translation of our Hebrew text, that is very funny, because in the mere matter of chronology alone, one version differs about 900 years; and in another version the difference is over 1,200 years from the Hebrew, and, therefore, cannot possibly be a translation of it. Mr. Roberts has got to prove his case, and I must ask him to state his evidence on which he relies for the Septuagint translation, and then I will reply to it. Evidently, Mr. Roberts and I differ as to what is evidence. He said he was going to prove from Justin Martyr the existence of the Four Gospels, and he read to you something about Memorials of the Apostles, but what on earth there is to identify those with the Four Gospels, in the books, as we have got them, I do not know, and it requires a mind like Mr. Roberts's to get the evidence out of it. That passage says nothing of any gospels, and would be as good evidence for forty gospels as for four; and I will show you that in the time of Justin Martyr, forty gospels and writings of apostles existed, at least; and I will tell Mr. Roberts where he can get a list of them—in the Rev. Jeremiah Jones's *Canon of the New Testament*. Jeremiah Jones has made an index of what he calls the Apocryphal Books and Gospels. Then he says that he read from Josephus's testimony. Well now, there again we differ as to the meaning of words. He was to prove from Josephus that Solomon wrote the Proverbs, and that Josephus had knowledge of the evidence which entitled him to say that Solomon wrote the Proverbs; and when he read it, there was not a word about Solomon, not a single word about the Proverbs. Well, if that is evidence, the sooner we leave off this debate the better. Then again, he quoted Clement of Rome, and he did not quote; and here is another difficulty: if my friend brought here the works themselves to quote from, I should be able to say, if he told me which edition it was, "turn to the preface, and you will find my arguments against it there, in the handwritings of your own men;" but when he simply quotes loose statements from other writers, there is no sort of reply to that kind possible. And when he says, "Oh! if Mr. Bradlaugh disputes, I will prove," that is not the question: his business is to prove as he goes on, and not to make loose statements, which require proof at some later time. Now, he says something about the women who went to the tomb, and he gave me chapter and verse, as he saw I was looking at the Bible; but he did not know what I was referring to. I want to know whether God revealed that, according to Matt. xxviii., two women went; or, according to John xx. 1, that one woman went; or, according to Luke xxiv., that several women went; and I want to know whether Mary went by herself, or whether several went with her; and I want to know whether that is one of the surface contradictions which Mr. Roberts had forgotten, and which he said he would look up for me. Then Mr. Roberts is good enough to say that he will refer you to Acts xxviii. 23. But what does that prove? Simply that there were current in the alleged time of Jesus, works which were called the law of Moses and the prophets. I have never denied that. But you have got first to identify those with the Bible as we have them, and then to prove that this is divine revelation. A loose statement of that kind is no sort of evidence at all. It is only evidence of the existence of something called the "law of Moses;" and I will defy Mr. Roberts to identify the Pentateuch with those words, because I will show you from the Bible itself plenty of places in which the word "law" is used, which cannot possibly mean the whole of the contents of the Pentateuch. And do not forget that Mr. Roberts has not said one word about the texts to which I called his attention: these texts affecting the goodness, omnipotence and immutability of Deity. Those are passed over; and then he tells you that all educated men have abandoned the mythical theory regarding the Christ Well, now, that is really a little too strong. I do not know that it would amount to anything if it were proved; but it is not even, in the

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remotest degree proved. What most men are prepared to concede is what I conceded in the answer to Mr. Roberts. The name which is rendered "Jesus," is only a form of the Hebrew word "Joshua." It is quite possible there was a real man on whom the myth has been centred; but there is not an educated man who admits a real Jesus, who was born without a father; whose husband's mother had two fathers; who lived at the same time in Judea and Egypt; who was known by John, and not known by him at the same moment of time; who was crucified, and in the grave three days and three nights, between late on Friday evening and the period which elapsed before Saturday night was quite over. Now, if Mr. Roberts should tell me those statements are not in the Bible, he will have an opportunity of asking me for texts, and he will find that I can quote him chapter and verse for every one of them. Now, I will ask him to take another illustration: whether Genesis xviii. 20, 21, where God is represented as saying that the story has reached Him about Sodom and Gomorrah, and that He is going to inquire, and will know—whether that is consistent with the omniscience of Deity, and whether what follows is consistent with the goodness of the Deity? And don't forget here that I hold exactly the doctrine put forward by John Stuart Mill: I hold that you have not the right to apply the word "goodness" in one sense in reference to man, and in some other sense in reference to God, and then tell me you cannot explain what that second sense is. I hold it is an entire abandonment of the whole of the debate to make any such contention as that. If Mr. Roberts does not know what goodness means, he ought not to be here; if he does, he ought to tell us. He ought not to tell us that goodness *for God may* not mean the same thing now as it may a thousand years hence, or *as it did* a thousand years since. A book which represents as an all-good God, guilty of evil acts, cannot be a Divine revelation. Then I will ask him as to Deut. viii. 2, and 2 Chron. xxxii. 31, whether these are consistent with God's omniscience? I will ask him whether the whole story of the Fall, omitting its absurdities, is not one of the most monstrous stories as a picture of the character of the Deity? whether it does not picture God making the Garden of Eden a damnation-trap in which to catch the whole of the human race, so that he may punish them; I will ask him whether the whole story of the Deluge, admitting its monstrous improbabilities and impossibilities, does not picture God as a cruel Deity, who would delight rather in punishing than reforming, and who slaughtered all living beings, the innocent with the guilty; I will ask him whether the case of Jacob and Esau, referred to in Mal. i. 2, does not show that God either loved the man because he was a rascal, or in spite of it; because he was a liar, or in spite of it; because he helped to rob his uncle; or in spite of it; because he cheated his brother, or in spite of it; and whether it does not show that He hated Esau, because he had the misfortune to be cheated, and the virtue to be forgiving, or in spite of it. I submit that on either contention it is utterly inexplicable with the contention that the Bible is the revelation of God. And then I will take him to 1st Kings xi. 33, 34, 38; xiv. 8, where it says David never did anything but good; did only that which was right in the sight of God; I will ask him whether David was not a thief, a liar, a murderer, a perjurer, an adulterer, a traitor, a scoundrel, all through, who did not even repent when he died? how could such a man have obeyed all God's statutes and commandments? And I will point out to him that, very curiously, he is wasting all his learned evidence on people who are certainly very remote from the time of Moses, and he does it in the funniest way, for he quotes you Clement of Alexandria, Irenæus, Clement of Rome; and he talks of "those days," as if they all lived at that time. Would you talk of a man who lived in 1745, and another who lived in 1845, as living in "those days?" Now, I ask my friend not to assume that I am ignorant of all these things. I do not assume to be a learned man, but there is not an author he can quote in relation to this subject that I will not, when he has quoted him, tell him what can be said for or against him.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Roberts will now occupy six minutes out of the twelve remaining, and then Mr. Bradlaugh will reply till ten o'clock.

Mr. ROBERTS: Ladies and gentlemen; if Mr. Bradlaugh would strictly confine himself to accuracy in his representations of what I say, my arguments would not suffer in his hands. I have not represented that those authorities I have quoted were

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contemporary. I have given, in each case, the year in which they wrote.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: No.

Mr. ROBERTS: I have. I stated that Clement wrote A.D. 83, and that Tertullian wrote in the middle of the second century. I gave those general indications, and certainly never committed myself to the absurdity of supposing that men living in the first century and the second could, by any construction, be said to be contemporary. He has given me a great many passages to explain. I wish he would give me them as questions. I will undertake to answer every one of them if they are put to me in the colloquial style of the Socratic method; but how can I, in six minutes, explain twenty or thirty alleged discrepancies, which discrepancies I am persuaded, do not exist. I have read through a list of 144 so-called contradictions, issued by a Secular Society in America; and with the exception of some five or six, there is not even the shadow of a difficulty to contend with, and every one of them in the process of question and answer, I would undertake to explain, and I would do so in a speech, were the speech of sufficient dimensions to admit of it. With regard to the Septuagint, I did not speak at random in saying what I said; I gave the evidence on which my statement rests. There is the Septuagint; there is such a book; it is substantially a transcript of the Hebrew Scriptures, though I grant there are discrepancies of the sort he mentioned; that is to say, the chronology does not agree; there has been tampering somewhere, undoubtedly, but there is the fact; here is a literary monument, which, apart from all discrepancies, certainly proves what I quoted it to prove: and that is, that the Hebrew Scriptures existed as a literary compilation, at least in the reign of Ptolemy Philadelphus, and I do not produce it to prove anything more than that. The simplest mind is capable of receiving that argument; for where does the Septuagint come from, if there were not Hebrew Scriptures from which to make a translation? What is the account of it? Josephus here gives us an account of it. We have both the book, and an account of how the book came into existence. The only thing Mr. Bradlaugh can do is to say, "How do I know that Josephus is speaking the truth?" He tells us he believes in Eusebius because there is an unbroken line of reference; and then, as I proceed to unfold my references in regard to Paul, he says, "How do I know that he wrote that letter you are referring to?" On the principle that Mr. Bradlaugh is contending for to-night, I deny that he can possibly prove that there ever existed such a person as Eusebius, or that he ever wrote the books that bear his name; indeed, he cannot prove the existence of Shakspere on the same principle, for he never saw him, and he has no certain evidence that he wrote the book—that is to say upon his principle. *I* admit that there is evidence in regard to Shakspere, and in regard to Eusebius, and in regard to Paul; and there would never have been any objection to the evidence in regard to Paul if his case had not involved evidence of Christ's resurrection. I produce, then, this statement of Josephus in reference to the Septuagint.—(*Josephus's Antiquities;* book xii., sections 1 and 4.) Those two sections contain a sufficiency of evidence on the point. I will read one or two extracts, though I am afraid the time will scarcely admit of it to-night. Of course, I am well aware that critics have written against it; but, nevertheless, my remark, in its general form, is unimpeachable, and that is, that critical, judicial, clear, unbiassed minds there are that receive the Septuagint as the translation made in the reign of Ptolemy Philadelphus.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Your statement was that the Septuagint was accepted and recognised by all educated men; you made no exception whatever. You have curiously forgotten that I said that you classed together Clement of Rome, Clement of Alexandria, and Irenæus, as "of those days;" and you said you gave the date of Tertullian. I did not say a word about Tertullian, and I say that you did not give the dates of the others; and it would be a great deal better if you would attend to exactly what I say, and not answer what I do not say. It is perfectly true that in six minutes you could not answer all the contradictions, but you might have answered one. Instead of that you have referred to an American society that has issued 144 contradictions; and you have said that I cannot prove the existence of Shakspere. Supposing I cannot, that would not show that the Bible is a divine revelation. On matters of ordinary occurrence, I accept the best experience of the best men as I find it fairly recorded, and upon that canon of evidence I can prove all reasonable historic events. It is only when you give me an extraordinary occurrence—of men

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who have no fathers; who are in the grave when they are out of it; and who are seen by one woman, who is two women, who are more than three women; it is then that the experience does not apply; and, surely, in six minutes you might have taken one illustration. If you would devote yourself to doing that, then we should have this matter cleared up very much. Now, I submit that, though we have got nearly to the end of our first night's debate, there has not been an attempt to state the attributes of Deity on the other side. There is an admission now that there is the variation I said in the chronology between the Septuagint and the Hebrew, which in one case is 900 years, and in the other, 1,200 years; and those are called trifling differences; but are we to be damned or saved by them? And you say there have been tamperings. Is it by God's consent or against it? And then you say, Oh! you quote the Septuagint to prove that the Hebrew books existed in the time of Ptolemy; but you have got to prove that your Septuagint translation was made in the time of Ptolemy. A statement of Josephus will not prove it, because you have got to go back to something behind it; and I will, to-morrow, give you the whole of the evidence for and against the Septuagint. I will quote every author about it. You ought to do it; but if you will not, I must do the work that you ought to do, unless you abandon the evidence. Now, I ask, that through this debate, when an author is quoted, that we shall have the author and his express words, and the date when he is supposed to have written, and not general statements that all educated men have accepted it. I submit that, up to the present moment, not one atom of evidence has been advanced in support of the proposition that Mr. Roberts has undertaken to prove.

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Second Night,

WEDNESDAY, 14th JUNE, 1876,

IN THE TEMPERANCE HALL, LEICESTER.

THE CHAIR WAS OCCUPIED BY MR. W. STANYON OF LEICESTER.

The CHAIRMAN having asked the meeting to refrain from the expression of their feelings, called upon Mr. Roberts to resume the debate.

Mr. ROBERTS: Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, in commencing my remarks this evening, I will comply with the request made by Mr. Bradlaugh last night, and define what I mean by the proposition that the Scriptures are the authentic and reliable records of divine revelation. By the Scriptures, I mean that compilation of writings that passes current in English society under the name of the Bible. By the proposition that these writings are authentic, I mean that they were really written by the persons by whom they profess to have been written, and at the time at which they profess to have been written; and, that, therefore, they are authentic; and, that, besides being authentic, they are reliable; that is, we can put our trust in them as an accurate record of the various matters which they profess to set forth. Those matters are, in my contention, the records of divine revelation, or rather the record involves the setting forth of divine revelation. By that I mean a communication of knowledge concerning God, which we could not otherwise have attained; and by God I mean the primal energy, force, wisdom, power, strength, or whatever other term you choose to employ to define the first creative energy from which things have had their development or their outcome, thinking it necessary only to add that in my belief, the view of that power presented in the Scriptures is the right one, viz., that in its totality, so to speak, that power is a person, having in their highest degree, all the attributes which go to constitute personality, consciousness, perception, volition, &c. Beyond this, I will not occupy time in presenting any abstract view of God, for we might occupy the whole six nights in discussing the thing in a metaphysical way without arriving at anything like a tangible result. In this connection I will remind Mr. Bradlaugh and his friends, that even upon their hypothesis, there is inscrutable mystery at the basis of things as they are. I can call no better witness to that fact than Professor Tyndall, a man great in the particular school to which these friends belong. He—in an inaugural address at the meeting of the British Association, at Manchester—says: "Science does not in any degree lessen the wonder with which we look at the material universe. At best it only marshals the phenomena of nature under the head of all its sequences, which are called law; but the great ocean of the unknown simply recedes as we advance, and all the researches that science may make to the end of time will never abridge by one hairsbreadth the infinite expanse of mystery across that boundless ocean. The curiosity of the intellect will always sail towards an ever-vanishing horizon. The region of mystery lies not merely in the distance, but also at our very feet." He says when he has looked at the spring-tide, at the sprouting leaves, and grass, and flowers; when he has seen the general joy of opening life, he has asked himself, "Can it be that there is no being or thing in nature that knows more about these matters than I do? Can it be that I, in my ignorance, represent the highest knowledge existing of these things in the universe?" And his answer is: "The man who puts that question to himself, if he be not a shallow man; if he be capable of being penetrated by a profound thought, will never answer it by professing that creed of Atheism which has been so lightly attributed to me."

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Therefore, I think that, in view of the fact that even upon the hypothesis of an insentient nature, so to speak, being the author of what we see, we land ourselves at last against a dead wall of mystery, it would be bootless for me to attempt to define, in a philosophical sense, what I mean by the word *God*, or the phrase *primal energy*. Suffice it to say that there is a primal energy in that particular phase in which He or *it*—if Mr. Bradlaugh prefers that pronoun—is presented in these records which constitute the ancient archives of the Jews. The truth, then, of the proposition I seek to maintain, not by hair-splitting, or far-fetched or misty arguments, but by submitting a plain, broad, common sense argument in matters of world-wide notoriety, which the meanest intellect can apprehend when brought to bear.

My contention last night was that, taking the Bible in our hands with the idea of believing it, we should be compelled, on the hypothesis of its being true, to expect to find existing at the present day the nation of the Jews and a corrupt political Christianity; and I pointed to the fact that these are in existence. Further, I produced evidence of the other fact, which ought to be capable of some degree of demonstration, that these writings existed at the time, and were in current circulation amongst the believers of it at the time they were produced. To-night I will take one step further, a more important step, and introduce a more interesting topic, perhaps—though the topic of last night was not uninteresting, and certainly not unimportant, for it constituted a necessary preliminary and a foundation for what is to follow. But the matter I am to speak of to-night appeals more directly to the common cognitions of men. I refer to the uprise in the world of the system bearing the name of Christianity. That system must have a history. Christianity did not spring up out of the ground; it did not come mysteriously out of the atmosphere; it is traceable back to certain circumstances that planted it in the world; and it is to those circumstances that I now call your attention, as furnishing the most palpable evidence of the truth of the proposition for which I am contending. And, first, let me say, there are not only Christians to-day, but there were Christians in the first century, and widely multiplied. It is necessary for me to prove that, as a step in the argument, by way of making it invincible; and I prove it by two citations, which, I think Mr. Bradlaugh will not call in question, and to which, probably, he has the scholastic access, without calling on me to produce a technical reference, though I will do that if he asks it. I refer to the testimony of Tacitus, the Roman historian, who lived at the close of the first century, and I refer to the letter written by Pliny the Younger to the Emperor Trajan in the year 112, asking the Emperor's advice as to how he was to deal with this rising sect of Christians, if they were to be murdered wholesale, as had been the custom. I will quote his very words, merely to show that there was a great multitude of believers in Christ in that age, as a preliminary to enquiring how came that multitude to be brought into the conviction they were entertaining—convictions which brought them nothing but evil as regards this world—for which they suffered death by martyrdom. I find Pliny's letter at the close of the works of Josephus, although, I believe, it is also extant in the writings of Jerome, and also in a book bearing Pliny's name, *The Epistles of Pliny*. This is the letter: "Sir.—It is my constant method to apply myself to you for the resolution of all my doubts." Now, please, transport yourselves back in imagination to A.D. 112; let the mind act telescopically to-night; let us remember that there have been centuries before our time; let us try to detach our consciousness from the immediate connection of present circumstances, and realise the facts that have gone before. Pliny the Younger, writing to the Emperor Trajan at Rome, says: "I have never been present at the execution of the Christians (by others), on which account I am unacquainted with what used to be inquired into, and what and how far they are to be punished. Nor are my doubts small whether there be not a distinction to be made between the ages (of the accused), and whether tender youth ought to have the same punishment with strong men; whether there be not room for pardon upon repentance, and whether it may not be an advantage to one that had been a Christian that he has forsaken Christianity; whether the bare name, without any crimes besides, or the crime of adhering to the name is to be punished? In the meantime, I have taken this course about those who have been brought before me as Christians. I asked them whether they were Christians or not. If they confessed that they were Christians, I asked them again

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and a third time, intervening threatenings with the questions. If they persevered in their confessions, I ordered them to be executed; for I did not doubt, but let their confessions be of any sort whatsoever, this positiveness and inflexible obstinacy deserve to be punished. There have been some of this mad sect whom I took notice of in particular as Roman citizens, that they might be sent to the city. After some time, as is usual in such circumstances, the crime spread itself, and many more cases came before me. . . . Hereupon, I have put off any further examinations, and have recourse to you, for the affair seems to be well worth consultation, *especially on account of the number of those that are in danger;* for there are many of every age, of every rank, and of both sexes, who are now and hereafter likely to be called to account and to be in danger; for this superstition *is spread like a contagion, not only into cities and towns, but into country villages also*, which yet there is reason to hope may be stopped and corrected. To be sure, temples *which were almost forsaken*, begin already to be frequented, and the holy solemnities, *which were long intermitted*, begin to be revived. The sacrifices begin to sell well everywhere, of which very few purchasers had of late appeared. Whereby it is easy to suppose how *great a multitude* of men may be amended if place for repentance be admitted."

Now, observe this testimony in A.D. 112, points back a long way into the first century, in saying that for a long time the worship of the idols *had been given up* on account of what he calls "this Christian superstition." The testimony of Tacitus, for the knowledge of which the world, for a long time, was solely indebted to the extracts given by Josephus in his *Antiquities*, is as follows: "Nero," says Tacitus, "in order to stifle the rumour (that he had himself set Rome on fire) ascribed it to those people who were hated for their wicked practices, and called by the vulgar Christian. These he, Nero, punished exquisitely. The author of the same was Christ, who, in the reign of Tiberius, was brought to punishment by Pontius Pilate, the Procurator not only over Judea, whence this mischief first sprang, but in the City of Rome also." That is sufficient for my present purpose: and by that testimony I have proved the existence, in the first century, of a vast multitude throughout the Roman Empire believing in Christ, and suffering all manner of disadvantages and evils in consequence of that belief; and I have to ask, What was the sacrifice for? I mean what did they sacrifice all these advantages for? Was it for the sake of a religious opinion? Was it for a mere belief in what somebody else had said? If it was, I grant that the argument would only go to show their sincerity; it would not necessarily show that the opinion which they sincerely entertained was a correct one. But I am now to call your attention to the fact that it was not a matter of opinion for which they suffered, but a matter of fact, of which the leading members of their body were personal witnesses. To that fact I wish now to call your attention, and I also particularly invite your consideration to the question of whether there was a possibility of any mistake about the matter. Pliny could not tell the cause of the multiplication of this people; Tacitus could not give the Emperor to understand what was the secret of the obstinacy of this "vulgar Christian sect" in the maintenance of their convictions unto death. We must, therefore, go to the writings which I showed last night, and which I am prepared to show much more extensively than I did then, were in extensive circulation amongst this multitude of persecuted people; we must go to those writings to find out the secret of that confidence.

Now I first call as evidence a Roman Governor—not one of themselves—Festus, I think, who had arraigned before him Paul, the ringleader of the sect of the Nazarenes, and the most effective instrument in the diffusion of the faith of Christ. He heard him himself, and afterwards held a joint hearing with Agrippa. Festus thus states the cause to the King: "There is a certain man left in bonds by Felix, about whom, when I was at Jerusalem, the chief priests and the elders of the Jews informed me, desiring to have judgment against him, to whom I answered, It is not the manner of the Romans to deliver any man to die before that he which is accused have the accusers face to face, and have license to answer for himself concerning the crime laid against him. Therefore, when they were come thither, without any delay on the morrow, I sat on the judgment-seat, and commanded the man to be brought forth; against whom, when the accusers stood up, they brought none accusation of such things as I supposed, but had certain questions against him of

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their own superstition, and of *one Jesus, who was dead*, WHOM PAUL AFFIRMED TO BE ALIVE." That is Festus's definition of the question that was at issue between Paul and his accusers; was it a correct definition by Festus? In answer to that, I invite your attention to a number of statements by the apostles themselves, which go to show that that was the matter involved in their public testimony. In the first chapter of Acts, at a meeting of the apostles after the ascension of Christ, and before the Day of Pentecost, when the question of the vacancy created by the apostasy of Judas came to be considered, this counsel was given one to another: "Wherefore of these men who have companied with us all the time that the Lord Jesus went in and out among us, beginning from the baptism of John unto that same day that he was taken up from us, must one be ordained to be *a witness with us of* HIS RESURRECTION." In the second chapter of the Acts, at the 32nd verse, Peter, in making a speech to a great congregation of Jews, who had been brought together by the great marvel which we shall have to consider at a later stage of the evening, viz., a number of men speaking languages they had never learnt, says: "*This Jesus hath God raised up*, WHEREOF WE ALL ARE WITNESSES." *Witnesses!* In Acts iii. 14, we have a speech delivered before the Jewish authorities, who tried to suppress this testimony: "Ye denied the Holy One and the Just, and desired a murderer to be granted unto you; and killed the Prince of Life, *whom God hath raised from the dead;* WHEREOF WE ARE WITNESSES." "Whereof we are *witnesses.*" Acts iv. 10: "Be it known unto you all"—this is another speech on another occasion—"and to all the people of Israel, that by the name of Jesus Christ of Nazareth, whom ye crucified, *whom God raised from the dead*, even by him doth this man stand here before you whole. This is the stone which was set at nought of you builders, which is become the head of the corner. Neither is there salvation in any other; for there is none other name under heaven given among men whereby we must be saved." Acts v. 29: "Peter and the other apostles answered and said"—again addressing themselves to the magistrates on the bench, who were telling them on no account to persist in this preaching of theirs, as they were filling Jerusalem with sedition, and that it would be at the peril of their liberty and life if they did; their answer is, "We ought to obey God rather than men. The God of our fathers *raised up Jesus*, whom ye slew and hanged on a tree. Him hath God exalted with His right hand to be a Prince and a Saviour, for to give repentance to Israel and forgiveness of sins unto Israel. And WE ARE HIS WITNESSES OF THESE THINGS, and so is also the Holy Spirit whom God hath given to them that obey Him,"—the full pith of which latter statement we shall have to consider upon a subsequent occasion

There are other statements of the same sort, but these are sufficient for the present purpose, and, therefore, I will leave it there, and ask, Was their witness true? What did they allege as the basis of their convictions upon the point? Acts iv. 19: "Peter and John answered and said unto them"—on another occasion before magistrates again—"Whether it be right, in the sight of God, to hearken unto you more than unto God, judge ye. For *we cannot but speak the* THINGS WHICH WE HAVE SEEN AND HEARD." Acts i. 3: "To whom"—that is to the disciples—"he (Christ) showed himself alive after his passion by many infallible proofs, *being seen of them* forty days"—nearly six weeks—"speaking of the things pertaining to the kingdom of God." In Acts x. 39, in the house of Cornelius, Peter declares: "WE ARE WITNESSES OF ALL THINGS WHICH HE DID both in the land of the Jews and in Jerusalem, whom they slew and hanged on a tree: *him God raised up the third day*, and showed him openly; not unto all the people, but unto witnesses chosen before of God, even *to us who did eat and drink with him after he rose from the dead.*" Therefore, observe, they were not put to death for entertaining a certain religious opinion; they were not put to death because they believed on the testimony of somebody else that Christ rose. Their testimony was: "We who were with him during his life in the flesh—we who saw him crucified, have seen him alive and have spent six weeks in his company, and he parted with us upon a certain occasion, with a promise to return." And now comes the question, What led them to make that statement? Did they get anything by it? Why! they just got all the things that all men everywhere, in every country and in every age, seek to avoid; they got poverty, they got insult, they got imprisonment, they got death. Everyone of the apostles lost their lives for it; perhaps I ought to qualify that statement; some of them, I believe, according to

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ecclesiastical tradition, came to a peaceful end; but, nevertheless, a great proportion of them suffered death for their testimony. Therefore, their sincerity cannot be impugned; for there is never a lie told by an impostor but what it is to get some good to himself by it; and as soon as the good does not come, and as soon as the bad begins to come, you will see him flinch and turn round.

This is no case of imposture; therefore, the question is, were they mistaken? In considering that, let us regard the circumstances: whether those circumstances were of such a character as to admit the possibility of mistake. In the first place, they did not expect Christ to die; in Luke xviii. 31, we read: "Christ took unto him the Twelve, and said unto them, Behold, we go up to Jerusalem, and all things that are written by the prophets concerning the Son of Man shall be accomplished. For he shall be delivered unto the Gentiles, and shall be mocked, and spitefully entreated, and spitted on; and they shall scourge him and put him to death; and the third day he shall rise again. And *they understood none of these things: and this saying was hid from them*, neither knew they the things which were spoken." In the 24th chapter of Luke you have the case to which I called attention last night; verse 44 is a further amplification of it. He said to them—this is after his resurrection—"These are the words which I spake unto you, while I was yet with you, that all things must be fulfilled which were written in the law of Moses, and in the Prophets, and in the Psalms, concerning me. Then opened he their understandings, that they might understand the Scriptures, and said unto them, Thus it is written, and thus it behoved Christ to suffer, and to rise from the dead the third day."

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Mr. Chairman.—It is very evident that either my memory has utterly deceived me, or that Mr. Roberts's memory has utterly deceived him. He said he had given you evidence, last night, that the writings were in current circulation at the time they were produced. Now I never heard him say when any one of the books was produced; I never heard him fix a date or an author in the New Testament, except the Corinthians, which he attributed to Paul; I never heard him fix a date or an author in the Old, except for the Book of Proverbs, on which he turned out to be utterly incorrect, attributing it to Solomon on the authority of Josephus, and then not fixing any date at all for its currency; I never heard him pretend to give you any kind of clue as to whom he supposed to be the several authors, or when he supposed anyone of the particular books to be issued; and I cannot help thinking that his memory must have entirely misled him, and that he never did, during his speech last night supply us with any one of those facts; and I will ask him not to imagine that something relating to the existence of Christians, which I do not dispute, is evidence of the authenticity and truth of every book in the Bible. I do not dispute the existence of the Mahomedans, but I should be very sorry to accept that as a proof of the authenticity and divinity of the Koran; I do not dispute the existence of the Buddhists, but I should be very sorry to accept the fact of their existence as clear and irrevocable evidence of the truth of any books they may put forward as sacred. And I must ask Mr. Roberts to begin by specifying with the first book of the Bible—the Book of Genesis—who it is that he says professes to be the author of it, when it is that he says it was issued, amongst whom he says it was issued, and to give some evidence from contemporary writers of its having been in current circulation at the time of its being issued. I say there is not a particle of such evidence to be found. But when he has done this with the Book of Genesis, I will take him through every other book in the Bible in the same way. And now I will ask him to be kind enough to just look at what he imagines to be evidence. He says, "I will quote to you a Roman Governor, Festus," and he coolly quotes the book of Acts to me. But he has got to prove the book of Acts before he is entitled to quote it here. If you are to demonstrate that that Bible is reliable from beginning to end simply because it says something there, well, then there is entirely an end to all discussion. Let him find this account of Agrippa and Festus in Roman history, with any record of these books, then I will grant there may be something in it; but the question we have got to discuss is not, "Did some man named Paul live?" the question we have got to discuss is not, "Did some man named Jesus live?" because both those facts might be true, and yet this book not be the authentic record of divine

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revelation. We must just please put the dots on the *i*, so that we may know what we are talking about. Well, Mr. Roberts stated that between the time of Christ's resurrection and ascension to heaven, Christ was on the earth six weeks, and he was good enough to refer me—not for that, but for another point—to the 24th chapter of Luke. I will ask him whether he can make anything like six weeks, or even one week, out of the period which is put in that chapter for the ascension of Jesus to heaven. I will grant that Mr. Roberts may be right, and that Christ may have been six weeks on earth; then I will ask him, if Luke says that was not so, on his own statement Luke must be stating something not true, and the book of Luke cannot be a divine revelation. If Acts is right, Luke is wrong; if Luke is right, Acts is wrong; and, in any case, Mr. Roberts is wrong, because he has got to make both books right. Now, we will pass by the whole of the quotation from Professor Tyndall. I have a great respect for him; but Professor Tyndall's opinions on Atheism, or natural processes, have not the smallest relation to the question we have to discuss. I will pass by every reference, at present, to Tacitus or Pliny, because it does not corroborate a single portion of the statement Mr. Roberts has to make out, which is, "That the Scriptures are the Authentic and Reliable Records of Divine Revelation." There is nothing to prove that proposition in Tacitus, and there is nothing in Pliny. If there were ten times there what Mr. Roberts imagines exists there, it would not go one step to prove his position. Now, I will ask him to follow me a little in what I shall submit. I gave Mr. Roberts a large number of texts last night. He said six minutes was not sufficient to answer them; but he has had thirty minutes to-night, and he might have answered some of them. If he could not have dealt with the whole, he might, at least, have commenced. Quoting Pliny will not prove that the story of the Fall in Genesis is one consistent with God's loving-kindness and mercy; quoting Festus, or Pliny, or Tacitus, or anybody else, will not get rid of any of the texts as to God being angry when He should not have been angry, and repenting when He should not have repented, and changing when He should not have changed. All those texts I read to Mr. Roberts last night remain untouched. I suppose it will be fair to say that they have slipped his memory since, because he thought them of importance at the time. The reason he gave for not answering them was that six minutes was not long enough, and it was a very proper reason; but he has had thirty minutes to-night, and he has quoted Professor Tyndall instead of explaining the Bible. Now, if you please, I will press Mr. Roberts a little further upon the position he has now taken. He says that by "authentic" he means that the books were really written by the persons by whom they are professed to be written, and at the times they are professed to have been written. Now, so far as I am aware, the only sort of profession of authorship for any of the early books in the Bible is the heading in the English Bible to the first five books—the First Book of Moses, the Second Book of Moses, the Third Book of Moses, the Fourth Book of Moses, and the Fifth Book of Moses. I am not aware that Moses—supposing him to have lived—ever made any profession on the subject at all; but I will assume that Mr. Roberts means that *authentic* means that these five books were written by Moses. Well, then, I will trouble him to give me some proof of that; I will trouble him to give me some proof of the time that Moses wrote them; I will trouble him to give me some proof from some other author of the existence of the books about that time, because he says they were in current circulation. Then I will ask him who it is who professes to have written the Book of Judges, because I do not see any profession of authorship; I should like him to tell me the date at which he thinks that book was issued, and to show me some evidence of its being in current circulation at the time he says it was issued, and then from that I will lead him through every one of the books of the Bible, and ask him whether, instead of all that being true, there is not very tolerable evidence, from some of the authors whom he has already used in this discussion, that the whole of the sacred books of the Jews were destroyed during their captivity, and had to be re-written. If he will tell us that that is so, then it would dispose of the whole of the position he has put to you; and I will press him still farther, that even when he has shown, which he never will, that each one of the books of the Old Testament was written by some individual, was published at a particular time, and was current from that time forward, he will not have gone one step forward then to prove they are a divine revelation; because no one doubts that the Koran has been current from the time of Mahomed, but it does not prove it to be

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a divine revelation, although Mahomed pretended it to be one, and a very large number of people believe it to be one. Then we have to do what I suggested last night—examine the book, and see whether the contents of it are consistent with the character which, under any fair definition of Deity, is to be attributed to Deity; whether the internal statements agree with themselves, and whether they agree with science. And I put some very flat contradictions last night to Mr. Roberts, not one of which he has touched to-night. Why did he not, when he was dealing with the resurrection of Jesus, say whether he believed it was one woman who went first to the tomb, according to one Gospel, or two, according to another, or more than two, according to another? and why did he not give us his reasons for accepting one and disbelieving the rest. He relies on the resurrection; but if the story be full of contradictions, how can it be God's divine revelation? Mr. Roberts has neglected all this, and made some speeches about matters entirely unconnected with it. Now, if you please, I will draw your attention to the New Testament, because it shows the utter recklessness of the language Mr. Roberts uses. He talks of this book (the Bible) representing the archives of the Jews. Now, evidently, he could not refer to the New Testament, because the Jews do not acknowledge a single page of it. Then I will say that, when you come to the New Testament, that of the Gospels attributed to Matthew, to Mark, to Luke, and to John, there is not a particle of evidence, not an iota of evidence, to connect any of the persons named Matthew, Mark, Luke, or John, with any one of those Gospels; and until something is done of this kind, I say the Four Gospels cannot be shown to have been in existence at all before the year A.D. 150, that is 120 years at least after the alleged date of the death of Jesus; and until something of this kind is done, the authenticity question ought to be given up. And, then, even supposing this were done, Mr. Roberts has the whole mass of contradictions in the history of Jesus; and until they are cleared away, it is no use talking of outside testimony; you have got to get the inside of the book; let him explain the contradiction about the the forty days, let him explain the contradiction about the woman who went to the tomb; let him explain the contradictions that I have pointed out as to the parentage of Jesus; let him deal with all these things step by step, and not say, "I have only six minutes," and then, when he has the time, to leave it undone. Now, if you please, what is the case we are to take? As far as evidence goes, for to-night, a reiteration of two statements—one that there are Jews, and another that there are corrupt Christians. But, really, if that is to make any kind of evidence, the same kind of evidence can be pleaded in favour of every religious book of every people in the world, and you must do something much more definite than anything of this kind. I will tell you why I submit to you that the Bible is not a revelation from God, by God meaning—in the sense in which I gave it last night, a sense which has not been corrected—an omnipotent, an omnipresent, omniscient, an infinite, an eternal, an all-good, person. When Mr. Roberts says that he means a primal creative energy, clearly the Bible reveals either something much clearer than that, or nothing at all; it reveals a God who could be seen, and who could not be seen; it reveals a God who knew everything, and did not know some things; a God unchangeable, continually changing; a God all-wise, repenting and grieving at the unanticipated failure of His plans; it reveals a God who was everywhere, but who lived somewhere above, and who came down occasionally. This is, I submit to you, the revelation of the Deity in this book, and it is no use making statements outside that until these are dealt with. I gave Mr. Roberts, last night, a mass of texts not one of which has been answered, and I will now give you several additional texts which seem to show to me that the Bible cannot possibly be a revelation from an all-good God. And I will take you first to the 21st chapter of Exodus. Last night I confined myself to matters of fact; now I am coming to matters of legislation. Mr. Roberts says the existence of the Jews is a fact in his favour. Now, here are the laws supposed to be given in a divine revelation for those Jews: "If thou buy an Hebrew servant, six years he shall serve, and in the seventh he shall go out free for nothing"—this is in Exodus the 21st chapter and the 2nd verse—"If he came in by himself, he shall go out by himself: if he were married, then his wife shall go out with him. If his master have given him a wife, and she have borne him sons or daughters, the wife and her children shall be her master's and he shall go out by himself. And if the servant shall plainly say, I love my master, my wife, and my children, I will not go out free; then his master shall bring him unto the judges; he shall also bring him to the door, or unto the door-

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post, and his master shall bore his ear through with an awl, and he shall serve him for ever." Now, I say that there is nothing divine in that, and I say it is not even human. The tendency of modern legislation and civilisation is to introduce a state of society exactly the opposite of that. I say that any half dozen men who were to pass such a law as that in any civilised community would be condemned as inhuman, would be execrated by the voice of to-day; and you cannot suppose that, in any age, that came from an all-good God which to-day's civilisation would reject. You say, "If a master gives his slave a wife," why! that presumes that a master has a right to have a slave wife! a woman from whom he may breed a race of slaves, and that if the servant insists on his own freedom at the end of the time, that he is to go, and leave the wife and the children in the custody of the master; and that if he loves his wife and children enough to stay with them, the reward he is to get for that, according to this book, is that he is to lose his liberty for ever. Now, I will give you next Leviticus, chapter xxvi, verses 44 to 46, because, while Exdous shows you how this legislation deals with the Jews, Leviticus shows you how the laws deal with the heathen. That runs in this way: "Both thy bondmen and thy bondmaids which thou shalt have, shall be of the heathen that are round about you; of them shall ye buy bondmen and bondmaids. Moreover, of the children of the strangers that do sojourn among you, of them shall ye buy, and of their families that are with us, which they begat in your land: and they shall be your possession. And ye shall take them as an inheritance for your children after you, to inherit them for a possession; they shall be your bondmen for ever." That is the law as to the heathen; then it goes on to say that, "over your brethren the children of Israel ye shall not rule with rigour." And you have two distinct laws here, one affecting the Jews, from Exodus, another affecting the heathen: and God, according, to Mr. Roberts, approves of slavery, thinks that people may buy and sell slaves, breed and get slaves, and keep slaves for ever. And I say, instead of that being divine, it is most inhuman; I say that doctrine made the most horrible slavery persistent in America; I say the consequence of texts existing like this was, that when William Lloyd Garrison wanted a Christian Church, to preach in, in Boston, on slavery, it was denied him, and he was obliged to have the only Infidel hall in Boston, because there was no other platform admitted to him. Samuel James May, a religious man, tells you how he was not allowed to preach in any of the churches where he had been formerly allowed to preach when he became secretary to the Abolition Society; and in Whittier's works you will find in one of his grandest poems a denunciation of the South Carolina clergy, where they held a demonstration in all their churches in favour of slavery. I say this slavery is a horrible doctrine, a wicked and damnable doctrine, which has cursed human-kind, and you can only defend it here to-night by telling me that this book came out in the childhood and infancy of the world, when people did not understand what freedom was. Its brutal and barbarous legislation has grown out of the character of its authors. It belongs to the far-off past. Now I will come to the question of legislation on difference of religious opinions. And I will take you now to Deuteronomy, chapter xiii. verse 6: 'If thy brother, the son of thy mother, or thy son, or thy daughter, or the wife of thy bosom, or thy friend, which is as thine own soul, entice thee secretly, saying, Let us go and serve other gods, which thou hast not known, thou, nor thy fathers; namely, of the gods of the people which are round about you, nigh unto thee, or far off from thee, from the one end of the earth even unto the other end of the earth, thou shalt not consent unto him, nor hearken unto him; neither shalt thine eyes pity him, neither shalt thou spare, neither shalt thou conceal him: But thou shalt surely kill him; thine hand shall be first upon him to put him to death, and afterwards the hand of all the people. And thou shalt stone him with stones, that he die." Now I say that is a doctrine which an all-wise and all-good and all-merciful God would never preach to human-kind; it shows a bigotry, it show a weakness, it shows an indisposition to listen to reason. Why! what would even be the doctrine Mr. Roberts would advocate, as evinced by his opposition to me here? When he meets an Infidel, instead of his hand being upon him to stone him to death, he challenges him to debate, to persuade him out of the opinion he thinks erroneous, while, according to the authentic revelation, what he ought to have done was to have killed me. His humanity rebels against that, and he will have nothing whatever to do with it. Now, if that is so, is it not evidence that he cannot think that book an evidence of divine revelation? Then I will refer

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you to Numbers xxxi. 17, as illustrating the sort of doctrine that God thought fit to recommend in cases of war. I hold the doctrine that all offensive war is bad. That war except in defence of liberty is never justifiable. I do not know how far anyone who believes in the Bible would agree with that. I suppose those who believe in the Bible would think that war is good, because war is so strongly recommended in the early part or it. Killing the people you quarrel with, destroying all their cities, butchering their men, wives, and mothers, only sparing the women, who would be the subjects of your lusts: I say that all that is provided for here. I will not read to you, as I might, but simply refer you to Numbers xxxi. 17, and if it be challenged, I will read you thirty or forty texts worse than that. I say, while you find texts like that in the book, it is no use telling me something that Festus said, or something that somebody else ought to have said. Deal with the book itself, and clear its blemishes away. I will have to draw my friend's attention to the point raised by him last night on the question of chronology. He quoted, as evidence for the Bible, the Septuagint; he referred to some passage in Josephus, but did not read it. I have not looked at the passage in Josephus recently. If my memory serves me rightly—and I am not quite sure it does—Josephus vouches nothing more than a translation of the Pentateuch; and I do not deny that the rolls of the Pentateuch have been in existence for a very long period prior to the Christian era. I should be simply a madman to attempt to deny anything of the kind; but what I do deny is, that you can identify the Pentateuch we have here with the rolls of the Pentateuch that did exist prior to the Christian era. I say that there is no Pentateuch roll which can be carried back earlier than the famous Darghestan roll; and I say that that comes nearly 600 years on this side of the Christian era by the contention of its best men—580 odd years; and I urge to you that the very matter in dispute between Mr. Roberts and myself turns on this. I do not pretend the Bible to be a forgery—I have not pretended it in any fashion; but I do pretend it to be, like every other religious book, an outgrowth of different ages, of different men, of different peoples, bundled together without one reason for bundling it together, and which cannot be contended to be a complete, coherent book under any circumstances whatever. I do not contend that, from the time of Solomon forward, it may not be possible that every king recorded in the Bible may possibly have ruled; but that will not make out one iota of evidence against me. You have got to prove the facts that I challenge, and to explain the difficulties I submit to be explained; you have got to prove that the theories I impeach fit into your doctrine of divine revelation, or you do nothing at all. Now we have got to the second night of this debate, and I submit to you that we have not got the shadow of a scintilla of evidence, because all that has been sought to be done is to show you that some people called Christians are in existence, which I do not dispute. Then we were told that all the Apostles lost their lives, and then Mr. Roberts thought some of them did not. Now, I will ask him to find a reliable account of the martyrdom of any one of them, and I will ask him even then how far he has advanced his proof, because there have been people martyred for every religion in the world. There have been martyrs for every heresy. Martyrdom is no voucher of the divinity of the book. I will show you that, when Jesus was in danger, his disciples ran away, and his most trusty disciple denied him over and over again. And I ask you, if Peter, who knew from heaven itself that Jesus was from heaven, denied him, how can you expect me to believe the Bible on Peter's authority—that authority even unvouched? I will not weary you at present with any examination of the New Testament, because, if we begin the subject, let us begin it at the beginning; and I will ask whether it is not true that each of the accounts of the Creation in the first and second chapters of Genesis contradicts the other? And I say the book is anonymous—you do not know when, or where, or by whom, it was written—and that you cannot prove that the Hebrew language existed at the time Moses lived; and, until you have done that, it is no use telling me the writings were in current circulation at the time they were supposed to be written and issued. Let us have the book of Genesis proved first, and my objections to the Books of the Pentateuch first. Then we will go on step by step, and get a little further. Has there been any attempt here to-night to show you that the objections I stated last night from the Bible are not fairly taken? I say, Not one. I will give you again the texts: Exodus xxxii. 7-14, comparing that with Exodus xxviii. 1, xxxii. 28, 35; Numbers xxiii. 19; 1 Samuel xv. 29; Malachi iii. 6;

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2 Kings xx. 1-11; 2 Samuel xxiv. 15, 16; Genesis vi. 6; 1 Samuel xv. 11; Genesis xviii. 20, 21; Deuteronomy viii. 2; 2 Chronicles xxi. 15. I commented on the horrible story of the God-invented Fall, I impeached the history of the humanity-destroying Flood, and not one of those points has been touched from the other side. (Time called.)

MR. ROBERTS QUESTIONS MR. BRADLAUGH.

Mr. Bradlaugh, you have admitted the reliability of the evidence of Tacitus and of Pliny to the fact that there existed a large Christian community at the end of the first century, and that they were the subjects of persecution?—I have not admitted the reliability of the quotation from Tacitus. I am inclined to think that the quotation from Tacitus is liable to impeachment. I think the letter of Pliny is a fairly historic document.

You admit the existence of a Christian community at the end of the first century?—I do not admit the existence of a Christian community at the end of the first century only; I think I can show the existence of what you call a Christian community prior to Christ.

But at all events after Christ?—And I say that the same community I think I can show before.

That is another point. It is sufficient for my present question that you admit the existence of a Christian community at the end of the first century?—I admit the continued existence of a community traceable back prior to the alleged birth of Christ.

My question does not relate——My answer relates to my opinion on the subject.

You must hear my question before you answer it. Do you deny that there existed at the end of the first century a Christian community?—I admit that the sect sometimes called Therapeutæ, sometimes called Essenes or Essean, sometimes called by other names, is found prior to the time of Christ, as evidenced by Philo, and that that same sect, sometimes called Christians, and sometimes by other names, may be traced afterwards.

Then it did exist at the close of the first century?—And prior to the first century.

Did it exist at the close of the first century—yes or no?—I can give no further answer.

You cannot say yes?—I must answer in my own way.

Why are you afraid to say yes? Having admitted there were Christians at the close of the first century, were there writings in circulation amongst them?—I have not the slightest evidence of any identifiable writings in circulation amongst the Christians to whom Pliny refers.

I did not say "identifiable writings;" I said "writings?"—I cannot speak of writings that cannot be identified, for I know nothing of them.

Yes; you might know of the existence of writings that you cannot identify, and I ask whether or not you believe there did exist writings in circulation among them?—If you will describe the writings I will answer you.

I purposely do not describe them?—Then I refuse to answer.

Then you refuse to say whether or not, in your opinion, there were any writings in circulation amongst them?—I refuse to give an answer which will not be of the slightest value.

Then you refuse to answer the question I put?—Give me something that I can identify in my mind, and I will tell you whether I have any evidence of the existence of that or not. I cannot answer on the vague word "writings," because I believe that ever since written language has been used, the people amongst whom the use of written language obtained have had writings.

Did written language obtain amongst the Christians?—Yes.

Did they have among them writings setting forth the facts of their religion?—I do not know.

In your reply to the Bishop of Lincoln you say: "In the early ages of the Christian Church, forgeries of Apostolic writings were common." I want to know if there were genuine Apostolic writings?—I never saw any.

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Do you believe there were forged ones?—I believe that there was a huge multitude of forged writings, and that nearly nine-tenths at least have been abandoned by the Christians themselves.

Does that not prove the existence of genuine ones somewhere?—I do not know that it does; I do not know that the existence of an imitation dragon proves a real one.

Do you mean to say that there can be a counterfeit coin without a genuine one?—Oh yes, if you will travel on the Continent, you will find a good many of them.

Do you mean to say that the idea of genuine coin does not precede the fact of counterfeit?—I do not know.

You do not know?—No.

I will be content with that answer.—What I do know is, that people who want to be dishonest will avail themselves of any means which they think will give effect to their scheme of dishonesty, and that is all I know.

Do you think the Apostles were dishonest men?—I don't know even that they existed; so I cannot call them "dishonest men."

Then what do you mean by forgeries of Apostolic writings?—I mean that there were writings which pretended to be writings of Apostles, when they were only forged writings by people who were not Apostles.

Were there such men as Apostles?—Of every faith; yes.

Of Jesus of Nazareth?—When?

In the first century?—I do not know.

May there have been?—Oh yes, and there may not.

Is it probable or not that they wrote?—I don't know. You say they were ignorant men; and they may not have known how to write.

One of them was not ignorant.—Which?

Paul?—I don't know anything about Paul.

I have in my hands a book—a compilation of Epistles, each of which begins with an introduction similar to this: "Paul, an Apostle of Jesus Christ, through the will of God unto the Church of God, which is at Corinth, to them that are sanctified in Christ Jesus, called to be saints." How do you disprove that Epistle?—It is not my business to disprove it; it is yours to prove it.

I have read a letter supposed to be addressed by Jesus to a king. It is not my business to disprove those things: it is yours to prove them.

You have admitted that Eusebius is a historian who lived, and whose writings are to be trusted?—No; I have not. On the contrary, I have said that Eusebius lived and wrote; and I also said that he was a party to the issue of many forgeries.

Do you believe that he lived in the beginning of the fourth century?—Yes.

Do you believe that, living at that time, he had materials—better materials than either you or I have—of judging whether these were genuine writings or not?—I am quite sure that he *made* materials; and if you give me, as you have it, his "Ecclesiastical History," I will give you instances of several that he made or circulated unjustifiably.

I refer my question to a particular point, to which I wish to call your attention. He lived 1500 years ago or thereabouts. My question is, whether or not you admit that at that time it was easier to judge—by reason of the great number of books then existing which have since perished—upon the question of whether these were authentic or not?—I don't suppose so many books existed in the fourth century as now.

Then, do you deny he was in a better position than you to judge?—I don't suppose that he was in so good a position, because I believe he invented some times. If you give me the writings of Eusebius you refer to, I will give you the evidence of my statement. I am not producing Eusebius; you are.

I am producing Eusebius in order to show that in his judgment these Epistles were written by the Apostle Paul, and the Gospels written by those whose names they bear.—And I say that the statements in Eusebius will not prove that the Gospels were written by the persons whose names they bear; but, on the contrary, will, at least in one case, prove exactly the opposite, and, if you will lend me Eusebius, I will show you.

No, I will be content with your answer, Mr. Bradlaugh—content, ironically, of course, you understand. Do you think it probable that a community, or a movement which has given a religion to all the civilised nations of Europe, should have existed and

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effected that revolution without authentic writings?—Up to the year A.D. 1000 the Christian religion had not given itself to Europe. The bulk of Europe up to that time did not accept it.

I am speaking of the present fact, the present day—1876.—Then the present day proves no more than Utah, being full of Mormons, proves that Mormonism is true.

I am speaking of the existence of the book.—I do not deny the existence of the book to-day; it is sold at 4d. a copy.

A book is *primâ facie* evidence of itself until it is disproved.—Then the book of Mormon is proof of itself until it is disproved.

And I shall be prepared to disprove it.—Do it.

One thing at a time. I ask you how you disprove that the 1st Epistle to the Corinthians was written by Paul?—That is not my business: It is your business to prove that it was written by him.

It is *primâ facie* evidence of itself?—No; but it is not until you, by external evidence, have proved the authenticity of the book from which you quote; you have not the slightest right to read its contents as evidence against me.

Then you cannot get rid of this *primâ facie* evidence?—It is not *primâ facie* evidence. We disagree as to the meaning of the words.

The 1st Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians exists with a profession on the face of it that it was written by Paul: can you disprove that profession?—Then Mahomedanism is true, and the evidence is this: the Koran exists. Can you disprove the evidence of the Koran?

Yes.—Do it.

This is not the time. Can you disprove that? (Paul's 1st Epistle to the Corinthians.)—I have disproved the reliability of the Bible by quoting an abundance of contradictory texts from it.

The 1st Epistle to the Corinthians: that is my question.—I have no other answer to give to that.

Then you cannot disprove it?—My business is not to disprove every statement you make without evidence.

Here is the book; it is *primâ facie* evidence of itself until it is disproved?—No, it is not. The book stating that a devil went into the pigs is not evidence until it is proved. You have got to show the evidence outside the books.

Then Mr. Bradlaugh fails in dislodging the basis of my argument to-night; he confesses his inability to disprove the 1st Epistle to the Corinthians as the production of Paul.—I have only said it is not my business. The moment you give any evidence of it I will answer that evidence.

Will it not destroy my argument if you disprove it?---But there is nothing to disprove: you have called no witness.

I have called the 1st Epistle to the Corinthians.---You have not proved it in the smallest degree.

It is proved by the unanimous consent of a hundred generations.---So is the Koran proved by the unanimous consent of a hundred generations, and many a falsehood in the world by an equal number of generations.

And if they were not capable of being disproved, we should be bound to receive them; but they can be disproved. Can you disprove the 1st Epistle to the Corinthians?---Generally, on the Bible, I have tried to, and you have not answered one of the texts I have given.

You say it is not your business?---On the contrary, I say that the Book of Genesis contradicts itself, and that the Gospels contradict themselves; and until you answer that, your case is disproved.

MR. BRADLAUGH QUESTIONS MR. ROBERTS.

Did I understand you last night to say that the chronology in the Septuagint differed from the chronologies in the authorised English version?---Yes.

Which chronology is true?---The Hebrew.

How do you know that the Hebrew chronology is more true than that in the

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Septuagint?---By a process of argument which would be too extensive to rehearse to-night.

I would like to have it.---I cannot do it in the time.

When will you?---In a lecture.

But now?---I have not time.

Do you mean that during the whole of the debate you will have no time to explain why you accept the Hebrew chronology, and reject the Septuagint?---With the immense argument I have to unfold, I do say I have not time.

Then, as you say that the Hebrew chronology is true, and the Septuagint chronology is not true, how do you account for a book, which you say was translated from a divine revelation, having an incorrect translation, at least as far as the chronology is concerned?---Because the translation was out of the custody of its safe and divinely-appointed keepers.

Who were the "safe and divinely-appointed keepers" of the original revelation?---I answer by quoting the Apostle Paul in the third chapter of Romans: "What advantage, then, hath the Jew? . . . chiefly because that *unto them were committed the oracles of God.*"

Will you be kind enough to show me any evidence prior to the time of Ptolemy Philadelphus, when you say the Septuagint translation was made, that the "original revelation was in the custody of" its safe and divinely-appointed keepers? Who do you say were the custodians of these writings? Tell me where kept, the town they were kept in, and the people who, you say, had the custody of them?—That is rather an extensive question; break it up.

Well, name the town where they were kept, first?---Shiloh, first.

When were they kept in Shiloh? from what date to what date?---Just after Joshua's conquest of Canaan by the tribes of Israel.

Where shall I find any evidence of that?---In the Book of Joshua.

Will you kindly quote me chapter and verse for that?—Yes, I will (after turning over a Bible for some time): Judges xviii. 31.

Do you rely on that text?---Wait a moment; let me give you my answer.

Don't you know there is not a word about any of the books being kept in Shiloh in that text?---Yes; that is only a part of my answer.

But where have you any evidence that at, or about, the time of Joshua any books were kept in Shiloh?---This is the first part of my answer. My answer is not complete. I prove here that the house of God was at Shiloh. I will next prove that the house of God contained the ark, and that the ark contained the books of Moses.

I am content to accept any evidence. Give me some.---I will give you the evidence (referring to the Bible).

I say that there is not a particle of evidence of the existence of any books about the time of Joshua in Shiloh.---Then I will prove it.

That is what I want you to do.---Deuteronomy xxxi. 24: "It came to pass when Moses had made an end of writing the words of this law in a book, until they were finished, that Moses commanded the Levites, which bare the ark of the covenant of the Lord, saying, Take this book of the law, and put it in the side of the ark of the covenant of the Lord your God, that it may be there for a witness against thee."

Where does that show that the five books you call the books of Moses were kept in Shiloh after the time of Joshua?---It shows that Moses commanded the Levites to put it there, and I must next prove that the Levites put it there. I ought to have begun by quoting the command of God to Moses.

I must ask you not to make speeches, but to give me the evidence. Please identify the book of the law with the five books?---I am dealing with the evidence to which I am alluding. In Exodus xxv. 16, we have the command that I ought to have quoted first---the command of God to Moses: "Thou shalt put into the ark the testimony which I shall give thee."

Exodus xxv. 16: I will read it: "Thou shalt put into the ark the testimony which I shall give thee." Will you show me how I am to make that prove that the first five books, which you call the Books of Moses, were kept in Shiloh at the time of Joshua?—And in Numbers iii. 31 we have the duty of the priests to take charge of the ark and its contents.

Numbers iii. 31: "Their charge shall be in the ark, and the table, and the candlestick

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and the altars, and the vessels of the sanctuary wherewith they minister, and the hanging, and all the service thereof." How does that prove that the first five books were in Shiloh after the time of Joshua?—It establishes a line of evidence, which a critical mind ought to be able to see.

Oh! does it?—Yes. Well, I think I need not attempt at present to continue this.

Do you mean you have given all the evidence you can?—No. I will undertake, when I have time, to do it.

When will you undertake to do it? On which night of the debate? Choose your own night.—I had better promise generally—before the discussion is out.

But "generally" means no time at all?—I don't like to commit myself to anything I am not sure of doing.

Do you mean to say that you cannot do it?—I am quite sure of my ability to do it.

What date do you say was the date of Joshua?—As a man?

You have spoken of "Joshua."—Do you mean Joshua as a man or a book?

I mean it in the sense you have used it.—I have used it in both senses.

When you said the five books were in Shiloh about the time of Joshua, I want to know in years, *Anno Mundi*, what time you meant?—Well, I suppose it would be in round numbers, somewhere about 1,500 years before Christ.

"Somewhere about 1,500 years" before the Christian era. Is there a particle of evidence outside the Bible of the existence of Hebrew as a written language at that date?—The Bible is sufficient evidence.

Just answer my question: Is there a particle of evidence outside the Bible of the existence of Hebrew as a written language at that date?—Yes, there is.

Give it me?—I cannot—not now.

Will you undertake to give me that evidence any night during this debate?—You are putting on me rather too much work, Mr. Bradlaugh.

Oh! I will put on you more than that; that is only a trifle. Will you undertake on any night during this debate to give that evidence—yes or no?—The Bible is such good evidence that I undertake to produce no other, although I believe there is.

Why do you believe there is any other evidence?—From scattered information I have gleaned in general reading.

Where?—General reading.

Where?—Everywhere.

Name an author?—All authors who have written on the subject with whom I have come in contact.

Name one that you have come in contact with?—The question is so frivolous I refuse to answer.

Then under those circumstances I decline to put any more questions.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Roberts will now have a quarter of an hour's speech.

Mr. ROBERTS: Mr. Bradlaugh occupied a considerable portion of his half hour's speech in reminding me of what he considered my failures. I have to remind him of what is a much greater failure on his part, and that is to deal with the positive argument in so far as I have unfolded it. I grant I have not yet conducted it very far; but, so far as I have carried it, Mr. Bradlaugh has not attempted to deal with it. Some of his difficulties I will deal with. At none of them am I frightened. In fact, I could like nothing better than a public test on this point in such a form as would admit of a thorough investigation. It is impossible, in the limit of six nights, conducted in this way, to go into the thing in that thorough, exhaustive, and critical manner that would be necessary for the full illustration of the whole of the bearings of the case. I am, therefore, obliged to content myself with a wise way of dealing with the question in a limited time—viz., the plan of seizing hold of those positive, unquestionable facts which Mr. Bradlaugh himself dare not deny, and which, when logically construed, yield the general conclusions for which I am contending, notwithstanding all those little bits of exceptions which he was taking, and discrepancies which he was urging, as regards the general contents of the Bible. I will undertake, in a thorough legal investigation, in the presence of a judge—so to speak—in which Mr. B. shall question me for so long, and make a speech on my answers, and I question him, and make a speech on his answers, and so forth—I would undertake, under those circumstances, to deal with

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every single item that he can produce in the way of general discrepancy; and, under such circumstances, I would undertake that every single difficulty that could be brought forward would melt away in the process. But, meanwhile, it would be most unwise in me to go grappling with the difficulties before I have marshalled the general evidence before you. It is my business to present these evidences, and it is Mr. Bradlaugh's business to deal with my general demonstration of the positive case, instead of trying to drown my argument with little points, that are not in reality inconsistent with it.

Now, pursuing the general argument, I resume the thread which I was obliged to break, or to drop, at the close of my first half-hour's speech. I was then showing that the apostles did not expect Christ to die. I will now show that, being dead, they did not expect him to rise. In John xx. 9: "As yet they knew not the Scripture, that he must rise again from the dead." I will next show that, when he did rise, they did not believe it in the first case—all of which goes to show that there was no predisposition in their minds to entertain any fantasy on the subject, and that, therefore, the theory of hallucination relied on by those who deny the certainty of Christ's resurrection is inconsistent with the facts. The evidence on that point is to be found, amongst other places, in Luke xxiv. 10, 11: "It was Mary Magdalene, and Joanna, and Mary, the mother of James, and other women that were with them, which told these things unto the apostles. And their words seemed to them as idle tales, and they believed them not." Then in Mark xvi. 14 we have this statement: "Afterwards he (Jesus) appeared unto the eleven as they sat at meat, and upbraided them with their unbelief and hardness of heart, because they believed not them which had seen him after he was risen." How came they, then, not expecting him to rise, and not believing the testimony of those who had seen him rise; how came they to believe in the fact of his having risen, and to give their lives and their well-being for the sake of their testimony to that fact? The answer is to be found in testimony which I have partly quoted in the earlier part of the argument. Peter says—speaking of himself and the other apostles—"We did eat and drink with him after he rose from the dead."—(Acts x. 41). One case in particular illustrates the scepticism of the apostolic band as regarded the first report of his resurrection, and also illustrates the means by which that scepticism was dissipated, and a firm faith lodged in its place; and we shall see that it is a faith placed upon actual personal witness, and not at all upon any fantasy, such as might be supposed to be nursed in a heated imagination. In John xx. 24, it is stated: "Thomas, one of the twelve, called Didymus, was not with them when Jesus came"—that is, the time of his first interview with the ten disciples—"the other disciples, therefore, said unto him, We have seen the Lord; but he said unto them, Except I shall see in his hands the print of the nails, and put my fingers into the print of the nails, and thrust my hand into his side, I will not believe. And after eight days again his disciples were within, and Thomas with them. Then came Jesus, the doors being shut, and stood in their midst, and said, Peace be unto you! Then said he to Thomas, Reach hither thy finger, and behold my hands, and reach hither thy hand, and thrust it into my side, and be not faithless, but believing. And Thomas answered and said unto him, My Lord and my God! Jesus saith unto him, Thomas, because thou hast seen me thou hast believed: blessed are they who have not seen, and yet have believed." In Luke xxiv. we find the whole of the apostolic band assembled together at an early period of the day of Christ's resurrection; and they are eagerly discussing the flying rumours they are hearing—first, the report of the women, afterwards, the report of Peter, to whom Christ had separately appeared, then the report of two of the disciples who went on a journey to Emmaus, and to whom Jesus made himself known. We are told in Luke xxiv. 33: "The eleven were gathered together, and them that were with them, saying, The Lord is risen indeed, and hath appeared to Simon! And they (the two who went to Emmaus) told what things were done in the way, and how he was known of them in breaking of bread. And as they thus spake, Jesus himself stood in the midst of them, and said unto them, Peace be unto you! But they were terrified and affrighted." Observe that, if this was a concocted story intended to create the notion—the false notion in that case—that Christ had risen, when he had not, you would not have found all these statements about the disciples not believing, and about them being terrified, and so on. They supposed they had seen a spirit or phantom; they supposed it was not the real Christ. "And he said unto them, why are ye troubled? and why do thoughts arise in your hearts? Behold my hands and my feet, that it is I myself;

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handle me and see: for a spirit"—a phantom—"hath not flesh and bones, as ye see me have. And when he had thus spoken, he showed them his hands and his feet. And while they yet believed not for joy, and wondered, he said unto them, Have ye here any meat? And they gave him a piece of a broiled fish, and of an honey-comb; and he took it, and did eat before them."—(Verses 38-43).

Realise the facts, please, for they constitute an explanation of the great bravery of the apostles in their testimony afterwards, for which they gave their lives.

The Pharisees (Matt. xxvii. 63), remembered that Christ had said that he would rise again after his death, and they asked Pilate to set a watch over his grave after his death, that there might be no doubt as to the fact of death having taken him and kept him, and, therefore, as to the fact of his being an impostor. What story have the Jews now as to the fact, which both Jew and Gentile admit, that the body of Christ was never found, but that the grave was empty? for all the people in Jerusalem at the time were witnesses to that. They say "his disciples stole him while the watch slept." Do you believe that story, that the disciples stole the body of Christ? What object could they have in stealing away a dead body? How could they steal a body with a numerous guard assembled round the sepulchre? They were a scattered and demoralised band. Yet afterwards they appeared in Jerusalem, and declared Christ had risen.

Thousands believed their testimony. Why? Was it because these men, in a fervid and an earnest manner proclaimed their belief in what might have been an illusion? No; the personal witness of the apostles was only one element in the evidence that persuaded thousands of Jews and Gentiles throughout the whole of the Roman Empire that Jesus of Nazareth, crucified by Pontius Pilate, had risen. The New Testament account is that God confirmed the testimony of the apostles by granting signs and wonders to be done by their hands; and I call upon Mr. Bradlaugh to account for the wide-spread reception of their testimony, if that account or explanation of it is not the correct one. Not only were the apostles personal witnesses of the fact of Christ's resurrection, but Christ endowed them with power to do things that constitute the confirmation of their testimony. God invited men to believe in the resurrection of His Son, but He did not unreasonably ask them to believe without evidence. He gave evidence; He placed the seal of His confirmation upon their testimony by fulfilling the promise Christ left them before his ascension. What promise was that? Before Christ parted from them he commanded them, we are told in Acts i. 4, that they should "not depart from Jerusalem, but wait for the promise of the Father, which said he, ye have heard of me." What promise? Here is the promise: John xiv. 26; xv. 26: "The Comforter, who is the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in my name, he shall teach you all things, and bring all things to your remembrance, whatsoever I have said unto you. . . . When the Comforter is come, whom I will send unto you from the Father, even the Spirit of Truth, which proceedeth from the Father, he shall testify of me: and ye also shall bear witness, because ye have been with me from the beginning."

Mr. BRADLAUGH: I understand Mr. Roberts now to say that it is impossible for him to prove his case in six nights. Then he ought not to have challenged me to this debate. He says he could do it before a judge and jury. He selected his own tribunal—a public audience. He says that all the points I have taken would melt away to nothing when investigated one by one. Why does he not do it then, one by one? He has not touched one. He says he can do it, and yet he does not do it; and if he can do it, and does not do it, then he is guilty of not being loyal to the cause he is here to defend. Then he has referred to the texts, and still avoided the points; he actually referred to the twenty-fourth chapter of Luke again, and did not say a word about my challenge as to the six weeks of Christ's alleged appearance after the resurrection. He referred to the tenth verse, about the woman, and did not say a word about that text contradicting the texts in other gospels as to the number of those women. It is not debating to do that; reading a number of texts of Scripture without giving any evidence of them The question to be debated is, "Are the Scriptures the authentic and reliable records of divine revelation?" and Mr. Roberts said that by "authentic" he really meant written by the persons by whom they professed to have been written, and at the times they professed to have been written; and when questioned as to books supposed to have been in existence 1500 B.C., he

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says that involves matter he is not prepared to give, when it is the very point he ought to have been prepared to state. You cannot say that when questioning him I did not wait with the utmost patience: I waited two minutes by the clock for one portion, three minutes for another, and two minutes and a quarter for another: I did not say one word; and he only said, when pressed for the evidence of his statement, that he was not prepared to give it. Asked for some evidence, he answers that I am pressing him too hardly. Pressed as to the authenticity of the first five books he does nothing. If he has not come to prove that, he came to prove nothing, and yet he has to confess, in answer to my questions, that on that point he is not prepared to answer. Well, then, he tells you that Gentiles and Jews admit that the body of Christ could not be found. Well, that is about as wild a saying as it is possible to give, and I dare him to produce me the writings of any Jewish Rabbi of any note at all containing any such admission. I do not pretend to be well read in Rabbinical writings; I have gone through a few volumes relating to them—not many, but I have not yet found a trace of an allegation of any such admission. I think I have read nearly every Christian evidence writing, and I have never seen a quotation from any Jewish Rabbi about anything of the kind, and I say it is utterly reckless—I do not mean it any way unfairly, but only showing that there is an utter looseness and carelessness in this debate about the meaning of words. Mr. Roberts seems to think if he reads statements out of the Bible, he has proved those statements to be true, and then he asks me to explain the wide-spread acceptance of it. But the wide-spread acceptance of a doctrine does not prove it to be true. Buddhism and Brahminism are widely accepted, but that is no proof that they are true. As to Christianity, the "wide-spreading" of it was done by the sabre, by the rack, by the prison, by the fagot, not by the internal evidences of the book. I could quote you from Christian history, going from about the fifth century to the thirteenth, and show you that the people were induced to profess to believe this simply by killing them if they did not believe it. Every religion that has a large number of converts is wide-spread, and if that is evidence of the truth of it, the verdict goes by the majority, and as it is only the minority that believe Christianity, then Christianity is wrong. Well, now, let us, if you please, just see what we have really got; we have had in the last speech—I think I should be within bounds in saying—two-thirds of the quarter of an hour occupied in reading portions of the Bible, and not one reference during that time to the contradictions I had drawn attention to; although on the very question of the resurrection I had pointed out that there were contradictions as to the three days and three nights; although as to the women who went to the sepulchre, I pointed out a distinct contradiction there; although as to the period Christ is stated to have been on the earth after his resurrection, I pointed out a distinct contradiction. All he tells you is what he could do in some other place and circumstances. But if he could not do it here, he should not have been here. Now, if you please, just see the position we are in; not one date alleged for the Book of Genesis, not one author tried to be proved for it; not one date alleged for the Book of Exodus, not one author tried to be proved for it; not one date alleged for the Book of Leviticus, not one author tried to be proved for it; not one date alleged for the Book of Numbers, not one author tried to be proved for it; not one date alleged for the Book of Deuteronomy, not one author tried to be proved for it; a statement, for which there is no foundation whatever, was made that in the time of Joshua these five books were kept in a place called Shiloh. When we have got some statement of that kind, of which there is not a particle of evidence here, then I shall want some proof of the place called Shiloh, and I think Mr. Roberts will find he has got his work to do there. And I shall want proof of any evidence in the world that there were manuscripts existing at that time; and I will show you, from the size of the ark, and the only fashion of record common to the country where the Jews were in the alleged time of Moses, that it would be simply impossible that you could have had anything of the kind. I said to Mr. Roberts, "Give some *prima facie* evidence," and he said, "O! I will do it some night in the debate; I am not quite sure I shall do it at all;" and I am sure you cannot do it at all. But that is what he ought to have done in his first speech. He has jumped over the whole of the Old Testament, and thinks that by reading from the gospels and the Acts of the Apostles, that he proves the authenticity of the

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whole of the Bible. Why! reading the Lord's Prayer will not prove the truth of the rest of the Book. Reading some story—and what have we had? a curious story; a story of Jesus appearing to two disciples going to Emmaus; while they could see him they did not know him, and directly they could not see him, knew him; and that is the best evidence he can give you. Why! if it were submitted to sane people as an event of to-day, only one verdict could be come to. How is this debate to go on? I am asked about the "widespread." Shall I deal with the "wide-spread," step by step? If you appeal to the wide-spread, I must take it as I find it; and what do I find this Church to be? I find it, in its earlier ages, to be a Church that made its way by fraud, by forgery, by assassination, and by perjury; I find it described by its own ministers as full of licentiousness and corruption; find that as it grew it incited wars all through Europe; took the side of king against people, and enslaving the people; I find it crushing out the possibility of education, and so destroying philosophy that it is only to the Moors we owe the preservation of great thought. If you want the spread, take the spread as it was through the centuries of gloom and ignorance, and the only gleam of light you will find in it is during the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries, when the bloody Crusades, and the ruined cities, and the burnt homes showed in bright relief the humanity of your Christianity. If you want the spread, take it in the early part of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries; take it under John of Burgundy and Charles the Bold, and under Charles and Louis of France. Take it when the Church aided to destroy the toiling burghers of Dinant. Take it when the priests of this book cursed the city, when they stood by while the duke and king razed every house to the ground! You talk of divine revelation! In the names of the murdered women of Dinant I impeach the faith founded on it. I say the whole history of it has been a history of cruelty, of fraud and of crime, until civilisation, struggling out, despite the whole hindrances of your superstition, has purified your religion despite itself. I should have been content, if anything like evidence had been given, to answer that evidence; I should have been content, if texts had been examined, to go through text by text. I am told I have piled up a bundle of texts. Yes; and I could have made it tenfold. Instead of any answer, I am referred to the "wide-spread" of it! "Wide-spread" of it! Where will you take it to-day? Which is it? Rome, England, Nonconformists, Unitarians, Trinitarians? Do not tell me about the "wide-spread," when there are a hundred sects cursing and damning one another, and at the present moment preparing for war against one another right through Europe! "Wide-spread" of it! Why, if you want any proof that it is not authentic, it is that it has failed to dominate mankind in the interest of humanity; if you want any proof of it, it is that the clergy are obliged to admit that belief in this book is disappearing as education increases; if you want any proof that it is not a Divine revelation, it is that while this version is urged to you as God's only message to man, a committee are now sittng to make out a new one! Friends, I will not intrude any longer on your attention, because I have exhausted, within a minute or two, the time alloted to me, but I must ask you to bear with me while I point out what my opponent ought to have done, and what he ought not to have done, because, practically, in the quarter of an hour to come, it will be divided into two short speeches. According to my friend's own contention he should have given you some evidence of the authenticity of the book. He has given you none. He should have been prepared to defend the morality of the book; but he has not answered what I said about slavery and murder, and the contradictions in the character of God; he has only read to you about Jesus being dead, and eating broiled fish and honey-comb when he was dead, and he apparently thinks that this passes in lieu of proof. And then he says it is impossible to do it in six nights. Then cease the debate at once; do not take six nights, and do not waste time in the unavailing attempt to do it. He says he can do it before a judge and jury, instead of which he is bound to do it before the tribunal he himself has chosen, a sensible and intelligent audience of Leicester men, who are able to form an opinion, and who will only have one verdict to give. [A pause.]

Mr. ROBERTS: I was only asking the chairman that I might have a quarter of an hour for the conclusion of my argument, but it seems we are pledged to close at 10

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o'clock, and, therefore, I must submit to the partition of the remaining time. I have, therefore, to say that Mr. Bradlaugh has either misunderstood or deliberately misrepresented my argument about the wide-spread reception. I did not refer to the wide-spread reception of the Christian tradition in the 19th century: I alluded to the wide-spread belief engendered in the mind of the Roman public in the first century. according to his own admission, in the face of all manner of pains and penalties, And what I ask him to do is to reconcile that undoubted historic phenomenon with any notion of Christ's not having risen from the dead, and of the disciples expressly declaring what they believed to be—what they knew to be—not true I will suppose a parallel case: I will suppose that the people of Leicester were to succeed in some way or another—not possible under our constitution, I admit—in apprehending Mr. Bradlaugh, and hanging him, and his dead body delivered up under official attestation, and buried, and all the Secularists disheartened and squandered; and the Leicester Secularists are found a few weeks after holding public meetings in the Temperance Hall, Leicester, and saying, "Mr. Bradlaugh has risen from the dead;" and the magistrates say, "If you say that, you shall go to prison;" and they say, "Well, we shall go to prison; but we declare that to be true, for we have seen him; we are not speaking of a mere opinion of our own; we rest our declaration on personal experience." And suppose that, in spite of their imprisonment, in spite of their fining, in spite of the assassination of their leading members, these same Secularists go up and down the country, and proclaim that Mr. Bradlaugh has risen from the dead, and that thousands in this enlightened country believe their testimony, notwithstanding pains and penalties that Parliament should decree against the reception of their testimony; then I say that, in that case, you would afterwards have a great historical problem to solve upon some rational principle; and if the facts of the case were equal to the facts in this other case, there would be no rational explanation, apart from the fact that Mr. Bradlaugh had really risen. In fact, the case could not occur apart from the fact that Mr. Bradlaugh had really risen from the dead, and that his followers had seen and conversed with him for a sufficiently long time to make it quite sure that they were not labouring under some hallucination of the senses. And these are the undoubted facts of this case; for Mr. Bradlaugh has admitted the existence of this wide-spread community in the first century, in days when they were persecuted, and attempted to be destroyed by all manner of evil agencies; the central feature of whose contention was that Christ had risen from the dead. I quoted from their authenticated writings, and my argument is not completed, and I am not able to complete it within the six or seven minutes that fall to my lot. Mr. Bradlaugh says I am away from the subject. Surely Mr. Bradlaugh will admit that if I prove Christ's resurrection, I prove him divine.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Yes.

Mr. ROBERTS: And if I prove him divine, I prove that his endorsement of Moses and the prophets is, in itself, a conclusive evidence of the divinity of these documents, apart from all abstruse and difficult questions connected with localities in remote times in which it is difficult almost to identify any place, particularly in profane records, and particularly as affecting other nations. With regard to the Jewish nation, with regard to Jewish localities, with regard to Jewish events, there is more abundant identification, and more definite and circumstantial evidence, than in the case of any nation under heaven.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: No.

Mr. ROBERTS: Well, of course, Mr. Bradlaugh thinks not; but I declare that to be a fact, which even Sir Isaac Newton alleged to be a fact, as the result of his acquaintance with general literature, that no book of similar antiquity, and no event in history, are so well authenticated, in accordance with all the rules of evidence, as the New Testament and the resurrection of Christ. Mr. Bradlaugh has attempted to represent that I am speaking irrelevantly to the issue, whereas, if the facts I am contending for—which I contended for last night, which I have been contending for to-night, and which I shall contend for in the nights to come—if these are all established, which I am sure they can be, then my case for the Bible is proved, and all Mr. Bradlaugh's objections will be seen in the light of trifling minor and obscure issues, which fall in with and are governed by the incontestible body of evidence that proves the Scriptures to be "the authentic and reliable records of divine revelation."

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Mr. BRADLAUGH: I have not admitted, and I carefully guarded my answer to prevent the possibility of such an admission, that there was a body of Christians in the first century believing in the story of Jesus as recorded in the gospels; for I pointed out that the people called Christians were people whom I thought that I identified as existing before Christ, who, therefore, could not have held any such belief; and it is not fair, therefore, to say I admitted it. Hence, I say there is not a particle of evidence given to us, because the reading of the gospels is no evidence until it is shown who wrote the gospels, when they were written, where they were written, and that they did circulate, as Mr. Roberts said he would prove, at the time of the events to which they relate. Now, Mr. Roberts says it is difficult to identify Jewish places. I did not ask him to identify them; he mentioned them, and he should not have mentioned a place he could not identify. Mr. Roberts says something of Sir Isaac Newton; but however good Sir Isaac Newton may be on some subjects, he is no good authority on Egyptian chronology or anything of the kind; because, during the last forty years, Bunsen has opened a field of inquiry of which Sir Isaac Newton and those who preceded him, were necessarily utterly ignorant. Then he says, if I were put to death to-day, and you folks went about saying you had seen me, would not that be conclusive? Well, but there is no evidence of anything of the kind having happened with regard to Jesus. Reading the gospels does not prove it. Reading the other day in the *Daily Telegraph* the story of the Sea Serpent, does not prove that the serpent stretched out thirty feet to bite a mast, more than twice the distance from the surface of the sea, and no sane person would pretend it does. You have got to verify the story before the story can be of the slightest value as to the facts it relates. Then, how do we stand now? Why, nothing whatever has been done. Mr. Roberts in his last speech says they conversed with Jesus for a sufficiently long period to make it clear. But the very period I have challenged as being contradicted in the gospels he quotes, and how can he pretend to keep repeating his statement until he has reconciled that? To say that every little thing can be cleared away, and not doing it, is simply to waste time with a mere verbiage of talk. He has not given me anything whatever to do in the way of reply, and I simply conclude my speech by thanking you for your attention, and by moving a vote of thanks to our chairman for having presided over us so impartially for these two nights.

Mr. ROBERTS having seconded the vote of thanks, the Chairman responded and the meeting closed.

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Third Night,

THURSDAY, 15th JUNE, 1876,

IN THE TEMPERANCE HALL, BIRMINGHAM.

MR. GEORGE H. ST. CLAIR IN THE CHAIR.

THE CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen, we are met together to hear a very important question discussed by two gentlemen very competent to discuss it. The question is, "Are the Scriptures the authentic and reliable records of Divine revelation?" The discussion of this question was commenced two evenings ago at Leicester, but we shall scarcely be at any disadvantage on that account, inasmuch as separate points are to be taken up each evening. In the agreement made between the two gentlemen it is provided that Mr. Roberts shall lead off with a speech of half an hour's length on the affirmative, that Mr. Bradlaugh shall follow with a speech of the same length on the negative side, then that Mr. Roberts shall have the liberty for a quarter of an hour either of making a speech or of questioning Mr. Bradlaugh: Mr. Bradlaugh to give categorical answers, not making a speech himself, and afterwards Mr. Bradlaugh shall have the same privilege of questioning Mr. Roberts for a quarter of an hour. Thus we shall occupy an hour and a half of our time. For the remaining hour it is arranged that the speakers shall speak alternately for a quarter of an hour at a time. That will bring us to ten o'clock, and at ten o'clock the meeting is to close. You will perceive that this arrangement leaves no room for any remarks to be made by the chairman, and it leaves no room for any interruptions on the part of the audience. It is, indeed, very properly provided that should either disputant be interrupted the time thus wasted—and it will be utterly wasted—shall not count against him; the only result therefore would be to keep the entire meeting to an unnecessarily late hour. Those, therefore, who disturb the public peace will be in a sense enemies of us all. However, I anticipate no interruption; I address you as ladies and gentlemen, and I anticipate nothing but polite conduct on the part of all. I now call upon Mr. Roberts to open the discussion on the affirmative side.

MR. ROBERTS: Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am sorry that so far as this audience is concerned, we have to begin in the middle of the discussion. That is a form of things that I tried to avoid, but was not successful. By what may for the purpose of to-night be described as an awkward twist in the preliminary negociations, I was compelled to consent to have two nights at Leicester out of six nights which I wanted at Birmingham. I do not now propose to occupy time in paying any further attention to that point, but I thought it necessary to allude to it as a necessary recognition of the awkwardness which I feel to some extent you are placed in and I also. In order, however, that there may be as little disadvantage as possible resulting from that circumstance, I will indicate in a sentence or two, so far as that can be done, what has taken place at Leicester.

On the first night I began the argument, at the date at which we were assembled and contended that the circumstances existing in the world at the present time are such as ought to exist if the Bible be true, and that the evidence that ought to exist of the early existence of the Scriptures if the Bible is true, does exist that there is ample evidence of the authenticity of these books which constitute the New Testament, upon which I contended the Old was also proved

night I argued that that great revolution in the history of mankind which occurred 1,800 years ago, by the general consent of all men, cannot be accounted for upon any rational principle apart from the account given in the New Testament, and that is that Jesus of Nazareth, who was crucified by Pontius Pilate, rose from the dead, and spent a certain length of time with his friends, and then left them with a promise to return, and afterwards endowed them with power to give evidence of the truth of their testimony in the working of miracles.

All that Mr. Bradlaugh has done hitherto has been, first, to neglect my general argument, which perhaps he did not quite comprehend, and secondly, to try to divert me from it by calling my attention to a number of discrepancies in detail, which certainly I admit at the right time ought to be capable of reconciliation with the general argument, but which it is out of my power, in the rehearsal of that general argument, to notice meanwhile. He demanded that I should first prove when and by whom the book of Genesis was written, when and by whom the book of Exodus was written, when and by whom all the other books were written; but I take a more sensible plan. When I wish to cross to the other side of a river, I begin by walking on this end of the bridge; and I began to step towards the other bank by lifting my feet in 1876, and marching downwards to the first century; and we have got there, and we are there to-night, and I have to-night to call your attention to what I shall contend to be the most unanswerable evidence of the resurrection of Christ that can be produced. I refer to the case of the apostle Paul.

The apostle Paul is a man whose individuality stands out more distinctly from the dark background of antiquity than almost any man of similarly remote times, with the single exception, perhaps, of Jesus his master. We not only have his biography written clearly, concisely, and distinctly, by a fellow-voyager of his, but we have a compilation of authentic letters of Paul, written under a variety of circumstances, and dealing with a variety of matters, in which even the minute shades of his character and tendencies are visible. Mr. Bradlaugh chose to deny the authenticity of them, he did no more. I asked Mr. B. to disprove them; he said that was not his business; and as a matter of fact, he has not done it. Therefore I am entitled, in to-night's argument, to assume it as an undisputed thing that these letters of Paul are Paul's letters, being *primâ facie* evidence of themselves, until they are set aside, and I am certain Mr. Bradlaugh cannot set them aside, as will be manifest to you in the course of this evening's discussion.

Upon that basis, then, I introduce to your notice Saul of Tarsus. In what character do we first find him? We find him an enemy of the Christians. In the 7th chapter of the Acts of the Apostles, we read that Stephen was slain for his testimony to the resurrection of Christ—stoned by the Jews and (58th verse), "the witnesses laid down their clothes at a young man's feet whose name was Saul." We next find him not only passively endorsing or sanctioning the destruction of the professed believers in the resurrection of Christ, but we find him taking very active and energetic steps to compass that end. In the 8th chapter and the 3rd verse, "Saul made havoc of the church, entering into every house and hailing men and women, committed them to prison." In Acts ix. 1, "Saul, yet breathing out threatenings and slaughter against the disciples of the Lord, went unto the high priest and desired of him letters to Damascus to the synagogue, that if he found any of this way"—that is, believers in Christ—"whether they were men or women, he might bring them bound to Jerusalem." That is the testimony of one who was afterwards a companion of Paul in his journeys. I will now produce Paul's own confirmation of these statements: I will give you Paul's own declarations as to his previous career. In the first chapter of the Epistle to the Galatians, verse 13, he says: "Ye have heard of my conversation in time past in the Jew's religion, how that beyond measure I persecuted the Church of God, and wasted it, and profited in the Jews' religion above many my equals in mine own nation, being more exceedingly zealous of the traditions of my fathers." Again, in 1st Timothy i. 12: "I thank Christ Jesus our Lord, who hath enabled me, for that he counted me faithful, putting me into the ministry, who was before a blasphemer and a persecutor." In Acts xxii. 3-5, you have this account delivered by Paul in an address to a very large and turbulent, but for the moment quiet, assembly of Jews assembled around the foot of the castle stairs, whom he had permission to address at the moment of his apprehension by the Roman governor of Jerusalem:—"I am verily a man which am a Jew, born in Tarsus, a city in Cilicia, yet brought up in this city at the feet of

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Gamaliel, and taught according to the perfect manner of the law of the fathers, and was zealous toward God, as ye all are this day; and I persecuted this way unto the death, binding and delivering into prisons both men and women; as also the high priest doth bear me witness, and all the estate of the elders, from whom also I received letters unto the brethren, and went to Damascus, to bring them who were there bound unto Jerusalem, to be punished."

Now, the man of whom these things are authentically declared, afterwards became one of the most energetic, indomitable, enterprising and successful apostles and a preacher and defender of the faith which he formerly destroyed. No sane man will deny that; and here is the question, How came about that great change? If Paul had been convinced by argument, I would not attach any great weight to the change, because the change in that case would merely indicate a change of his conviction, and would not be a guarantee of the correctness of his convictions. But was he changed by argument? Let us see. Surely such a man is able to give us a reasonable account of so great a change; and when he stood a prisoner before that extensive assembly of his fellow-countrymen at Jerusalem, his particular business was to explain to them how it was that he came to be changed; and I will read you his account.

Before I do so, let me remark that when you come to realise Paul's character, you will find that he was not a man that could be changed by anything short of the evidence of his senses in the particular circumstances in which he was a persecutor. He must have been a witness of the miracles of Christ, as an inhabitant of Jerusalem and a disciple of Gamaliel, a leading Pharisee; but in common with the rest of the Jews, he would see, in the crucifixion of Christ, a complete evidence of Christ's imposture, and a reason why he should refer the miracles of Christ to the supposed magical power to which they ignorantly referred them. This man, who resisted all the evidence displayed in the life of Christ while on earth, changed in the manner I have described, and the mere fact of this change is presumptive evidence that some powerful cause must have produced it. Paul himself explains the cause, and this is his account of it, in the 22nd chapter of Acts, verses 6-16: "And it came to pass," says he, "that as I made my journey (on the persecuting errand before referred to), and was come nigh unto Damascus, about noon, suddenly their shone from heaven a great light round about me. And I fell unto the ground, and heard a voice saying unto me, Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou me? And I answered, Who art thou, Lord? And he said unto me, I am Jesus of Nazareth whom thou persecutest. And they that were with me saw indeed the light, and were afraid, but they heard not the voice of him that spake to me. And I said, What shall I do, Lord? and the Lord said unto me, Arise, and go into Damascus, and there it shall be told thee of all things which are appointed for thee to do. And when I could not see for the glory of that light, being led by the hand of them that were with me, I came into Damascus. And one Ananias, a devout man according to the law, having a good report of all the Jews which dwelt there, came unto me, and stood, and said unto me, Brother Saul, receive thy sight. And the same hour I looked up upon him; and he said, the God of our fathers hath chosen thee, that thou shouldest know His will, and SEE THAT JUST ONE, and shouldest *hear the voice of his mouth*, for thou shalt be his witness"—*his witness:* it is not a matter of opinion; it is not a matter of "religion." Mr. Bradlaugh, last night, talked of the number of the Brahmins being an evidence of the truth of their religion. I don't argue that way about this matter. I say this is no matter of religion, so-called; it was not a matter of theory which Paul was called upon to embrace. It was a matter of fact of which he was allowed to be a personal witness: the fact of the existence of Christ who had been crucified. It is, therefore, a question of evidence we have to consider; a matter of fact; a matter of logical induction from very definite premisses: "Thou shalt be his witness unto all men of what thou hast SEEN AND HEARD. And now, why tarriest thou? Arise, and be baptised, and wash away thy sins."

Now, from the record of that transaction, it transpires that Paul saw Christ and not merely something from which he inferred his presence. Ananias expressly speaks of his "seeing that just one." The fact appears more clearly from one or two other points to which I will direct attention in the 26th chapter of Acts, verses 15 and 16.

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Paul upon this occasion gives another address upon the same subject, and, like all truthful men who are detailing a truthful matter, although he substantially tells the same things, it is not told in the same words; though if this book were a concoction or an imposture, very great care would have been taken to make the story exactly the same whenever told. "I said, Who art thou, Lord? and he said, I am Jesus whom thou persecutest; but rise, and stand upon thy feet, for *I have appeared unto thee* for this purpose, to make thee a minister and a witness to both of THESE THINGS WHICH THOU HAST SEEN, and of those things in the which I will appear unto thee." And afterwards Paul, alluding to it in the 15th chapter of the 1st Corinthians, verses 3-8, in combatting an objection which had arisen in the minds of certain living at Corinth on the subject of the resurrection of the dead, says, I first preached unto you "how that Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures, and that he was buried, and that he rose again the third day according to the Scriptures; and that he was seen of Cephas, then of the twelve; after that, he was seen of above five hundred brethren at once, of whom the greater part remain unto this present, but some are fallen asleep. After that he was seen of James, then of all the apostles; and last of all *he was seen of me also*, as of one born out of due time," that is to say his apostleship was late in its date, because strictly speaking they only could be apostles who answered to the description which you find in the 1st chapter of Acts, when they came to appoint a successor to Judas, where this is defined as the necessary qualification—(verse 21): "Of these men which have *companied with us all the time that Jesus went in and out among us*, beginning from the baptism of John, unto that same day that he was taken up from us, must one be ordained to be A WITNESS *with us of his resurrection.*" As Paul was appointed after all these things, he declares of himself that he was as one born out of due time. But he had the essential qualification of having seen the Lord and thus enabled to give personal witness to the fact of his having risen. This is the strong point of his testimony: "*he was seen of me also.*" Now, those of Mr. Bradlaugh's way of thinking may be disposed to laugh at this, but, remember, that one man's evidence as to what he has seen and heard is as good as another man's evidence, and better when his evidence is supported in so many collateral and powerful ways, as it is in the case of Paul. Paul's seeing Christ was not a matter of isolated curious experience. It was followed by a career of forty years' length, during which Paul's particular business was to declare these things and to apply them in a definite manner for the eternal benefit of those by whom they were received; for doing which work, recollect, he "suffered the loss of all things." This is a strong confirmation of his testimony of having seen Christ. His declaration in writing to the Philippians, to which I also now call your attention, is this—and judge ye whether this is the language of an impostor or an ignorant enthusiast, or a literary forger, which the author of Phillipians must have been if Paul did not write it. Referring to his previous career, in Philippians iii. 4-8, he says: "Though I might also have confidence in the flesh. If any other man thinketh that he hath whereof he might trust in the flesh, I more; circumcised the eighth day, of the stock of Israel, of the tribe of Benjamin, a Hebrew of the Hebrews; as touching the law, a Pharisee; concerning zeal, persecuting the Church; touching the righteousness which is in the law, blameless. But what things were gain to me, those I counted loss for Christ. Yea, doubtless, and I count all things but loss for the excellency of the knowledge of Christ Jesus my Lord, *for whom I have suffered the loss of all things*, and do count them but dung, THAT I MAY WIN CHRIST."

Let me also read you his description of the general position of the apostles in the world at that time; and judge ye whether it was such a position as men of sinister aims could possibly be brought to take up. In 1 Corinthians iv. 9-13, he says, "I think that God hath set forth us the apostles last, as it were appointed to death; for we are made a spectacle unto the world, and to angels, and to men. We are fools for Christ's sake, but ye (Corinthians) are wise in Christ; we are weak, but ye are strong; ye are honourable, but we are despised. Even unto this present hour, *we both hunger and thirst, and are naked, and are buffeted, and have no certain dwelling-place; and labour, working with our own hands*; being reviled, we bless; being persecuted, we suffer it, being defamed, we entreat; we are made *as the filth of the world and are the offscouring of all things unto this day.*" Now a man who was educated at Jerusalem, of a high parentage, and with splendid opening prospects

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before him, who should suddenly rush into a career leading to such results, must be held to have had some rational reason for doing it. Paul's reason is rational. There is no other reason admissible in his case. Let me ask Mr. Bradlaugh to tell us what he thinks was Paul's reason, and I will then examine it. Mr. Bradlaugh cannot give a rational account of Paul's case. He can only say he has no evidence there ever was such a man, which is simply shutting the eyes to the clear beams of truth.

But the case for Paul does not rest entirely upon the facts I have rehearsed. There are other strong confirmatory elements when we come to look into it. Paul not only went before Jews and Gentiles and presented his personal testimony to the resurrection of Christ, but certain things transpired in connection with the presentation of that testimony which we shall now have to consider. We are told that "God wrought special miracles by the hands of Paul"—(Acts xix. 11). I submit the evidence of it: 1 Corinthians xiv. 18-19: "I thank my God, *I speak with tongues more than ye all*," says he, in writing to the Corinthians. He says this in the course of an argument tending to depreciate the importance of speaking with tongues. Let me read it to you, as it is an illustration of the great good sense that characterised this man: "I thank my God I speak with tongues more than ye all: yet in the church I had rather speak five words with my understanding, that by my voice I might teach others also, than ten thousand words in an unknown tongue. Brethren, be not children in understanding: howbeit in malice be ye children, but in understanding be men." What does he refer to when he refers to that "speaking with tongues?" You will find an answer in the second chapter of Acts, which I intended to call attention to last night; but which I was prevented from doing for want of time, but which will come in appropriately at this point of the argument. You will see by reference to that chapter that the apostolic "speaking with tongues" was not the sort of gibberish which passes current in certain holes and corners in our day for "tongues." Hear the definition of them (Acts ii. 1): "When the day of Pentecost was fully come, they were all with one accord in one place, and suddenly there came a sound from heaven as of a rushing mighty wind, and it filled all the house where they were sitting. And there appeared unto them cloven tongues like as of fire, and it sat upon each of them. And they were all filled with the Holy Spirit, and began to speak with other tongues, as the Spirit gave them utterance. . . . . Now when this was noised abroad the multitude came together, and were confounded, because that every man,"—every man of the multitude spoken of in the 5th verse: "devout men out of every nation under heaven,"—"every man heard them speak IN HIS OWN LANGUAGE." And they were all amazed, and marvelled, saying one to another, "Behold, are not all these which *speak* Galilæans?" not only Galilæans, but illiterate fishermen, who knew no tongue but their native dialect—"And how hear we every man *in our own tongue, wherein we were born?* Parthians, and Medes and Elamites, and the dwellers in Mesopotamia, and in Judæa, and Cappadocia, in Pontus, and Asia, Phrygia, and Pamphylia, in Egypt, and in parts of Lybia about Cyrene, and strangers of Rome, Jews and proselytes, Cretes and Arabians, WE DO HEAR THEM SPEAK IN OUR TONGUES the wonderful works of God." Therefore this speaking with tongues in the apostolic days was no matter of gibberish; it is no matter of what is understood in our day by "unknown tongues:" the *tongues* spoken in those days were "known;" they were the spoken languages of mankind. And therefore the question to be answered is, how came illiterate men, without previous instruction, to be able in a moment to speak the current languages of mankind?" Paul says, "I thank my God that I speak with tongues more than ye all," yet he counts it as a matter of little importance, which shows how real an experience it was in the apostolic day; for men don't talk this way about a thing that is not happening. If it was real, it was miraculous; and if miraculous, we have another evidence of the truth of Paul's testimony of Christ's resurrection: for these miracles were expressly declared to be God's confirmation of the testimony of the apostles. Then beside the speaking with tongues, we have other miracles. In Acts xix. 11 we read: "And God wrought special miracles by the hands of Paul: so that from his body were brought unto the sick handkerchiefs or aprons, and the diseases departed from them, and the evil spirits went out of them." Again, Acts xvi. 25: "And at midnight Paul and Silas prayed, and sang praises unto God;" this is when they were made prisoners for teaching the word of God, "and the prisoners heard them. And suddenly there

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was a great earthquake, so that the foundations of the prison were shaken; and immediately all the doors were opened, and every one's bonds were loosed." In Acts xiii. 9-12, you have the account where Paul struck with blindness a man who was opposing him before the Roman deputy. In Acts xiv. 8-10, you have a case where he cured a man who was crippled from his infancy, in consequence of which the people of the city wanted to do him and his companions the honours supposed to be due to the gods, which they declined, saying that the works done were not their works, but done by God through them in attestation of the fact that His Son was risen and was offered to all men for faith, that they might obtain forgiveness of sins and a title to another and a glorious life, which Christ is to develop upon the earth at his second coming.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Mr. Roberts has been good enough to sketch to you what has happened on the previous two nights of this debate, but his sketch lacks one or two features which I will take the liberty of supplying. The question for discussion and the point that Mr. Roberts ought to try to prove is that the Scriptures are the authentic and reliable records of divine revelation; and in answer to a challenge from myself Mr. Roberts said that by authentic he meant really written by the persons by whom they professed to have been written, and at the times they professed to have been written, and said that there was evidence that the writings were in current circulation at the time they were produced. He has not given a particle of evidence, either on the two previous nights or to-night, in favour of any one person as the writer of any one book. He has asked me to disprove that some epistle was written by some man whom he calls Paul. His business is not to ask me to disprove it, but to prove it to you, and my business is simply to wait for his proof, and then examine it. If I know nothing whatever on the subject, that don't prove that Paul wrote the epistle: his business is either to prove them or to say nothing about them. Then he is good enough to say something about the books not being the works of impostors. He ought to have told you that I had said that I do not maintain, that I never pretended to maintain, that the Bible, as represented in the authorised English version, which Mr. Roberts tells me is what he is content to be bound by in this debate; I have never pretended that that whole book is the work of some men designedly intending an imposture. I have always pretended, and do pretend, that like many other mythic books it is an out-growth of different ages, the work of different men and at different times, full of their blunders when they blundered, full of their crimes when they were criminal, having their poetry if they were poetical, but simply expressing the men and the age out of whom it came. (A voice: ha! ha!) The gentleman who thinks that ridiculous has afforded us the weight of his testimony to the truth of the divine revelation, and I am sure it is the most valuable piece of evidence I have listened to in this debate here. And now you must do me the justice to say that our friends did not begin any of that interruption. I asked Mr. Roberts whether that could be a divine revelation which, professing to state the character of Deity, contradicted every fairly assumable attribute for Deity, and I read a number of attributes which, with one exception, were thoroughly agreed to by Mr. Roberts; viz., omnipotence, omnipresence, omniscience, including foreknowledge, infinity, eternity, personality—I added another—all-goodness; to that Mr. Roberts objected, not to the attribute of all-goodness, but as saying that he did not mean to bind God with the meaning of the word goodness as usually applied to man. I did not gather from him any sufficient meaning in lieu of it; that might have been simply my fault, but with that exception we were agreed. And I drew his attention, not simply to discrepancies of detail, but I drew his attention to Exodus the 32nd chapter, verses 7 to 14, where the Lord says unto Moses, "Now therefore let me alone, that my wrath may wax hot against them, and that I may consume them; and I will make of thee a great nation;" and I asked whether, in that which professed to be a revelation from an all-wise and all-powerful God, we could fairly expect any language of that kind at all. I drew his attention to verse 35, and to chapter 28, verses 1-3, and showed that by those verses God was appointing Aaron a priest at the very time He knew that Aaron was misleading His people, and that God punished the people because they did the sin which Aaron had done, whom God had appointed to be their leader; and I asked him whether this was

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consistent with any notion of a revelation from God. I took him to a variety of texts: Numbers xxiii. 19; 1 Samuel xv. 29; Malachi iii. 6, which represent that God does not repent and that God does not change. I took him to the case in 2 Kings xx. 1, where He says to Hezekiah, "Thou shalt die," and afterwards, on Hezekiah praying to Him, relents, and doesn't kill Hezekiah at all, but lets him live. I took him to where He repented of having made Saul king, 1 Samuel xv. 11; and to 2 Samuel xxiv. 15-16, where God punished a people for the crime of their king, and then repented Him of the evil He was doing. I took him to Genesis vi. 6, where God repented that He had made man, and it grieved Him at His heart. I took him on the point of omniscience to Genesis xviii. 20-21, and pointed out to him that the story had reached God in Heaven, that He did not know whether it was true or not, that He had come down to find out; and asked him whether that was consistent with omniscience. I took him through the same story, and showed the whole trick of bargaining with Abraham as to the preservation of the people in the doomed cities. I took him to 2 Chronicles xxxii. 38, and Deuteronomy viii. 2. I took him from these to the abhorrent cases of legislation in Exodus xxi. 2-6, where it provides that a slaveowner may give to a Hebrew slave a wife, and that when the seven years of servitude are up, that if the slave have begotten children by that wife he is to leave his children behind him and go away by himself; and if he wants to remain with them, as a penalty for that he is to be made a slave for ever; and I also referred to Leviticus xxv. 44-46; and I pointed out that while these doctrines applied to the Jews, for the pagans there was a never-ending slavery: "Ye shall take them as an inheritance for your children after you, to inherit them for a possession; they shall be your bondmen for ever." I took him to the war commands of Numbers xxxi. 17, and pointed out that while the tendency of all wise men to-day was towards peace, this represented a God full of blood and murder, authorising the killing of every man, of every woman who was a mother and wife, and only sanctioning the saving of women who were not wives for purposes so horrible as to shock all right-minded persons, and which are yet imagined to be legalised by God. (Hisses). If you dare not listen to your own Bible you have the fullest evidence that it is not authentic. I took him to the whole story of the fall, as depicted in Genesis, and asked him how God could be imagined as inventing a damnation-trap in which to catch the whole world. I took him to the story of the deluge, and asked him whether it was consistent with the attributes of God, as we have them, that He should convert the whole world into a slaughter-house, when He was omnipotent enough to have reformed it. I took him to the case of Jacob, the thief, the liar, and the cheat, who was loved by God either because of, or despite his rascality, and to Esau, the one who when strong forgave his mean brother, who nevertheless was hated. I took him to the case of David, in 1st Kings xi. 33, 34, 38; and xiv. 8, where he is spoken of as having kept God's statutes all the days of his life, and as never having done anything wrong; and I pointed out that he was a murderer, a traitor, a liar, a thief, an ungrateful scoundrel, betraying to death the subjects of the king who sheltered him. I asked whether this was a picture of an authentic revelation. Well, those were a few of the little discrepancies. And not one of these having been answered, Mr. Roberts says, if he had time he could, if he had time that he could melt them away one by one, but he has not tried the melting process yet: not one of them has been touched, and nearly the whole of them were put forward in my first speech on the first night. He has quoted Acts, but until he proves when the book was written, where it was written, by whom it was written, that it was current at the time to which the events it refers to relate, according to his own statement he has no right to read the book of Acts to me at all; because to say, I will prove to you that the Bible is an authentic and reliable revelation of God, simply by reading his statements, is the funniest fashion of conducting a debate I ever heard of in my life. Then Mr. Roberts says this evening, Oh! I will refer to Paul and to the resurrection, but he did not tell you that when he had quoted from Acts the night before last, about Jesus having been seen for forty days, and curiously, he did not mention the forty days: he said "for a certain time" to-night, that I quoted from the last chapter of Luke a statement utterly impossible to be reconciled with that forty days. Why didn't he touch that? Then when he deals with the case of Paul, he says Paul, as a truthful man, don't recite it in the same words. But it is not the question, Is Paul a truthful man? but "Are the Scriptures the authentic

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and reliable records of divine revelation?" that is, did God, who could not make a mistake at all, send this message to humankind, or is it simply the work of men who may have blundered? Then in the discrepancies I gave I gave him the whole history of Jesus himself, born without a father, whose mother's husband had two fathers born in the lifetime of Herod and not born till after Herod's death, who was in Egypt and Judea at one and the same moment, known and not known by John at the same moment, in the grave three days and three nights, between late on Friday evening and before Saturday was over. These are the discrepancies he says he can answer at the proper time and place, but surely the time is now and the place is here. If not, then I don't understand what a debate is. I submit to you that merely to go on reading texts out of this book until the book has been disproved is a most absurd thing. What does Mr. Roberts say to-night? Oh, he says, "I began at 1876 and got back to the first century." He did nothing of the kind: he jumped from 1876 to somebody he called Clement of Rome, and whom, without proving, he quoted as a thorough authority. He lumped with him Clement of Alexandria and another, and spoke of those writings "in those days," and I ask whether that is a fashion in which proof can be conducted. We must take the Old Testament first, and show you at any rate who he pretends was the writer of each book; he must show you at any rate when he pretends each book was written. I am not using the word pretend in any unfair sense; I am only using it in the sense of the contention he has got to make out in this case. He must show you where he thinks the books were in custody; and last night he contended that the five books of Moses were in custody at Shiloh during the time of Joshua, but he gave no evidence, quoted no texts, and would not even promise that he would find them at all for me.

Mr. ROBERTS: I did promise I would.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: I did not interrupt Mr. Roberts at all, and I have a splendid memory.

Mr. ROBERTS: I merely avail myself of the Parliamentary right to speak to a question of fact. I merely say I did promise, and I will fulfil my promise before the discussion is out.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: When? On which night of the debate will he fulfil his promise?

Mr. ROBERTS: Next.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: On the next night of the debate Mr. Roberts is here to show that in Shiloh, in the time of Joshua, he can prove that there were the five books kept that are called the five books of Moses. Now that is a step; the only pity is, that as he made the statement, he was not prepared with the proof of it at the time. I will show that there is not a particle of such proof existing anywhere, and it won't be enough to give loose texts from different books; we must have proof of the books, from which the texts are quoted before they can be used as any evidence against me. It is not enough to bolster up one position of a book with a declaration from another until you have verified the portion of the book from which you use the declaration.

Now, if you please, we will carry this a little further. Mr. Roberts asks, What explanation will I give of Paul's reasons. First, I know nothing about Paul; reading about Paul from the Acts of the Apostles is no evidence to me until the Acts of the Apostles are proved to me. How are they to be proved? The question is, Are they authentic? What does *authentic* mean? Were they written by some people at some time? Were they current literature at the time they profess to have been written? And when Mr. Roberts has given the evidence of that in relation to the Acts of the Apostles—and I deny that he can show the Acts of the Apostles to be in existence within one century after the time of the alleged death of Jesus, and if that be so the whole burden lies, not of disproof upon me, but of proof upon him. And curiously let us see the kind of reading you have had from the texts: you have had reading from the 22nd chapter of Acts, but what Mr. Roberts should have done was this, not simply to tell you that the language did not agree, but that there was positive contradiction of fact. In Acts ix. 7 it is said, "The men which journeyed with him stood speechless, hearing a voice but seeing no man;" and yet when he comes into Acts xxii. he will there find, "They that were with me saw indeed the light, and were afraid, but they heard not the voice." Now which is true? Is it true that they heard it, or that they did not hear it? Don't say that Paul made a mistake; it

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is God who made a mistake if this is God's revelation to man; this is the point to deal with. If Mr. Roberts will admit that the people who have written in this book have blundered over and over again, if he will admit that there are many matters of detail entirely incorrect, if he will admit that the book is on a level with any ordinary book, I shall know with what I am dealing; but his contention is that "the Bible is the authentic and reliable record of divine revelation." Now, is it true that the people heard the voice or that they did not? is it true that they stood up or fell down? Can it be pretended that these contradictory statements are divine revelation? Then I will ask you just to consider what he says: he says one man's evidence as to what he has seen and heard is as good as another's. But we have got to get the evidence first, and we have not got it, and reading a statement from an unverified book is not evidence; and besides, one man's evidence as to what he has seen and heard is not as good as another's: it depends on the ability of the man to judge of the facts of which he gives evidence. Some men can note more accurately and state more clearly what they note; for example, suppose a man comes to you and says I made a journey across the Atlantic in the *City of Berlin;* when we were half-way across a big fish swallowed the whole ship, and I alone ultimately escaped from the belly of the fish; the man's evidence is not good, because it contradicts all experience and all probabilities, the whole story outrages all experience, and the moment a man makes such a statement you condemn it at once. And yet when Mr. Roberts comes here and says that somebody saw the invisible God, oh! that ought to be believed, and that is to be something you are to accept! The Bible says "no man hath seen God at any time." O yes, Abraham saw Him; Paul saw Jesus, who was either God or was not—I don't know which contention Mr. Roberts will make, and don't much care—what I submit is that the testimony to events which contradict all experience, the testimony to events which are alleged to be outside the range of all experience, is not testimony which you accept in the same fashion as testimony which you are entitled to examine and testimony which you are entitled to weigh. And I will ask Mr. Roberts frankly to take up the points I have dealt with. On the first night of the debate, when I read nearly the whole of those texts, all accept four, he said, Oh! six minutes is not enough to deal with those texts. I said, at any rate you might have done one of them. He told us he had gone through 144 contradictions issued by a society in America, but his business was to go through the contradictions I stated, but this has not been done. Last night not a reference, to-night not a reference; and I ask whether it is not simply a sham of a debate to allow these things to go on, and to make no effort at all to answer them now. I submit that if the book contains statements inconsistent with the character of God as omnipotent, inconsistent with the character of God as all-good, inconsistent with the character of God as omnipresent, inconsistent with the character of God as infinite and eternal, then I say that book cannot be a revelation from a Deity having such attributes; and I say it is not enough for Mr. Roberts to say disprove this or disprove that, because the whole burden of proof lies upon himself. He is the challenger in this debate; he has undertaken to prove it; it is he who should have brought his evidence here. I have not seen one particle—one atom of it yet. I don't know whether I shall during the continuance of this debate, but, at present, the whole case on the other side is utterly unproved. Mr. Roberts tells you I referred to the Buddhists and Mahommedans; but I will tell you why I referred. He talked of the spread of Christianity, and then I had a right to answer him by the spread of other religions. Oh! he says, I don't mean the spread now to-day. But in his very opening, he had referred to Christianity as existing in 1876, and I had the same right to go back through it step by step, and show what it had been, and that is what I did; and I showed that while it pretended to be founded on this book as a divine revelation, that it had been productive of murder, of wickedness, of licentiousness, of ignorance, of poverty, of tyranny, of serfdom, and of keeping down people during the whole time that it had obtained power in the world. When Mr. Roberts talks of his first century proofs, he must remember that, at the present moment, I dispute them all, and that I have not had submitted to me the evidence on which I am bound to receive them. To tell me that I am to account for Paul until Paul is proven is the most absurd nonsense. He says that Paul suffered; where is the evidence of Paul suffering? In the Acts. You are going to prove Paul from the Acts, and the Acts

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from Paul. Well, if that is not turning all debate topsy-turvy, abandoning all reason, then the English language has no meaning whatever.

Well, is there any other evidence I need trouble you with? Yes; that every man spoke in different languages; and he proves that by referring to the Bible. And then he says they were ignorant men. Where is the proof that they were ignorant? How can you even identify the men at all? You have no right to open the book and quote a line from it to me until you have said that this book was written so and so, was in the custody of such and such people, at such a time. Submit to me that evidence, and let me examine it, and then, perhaps, you will be entitled to read the book. But, then, I am entitled to go through it, and to show you, that instead of being a book full of love and kindness and goodness, like every other book representing the religion of the past, it is full of the barbarities of the past, full of the cruelties of the past, full of the mischiefs of the past, and full of the ignorance of the past. I sit down saying, that up to this, the third night of the debate, there has not been an atom of attempt to prove one of the positions that lay on Mr. Roberts to prove.

THE CHAIRMAN: Allow me to say that I do think that those persons who are not prepared to calmly listen to both sides should not have come. I for my part am very desirous of hearing what each of the disputants has to say, and I am of opinion that if I listen quietly I shall be in a better position to judge at the end of the debate than I shall be if I am continually interrupted and they are interrupted too. Do please let us have quietness: restrain your feelings. I wish that neither gentleman shall have any reason to complain of the way in which he has been treated by the audience. Mr. Roberts will now occupy a quarter of an hour, and will have the option either of making a speech or putting questions to Mr. Bradlaugh, which Mr. Bradlaugh will answer categorically.

MR. ROBERTS QUESTIONS MR. BRADLAUGH.

Mr. BRADLAUGH, do you believe that ever such a man as Saul of Tarsus existed?—I have not evidence sufficient to believe that he did exist.

Are you doubtful?—It is quite possible a man named Saul of Tarsus may have existed.

If I were to prove that the book of Acts and Paul's epistles were in circulation at the close of the first century, would you doubt then that such a man as Paul existed and took a leading part in the establishment of the Christian faith?—I think you had better give me the proof first, and then I will tell you what my opinion is on that proof.

It will make it more worth my while to produce the proof if I have some hope of doing good.—If you produce the proof I must be convinced by it, and it is no use asking me what effect it will have on me till I see it.

I ask you whether you will accept Paul's epistles as proof of Paul's existence?—I accept proof as a fair man, when the proof is produced.

I asked you last night how far back you allowed the New Testament to have existed, and I think you said you could trace it no further back than A.D. 150?—I stated that the four gospels cannot be brought to a date as early as A.D. 150.

Would you object to substitute in your answer the New Testament for "the four gospels?"—Yes, I certainly should.

Why do you fix on the year 150 for any part of the New Testament?—Because I know I can show it later than that, and I always like to be on the safe side.

What is the earliest date you can show it?—That is not my business. It is your business to show it, and I decline to give you proof which it is your business to bring.

Can you trace it before 150?—I have already said that I decline to give you proof which it is your business to bring.

Why do you fix on that year?—Because I know you cannot produce the shadow of a particle of evidence, going earlier.

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Can I produce any at that time?—I don't know what you can produce, because I don't know how far your researches have extended.

I am speaking to a gentleman on the supposition that he is educated, and I am asking him how far the proof can be carried in his view of the case?—You will find the whole of the proof stated by me in my pamphlet, *When were our Gospels written?* in my discussion with B. Harris Cooper, Esq., in *Horne's Introduction to the Bible*, in *Davidson's Introduction to the New Testament*, in *Norton's Introduction*, and in other works of that class.

Then you cannot tell why you fix on 150?—Yes, I have told you: so that you sha'n't catch me on a wrong date.

You have told me generally; I ask for specific information?—And I decline to give you that which it is your duty to produce.

You can't do it, then?—Yes, I can.

Then you won't?—No; it is your business to prove your case, not mine to make it out for you.

Then I must produce it. I first produce the book itself: every book is *primâ facie* evidence of itself until it is disproved.—That is not true.

It is a canon of universal criticism that a document is evidence of itself until it is disproved?—No, that is not true: the book of Mormon is not evidence until it is disproved; the tale of the sea-serpent is not evidence until it is disproved.

Then you refuse to recognise the universal principle of literary criticism?—It never has been the principle of literary criticism in relation to theological Scriptures.

Well, all I can say, of course, is that you contradict the facts.—I generally do, especially when they are not true.

Can you disprove that Paul wrote the Epistles bearing his name?—It is not my business to try until you have given me the proof.

I give you the proof—I have not heard it.

I will read it.—What are you going to read from?

"Ye see how large a letter I (Paul) have written unto you with mine own hand." (Gal. vi. 11).—What are you reading from?

I am reading from Paul's epistles.—That is the book you have got to prove.

Then I produce the book as *primâ facie* evidence. Can you disprove it?—Really, that is simple nonsense. If I produce a bill signed "Robert Roberts," before I am entitled to make Robert Roberts pay, I must prove his signature.

Then I ask you, why don't you believe the evidence I produce that Paul wrote that statement?—Because I don't: the evidence is not sufficient to induce me to believe it. There have been so many forgeries in connection with apostolic writings that I am inclined to look at all of them as false until I have evidence of their verification.

What are apostolic writings?—Writings pretending to be by apostles.

Do you mean to say that those are apostolic writings that are not apostolic writings? I do not mean to say anything more than my answer conveyed.

Do you mean to say a pretended thing is a thing itself?—Everything is a thing.

"A pretended thing?"—A pretended shilling is a shilling.

Is it a real one?—The difference between a pretence and a reality is that one is sham and the other is real.

I ask you if an apostolic writing is not a real apostolic writing?—A forged apostolic writing is no more a real apostolic writing than a forged bill signed "Robert Roberts" would be a real bill signed "Robert Roberts."

I ask about a real apostolic writing?—I know nothing of any real ones.

Then what do you mean by apostolic writings?—I said "forged."

"Forged!" Then I ask again, Are forged apostolic writings real?—If you don't know the meaning of the words you have used yourself, I cannot supply you with any better.

Are forged apostolic writings real?—Forged apostolic writings are real forgeries, but are not real writings by apostles.

Then do I understand you to mean that there are no such things as real apostolic writings?—That is not my business. Show me something, and ask me whether I consider that to be so, and I will answer.

I ask you whether there are such things as real apostolic writings?—Out of the enormous mass of forgeries, I have not been able to find any.

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What proof of forgery can you give me in Paul's letters or outside of them?—If you will hand me the volume of Eusebius, I will give you lots of proofs of forgeries.

I ask you about the Epistle to the Corinthians.—I have not said it is a forgery.

Then do you admit it is real?—It is not my business to do so.

Can you prove it is a forgery?—I have not said it is a forgery.

Do you believe it real?—My belief is not an atom's weight in this debate. We are not discussing "Does Mr. Bradlaugh believe the Bible to be an authentic revelation?" We are discussing "Is the Bible an authentic revelation?" and Mr. Roberts undertook to prove it. I don't believe those to be the writings of Paul, but I don't necessarily involve any allegation as to forgery about them, because it is not part of my case.

I must return to my question. I must insist upon an answer whether or no Mr. Bradlaugh believes the 1st epistle to the Corinthians to be forged or real?—I don't believe the 1st Epistle to the Corinthians to be the writing of Paul.

Then if it is not the writing of Paul, is it not a forgery?—I don't know anything about it until you give me the evidence for it, and then I will tell you my opinion on that evidence.

What is your reason for saying it is not the writing of Paul?—Because the evidence that I have examined has not brought the opinion to my mind that it is Paul's.

Have you any evidence that it is not?—That is my business, not yours; your business is to prove that Paul wrote it.

Is it not your business to take away the foundation on which I stand?—Oh! the moment you build a foundation I will knock it away quick enough.

I ask again, are you prepared to prove Paul's Epistle to the Corinthians a forgery?—I have not said it is a forgery. I have said I do not believe that to be the writing of Paul. It is not my business to express anything more than my belief at the moment.

If it be not the writing of Paul, is it not a forgery in pretending to be so?—I can give no other answer than that I don't believe the writing to be the writing of Paul, and that it is your business to make out that it is.

And my question is that if it be not the writing of Paul, is it not a forgery in pretending to be so?—If it does pretend to be the writing of Paul, and is not the writing of Paul, then it is a forgery; but my belief and the fact are two distinct matters.

Will you define the sense in which you used the term "forgery" as applicable to a literary document?—O yes; I say that where I can show that the name of an author has been used for a book that he never wrote, that if that has been used intentionally then that is a forgery; but it may have been used unintentionally: then it is not a forgery but a blunder.

Then do you mean to start the theory that somebody unintentionally wrote these letters as Paul's letters, when they were not the letters of Paul?—That is not my business.

I ask you whether that is the theory you wish to broach to-night.—I will tell you my theory in my speech.

Do you believe that Josephus, the Jewish historian, wrote, in the first century, the works which are attributed to him in our day?—I believe that the works accredited to Josephus in our day, are, with slight alterations, as Josephus left them to us.

Have you any better evidence in the case of Josephus than you have in the case of Paul?—I think yes.

Please produce it.—The business is not for me to prove the writings of Josephus, and, therefore, I decline.

Can you produce contemporary evidence of Josephus having written a work which you believe to be his?—I can produce it, only that it is no part of this debate, and therefore, I utterly decline to do it, because I have not relied on Josephus. I can produce quotations, in every age, coming through from time to time, of the writings of Josephus; but it is not my business to do it; it is no part of this debate, and I decline.

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The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and gentlemen, I can understand that this process of questioning and answering might be extremely interesting if we were only permitted to listen to it quietly. Mr. Bradlaugh will now have the privilege of either making a speech or questioning Mr. Roberts.

MR. BRADLAUGH QUESTIONS MR. ROBERTS.

By whom do you think the Book of Genesis was written?—By Moses.

When?—Principally while the Israelites were sojourning in the wilderness for forty years.

But about what date is that?—About 1500 years before Christ, more or less.

Can you show me any evidence that the Book of Genesis was in current circulation about 1500 years before Christ?—Yes.

Will you please give it?—I produce the book itself.

Except producing the book itself can you give any evidence that the Book of Genesis was in current circulation 1500 years before Christ?—I can give the consent of subsequent generations in an unbroken line for many centuries.

Then as you can give it in an unbroken line for many centuries, give me one in the year 1400 before Christ?—Joshua.

Give me a writing of Joshua?—I produce it.

Show it to me?—You know it.

Do you mean the Book of Joshua in the authorised version?—Yes.

Give me any evidence that Joshua wrote it?—I produce the evidence (pointing to the book).

Give me any evidence that Joshua wrote it?—Then I will read it.

Please, just give me chapter and verse as you read?—The 8th chapter of Joshua.

Please tell me the verses.—I will read them.

No; if you will tell me them I will read them: I can read them quicker.—You must allow me to read them, Mr. Bradlaugh.

No; I must read them.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Bradlaugh asks Mr. Roberts to produce the passage and read it; Mr. Roberts has a right to do so. That is the fair and proper way. If he occupies a long time, then the time is lost to one gentleman as much as another, when it is questioning that is going forward.

Mr. ROBERTS: "And he (Joshua) wrote there upon the stones a copy of the law of Moses, which he wrote in the presence of the children of Israel." "And afterwards," verse 34, "he read all the words of the law, the blessings and cursings, *according to all that is written in the book of the law, there is not a word of all that Moses commanded*, which Joshua read not before all the congregation of Israel."

Is that the whole of your evidence that the Book of Genesis was in existence in the time of somebody who you say wrote this Book of Joshua?—No.

Then give me the evidence, because there is not a word about Genesis here: it refers to a book about law—a copy of the law written upon stones, and it does not refer to a book written by Moses; and I want you to give me the evidence that Moses wrote a book which we now have called Genesis. This evidence is that Joshua wrote a book, and not that Moses did.—Do you deny that the law there spoken of is the law of Moses?

It is your business to prove what you said you would prove.—Then I prove it again. This is a verse I did not read before.

What verse?—The 33rd. "And all Israel, and their elders, and officers, and eir judges, stood on this side the ark and on that side, before the priests the Lev es, which bare the ark of the covenant of the Lord, as well the stranger as he that as born among them; half of them over against mount Gerizim, and half of them er against Mount Ebal; *as Moses, the servant of the Lord, had commanded before*, at they should bless the people of Israel. And afterward he read all the words of the law he blessings and cursings, according to *all that is written in the book of the law.*" ow what is that? I will refer to Deuteronomy to prove that.

But wait a moment. Your statement was—and I recall it to you—that the B of

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Genesis was written by Moses, and that you could bring evidence of that, and you said that you could bring evidence in the time of Joshua. I asked you for proof that the book was written in the time of Joshua. That you have not given me, but you read me instead a statement in the Book of Joshua—a statement that Joshua wrote a copy on the stones, and that he read it to the people. Now how is that evidence?—It is a recognition of the fact by Joshua that Moses had written a book of the law.

Where does it say so in those verses which you have just read?—It says that Joshua wrote—"According to all that is written in the book of the law," and I was proceeding to prove what that was when you interrupted me.

No, but you must prove it from Joshua. You cannot prove it from any other than Joshua until you abandon Joshua: Can you find me in the Book of Joshua a statement, that Moses wrote the book which we now have as Genesis?—I have produced it, and I have not completed my evidence.

But is there any other portion of the Book of Joshua you want to read?—Not at present.

Then I decline to allow you to read any other than the evidence you offered. Will you now give me the evidence that Joshua wrote the book from which you have just been reading?—I begin at the modern end of the line of the evidence.

No, but you will please begin where I ask you. You said you would trace it from the time, and I want you to begin by showing that Joshua wrote it.—What I said was that I relied on the Books of Moses having been written by Moses by the consent of subsequent generations in an unbroken line.

Then I want you to begin at that time.—I trace the line backwards.

But I decline to allow you. I want you to begin at the beginning, and I ask you to give me the evidence because your statement was in your speech that you would give evidence that the writings were in current circulation at the time they were produced, and I want you to show that the writing you call *Joshua* was in current circulation at the time it was produced.—The book itself is evidence of its production.

Show me the date of it.—What do you mean?

I mean the date on the book. You say there is a date on the book, and I want to see it.—I did not say there was a date on the book: I said the book was evidence of the date of its production.

What was the date of production?—1500 years before Christ.

Where do I get it?—By a calculation of the various dates involved in the narrative.

You spoke of the consent of subsequent generations.—Yes.

Give me the consent of someone at that time.—I produce Josephus, who——

But Josephus was—did not live at that time.—You must allow me to finish my answers.

Josephus is 1300 years at least later than the date I am enquiring about, and it is not fair when I ask for contemporary consent to give me Josephus, 1400 years later, and say that is evidence.—Mr. Bradlaugh you must allow me to answer your question, and you will see whether or not I give you the evidence you want: You break in upon me before I have done.

You said you could prove from Joshua that Moses wrote the book we call Genesis, and I want the evidence, not from Josephus, but from Joshua?—You want evidence from anywhere I can get it surely.——

No, I don't: I want it from the witness you call Joshua.—And I have produced it.

Then show me that the book you call *Joshua* was in existence 1300 years before Jesus.—And I first produce the book itself as evidence.

Then show me that the book was in existence.—I am about to do it, and you will not allow me.

But Josphus was 1400 years later, and I object to that. I want a witness of the date you pretend the book came.—I am going to prove it just as you would prove to me the age of Homer's writings.

But the age of Homer's writings is not the matter in debate. What you have said is that you can show the Book of Genesis in existence in the time of Joshua. You try to do that by quoting a book you call the Book of Joshua, and I want you to show me

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the Book of Joshua in existence 1400 years before Jesus.—And I am about to do it, and you will not allow me.

Then try; but not from writings 1400 years later.—If I can prove it in any way proof is proof. I produce Christ as a good witness, because——

But Christ was 1400 years later.—Mr. Bradlaugh, you ought not to interrupt my answers. If you interrupt my answers I shall decline to answer any more questions.

I will interrupt the answers if they are not answers to the question.—Then I will not answer any question, because you cannot judge till you hear my answer whether it is an answer or no.

The CHAIRMAN (to Mr. Bradlaugh): You might have avoided this difficulty by making your question a little more definite.

I have made it very definite.

The CHAIRMAN: But there was just the possibility of mistake on Mr. Robert's part. If you say, produce me evidence from a book of that date.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: That is what I have asked for, I say, produce me evidence from the year 1400 before Christ, or about that time, that the book you call the Book of Joshua was in existence?—And I am producing the evidence, and Mr. Bradlaugh will not allow me to elaborate it.

But which is the author you are going to quote?—You won't wait to see.

The chairman has made a very fair suggestion. Can you give your evidence without quoting writers 1400 years after; yes or no?—Yes.

Which is the nearest writer to the 1400th year before Christ that you can quote?—At the very time.

Very well: now we have got it. Then quote me some writer at the very time to show that Joshua wrote the book.—Joshua.

But how can you prove that Joshua wrote it?—By evidence which you have prevented me giving. You know there are no books extant in the world except the Bible that existed at that age.

Oh! then now your answer is, there are no books extant in the world except the Bible which existed at that age?—Yes.

Then were you wrong when you said that you would give evidence that the writings were in current circulation at the time they were produced?—No: I was not wrong.

But how can you give evidence if you have only got the book itself to rely on?—The book itself is *primâ facie* evidence until it is disproved.

Do you mean to say, then, that every book in the world is *primâ facie* evidence for the truth of its contents.—Until it is disproved.

Of course. But I say, do you mean that every book in the world is *primâ facie* evidence of the truth of its contents?—It is *primâ facie* proof of its authenticity, which is another point altogether. I admit the authenticity of the Koran, but I do not believe the contents.

But wait a moment. You have said two things; first, that you would show that the Book of Genesis was written by Moses, and that it was in circulation 1500 B.C.—Yes.

Asked for your proof, you simply quote a certain text from the Book of Joshua.—I do not simply do so; I was about to do that which you will not allow me to do.

Pardon me for a moment. Have you any other evidence outside the Bible of the circulation of the books at all: yes or no?—In a general way, yes.

Give it in a general way, then, outside the Bible.—I will only refer to it in a general way, because I presume you are acquainted with the facts, and that as an honest man you will——

Give it in a general way.—I prove it by the evidence of Ptolemy Philadelphus' library.

But is Ptolemy Philadelphus within a thousand years of Joshua?—No; but the presence of the Septuagint there is evidence that logically goes far back beyond the library itself.

THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. Roberts will now speak for a quarter of an hour.

Mr. ROBERTS: Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, I only wish Mr. Bradlaugh

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would employ the opportunity he has during his option of questioning me for 15 minutes, to put to me that host of difficulties he says I did not answer, instead of wasting the time with uncertain and impracticable issues which do not really affect the question, though apparently to the point. As he has never yet so used his opportunity of bringing home to me the alleged discrepancies and difficulties in the Scriptures, he has no right to complain of my not noticing them in the time allotted to me to maintain the affirmative; for what is the duty of any speaker who undertakes to prove the affirmative of anything but to rehearse the positive evidences on which his proposition rests? Positive evidences are far more profitable to consider than mere gaps and negations. The positive argument is more powerful to sustain a proposition than an attempt to grapple with multitudinous details of an opposing character, which are capable, with deliberation and coolness, of being harmonised with the affirmative, but which, in the short time allowed to the disputants, and in the heat of discussion, are not capable of being treated in a satisfactory manner, if the main duty of marshalling the positive evidence is to be performed. I prefer to rehearse before you the great positive evidences on which rests the proposition that the Scriptures are the authentic and reliable records of divine revelation; and Mr. Bradlaugh's business is to destroy those positive evidences if he can. He has not yet attempted to touch those evidences, and, to-night, for the second time, he has said that it is not his business to do so. He tries rather to inveigle me into the consideration of details which would conceal the general argument from view. I must simply disregard his tactics, and address myself to the important duty of the moment, and that is to make some attempt, in our day, when scepticism is creeping into every corner like a rising tide, to show reasonable minds that there are evidences that cannot, in true, calm and unbiassed process of logic be got rid of, which go to show that God spoke by Moses and the prophets to Israel, and that Jesus rose from the dead and is now in heaven, and will re-appear among men, to carry out that great programme which God has put in his hands to accomplish for the regeneration of mankind and the blessing of all the families of the earth at the appointed time, when we shall have got through the present wretched but necessary preliminary period, when men like Mr. Bradlaugh can with impunity go about and try to blast the hopes of men by attempting to destroy the only foundation of hope that is extant amongst men; for certainly if the Jewish Scriptures do not contain the elements of that hope, there is no hope, and we must be content to drift down the dreadful stream of time to the region of alluvial deposits, and to be laid among those fossils whose eternal fellowship is all that Mr. Bradlaugh can offer us as the result of a life's exertion and a life's sacrifice on behalf of the highest aims.

Pursuing that policy, then, I recall your attention to the great and unimpeachable facts connected with the apostle Paul. Not only did he personally testify for forty years, in the face of the organised and formidable opposition of Jew and Gentile, that he had seen Christ; not only did he base upon that testimony the most earnest practical and noble objects it is possible to aim at or conceive in connection with men; not only did he write to communities of the people those epistles of unexampled loftiness, density, purity and power; not only did he work miracles in the execution of his work, but there are minor practical elements in his case which, when impartially considered, will do as much as anything else, to convince sober, practical and unbiassed intellects of the truth of Paul's whole testimony for Christ. I may mention, as a singular illustration of the truth of this remark, that the late Lord Lyttelton, in his early days, stood on Mr. Bradlaugh's ground in being a sceptic, and in connection with another gentleman, he undertook to prove the fallacy of the Scriptures by an analysis of the case of Paul. With this view, he sat down to examine that case thoroughly in all its facts, with all the collateral circumstances involved in Paul's epistles, whose authenticity he confessed himself bound to admit, unless he chose to reject all established rules of evidence. In the execution of his task, he came to the very opposite conclusion to that which he intended to establish. He came to the conclusion that Paul's case was a proof of the resurrection of Christ; and he reduced to writing, in a systematic way, the whole of the considerations that had guided him to that conclusion, so that others might have the benefit. That argument is extant now, and accessible to anyone; and if examined by logical minds, open to follow the results of evidence, I am convinced it cannot fail to bring them to the same result.

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A few, then, of the minor but potent elements in Paul's case are these. First, he was successful in his labours; he carried away whole districts; he turned the minds of vast masses of men, notwithstanding the opposition of the authorities and notwithstanding the fact that imprisonment and ruin stared in the face of every one who should adopt his views. This is a circumstance to which too much weight cannot be attached in the argument. The proof of the circumstance I give by reading an extract from the undisproved Acts of the Apostles, and which indeed are their own proof to any man who will calmly read them. In chapter 19 of the Acts of the Apostles, verse 23, we read: "At the same time there arose no small stir about that way:" that is, in Ephesus, 'for a certain man named Demetrius, which made silver shrines for Diana, brought no small gain unto the craftsmen; whom he called together with the workmen of like occupation, and said, sirs, ye know that by this craft we have our wealth. Moreover ye see and hear, that *not alone at Ephesus, but almost throughout all Asia, this Paul hath persuaded and turned away much people*, saying that they be no gods which are made with hands: so that not only this our craft is in danger to be set at naught, but also that the temple of the great goddess Diana should be despised, and her magnificence should be destroyed, whom all Asia and the world worshippeth. And when they heard these sayings, they were full of wrath, and cried out, saying, Great is Diana of the Ephesians. And the whole city was filled with confusion; and having caught Gaius and Aristarchus, men of Macedonia, Paul's companions in travel, they rushed with one accord into the theatre. And when Paul would have entered in unto the people, the disciples suffered him not," for they were afraid of his personal safety in such a turmoil. That is evidence of the fact that his preaching produced a wide-spread effect in the teeth of persecution; and as reasonable men, you have to explain that circumstance. What is the explanation? If Christ rose from the dead, if Paul worked miracles, then the circumstance is explained; but if Christ did not rise from the dead, then Paul was a madman, and could not work miracles, and how in that case are you to explain the fact that those vast multitudes went in the teeth of their dearest temporal interests for the sake of believing Paul's doctrine? There is no explanation apart from that one explanation which I stand before you to represent. There are only four suppositions possible in the case, and they are all inconsistent with the facts except one. No man will say Paul was an impostor; no man will say he was an ignorant enthusiast; no man will say that he was an earnest man deceived by others, for the incident which Paul alleged as the great turning point of his career was of a character that did not admit of the interposition of others in the way of deception. It was something that happened in the broad day-light: it was not at night; it was at noon-day, and what he saw was a light above the brightness of the sun, which is not a thing that could be done by deception. The company of officials who were with him saw it also, and were felled to the earth by the brightness of the light. Besides the light, Paul heard a voice, and here I am reminded of Mr. Bradlaugh's difficulty about the narrative on this point, to which I will address myself for a moment, as an illustration of the unreal character of the difficulties raised by Mr. Bradlaugh, and which could all of them be dissolved if there were time to address myself to them in detail. In one account it is said that those that were with Paul did not hear the voice; in another, namely, Paul's own account, it is said they did. What is the explanation of that? Is it a contradiction? It appears like it; but what is the fact? There are two senses in which the word *voice* is used: you say you hear voices in the street, though you cannot make out the words; you hear a voice if you hear a person speak to you. In the one case you hear the voice in a sense different from that in which you hear in the other. In one case, you hear without being able to make out what is said: in the other you hear the words. A man who hears the voice and hears the words hears it in both senses; and that was the fact with Paul; but in the case of Paul's attendants they only heard the sound of the voice without making out the words. Probably this was because the voice "spake to him in the Hebrew tongue." The officers that accompanied him would probably be Romans, and they while hearing the voice, would not know what was said, and, therefore they could be said by one narrator to hear and by another not to hear without any contradiction occurring. Paul's attendants afterwards led him by the hand to Damascus, and when they arrived there, a certain man came to him named Ananias with a message from Christ. Mark this circumstance. On any other supposition than

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the reality of Christ's appearance to Paul, it is inexplicable. How came Ananias to know about Paul at all? The New Testament account is that Christ appeared also to Ananias: if this be true, the explanation is obvious, and Christ's resurrection proved; but if Christ did not appear to Ananias, how came he to know that Paul had been the subject of the incidents that happened on the way? The account is (Acts ix. 10): "And there was a certain disciple at Damascus, named Ananias; and to him said the Lord in a vision, Ananias. And he said, Behold, I am here, Lord. And the Lord said unto him, Arise, and go into the street which is called Straight, and enquire in the house of Judas for one called Saul, of Tarsus; for behold he prayeth, and hath seen in a vision a man named Ananias coming in, and putting his hand on him that he might receive his sight. Then Ananias answered, Lord, I have heard by many of this man, how much evil he hath done to thy saints at Jerusalem; and here he hath authority from the chief priests to bind all that call on Thy name. But the Lord said unto him, Go thy way, for he is a chosen vessel unto me, to bear my name before the Gentiles, and kings, and the children of Israel; for I will show him *how great things he must suffer for my name's sake.*" That is another element in the case. Paul was to suffer by the new course to which he was introduced. If Paul had been to gain any advantage by it, it might have been suggested that he had some sinister object in his testimony; but he gained nothing; he realised the sufferings referred to here. Afterwards, when Paul was brought before King Agrippa, there occurred this remarkable interchange of remarks between the two. Festus, in introducing Paul's case, said (Acts xxv. 24), "King Agrippa, and all men that are present here with us, Ye see this man, about whom all the multitude of the Jews have dealt with me, both at Jerusalem and also here, crying that he ought not to live any longer. But when I found that he had committed nothing worthy of death, and that he himself hath appealed to Augustus, I have determined to send him, of whom I have no certain thing to write, unto my lord. Wherefore, I have brought him forth before you, and specially before thee, O King Agrippa, that after examination had, I might have somewhat to write. For it seemeth to me unreasonable to send a prisoner, and not withal to signify the crimes laid against him. Then Agrippa turns to the prisoner, and says, "Paul, thou art permitted to speak for thyself. Then Paul stretched forth his hand, and answered for himself." And observe his compliance with the decorous customs of society, his courtesies, not at all characteristic of a self-confident and egotistical and visionary enthusiast. "I think myself happy, King Agrippa, because I shall answer for myself this day before thee, touching all the things whereof I am accused of the Jews, especially because I know thee to be expert in all customs and questions which are among the Jews: wherefore, I beseech thee to hear me patiently." It is just as good as having Paul on this platform to rehearse his own case in the presence of Mr. Bradlaugh. "My manner of life from my youth, which was at the first among my own nation at Jerusalem, know all the Jews, which knew me from the beginning if they would testify, that after the most straitest sect of our religion, I lived a Pharisee. Why should it be thought a thing incredible with you that God should raise the dead?"

Mr. BRADLAUGH: There is one thing that I think I ought to do before commencing this speech, and that is personal to myself. A little while ago I disputed the ruling of the chairman. It happened to be exactly the reverse of the ruling of the chairman last night, and I thought I was right in disputing it at the moment. I now think I was wrong. I think that when you accept a chairman you ought not to challenge his decision, and I therefore tender him my apology.

I feel considerably troubled about the course this debate has taken, because, frankly, I would not have entered into it at all if I had not thought that the best that could be said for the authenticity of the Scriptures would be said, and that I could reply to it. And I hold that it is not the proper way to prove that authenticity by simply reading from the Bible and contending that that is evidence, because with reference to the New Testament, I put the challenge in a very narrow shape, because I challenged there the possibility of evidence of the four Gospels until the year A.D. 150. Now on that I am either right or wrong. The burden is on Mr. Roberts, and he ought to have been prepared, before he entered into a debate of this kind at all, to

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deal with that, and what he ought to have been prepared to do would have been this had he been frank: he would have said, the old Hebrew books, I am not prepared to verify them in the same fashion, because there is in the Hebrew nation only that literature to which I can appeal: there is no literature outside it. But he then would be bound to try the books on their contents. What I complain of is this that he pretends there is evidence, which he ought to know don't exist, and that he don't answer frankly, for the purpose of avoiding the confession of it. And I will give you what seems to me the most startling evidence of that. Challenged to prove that the book of Genesis existed at what he called the era of Joshua, he read these verses—and why I wanted to read them was: I knew that they had nothing whatever to do with it, and I knew that I would read them much quicker than he did, and that it would give me the opportunity of asking further questions. There is not a particle in the 31st, 32nd, 33rd, or 34th verse which he read identified any books as written by Moses then being in existence. On the contrary, the pretence is there that Joshua wrote something upon stones, not that Moses wrote something, and not that they had then got that which Moses wrote.

Well, now we come to the only difficulty which Mr. Roberts chose to deal with. He says he could deal with all of them; why don't he? He wants me to take up the time of my speech in questioning. It is enough for me to state the objections in my speeches. I have plenty of other matters I want to deal with. I want to show that Mr. Roberts has not a ray of evidence in favour of the case he ought to maintain. But he says, Oh! the statements in the 9th of Acts and the 22nd of Acts are reconcileable, for although one says they heard a voice, and the other says they did not hear it, it does not mean that, but it means that they did hear it but did not understand it. Now I ask, If this is a divine revelation, why did not God say what He meant, instead of leaving it for Mr. Roberts 1,800 years afterwards to give the explanation? Well, Mr. Roberts says they all fell down; but Acts says No, they stood speechless. I don't know whether they did or did not; I only know that the story contradicts itself. Mr. Roberts says that Christ rose and was seen for a long period prior to his ascension. I quoted from the 24th of Luke to show you that that was impossible, and he never dared to answer it. Which statement is true? both cannot be. Let us dismiss such things as Lord Lyttelton. The Lord Lyttelton who has just died never said he was an Atheist at any time.

Mr. ROBERTS: His father: they are both "late."

Mr. BRADLAUGH: You should say what you mean. Now I have another allegation, and I am extremely doubtful whether the most straining of opinion can identify the views of Lord Lyttelton, as expressed in his writings—now dealing with Lord Lyttelton the father—at any time of his life, with the opinions put forward by me. But if it were so, the fact that Lord Lyttelton said one thing at one time of his life, and at some other time of his life said something else, makes nothing out whatever for the case Mr. Roberts has to prove. I will tell you what would be important: if he would put forward the evidence on which Lord Lyttelton was convinced; then that evidence might have some effect. But I have never yet found Mr. Roberts quote accurately from any things he has been dealing with, and I want precise evidence, not general statements, because the general statements, when examined, simply come into nothing at all. What is the case? O! Paul spoke. But suppose Paul did speak, how does this get rid of the objection I took to the 21st of Exodus, which gave a man the right to have a slave, to keep that slave, if he were a Jew, for seven years; if he at the end of that time had been married before he went into slavery, he was to take his wife and children with him; but if his master had given him a wife, and she had borne him sons or daughters, the wife and her children were to be the master's. How can any statement about Paul make that a revelation from a good God? How can anything make the text in Deuteronomy, which says you are to kill a man who tries to entice you away from your religion—how can any statement about Paul make that a revelation from a good God? How can any statement about Paul make that a revelation from a good God which says both thy bondmen and bondmaids shall be of the heathen round about you, and they shall be your bondmen and bondmaids for ever? Nothing about Paul will make that into a good declaration. The civilisation of the world condemns it, the humanity and civilisation of to-day

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reject it; and then, Mr. Roberts ventures to tell me about my scepticism, which is ruining the world—yes, my scepticism has had to fight against the slavery which this book taught—against the corruption which this religion fostered. But Mr. Roberts's business in this debate is not to attack my scepticism, but to prove that these Scriptures are an authentic Divine revelation. I am quite willing to come at another time and defend my scepticism against any representative Christian. Here I bind myself to the Bible, and when he talks about my wanting to put you amongst fossils, at any rate the fossils are better than the hell and damnation which this book teaches. But these kind of things are no arguments either on one side or another: they are simply so much talk thrown in to utterly avoid the subject. The subject we ought to deal with is this: Is there evidence of the authenticity—that is of the authorship—of these books? What is the evidence? It is not for Mr. Roberts to say to me, Can you disprove it. Because, supposing I am the most ignorant man in the world, that don't make out a case for him. My business is not to disprove. In the opening of a case on the part of the plaintiff in a court of law—because Mr. Roberts has talked about what ought to be done in a court of law—the plaintiff has to prove his case; the only duty of the defendant is to cross-examine the witnesses, and unless a *prima facie* case be made out, he is not obliged to do anything more, and that is what I say here: there is no case to go to a common sense jury. Mr. Roberts has read, in a tone of voice which may be effective from the pulpit, texts from the Bible, but he has not given a particle of evidence outside. Friends, I cannot understand that Mr. Roberts could allow one of these points, which he says he can explain, to pass unexplained for three nights, when he knows the effect they must have. I show God cruel, I show God repenting, I show God vascillating, I show God unjust to peoples and favouring kings against peoples, I show God, by the texts I have quoted, giving pardon to kings, no pardon to people, and punishing a people for the offence of their king; and if you tell me that is a revelation from an all-wise God, and a just and merciful God, then language has a different meaning in your mouth than what it has when spoken by most English people. And I object that no man, when pleading here, has any right to cast my scepticism against me; his business is to make out *his book*. Without scepticism we should still have been in the dark ages of the world, when your Bible-Church was triumphant. If it had not been for the scepticism of the Arabian and the Moor, who lit up philosophy again when your Christianity had crushed out its flame, there would have been no possibility for the reform of to-day. When your Church was in the plenitude of its might, you had a divinely-ordained tyranny, a proud and licentious clergy, and not a shadow of aspiration amongst the people. You twit me with my scepticism: what have your Churches done? Look where huge cathedrals cumbered the ground, while poor men's dwellings were miserable, and the poor had no right. God's revelation! Why didn't it rescue peoples long ago? Why didn't it give freedom to peoples long ago? Why didn't it help the people long ago? Why didn't it relieve the poor and sick long ago? Why is it that infidelity has had to battle against the tyrannies of the world when your Church has taken the side of the strong against the weak. Friends, I have nearly arrived at the exhaustion again of my time, and I have only to regret that this third night, as every other, is utterly fruitless on the question we have to discuss, because, if Mr. Roberts begins at the beginning of one epistle and reads to the end of it, until he has addressed some evidence as to the authenticity of that epistle, it is so much waste of time. We don't seem to apprehend the commonest principles of evidence in a case of this kind; and I ask you, who were against me when I began to speak—I ask you, if you think my opinions so bad, at any rate you ought to give the frankest and the best care to try to change those opinions, so that they may not influence others for wrong. I have been obliged to find throughout the whole history of the world that what you call *the Bible* has been on the side of wrong, on the side of the mighty against the people, on the side of the priest against the poor, on the side of the rich abbot and the richly-endowed cathedral and the rich King. I find the people in misery, and that those who have striven to rescue them have been assailed as sceptics during their lives, and have only been canonised when their bones have mouldered in the grave.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and gentlemen, the threat that I addressed to you at the

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beginning we are about to remit: instead of keeping you later we intend this evening to close at ten o'clock, I shall therefore be obliged to restrict each gentleman to ten minutes in their concluding speeches. Mr. Roberts will now speak.

Mr. ROBERTS: Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, the apostle Peter speaks of men who speak evil of things which they understand not. I am rather under the impression that we have had an exemplification of that in the speech to which you have just listened. Mr. Bradlaugh has said that fossils are better than hell-fire; so say I. But there is an implication under that remark which is not sustained by the facts. The implication is that the Bible teaches the eternal torment with which the clergy have striven to maintain their ascendancy in all those dark ages which Mr. Bradlaugh denounces, and which I denounce equally with him.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Hear, hear.

Mr. ROBERTS: The Bible is innocent of any such monstrous doctrine, as I am prepared to prove on the right occasion. He makes the Bible responsible for the cathedrals; I should like him to try to prove that the Bible has ordered cathedrals to be built by Christians. He makes the Bible responsible for the wretched houses of the poor, and a great many other dark features which characterise the present, and more particularly the past, civilization of Europe. For these the Bible is totally irresponsible. The system of the Papacy, it is, which has given the political law to Europe during all the ages which Mr. Bradlaugh has referred to, and which in itself is a great fulfilment of prophecy and a proof of the Bible's truthfulness, as I shall show when we come to that department of the subject—I say that these things which Mr. Bradlaugh denounces, are the doings of a system that has tried to suppress the Bible in the doing of them, in order that its iniquity might not be known.

But Mr. Bradlaugh says that the Bible is responsible for a few things that I am afraid to explain. By no means; I am not afraid to explain any of them. The things done and laws enjoined, through Moses, are legitimate enough in view of the prerogative of the lawgiver. Has God, who created man, no right to say when man shall be destroyed? Has Queen Victoria no right to order a man to be hanged? (No, no). Very well, have you any right as soldiers to shoot Frenchmen if they invade England? (A voice: yes). Then upon what principle will you deny that God has the authority to kill as well as to make alive? I own to and take the full responsibility of those statutes which are contained in the Bible: they are wise in their place and in their time, and God is a better judge of time and place than we.

Then Mr. Bradlaugh has tried to make a great point of slavery. On this I have simply to say the slavery of the Bible is not the slavery against which modern anti-slavery advocates have had to contend: the slavery of the Bible was a mere domestic servitude in which rights were recognised as attaching to those in servitude. American slavery recognised no rights; but whatever the form of servitude might have been, I deny that any argument against the Bible could be extracted from it. Has God no right to dictate the form that domestic institutions may take? Is He not possessed of the highest wisdom to judge in what particular circumstances particular institutions are adapted to work best for objects He may have in view in dealing with men? If it came to detail, I would grapple with all these points: and I wish Mr. Bradlaugh would put them to me at the time he has to put questions to me: I would undertake to shoulder them all and not to stagger in the least degree in carrying the burden. They would not in the least shake faith in the Bible; for that faith is founded on too strong reasons to be touched by the kind of objection Mr Bradlaugh relies on, and as to my treatment of those objections, notwithstanding the tirade of Mr. Bradlaugh against my method of argument, a logical mind is able to perceive that if my argument can be sustained, my proposition is established, that the Bible is the authentic and reliable record of divine revelation. For if Christ rose from the dead, surely it will not be denied that he was the Son of God; if he be the Son of God, surely it will not be denied that his approbation of anything is a proof that it is right, and that therefore his sanction of the writings of Moses and the prophets is a proof that they are authentic and reliable, even if there were a total absence of all other kind of evidence whatever. Is not that so? And I use the case of Paul to show that Christ rose from the dead in the same way that I used the case of the

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early Christians last night to show that he rose from the dead. And that line of argument Mr. Bradlaugh dares not attempt to meddle with. Instead of dealing with it, he piles upon me a number of little points of alleged inconsistency in the book as a whole, and in a way that I am sure cannot carry conviction to cool and dispassionate and disinterested and logical minds, although it may please and tickle the fancies of a shallow class that do not understand the bearings of evidence. I shall not be diverted from my excellent plan. On the contrary, I rather invite Mr. Bradlaugh to follow me in that plan and pull down, if he can, the house I am building. His course is an oblique one. He did not attempt to allege that the Epistles of Paul are forgeries, and he will not admit them to be true. Why won't he admit what he cannot deny? Because if these epistles were written by Paul in the first century, my argument is substantiated, and the resurrection of Christ proved. He contents himself, therefore, with saying he has no proof that Paul wrote them. Why doesn't he give us the argument that leads him to doubt that Paul wrote these epistles? He talks of the practices of a court of law: who ever heard of a counsel for the defendant who shrank from exposing the forged character of a document produced and relied upon by the other side? Therefore on the very principle of advocacy Mr. Bradlaugh has himself sketched out, he ought to do that which he has refused to do; and he cannot do it: (energetically) I defy him to do it. (Laughter). You may laugh, but it is a very serious matter—so serious that you must excuse me for being in earnest. I am so certain that Paul was a true man, that Christ rose from the dead, that I am prepared to place my neck on the block to-night, if necessary, for my faith. You may make light of it, but Christ will shortly be in the world again, to the utter consternation of those who are so easily carried away by the shallow criticisms to which we have listened to night—I had further arguments on the case of Paul, but as the chairman informs me I have only two more minutes, and as it would be impossible in that short time to develop those further arguments, I will resign my post to Mr. Bradlaugh.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Mr. Roberts said why don't I touch the question that Christ rose from the dead. I thought I had challenged that what he had said about Christ being seen for forty days according to Acts was contradicted in Luke. I thought I had said, giving texts to him on the previous nights, and reminding him of it to-night, that the statement about Christ being three days and three nights in the grave was not true. I thought I had shown him on each of the two nights that the statements about the women who came to the tomb were self contradictory, one making it one woman, another making it two, and another making it more; and while I have mentioned these contradictions relating to the resurrection, it is simply an impertinence to say that I have not dealt with it.

Now we have a new case made. First, the Bible don't teach hell-fire; and for the purposes of this debate Mr. Roberts is governed by the authorised English version, which he agreed to accept. Mark, 9th chapter, verses 43 to 48: "If thy hand offend thee, cut it off: it is better for thee to enter into life maimed, than having two hands to go into hell, into the fire that never shall be quenched, where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched." And that is repeated over and over again. Matthew xxv. 41: "Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels." Matthew xviii. 8: "Wherefore if thy hand or thy foot offend thee, cut them off, and cast them from thee: it is better for thee to enter into life halt or maimed, rather than having two hands or two feet to be cast into everlasting fire." Well, if "everlasting fire" don't mean everlasting fire, if fire that can't be quenched don't mean fire that can't be quenched, then we have got to get a new language. It cannot be said that this is wrongly translated from some other tongue, because Mr. Roberts has agreed to accept the authorised English version as authority in this debate. Then he says that the slavery of the Bible was a mere servitude, in which rights were recognised, but that the American slave laws did not recognise rights. I say that is not true. I have read with attention the decisions relating to the slave laws of America, and I say there was no portion of the slave laws of America which said that a man might beat his slave within three days of his life, and that if he lived till the third day he was not to be punished because he was his money; and I say that in Exodus xxi. 20, 21, it is provided that "if a man smite his servant

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or his maid with a rod, and he die under his hand, he shall be surely punished. Notwithstanding, if he continue a day or two, he shall not be punished, for he is his money." I say that I am not here to defend American slavery. I admitted that American slavery reduced man to the position of a chattel, I admitted that it was damnable and wicked, and I admitted that the clergy defended it on the authority of this very book. I affirm that it was under cover of this book that pious slaveholders upheld their iniquitous system. Our friend says God in His highest wisdom knew what was best. I say that it was never best for any men at any time in the world to have the right to buy people whom they might beat within three days of their lives; I say it was never right for a rich murderer to escape because he paid for the man he had murdered. I say that it never could have been right to steal a woman and then turn her adrift. I say the whole thing is as monstrous as it can be. Then I am told, I am defied to prove the epistles of Paul to be a forgery. That is not the language that a man who is bound to prove them to be true should use to his opponent. Mr. Roberts has told me about the proceedings of law courts. If I don't understand the Bible I understand the proceedings of law courts, and no man who knows me will say I don't—and I say it is a most ridiculous proposition to say that if the plaintiff had not proved any case at all, that the defendant would try to contradict the case he had proved. If a deed is put in as evidence, it is not received as evidence until that deed is verified: it is only a piece of paper to which no attention is paid until it is proved by whom it was written. It is simply a piece of paper that the clerk of the court won't read, because there is nothing in evidence about it.

Then I am told that I have led you off with silly criticisms. The wisdom of the criticisms must be judged by others by and bye. I have only followed Mr. Roberts in the course he has taken. I did not attack the general teachings of Christianity to-night until he had referred to the scepticism of myself to-night, and then it was a fair retort to the speech he had made. If he wants to confine us to a critical examination of the book, I will follow him step by step; but if he fancies that flowers of speech will do, then to the best of my ability I will try flowers of speech too. I don't pretend that we have the deep and profound mind of our friend, who pretends to see evidence where it does not exist; but we have sufficient intelligence for the ordinary affairs of life, and we want that kind of evidence put to us here. Then we are told that there is a comparison between you killing Frenchmen who invade your country, and God telling the Jews to kill Canaanites who were born in the country the Jews invaded under the direction of your merciless Deity. Mr. Roberts says you will be justified in killing Frenchmen who invade your country.

Mr. ROBERTS: No, I did not.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: You did.

Mr. ROBERTS: No; I asked them if they believed they would be.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: But you must have meant something. If it was not intended to explain the one point by an analogy to the other, then it was a mere trick of speech, which might be proper in an infidel not governed by the considerations of the Bible, as Mr. Roberts is, but which ought never to have come from his side at all. Friends, we have nearly finished. I ask, is there one of you who has had the slightest evidence given to you that Christ rose? Has there been an attempt to prove any one of the facts, any kind of evidence given of the authenticity of any one of the books? No; all we have had is a daring "I defy Mr. Bradlaugh to disprove it!" My business is not to advance a line of negative proof: my business is to examine the evidence submitted from the other side; and you have not to do with my mere opinion. My mere opinion may be correct, or it may be incorrect. I pretend to no infallibility. I am ready to examine the evidence if it be submitted to me; but unless, during the three nights of the debate to come, Mr. Roberts is prepared to advance something, he had better make an announcement that he is not prepared to do it now, but will on some other occasion. This is the proper time and place to prove that it is God's Word, and it cannot be God's Word if it be full of cruelty, crime, treachery, deceit, and murder; full of those abominations which a civilised world has set aside. I beg to propose a vote of thanks to the Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: That had better be reserved till the last meeting.

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Fourth Night,

TUESDAY, 20th JUNE, 1876,

IN THE TEMPERANCE HALL, BIRMINGHAM.

MR. GEORGE H. ST. CLAIR IN THE CHAIR.

THE CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen, The order of the discussion, this evening, will be the same as last Thursday. The order of the meeting will, I trust, be kept at least as well. There was not much to complain of on that occasion; but there was a little. Some few friends found they were not able to control their feelings; and it is reasonable to suppose that having made that discovery, they have staid at home to-night. One or two friends, again, seemed desirous of taking part in the debate, and these, no doubt, have sent a challenge in the meantime, to Mr. Bradlaugh or Mr. Roberts, and they will reserve any further arguments until their own proper debate comes off. It cannot be too well understood that any interruption is a loss of time to the speakers, and a loss of time to the entire meeting, and cannot possibly result in any good. The subject for discussion is the same as before, namely, "Are the Scriptures the Authentic and Reliable Records of Divine Revelation?" Mr. Roberts will affirm that they are, and Mr. Bradlaugh will deny. I ask Mr. Roberts to resume the discussion.

Mr. ROBERTS: Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, Mr. Bradlaugh correctly defined the duties devolving upon the respective parties to this discussion when he said that it belonged to me to affirm that the Bible is true, and that it belonged to him to examine my evidence. Unfortunately, however, so far as the discussion has gone, Mr. Bradlaugh has not acted in accordance with that excellent definition. He has neglected entirely to examine the evidences, such as they are, which I have, so far, rehearsed in your hearing. He has not attempted to controvert the fact that there are Jews, though I should not have been very much surprised had he tried to do so. He has not attempted to controvert the fact that the existence of the Jews is required by the hypothesis of the truthfulness of the Bible. He has not controverted the fact that there is an ecclesiastical tyranny in Europe as the most prominent feature of the European system—a feature which has prevailed for many centuries, as the Bible required. He has not attempted to show that the existence of that ecclesiastical imposture is inconsistent with the position I am taking, or that it fails to sustain the argument I have founded upon it. With regard to the third proposition, he has not attempted to give us a reasonable account of the origin of Christianity, nor has he attempted to deal with the account I gave, which I endeavoured to show was thoroughly reasonable. He has not attempted to deal with the case of Paul; but he has taken the extraordinary course of denying that there ever was such a man, or, at all events, that there is evidence sufficient to justify us in believing in his existence.

When, however, he did attempt to deal with any part of the positive evidence I have rehearsed in your hearing, he has done that which he said he was not called upon to do; he has attempted to disprove my evidence. This he has done by a hurried, rather excited and somewhat disconnected recital of miscellaneous points and passages, which he rather hinted at as inconsistent with my argument, than tried to show that they actually were so.

There was one notable exception to that course of his. I produced the writings of

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Paul as one of my principal and most valuable evidences. They exist, which is a great fact. I mean the existence of the epistles bearing his name is a great fact, for a reading of them would convince any unbiassed mind that they are no forgery; an unbiassed reader instinctively feels that a forger or literary inventor could not produce such writings. I produced them as a weighty element in the argument. Mr. Bradlaugh did not attempt to disprove them; he said it was not his business. He knows he cannot. When he cannot, he says it is not his business; but when he thinks he can, he tries.

But I am not content to leave the matter in that position. I was a little taken by surprise, I must confess, by Mr. Bradlaugh's tactics on this point, because it is universally conceded now, with the exception of a few of the more unscrupulous and uncritical of the unbelieving class, that Paul lived in the first century, and that Paul wrote these letters. I assumed that Mr. Bradlaugh would admit this also, and argue the case on the basis of that admission. Therefore I had not come prepared with the complete and exhaustive technical evidence which it is possible to produce in support of the fact. I would have prepared myself with the evidence if I had expected Mr. Bradlaugh would have taken the position he has taken. I have come to-night so prepared, and I shall carry the chain of evidence not only back to A.D. 150, but right straight away into the days of Paul himself in an unbroken chain—not a broken one, such as Mr. Bradlaugh says he is contented with in the case of Eusebius. In the case of Homer, Herodotus, Livy, and other ancient writers, he has to be content with a very faint and broken chain of evidence, and the principle which guides him in accepting that evidence would compel him in consistency to accept Paul even if there were only a few scattered links, instead of there being, as there is, a chain without a single link missing.

I asked him last Thursday night how far back he would allow the New Testament to have existed. He said A.D. 150. I asked him his reasons for fixing upon that date, and he declined to give me them upon the somewhat trivial plea of being afraid to furnish me with valuable information. I hope Mr. Bradlaugh will not any longer refuse to answer my question on such a ground, or he will lay himself open to the imputation that he is afraid to submit his case to the test of cross-examination. The object of all my questions is to put the position he takes to a logical test, and if he evades them, it is simply evading legitimate test, which will reflect injuriously on his advocacy. My object in asking for his reasons for admitting the existence of the New Testament as early as A.D. 150, was that I might show to him had he given those reasons, that the evidence which carried the proof back to A.D. 150 would logically carry it back to the days of the apostles. This I hope now to make manifest.

There are five witnesses to the particular date Mr Bradlaugh speaks of, not that they fix on A.D. 150 as a hard and fast line, but their witness establishes that date beyond all question. The five witnesses which I produce are Tatianus, who was born A.D. 130, who wrote an oration to the Greeks and "The Harmony of the Four Gospels." Then there is Theophilus, of Antioch, who died A.D. 181; he wrote three books to Autolycus, in which he mentions John, and makes thirty or forty quotations from the New Testament. We then have Athenagoras, an Athenian philosopher, who became a Christian, and flourished in the second half of the second century. He wrote a treatise on the Resurrection; and also addressed a petition on behalf of the Christians to the Roman Emperor of the day, asking that they might be shielded from the persecution to which they were subjected. In these two publications he quotes the New Testament twenty times. There is, then, Irenæus, who was born A.D. 130, died A.D. 202. He wrote "five books against heresies," and in the course of his arguments, he mentions by name twenty-one books of the New Testament. Earlier still, we have Melito, of Sardis, who wrote a work "Extracts from the Law and the Prophets," and in which he recognises the New Testament by speaking of the Old, a distinction which did not exist until there came to be a new one, of course. Then there is Papias, of Hierapolis, who died A.D. 153, a disciple of Polycarp, who wrote five books of Commentaries, in which he distinctly mentions by name Matthew, Mark, Peter and John. All these men flourished in the middle of the second century, and gave evidence of the existence of the New Testament, certainly in A.D. 150, for they quote from it as a book commonly accepted at that time. They were separate men, living in various parts of the world, all quoting the New Testament in A.D. 150, which excludes the

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notion that the New Testament only came into existence in A.D. 150; for, mind you, the argument is stronger than it appears. Athenagoras, for instance, tells the emperor, in his petition, that there was, at that time, a community acting upon the precepts of the New Testament, which he quotes. The very fact of his addressing a petition to the emperor is evidence of this; for how came such a petition to be presented, except that there had, for a long time, existed a community of Christians subject to persecution. Athenagoras, to show their inoffensive character, quotes the precepts of Christ from Matt. v., as those by which they were governed. Consider what this proves. It proves that the New Testament must have existed a long time previous to the time of Athenagoras writing; for how, otherwise, could subjection to New Testament precepts (so contrary to the natural impulses of men), have been extensively brought about?

I say, then, that the evidence that carries the New Testament back to A.D. 150, logically carries it much farther back than that. But I am not content to rest my case there, and I march, step by step, back into the very age of the apostles while they were yet alive. I produce Justin Martyr. He was born A.D. 103; he was brought up a Greek philosopher, a man of education and of considerable natural abilities. I emphasise upon this, because this man was converted to Christianity in the year A.D. 130, ten years after which, he wrote an apology to the then reigning Emperor (Antoninus Pius) on behalf of the Christians; and again in A.D. 162, to Marcus Aurelius. In both of these, he quotes extensively from the New Testament. If the New Testament was only in existence in A.D. 150, how came Justin Martyr to quote from it in A.D. 140? and if Justin Martyr quoted from it in A.D. 140, is that not evidence of its existence many years before? for how could you imagine an educated man, as Justin Martyr was, embracing Christianity A.D. 130, and quoting in A.D. 140, from books which were not current in the Christian community, at least at the time he joined them? And if they were current at the time he joined them, they must have been current many years before, for the Christians were scattered in many places, and Justin Martyr travelled among them, and had the opportunity of knowing *the* facts on so simple a point as this, that is, whether they had the New Testament in their possession or not; and whether, being in their possession, it was a genuine book or the production of forgers. A curious kind of forgery certainly, as anyone may see if they will read; it is a forgery impossible on the face of it. And a successful forgery, extraordinary certainly, if it were a forgery, for it is made up of letters purporting to have been addressed to communities in detail, which communities were in existence, and knew whether they had received those letters or not. But Mr. Bradlaugh says "Oh no; I don't say they are forgeries." When I ask him if they are genuine, then he says, "I have no evidence of it." This is incomprehensible. He broaches a new and extraordinary definition of forgery. I always understood that a forgery was an attempt to imitate something real and valuable; but in this case, Mr. Bradlaugh denies the value or the reality of the thing said to be forged. He will not admit the existence of real apostolic writings, though he says there is plenty of forged apostolic writings. This is an extraordinary position for anyone to take, and I must leave you to draw your own conclusions as to its meaning in this case. I have already spoken of Tatianus, who died A.D. 153. He wrote five books of commentaries, in which he distinctly mentions Matthew, Mark, Peter and John. I may say I come prepared with the names of the books and with the quotations from them, if required, wherein all these things appear. Next, I take Polycarp, who was born A.D. 80, when the apostle John was still alive. He died A.D. 167. While he lived, he wrote a letter to the Philippians. I have that letter in my possession, and with me on the platform. In that letter, Polycarp mentions three books of the New Testament expressly by name, and quotes from the New Testament fifty times. Polycarp, in the early part of his life, had the society of the apostle John, and learned from him concerning Jesus. This we learn from Irenæus, the disciple and companion of Polycarp. Earlier than Polycarp, we have Ignatius, who was born A.D. 35, a year after the crucifixion. He wrote seven epistles, in which seven epistles he quotes forty or fifty times from the New Testament, and refers once expressly to the Epistle to the Ephesians. He died A.D. 107. If the New Testament was forged in A.D. 150, how came it that Ignatius, who died A.D. 107, quoted from it at the end of the first century? His epistles were written at the close of the first

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century, and in them he quotes the New Testament, which constitutes evidence not only that the New Testament existed at the time he quoted it, but that it was then recognised as a book which was a standard authority for reference among Christians. This shows a previous existence of many years. I go a step or two farther, and I take Hermas, who also flourished before A.D. 100, while John the apostle was still alive. In his work, entitled *The Shepherd*, there are at least fifty quotations from the New Testament, and we know that Irenæus, Clement, Tertullian, Origen and others, cite or refer to this work of Hermas as a writing antecedent to their days. Besides Hermas, we may take Clement, who is referred to by Paul. Clement was born A.D. 30, and died A.D. 100. He wrote a letter to the Corinthian Church, as I stated on a former evening, in which letter he expressly refers to Paul's epistle to the same community, and quotes many times from the New Testament. Then there is the testimony of Barnabas, who wrote a letter somewhere about the time of the destruction of Jerusalem, to which he refers as a contemporary event; and in this letter is quoted the New Testament more than thirty times.

With regard to these witnesses, although I do not accept them as competent expositors of true Christian doctrine, yet they are competent witnesses of what existed while they were yet alive. A man may be a trustworthy witness of a fact without being accepted as a judge of the fact. For instance, scientific men may take the statement of an agricultural labourer as to the finding of a particular plant in a field, while we may reject his theory as to the nature and quality of the plant; or a country villager's evidence may be accepted to the existence of a certain custom in the village back to a certain date, without people being bound by his explanation of the meaning of that custom. We may accept the fact while we disregard the theory. So, these "Fathers," as they are called, may be taken as witnesses of what passed in their own day, as the writings of the apostles, though they may not be accepted as good judges with regard to the true nature of the doctrine of the apostles.

The evidence of the authenticity of the New Testament is so complete, that I can only account for Mr. Bradlaugh's objection to Paul's writings on one principle. There would be no difficulty about the authenticity if it were not for the apostolicity. If these writings of Paul merely ranked with those of the scholars of the day, Mr. Bradlaugh would accept the evidence of their authenticity. In fact he is bound to. There is no denial of the fact that these men whom I have quoted lived at that time. There is no denial of the fact that they wrote at that time, and that they quoted the New Testament. It would not alter the argument if it could be shown that these were not their letters, because the writings produced, even if forged, were forged in the age during which Polycarp and the others lived (as shown by the recognition of their existence by Eusebius, Irenæus, and others), and the quotations they contain from the New Testament would have the same force as showing that the New Testament existed, as if they were the production of their professed authors.

The evidence is complete. I have carried the proof right back to the age of the apostles. I have proved the New Testament to have been in existence in the first century. It is a perfect marvel that we have such an unbroken chain of evidence, for we have to remember that the Christians in their beginning were a sect everywhere spoken against, despised and trodden down, and composed principally of the poor. The wonder is that documents should have been produced among them which should be extant to the present day. It was different in the days of Eusebius. Then the protection of the State was thrown over them, and Christian documents became public documents, and Christian writers public writers under imperial patronage, as Eusebius was. Before then Christian documents were private documents, and the wonder is that they are now in existence at all. Having been proved from the beginning of their existence, I ask you to take up and apply the argument concerning Paul which I advanced the last night we were together. That argument properly belongs to to-night, and is in the same line as that previously pursued, though the evidence is stronger. With the proof of the document there is the proof of the facts, and therefore of the conclusion I sought to deduce from them.

I have referred to the internal evidence which Mr. Bradlaugh has refused to look at. Surely internal evidence should go for something. In my judgment it weighs a great deal more than any amount of external evidence that can be produced. I think I shall be able, though necessarily in a brief manner, to indicate some general

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considerations on this point which will help to carry conviction as to the divinity of this book. This belongs to the second part of my general proposition—that the Scriptures besides being "authentic" are "reliable." Mr. Bradlaugh has not directed his attention to the word "reliable." He has confined himself to the word "authentic." He has limited me in the argument to the idea of authenticity. This is a mistake, for a thing may be utterly worthless and still an authentic record. I believe the Koran to be authenic, but I don't believe it to be reliable. I believe Mahomet wrote it, but I don't believe what he wrote in it. Even on the question of authenticity the Koran cannot be placed in competition with the Bible; but it is necessary, besides saying it is authentic, to show that the Bible is a reliable account of the Divine dealings with mankind; and I proceed by a few hasty thoughts to make that apparent.

I call attention to this fact that the Bible, as a whole, is in harmony with what is now found scientifically to be true, though written at a time when the whole world outside of it was wrapped in speculative fog. I refer now to two items in particular —God and man. With regard to God, the nations of the world said there must be a variety of gods, because there was a variety of power-mainfestations. They saw fire and heat, and sunshine and darkness, and water and love and thunder, &c., and they argued these must be manifestations of separate deities. They, therefore, invented Jove and Venus, and Mars and Neptune, &c. A plurality of deities was believed in by almost every nation. But science has shown that all manifestations of power are referable to one common source, origin or principle, though that common origin is itself admitted to be inscrutable. The doctrine is defined as "the co-relation of forces:" that is, that all forces have their root or origin in one principle. Now, that fact the Bible taught ages before it occurred to natural thinkers. It taught that there is but one God and one universal Spirit, out of which all things have come. Did time allow, I would show this by a number of citations; but my time is drawing to a close. But there is a difference between the Bible form and the scientific form of this doctrine. Science, at least in the hands of some scientists, makes a curious application of its "co-relation" discovery, which I venture to say does not bear a favourable comparison with the Bible use of that truth. I now refer to the doctrine of the origin of the universe, as expounded by men who wish to get rid of a God, upholder of all, proprietor of all, to whom we are all responsible. They say the primal force is an unintelligent impersonal force. They won't accept a personal God. They say they cannot comprehend such an explanation. They cannot comprehend how universal power should have a personal nucleus at one central point in the heavens, as taught by the Scriptures. They cannot grasp the idea of universal power being, in its totality, One Mighty Being. They reject it because they cannot understand it. But do they give us something they do understand? Let us see. They are obliged to admit that things have had a beginning, at least upon earth. They tell us of a time when the earth was in an incandescent state, and when there was no life on it. They tell us of a time before that, when there wasn't even an incandescent world, but when its substance existed in a nebulous ethereal form, diffused throughout the universe. We follow them, and ask them what preceded the nebulous condition of substance? and whatever it was, how came it to advance to a more concrete state? If the impelling motion was due to blind, unreasoning, unsentient generation in the inert universe of vapour or gas, or whatever it was, why didn't the generation take place countless ages before, when the same force being there, the same power of development existed? Why the blind force did not develop itself millions of years before it did is not explained. It ought to have brought itself out from eternity if there was no intelligence to plan, control, check, restrain, or stimulate. What a strange account of creation we have at the hands of such a theory. Here is the 1st chapter of Genesis, written by an American, according to the philosophy which Mr. Bradlaugh represents:—

CREATION ACCORDING TO DARWIN.

1.—Primarily the Unknowable moved upon cosmos and evolved protoplasm.

2.—And protoplasm was inorganic and undifferentiated, containing all things in potential energy; and a spirit of evolution moved upon the fluid mass.

3.—And the Unknowable said Let atoms attract, and their contact begat light, heat and electricity.

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4.—And the unconditioned differentiated atoms, each after its kind, and their combinations begat rock, air and water.

5.—And there went out a Spirit of evolution from the unconditioned, and working in protoplasm, by accretion and absorption, produced the organic cell.

6.—And cell, by nutrition, evolved primordial germ, and germ developed protogene, and protogene begat eozoon, and eozoon begat monad, and monad begat animalculæ.

7.—And animalculæ begat ephemera: then began creeping things to multiply on the face of the earth.

And so on, and so on. Is that a bit more intelligible than this?—

THE BIBLE ACCOUNT.

"In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth. And the earth was without form, and void; and darkness was upon the face of the deep. And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters. And God said, Let there be light: and there was light."

If that is mysterious, I can only say it is at least not more mysterious than the Darwin mystery, and if I must choose between mysteries, I would rather have mystery with intelligence in it than mystery without intelligence. I can understand how things made a start, if there was a designing initiative to start them. I cannot understand how things could start if there was nothing to give them an organic propulsion.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: On this, the fourth night of the debate, the names of the witnesses are mentioned, and Mr. Roberts says he can quote from them, but he has carefully refrained from doing it, and I will give you the reasons in my speech why he has not done so. He says I admitted that the New Testament existed A.D. 150. But I am in the recollection of the audience, and still more in the recollection of the short-hand writer, whose notes will speak for themselves, and I am positive my answer was that not the slightest evidence could be shown of the existence of the Four Gospels before A.D. 150. I did not say that at A.D. 150 you could show the existence of the book, and if Mr. Roberts thinks I said so he has greatly misapprehended what I said. On the contrary, I took that date to be on the safe side, because I knew it was a long way on the safe side, and I cannot make out a man who has listened with reasonable attention having so entirely misunderstood the statement. Mr. Roberts has referred to Tatian, but not a word has he quoted from Tatian, because there is not a word in existence, and that is a good reason for not quoting him. And here I must ask Mr. Roberts not to use people's names as witnesses, but to quote, with chapter and verse, the phrases on which he relies as evidence. It is simple impertinence to read names to us and tell us he has got the books here when those books do not exist in the world. Mr. Roberts next quotes Theophilus. The reference to Theophilus stands in much the same position as that to Tatian,. with this exception, that there is a commentary of Theophilus which is referred to as spurious. If that is evidence all I can say is that language gets very puzzling. It is alleged by Lardner that the date given to Theophilus is A.D. 181, and how that can come before A.D. 150 my arithmetic don't tell me. Next we come to Athenagorus. With reference to this writer he never mentions either Matthew, Mark, Luke, or John, by name, and when any texts are quoted from him, I will undertake to quote from him that which is not in the Four Gospels at all, and which he must have derived from some other gospels, which it will be my duty to mention to you before this evening is over. We now come to Ignatius—I beg pardon, Irenæus; and the very funny way in which Mr. Roberts manages his dates is remarkable. He says "Irenæus, born A.D. 130, died A.D. 202," and therefore he brings him before A.D. 150.

Mr. ROBERTS: No.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: I say yes, or I don't understand the meaning of the language Mr. Roberts uses. The books against heresies attributed to Irenæus came between A.D. 180 and A.D. 190, and cannot possibly affect the question of what took place before A.D. 150. Next we are told there is Mileto. Would Mr. Roberts name the particular works he relies upon. I don't mean the works of Christian evidence mongers 300

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years after, but I mean of the works which Mileto has handed down. I defy him to do it for the simplest of all reasons. He can only quote to you by the process of using the works of writers considerably later. Then Mr. Roberts uses the name of Justin Martyr. I have taken the pains of looking up Justin Martyr, who I thought would be referred to, because I wanted to have something to say in my speech without referring to the very agreeable nonsense with which Mr. Roberts concluded. Justin Martyr is supposed to have lived from A.D. 130 to 140. Some put the date a trifle earlier and others a great deal later. Mr. Roberts says he was born A.D. 103, converted A.D. 130. Will you permit me to tell you that the whole of the dates which Mr. Roberts gives so glibly are all disputed dates—not disputed by infidels, but by religious men. There are disagreements on every one of those dates, and it is not fair and frank in a man calling witnesses to give you these as though they were undoubted dates. However I am contented to take it that Justin Martyr was converted in 130, and I will take it that his works existed in A.D. 140. Justin Martyr was a voluminous writer, but the truth of the works published in his name have since been abandoned as forgeries by Christians themselves. And then when Mr. Roberts was referring to Justin Martyr, why did he not tell you that the famous Paul, of whom he talks so much, is never once named by Justin Martyr in any one of his writings. Why did he not tell you that Matthew, Mark, Luke and John, as writers of gospels, are never once named by Justin Martyr in any one of his writings? Why did he not go on to tell you that Justin Martyr repeatedly uses language to show that whatever gospels he had, it was evident he did not have ours, for he talks of the father, or rather the husband of the mother of Jesus as putting up in a cave. He talks of fire kindled in Jordan at the baptism of Christ, which does not come out of the Four Gospels. He talks of Jesus whilst amongst men making works of carpentry, as ploughs and yokes, which clearly don't come out of the Four Gospels. But I won't weary you and waste your time by further referring to Justin Martyr. It is clear that whatever books Justin Martyr had, he does not mention the gospels. He does not, excepting in one passage, use the word interpreted "gospel," and that is an *interpolation*. He never mentions Matthew, Mark, Luke and John; and the famous *Paul is* not mentioned from first to last.

I will pass on to the next matter Mr. Roberts mentions. He says that a forgery is an attempt to imitate, and must be an attempt to imitate some valuable document. But if that be true, in what position is Mr. Roberts placed? I have here a list of fifty or sixty writings which have been abandoned as forgeries—books published as Acts; books published as Gospels; books published as Epistles. I may have time to read the list to you, but at present I only refer to it. But if Mr. Roberts's contention is true, the existence of a false gospel of Barnabas would be evidence of an imitation of a true gospel of Barnabas; and if the contention has not that value, then it has no value at all. I ask you to remember that Justin Martyr's silence is important, because he does, in his writings, mention a revelation to John, and he mentions it in a peculiar, curious fashion, which, no doubt, you are thoroughly acquainted with, and I say the fact that Justin Martyr mentions that so distinctly shows that he could not have had others to mention, or he would have mentioned them with equal distinctness. I pass on to the next witness, Tatian. Mr. Roberts said he would quote to you from Tatian. There is not a scrap of Tatian existing except in a quotation of Eusebius, and it is utter pretence to carry you back in this fashion without explaining it to you. But what is the evidence of Tatian? It is the evidence of four gospels. If evidence at all, it is evidence against the Four Gospels we have. I have carefully compared the evidence, and I know exactly what I am saying. I say that the evidence is distinctly against the books and not in favour of them. We are told that Matthew composed his history in the Hebrew dialect. Tatian's evidence is that what existed was only in Greek, and there is no evidence of there having been any translation at all or any sort of testimony as to the way it comes to us in the fashion it has done. Again he says of Mark, that Mark being the interpreter of Peter, whatever he recorded he wrote with great accuracy, not in the order in which things were spoken or done by our Lord, for he never heard of or saw our Lord. What becomes, then, of the Four Gospels in the earlier part of the history? But it is a history composed in a fashion which precludes the possibility of the evidence of Tatian applying to it at all.

I now come to the alleged epistle of Polycarp, and I don't want to use any unduly

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strong language, but when people quote gospels and epistles as though they were not open to the slightest objection at all, they are dealing in a manner that is utterly unfair, and I urge that the evidence against the authenticity of the epistle of Polycarp has to be considered by anyone of those who take these things in hand for discussion at all, and I urge that the bulk of these epistles had to be abandoned as forgeries. A great German writer says the authenticity of this epistle has been called in question by a writer whom he names. The contents of them I will deal with presently. There is no evidence of anything about when Polycarp lived, and the authorised translators tell us that of Polycarp's life little was known. The whole story of his martyrdom is spurious and forged, and when you quote him, if I admit the evidence is true, I ask what have you got about Matthew? What have you got about Mark? What have you got about Luke? or what have you got about John? Not a solitary single word, and in order to show you this, I will take one of your witnesses, Clement of Rome. Would you believe that the writers and translators of the Ante-Nicene Fathers, the Rev. Dr. Donaldson and the Rev. F. Crombie, are obliged to tell you, in their introduction, that "who the Clement was to whom the writings are ascribed cannot, with absolute certainty, be determined." Mr. Roberts places Clement at A.D. 30 or A.D. 83. But taking Clement as presented to us, what does he prove? First, I submit to you if he proves anything, it is fatal to the Bible, for whatever he quoted was not in the Bible which we have, the authorised English translation, and I will give you my evidence; but before I do so, permit me to refer to Mr. Roberts's own case. He says Clement lived A.D. 30, and this epistle was written A.D. 83. Supposing that to be true, in the second chapter we have the passage: "Every timely honour and happiness were bestowed upon you, and my beloved did eat and drink, and waxed fat and wicked." This was said of a people which Mr. Roberts says were a persecuted race. Because honour and happiness were bestowed upon them they eat and grew fat—these followers of Christ, before there were any infidels to corrupt them at all. Again, he said, "I am but the smoke of a pit." Find me that within the cover of this book! Then, I say, the book he has proved is not the book we are discussing before this audience. But Mr. Roberts has given us the evidence of the resurrection. Let his own witness talk about the resurrection. In chapter 25 he says, "Let us consider the wonderful scenes of the resurrection which take place in eastern lands." There is a certain bird that is called the phœnix. There is only one of the kind, and it lives 500 years, and when the time of dissolution draws near, that it must die, it builds a nest of frankincense and myrrh, into which it enters and dies." He then describes the process of the bird rising from its ashes, and that is the kind of nonsense to prove the Bible true. But let us see what is the evidence of Clement, and I refer Mr. Roberts now to Eusebius's Ecclesiastical History—book 3, c. 38; book 2, c. 1—and I say he will find Eusebius there speaking with the same authority of the other writings of Clement, which have since been abandoned as forgeries. How dare Mr. Roberts pretend to talk of Clement, when he produces no witnesses; for those he quoted were not witnesses; they were only people who spoke from hearsay, like Tom who heard Dick say he knew William's grandmother 50 years ago. (Hisses). You do quite right to hiss, because the evidence can only be answered in that fashion. You do well to hiss, because you show that the sharp point of the blade has been thrust right through your advocate, and that you are afraid of hearing me. You do well to hiss, because it shows that your witnesses have been turned out by judge and jury with bad characters, and we cannot indict them for perjury, because they do not exist. Now we come to Hermas and Barnabas, but it would be dealing unfairly with two such reputable witnesses to waste the end of my speech upon them, and I shall occupy the few minutes that remain to me by commenting on the commencement of Mr. Roberts's speech this evening. He said the existence of the Jews was required on the hypothesis of the truth of the Bible. So I say is the existence of Mahomedans required on the hypothesis of the truth of the Koran. So the existence of the Mormons is required in confirmation of the truth of the story of Joseph Smith. So the existence of fire-worshippers proves the truth of the founder of their story, and the existence of the followers of Confucius to the truth of his works. And so I might go all through. These are simply the verbal phrases of nonsense which have been too much used. I don't deny the Jews. I don't deny that they had sacred books. Every people have their sacred books. The

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question I have discussed is, does the Bible contain an authentic revelation to man? Mr. Roberts says that I have dealt entirely with the internal evidence, and that I have not dealt with the external—that I have not dealt with the existence of an ecclesiastical tyranny. I cannot distinguish much difference in this particular between the Church of England and the Church of Rome, and the Nonconformists persecuting the Quakers in New England. Our friends of the Church of Rome as well as of the Church of England have been found in opposition to progress and education. That is why I impeach the book; that is why I impeach Rome. But it is no question of taking an ecclesiastical tyranny alone, if you tell me it is the out-growth of the book. By their fruits ye shall know whether the book is the book of truth. You tell me of a tree planted 1,800 years ago, and you tell me to come under its branches. I show you wars and murders, anathematising and persecution. I shake your rotten tree, and I say, "Look at the fruit." (Hisses.)

The CHAIRMAN: You do quite wrong to hiss, and you do quite wrong to cheer. You would do quite right to remain quiet and listen to the arguments. Mr. Roberts will now have the option of speaking for a quarter of an hour, or of questioning Mr. Bradlaugh, who will subsequently have the same opportunity.

MR. ROBERTS QUESTIONS MR. BRADLAUGH.

Does the Koran foretel the existence of Mahomedanism at a period 3,000 years after its establishment?—I think not.

Then in what sense does the hypothesis of the Koran's truth require the existence of Mahomedanism at the end of a similar time?—At what time?

3,000 years after the writing of the Koran?—3,000 years have not elapsed since the date of Mahommed. Therefore I cannot answer the question.

Then I will change the date to 1876, and repeat my question?—If you will repeat it, I will try to answer.

In what way does the hypothesis of the truth of the Koran require that we should find Mahomedans in existence now?—The supposition may be equally devised for any religious system embraced by so many millions of people.

Does the Koran foretel that Mahomedanism should exist centuries after its production?—I cannot challenge my memory.

I must ask you to try and remember?—My copy of the Koran is at home. I will look by to-morrow night.

I have a copy here (handing the book to Mr. Bradlaugh. Mr. Bradlaugh sits down and turns over the book).—Go on with your questions.

No; I cannot while you are reading.—Oh, I can answer you quick enough.

Excuse me, Mr. Bradlangh: I must wait till we have disposed of the present question. Read and I will wait.—I will, and perhaps I may find some things useful to both of us. (Turns over the book). Go on with your questions.

I must wait till you find the place.—I said I was not aware of any text capable of being so construed in the Koran, but you can go on. (Keeps turning over the leaves).

Allow me to ask you to put down the book if I am to go on?—I will answer your questions. I was going to give you a text which I think will conflict with the other book a little. I think that you will find that the Koran, chapter 24, provides for the better treatment of slaves than the Bible does in Leviticus, chapter 25. There are other things I will find if you will give me time.

That is not to the point at present. I now ask you whether you are aware that the Bible foretells the existence of the Jews till the end of time?—I am not aware of it.

Will you allow me to present you with evidence?—You have a right to do what you please. You have a right to occupy a quarter of an hour.

I now quote from the 30th chapter of Jeremiah and the 10th and 11th verses:—"Fear thou not, O my servant Jacob; neither be dismayed, O Israel: for lo, I will save thee from afar, and thy seed from the land of their captivity; and Jacob shall return and shall be in rest, and be quiet, and none shall make him afraid. For I am

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with thee, saith the Lord, to save thee : *though I make a full end of all nations whither I have scattered thee*, yet will I NOT MAKE A FULL END OF THEE : but I will correct thee in measure, and will not leave thee altogether unpunished." I ask upon that, whether the existence of the Jews does not bear out the hypothesis of that being a true prophecy ?—No, because in Genesis God made an equally kind promise which He did not keep, and I have no means of estimating one more than the other.

Give me a promise He did not keep.—More than one. In Genesis chap. xii., verse 7 : "And the Lord appeared unto Abraham and said, Unto thy seed will I give this land ; " and again, Gen. chap. xiii., verse 15 : Lift up now thine eyes, and look from the place where thou art, northward and southward and eastward. For all the land which thou seest to thee will I give it, and to thy seed for ever." I say the Jews have not had it for ever.

So you say ; but is that a proof that they won't ?—Yes it is, because it is said, "To thee will I give it, and to thy seed for ever," and, clearly, as some years must be taken off the "ever," it cannot be fulfilled.

You said you were going to give me a case of a promise not fulfilled ?—I will give you a dozen.

Let us keep to the one you have adduced at present. You think God has not fulfilled what he promised to Abraham. Is it not possible it may yet be fulfilled ?—No ; because the words are, "I will give it thee for ever," &c., and if the Jews are not in existence there, it is quite clear, according to your own contention, that they have not had it for "ever."

That is to say "for ever" when they get it under the promise ?—But it is said, "To thee (Abraham) will I give it." Abraham never had an inch of it.

Are you aware that he is to have it when Christ comes to establish his kingdom upon the earth ?—I don't know what will happen when Christ comes.

If you are not acquainted with what will happen when Christ comes, are you in a position to speak of an unfulfilled promise ?—Yes. The land was given to Abraham and his whole seed. Abraham did not get it, and several generations have not got it ; and it is clearly unfulfilled as far as they are concerned.

But if Abraham and his seed have it for ever at a future time, will not the promise be fulfilled ?—No ; because it won't be 'ever' after the promise.

It will be 'ever' after its fulfilment. The 'ever' begins with its fulfilment surely ?—It will be several ages short of ever.

Well, we will leave that. Do I understand you to deny that the Christians suffered persecution in the first century ?—I have no evidence of the existence of persecution. I only find your own witness saying they received "honour and happiness, did eat, drink, become fat and kicked."

Do you believe that Tacitus lived and wrote in the first century ?—I forget the exact date of Tacitus's writings. I have no doubt he lived and wrote about that date.

Are you aware that Gibbon admits the authenticity of the writings of Tacitus ?—Gibbon was a Christian, and I am not. I have read Gibbon and I have read Tacitus. Gibbon lived 1600 years after Tacitus. You have Gibbon on your side, but Gibbon was a Christian gentleman, and I am an Atheist gentleman. I may say I don't lay particular weight on the era of Tacitus' writings. I believe it was at the close of the first century.

Do you admit he wrote ?—No doubt.

Do you admit what Tacitus declares, that Nero, in order to stifle the rumours that he set Rome on fire, ascribed it to a people "called by the vulgar Christians," whom he persecuted greatly ? Do you admit that was in the first century ?—I don't think it was. It is not noticed by Eusebius, and he would not have circulated the turbid writings of Josephus if he had had to his hand the writings of Tacitus. That is only my opinion, and I am corroborated by knowing that our "Christian Evidence" people altered every book they could.

Do you endorse this : "The most sceptical "——What are you reading ?

I will tell you when I have read it :—"The most sceptical are obliged to respect the truth of this extraordinary fact, and the integrity of this passage" from Tacitus. Do you admit that Gibbon wrote that ?—I do.

Do you admit Gibbon to be a first-rate authority ?—It may be that Eusebius had

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Tacitus to his hand. If so, it is most extraordinary that he missed that passage, if it existed, and circulated one which all intelligent men abandon as a forgery.

Supposing Gibbon says the Christians were persecuted in the first century, would you believe that they then existed?—I am inclined to think that the people whom you call persecuted Christians existed before that.

How far back would you take them?—I don't know how far back: Philo takes them back before the first century.

Do you take the name of Christ in connection with them back before that time?—At least 1,000 years before that time.

Do you mean to say that you find people called Christians before the first century?—That is not the question you asked me.

That is my question.—I don't know. I do find the name of Christ.

How came the name of Christ to be associated with the body of Christians?—I don't know.

Do you admit it has become so associated?—Yes.

And associated some time between A.D. 150 and A.D. 1?—I have no means of forming an opinion.

Then you deny this extract from Tacitus?—That is not the way of putting it. You asked me a question and I frankly answered it. You asked me the position of Tacitus. I answered by giving my reasons for what I think it was. But my reasons don't go any further than my own expression of disbelief, and don't go the length of absolute denial, but they put upon you the burden of proving it.

As a reasonable gentleman, I ask what have you reason to believe on the subject?—I find that the author Eusebius don't quote it. The whole of the early ages abounded in forgeries, and I cannot think so important a statement would have been missed.

Do you think Josephus wrote about the same time?—I should think about the same time or a little earlier.

Are you aware that Josephus quotes Tacitus?—Yes, but not for Christ, and he cannot have missed so important a corroboration. There was no need of putting the forged testimony of Josephus if the real evidence was to be found in Tacitus.

Are you aware that Josephus quotes that passage in Tacitus concerning Nero's destruction of Rome?—I am not aware that he quotes it as from Tacitus.

MR. BRADLAUGH QUESTIONS MR. ROBERTS.

Will you please find me the quotation in which Josephus speaks about Jesus?—Mr. R. (reading): "Now there was about this time Jesus, a wise man, if it is lawful to call him a man, for he was a great doer of miracles."

Do you find a word there about Tacitus?—No.

What do you mean by saying Josephus quoted Tacitus?—I did not say so as to this passage.

I quite misunderstood you, then. I certainly believed you to imply that a quotation from Tacitus was to be found in Josephus. If Mr. Roberts says I misunderstood him I only want it distinctly recorded. Will you please give your authority for saying that Clement of Rome was born A.D. 30?—I have only the authority of the ancient writers.

Of whom? Name him. (Mr. Roberts turns to a book). If you are going to quote from Eusebius I will find you the chapter.—I have the Apochryphal New Testament published by Hone.

I am afraid Hone is not an ancient writer. I want an ancient writer, not one of this century.—William Hone's statements are based upon his researches into ancient manuscripts, and are to be accepted as credible.

William Hone's statement is not ancient?—He is not my only authority.

Give me your other.—I give you Milner.

Is he an ancient writer. I want an ancient writer?—He is a gentleman——Mr. B., they are all gentlemen. I am not disputing that, I want an ancient writer. He is a gentleman who conducted his investigations in the light of ancient works in the most searching manner.

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That is no categorical answer to my question. The rules of this debate say that questions must be answered categorically, and to answer me by explaining who Milner is, is not categorical. I don't want modern writers, because they only base their statements upon something else. If you tell me you have only read modern writers, I can understand. Have you read the ancient authority? If you have not read the original writings, have you read translations from books such as are prepared from the original language? I don't want your "Christian Evidence" mongering works of modern times. I want the original authorities. Tell me, have you any others you have taken the pains to refer to?—Not on the question of Clement's age.

Have you in relation to Barnabas?—My answer must be the same.

Hermas, Irenæus, Mileto?—My answer must be the same in all these cases.

Justin Martyr? Do you mean to say that you have formed your judgment upon ancient matters without taking the trouble to go back to the ancient writers?—I have gone through a number of ecclesiastical histories.

What ancient ones?—Ecclesiastical histories are not ancient.

Yes, there are some?—What do you mean by "ancient?"

I am asking questions. It is your duty to answer them. I mean by "ancient" relating to the period of the writers whose names you have used.—Precisely so. I have given an answer. In some cases, I have referred to the first authorities.

Name one to whom you have referred in relation to this discussion?—I have not referred to original documents.

Nor have I, but I have been to the best translations, and I want to know if you have taken the trouble to do that. Tell me what edition of Justin Martyr you have used?—I have already observed that I have in some cases referred to the first authorities, and others I have taken second-hand on the authority of credible gentlemen.

What do you mean by "some cases?"—I cannot be more explicit.

Have you a translation of Melito?—Having said "some cases," allow me to state the cases. There is the case of Barnabas; there is the case of Hermas; there is the case of Polycarp, of Clement, of Ignatius. You had better take my general answer, in the way I put it, viz., that I have not found it necessary to refer to original authorities for well-vouched statements.

I want an honest answer, and not a general answer which avoids it?—My answer is that. In the main my information is second-hand. I have read translations of the original authorities in the cases I have mentioned.

As you have mentioned translations, is every statement of Clement true within your knowledge?—Not recollecting the whole of them, I cannot answer. I may say in brief that I refer to them merely for a question of facts. Even an idiot can speak to facts.

Is there any one you can recollect which was not true?—I think I cannot say yes.

Can you say no?—I cannot say no at the moment.

You mean to say that in the speech I made three quarters of an hour ago, although I read Clement, you do not know whether it is true or not?—You read in so hurried and incoherent a fashion that I have a difficulty in making out what you do say.

I shall not ask any more questions (Mr. Bradlaugh sits down).

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Roberts will now speak for a quarter of an hour.

Mr. ROBERTS: I said in my opening speech that I did not require the testimony of those men whom I have been compelled to produce, in order to be persuaded that the apostles wrote the New Testament at the time they professed to have done so. I think the internal evidence is so convincing that no man of clear, calm, patient, unbiassed intellect can fail, in the reading of it, to be persuaded of that fact. A good illustration of this just occurs to me. A certain sceptical gentleman some years ago, speaking with an infidel friend, said that if anybody wanted a cure for infidelity, he would be certain to find it in the reading of the Bible every day for one year. The prescriber of the advice was not consistent enough to carry it out in his own case; but

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he has since done so, as the result of his attention having been called to a new, or at all events, non-orthodox interpretation of the Bible, and that gentleman is now a believer in the word of God. My anxiety is to bring to bear the argument leading to that result, to so present before you the internal characteristics of the Bible as a whole, as to show you that it is a divine book, and cannot be a human book. I can only do this in a brief form. I will lay before you examples of the Bible's uniform depreciation of human nature—a peculiarity which is characteristic of the Bible alone. We have in the 9th Psalm this enquiry made: "What is man that thou art mindful of him, and the son of man that thou visitest him?" In Psalm 144 a similar question is asked and answered in this way: "Man is like to vanity: his days are like a shadow which passeth away." In the 40th chapter of Isaiah we read: "The voice said Cry; and he said, What shall I cry? *All flesh is grass, and all the goodness thereof is as the flower of the field;* the grass withereth, the flower fadeth, because the Spirit of the Lord bloweth upon it; surely the people is grass." Isaiah ii. last verse: "*Cease ye from man*, whose breath is in his nostrils, for *wherein is he to be accounted of?*" Ezekiel xxxvi. 22nd verse: "*Not for your sakes*, O house of Israel," that is, not for their sakes would he bring them from all the nations among whom they were scattered. "I do not this for your sakes, O house of Israel, but *for my holy name's sake*, which ye have profaned among the heathen whither ye went." In the 17th of Jeremiah, at the 5th verse, we read: "*Cursed be the man that trusteth in man, and maketh flesh his arm . . . .* but blessed is the man that *putteth his trust in the Lord.*" In the 9th of Jeremiah, 23rd verse: "*Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom, neither let the mighty man glory in his might; let not the rich man glory in his riches;* but let him that glorieth glory in this, that he understandeth and knoweth me."

I mean to contend upon these quotations, which are but a specimen of the universal character of the Bible, that no book, pervaded by such sentiments of depreciation towards man, could have a merely human authorship. I base this contention on the tendency of all writers, whether ancient or modern, Jew or Gentile, to glorify human nature, and boast in human achievements. All human writers, without exception, run in the line of thought illustrated in Mr. Bradlaugh's *National Reformer*, which speaks of the dignity of manhood and the greatness of human nature.

Then we have no parallel in any human writing to the constant exaltation of God as the great object of all arrangements and operations. "This people," for instance, we read, referring to the Jews, "have I formed for myself: they shall show forth all my praise." Again, consider this: 1 Cor., 1st chapter 26th verse: "For ye see your calling, brethren, how that not many wise men after the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble are called; but *God hath chosen the foolish things of the world* to confound the wise; and *God hath chosen the weak things of the world* to confound the things which are mighty; and base things of the world and things which are despised hath God chosen, yea, and things which are not, to bring to nought things that are; THAT NO FLESH SHOULD GLORY IN HIS PRESENCE." This is not a sentiment native to human nature. Human sentiment always runs in a contrary direction. Man always chooses the powerful, the great, the rich, the mighty, the noble, for the accomplishment of any schemes he may conceive, as we see in all other religions throughout the whole world in every country and in every age. If the Bible were a human production, it would be characterised by human sentiments with regard to human nature; for it is an absolutely universal characteristic of man to glory in man and to boast in his own or somebody else's wisdom, riches, glory and might The Bible runs directly counter to human feelings and sentiments in this matter, throughout its entire contents. This is inexplicable if it is a human production: but if the Bible be the reflex of divine views communicated by the Spirit of God to the writers, there is an explanation, instant and entirely satisfactory.

Then we have the perfect modesty of all the men who took a part in the development of Bible things; that is, modesty as regards any credit for the part they performed. I will give you a few illustrations of this. In the 3rd chapter of the Acts of the Apostles and the 12th verse, Peter says: "Why look ye so earnestly upon us *as though by our own power or holiness we had made this man to walk?*" Is it not the tendency in human nature, acting by itself, to take the credit of any gift possessed and to glory

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of it and make it the means of honour and personal consequence? No one with the history of mankind before him can deny this; but here are men who refuse the credit, as in the case recorded in the 14th of Acts: "Sirs, why do ye these things? *We also are men of like passions with you*, and preach unto you that ye should *turn from these vanities* UNTO THE LIVING GOD." Again, in the 10th of Acts and at the 25th verse we read: "And as Peter was coming in Cornelius met him" (Cornelius having sent for him by divine direction,) "and fell down at his feet and worshipped him; but Peter took him up, saying, *Stand up; I myself also am a man.*" In 1st Cor. xv. 9, we find Paul saying: "For I am the least of the Apostles that am not meet to be called an apostle, because I persecuted the church of God." In Exodus xvi. 8, Moses, speaking of the murmurings of the people says: "*What are we?* Your murmurings are not against us, but against the Lord." In Numbers xi. 29, Moses, when told deprecatingly by Joshua that somebody else had received the Spirit, replied: "Enviest thou for my sake? *Would* GOD *all the Lord's people were prophets* and that the Lord would put His Spirit upon them." In Daniel, ii. 30, Daniel, when cited before Nebuchadnezzar to explain a dream which had baffled the magicians, prefaced his explanation by these words: "As for me, this secret is not revealed to me for any wisdom I have more than any living, but for their sakes that shall make known the interpretation to the king, and that thou mightest know the thoughts of thy heart." Now, if Daniel had been an impostor, like all other impostors, he would have placed his own credit in the front rank; instead of that, he says the explanation he is about to give is not due to his superior wisdom, but to communication from God. That is the utterance of a true man, who knew that the information was not out of his own head, but that he had received it from external sources. If so, the divine character of what he said is proved. Then there is the case of Joseph in Gen. xii. 15, 16. Joseph was standing before Pharaoh under similar circumstances, and was called upon to explain an enigmatical dream. Pharaoh said to him: "I have heard say of thee that thou canst understand a dream to interpret it. And Joseph answered Pharaoh saying, *It is not in me;* GOD SHALL GIVE PHARAOH AN ANSWER OF PEACE." Coming down to Christ himself we see the same peculiarity. What does he say concerning the miracles he wrought and the wisdom he spake? "The words that I speak unto you, I speak not of myself; but the Father that dwelleth in me, He doeth the works."—(John xiv. 10.) "I am come in my Father's name."—(John v. 43.) And again: "Of mine ownself, I can do nothing."—(John v. 30.)

Now, although this argument may not tell in an excited public meeting, yet in the calm hours of anxious thought, I am certain its full weight will be felt by those who are capable of appreciating an argument. It goes more than anything to show that the men who had to do with the transactions involved in the Scriptures and the writing of them were true men, and not such men as Mr. Bradlaugh would represent them to be; though, by the way, he has not given us his idea very distinctly. I should like to hear him define what he thinks they were. He does not consider them designing or ignorant men. Were they honest and enlightened men, then? If so, is not the Bible an authentic and reliable record of divine revelation? The circumstances in which they were concerned were of that character that the men must either have been true or knowingly and deliberately false. They were not like questions of opinion, in which a man may be mistaken without being insincere. The matters to which they stood related were matters of fact, in which the transactors of them must have known positively whether their professions were true or false. And those professions were at the very time put, in many instances, to so severe a test, as to have dispelled any mist of doubt.

Let me give a single affecting illustration in the case of Jeremiah; and, by the way, this bears upon a point which it is well to notice. Mr. Bradlaugh tauntingly asked how he was to distinguish between the false prophet and the true. I answer they may both be distinguished by a simple test. In fact, they are to be distinguished the one from the other on the very principle by which I have sought to demonstrate the divine character of the Bible. The Bible speaks uncomplimentarily of human nature; all other books speak well of it. So the true prophets went against the popular current in denouncing popular sins, while the false prophets "spoke smooth things."—(Isa. xxx. 10.) This peculiarity of the false prophets is illustrated in the following citation: Jeremiah xxiii. 16: "Thus saith the Lord of

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Hosts, Hearken not unto the words of the prophets that prophesy unto you; they make you vain; they speak a vision of their own heart, and not out of the mouth of the Lord. They say still unto them that despise me, *The Lord hath said, ye shall have peace;* and they say unto every one that walketh after the imagination of his own heart, No evil shall come upon you." The disagreeable result of a true testimony is illustrated even in Jeremiah's case on the occasion when he was inclined to hold his peace. He said: "The word of the Lord was made a reproach unto me and a derision daily. Then I said, *I will not make mention of Him, nor speak any more in His name.*" The thing he said was a disagreeable thing, and brought upon him an attempt, on the part of the rulers of Jerusalem, to destroy his life; and then he makes this pathetic appeal to the princes and the people, which we find in Jeremiah xxvi. 12, and in which the truthfulness of his profession is apparent: "The Lord sent me to prophesy against this house and against this city all the words that ye have heard. Now, therefore, amend your ways and your doings, and obey the voice of the Lord your God, and the Lord will repent Him of the evil that He hath pronounced against you. *As for me, behold I am in your hand; do with me as seemeth good and meet unto you.* But know ye for certain, that if ye put me to death, ye shall surely bring innocent blood upon yourselves and upon this city, and upon the inhabitants thereof: *for of a truth the Lord hath sent me unto you to speak all these words in your ears.*"—(Time called.)

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Mr. Roberts, in his first speech, said he had a large number of witnesses, and that he could read from them, chapter and verse. For I challenged him to do so—that will be in the memory of all of you. I challenged them in very explicit terms; and instead of venturing to read a line of any of them he has occupied himself by reading texts from the Bible. I went through the witnesses, and I put it to you, that although I could not possibly guess what his first speech would be, that I dealt with the majority of them there and then, and he has not ventured to pretend that any one of my statements was untrue. But the difficulty is that if mine were true, his were not accurate. He said to you, when he was talking about Tatian, Theophilus, Athenagoras and Mileto, that he had got these and would read them if Mr. Bradlaugh challenged him. Mr. Bradlaugh did challenge him, and he has not read them, and will never read them during this debate. I carefully distinguished between what he could read and what he could not I took one writer, Clement, whom he could have read. Clement I have read not at second-hand but in a translation. If he had read Clement, as I quoted Clement, does he mean to say I did not read the passages of Clement distinctly enough for him to know their truth or falsehood? Mr. Roberts ought to have known Clement and the others, or he ought not to have challenged me to debate. Mr. Roberts says he had taken his information from reliable writers. My objection is that the mass of writers who wrote on the side of Christianity is not reliable. We may take a few men and agree with Lardner as to their credibility. I believe that Lardner writes thoroughly, earnestly, and honestly, and although I don't agree with reference to his ancient authority when Lardner's opinion is distinct and complete with regard to it, he is entitled to some respect. But when I find a man like Paley convicted of receiving information at second and third hand, and making blunders, do you think somebody ought to pass muster whose information comes at third or fourth hand? It is not reasonable; it is fencing with an empty scabbard—not fencing at all. In his last speech, Mr. Roberts says he does not need external evidence; then he should not call it. If that was the case, our friend in his first speech should not have tried it. I have only found this that my opponent has offered to advance evidence with this curious result, that all through I have always been right and we have not heard Mr. Roberts right in one instance. Take Solomon in the writer Josephus, the Proverbs in the writer Josephus. When he got Josephus, although Mr. Roberts was ready with explanations, there was not a word about Solomon or the Proverbs in the quotation. Mr. Roberts says I misapprehended him about Josephus and Tacitus, and I am bound to accept what he said; but I cannot imagine what he meant by asking me about Josephus and Tacitus. The question was what Josephus had written about Tacitus? and if it was not put with that object, then it was an attempt at bewilderment on the part of the questioner.

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At present I take it he has been misinformed. He did not quote Tatian to you. He has not read a line from Tatian, and he never will. In my speech I referred him to the only authors he could get references from. If he likes he can have my books, and I think I can supply him from my own little library with such English translations as exist of every one, not only of the people whose works are supposed to be whole, but of such extracts as are supposed to be prepared not from infidel sources—for I don't go to infidel sources—but from Christian sources.

Where are we about to go in this debate? Mr. Roberts first says there is external evidence. So there is. Now quote it and see what it is worth! But he cannot even do that. And, then, again I appeal to my friends, and I appeal to Mr. Roberts, whether he thinks the way to convince me that this book is God's authentic revelation, is by quoting to me writers I am better acquainted with than he is, and who don't say a word of what he thinks they say. It might do with somebody who never debated at all, but it don't do with me. Now what have we? We have a statement that we must account for Christianity, and in accounting for Christianity we may be very simple. Every religion in the world is the result of growth more than of fraud. There are some few cases, but very few, in the world, in which people have been utterly fraudulent. But the truth of cases in which men make headway, are cases in which they have had strong convictions—very often believe themselves to be thoroughly in the right, and although I may think them utterly wrong, it is not an impeachment so much of their *morale* as it is of their accuracy in dealing with these things. I do not regard Johanna Southcote as I would a woman not misled by enthusiasm. It does not follow because I do not regard a book as true, therefore I regard it as a directly fraudulent manufacture. The Pantheisms of the world, the religions of the world, the superstitions of the world—call them what you will—have not been the product of special men at a special moment. They have been the outcome of special organisations, and with different types of men we obtain different types of religion. It is only some men who have never been out of some Christian Evidence volume—with a large amount of "evidence" at fourpence a volume—it is only such men who put to you the conclusion of absolute fraud and forgery, or of absolute truth. All the religions of the world have some truth in them. I don't deny there have been good Christians; but when I am to have the apostles put to me for examples of perfect modesty, and Peter, of all people, quoted as "modest Peter," I must give you an illustration of Peter's modesty. Peter to whom God had revealed, "Blessed art thou, Simon Barjona, for flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee, but my Father which is in Heaven." How does "modest Peter" then get on when his master was being despitefully used? "Modest Peter" declared "I know not the man;" with an oath, "I know not the man." "But surely you were of the company," says a bystander: "Damn you, I don't know the man." That is your "modest Peter." If that was modesty, then Tatian was evidence. But let us, if you please, see what we are to do? External evidence—very inconvenient when it is to touch internal evidence. Very inconvenient! "Mr. Bradlaugh talks so quickly and incoherently." Then I will talk slowly about the internal evidence, and will remind you that this divine revelation says that John did know Jesus, and that he did not know him at one and the same moment of time; we have not been honoured with an explanation of that; nor of his own witness, Justin Martyr, saying that a fire was kindled in the river Jordan just at the moment of the baptism. He has not answered about three days happening between late on Thursday evening and before Saturday was over. He has not answered whether it was one woman, or two women, or more than two women, who went first to the grave. He has not answered the slight contradiction between Luke xxiv. and Acts i., as to 40 days Christ was said to be upon the earth after the resurrection. He has not answered any one of the mass contradictions which have been pointed out, and although I may talk quickly I t tolerably clearly; and if he imagines the Bible to be true, I can only say I wish l quicker wit when he challenges me another time. But we have had sneers at infide and references to the *National Reformer*—not a bad journal. I did not introduce Mr. Roberts did. It is a very good journal; there is a great deal of sensible writ in it to my taste. It happens to contain in the volume for 1867 the whole of evidence which Mr. Roberts has referred to to-night, all turned down. He could r it from there. He would do right to refer to it, and it would have saved him f

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some blunders. Then he talked of infidelity. What is infidelity? The world calls me infidel, and I am not ashamed. What is an infidel? If it is to be unfaithful to my views, then I am not. If it is to be unfaithful to my convictions, then I am not. If it is to be unfaithful to my country, then I am not. If it is to be unfaithful to the redemption of the human race, then I am not. If it consists in disbelieving that God made a damnation trap to catch all the human race in, then I am an infidel. I have used no hard words against Mr. Roberts. The word infidel came several times from him. I am content to argue out this question without the slightest resort to verbal retaliation. But I carry two swords and it depends upon those who fight me which one I fight with. I am ready to fence with the rapier, and I can handle the two-handed broad-sword too, and if wielding the two-handed weapon is necessary, I wield it. At the last moment, before I sit down, I remind Mr. Roberts that he professed to have upon the platform the writings of Tatian, Theophilus and others. He has not quoted them, and cannot quote them, and never will quote them throughout this discussion.

Mr. ROBERTS: It suits Mr. Bradlaugh's purpose to make these statements, but it would not suit my purpose to do what he challenges me to do, because—and he knows that well—in pursuing these unimportant enquiries, I would be prevented from doing other things which I am more particularly intent upon doing, and which are of far more consequence, and that is the exhibition before you of positive evidences which establish my proposition. Nevertheless, I affirm that I have produced the authorities he asks for. They are on the platform now, and if Mr. Bradlaugh will consent to the appointment of a committee of gentlemen, they will investigate the truth of my statement

Mr. BRADLAUGH (pointing to the audience): Here is the committee.

Mr. ROBERTS: Meanwhile I shall do my part, and that part is to prove my case. It is no way of proving the case to combat difficulties in detail. Nevertheless I am prepared to combat all these difficulties. Let Mr. Bradlaugh give me the opportunity by accepting a challenge for another six nights, in which he will undertake to affirm that the Bible is a forgery, or a mass of sincere nonsense, or whatever else he likes to affirm it to be. In such a discussion I would be free to follow him in all his arguments. Meanwhile it is his part to follow me. I have to deal with positive evidence, and my dealing with it prevents me doing all he would like me to do.

Before I proceed further, I will fulfil the promise I made the last time we were together, that I would give evidence of the existence of the law of Moses at Shiloh for a period of centuries. The process of proof consists in reading certain texts out of the Bible. Mr. Bradlaugh does not like so much Bible reading. I can only say that more weight attaches to the contents of the Bible itself than to the ephemeral, worthless sayings of contemporary witnesses to the fact of the Bible's existence. The first I shall quote are the directions of Moses to the priests (Deuteronomy xxxi. 9), "And Moses wrote this law and delivered it unto the priests, the sons of Levi, which bare the ark of the covenant of the Lord, and unto all the elders of Israel." In the 25th verse of the same chapter, Moses gave these directions: "Take this book of the law, and put it in the side of the ark of the covenant of the Lord your God, that it may be there for a witness against thee." Not "in the ark," as Mr. Bradlaugh suggested the other night, making it an objection that the place would not be large enough; but near it—by the side of it, in a manner we should understand if we had an exact knowledge of its surroundings. Then we have the information that the ark followed Joshua and the Israelites. Joshua 3rd chap., 17th verse:—"And the priests that bare the ark of the covenant of the Lord, stood firm on dry ground in the midst of Jordan, and all the Israelites passed over on dry ground, until all the people were passed clean over Jordan." In the 18th chapter of Joshua and the 1st verse we have:—"And the whole congregation of the children of Israel assembled together at SHILOH, and *set up the tabernacle of the congregation there.*" The tabernacle of the congregation included all that constituted it, and one of those items was the ark and the law written by Moses. We find the tabernacle still at Shiloh in the days of Samuel (1 Sam. i. 3; iii. 15-21; iv. 4), which was at least four centuries after it was set up by Joshua. I now proceed to show that the law was in the custody of the priests, and that it was their duty to teach it. In the 33rd chapter of Deuteronomy, 10th verse, we read: "The Levites shall *teach* Jacob Thy judgments, and Israel

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thy law; they shall put incense before thee and whole burnt sacrifice upon thine altar." In the reign of Jehoshaphat, we read (2 Chron. xvii. 8) that he sent Levites to teach in the cities of Judah. "And they taught in Judah, and *had the book of the law of the Lord with them*, and went about through all the cities of Judah, and taught the people." Again (Mal. ii. 7), "The priests' lips should keep knowledge, and they should *seek the law at his mouth.*" The conclusion deducible from these promises is that the priests had the law in their possession at Shiloh. I don't attach any importance to the point; but having promised to prove it, I have fulfilled my promise, and must now proceed to the further illustration of the argument which it is my duty to unfold.

Before I do so, I would notice the statement of Mr. Bradlaugh, that superstitions and religion—which he seems to regard as interchangeable terms—are the outgrowth of ages, the result of climate, and of natural peculiarities. He says that religion is not the product of particular men, or of particular circumstances. That may be true with regard to superstitions, which are not worth discussing, but it is not true with regard to the religion of the Bible. The religion of the Bible is, in a secondary sense of course, the work of particular men, and the offspring of particular circumstances of the most definite character. It is upon this, in fact, that I rely, as affording one of the most conclusive evidences of its truthfulness and divinity. It is very easy to talk of the "outgrowth of ages," but this will carry no weight with those who are acquainted with the facts of the case. My argument is that there is a method in the growth of Bible religion which, when critically investigated, will show that it was a designed affair, and not an accidental development of superstitious or any other kind of sentiment. The work of Moses in Egypt and the wilderness, for forty years with the Jews; the life and sayings of the prophets that arose in Israel; the appearance and doings of Christ and his apostles in the beginning of the Christian era, are all matters of a definite, palpable, and historic character, connected with statements of fact which, if sustained, prove the divinity of Bible religion beyond question: and the writings produced by all these men, giving an account of their proceedings, are also matters of palpable evidence; and my contention is that an examination of *all* these things in connection with the effects which are now visible in the world before our eyes, in true process of logic, will yield the result that the religion of the Bible is not like the religion of the Brahmin or any other superstition of unenlightened ages or nations, but is directly due to the initiative of Almighty wisdom, and therefore a coherent, and rational, and elevating, and glorious system of truth, which has already, despite of Mr. Bradlaugh's declaration to the contrary, immensely benefited the world, and given us a far higher civilisation than any other system is capable of doing, and which, in the hands of God, like the path of the just, will yet shine brighter and brighter unto the perfect day; for the world has not seen the last of the work of God on earth. The Bible informs us that Christ will re-appear and sweep away all the political nuisances which Mr. Bradlaugh tries in vain to reform, and establish a perfect system of government in the autocratic, infallible, and omnipotent despotism which Christ will give to the world. This, and not Republicanism, is the destined cure for the evils under which the world groans.

The incidents connected with the development of the work of Christ upon earth, to which Mr. Bradlaugh alluded, in my judgment, tell the other way from Mr. Bradlaugh's construction of them. I could not understand his logic about Peter. It seems to me that Peter's denial of Christ constitutes the greatest possible proof that Peter afterwards had good reason for preaching his resurrection. Not only so, but it is a positive evidence of the genuineness of the narrative. How came it to be recorded that Peter denied his Master? The very fact that we should have so distinct a record of Peter's denial of his Lord is a proof that the record is a Divine work; for if Christianity had been a human movement, the writers on its behalf would carefully have suppressed such a fact; and we have, in the very fact that such a man should be chosen as the principal apostle, another evidence of the Divine work; for men devising such a work would not have placed in the forefront the man who had disgraced himself most, but because there is a God, and because He so works that there is no room for human boasting, Peter, who had so humbled himself, was placed in a position where another man might have been uplifted. God's authority and God's honour are placed in the forefront, when the work is in the hands of a man who has

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everything to be personally ashamed of and nothing to boast of. Therefore that Peter, the leader of the apostles, should be recorded as having denied Christ, to my mind, leads to an exactly opposite conclusion to that which Mr. Bradlaugh extracts from it. It is a peculiarity we find in other cases; for not only was Peter, who denied Christ, chosen as the mouthpiece of the apostles, but Paul who persecuted the Church, was used as the most influential and successful agent in the dissemination of the religion of Christ throughout the world. Mr. Bradlaugh is obliged to admit that the Christians were an extensive community at the end of the first century, and that they were persecuted for the name of Christ which they professed. This is established by the letter of Pliny to the Emperor Trajan, and however he may try to obscure the bearing of the fact, here comes a problem which Mr. Bradlaugh says he is not bound to explain. It is a problem, the historic reality of which rests upon unquestionable grounds. The evidence I produce is not Justin Martyr, nor any of those other men with whose writings he is so particularly familiar, and who, in my judgment, are trashy writers. I rely upon historic facts, which Mr. Bradlaugh cannot overturn, and which his class have never been able to explain in harmony with their theory of Christ's resurrection being a myth. We know that men will not sacrifice everything and go to prison and death for a myth; but men did this for Christ, and Christ was commended to them on personally attested and solid facts. Paul said, "I preach unto you Christ. I have seen him. I give proof of his working with me in these signs and wonders, and my reason for telling you of him is that he is coming back again, and to you personally if you believe in him and obey him." If that is accepted, there is a reasonable explanation of the circumstance that vast crowds believed and submitted to disadvantage for their belief. But Mr. Bradlaugh says there never was a Paul. I call upon him to explain how it comes to pass that the vast community, whose existence he cannot historically deny, came into being without a Paul; and how that community, in all the ages of its existence, came to believe in Paul? It is playing with the subject to go recklessly in the face of manifest truth. The New Testament explanation is a rational explanation. There is no other rational explanation. It shows the straits of unbelievers that Mr. Bradlaugh should have to suggest that the New Testament was a forgery, written A.D. 150. It cannot be. How could it be? There were then large communities who would have been witnesses to the imposition. How could they, in various parts of the world, have been brought for the first time to accept as Paul's letters documents professing to have been written a hundred years before, but of which they had never heard anything till then for the first time? It is utterly contrary to all reason.

I have but a minute and a half, and I conclude by saying that the general character of the gospel teaching of Christ is of itself evidence of its divinity. For what is it? That by submitting to present denial in a variety of ways, without any hope of compensation in this present life, we may afterwards attain to a higher benefit which nobody can confer but God. Would any man have invented a doctrine like that? Would any man have deferred the hope of advantage to a remote and subsequent time as the benefit of present sacrifice? We have only to examine the whole range of human philosophy to see how utterly non-human such a system is.—(Time called.)

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Mr. Roberts is good enough to tell you that I am extremely familiar with the early fathers. I am obliged to him for that admission. I wish I could return the compliment. He says they are "trashy," but he did not say so when he opened his first speech.

Mr. ROBERTS: I did.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: You did not. You said you had them, and I challenged you to read them off one after the other as if they were really good evidences. I say either you had not read anything whatever of the writings which you attribute to Tatian, to Theophilus, to Athenagoras, to Mileto, to Justin Martyr, and, in that case, you ought not to have mentioned them, or you represented them to this audience, knowing they did not say what you pretended they did. That is the plain and simple issue. You have said they gave evidence which an idiot could give. I admit that, but they are not evidence for me. It is you who call idiotic witnesses. And now I am told I don't give you texts. Why the complaint has been that I gave so many texts. My familiarity with the fathers should have been anticipated, or I should not have

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deserved to have come to a debate of this kind. But now that I am familiar with them, they are trash. I agree they are trash, but they are your best evidence—your only evidence. If Mr. Roberts was not prepared to produce the writings of these fathers he should not have used their names. He says he cannot follow me. I took up everyone of them, one after another, and simply knocked each one of them to pieces. I think that was following them pretty closely. He says he cannot understand my logic about Peter, if the stories were forged. He knows I don't pretend that the whole of the stories were forged. I have said that I consider the Christian myths have grown like other myths, and Mr. Roberts has not refuted the assertion. At the close of the first century Christians existed, I admit, to a large extent; but at the close of the 19th century more Mormons exist than there were Christians at the close of the first century. What does that prove? By my friend's argument it proves Mormonism. But in that case he will say that the men were foolish who built up the Mormon system, and that the success of Mormonism is no proof that the Bible is not true. I account for Christianity in the same way; I account for sun worship in the same way, and for the worship of the general forces of the world, and for the entire myths and superstitions which embody themselves under the names of different religions throughout the world. The clear and precise duty of Mr. Roberts in this debate was to have steered clear of external evidences, and if he thought a public audience was not the proper place to have tested Mileto, Tatian, Theophilus, &c., he should not have brought them before you at all, and should not have come before a public excited audience, but challenged me to a written debate, where there can be no excitement. Does he expect to become more familiar with these witnesses, because of my familiarity with them? He says they are trash. He says they are idiotic, and none but an idiot would give that kind of evidence.

Then we have now an attempt in words but not in truth to perform a promise which Mr. Roberts undertook, namely to show that the Pentateuch was in a place called Shiloh in the time of Joshua. That was the proposition which Mr. Roberts undertook to prove. He has quoted to you some texts saying that Moses wrote the law, but he has not identified the law with those five books at all, though much of the five books certainly was not law, and much of the five books could not by possibility have been written by Moses. He tried to trick the question about the Pentateuch being in the ark, and he jumped out of the frying-pan into the fire by saying the Pentateuch was not put into the ark, but in a place beside it. If the Pentateuch was not in the ark, what was the good of tracing the ark? If the Pentateuch was in place beside the ark we have nothing at all to do with the ark. Then he says as evidence that the Pentateuch was in the ark, or near to it, or by the side of it, and that a number of things mentioned in the law ought to be there. No doubt it ought to be if God revealed it; it would have been there, if God ordered it to be put there, but it is not there. For a long while it was not known to exist, and in the 2nd of Kings 22nd chap. and 8th verse, we read about somebody finding it. We learn from Eusebius that, in the captivity of the people under Nebuchadnezzar, the Scriptures were destroyed, and God inspired Ezra to write them afresh. I want external evidence; Mr. Roberts says it is trash, yet he brought it. You cannot have external evidence except you read it. You say you want internal evidence; yet if I quote the immorality of the book, you pass that by. If I refer to flat contradictions in the book, oh, Mr. Bradlaugh is incoherent. You spin the Acts of the Apostles by the yard, and then say Mr. Bradlaugh is to disprove it. A debate of this kind might have been useful, but if I had known that my opponent knew no more of the common rudiments of the case than he has shown, I should have refused his challenge. I understood he was the representative of a respectable set of men. Some of those men I have come in contact with in America and England, and I have found to be honest men. I am not going to say hard things of them. I don't find idiots and shallow pates in those who have disagreed with me. My life has taught me that there are men not more shallow than myself (though I may not agree with them), and I have learned that the worst shallowness is to profess to be acquainted with learned authorities, relying upon the ignorance of untaught men who have taken the pains to know every scrap you can bring. Four nights of this debate have gone. If aught of proof has been given that this book is God's Divine message to man, I confess I have not heard it. I have only heard the speeches

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of a man who varies and twists, and shifts and turns, and then, with all his evidence upon the platform—here where he might have read it to you, where he said he would read it to you if challenged to do it—says he won't take up good time with doing so, or that he hasn't time to do it. It was not true; it was not honest; it was not fair. He said he would and did not, because it would only have proved he was ignorant of the subject. Friends, is this the way to prove God's truth? Then he sneers at Republicanism. Was that meant as a sneer to me? I am not ashamed of my Republicanism, and if I only wanted reasons to be republican, it would be when I found an ordained king like David, "a man who kept God's commandments and walked in the way that was right in His eyes," trampling on His people, robbing His people, murdering and betraying His people, ruining is people. I say that is enough to make any man republican. You tell me republicanism won't succeed. I don't know the relevancy it has to the argument, but I do place it against the lustful, lying, cowardly Brunswicks, and the wicked and lustful Bourbons. I place it against kings living upon the people—and against a sham of a book which sanctions such a system, without which it could not otherwise be defended. I have nearly done. I know you have men who could better plead in this cause than myself, but at any rate you have one here who has never made fight against what he conceives to be true, and never degraded the platform by manufacturing an argument for the purpose of defeating an opponent.

The CHAIRMAN: The discussion will be continued to-morrow evening at the same hour.

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Fifth Night,

WEDNESDAY, 21st JUNE, 1876,

IN THE TEMPERANCE HALL, BIRMINGHAM.

THE CHAIR WAS OCCUPIED BY MR. GEORGE H. ST. CLAIR

The CHAIRMAN: You will be familiar by this time with the order of discussion, which is the same each evening. Last night, I think we were less interrupted than on the previous occasion, and I trust, in this respect, you will apply the Christian exhortation, and go on to perfection. I have the pleasure to ask Mr. Roberts to open on the affirmative side.

Mr. ROBERTS: Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen.—Last night Mr. Bradlaugh said some rather hard things. They did not hurt me, however: firstly, because I am accustomed to such things; secondly, because, they were not true; and thirdly, because I rather think they indicate, on the part of Mr. Bradlaugh, a conscious weakness in the argument. But there is one thing Mr. Bradlaugh said to which I feel called upon to make allusion, lest my silence should be misconstrued. I refer to his denial of the statement I made at the beginning of last night's meeting—that I was prepared with chapter and verse to all the authors whose names I mentioned as contemporary witnesses of the existence of the New Testament, at the end of the first and the beginning of the second century. He denied that I had these evidences or had access to these writers. I, therefore, produce them, one by one, to the chairman; and I ask the chairman as a scholar and a gentleman——

Mr. BRADLAUGH: I object.

Mr. ROBERTS: As a scholar and a gentleman, I ask him to say whether or not these books produced justify my assertion, and constitute the proof which I allege. The chairman shall act as umpire, on a matter of fact like this, affecting, as it does, the veracity of the speaker. I produce, first, the seven epistles of Ignatius—the very epistles themselves, and not extracts from them by other writers. I produce the epistle of Barnabas. I produce the epistle of Clement to the Corinthians. I produce the epistle of Polycarp to the Philippians. They are all bound together with those other writings which constitute the apocryphal New Testament. Next, I produce *Milner's Church History*, which was also on the platform last night, in which Milner quotes largely from all these men. I next produce Reid's edition of *Mosheim's Ecclesiastical History*, in which also are extensive allusions, particularly in Reid's footnotes, to those writers. I finally produce a compilation by Dr. Brewer, which brings the entire mass of the evidence to a focus, so to speak.

There is only one hypothesis on which I can imagine Mr. Bradlaugh can attempt to justify his assertion, or upon which I can understand it. He may have meant that I did not have in my possession the original books written by these men, that is, the actual manuscripts—the actual parchment on which they wrote. I never said I had. I don't suppose they are in existence, but this is no barrier to their reception. Mr. Bradlaugh has produced books. What if I said he did not produce them because he could not produce the actual caligraphic productions of the writers? He would say he had copies, which would be an answer. I claim equally the reception and use for the present argument of those books which I have produced. I have made no profession of learning in the matter. If there has been any profession of learning in the matter it has been on the other side of the platform entirely. The works I have alluded to, are such as are accessible to illiterate persons. Nevertheless, I contend

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they are conclusive evidence on the question as to whether or not the New Testament existed in the first century. My argument is that the New Testament must have existed then or these writers could not have quoted from it. And the force of that argument is not weakened by the fact that some of the writers believed in the Phœnix or any other nonsense. Nor is it affected by the suggestion that these letters of Clement, Ignatius, Polycarp, &c., may be forgeries: for even if forgeries, their existence is traceable to the first century, and their evidence of the existence of the New Testament at that time is all the same.

Having alluded to these matters which, I am sorry to have taken up so much of my half hour with, I propose returning to my affirmative argument, and to show that the history of the Jewish nation, particularly as involving the character and career of Moses, cannot be explained on the Free-thinkers' hypothesis, but is, on the contrary, an irrefragable proof of the divine character and authorship of the Scriptures. In this we are dealing to a certain extent with a palpable contemporary fact. There is such a nation extant in the world as the Jews, as Mr. Bradlaugh himself is compelled to admit. That nation is not of yesterday: its records go farther back into the remote dim regions of antiquity than those of any other nation under heaven, with the exception of the inscriptions on Egyptian and Assyrian remains and monuments, which are childish affairs compared with the magnificent writings of Moses. I must of course refer to those writings in elaborating the argument of this evening. That they are the writings of Moses is proved in several ways. First, there is the tradition of the Jews in all generations. They have said that Moses is the author of that book, and that of itself is a weighty, and in fact, conclusive argument, for how could such a reputation come to exist apart from the fact that Moses at the beginning did write them?

But it is said the Mahommedans are witnesses to the Koran. So they are; I admit it. And it is said the Mormons are witness to the writings of Smith. I admit it. But what have we then? We have a book admittedly written by Mahomet, and a book admittedly written by Joe Smith; but when we come to examine the books in the light of facts, we find evidence that Mahomet and Joe Smith are impostors. The result is the same in a less degree in the works admitted to be the productions of Zoroaster, Confucius, and other ancient writers. The authenticity admitted, their undivine character is self-manifest. All I ask Mr. Bradlaugh is to concede a similar process of treatment to the writing of Moses. That is, admit its authenticity on the evidence on which he admits the authenticity of the Koran, and then examine the book. Let him admit that just as the authenticity of the Koran is proved by the universal consent of the Mahommedans, so the authenticity of Moses is proved by the universal consent of the Jews. And, then go to the investigation of the books and see whether or not the allegation that it is a divine revelation is proved by its very contents.

My next witness to the authenticity of the writings of Moses is Jesus of Nazareth, whom I have a right to call, because I have proved his resurrection by arguments which Mr. Bradlaugh has not attempted to upset. The testimony of a man proved to be the Son of God by resurrection from the dead, must be true. Jesus recognises Moses as the author of the Pentateuch. In John v. 46, He says:—"Had ye believed Moses, ye would have believed me: for HE WROTE of me. But if ye believe not HIS WRITINGS, how shall ye believe my words?" In Luke xvi. 29, he puts these words into the mouth of a parabolic character:—"They have MOSES *and the prophets;* let them hear them. If they hear not MOSES and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded, though one rose from the dead." In Luke xxiv. 27, it is recorded concerning Christ that, after his resurrection, that "beginning *at Moses* and all the prophets, he expounded unto them in all the Scriptures the things concerning himself." Logically this evidence is conclusive without anything else. But there is other evidence not so strong, which I produce, because Mr. Bradlaugh has a curious preference for the imperfect and blundering evidence of merely secondary writers, instead of going direct to the merits. I have already referred to Josephus. I have already shown that he (a careful, clear, and trustworthy writer) comes before us as a witness to the writings of Moses. It may be asked how did Josephus know? My answer is, Josephus was a man in office amongst the Jews, with access to all the means existing in the first century of forming a decision, and his writings show that he had the capacity for forming a just decision. The recognition of the writings of Moses by such a man, is of some weight in the scale. I have already referred to the

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Septuagint as a collateral evidence of value. I might also mention the Samaritan version, which was made from the original ages before even the Septuagint, from a desire on the part of the Samaritans to have the books of Moses in their own possession. All these are valuable collateral evidences of the authenticity of the book now in question.

But let us now go to the book itself. I will affirm that, if you take God out of the five books of Moses, those five books fall to pieces. They cannot be understood on the hypothesis that they were written by a man to glorify himself, his name, or his nation; or to serve any sinister purpose whatever, or human purpose of any kind, minister or otherwise. Let us look at the evidence of this. If written by a man of his own notion, we know, from acquaintance with man universally, that the purpose would be to call attention to or create honour for somebody, or to serve some purpose congenial to human nature. Let us then test Moses by this hypothesis, by the hypothesis that his writings were merely a human production, and then you will see my meaning. If the object of Moses in the operation he conducted in connection with the Jewish nation was to make himself a great leader and make himself a great name, as Manetho says, it would have been necessary for him to conciliate the people by complimentary words, as all popular leaders in all ages have found it necessary to do and have done. He would speak to them pleasant things, and cheer them with prophecies of good. You will find that Moses did nothing of the sort, but indulged in language and assumed an attitude utterly inconsistent with any human object whatever. Let me draw attention to Deuteronomy ix., from the 4th to the 7th verses, and let me ask you to imagine either Moses or anyone else speaking thus while practising an imposture for the glorification of himself or the Jewish nation:—"Speak not thou in thine heart after that the Lord thy God hath cast them (the Canaanitish nations) out from before thee, saying, For my righteousness the Lord hath brought me in to possess this land: but for the wickedness of these nations the Lord doth drive them out from before thee. *Not for thy righteousness or for the uprightness of thy heart* dost thou go to possess their land; but for the wickedness of these nations the Lord thy God doth drive them from before thee, and that he may perform the word which the Lord sware unto thy fathers Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Understand, therefore, that the Lord thy God giveth thee not this good land to possess it *for thy righteousness*, FOR THOU ART A STIFF-NECKED PEOPLE. Remember, and forget not, how *thou provokedst the Lord thy God in the wilderness, from the day thou didst depart out from the land of Egypt; until ye came unto this place ye have been rebellious against the Lord.*" Is that the way a patriot speaks to the people whose suffrages he canvasses, or whose good opinion he aims to secure, that his name may be sent down with fame to posterity? Every man can answer that question for himself. We all know the language of men who aim at a personal object. They flatter and speak well of those whom they seek to use as instruments of their personal ambitions. Moses never did so. What I have read is only a mere sample of his style. Let any one read his writings, and they will find they are all in the same strain. If God sent and was with Moses, the style of his address is explained. If God did not appear to Moses, but Moses, out of his own head, sought to accomplish a personal object, such language is incomprehensible.

I must be content on that point and hurry on to something else. I will next ask: Did the people glorify Moses? Did they accept him as their leader? If this book was written in order to glorify Moses or to glorify the Jewish nation—if Jewish transactions in their beginnings were merely human performances, with which God had nothing to do, or if this book had been written afterwards to create confidence in a merely traditional Moses, without reference to truth, it would have been carefully shown that, at the beginning and during all his life, Moses was accepted by the people; certainly, every circumstance tending to show rebellious conduct on the part of the people during all the circumstances attending their exodus from Egypt, and their passage through the wilderness, would have been suppressed. Instead of this, what do we find? Why, the people are described as in a state of continual revolt. Let me illustrate this by Exodus xvi. 2nd verse:—"And they took their journey from Elim, and all the congregation of Israel came unto the Wilderness of Sin, which is between Elim and Sinai, on the fifteenth day of the second month after their departing out of the land of Egypt. And the whole congregation of the children of Israel *murmured against Moses* and Aaron in the wilderness; and the children of Israel said to them,

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would to God we had died by the hand of the Lord in the land of Egypt, when we sat by the flesh-pots and when we did eat bread to the full; for ye have brought us forth into this wilderness to kill this whole assembly with hunger." Again, when the spies sent before to see the land to which they were journeying, took an evil report, we read (Num. xiv. 1-5; ii. 22, 23) "And all the congregation lifted up their voice and cried, and the people wept that night. And all the children of Israel murmured against Moses and against Aaron: and the whole congregation said unto them, would to God that we had died in the land of Egypt, or would to God we had died in this wilderness. . . . Were it not better for us to return into Egypt? And they said one to another, Let us make a captain and let us return into Egypt. Then Moses and Aaron fell on their faces before all the assembly of the congregation of the children of Israel. . . . And the Lord said unto Moses, how long will this people provoke me? and how long will it be ere they believe me for all the signs which I have showed among them? . . . Because all those men which have seen my glory and my miracles which I did in Egypt and in the wilderness, and have tempted me now these ten times and have not hearkened to my voice, surely they shall not see the land which I sware unto their fathers."

Then there is the account of the conspiracy of Korah, Dathan and Abiram, who rose against Moses with the support of the entire assembly, and whose rebellion was only quelled by miraculous destruction. Now, if God did truly send Moses, and if his statement to Korah, Dathan and Abiram be true, viz., "The Lord sent me to do all these works, for I have not done them of mine own mind,"—(Num. xvi. 28.)—then the putting on record such a history is intelligible. But if these things never happened, how came they to be invented? What purpose could be served by the invention? No man invents a lie without an object, and what object could there be in insulting the national character by placing in the national archives such an invention? It is impossible to conceive such a thing. The narrative bears the stamp of truth: If true, its record is explained; and in that case, God is proved, and the authenticity and reliability of the Scriptures in general. I am content with the illustration adduced, though there are many others of the same sort, and I pass to the next point of my argument.

If Moses acted as a man out of his own head as the deviser and inventor of the law, he would have taken good care to have contrived that his hand in it would always be visible, so that credit would come to him as the author of it. Instead of that what do we find? We find him always attributing the law to God. *e.g.* "These are the commandments, the statutes and the judgment *which the Lord your God commanded* to teach you."—(Deut vi. 1.) When expostulating with them for their rebellion, his language is, "*What are we?* Your murmurings are not against us but against the Lord."—(Deut. xvi. 8.) In Deut. iv. 20, this peculiarity comes out strongly in connection with an extraordinary instance of personal disparagement—incomprehensible on any other hypothesis but that of its truth. We find him saying: "*The Lord* hath taken you, and brought you forth out of the iron furnace, even out of Egypt, to be unto him a people of inheritance, as ye are this day. Furthermore, *the Lord was angry* WITH ME *for your sakes*, and sware that *I should not go over Jordan* . . . but I MUST DIE IN THIS LAND." (Time called.)

Mr. BRADLAUGH: I will dispose of a matter of fact first. Mr. Roberts has said that he had Tatian, Theophilus, Mileto, Athenagoras, Barnabas, Polycarp, Ignatius, and others giving evidence as to the existence of the New Testament gospels, before A.D. 150. I call for the writings of Tatian, and I sit down until they are produced. (Hear, hear.)

Mr. ROBERTS: I have handed the documents to the chairman.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Producing them to the chairman won't do for me. Produce me extracts from Tatian. I have them all lying before me, and not one of them says what you pretend to say they do. If the book is there, I ask that it may be put into my hands. If not, Mr. Roberts has claimed credit for what he did not possess.

Mr. ROBERTS: I never admitted I possessed the book in the sense of which you speak.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Give me the best reference you can. I don't want you to read it if you will give me the reference.

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Mr. ROBERTS: I find in the case of Tatian it is the name of one of his books I rely upon as evidence of the existence of the New Testament, viz.: his *Harmony of the Four Gospels.*

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Don't take up my time. Give me the books. Then I will read you what it is. I ask what I am to say to a man who pretended to put into the hands of the chairman that which he has not got? The first reference to Tatian is in Eusebius's *Ecclesiastical History*, in the 29th chapter. I ask if it is not wretched audacity for anyone to pretend that Eusebius's history is any sort of testimony whatever? Having denied that testimony, I now ask for Theophilus.

Mr. ROBERTS: I say the book is not here. There is evidence of "three books to Autolycus."

Mr. BRADLAUGH: You cannot produce it to me. The man offers to put the books in the hands of the chairman and yet they are not produced. So that the debate is simply ended so far as concerns the evidence put into my hands. I have got it all here. I ask for the book, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROBERTS: I never said I had it.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Then the matter is disposed of so far as regards Theophilus. I ask for Mileto, and if it is not produced I won't go on with the debate.

Mr. ROBERTS: I produce evidence of Mileto having written a work, in which—

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Give me the book and I will read it.

Mr. ROBERTS: I produce the evidence upon which I founded my argument last night.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Mr. Roberts offered to leave in the hands of the chairman the evidence upon which the argument was based, and it is not produced. I say there is nothing in Mileto capable of the construction he put upon it, and I say he has no extract capable of the construction put upon it.

Mr. ROBERTS: I said he wrote a work in which he indirectly recognises the New Testament by speaking of the Old. I gave the title of it as my argument. The shorthand writer will bear me out in what I say.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Mr. Roberts has made an appeal to the shorthand writer. I know that there is a trustworthy gentleman* employed by Mr. Roberts's friends, and I call upon him to read from Mr. Roberts's first speech. If my memory serves me rightly, I remember that, over and over again, I challenged him to produce the authorities upon which he relied, and he at last said he would. As we are not to have Mileto, I ask for Athenagoras. I will wait for Athenagoras. Are you going to produce it?

Mr. ROBERTS: I will give you the quotation from him on which I rely.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: I don't want you to occupy my time with quotations. I must decline to continue the debate if I am to be thus dealt with. I say it is the greatest pretence of evidence I ever heard in my life. I am ashamed of it.

Mr. ROBERTS: I have submitted the evidence to the Chairman.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: But evidence submitted to the Chairman I don't accept as produced evidence. Give it to me.

Mr. ROBERTS: Then I will read it.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Give it to me.

Mr. ROBERTS: I will when I have read it.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: But why can't you give it me now?

Mr. ROBERTS: I have my own reasons. I will give you the book when I have read the quotation.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: It is manifestly unfair that this man should take up my half-hour.

Mr. ROBERTS: It is in answer to your own request.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: He is going to quote from Athenagoras.

Mr. ROBERTS: I read from his petition on behalf of the Christians.—(Page 11.) He said to the Emperor, in answer to the charge of Atheism: "To convince we are not mere Atheists, hear the maxims in which we are instructed: I say unto you, love your enemies, bless them that curse you, pray for them that persecute you, that ye may be the children of your Father in heaven, who maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust." That is a quotation from Matthew made in the middle of the second century.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Give me the book. [Mr. Roberts hands the book to Mr. Bradlaugh.] Now, friends, Mr. Roberts said he would read to you from Athenagoras to prove the

* Mr. Arthur Andrew, of London.

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existence of the gospels in the middle of the second century, and he begins by referring to his charge to the Emperor, and says the quotation is from Matthew. I say there is nothing in any writings attributable to Athenagoras that refers to Matthew at all. I say that that is an addition by a man called Brewer, and has no existence in Athenagoras at all—(A VOICE IN THE AUDIENCE: "That is only your assertion.")—Thank you for saying that is my assertion. I have taken the trouble to become acquainted with the matter, and I am not like the man who says he is not obliged at all to produce his authorities. When you tell me a man challenges another with access to a library, he ought to be armed with the evidence itself, instead of bringing Brewer's paltry work. Now, I ask you to hear what Murchine says, and you will judge of how much or how little Mr. Roberts knows of these things when I come to read it to you. You will find that one of the epistles he quoted to you was the epistle of Barnabas. Murchine says that, whilst, in his opinion, the epistle was the production of some Jewish writer, it was clearly a different person from Barnabas; and we find him saying just before, with reference to a number of works which bear the name of Clement:—"The epistles of Clement were falsely ascribed to that eminent father, for the purpose of securing for them great authority; and we find, during these times, various histories full of imposition and fable were composed by persons addicted to pious frauds, and were palmed upon the world." That is the evidence of your own witness against you. Now I put to you this, and I beg you will bear your mind upon it. You have cited Ignatius, Barnabas, Hermas, Clement, and Polycarp, to prove the writings of the apostles, and my answer to that was that, so far as they were concerned, not one of the gospel authors was mentioned in one of them—not one. I read to you from Justin Martyr a statement showing that whatever documents they did quote were not the documents of our gospels. I told you last night that I was fully assured that the writings of Tatian did not exist. Why did you not come here to-night and frankly say, "It is perfectly true, they do not exist?" for you clearly ought not to have quoted that with which you were not acquainted. It is perfectly true Mr. Roberts only relied on the name of Mileto's book; but I ask whether this is the style in which a debate of this kind should be conducted, when a speaker cannot pretend to something more than mere names. Mr. Roberts has told you, with respect to the Septuagint and Samaritan versions of the Pentateuch, that he relies on the Septuagint version, which is the only version available for the Pentateuch, the Samaritan only extending to the letter of the law and not one line beyond that. I have put this in the *Free Thinkers' Text Book*, and had come prepared for hearing the strongest things about it. Dr. Haynes says about the Septuagint, or Greek version, that it is not the original Bible, but what the interpreters have made it. Strictly speaking it appears to be the growth of at least two generations, and we might expect this from the nature of the thing. Mr. Roberts quoted Josephus as an authority for the Septuagint version, but there is no evidence, even in Josephus, as to the whole Septuagint. The express language of Josephus limits the translation to the books of the law, whatever they may mean; and therefore it is utterly impossible he could mean the whole of the Old Testament book. Mr. Roberts quotes Eusebius, whose works he calls trashy—don't forget, "trashy"—and, if trashy, he should not have produced them. You can buy the work at any library for 5s. 6d. Then, as to the letters of Ignatius, if some editions of them are forgeries, the great question is, which edition is and which is not a forgery. But come, if you please, a little further, to Spinoza, who says, "of the author or authors we know almost nothing; we entertain great doubts if they were written by the persons whose names they bear." If with Mr. Roberts we are to take Josephus, then the Old Testament he referred to is clearly not the book we have to-day. Thousands of passages might be read to show that the book he refers to is not the book Mr. Roberts is here to defend; and when Mr. Roberts tells me these are mere trifling matters, I want to know where the trifles are to begin or end? I cannot understand. If Mr. Roberts had said that he relied on the New Testament to prove the Old, I could have understood him. But is there anything in the New Testament to prove the existence of the Old? There is no mention of the book, beginning with Genesis and ending with Malachi. The very Septuagint contains matters of fact which are entirely different from our Bible. I pass from this to refer to what has been said as to Paul. None of the authorities who have been quoted refer to Paul at all, though we certainly have the manufactured

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Christian evidences, which are the most childish authority in the world. I make no concealment of the fact that I do come prepared with authoritative evidences to support my views. If I were not I should not be fit to take part in a debate of this kind. I may now refer you to Lord Amberley's new book, p. 254. I am not reading this as evidence. I am reading an expression of opinion from a book in which I find every research. [Here Mr. Bradlaugh read an extract from Lord Amberley's new work, which the shorthand writer has not supplied.]

Let us look at some more of the internal evidence. We have a statement that, before the baptism, John knew Jesus, and thought himself unworthy to baptise him, and we have a statement that he did not know him before, but knew him on the announcement, "This is my beloved Son." We have Matthew xi. 2, 3, and Luke vii. 19. John sending to enquire whether Jesus was the Christ or not? We should think if John heard the delaration, "This is my beloved Son in whom I am well pleased," he would not have thought it necessary to send messengers to ascertain whether Jesus was the Christ or not. And what answer did Jesus give? He does not remind John of the scene at the baptism, but he says, "Go and tell John you have seen me performing miracles, that the blind see, the lame walk, the leper is cleansed." I submit that one of these two statements is untrue, and that the entire part of the book which contains them cannot be otherwise. I would refer to the miracle of the loaves and fishes, where Jesus fed five thousand with five loaves and two small fishes; and I would refer to the worthy disciples, and to their forgetfulness of the miracles afterwards. In either case an authentic revelation of God would not be made in so ridiculous a fashion. Take the case of the miracle which is recited in three different ways in three of the evangelists—I mean the miracle of casting out the devils. Was it one man or two men? Was there one devil or two? or a legion? Is the story true or untrue, or is it divine revelation at all? If you took any other book with so many contradictions in so many pages you would resign or reject it. I come now to the alleged cursing of the fig tree. We are told that Jesus came to the fig tree, when the season was not in, and cursed it, because it had no fruit, which it could not have, not being the season. I ask, is that an authentic revelation? And take that declaration of Christ which is most important according to you—I mean the death and resurrection of Jesus. Take the gospels of Matthew and Mark; the last recorded words of Jesus, according to Matthew and to Mark, are, "Eli, Eli, lama sabachthani." If Jesus deemed God had forsaken him, when his death was to save the world, and he had so little confidence as to cry, in the bitterness of despair, "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" am I to be condemned because I cannot see such a thing divine? Is not this the language of an enthusiast who had deluded others, and a man who was himself deluded? It is not certainly the language of a man who believed in the truth of his mission, which was to redeem the world. I refer you again to Matt. ii. 5, 6, where there is a pretended quotation from Micah v. 2, making Bethlehem the place of the advent of the governor that shall rule my people Israel. This made Hosea (xi. 1) deliberately untrue, for it was there said, "Out of Egypt have I called my son." My time is gone, and gone in such a way with nothing to answer that I need not regret it.

The CHAIRMAN: I may say, in my position of referee on points of order, I should not consider myself as referee on a subject like that submitted by Mr. Roberts, unless at the request of both parties. If, when the discussion is fully over, the gentlemen choose to refer any point to me I will have no objection, as far as I am concerned, but nothing but a mutual request would induce me to act in this way. Mr. Roberts will now occupy a quarter of an hour, either by a speech or by questioning Mr. Bradlaugh, who will answer categorically.

MR. ROBERTS QUESTIONS MR. BRADLAUGH.

Mr. Bradlaugh, do you believe that the Jews are an ancient nation?—I believe the were an ancient race.

Do you believe they have always accepted Moses as the writer of the works bearin his name?—I don't think I have very clear evidence on the point. Some time a

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an eminent Jew wrote a letter, and he gives a statement of the arguments used by the Rabbis themselves against it.

Do you know that these writings have been all along attributed by that race to Moses?—I believe there were writings current amongst the Jews which the popular voice attributed to different people. I am not able to fix that popular voice. From the Bible I learn that the law was lost and found suddenly. From outside writings I learn that during the captivity they lost all their books.

Have the Jews always regarded Moses as their principal leader?—I should think not, so far as I am able to judge.

Have you any good reason to think otherwise?—The question of Moses's existence, like that of Buddha and Zoroaster, is very mythical.

Then you doubt whether Moses was their leader in the beginning of their history?—The whole of the alleged exodus is so very doubtful, I can find nothing to verify it.

Can you verify a myth from records of an historic character?—Yes in the case of the Buddhists, I have carefully worked out the system, and the remark equally applies to Zoroaster. In every case there has been some person semi-miraculous, or who is believed to be miraculous.

Do you admit there was an historic beginning in all cases?—I don't.

Do you think there was any historic beginning to the career of Moses?—I don't. The whole of the story is so monstrous that it looks as if the name itself was mythic.

What part of the account given of Moses is monstrous?—I will tell you: "the killing of all the cattle by a storm."

Do you mean to say it is monstrous and abstractly impossible for a storm to result in the killing of cattle?—I do, if the cattle were dead already. I will read it from the book. Do you ask for the proof of what I have said?

I did not ask for it. Do you consider that all miracles are impossible?—Yes, especially the killing of cattle twice over.

Why do you say they are impossible?—You have asked me if I believed them. I don't believe them to be possible because my definition of a miracle is: that which never happened in the past, don't happen in the present, and won't happen in the future.

Is that not a begging of the question?—No. Logically, the word miracle to me is without meaning. In Scripture the word miracle is used to denote events which experience gives no record of their possibility of execution.

Are we to make our experience the measure of the possible?—I mean to make experience the measure of my possibility.

Do you mean to say you only believe in what you have seen?—I never said anything so intolerably stupid.

What do you mean, then, by forming a judgment of the possible on the basis of experience?—I don't limit experience to my own experience only. I mean the recorded experience of other men too.

Then you will admit the experience of others as a basis of belief in things you have not yourself experienced?—I have said so.

Why do you not admit the experience of the apostles in the matter of the resurrection of Christ?—I have already early in this debate admitted that evidence that applies directly to ordinary occurrences, and can be judged of by ordinary experience, cannot be so judged when it applies to extraordinary occurrences.

Then in the case of extraordinary occurrences, you would not be governed by what you have called "the best experience of the best men?"—If you appeal to me I must be allowed to be judge on such matters myself.

In such matters, you would not be guided by the experience of others?—Not if inconsistent with the operation of the senses.

You would not believe what others have seen unless you considered it possible?—I don't say that.

Then I ask you why you refuse to accept the testimony of the apostles who testified the performance of miracles, and evidenced the sincerity of their testimony in so many ways?—Just on the same principle that I should not believe that Mr. Bradlaugh turned three somersaults on the platform, and then stood on his head in the course of the discussion last night, because it is unreasonable.

Do you say it is unreasonable for a man to rise from the dead?—Yes. Because the

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word life means organic function, and if he died and re-appeared, it would then be a new life.

Upon what philosophic ground do you hold it is impossible for a man that had once lived to be put together again?—I did not say once lived; I said a man that once died.

Of course; my question implies that. I ask on what ground you deny the possibility of a man who has once lived and died being re-organised and made to live again?—It is beyond the range of my experience, and I have no evidence that it is within the experience of other men.

Is it not possible that such a thing might occur without coming within the range of your experience or that of other men?—I don't know.

Do you admit that, many ages ago, there were no human beings on the globe?—I have reason to believe that, some millions of years ago, there was not a human being upon earth.

Would not your principle lead you, had you been alive then, to say it was impossible human beings could ever appear on earth?—Not being alive then, I cannot see how I could have formed an opinion one way or the other. I don't imagine a time when nobody lived.

Well, I will put it retrospectively. Would not your rule of belief lead to this conclusion, that at the same time no human being had as yet appeared upon earth, it was an impossibility that they ever could appear, because it was not within the experience of any living being upon earth?—It is not for me to say what might have been; I deal with experience, and here we are.

And may it not yet be a matter of experience that men will rise from the dead?—There are no known laws in the universe to warrant the idea.

Do you mean to say that your knowledge of the universe is sufficient to enable you to say that there may not be a latent power somewhere equal to the reproduction of dead men?—We don't know everything, of course.

MR. BRADLAUGH QUESTIONS MR. ROBERTS.

Will you kindly tell me whether you think a book could be Divine revelation which provided that a man might steal a woman, rob her of her virtue, and then turn her out in the world without any sort of recompence?—I decline to answer the question in that form.

Do you know that Deut. xxi. 11-14, does preach that?—No, it does not.

I will read it to you: "When thou goest forth to war against thine enemies, and the Lord thy God hath delivered them into thine hands, and thou has taken them captive, and seest among the captives a beautiful woman, and hast a desire unto her, that thou wouldst have her to thy wife, then shalt thou bring her home to thine house; and she shall shave her head, and pare her nails; and she shall put the raiment of her captivity off her, and shall remain in thine house, and bewail her father and her mother a full month; and after that thou shalt go in unto her, and be her husband, and she shall be thy wife; and it shall be, if thou have no delight in her, then thou shalt let her go whither she will; but thou shalt not sell her at all for money, thou shalt not make merchandise of her, because thou hast humbled her." Don't that say exactly what I say?—No.

Do you hold that to be divine revelation which provides that a man may buy a servant, keep him for seven years, and if he cannot buy himself off at the end of that time, to bore his ear with an awl. Do you hold that to be divine revelation?—Yes.

Do you hold it to be a divine revelation that of people who are not of the Jewish race, the Jews may buy bondmen and bondwomen, and take them as an inheritance and have them in possession for ever?—Yes.

Do you hold it to be divine revelation that a man might beat his slave, and if that his slave live for three days after the beating, then the master shall escape his punishment?—I object to the term "slave" with its modern associations.

Then I will substitute "servant." May a man buy a servant and beat him, and if

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the servant does not die in two days the master shall escape punishment?—The law of Moses provided that, and I believe the law of Moses to be divine.

Do you believe that David never did anything that was wrong?—No I do not believe that.

Do you think that the text which says that he always did that which was right in God's eyes is divine revelation?—Allow me to read it to you. That is said with qualification.

What are you going to read?—1 Kings xv. 5. "David did that which was right in the eyes of the Lord, and turned not aside from anything that he commanded him all the days of his life, *save only in the matter of Uriah* the Hittite."

But it says in xiv. 8; "Yet thou hast not been as my servant David, who kept my commandments, and who followed me with all his heart to do that only which was right in mine eyes."—Yes, that is correct.

Do you think it is true?—I do.

Do you think it is true that David did keep all God's commandments and follow Him with all his heart?—Yes, with the exception mentioned in the 8th verse.

I ask you whether in the 14th of 1st of Kings, and 8th verse, there is any exception made?—No.

Then is the 8th verse true or not?—It is true of the general tenour of David's life.

Was David a liar?—David sometimes said that which was not true.

Was he a murderer?—No, except in the case in question.

In how many cases within a few hundred had David murdered?—Only in the one case of Uriah the Hittite.

Did not David murder many others?—There was a great difference in those cases. To kill is not to murder, if God commands.

Was not David a thief?—No.

Did he not take property which did not belong to him?—In a certain sense, yes; in a certain sense, no. I can explain the difference if you will allow me.

Then with these slight exceptions David did keep all God's commandments—murdering, stealing, lying and adultery—this being the description of a man after God's own heart? Is stealing a wife, while her husband is fighting for the thief, good or bad?—Bad.

Is murdering men good or bad?—Bad.

Is stealing property good or bad?—Bad.

Did David do all that?—No.

Do you mean to say that when he was sheltered by the king of Gath he did not commit murder and robbery?—I mean to say that the law of God in the case in question authorised what David did, and, therefore, it was neither murder nor robbery.

Will you kindly tell me who authorised David to kill the subjects of the king by whom he was sheltered?—There was a general law under which Israel took possession of Canaan, and that was that nothing should be left alive. The Canaanitish nations were sunk in wickedness, and God had given them over to destruction.

Do you think God sanctioned men seeking shelter and protection from people they meant to exterminate?—As they were only in the position of savages or animals, the action was not of the character you impute to it.

Then the killing of savages is not in your judgment immoral?—Not if commanded by God.

Do you think there could be a divine revelation which commanded people to kill other people against whom they had no cause of offence?—They had offended against God.

Do you think there could be a divine revelation which enjoined any people to kill all the males of the nation and all women who were mothers or wives?—I do.

Do you think there could be a divine revelation which alleges that when mercy was shown, God was angry with the merciful?—Give me the case you refer to.

Do you think there is such a case as that?—I decline to answer the question in that form.

Do you mean to deny that, more than once, there were cases in which the Jews spared the people they went against, and God's displeasure was kindled against them?—I admit there are such cases.

You admit they destroyed people they had no quarrel against?—Yes

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And you think that is good?—Yes, under the circumstances.

Should you think it good for to-day?—If God commanded me I would do it.

You had better take care whom you try it on!—No fear; If God gives me a commission, I shall be able to execute it.

Don't you hold that under any circumstances war by a people against another with whom they have no cause of quarrel, is monstrous, cruel, and merciless?—If God has not commanded it, Yes.

Do you think God's commands can make a bad thing a good thing?—No.

Yet you deem all God's commandments good?—There is a difference between God and man as to what is good and what is bad. God has a right to do with his own property as he likes.

You hold that God may make a man good by torturing him?—I had not that thought.—(Time called.)

The CHAIRMAN: It is becoming necessary that I must ask you to maintain better order. That is to say, to do justice to the speakers, let them have the argument between themselves. You can judge, moreover, when you have the printed discussion if there has been any mistake. I am speaking to the few who occasionally interrupt. I judge the body of the meeting will be on my side during the remaining hour.

Mr. ROBERTS: You will have observed that Mr. Bradlaugh has not attempted to discuss the case of Moses from its internal peculiarities, upon which hangs a very powerful argument. I will not follow him in his remarks on what are called the Apostolic Fathers, because I do not attach any particular importance to them. I cited them merely because Mr. Bradlaugh took the unreasonable position of denying that there was evidence of the existence of the New Testament prior to A.D. 150. And now I have produced the evidence, he tries to make light of it. Mr. Bradlaugh's attempt to disprove the Bible has been to rehearse alleged difficulties and discrepancies, some of which, in cross-examination, I have endeavoured to explain. He has gone into the same course every night. He might have gone into the contradictions in the way the Socratic method allows, but he has not done so. He dwelt on them in long speeches; perhaps because he knew their force would disappear under the Socratic treatment, while they seem to show for something in a speech. Well, I will now notice some of them. I do so with reluctance, and only lest a false impression might remain if I were to ignore them, and at once resume the thread of my discourse about Moses. I take up, first, the alleged discrepancy between the 24th of Luke and the 1st of the Acts on the question of the forty days. Acts i. states that Christ was seen for forty days after his resurrection, and that his disciples, during that time, tested his reality by many infallible proofs. Mr. Bradlaugh says this is inconsistent with Luke xxiv. There is nothing whatever in the objection; for though the 1st of the Acts certainly specifies forty days, Luke mentions no time at all. Where can there be a contradiction in such a case? Remember that Luke is the writer of the Acts as well as of the gospel; and the fact that he mentions forty days in the Acts as the length of time Christ spent with his disciples is to be taken as a supplement in the one case of an omission in the other. Perhaps Mr. Bradlaugh may have something to say in reply to that. He did not develop his objection with the distinctness necessary to enable me to be more particular. I fancy the suggestion is that the whole of the 24th of Luke, including Christ's ascension, is crowded into one day, and that, according to Luke, Christ ascended on the day of his resurrection; but there is nothing to shew this. It was simply stated that he did this and that, without telling us of the time at all. The writer of the Acts of the Apostles tells us the time he lingered in the midst of the apostles, giving them proofs that they were dealing with a real person.

Then Mr. Bradlaugh says that to Abraham God made a promise which he has not fulfilled. If he had stopped there, he would have been within the bounds of truth. But when he argued that, because it is not fulfilled, therefore it will not be, he was illogical. It would not be difficult to show that it is the teaching of the New Testament that the promise will be fulfilled. But Mr. Bradlaugh said it never could be because there has been a gap, and that there can be no gap in "ever." It depends upon when "ever" begins. In this case the expression "for ever" goes back

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to the time of the promise. It begins with the time of performance. There is evidence that Abraham himself recognised this. In Gen. xv. we read that this was addressed to him:—"And thou shalt go to thy fathers in peace; thou shalt be buried in a good old age. But in the fourth generation they shall come hither again." That shows the promise was not to take immediate effect. A promise does not involve immediate possession. If an interval elapses, and the promise has not been recalled, that is no reason for concluding the promise will never be fulfilled. We are expressly told in Hebrews xi. 13, "These all died in faith, *not having received the promises*, but having SEEN THEM AFAR OFF." Faith, of which Abraham was the type, is defined by Paul to be "believing in the promises of God." This of itself involves the conclusion that the promise to Abraham was not to be fulfilled at that time. The Bible affirms that Abraham has not received the promise, and yet Mr. Bradlaugh makes use of the fact that he has not received the promise as a proof that the Bible is telling lies. Extraordinary argument! which requires no further notice. The proof is entirely the other way. I am sorry Mr. Bradlaugh is sacrificing good time by forcing these trifles on my notice. He asks me to decide whether there were one, two, three, or more women at the sepulchre on the morning of Christ's resurrection. My answer is very brief. There was one, two, and three and more. When two or more narratives are proved to be true, they must be in harmony in their details, though they are apparently discrepant, and this discrepancy is a proof that the gospel is not a forgery; if it had been a forgery, the Four Gospels would have been made to tally precisely. Whereas, like all cases of true witnesses, three or four men speak to the same facts, but vary in their narrative of them, though consistent when all put together. I put them together in the following manner:—

The first fact to be noted is that there were a number of women, related to the transactions of the resurrection morning. We find (Matt. xxvii, 55; Mark xv. 40–41) that "many women" had followed Jesus from Galilee to Jerusalem, "among whom were Mary Magdalene, and Mary the mother of James and Joses, and the mother of Zebedee's children." These many women were witnesses of the crucifixion (*ibid*), and also of the deposit of the body of Christ in the tomb of Joseph (Luke xxiii. 55, also Mark xv. 47); after which they returned and prepared sweet spices and ointments, and rested on the Sabbath (Luke xxiii. 56), having arranged for an early visit to the sepulchre on the first day morning to embalm—(Mark xvi. 1). In the early visit, most of the "many women" appear to have taken part (Luke xxiv. 1), and at first in one band. The order of events seems to be this:

1.—Before the arrival of the women, there had been an earthquake and angelic manifestation attendant on the resurrection of Jesus, throwing the keepers of the tomb into a panic.—(Matt. xxviii. 2.)

2.—The women, who had wondered how they were to obtain access to the tomb, arrive and find the stone rolled to one side, and the sepulchre empty. They conclude the body had been taken away, and are perplexed.—(Luke xxiv. 4.)

3.—Mary Magdalene, leaving the other women at the sepulchre in their perplexity, returns and tells Peter (Jno. xx. 2), saying, "They have taken away the Lord out of the sepulchre, and WE know not where they have laid him."

4.—In Mary's absence, two angels appear at the sepulchre, in whose presence the remaining women stoop, affrighted, to the earth. The angels inform the women of the resurrection of Christ, and tell them to go and tell his disciples. They depart quickly with fear and great joy, and run to bring the disciples word.—(Matt. xxviii. 8.)

5.—Mary returns with Peter and John, who inspect the empty sepulchre, and see the left clothes of the dead. Not knowing the Scriptures that Jesus should rise again from the dead, sorrowing curiosity satisfied, they go away again to their own home.—(John xx. 2.–10.)

6.—Mary remains behind, and stands outside the sepulchre weeping. In a short time she takes another look into the sepulchre, and this time she sees the angels who had some time before appeared to the rest of the women. She does not know them to be angels, but probably supposes them to be visitors. They ask her why she weeps. She says, "Because they have taken away my Lord, and I know not where they have laid him." Having said this, she steps back to resume her position outside the sepulchre, and sees a third person, whom she supposes to be the gardener. She instantly

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asks him where he has laid the body of Jesus. The response reveals to her the delightful fact that it was Jesus himself. Forbidding her to touch him, he tells her to go and tell his disciples that he is about to ascend. The interview terminated, Mary departs.—(John xx. 11–17.)

7.—The other women, yet on their way, having been angelically apprised of the resurrection, are met by Jesus, who salutes them, and tells them to go and ask his brethren to meet him in Galilee. They hold him by the feet and worship him. There is no interdiction against touching him, as in the case of Mary, the cause being removed.—(Matt. xxviii. 9-10.)

8.—Mary Magdalene arrives at the place of the disciples' stay, about the same time as "Joanna and Mary, the mother of James, and the other women that were with them."—(Luke xxiv. 10.)

9.—The women (all of them) tell what had happened; but their words seem to the apostles as idle tales.

10.—Two of their company afterwards (during the day) go on some business to Emmaus; and while on the way, are joined by the Lord, who converses with them, but holds their eyes, and reveals himself to them at the end of the journey and then disappears.—(Luke xxiv. 13–31.)

11.—Peter, being out by himself, is also visited by the Lord, and returns and declares the fact to the assembled disciples, who begin to believe it must be true.—(Luke xxiv. 33-34.)

12.—The two from Emmaus return and narrate their experience.

13.—While they are discussing the matter, Jesus himself appears, shows the nail marks on his hands and feet, submits to be handled, and eats before them in their midst, Thomas being absent.

14.—Thomas returns after the interview, but refuses to believe what he is told, unless he sees Christ for himself, and is allowed to put his fingers in the holes of the nails and spear.

15.—Eight days afterwards, the disciples being again assembled, and Thomas being with them, Jesus again appears in their midst, and addresses himself specially to Thomas, whose scepticism disappears before the evidence.

16.—Afterwards the disciples return to Galilee, where Christ appears to them several times, and finally, at the end of forty days, the disciples having returned to Jerusalem, he takes leave of them at Bethany.—(Time called.)

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Mr. Roberts says that I did not make my objection about Luke and the forty days of the Acts quite clear. I will try to do so now. I say the whole of the events following the resurrection are limited to one day by the 24th chapter of Luke. You will find the story as distinct as possible. First, the journey from Emmaus: they "rose up the same hour" and returned to Jerusalem, where they found the eleven gathered together; then Christ appears, and after talking to them, he led them out to Bethany. If that don't mean one day, language is not of much use. That is corroborated by Mark xvi., which says that, when Jesus was risen early the first day of the week, he appeared unto two of them, and afterwards to the eleven. "So then, after the Lord had spoken unto them, he was received up into heaven, and sat on the right hand of God." I say this chapter leaves no room for forty days. Then, as to the women, I say the discrepancy is equally proved. Mr. Roberts says, that if forged, there would have been no discrepancy. I never said the gospels were forged. I say, like the mythic books of all religion, they have germs of historic fact, with the gradual addition of traditions. We may admit that, as ordinary men telling a story they believe, they vary, but we ought not to be damned or saved for our belief or non-belief of that story. In the case of two reporters, one might leave out some words, and another might misunderstand others, and then some discrepancies might be expected; but in a narrative divinely commissioned by God to give the exact truth, we should not expect that sort of thing. Matthew gives two women—the two Marys; Mark mentions two Marys and Salome; Luke named Mary Magdalene, and Joanna, and Mary the mother of James, "and other women that were with them;" and John only specifies Mary Magdalene. Mr. Roberts says all this is true; to use his own phrase, it is a real discrepancy on the surface, but that the discrepancy may be

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explained away. I must say that Mr. Roberts has a very different notion as to what is good evidence from myself; and I put my notions to you very strongly. When as to David, he says that, with the exception of the affair with Uriah the Hittite, David never did anything that was not good. I cannot help reminding him of what is recorded in Samuel xxvii. I find that David went to Achish, king of Gath, for shelter. "And David said unto Achish, if I have now found grace in thine eyes let them give me a place in some town in the country that I may dwell there: for why should thy servant dwell in the royal city with thee? Then Achish gave him Ziklag; wherefore Ziklag pertaineth unto the kings of Judah unto this day." In return for this, David smote the land and left neither man nor woman alive, and took away the sheep and the oxen, and the asses, and the camels, and the apparel, and returned to Achish. David saved neither man nor woman alive to bring tidings to Gath. I say that was the conduct of an ungrateful scoundrel, who knew he was doing wrong. He was a traitorous thief, who murdered the people and stole their cattle. If that is religion, save me from that religion. Then we come to another case. Mr. Roberts don't think that David robbed. In 1 Samuel xxv., two chapters before the one I have read from, we find that David asked Nabal to give things to him, the only justification being that he had not already taken them; and when Nabal in strong language said he would not do it, David prepared himself to take them by force, but Nabal's wife met him and he took her. Mr. Roberts said that David committed no offence except in the case of Uriah the Hittite, and that these people were savages. I don't wonder at the mischief done in Patagonia or Terra del Fuego of old. Why should they be killed because they are savages? Were they consulted by the God of high heaven before He made them? With such savage doctrines, such inhuman and damnable doctrines, instead of being an Atheist as I am, I would be an Anti-theist, if I thought it would avail—(A VOICE: "Shut up.") That is just what I am doing with your Bible. In the 9th of Exodus, you will find that all the cattle of Egypt died, and you will find, in the 19th verse, a caution was sent to those who believed, in order that they might escape with their cattle, so that they should not die; and we find that those that left their cattle in the field, discovered that they had become victims in the storm, although they had already been killed in the 6th verse. Mr. Roberts says that the promise of the land to Abraham is misunderstood by Mr. Bradlaugh. Of course, if you have a £5 note given to you, and have ten thousand promised to you that you shall have them for ever, and you never receive one of them, that is a promise, and it is broken. That is the case of Abraham. The words I have read to you: "Lift up now thine eyes, and look from the place where thou art, northward and southward, and eastward and westward; for all the land which thou seest, to thee will I give it and to thy seed for ever." He never did give it. Mr. Roberts says, "But he will when Christ comes; and, therefore, pray Mr. Bradlaugh, what will you say to Christ then?" I don't know. We shall see. Wait till it happens. Then Mr. Roberts says that the texts about cruelty are not capable of the construction I put upon them, because these people may have been ordered to be punished. I draw attention to Deut. xx. 10: "When thou comest nigh unto a city to fight against it, then proclaim peace unto it." If the nation will make peace, they shall all be slaves; but if they won't, "but will make war against thee, then thou shalt besiege it; and when the Lord thy God hath delivered it into thine hands, thou shalt smite every male thereof with the edge of the sword; but the women, and the little ones and the cattle, and all that is in the city shalt thou take unto thyself; and thou shalt eat the spoil of thine enemies which the Lord thy God hath given thee." I ask if that is not a horrible and terrible doctrine? I ask how can that be divine revelation which is so full of cruelty? I ask whether it is not savage? This was the language which justified negro slavery, and still supports the Coolie trade. It is said these slaves are inferior beings—"savages." Why, that is language which might have been uttered in some far-off corner of the globe? I never expected to hear it in Birmingham. I hold slavery is a damnable cruelty everywhere; but where we have the stronger intellect against the savage, it is ten times more cruel. How, then, shall we further proceed? Shall I follow Moses when conjuring with the magicians? Is that an authentic revelation from God which brought up the wicked frogs from the waters of Egypt to spread over the land? Is this believed which says that there was darkness over all the land of Egypt, but there was light in the dwellings of the children of Israel, though they might be living in

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the same house or be immediate neighbours, there being thus for the time light and dark, patchwork fashion? Follow Moses through his zig-zag journey, during which the clothes of the people were not to wear out? Imagine, a Jewish baby two months old on leaving Egypt arriving at Palestine in the same clothes 40 years after! Follow Moses, when in the war between the Amalekites and the Jews, he, like some Duke of Cambridge, seeks a place of safety while the battle goes on. Shall I follow him while the drooping hands are being held up until the Amalekites are beaten? Shall I follow him through the absurdities of the quails and the manna? Shall I follow him up the Mount where God says to him, "Let me alone that my wrath may wax hot against them, that I may consume them?" Shall I follow him where he persuades God that he is wrong, and repenteth him of the evil which he thought to do to the people? Follow Moses! I have followed him a step too far. Is this Bible an authentic revelation, or is it a record of a hundred different myths linked together from the minds of a thousand different men? I have never, from the first speech I made in this debate, said that this work is the work of forgers; and no man, no honest man, would keep me to that which I don't advance.

Mr. ROBERTS: There are always two ways of looking at every case, and he pursues the best course who puts all the facts together harmoniously. I daresay I might appeal to the experience of every one as to mystery hanging over some particular incident, till one fact is ascertained which throws all the rest into beautiful harmony. So it is in this matter. Many things appear jumbled and inconsistent if they are looked at apart from the central fact. I don't wonder that Mr. Bradlaugh does not understand the Bible because he ignores its backbone, so to speak. As I said in my opening address, take God from the Bible and you take reason and all that is intelligible away from it, and lay it open to all the harsh unfriendly sayings in which Mr. Bradlaugh indulges as to its principles, its ordinances, and its history. Recognise the book as it stands in its completeness and it appears in a totally different aspect. In fact its divinity appears from itself. This will be seen if you try to apply to it Mr. Bradlaugh's hypothesis of its character. Mr. Bradlaugh's judgment of the book is that it is a human production. Now if that judgment of it be right, then its internal peculiarities ought to agree with it. We ought on such a theory of it to see human principles at work, the same as in everything else of human evolution. My argument is that there are facts in the case that defy explanation upon any human principles. I have rehearsed some of them. I show that some phases of the recorded attitude of Moses cannot be explained unless we accept the theory of his divine mission. On Moses, then, I propose to retain your attention during the short time at my disposal. It might please Mr. Bradlaugh better if I were to follow the assertions he has made this evening, but I must do my duty. I am here to affirm the truth of the Bible. To prove this affirmation requires argument and I would be precluded from entering upon this argument were I to do as Mr. Bradlaugh wishes, for it would take all the time at my disposal. But there is a way out of the dilemma. If Mr. Bradlaugh will affirm that the Bible is a myth, a human production, or undivine I will agree, as I have already said, to meet him for a similar period to this discussion, and it would then be my duty to follow him in all points and particulars, and to show that none of them were inconsistent with the fact that the book consists of reliable and authentic records of the proceedings of God in human affairs. Mr. Bradlaugh referred as a matter of animadversion to the fact that Moses took the Israelites into a sterile part of the world. This is one of those points that, in my judgment, tell in support of the professions of the Bible; for such a proceeding is unintelligible, if Moses was not directed to do it by God, who had power to sustain them there. If God directed him to do it, the proceeding is a perfectly rational one. But if Moses acted out of his own head, what possible explanation could be given of his taking the people into a region where it was impossible they could obtain sustenance? Manna was given. That Mr. Bradlaugh treated as an invention. Upon that I have to say that, if the manna had been an invention, something better would have been invented than that. For what are the facts concerning this manna? That the people murmured about it; that they chode with Moses; they re-called to mind the leeks and garlics of Egypt, and wished themselves back again. The fact of their murmuring is recorded; and if the

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murmuring occurred, it is a proof the manna was given, and that God was working with Moses; for Moses could not bring down manna to feed so large an assembly. If the murmuring did not occur, what conceivable object could the inventor of the story have had in inventing the murmuring? It may be asked, why did not God provide the children of Israel with something better than manna? Why not roast beef and plum-pudding and wine? which certainly would have been the sort of thing invented if the story of Exodus was a Jewish invention for the glorification of the nation. They would then certainly have been represented as having received in the wilderness a plentiful supply of first-class articles. Instead of that, here is an article which the people did not relish and soon got tired of. What was the reason for feeding the people on this peculiar kind of food? Mark the reason! Deut. viii. 16:—"Who (God) fed thee in the wilderness with manna, which thy fathers knew not, *that He might humble thee*, and that He might prove thee, to do thee good at thy latter end." You will judge for yourselves whether it is possible to admit that this could have been an invention. Invention is always for a purpose, and that purpose the glorification of the people concerned. In this case, no such purpose is served, but the contrary. The theory of invention has no reasonable standing ground; while, on the other hand, if it is not invention, but a record of what actually occurred, the occurrence and the record of it have a reasonable explanation, and in that case the divinity of the Bible is proved. Just listen to the context, and imagine whether the language is possibly that of an inventor, or a man seeking to use the Jews for his own glorification: "When thou hast eaten and art full, then thou shalt bless the Lord thy God for the good land which He hath given thee. Beware that thou forget the Lord thy God in not keeping His commandments and His judgments and His statutes which I command thee this day. Lest when thou hast eaten and art full and hast built goodly houses and hast dwelt therein, and when thy herds and thy flocks multiply and thy silver and thy gold is multiplied, then thy heart be lifted up and thou forget the Lord thy God which brought thee out of the land of Egypt, from the house of bondage." You see Moses never takes the credit of the Egyptian deliverance to himself.—(Time called.)

Mr. BRADLAUGH: The remark has been made that if we take this book as a human production we cannot understand it. How useful that is. We have no other books of a similar character to which similar objections apply? Have we Lord Amberley's new book, in which he has two sub-divisions, one of which he applies to holy persons and the other to holy books:

"Under the title 'Holy Persons,' we have Confucius or Khung-fu-tsze, the founder of Confucianism; Laò-tsè, the founder of Taouism; Sakyamuni or Guatama Bhudda, the founder of Buddhism; Zarathustra or Zoroaster, the founder of Parseeism; Mahommed or Mahomet, the founder of Islamism."

Each of these has religious books, some more and some less ancient than ours, to which similar objections do apply. Then Mr. Roberts says, "I won't answer Mr. Bradlaugh's objections to the Bible now, because that is not now my business. I will do it in another discussion." Why, during three nights, we have diminished considerably as regards the number of the audience; and if we continue to diminish till the sixth night, there will be nobody left but the disputants and their committee. I am not so foolish as to incur a second infliction of this sort if I can help it. I accepted Mr. Roberts's challenge in this case because I knew he was regarded as a fair representative man of a body of religionists whom I had heard well spoken of here and in America. I have met with strong men and weak men among them, but all I believe reasonable and respectable men; but, as regards Mr. Roberts, I have done my whole duty in accepting this challenge. If Mr. Roberts has the victory, I shall be quite content, and if he thinks I am unwise enough to submit to another six nights, all I can say is he don't know me as well as I know myself. But I will tell you what I will do. If he can get half-a-dozen clergymen of the Church of England or ministers of other bodies to back him as their representative, then I am bound to meet him in a second debate; but I have accepted now his challenge, and my reason for not accepting a second is that I don't think he is competent to treat the subject he has undertaken to treat. I don't think it would be doing justice to

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Christians to do it. And I will tell you why. I would not willingly have chosen a weak man, when I might have had a stronger man. I do not, therefore, fear; for I have occupied too many years upon the platform to be afraid. I call a weak man a man who pretends to quote works he is unacquainted with. You here, to-night, who have listened so far, especially ladies, will bear with me for a moment. I have not chosen to consider whether I have been speaking to believers or unbelievers, but I have here an extract from *A String of Pearls*, collected and strung together by my friend Mr. C. C. Cattell :—"A believer is one who takes for granted anything, sense or nonsense; while he who examines for himself into the truth or falsehood of any statement, and has the courage to avow his conclusion, is by the ignorant and prejudiced, designated an infidel. Such were, in their time, the great reformers, the philosophers, and the best men of past times, who were severely persecuted; as Aristotle, Descartes, Socrates, Virgilius, Trithemisis, Pythagoras, and others"—(A VOICE: "Has he got his portrait in the book?") Yes, and if yours had been beside it, it would have been the portrait of an indecent donkey who could not keep quiet. What I wanted to point out to you when that indecent interruption took place was that, if it be true that I shall suffer so severe a penalty as has been foreshadowed at some future time at the coming of Christ, the more reason you have for bearing with me and try to convince me and convert me now—the more reason because it is not alone for myself. You think my denials deserve a penalty, but there are thousands whom my voice influences—thousands of young men whom my voice is influencing. You may think I am not in earnest, but where is the inducement to be an infidel? An outlaw in early life from my country for my opinions, it is enough that they have stopped my way in many a walk in life. Say what you will, you will not deny me some powers of speech; you won't deny me the acquaintance necessary to deal with these subjects. If a desire to improve my home later in my life should draw me from public view to make my means of life, my advocacy would still continue amongst those with whom I lived. I find the whole of the religion of the world centred against myself, and those young men around me. You won't destroy my influence with hisses and such like demonstrations. You can only do so by meeting us man for man and woman for woman, and in the spirit of your book try and convert us, but not by taking up the first stone to smite us to the earth.

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Sixth Night,

THURSDAY, 22nd JUNE, 1876,

IN THE TEMPERANCE HALL, BIRMINGHAM.

THE CHAIR WAS OCCUPIED BY MR. GEORGE H. ST. CLAIR.

THE CHAIRMAN: Ladies and gentlemen, this being the last night of the debate, time is of more consequence. I trust it is not necessary to make a single remark, and I shall sit down at once, asking Mr. Roberts to commence on the affirmative side as usual.

Mr. ROBERTS: Mr. Chairman, ladies, and gentlemen, on this, the last night of the debate, it is my duty to submit to you the strongest of the arguments which I have to bring forward in substantiation of the proposition that the Scriptures are the authentic and reliable records of Divine revelation. My contention to-night is that the prophecies of the Bible—so explicit, so sober, and so useful in their character, being in these respects so unlike the vague, incoherent, irrational predictions of the Greek augurs and other contemporary pretenders, are an evidence of the divinity of the authorship of the Bible—evidence which becomes simply overwhelming when we consider their fulfilment in the accomplished history of mankind. That you will perceive is a very large subject, but I shall have to treat it in a very small way on account of limited time.

If there is one feature more characteristic of the Bible than another, it is the peculiarity of prophecy—the foretelling of coming events. It runs—I will not say as a golden thread or vein, but rather as a broad belt or seam of precious metal—throughout the book, beginning at the very beginning, and only ending at the last chapter of Revelations. Genesis iii., for example, contains a comprehensive prediction of human redemption, "That the seed of the woman shall bruise the serpent's head," and that at last the seed of the woman shall triumph, into which in detail I do not now enter, having more palpable matter in hand. I will not enter minutely into the history of the fathers, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, whose history is replete with the element of prophecy; nor into the history of Israel, of which the same may be said. I will bring before you those prophecies which, both for their extensiveness and frequency, and the remarkable manner in which they have been fulfilled, are visible to the eyes of all the nations of the earth. I refer first to the predictions which have been realised in the history of the Jewish nation.

Mr. Bradlaugh's notions on the subject are somewhat indefinite, but he was bound to admit last night that the Jews were an ancient race, going back at least 3,000 years, and that they have, all that time, had documents which they have regarded as those of Moses, and which they have all that time regarded as divine. I shall quote from those documents, because their reception for so long a period is a proof that they are so entitled to be received. As I have said, the predictions are so frequent and extensive that I shall have to be content with a mere selection, at the same time premising that they are but a sample or two of hundreds.

We have in the 26th chapter of Leviticus, the 31st to the 36th verses, a statement which I will now read: "I will make your cities waste, and bring your sanctuaries into desolation, and I will not smell the savour of your sweet odours. And I will bring the land into desolation: and your enemies which dwell therein shall be astonished at it. And I will scatter you among the heathen, and will draw out a sword after you: and your land shall be desolate, and your cities waste. Then shall the

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land enjoy her sabbaths, as long as it lieth desolate, and ye *be* in your enemies' land; *even* then shall the land rest, and enjoy her sabbaths. As long as it lieth desolate it shall rest; because it did not rest in your sabbaths when ye dwelt upon it. And upon them that are left *alive* of you I will send a faintness into their hearts in the lands of their enemies; and the sound of a shaken leaf shall chase them; and they shall flee, as fleeing from a sword; and they shall fall when none pursueth." I call attention to a similar statement in the book of Deuteronomy by the same speaker. In Deut. xxviii. 49, 50, 61, we read: "The Lord shall bring a nation against thee from afar, from the end of the earth, as swift as the eagle flieth; a nation whose tongue thou shalt not understand; a nation of fierce countenance, which shall not regard the person of the old nor show favour to the young . . . Also every sickness, and every plague, which is not written in the book of this law, them will the Lord bring upon thee until thou be destroyed." I should like to read other illustrations of the same thing, but I must be content to refer to one specimen from each of the prophets: Isaiah vi. 11-12; Jer. v. 15-20; Ezek. v. 5-17; Dan. xii. 7; Hosea ix. 17; Joel i. 1-6; Amos viii. 12; Micah. 5-16; Zeph. i. 12-18. &c., &c. I add to the list the prediction of Christ himself, who spoke upon the same subject in the following terms. In Luke xxi. 24, he was foretelling the destruction of Jerusalem, and the calamities which should befal the Jewish nation, and at verse 24 he says: "They shall fall by the edge of the sword, and shall be led away captive into all nations, and Jerusalem shall be trodden down of the Gentiles, until the times of the Gentiles be fulfilled." As a comment upon all these predictions, I simply point to the fact of the desolation of Jerusalem under the foot of the Gentiles for eighteen centuries, and the dispersion of the Jews among all the civilised nations under heaven. Here is the prophecy: there is its fulfilment. Can it be possible for prophecies to be fulfilled more completely than these? The Jews are the most valuable witnesses of the Bible's truth. Mr. Bradlaugh did not quite comprehend my argument as to their continuous existence being involved in the question of the truth of the Bible, and I will make the argument plainer now, since in itself it involves the fulfillment of prophecy in the most specific manner. The simple prophecy that the Jew would remain in all nations until a certain time, "until the times of the Gentiles be fulfilled," would alone require, if true, that the Jews must be in existence at the present time. But I will make the argument more manifest than that. In Jeremiah xxx. 11, we read: "Though I make a full end of all nations whither I have scattered thee, yet will *I not make a full end of thee;* but I will correct thee in measure, and will not leave thee altogether unpunished." Again, Amos ix. 8:—"Behold the eyes of the Lord God are upon the sinful kingdom, and I will destroy it from off the face of the earth; saving that *I will not utterly destroy the house of Jacob*, saith the Lord." In Deut. xxxii. 26, we have a memorial song—a prophetic song: prophetic of Israel's future experiences, which Moses committed to the custody of Joshua, the son of Nun; a very remarkable composition, certainly, if it was the production of a patriot who wished to ingratiate himself with the people. It is worthy to be read through; but I must confine myself to an extract, as bearing on the point in view:—"I said I would scatter them into corners; I would make the remembrance of them to cease among men, were it not that I feared the wrath of the enemy, lest their adversaries should behave themselves strangely, and lest they should say, Our hand is high; the Lord hath not done all this." Here you see is an express reservation of the Jews from destruction for a season; and, accordingly, here they are in our midst. God has preserved them from generation to generation. The arrangements of human affairs are at God's disposal and not in human hands, although men think they are the initiators in the case. Then I conclude this part of the argument by calling attention to this, that at the time spoken of when the promised Messiah shall be manifested in great glory, we read that "He shall assemble the outcasts of Israel, and gather together the dispersed of Israel from the four corners of the earth," whence it follows that, up to that period, they will be found in that position, and there they now are.

I will now allude to the second point which Mr. Bradlaugh equally failed to comprehend, which is that the truthfulness of the Scriptures requires that there should be at this day a dominant Christianity—political, tyrannical, and corrupt—a complete perversion of the original thing. I now call attention to the proofs of this. I begin

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with Paul, who, in Acts xx. 28, says: "Take heed, therefore, unto yourselves, and unto all the flock, over which the Holy Ghost hath made you overseers; feed the flock of God which he hath purchased with his own blood. For I know this that, *after my departure*, shall grievous wolves enter in among you, not sparing the flock; also *of your own selves* shall men arise and SPEAK PERVERSE THINGS." In writing to Timothy (4th chapter 3rd verse) he says: "The time will come when *they will not endure sound doctrine:* but after their own lusts shall they heap to themselve teachers, having itching ears; and they shall turn away their ears from the truth, and shall be turned unto fables." There we have a prediction of departure from the truth as apostolically delivered. I now produce the evidence that this was to grow into a political shape, and give the world an ecclesiastical imposture, supported by the sword. Paul's brethren in Thessalonica had been agitated about the coming of Christ as an event which was about to happen, but he knew it could not happen until certain things occurred. In 2 Thess. ii. he tells us what these certain things are. He says: "Let no man deceive you by any means: for that day shall not come, except there come a falling away first, and that man of sin be revealed, the son of perdition; who opposeth and exalteth himself above all that is called God or that is worshipped; so that he as God sitteth in the temple of God, showing himself that he is God. . . . . And now ye know what withholdeth that he should be revealed in his time. Only he who hindereth will hinder till he be taken out of the way. And then shall that wicked be revealed whom the Lord shall consume with the spirit of his mouth, and shall destroy with *the brightness of his coming.*" Therefore, according to Paul's prophetical foresight, there ought to have been in our past times an extensive corruption of Christianity, resulting in the development of a pretender to divine authority, who, as one head over all, should exhibit himself as a prominent object of the highest homage upon earth. I ask if the whole of this great prophecy has not exactly been realised? What is the most conspicuous feature of the history of Europe but the spectacle of a man in the name of Christ claiming the highest authority, and lording it over the kings and governments of the earth? And what is the foundation upon which he rests but an extensive professedly Christian society in all the countries of Europe, which has nothing in common with the faith originally preached by the apostles? The mischief that led to this result had begun to work in the days of the apostles. Paul says to Timothy that a whole district had turned away from him (2 Timóthy i. 15):—"This thou knowest that *all they which are in Asia* be turned away from me, of whom are Phygellus and Hermogenes." According to John, the longest-lived disciple of Christ, the departure from apostolic principles had become so serious in his day that it was necessary to try every professor whether he was true or not. See 1 John iv. 1-7 for this. The history of European Christianity is not the history of a truly apostolic thing. Mr. Bradlaugh was not too fervid in his denunciations of the system which has cursed Europe for so many centuries. His mistake was to make the Bible responsible for that system, to the symbolic prediction of whose uprise and success I now call your attention. Revelation xvii. 1:—"And there came one of the seven angels which had the seven vials, and talked with me, saying unto me, 'Come hither; I will show unto thee the judgment of the great whore that sitteth upon many waters, with whom the kings of the earth have committed fornication and the inhabitants of the earth have been made drunk with the wine of her fornication. So he carried me away in the spirit into the wilderness, and I saw a woman sit upon a scarlet coloured beast, full of names of blasphemy, having seven heads and ten horns. And the woman was arrayed in purple and scarlet colour, and decked with gold and precious stones and pearls, having a golden cup in her hand, full of abominations and filthiness of her fornication; and upon her forehead was a name written Mystery, Babylon the Great, the Mother of Harlots, and Abominations of the Earth." We are told in the 6th verse that John "wondered with great admiration," at the spectacle, and the angel explains to him the meaning of what he has seen. It is to that explanation I now call attention as furnishing the prophecy in question. First of all what is the meaning of the woman? and before we seek the answer to that, I would remind you that the community of Christ—those who are true to him and keep his commandments, are likened to a bride, a chaste virgin, espoused to an absent husband for whom she is waiting. Here, in the symbol before us, we have a false woman riding upon a scarlet-coloured beast. It is important to notice

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this in preparation for the explanation which identifies a false church with the symbol. I hope Mr. Bradlaugh won't make fun of the scarlet-coloured beast, for I presume he does not despise the British Lion. Symbolism is appropriate in its place. If we have a more hideous symbol than the British Lion to deal with here, it is because we have a more hideous system represented. In the 18th verse, we have the answer as to who the woman is: "And the which thou sawest is *that great city which reigneth over the kings of the earth.*" I am sure there will be no dispute between Mr. Bradlaugh and myself as to what city that was. Rome exercised imperial power over the whole world at that time.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: No.

Mr. ROBERTS: Over the whole civilised world. Rome is here represented as having ecclesiastical relations with the kings of the earth, which answers to history exactly. "The seven heads are seven mountains on which the woman sitteth"—Rome is on seven hills. "And there are seven kings: five *are fallen*, one is and the other is not yet come." The Roman symbol comprehended a representation of the seven forms of sovereignty that have been located on the seven hills of the topographical Rome. Up to the time of John's prophecy five forms of government had passed over those seven hills since the time of Romulus: the sixth (the imperial) existed at the time of the vision. The seventh prevailed for a short time, as the prophecy states, and the eighth, the Papal, is of the seven, for it is only another form for the Pagan; it is Paganism under a new name. I say that the history of Rome verifies in a marked manner these predictions of the apostles Paul and John. The complaint that the present system is a hideous system is well founded, but that complaint is an unwitting testimony to the truth of this great prediction. A religious apostacy, taking a political shape was to make all the nations of the earth drunk with false doctrine and sentiment; and the proof of its having accomplished this bemuddling mission is seen in the fact that when anyone attempts to present the sober truth of God, he is set down by religious people as an infidel or heretic.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: On the first night of the debate, and again to-night, Mr. Roberts said he would contend that the prophecies of the Bible were so explicit, so sober and so useful in their character, being, in this respect, so unlike the vague, incoherent and irrational predictions of the Greek augurs, as of themselves to prove the divinity of the Bible. Sober! Useful! Explicit! If you have heard one word that has been either sober, useful or explicit, all I can say is you are a great deal more clever at listening than I am. There is one pretence of explicitness, and that is the case of Luke xxi., in which there is an "explicit" reference to the destruction of Jerusalem. But Mr. Roberts must have forgotten that the gospel of Luke was not written before Jerusalem was destroyed; but, on the contrary, there is not a particle of evidence of the existence of the gospel before A.D. 150, and the earliest is much later than that. Although he has the coolness to tell you that with respect to the ancient fathers, he was content to call witnesses, he could do without them. I remember that the truth of the evidence came from my side and not his. He pretended to hand his evidence from the fathers to the chairman, and then when I came to question him about them, they vanished into thin mist. On my part, I called as a witness Clement, and was told an idiot could give evidence like that. I called Justin Martyr; Mr. Roberts said he was "trashy." I thought so, too, and so on, with the others. Then he has quoted a prophecy from Hosea, forgetting that, during the dispersion and captivity of the Jews, the whole of their records were swept away, and swept away, too, because they were in the way. Then we had a reference to 2 Thess. ii., which Mr. Roberts had a very curious way of reading. Turning to the chapter, you will find that Mr. Roberts stopped at the word "coming," at the end of the 8th verse, though not a completed sentence. If he had read on he would find that "for this cause, God shall send them strong delusion, that they should believe a lie." I don't know whether it struck him as remarkably inconvenient, or whether he thought it rather too expressive. Certainly the reading was vague enough. He next brought you to the 17th chapter of the Revelations, with its filthy, disgusting language, which he hoped I would not turn into fun, but whose extreme filth was revolting in reading. The 4th verse it requires the height

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of human audacity to read. There is nothing more revolting to my way of thinking. Mr. Roberts it cannot shock apparently. The woman had "a golden cup in her hand, full of abomination and filthiness of her fornication." Is there abomination of language more filthy and disgusting in any book you ever read in the world? Mr. Roberts says that these prophecies of the Bible are explicit, are sober, are useful. Does this refer to such twaddle as women sitting upon waters and scarlet beasts, with so many heads and so many horns. I want Mr. Roberts to say if that revelation is explicit. It is simply not explicit; it is simply incoherent and irrational. Then he talks of John as the oldest living disciple of Christ. Where is there a particle of evidence of that? It is simply an impertinent assertion. He says that Mr. Bradlaugh is fond of figures of speech, or does not despise emblems, or something of that sort. I am fond of them, but I don't like filth, and the whole Bible is full of filth. In Hosea, Ezekiel, and Nehemiah it abounds, and the only way of regarding it is as the outcoming of an ignorant and barbarous age. Hosea seems to have entirely lost all sense of decency. Read, if you please, the second chapter. Mr. Roberts says they are not vague. If sober, they are irrelevant. "Plead with your mother, plead; for she is not my wife, neither am I her husband; let her, therefore, put away her whoredoms out of her sight, and her aldulteries from between her breasts; lest I strip her naked, and set her as in the day that she was born, and make her as a wilderness, and set her like a dry land, and slay her with her thirst. I will not have mercy upon her children, for they be the children of whoredoms." I might read you filthy passage after filthy passage, but I don't like, especially in the presence of ladies. I have not provoked this. These are not our books. You say they are not vague. Perhaps not, sometimes, but they are not sober; and when explicit not useful. If they appeared in any book but the Bible, they would have been suppressed by the society formed for the suppression of indecent publications and seized wherever they were placed. (A VOICE "Shakespere.") Shakespere! Yes, but Shakespere don't pretend to be a revelation from God to man. I will refrain from reading more of those texts. I should not have used the few I have at all, only I wanted to base what seemed to me an important argument upon them. From gross-minded people we get low figures; from degraded men we get degraded figures; from low people we get licentious arguments; from disgusting men we get disgusting figures. Such things could not have come from an all-wise God. I regretted for the sake of this meeting there was the slightest necessity for dealing with the subject. I can understand it must have been as painful to you as it is to me. But as you had brought before you an example of a horribly filthy passage, I was bound to show you to what such passages lead.

Let us, if you please, pass on to another part of the subject. The Assyrian slabs and Egyptian monuments we are told are not easily deciphered, and when deciphered are not useful. Mr. Roberts is of that opinion, and coming from him it is no doubt entitled to some weight, as my own knowledge is only second-hand, and I have no ability to translate the hieroglyphs of Egypt. Relying upon second-hand information, therefore, it is quite possible I may be misled, but as far as I have been able to follow these hieroglyphs, opinions upon them vary much, and there is no perfectly safe ground for their interpretation. Until I know something more about them than I do at present I should say it would be better not to introduce them at all. Mr. Roberts says that at the end of the first century Rome was a great city reigning over all kings, and when I corrected him he said civilized kings. First, there is nothing about civilized kings in the Bible, and next Mr. Roberts might have known, if he had been explicit enough, that China was as civilized as the bulk of Europe and a portion of Hindostan. To pretend that this city of Rome reigned over all the kings of the world was as perfect a piece of pretence as could be imagined. Early in this debate Mr. Roberts said he would show that there was historic harmony in the Bible not only with the facts, but in relation to the history and the measure of the duration of the world. I pointed to the Egyptian chronicles and to the Septuagint. Is there historic harmony with these? The Bible limits the face of the earth to 6,000 years, while these go back far longer than that. The other day they opened some caverns in a neighbouring county and they found buried there remains which in the silent and increasing march of events, must have been deposited there when England and France were

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united together, which must have been hundreds of thousands of years ago. Talk of harmony in hieroglyphics 15,000 years old! let Panglos's discoveries speak—discoveries which show that Egypt existed 5,000 years before Eden's foolish story sounded in the world. There could be nothing more vague, nothing less sober, nothing more incoherent, nothing more irrational. What is the story? God makes one man and one woman, and places this man and woman in a garden, the fruit of one tree in which they were forbidden to eat. The tree was placed within reach and very tempting to the eye, and was, moreover, the tree of knowledge of good and evil. As long as man withstood the temptation all was well. But at length the serpent, wiser than the other beasts of the field, persuades the woman in her husband's absence to partake of the fruit. She does so, tempts her husband to do the same. He does so, and this caused the Almighty to turn round and curse the world. I am told that there is prophecy in it. The prophecy was contained in the curse pronounced upon the serpent:—"Because thou hast done this, thou art cursed above all cattle, and above every beast of the field; upon thy belly shalt thou go, and dust shalt thou eat all the days of thy life. And I will put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy seed and her seed: it shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise his heel." That is supposed to be sober, explicit, and useful prophecy. To me it seems as vague, incoherent, and irrational as any that ever appeared in any language. Again, Mr. Roberts, in his first speech, said there were apparent contradictions and discrepancies, but that, when examined by himself, they would melt away one by one. I have given 150 of these discrepancies and contradictions and absurdities. How many of them has he tried to answer? He has referred to the sentiments running through the Bible as evidence of its divinity. Why! they are sentiments of which the readers of the Bible are beginning to be ashamed of. I have produced sentiments as to the treatment of women and training of children—sentiments of giving to men of one nation power over the liberties and persons of their neighbours—sentiments with respect to doctrines which, as good and true men, they must regard as immoral and barbarous—sentiments regarding the actions of immoral men, particularly David, the man "after God's own heart," who never went astray, and, except in the case of Uriah the Hittite, did right in the eyes of the Lord, but still stole a little, robbed a little, was a liar, a thief, and a tenfold scoundrel; and these are anomalies which Mr. Roberts has not attempted to explain.

The CHAIRMAN: I had hoped, after the experience of our first meeting, that weak-minded people who could not command their feelings would have stayed at home, and that egotistical people would have sent challenges of their own to the disputants against whose sentiments they wished to protest. The troublers are so much in the minority that I trust to the general sense of the meeting to keep them quiet, and to see that they shall have respect for the meeting. Do let us maintain order during the rest of the debate. Mr. Roberts and Mr. Bradlaugh will each occupy a quarter of an hour with the option of making a speech or of asking questions. Mr. Roberts will begin.

MR. ROBERTS QUESTIONS MR. BRADLAUGH.

If I understood you correctly last night, you do not say the New Testament is a collection of forged writings?—I said I did not hold the doctrine that the Bible as a whole was the work of forgers; that I held that the Bible, like other books, amongst much that was mythical, had a basis of truth round which the myths were centred.

May not Paul have existed and written the epistles if the New Testament is not a collection of forgeries?—You have given me at present no authentication of the letters you call Paul's, and therefore can base no question upon them.

My question is based upon your statement that the New Testament is not composed of forgeries. I ask if the New Testament was not forged, is it not an honest production?—I have given you an answer. There may have been those who contributed their own amount of what was false and while other parts may have a basis of truth.

Do you not admit——I make no admission whatsoever. I said last night the onus of proof lies with you.

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I ask you to say finally whether the New Testament, or any portion of it was according to your conception of it, forged for the purpose of deceiving the people?—I don't mean to say that there might not be contributions and interpretations which may not be deceptions,

Do I understand you to say that of the 2nd Epistle of Paul to Timothy?—It all depends upon the evidence.

Presumably you know the evidence, and I am asking whether your answer applies to Timothy?—You are wrongly putting my answer. I have not the slightest evidence to enable me to identify any person whom you designate as Paul, or the person Timothy, to whom the epistle is said to have been written, and therefore am not unwise enough to express an opinion without having sufficient evidence.

Have you sufficient evidence to form an opinion—yea or nay?—I reply that I have no evidence of the fact.

What is your opinion of the fact?—My opinion is not evidence, and I have no facts to found an opinion upon.

You have the fact of the epistle existing and circulating for centuries, and upon that fact I ask for your opinion as to its genuineness?—It is my opinion that I have no evidence.

Do you refuse then to say that the 2nd Epistle to Timothy is a forgery?—If you mean, is it probable that Paul wrote it, my answer is that, as I have no knowledge about Paul, I cannot speak about his epistles, and I am not so foolish as to be drawn into the position of saying that a forgery had been committed, when I have no evidence on the subject.

Do I understand then that you know nothing about it?—I know more about it than you may suppose.

Tell me, then, is it a forgery?—The bulk of the evidence for it, I have no doubt, has been forged evidence.

I ask you for your opinion, and you tell me about the evidence.—The bulk of the evidence, during the first eight centuries, was forgery without doubt.

I am asking you about the 2nd epistle of Paul to Timothy.—And I cannot give any opinion apart from the evidence which I say has been forged—the bulk of it.

You evade my question: I ask you as to the 2nd epistle of Paul to Timothy; and you refer me to other writings. My question is, whether, in your opinion, on whatever ground you have formed that opinion, Timothy is a forgery?—I am of opinion, if you have *bonâ fide* evidence that Paul wrote it, the evidence should be produced.

I have now been asking you for some time, Mr. Bradlaugh, whether you believe that the 2nd epistle to Timothy was written by Paul, or is a forgery, and you do not answer the question.—I answer I know nothing about Paul. I have answered the question satisfactorily to myself. The evidence of the epistles—I have read the bulk of what is alleged to be evidence—and I believe it to be a forgery. Beyond that which is strict evidence, you will get nothing from me.

Say yes or no. Is it in your opinion Paul's letter or not?—I won't say that. You won't get me to go into a trap—(laughter). I have a letter in my possession—how can I tell whether a letter has been forged or no, when I don't know who wrote it.

I should say in such a case, "I am in ignorance of the entire matter, and cannot form an opinion," but I most certainly thought Mr. Charles Bradlaugh had formed an opinion, and I merely ask what that opinion is.—Your question began with a statement about ignorant persons. I say that I have examined the Christian evidence as cited by the whole of the writers, and the presumption formed in my mind is against the professions of the epistles, but I decline to be entrapped into saying what might convey more than I might mean.

My question is based upon the examination you have made. I merely ask, have you formed a definite opinion? if so, what is it?—I have given you a definite opinion.

What is it?—My definite opinion is that I have not the slightest evidence.

I ask your opinion, and you tell me about the evidence.—Apart from the evidence I have no opinion.

But you can tell me what your opinion is on the evidence.—My opinion is I am giving answers to a man who does not comprehend them.

All I wish you to do, Mr. Bradlaugh, is to take positive ground one way or the other as to the character of the second epistle of Paul to Timothy.—My opinion was expressed six days ago. My opinion is that you cannot connect Paul with it.

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I ask you do you discover anything in the epistles themselves to justify the supposition that they were forged?—Yes, I have clear evidence, and if you examine the Christian evidences you will find that the titles to the Old and New Testaments have been held to be forged.

I am not speaking as to the titles.—I have not finished. I was saying that the ecclesiastical writers of the earlier ages used the names of people not connected with the book at all. I refer to the the titles distinguishing between them and the contents of the letters. There is nothing in the contents to show the authorship.

I can understand that a work may not be Charles Bradlaugh's though it has "C. Bradlaugh" affixed to it; but here we have in the body of the letter a statement like this: "Paul, the apostle of Jesus Christ to Timothy," do you say that was not written by the writer of the letter?—I have not the slightest evidence connecting the writer of the prefix with the body of the letter,* and further than that I can give no answer.

MR. BRADLAUGH QUESTIONS MR. ROBERTS.

Do you admit my definition of life as applied to man?—I don't recollect what your definition was.

Do you mean seriously to tell me that you have forgotten my definition of life last night?—Yes, but if you will repeat it, I will tell you whether I agree with it.

Kindly tell me your ideas of life as applied to a man and as applied to an elephant. —I believe it is the same in both cases.

You have read Eccles. iii. 18?—Yes.

Mr. B., (reading:) "I have said in mine heart concerning the estate of the sons of men, that God might manifest them, and that they might see that they themselves are beasts. For that which befalleth the sons of men befalleth the beasts; even one thing befalleth them: as the one dieth, so dieth the other; yea, they have all one breath; so that a man hath no pre-eminence over a beast; for all is vanity."—Yes, those words are there.

Do you think those words are God's authentic revelation to man?—Yes.

Do you consider that a sheep which has been killed by your butcher, of which you have eaten part, will continue to live despite that eating?—No.

Do you consider that a man who has been dined on by the Patagonians will continue to live despite that dining?—No: not unless he is raised.

Have you sufficient memory to serve you as to the plagues of Egypt?—Perhaps.

Is it a fact that God afflicted the land with a plague of murrain, which killed the whole of the cattle in the land, excepting the cattle of the children of Israel? I refer you to the 9th chapter of Exodus and the 6th verse. Is it the fact that after the whole of the cattle of the land had been killed, God, in the 19th verse, sent a warning so that those that were left might be taken out of the field and not die?—I prefer you to read it as it is.

Does it say, in the 19th verse: "Send, therefore, now, and gather thy cattle, and all that thou hast in the field; for upon every man and beast which shall be found in the field, and shall not be brought home, the hail shall come down upon them and they shall die?—Yes.

Is it a fact that some of them regarded the word and fled?—Yes.

Do you consider it probable that they fled away after they had been killed. Don't you consider that an improbability though the book states it?—The book does not state that.

Read it. Read all relating to the cattle fleeing out of the field, and see if it doesn't.—There is no occasion to read anything besides what you have read.

Is it true that later than that, God destroyed the firstborn of man and beast throughout the whole of the land of Egypt?—Yes.

All the cattle having been previously dead?—All that did die.

The words are: "And all the cattle of Egypt died." Read from the 2nd to the 6th verse, and say if it don't mean all the cattle?—It means all the cattle that were meant.

* The body of most of Paul's letters contain the expression, "I, Paul," frequently, e.g.: 2 Cor, x. 1,

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How much less than "all?" Is not all the money in my pocket all the money?—That is a trifling way of putting it.

Can anything be trifling that helps to clear up God's Word?—In the abstract, of course not.

Then please clear up how all the cattle can mean less than all the cattle.—If I knew all the circumstances which the writer had before his mind, in their details, I could do so.

Oh, that is your answer, is it?—My answer is that the book, being otherwise proved reliable, my ignorance of the details does not preclude my believing it to be a divine revelation.

You said, last night, you had enough of evidence of the divinity of the book in the establishment of Christianity by miracle: is it not a fact that all people who pretended to perform miracles pretended to perform them by supernatural power?—No doubt.

Most of those who claim to perform miracles claim to do so by supernatural power? Yes, but to claim a thing is not to prove it.

Did I understand you to say that slavery as the injunction of Leviticus was justifiable? I think your statement was that savage people might be dealt with as animals?—I don't recollect my precise words.

You said they were in the position of animals, and that the Jews had a right to kill them.—God's right transferred to the Jews.

Does the Bible say that the serpent was condemned to go on his belly as punishment?—Yes.

Do you think that, before his condemnation, he went on his head, his tail, or his back?—I don't know.

And I am sure I don't—(laughter). Do you hold that, at some time in the history of the world, there was an actual tree bearing fruit, the eating of which would give a man education?—I must know in what sense you use the word education.

If you ask me, it means knowledge: "The tree of knowledge of good and evil:" was there such a tree?—Yes.

Do you think there are similar trees existing to-day?—No.

In your opinion, what has become of the genus?—It was not a genus.

Then what has become of the individual specimen?—I fancy it must have gone long ago.

So do I—(laughter). Will you kindly tell me how you make three days and three nights between late on Friday night and early on Sunday morning?—I don't make it.

Is it true, as the gospels represent, that Joseph of Arimathea begged the body of Jesus on Friday evening?—No.

When was it?—Thursday.

Where shall I find that?—In Luke xxiv.

In the 24th of Luke I don't see anything about Thursday. I know where it is written, "We trusted it had been He. Besides all this, to-day is *the third day?*"—"The third day SINCE;" consequently Saturday was the second day "since," and Friday the first day "since," and Thursday the day itself.

When it says that Joseph of Arimathea begged the body, according to the 23rd of Luke 50-54, it was in the evening, as "the Sabbath drew on?"—That was the Sabbath connected with the Passover. Two Sabbaths came together.

Will you kindly give two Sabbaths.—You will find it in Matt. xxviii. 1.

(Looks.) There is only one Sabbath mentioned in Matt. xxviii. 1.—The word is plural in the Greek. There is my Greek Testament (producing a book).

I have nothing to do with the Greek. We have agreed to take the authorised English version throughout. I asked, as my first question, if we were to be bound by the authorised English version, and it is simply a trick to refer to the Greek Testament when we have debated on the authorised version all through.—(Time called.)

The CHAIRMAN: We have only one hour left. Let us listen with the utmost quietness. Mr. Roberts now speaks for a quarter of an hour.

Mr. ROBERTS: I am surprised that Mr. Bradlaugh should insist on an English translation when the original is presented to him illustrative of a point referred to.

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When he asked me to be bound by the English version, I did not understand him to exclude the original from which it is made. I understood him to mean the English version and its original, as distinguished from the Septuagint and other versions which are different. A version is the same in all the languages it may be translated into: the original of course governs all. With regard to Mr. Bradlaugh's remarks upon my opening speech, I am not quite sure whether I am right in giving him credit for sincerity in the disgust he expressed at the chapter I quoted. Not that I wish to dispute his sincerity in any offensive sense. I have no doubt that in measure he is sincere to his cause, but I cannot conceive any really thoughtful man objecting to Rev. xvii. on the ground of delicacy; I cannot think of a better answer than the words of Paul, "to the pure all things are pure, but to the unbelieving and defiled nothing is clean." The Bible deals with facts; and its unvarnished delineations of them is one evidence of its divinity. It is unhampered by human delicacies. If it has a bad thing to speak of, it speaks of it. If it has a bad thing to symbolise, it symbolises it in a character befitting it. Then Mr. Bradlaugh asks, why was not the book of Revelation written plainly? I should like to ask him if even all human compositions are plain? Are there not problems in Euclid, allegorical pictures, in paintings and hieroglyphs on stone? Are there not emblems connected with the various secret orders? All these might be considered as open to the same remarks, if Mr. Bradlaugh's objection is reasonable. But in point of fact it is not reasonable. Advanced matters are treated in an advanced way. You would not speak to educated men as you would to those you wished to instruct. The book of Revelation was written for a particular class. They are described in the opening verses as "the servants of Jesus Christ." Now the servants of Jesus Christ are instructed in first principles, and the principles furnish the clue to an interpretation of this book which they have in their hands. To them the book is intelligible and interesting. The knowledge it communicates is valuable to them and accessible. Its symbolical character is a veil only to those for whom its contents were never intended. With regard to historical correspondences, I acknowledge that Mr. Bradlaugh is right when he says I have not done what I said I would do; I can only say my omission to do so is not from want of materials, but simply because it has been a matter of impossibility to introduce them during the time at our disposal. On some subsequent occasion I may take the opportunity of bringing them forward. To-night I have put forward some strong things, which so far Mr. Bradlaugh has entirely failed to answer. Perhaps, here, I may refer to his allusions to the discovery of human remains said to belong to times anterior to our own race. I would simply say that the discovery of such remains, even granting all that is claimed for them, would not be anything against the Bible because it is a teaching of the Bible that there was a race on the earth preceding the chaos which prevailed 6,000 years ago, at the time Adam appears on the scene. A disaster to the race occurred, probably resulting in the pre-Adamite chaos; and the remains found may go back to that time without invalidating the Bible account of our own race. Our own race cannot be carried farther back than the Bible puts it. It is a simple mathematical calculation. Population increases at a known rate. Reckon the rate backwards and you cannot carry the present farther back than the time of Noah.

With regard to prophecy, I have produced the case of the Jews, and the case of the corrupt ecclesiasticism of Europe. I now refer to Isaiah's prediction of the downfall of Babylon (Isaiah xiii. 19); Ezekiel's prediction of the downfall of Egypt (Ezekiel xxix. 12-15); also his prediction of the destruction of Tyre (Ezekiel xxviii. 6-18), a power at that time occupying a great commercial position in the world, answering the position in the present day of Great Britain. Then I produce Daniel's prophecy of the uprise of the four empires (Daniel ii. and vii.) I cannot, in a quarter of an hour, elaborate these; I ask you to refer to them at home and see whether or not these predictions are there. One particular illustration I will refer to, though involving the symbols which brings the jeer to Mr. Bradlaugh's lips. The date of the prophecy is B.C. 553, and the events to which it relates occurred about 300 years before Christ. Daniel saw in a vision a goat and ram with two horns, representing the empires of Persia and Greece, as the angel showing the vision told Daniel. The goat, representing Greece, had a great horn, which was broken in the encounter with the ram, and from the great horn there sprang up four smaller horns. This was explained to mean that, when the Greek empire should appear on the scene,

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its first ruler would die, and his empire be divided into four parts outside his family. Now, we well know that, after Persia was conquered by Alexander, he died without issue, and his empire was divided among his four generals—a fact referred to in the 11th chapter of Daniel, thus :—"A mighty king shall stand up that shall rule with great dominion and do according to his will. And when he shall stand up, this kingdom shall be broken, and shall be divided toward the four winds of heaven ; and not to his posterity, nor according to his dominion which he ruled : for his kingdom shall be plucked up even for others beside those." I dare say Mr. Bradlaugh, with his usual adroitness, will say that this is a forgery ; but intelligent men are not to be scared away from truth by these reckless assertions. There are unquestionable matters of fact which lead logically to certain great conclusions, which may not possibly be apparent to every one, and which may be caricatured, but which are still undeniably true. Even in science this is the case. Some scientific experiments are so refined as to be only understood by few ; and yet, conducted in a calm and skilful manner, yield demonstrated truth upon which great public conveniences are founded. I might refer on the subject of prophecy to the history of Christ, in so far as it was unfolded during the thirty-three years and a half he sojourned on earth. The time of his appearing, the character of his ministry, and the nature of his death, were all foretold with a minuteness which cannot be accounted for on any other principle than that the prophets were guided by the Spirit of God.

Mr. BRADLAUGH : Mr. Roberts says he never meant it to be understood that we were to be bound, in this debate, by the ordinary English version. But I will remind him that, in my first speech, I said I should assume, for the purposes of this debate, that he meant the ordinary authorised English version, beginning with the Book of Genesis and ending with the Book of Revelation ; and supposing I might happen to be wrong, I asked him if that was his meaning, and he said "Yes." It was the very first question I asked him : "Do you mean by 'the Scriptures' or by 'these Scriptures' the authorised English version of the Bible, commencing with Genesis and ending with Revelations?" Mr. Roberts's answer was "Yes." If that is not explicit language, language can have no meaning. If Mr. Roberts does not remember it, he ought never to enter into another debate. Then what does he say? He says that which positively I confess I cannot understand : that some version other than the English would distinguish a Sabbath preceding the Passover from the ordinary Jewish Sabbath, and that in fact there were two Sabbaths. Does he suppose I will admit that? He does not suppose anything of the kind. He says there is a Greek version. I know that. I have thirty of them at home ; and I know that none of them I have yet seen speak of a second Sabbath or two Sabbaths. All the books I have seen speak of "the first day of the week." Then Mr. Roberts spoke about Mr. Bradlaugh's "class." I might mention Sir Charles Lyall as one of my class, Baron Bunsen, and there are a few more of my class ; and as we have, amongst others, the evidence of these men, it is rather unfair to talk of Mr. Bradlaugh's class, because Mr. Roberts knows nothing about them. But with respect to the remains I spoke of, Mr. Roberts suggests that they might have belonged to a pre-Adamite period. In that case, the Bible is disproved ; for it says Adam was the first man. We are told that the first man Adam was made a living soul. According to Mr. Roberts the first man was not the first man ; and if there was a pre-Adamite man there is no truth that Jesus Christ came into the world to save the descendants of the first man. Then take the case of the prophecy of Daniel, the date of which Mr. Roberts gives as 553 B.C., and which he says relates to something which happened after that. He has proved nothing about the date of 553 B.C., although challenged over and over again to produce proofs of the dates he specifies. How dare he pretend that 553 B.C. is an accurate date? He might just as well have said twenty or a million, or any other date, but simply it suited his own purpose. It is about as funny a way of conducting a debate as anyone could adopt. Oh, Mr. Roberts says, but of course, Mr. Bradlaugh will say that this is a forgery. This word forgery is a convenient word, when wanting to describe in the future time what has already taken place. I might, in describing what would be the result of another quarrel, give a warning as to how the quarrel would begin. Unless you can tell me when Daniel was written you have no right to

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claim it as a prophecy. Mr. Roberts cannot even show that it was not written after the event, and it is a deliberate impertinence to assume that upon which the whole argument turns. If you please, let me draw your attention to the fact that Mr. Roberts changes the whole course of things, and brings about a revolution of religious sentiment. He says that "to the pure all things are pure," and thereby justifies those people who are prosecuted for selling things which we say are not pure. There is no justification for a man taking a coarse and filthy way of stating a thing, when he might have taken a pure way of stating it.

We have now got near the end of this debate. One point upon which our friend has complained is that he has not had time to elaborate his arguments, but this might have been obviated if he had not read so many texts. He says that I have dealt with these things in a way that he won't criticise as unfair. In this case I did not come here—I never have come to any place—to plead for a foregone conclusion, regardless of what could be said on the other side. I have always been ready to listen to the arguments of an adversary. You will admit that I have met every point with distinctness and as directly as possible. If Mr. Roberts has not heard my explanation it is not my fault. To prove that this book is a revelation from God it seems to me absurd that a debate should be conducted solely in reference to its internal contents, without respect to its history outside. To answer me with a pile of texts is no answer at all. It is an admission that the spokesman has undertaken a task which he ought not to have undertaken at all. The jury to whom he has submitted the case during the six nights of the debate, have no evidence outside the book for any of the books of the Bible. For the Old Testament none exist, so far as Mr. Roberts knows; for the New Testament, a number of names have been given to you, Mr. Roberts carefully refraining, until pressed by me, from giving those names. When still further pressed on the subject, he had nothing practically to produce beyond the book. He certainly did quote Athenagoras with a pretence upon which I do not congratulate him. He fixed the date of Athenagoras at A.D. 180, but his witness never mentions one of the gospels or the names of their writers. This cannot be said to have sprung, as a mine, upon Mr. Roberts, because he had been challenged by me to produce his witnesses. He did so, but then discovered that they were "trash." When we come to the book itself, we have the statement from Mr. Roberts that the people of the world, with the exception of a few descendants of Abraham, were as animals, and that God had, no doubt, in mercy, justice, and love transferred them to the Jews for ever as bondsmen, and as the sport of their cruelty, lust, and pride—a position so terrible as to make any man shudder. I shall only have one further opportunity of addressing you. I am obliged to you for having treated me as you have. I beg, during the few minutes I have to speak, at any rate, to say that we have no other object than the common object of truth. Don't look upon our class as if it was few or weak. It is a growing class. It is a class increasing in influence with respect to the education of the day. It consists of those who have been struggling for the education of the country during the last fifty years. It is a class worthy of a better advocate than he who stands before you at the present time.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Roberts will now deliver his concluding speech for which he is to be allowed the full time.

Mr. ROBERTS: And now, Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, we have reached the end of the discussion. It has not been so entirely satisfactory as might have been wished; but it has been as much so as was to be expected with the limited time at disposal and the broken form into which the discussion has necessarily been thrown. I, for one, am well content with the result. I have established a series of propositions which, in their combined force, place it beyond all reasonable doubt, that the Scriptures are the authentic and reliable records of divine revelation.

I have proved that, beginning where we stand, the state of the facts now existing in the world is such as ought to exist on the hypothesis that the Bible is true,

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I have proved that there is in contemporary literature sufficient evidence of the fact of the Scriptures having existed at the time they profess to have begun to be in circulation, although admitting that such evidence is not necessary in the presence of the far weightier evidences of their divinity that exist.

I have proved that the unquestionable facts connected with the establishment of Christianity in the world in the first century, are incapable of being explained on any rational principle apart from the New Testament account that Christ rose from the dead, and that power to work miracles was bestowed on the apostles. I have proved that the single case of the apostle Paul, when all the facts of his unimpeachable history are distinctly realised and logically construed, is sufficient of itself to prove the divinity of Christ, and therefore of the entire Scriptures. I have proved that the literary and moral peculiarities of the Bible are at variance with the supposition of its being a human production, though this argument I have not had time to elaborate to the extent I should have liked. I have proved that the history of the Jewish nation, particularly as involving the character and career of Moses, cannot be explained on the Freethinker's hypothesis of the Bible; but on the contrary, is an irrefragable proof of its divine character and authorship.

And lastly, I have proved that the prophecies of the Bible—fulfilled in the past, and now fulfilling before our eyes—are an irresistible evidence of their divine character.

How have these arguments been met? Has there been any attempt to grapple with them on their merits? None whatever. Mr. Bradlaugh, instead of attempting to break the chain of my reasoning, has hurled at me, in his undiscriminating way, a number of detached features of Bible things, which he alleges to be contradictory of the professed character and teaching of the Bible. Even if his contention about them had been correct, their citation was no answer to the argument I have submitted. But what are we to say to them when they turn out to be mere points of *ex parte* declamation. Mr. Bradlaugh professes to find things in the Bible inconsistent with what he thinks God ought to be and to do; therefore these things are inconsistent with the God the Bible reveals. Extraordinary reasoning! I have disposed of some of his objections; and it will be on public record in this discussion that I offer at any time, in public contest with Mr. Bradlaugh, to answer or explain all that he can produce, when he will consent to affirm the Bible is an imposture, and so give me the opportunity of disproving the arguments he will advance in support of his affirmation.

Then he has endeavoured to embarrass me on the mere question of technical reference to writings whose existence is notorious to all the world. He knew that in one or two cases the name of a non-existent work was all that was relied upon as proving the existence of the New Testament at the date of that work's production; yet he insisted on the production of the work, while refusing to recognise the weight of those actually produced. It is immaterial to the purpose for which I used them whether they were really the works of their professed authors or not. They were written in the first and second centuries; it matters not by whom. They quote the New Testament many times over, which shows the New Testament existed at the time they were written, and this was all the use I sought to make of them. But I could have dispensed with them; the argument is irresistible without them. My reference to them only gave Mr. Bradlaugh an opportunity of appearing to advantage, which he would otherwise have lacked.

Well, I do not blame Mr. Bradlaugh for his tactics. They were the only tactics available to him in the discussion if he was to appear to show any fight at all. He could make

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no headway against the overwhelming arguments in defence of the Bible. In the eyes of his friends he could not even appear to make a stand, except by giving to these irrelevant matters a prominence that does not logically belong to them. I will allow he has made a good handling of a very bad case.

But what does his contention amount to, even supposing we were for a moment to allow, for the sake of argument, that he had established what he has been contending for? Merely this, that he (Mr. B.), does not believe in the New Testament. It may be true for anything he knows to the contrary; he is inclined to think it is not true, but he cannot prove that is not so, and it is not his business! Is that a position with which a wise man ought to be content on a subject of such tremendous importance? Rather, will not the highest reason impel a man, in such a case, to seek for solid ground of conviction one way or other? A wise man will not be content with a "maybe" in such a matter as this. He will not rest till he is able to say with confidence, "I know this to be a forgery and a lie, for I can prove it," or "I know this to be the truth of God; for it is in my power to give conclusive evidence of it."

I have unfolded an argument during these six nights, imperfect and fragmentary though it be, which justifies a man in taking the second of these confident positions. I have shown by the facts accessible to all men, in connection with the Bible, that God exists, and that He has a glorious purpose with the earth and with man upon it, involving immortal life and perfect well-being to all who may become beneficially related in the way revealed by Christ. Is there no antecedent presumption in favour of such a conclusion, in our own constitution and in the spectacle of heaven and earth around us? Is it reasonable to suppose that the stupendous system of the universe exists for no higher end than the feeble gratification of an ephemeral and decaying race of animals? Is it reasonable to suppose that the aspirations of the noblest of mankind are without a counterpart in the region of the possible? Is it reasonable to suppose that the earnest uplifting of the human heart in agonising desire towards a Higher than man are without a meaning in the universe of being? The vibrations of the needle pointed to the pole long before the existence of such a point on the earth's surface was known. So, in true philosophy, do our fervent longings point to the Almighty Father and Disposer of all things, even if He had not chosen to reveal Himself.

The higher minds of the nation are on the side of my argument in an indirect way. Mr. Gladstone in his article on "Phases of Modern Thought," just published in the *Fortnightly Review*, has told us that in his judgment, the system of negation represented by Mr. Bradlaugh and his friends, is calculated, if generally received, to disintegrate society in the next generation, though its present advocates, through the bias of inherited principles, might continue subject to moral restraint. Professor Tyndall, in the preface to his published addresses, says that mankind require the lifting power of a noble ideal. Even John Stuart Mill, born and bred a sceptic, in his last days assumed an attitude indicative of something higher than his atheistic proclivities. The *Daily News* says "Mr. Mill was so far true to his early training that he tried hard to show how small was the intellectual warrant for the misty aspirations; but the 'Time-Spirit' led him again and again to the brink of the abyss after logic had made its final declaration; and his last book reveals him in the attitude of one looking across the ocean of eternity with wistful eyes and something of a fond expectancy. Thus he presents one of the most pathetic figures in all the literature of negation. His aspiration for *something to believe in beyond this petty life* will speak to doubting

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intellects with intense force. He and such as he testify not that this age is sceptical, but that even sceptical minds *hunger for a religion in which they can believe.* The last century tried to feed the mind on the husks of dry and negative logic, but again has come that yearning for something higher, which has often before been the harvest of new faiths. When essentially scientific intellects like Mill and Tyndall link reverential hopes to strict deduction of the reason, the most careless observer may detect an immense transformation of opinion, and the most timid heart may take comfort."

All these utterances of the intellectual men of our day, point in the direction of a need which the Bible supplies. The Bible gives us the purifying and reforming restraint which Mr. Gladstone sees human society needs. It gives us a divine interdict of evil doing and a divine command of well-doing. The Bible gives us the uplifting ideal of professor Tyndall's declared want. It gives us an ideal glorified man—the manifestation of the Eternal invisible Father of all—a man who once lived in our weak and afflicted state, whose work has already filled the world with light compared with the darkness that reigned before his appearance; a man who now exists in an incorruptible, immortal, omnipotent nature; whose re-appearance in the world will take place at an appointed time for the abolition of every existing form of human government, and the establishment of a divine despotism for the blessing of all mankind, on the foundation of glory to God, to whom alone glory is reasonably due; with whose appearance there is associated this glorious prospect for every friend of his, that he will use the power God has given him to recall them from the oblivion of the grave, or transform them to an immortal state identical with his own, and associate them with himself, with every circumstance of honour and renown, in the perfect order of things he will establish and administer among men in that blessed day of promise, when there shall be no more curse and no more pain, and sorrow and sighing shall flee away. A more uplifting ideal it is impossible to conceive; and as for poor John Stuart Mill's wistful wonderment of the future, the gospel of Christ is the satisfactory and the only answer. There is no solution apart from it. There is no consolation to the intellectual mind apart from it. It gives the believer of it a permanent interest in the universe and its affairs. It takes away the blackness which darkens and shortens the Atheist's horizon; it dispels the fear, the *ennui*, and the gloom, which, at some time or other, invade every man's thought, and rescues him from that depressing companionship with fossils and death which Mr. Bradlaugh's faith compels him to accept; and gives him instead a fellowship with the Almighty through His Son, and a destiny as glorious and endless as the sun itself.

A knowledge of the truth puts its possessor in the privileged position of being able to explain the conflicts that distract the intellectual world, and to see his way through the labyrinth where others are lost. He turns his back on the priest and preacher, as the scientist does: but he grasps the Bible to his bosom, as the scientist does not, having in the understanding of it, attained to the possession of a religion that he can believe in, without closing his ear to science like the dogmatist, or to the voice of Jewish historic evidence like the scientist—a religion which solves the problem of human existence, mellowing the present with the tranquillity of faith, and gilding the future with the brightness of well-founded and rational hope. This is truly a great possession, the value of which is enhanced by the foregoing newspaper picture of intellectual unbelievers looking (vainly) across the ocean of eternity with wistful eyes. Christ is the solution of all anxiety in this direction, and he is to be obtained in the belief and obedience of the truth. "If ye believe not that I am he, ye shall die in your sins."

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I admit the glory of it has been obscured by a false theology, whose hideousness is due to a mixture of the philosophical speculations of ancient Pagans with the fables of Romish priests, glossed by the thinnest varnish of Scripture phraseology. I admit that, for this reason, men like Mr. Bradlaugh are more to be pitied than blamed. I do pity him. In some respects I like him. And I would tell even him to hope; for the Creator of heaven and earth is gracious and forgiving, and will forgive even blasphemies equal to his, if he will turn and repent and submit himself as a dutiful child to the Everlasting Power, in whose hand his breath is, and whose are all his ways. But he may not hope if he does not repent. Though the reigning darkness of Christendom may excuse him, and his courage and manliness may extenuate the blacker features of his case, the truth compels every friend of it to regard him as a misleader of men to their utter ruin both now and hereafter. In this character I have, at the request of the truth's friends, accepted the present opportunity of strenuously opposing him, in the proof that the Scriptures are the authentic and reliable records of divine revelation.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: I have elected not to occupy your time beyond ten o'clock in allowing Mr. Roberts to proceed with his prepared speech, and shall, I think, be able to limit myself to eight minutes, if allowed to proceed free from interruption. First, I regret that Mr. Roberts, in his written *finale*, should have said that he has produced contemporary evidence. It is not true, as Mr. Roberts has said, that my tactics were directed to irrelevant matters, for had they been irrelevant, I should not have introduced them. I regret that he only relied upon titles and names; and the report will bear me out that he said he had the books here, and that I challenged their production. He says my position is that the New Testament may be true for anything I know to the contrary. On the contrary, I have given contradictions which show it cannot be true. I regret also that Mr. Roberts should have referred again to the challenge thrown out last night. I had been taught to regard him as the representative of an earnest body of men and women, but I must refuse to accept a second challenge from a man who is incompetent to make out the case he has undertaken to establish. Mr. Roberts says I ought to put it to you that this book is a forgery and a lie, or accept it. Surely I have taken pains to explain to you that I regard the Bible as I do the religious books of every people in the world—none of them entire forgeries, none of them entire lies; all of them the growth of different ages; all of them with a little truth. I have studied them, and if I cannot receive them, it is only because my reason does not permit of my doing so. I am not the best man that could be put forward against them; but I hope you will do me the justice of allowing that whatever may be our differences, I gave a full and a fair hearing to whatever is advanced in their favour, and as full an answer as I am able to give, and so it shall be every time a cause is entrusted to my charge.

I have now the pleasant duty to perform to ask you to pass a vote of thanks to the gentleman, who with so much good temper and so much firmness, has presided over these debates. With this I am sure Mr. Roberts will agree.

Mr. ROBERTS: I second the motion, only regretting that Mr. Bradlaugh and myself cannot agree on higher things. I feel pleasure in joining in this proposition because I

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believe the good temper and impartial conduct of the chairman has greatly tended to the success and dignity of the debate. I might add as a reason for the vote what may not be known to all, that the chairman has postponed his summer holidays in order to attend to the unsummerlike duty he had undertaken, to preside over this debate.

The resolution was carried with acclamation.

The CHAIRMAN in responding to the vote, said he had listened with great interest to the debate, and had learnt some things from it. There had been some warmth on each side, but not more than might have been expected on such a subject with such earnestness of conviction on each side. He considered that the disputants were both wrong and both right, and if the audience would only come next Sunday to the Chapel where he preached (loud and prolonged laughter), he would try to show them the way in which these things should be looked at.

The meeting then separated.

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A REVIEW

OF

THE DISCUSSION.

By Mr. Roberts.

Mr. Roberts has asked and obtained Mr. Bradlaugh's consent to the publication of this review of the discussion at the end of the published report. He has also offered to print along with it any rejoinder Mr. Bradlaugh may choose to write, but Mr. Bradlaugh has not chosen to write a rejoinder. The addition of a review of the discussion by one of the disputants will seem uncalled for and out of place to such as hold with Mr. Bradlaugh that the discussion should stand or fall on its own merits. If Mr. Roberts could limit his view to the discussion as a performance or trial of polemical skill between two men, he would be of the same mind. But this aspect of the case is to him of the least consequence. He cannot shut his eyes to the wider bearings of the affair, as affecting, in however small a degree, the convictions of those who may seek in the reading of this discussion, some acquaintance with the merits of the question debated. This to him is the only important phase of the reported discussion, and has led him to desire and to ask permission to supplement the discussion with a few things necessary to complete the consideration of the subject.

Six nights seems a long time, and long enough to exhaust the subject, or at all events to allow of a very adequate treatment of it. But in the practical working, the case was otherwise. Each disputant had only one hour and a quarter per night, and part of that devoted to interrogation. Even with a full and undisturbed occupation of that time, any one having any acquaintance with the subject will know how small an extent of ground could be covered in an hour. But when it is remembered that a half of that hour was broken into two separate speeches, in reply to speeches from the other side, it will at once be seen that half-an-hour was practically all that was at the disposal of the affirmative side for the elaboration of lines of thought involving really extensive treatment, if at all thoroughly done. The consequence was that the affirmative argument was imperfectly developed, while on the other hand, it was absolutely impossible to deal with a great portion of the hostile details marshalled so rapidly, and on the whole so skilfully (for a bad cause) on the other side.

To make good the deficiency arising from these causes, Mr. Roberts proposed to Mr. Bradlaugh a second discussion, in which Mr. Bradlaugh should affirm the mythical character of the Scriptures which would have given Mr. Roberts the opportunity of following all his objections, but this Mr. Bradlaugh declined. Consequently, Mr. Roberts's only other course is to add this review, which he thanks Mr. Bradlaugh for consenting to. For convenience sake, the review is divided into six parts, corresponding with the six nights of the debate; and each part into two sections.—1, the affirmative, and 2, the negative.

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FIRST NIGHT.

MR. ROBERTS'S ARGUMENT.

The first night may be found somewhat ineffective on the affirmative side. This was due to a cause that could not be appreciated by listeners. It could only be known thoroughly to the speaker himself. A word or two will make it intelligible. Mr. Roberts is in the habit of speaking *extempore* in the absolute sense. But in meeting a man like Mr. Bradlaugh, he felt he must make some degree of preparation. Yet could not prepare to the extent of getting ready speeches verbatim. He had to limit himself to notes. The consequence was that, hampered by notes and not having speeches by heart, he had neither the advantage of complete preparation on the one hand nor the impromptu freshness on the other. This disadvantage was aggravated by the embarrassment natural to meeting an able man for the first time, of whom he had not yet taken the measure, and of commencing the discussion in a large strange hall. The result was that what preparation had taken place was not fully utilized, while the argument put forth lacked the completeness and force that an *extempore* effort would have had.

The importance of the first night's argument will only be appreciated by those with whom the question of the Bible's divinity is a matter of anxiety. By such the argument will be felt to be a vital one and satisfactory. It supposes a man anxious to satisfy himself as to the truth of the Bible. Such a man has it in his power to apply various tests; but obviously the first one is that which relates to what he actually sees and knows for himself. He is living in the world to which the prophecies of the Bible relate. He knows what are the leading features of the affairs of mankind as they now exist. Hence, he can apply an immediate and palpable test of a precise and crucial kind. If it could be shown that the state of things now existing is what ought not to exist according to the Bible, the inquirer would feel that it was needless to proceed another step in the investigation. On the other hand, if it can be shown that the state of things now existing is exactly what ought to exist, according to the Bible, every one instinctively feels that that is a powerful fact in its favour, and one in fact which almost of its own force proves its divinity. Hence this enquiry is of great consequence in the consideration in question. Mr. Bradlaugh made light of it, and tried as much as possible to conceal its importance from view. But the fact remains that the two great features of the present situation of human affairs are what the Bible requires—the existence and dispersion of the Jews, and the dominant existence in Roman Europe of a political ecclesiasticism, founded on a corruption of apostolic Christianity.

The following are portions of Mr. Roberts's notes, unused in the discussion. The substance of some of them may appear in certain parts of the discussion, but not in this form:—

"The proposition I have to maintain, joyful if true. It lights the horizon with the morning glow of hope, while Mr. Bradlaugh's position is the reverse. Mr. Bradlaugh would extinguish the historic light of Bethlehem. He asks us to believe there is no hope. He would overwhelm us with dreary despair. He would take from us God, and ask us to regard our being as the accidental development of callous force, undiscriminating, unknowing, unconscious, unloving, helpless law, which has brought us thus far, but will not and cannot take us farther. He inscribes the skull and crossbones on his banner, and holds up to us the coffin as our goal.

"I am here to maintain that, in the strict sense, the question is not an open one: not one admitting of a doubt, when the evidence in its entirety is realised. Doubts there always are in some minds; but this is no argument against the truth. Doubt may be the mere result of ignorance of the facts, or incapacity to discern the logical result of facts, or aversion to fairly open the mind to that result.

"The proposition I have to affirm stands on a very broad foundation. It is not a theory depending upon correctness in the process of induction. It is not the question of an isolated historical incident, depending for its credibility upon circumstances easily capable of distortion or suppression. It is not even a matter of creed in the ordinary

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sense, depending upon modes of reading and argument. It is a great and broad historical matter, embracing in its foundations, current, existing facts; the attested history of mankind, and the known characteristics of human nature in a hundred generations.

"I will show that the truthfulness and divinity of the Bible are shown by every test that can be applied to it.—1. By the facts that ought to exist at the present moment on that hypothesis. 2. By external testimony to its existence in ancient times. 3. By its correspondence with the known history of mankind. 4. By its internal constitution and peculiarities. 5. By the nature of its histories, and 6, by the fulfilment of its prophecies.

"I am not unaware that much may be said against these propositions; but this fact is no disparagement of their truth. Where is the matter, person or thing against which ingenious hostility cannot say something? It is a true proverbial saying, that there are two sides to every question—not that there are two real sides, but two ways of arguing it. Cases in court every day furnish an example. But truth exists for all that.

"It is not an uncommon thing to assume a theory of a matter, and to hammer everything into harmony with that theory, with however much violence to truth. Somebody must have done this in the Tichborne Case. Somebody does it in the present question. You will judge on which side this process is resorted to. I know a gentleman of Mr. Bradlaugh's persuasion, who on board the *Aleppo*, being cornered on the evidences of Christ's resurrection, said he would not believe in that resurrection, though he could not dispose of the evidence, because the resurrection was contrary to his experience!

"The plan to work by is to lay hold of what is unquestionably true, and decide all doubtful points in accordance with these. We shall have doubtful matters urged against the Bible. I shall undertake to grapple with and explain these in harmony with the views I present, while, on the other hand, I know it is impossible for the opposing side fairly to dispose of the positive evidences in favour of the truthfulness of the Bible.

"The difficulties against which the argument for the Bible has to contend may be called artificial difficulties—not real, but easily raised with telling effect where ignorance exists, such as 1, the history of Papal Europe; 2, the nature of orthodox doctrines; 3, misconception of Bible teaching; 4, natural sympathy with unbelief.

I.—If the Bible is true, there ought to be Jews now in existence, because besides the evidence adduced in Mr. Roberts's first speech on the sixth night of the discussion, it is written (Jer. xxxi. 36): "If those ordinances (of heaven and earth) depart from before me, saith the Lord, then the seed of Israel also shall *cease from being a nation before me* for ever." The existence of the Jews is a fact which is known to all the world.

"If the Bible is true there ought to be extant in the earth a corrupt Christianity, as the basis of the political system of Roman Europe, maintained by the kings thereof; because such was foretold to be the final form into which the community established by the apostles would grow, and it was also foretold that the system so developed would continue in existence and power till the re-appearance of Christ. Proof as follows:—

I.—APOSTASY PREDICTED.

1.—Acts xx. 29: After my (Paul's) departing, shall grievous wolves enter in among you, not sparing the flock. Also of your own selves shall men arise, speaking perverse things, to draw away disciples after them.

2.—2 Tim. ii. 16: Shun (O, Timothy) profane and vain babblings; for they will increase unto more ungodliness, and their word will eat as doth a canker.

3.—2 Tim. iii. 13: Evil men and seducers shall wax worse and worse, deceiving and being deceived.

4.—2 Tim. iv. 3: The time will come when they (Christians—see context) will not endure sound doctrine, but after their own lusts shall they heap to themselves teachers, having itching ears. And they shall turn away their ears from the truth, and shall be turned unto fables.

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5.—2 Peter ii. 1-2: There shall be false teachers *among you*, who privily shall bring in damnable heresies. . . . . And *many shall follow their pernicious ways* by reason of whom the way of truth shall be evil spoken of; and through covetousness shall they with feigned words make merchandise of you.

6.—2 Thess. ii. 3: That day shall not come except there come *a falling away first*, and that man of sin be revealed who opposeth and exalteth himself above all that is called God, or that is worshipped. . . . The Mystery of iniquity doth already work.

7.—1 John ii. 18: Antichrist shall come.

II.—THE PREDICTED APOSTASY BEGUN IN THE APOSTOLIC AGE.

1.—2 Thess. ii. 7: The mystery of iniquity *doth already work*.

2.—2 Tim. i. 15: This thou knowest that all they which are in Asia *be turned away from me*.

3.—1 John ii. 18: Even now are there many antichrists.

4.—1 John iv. 1-5: Many false prophets are gone out into the world . . . and the world heareth them.

III.—THE PREDICTED APOSTASY TO CORRUPT ALL NATIONS.

1.—Rev. xvii. 1-3: The inhabitants of the earth made drunk with the wine of her fornication.—(that is with the teaching of Rome—see last verse of the chapter.)

2.—Rev. xiv. 8: She made all nations drink of the wine of the wrath of her fornication.

3.—Rev. xviii. 3: All nations have drunk of the wine of the wrath of her fornication.

4.—Rev. xix. 2: She did corrupt the earth with her fornication.

IV.—THE PREDICTED APOSTASY TO BE IN EXISTENCE AT THE SECOND APPEARING OF CHRIST.

1.—2 Thess. ii. 8: Whom the Lord shall consume with the spirit of his mouth and destroy *with the brightness of* HIS COMING.

2.—Rev. xvi. 15-19: Behold I (Jesus) come as a thief. . . . And Great Babylon (that is Rome—see xvii. 18) came in remembrance before God to give unto her the cup of the wine of the fierceness of His wrath.

3.—Dan. vii. 9-11: The Ancient of Days did sit . . . and the judgment was set and the books were open. And I beheld then, because of the voice of the great words which the horn spake, I beheld even till the beast was slain, and his body destroyed and given to the burning flame.

Europe is Roman-ecclesiastical at the present moment—consequently the existent state of things is what the truthfulness of the Bible requires. If the world had been Pagan, as it was when the apostles died; or in a state of enlightened and faithful subjection to the teachings of Christ, this would have been an argument against the Bible.

External evidence of the authenticity of the New Testament.—The collateral testimony to the existence of the Bible at the time it professes to have been produced, is beyond reasonable dispute. As regards the New Testament, there is the uncontradicted tradition of the Christian community from the very beginning, which, on examination, will be found to carry more weight than even the express testimony of individual witnesses. The New Testament is mainly composed of the epistles of Paul, addressed not to persons but to churches. These letters were preserved and read habitually by the various churches to whom they were addressed, which is the best evidence of authenticity that could be produced. Besides being preserved and read by these, they were copied and circulated among all the Christian communities.

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They were equally used in Alexandria, and Carthage, and Gaul. They are cited by the writers of the second century as commonly and familiarly as by preachers and writers in our own day. The uncontroverted writings of Justin Martyr, Irenæus, Tertullian, Clement, and Alexandrinus prove this; and the fact is conclusive evidence of their previous currency for a long time, and establishes their authenticity by proving them to have been received by the very communities to whom Paul's letters were severally addressed in the first instance. No demonstration could be more complete than this. It is not in the least affected by the fact that literary forgeries were abundantly perpetrated in the second and third centuries. These forgeries only go to show that there were genuine writings in existence, commanding the confidence and influencing the lives of the Christian community from the very commencement of its existence. The forgeries are, therefore, indirect evidence in support of the authenticity of the New Testament.

Being authentic, the nature of the contents is evidence of their divinity. The contents would be evidence of divinity, even if the authenticity were in doubt.

Mr. Bradlaugh's Argument.

Mr. Bradlaugh says, on page 6: "I do not pretend that at any particular date, some class of ignorant and designing men forged a whole book which they called the Bible, for the purpose of deceiving the people: such would simply be an absurd contention." He also says: "I have never contended . . . that the whole of this Bible is the work of ignorant and designing men." This concession is an indication of the strong position of the Bible with regard to the evidence of its being a genuine production. If Mr. Bradlaugh could have affirmed that the Bible was the work of ignorant and designing men, he would not have scrupled to do so. He says he does not do so, and has never done so. Consequently, on the testimony of its bitterest foe, the Bible is the work of enlightened and candid men, for that is the opposite of ignorant and designing. If the Bible is the work of enlightened and candid men, it is a reliable witness to the innumerable facts which it testifies. The facts are, therefore, true; and consequently, the Bible is the reliable record of divine revelation; because its record embraces the constant testimony of God having spoken the things recorded and done the things described; *e.g.*, the crossing of the Red Sea; communications to Moses on Sinai; the resurrection of Christ, &c.

Mr. Bradlaugh says a book in which there are "contradictions on the surface" and admitted "difficulties and obscurities," cannot be a record of divine revelation. This is plausible but not true. The logic of the argument is not apparent unless it be this: "I, Mr. Bradlaugh, have an idea what a divine revelation ought to be, and it is not possible that anything can be a divine revelation which differs from my idea of it. The Bible differs from my idea of what a revelation ought to be, therefore, it is not a divine revelation." This would be plain reasoning, but even Mr. Bradlaugh, with all his assurance, would not like to be guilty of it in this form. Yet this is what his argument amounts to. If this is not the argument, there is nothing in it. On what other principle can he contend that the existence of difficulties in the Bible is an evidence of its untruth? The fact of the difficulties in reality works the other way. The Bible does not profess that God has made His way as plain as the shining of the sun. On the contrary, He has concealed wisdom, and made it difficult of attainment, that the intellect of His creatures may be stimulated and developed. Thus we are told to "search for wisdom as for hidden treasure."—(Prov. ii. 4.) Further, that it is "the glory of God to conceal a thing, and the honour of kings to search out a matter."—(Prov. xxv. 2.) More than once we read, "Here is wisdom: let him that hath understanding" do so and so. The whole Mosaic economy was an enigma.—(Heb. ix. 9; x. 1.) The gospel contained a mystery hid from the beginning.—(Rom. xvi. 25.) Christ spoke in parables that the scornful ruling class might not understand.—(Mark iv. 11-12.) These things are testified in the Scriptures; if, therefore, we are to judge the Scriptures by their own professions, it is a circumstance in their favour that there are "difficulties and obscurities."

The same principle is observable in nature—the workmanship of the Being who revealed Himself to Moses. The precious metals are hidden: the earth has to be mined

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to get at them. Valuable results are got at through difficulty. Coal, and gas, and drainage, and useful articles are not come at without skill and labour and patience. We have not obtained the convenience of rail and telegraph without a vast amount of patient application and difficulty. The Bible is in harmony with nature in this respect. We err if we judge it by any theory of our own as to what it ought to be. Our business is to take it as it stands, and adapt ourselves to it wisely as in natural things. To fall out with the Bible because it differs from our idea of what it ought to be, is foolish. We might as well fall out with our own existence because we have to take the trouble to eat, and in most cases to procure our food and do many other things with difficulty.

But Mr. Bradlaugh says the Bible contradicts itself. If this were really so in the serious sense required by Mr. Bradlaugh's argument, it would doubtless be fatal to the claims of the Bible as a whole. It would not prove that some things in it might not be of God, though contradicted by some things in it that might be of human addition. It would, however, prove that the Scriptures as originally delivered had been corrupted and might therefore raise a difficulty as to which part was to be received with confidence and which rejected. But in point of fact the contradictions alleged by Mr. Bradlaugh does not exist. They are appearances of contradiction merely, which disappear on close investigation. This is no unusual thing in truth. Everyday life makes us familiar with constant illustrations of two apparently opposite statements, being both true and reconcileable. Minds not careful to ascertain truth, can find in every day occurrences abundant materials for captious telling criticism: but it is possible, for the candid mind to steer a safe course through intricacies of an apparently conflicting character, and arrive at the possession of truth. This is the case with the Bible, where appearances of contradiction exist which Mr. Bradlaugh turned to the most advantage.

Mr. Bradlaugh referred to Numbers xxiii. 19; 1 Sam. xv. 29, and Matt. iii. 6, setting forth

GOD'S IMMUTABILITY.

I.—"God is not a man that He should lie, nor the Son of Man that he should repent." 2.—"The strength of Israel will not lie nor repent, for He is not a man that He should repent." 3.—"I am the Lord: I change not: therefore ye sons of Jacob are not consumed."

In juxtaposition with these, he placed 2 Kings xxi. 1-5; 2 Sam. xxiv. 16; Gen. vi. 6, and 1 Sam. xv. 11, which he contended were illustrations of

GOD'S CHANGEABLENESS.

1.—"Thus saith the Lord, set thine house in order; for thou shalt die and not live . . I have heard thy prayer. . . . I will add unto thy days fifteen years." 2.—"The Lord repented Him of the evil." 3.—"It repented the Lord that he had made man upon the earth." 4.—"It repenteth me that I have set up Saul to be king."

And upon these Mr. Bradlaugh argued there was a clear contradiction. But there is none to those who realise that there are two aspects in which God's actions, like man's actions, are to be considered, first in so far as they depend upon himself, and secondly in so far as they conditionally depend upon the actions of others. The first three texts affirm the steadfastness, in the sense of non-fickleness, of any purpose the Almighty may form, when the stability of that purpose depends upon Himself alone. The last three intimate a change of purpose consequent on a change of the conditions in others upon which the purpose was based. This distinction is actually affirmed Jer. xviii. 7, "At what instant I shall speak concerning a nation and concerning kingdom to pluck up and to pull down, and to destroy it, if that nation against whom I have pronounced turn from their evil, *I will repent of the evil that I thought to do unto them.*" There is no conflict between personal steadfastness of purpose and readiness of adaptation to changed circumstances. The difference between a stable and an unstable man illustrates the point in some degree. The one can always be relied upon under given circumstances; and the other not at all. But the steadiness of the stable man does not consist in a propensity to adhere with mulish pertinacity to plan

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without reference to their propriety; but in the disposition to steadily follow a certain course of action, so long as that course of action is wise. To continue in the course when circumstances have so altered as to make that course unwise, would be evidence of stupidity and not of stability. To alter the course when the circumstances dictating it have altered, is no evidence of inconstancy or instability. The stability of a wise man shows itself in steadily pursuing one end, and adapting himself to every change in circumstances that might prevent him reaching his aim; like the captain of a vessel who has to shift his sails a hundred times in a voyage, and tack in many different directions to reach the port of destination. The contrast to this would be the man at sea who determined to keep his sails as they were, whatever wind should blow. The first man will be found in a certain port at last, weather permitting; but the other you will never know where to find.

Now, in effect, the declaration of the first three passages concerning God is, that He is more stable than any sea captain that ever put foot on a quarter deck; that His purposes, where they depend only upon Himself, are immovable and unchangeable absolutely; that anything resting on His word is more certain and secure than the everlasting hills; that He is, in His nature, the highest reason and most steadfast of purpose; that the principles upon which He acts are absolutely unchangeable; that nothing like wanton change or fickleness is possible in Him. But this is not inconsistent with the fact that He adapts Himself to circumstances as they arise in the evolution of His purpose. The human race, in the first instance, turned out differently from His desire. He intended them to be obedient, and was working with them on this basis. They became disobedient, and (after much patience) with the alteration in the conditions upon which the original intention was based, He alters His intention, and gives them up as hopeless. Saul is chosen on the understanding that obedience is the basis of favour. Saul disobeys, and God repents (or changes His mind) with reference to his selection as king. This is not inconsistent with the unchangeability of the principle on which He acts. What would be thought of a stable captain who should allow a mutinous officer to continue in his place? The captain would put him in irons, and would not, thereby, sacrifice his character for stability, but contrariwise would establish it.

When it is seen that the first set of passages have (as the context will show) reference to God's sovereign purpose, while the second set refers to intention dependent upon the condition of others, the appearance of "contradiction" disappears.

Next with regard to the character of God, Mr. Bradlaugh refers to Ex. xxxii. 7, 14, and asks whether we are there to find a divine representation of it: "Let me alone that my wrath may wax hot against them (Israel) that I may consume them." This is addressed to Moses, who was interceding with God for Israel, who had grievously offended in turning to idolatry while Moses was in Sinai. Mr. Bradlaugh would contrast it with the New Testament declaration, "God is love," and contend there was a contradiction; but there is no force in the argument, unless it can be shown that two qualities or attributes cannot co-exist in the same character. Mr. Bradlaugh himself would not pretend that this can be shewn. It is a matter of everyday experience that a benevolent man may be capable of great anger if circumstances call for it. Mr. Bradlaugh may say, "But God is not a man." True; but we can reason from the small to the great. If created man is capable of both love and anger without inconsistency, there can be no true objection to the Bible representation of God in both aspects. It is expressly testified (and in the New Testament too) not only that He is love, but that "He is a consuming fire" (Heb. xii. 29); where also (x. 31) it is said "It is a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God." If we are to judge of the consistency of the Bible revelation of God, we must take all parts of it, and not leave out one or elevate one at the expense of another. The philosopher (who after all is a very ignorant person as regards the primary force of the universe) may smile at the idea of God being capable of anger, but he can show no reason against it. Nature, of which he can give no account, except that it is, shows destructive forces and performs destructive operations, and what objection can there be to the analogue of this existing in the first cause? The creator of the eye can presumably see; and the creator of the impulse of anger can presumably show it in a higher form than we know it. There is no inconsistency in the revelation of the divine character. If anger is shown, it is never without a cause, and the cause is

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always to be found in things that frustrate the objects of love. Divine love without divine energy to destroy things that would work against it, would be a weak and incomplete character. There is perfect symmetry in the divine character when all its parts are taken in. But, of course, if you disconnect manifested wrath from the circumstances that evoke it, and from the ultimate objects which its manifestation proposes, you exhibit an unintelligible and ugly thing. By a similar treatment of the modest man's anger, it would be possible to show him a tyrant. But this is neither a skilful nor a faithful treatment of the subject. God angry with sin is not an ugly but a beautiful picture, when seen in connection with the evil results of sin and the perfection of divine love, where the divine wisdom and authority are accepted as a law of action.

But there is another consideration to be taken into account in connection with the transaction at Sinai, which becomes specially appropriate in looking at another of the alleged contradictions, viz., the statement that Moses and the elders of Israel saw God (Ex. xxiv. 9-11), and the statement in John i. 18, that "No man hath seen God at any time." The consideration is that the term God does not always mean the Creator *in propria personæ*. While the Pentateuch tells us that God spoke to Moses at the bush, it explains that the medium of communication was an angel (Exodus iii. 2, 6), which is supported by the New Testament.—(Acts vii. 30.) It records that Jacob saw God face to face, yet the actual personage seen was an angel.—(Hosea xii. 4.) Jehovah, we are told, rained upon Sodom and Gomorrah brimstone and fire, yet the narrative shows the actual operators in the case were angels.—(See Gen. xix.; compare the following verses—1, 14, 22, 24.) The same thing appears many times; and the case of Moses on Sinai is no exception, for we are expressly informed, in Acts vii. 38, that it was an "angel which spoke to Him in the Mount Sinai;" and, in the 53rd verse, that the law was given "by the disposition (or ministration) of angels." In the light of this, there is nothing inconceivable in the proposition that seems to startle Mr. Bradlaugh; the difficulty exists in the want of information, and not in the subject itself. That the name of God should be identified with angels may, at first sight, appear a little confusing; but the difficulty vanishes when we recognise the fact illustrated in Ex. xxiii. 21 ("I send mine angel: obey his voice, for MY NAME is in him"), that angels engaged specially in the service of the Creator bear His name. "They do His commandments, hearkening to the voice of His word."—(Psalm ciii. 20.) They act as the instruments of His power; but the connection between their acts and His authority is maintained in the use of the singular verb, with (their) plural nominative—a grammatical anomaly, explained by the fact that one power operates through a plurality of agents.

It is another difficulty with those who think with Mr. Bradlaugh, that God should write with His finger (Ex. xxiv. 12; xxxii. 16); but, in view of the fact that angels are actually signified, there is no difficulty. The angels are spirit (Psalm civ. 4), and spirit is taught by the Bible to be the substratum of all substance, pervading all space.—(Psalm cxxxix. 7.) What difficulty would there be to an angel possessing control of this permeating energy in tracing with his finger on stone, characters which, in consequence, should be deeply graven there? The accomplishments of electric science should teach us that there are higher possibilities in heaven and earth than even philosophers dream of, and point to higher developments of power and intelligence than it is permitted frail mortals to experience.

Then stress is laid on the so-called discrepancies between the two versions of the Decalogue.—(Ex. xx.; Deut. v.) It is usual to speak as if the existence of the differences constituted a difficulty in the way of receiving either, but much attention to the matter is not needed to perceive the fallacy of the suggestion. If there were even serious differences between the two accounts, they would not, in the presence of all the evidence, disprove that God gave the law from Sinai; for while one account (that of Exodus) is, so to speak, the official and exact record of what transpired at Sinai, the other is part of an historical *résumé* orally delivered by Moses forty years afterwards, in which correctness of fact was of more concern than exactness of words. Verbal variations between such a rehearsal and the original deliverance are natural; but the variations are slight indeed; much more so than might have been expected. The language, in both cases, is nearly identical throughout, and

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the meaning absolutely so, except that, in the rehearsal in the plains of Moab, Moses supplemented the fourth commandment with a retrospective explanation of its reasons, and omits the reference to the creation contained in the original. The variations are confirmatory of the historical reality of the matter, for the one is evidently no copy of the other, but both independent accounts, written at two different times; and that, under such circumstances, they should be so alike in substance is evidence that they both refer to a matter of historic occurrence. Those, therefore, speak otherwise than as scholars who talk of "perplexity (on the part of believers) in having to defend two opposing accounts." The two accounts are not "opposing," but mutually confirmatory; and there is no perplexity in the maintenance of both when this is done on Bible ground simply, apart from the theories of inspiration which belong to the clerical thought merely. The Spirit, doubtless, guided Moses in the record, but the guidance had reference more to substance than to form. The Scriptures never show us the preternatural brought to bear where the natural is sufficient.

It is put forward by the same class as an implied impossibility, that God should "issue a complete ethical code which contains nothing about the love of God or the love of man, nothing about public or private worship or prayer; nothing about trust in God or gratitude towards Him: nothing about such virtues as generosity, gratitude, prudence, temperance, fortitude, activity, nor thoughtfulness, which offers a reward to virtue, but not an eternal reward; and not the reward of God's blessing and a good conscience, but longevity in one narrative, and in the other, prolonged residence in Judea." This is very specious; but the fallacy of it is apparent when a demand is made for the authority for assuming that the Bible puts forth the Mosaic law or any part of it as "a complete ethical code." The Bible does the very opposite. It declares the law to have been provisional, partial and imperfect, adapted only to the transition period for which it was given. Paul, discussing this very point, discourses thus: "God gave the inheritance to Abraham by promise . . . Wherefore, then, serveth the law? It was added, because of transgression, till the seed should come . . . The law was our schoolmaster [a teacher of first lessons] unto Christ. . . . after that faith is come, we are no longer under a schoolmaster."—(Gal. iii. 19, 24, 25.) The law he further styles a "shadow of good things to come" (Heb. xi. 1); and that it made nothing perfect (vii. 19). There is a good deal of evidence on this point; but it is perhaps unnecessary to quote more than the following: "If the first covenant (the law) had been faultless, then had no place been sought for the second."—(Heb. viii. 7.) Mr. Bradlaugh may object to this teaching of Paul's, but he ought, at all events, to see that it is a false assumption that the law, or any part of it, is put forward by the Bible as "a complete ethical code."

It was a system of things which was never intended as a complete development of the divine will, but adapted to the special exigencies of a time of crudeness and transition. For these times its adaptation was admirable. Its immeasurable superiority is realised when contrasted with the contemporary morals of Egypt and Chaldea, or (later) of Greece and Rome. It is not doing justice to the subject to judge of the Mosaic system of things in the light of the larger illumination that has since come from the same source. Granted that it had nothing to do with "eternal rewards," a reason might be given for this which would startle sceptics, and that is, that eternal rewards of the clerical order are fictions of Paganism. This answer can be substantiated. Disembodied destinies are unknown to the teaching of Christ and Moses. The Bible treats immortality as a something extraneous to human nature, and to be realised (in a limited number of cases only) by resurrection at Christ's reappearance on the earth. The immortality of the soul is not mentioned in either the Old or New Testaments. It is foreign to the teaching of both, as much as it is opposed to philosophical truth of the Huxley order.

Then Mr. Bradlaugh said something about the Bible being opposed to science. He did not elaborate this objection. Presumably his reference was to the notion that the Bible "teaches that the universe was created in six days, six thousand years ago." This is not a correct representation of what is involved in a reception of the Mosaic account. "Heaven and earth" of Genesis is not synonymous with "the universe." Heaven is described as "the firmament," formed "to divide the waters that are

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above the firmament from the waters that were under it." It is, therefore, the body of atmosphere encircling the globe, whose existence was thus Mosaically made known ages before it was philosophically ascertained. The testimony is, that heaven and earth, in this limited sense, were the subject, six thousand years ago, of a process called "create." But does this create *(bara)* express the theological idea of being "made out of nothing?" By no means, for such an idea is foreign to the Bible. The teaching on this point is, that all things were formed "out of God."—(Rom. xi. 36; Cor. viii. 6), and the Hebrew verb *bara*, translated "create," signifies to make, in the sense of constitute, arrange, set in order. It is used periphrastically with "*formed* the earth to be inhabited" in Isa. xlv. 18. It is translated "made" in the following instances: Psalm xlvii. 48; Num. xvi. 30; "done," in Ex. xxxiv. 10; "choose," in Ezekiel xxi. 17; "make fat," in Samuel ii. 29; in other places, "create." That Moses does not teach the *creation* of the earth in the ordinary sense, six thousand years ago, is proved by his recognition of a pre-"creation" existence. Before the six days' work began, he speaks of the earth as being "without form and void," and "darkness on the face of the deep."—(Gen. i. 2.) How long it had been in this state is not hinted; but the narrative leaves room for the measureless ages said to be required by geology. Neither was the human the first rational race on its surface, if we are to attach the same sense to the words addressed to Adam as they possessed when addressed to Noah: "Be fruitful and multiply, and *replenish* (fill again) the earth." There may have been a previous race, swept away after the manner of the flood, the catastrophe leaving the earth in the state in which the six days' work found it. Jude and Peter both refer to pre-Adamite occurrences in this direction.—(2 Peter ii. 4; Jude 6.) The work occupying the six days was the work of reclaiming the world from pre-Adamite chaos, with which there is nothing inconsistent in the "historical, critical, and scientific books," to which it is usual to make such reverential allusion.

"That because God then rested, the last day of the week is to be observed as a day of absolute idleness" is usually a difficulty brought forward by the sceptical objector. That he should stumble at it with orthodox views of divine operations, is no matter of marvel. The difficulty is not incidental to the subject itself. The "Elohim," the angels of Almighty power, carrying out the mandates of Omnipotence in the re-organisation of the world, must have expended vast energies in the enormous physical achievements of the six days; and although their endowment with these energies must be correspondingly vast, there is nothing inconceivable in their finding the seventh day's cessation a source of refreshment. The Creator only is unlimited in His power. The idea may be startling to clerical minds, but it belongs to the Bible, and is the explanation of what strikes him in this item as inexplicable.

In Genesis i. light appears on the scene before the sun. This is made a difficulty needlessly. If all light came from the sun, it might be a difficulty; but there are many sources of light besides the sun. Witness the phosphorescent glow of the ocean at night. There is light in the rocks. A blow with a steel instrument will manifest a spark of it. Light is latent everywhere. It requires but all-controlling Power to be brought to bear to make it manifest; and this was what took place in the present instance. The Spirit of God, which is in itself the light of all light, brooding on the face of the waters, illumined the darkness covering the face of the deep. But it is said, What need for this mode of light, seeing the sun was in the heavens, where it had been for countless ages? Answer: there are conditions of the atmosphere which prevent the light of the sun from coming through. An unusually dense storm-cloud will darken the air at noon. Now, it is evident that when the Mosaic six days' works of re-organisation began, the globe was enwrapped in watery vapours; for we read in verse 7 of a separation taking place between the light and the heavy elements of the vaporous mantle, the condensed water descending and the vapour ascending to the cloud region of the atmosphere. Before this took place, the vaporous covering of the earth would effectually prevent the light of the sun from reaching it, and cause that state of darkness which was first dispelled by Spirit-caused light.

Verses 16 and 17, speak as if the sun, moon and stars were then made for the first time. But the narrative was written for man as an inhabitant of the earth. We must therefore, read it from the terrestrial and not the astronomical stand-point.

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From this point of view the sun, moon, and stars would come into existence at this time; for previous to the fourth day, they would not be visible from the earth, on account of the condition of the atmosphere previously referred to; and, therefore, practically, they did not exist in relation to the earth. It is not the modes of the divine procedure that are made the subject of narrative, but the practical results in relation to us. Yet the narrative is consistent with the modes, though the modes are not made visible. God made two great lights, &c.; true: in this there is nothing as to how long He took to make them. Having made them, He placed them (or caused them to appear) in the terrestrial firmament on the fourth day. Thus the narrative suits the proximate aspect of the case, as it would have appeared to a man witnessing the evolutions of the six days, and at the same time, is not in conflict with the mightier phase in which they are to be contemplated through the medium of astronomical science.

There is palpable fallacy in Mr. Bradlaugh's method of construing evidence when it bears on divine things. Called upon to define the principle upon which he believes in the existence and productions of ancient secular writers, he says: "On matters of ordinary occurrence, I accept the best experience of the best men, as I find it fairly recorded, and upon that canon of evidence, I can prove all reasonable historic events." But when matters of extraordinary occurrence are in question, then he says "the experience does not apply." The fallacy here is that Mr. Bradlaugh sets up ordinary experience as the standard of what is "reasonable" and possible. If we accept testimony to things we know to be possible, it is not because of the nature of the things testified, but because of the reliability of the testimony proved in various ways before we accept it. Therefore, we should act illogically if we rejected the same testimony to an event out of the channel of our experience, merely on the ground that the event is out of the channel of our experience, for that would be the mere opposition of ignorance to knowledge. For example: a European banished a hundred years ago, to a foreign island, cut off from all communication with the civilised world, has descendants who never heard of the electric telegraph. Mr. Bradlaugh visits them and tells them a message can be sent invisibly across three thousand miles of ocean in five minutes, and that when it arrives, it is not the paper written by the sender. They say he is fooling them. He earnestly declares it is true, and says he has witnessed the performance. They say it cannot be. Mr. Bradlaugh fetches men from the ship that has brought him to the island. They confirm his representation, and declare they also have seen the telegraph at work, and have themselves received messages from long distances in a few minutes, although the messages were invisible in the transmission. If they act on Mr. Bradlaugh's principle, the islanders will say the law of evidence does not apply in such a case, and those who give such evidence must be mistaken, because they declare a thing of "extraordinary occurrence," and inconsistent with their "experience." They would say, "If it had been a matter of ordinary occurrence," such as the sending of a letter under the wing of a bird, or shooting a message on an arrow, or darting a swift canoe across the water—anything in harmony with their "experience"—they could have received the testimony of Mr. Bradlaugh and his company; but "when you give us an extraordinary occurrence—of a message going and not going—seen when you get it, and not seen when it is coming—that crosses the ocean and yet does not take time to cross—it is then, say they, that the canon of evidence does not apply."

Mr. Bradlaugh would be amused at the simplicity and conceit of the islanders. Their presumption also would strike him, in setting up their limited island experience the measure of what is possible in the great world of civilisation. Yet this is the sition which he himself takes up in relation to the testimony of the apostles. He oes not deny that their testimony is given; he does not deny that it is honest and apable testimony; but he won't receive it because the testimony affirms the surrection of Christ, which is "contrary to his experience." By the ordinary canon of evidence" the authenticity of the Bible is proved; but because it testifies extraordinary occurrences," therefore, says Mr. Bradlaugh, "the ordinary canon does ot apply!" The reasoning is utterly fallacious and perverse. It ought to go the ther way round. Mr. Bradlaugh ought to say, "This testimony is authenticated in

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too many ways for me to deny it. Therefore, although the testimony affirms something outside of the channel of my experience, it must be true ; and I am ignorant of many things that are possible."

"But," says Mr. Bradlaugh, "this book tells me of a man who had no father." In this Mr. Bradlaugh is mistaken. It tells us of Jesus, who had no human father, but who had a father in the Creator, whose son he thereby became.—(Luke i. 35.) Surely Mr. Bradlaugh would not deny the possibility of the Power that produced the first man without human instrumentality, producing a second without human instrumentality.

"It tells me," says Mr. Bradlaugh, "of a man who was in the grave when he was out of it, and who was seen by one woman, who is two women, who are more than three women." This is a misrepresentation. Jesus was in the grave three days and three nights, as was shown to Mr. Bradlaugh in his last questioning of Mr. Roberts: and he was seen by one, by two, by three, and by more women, on the morning he rose from the dead. The evidence on the point is perfectly consistent, though varied in the form of its presentation, as was fully shown on the fifth night of the discussion.

"*It tells me that Christ's mother's husband had two fathers.*" It does not, Mr. Bradlaugh. It gives you two genealogical lines—one Joseph's and the other Mary's, but both nominally terminating in Joseph, as the Jewish custom required ; because Mary, by marriage, had become one with him.

"*It tells me Christ lived at the same time in Judæa and Egypt.*" It does not, Mr. Bradlaugh. There is an omission of mention in Luke's narrative of the visit to Egypt, but that narrative is elliptical enough to allow of the insertion of Matthew's, though, at the first sight, the two are irreconcileable.

"*It tells me that Christ was known to John and not known to him at the same moment of time.*" This is not so. John the Baptist knew Jesus as his righteous cousin, but not as the Messiah. His ignorance of his Messiahship may appear marvellous in the light we now possess ; but it is otherwise when we remember the circumstances preceding Christ's baptism in the Jordan. John "was in the desert until the day of his showing to Israel."—(Luke i. 80.) He was brought up there from childhood. He was secluded from sources of information with regard to Jesus ; and those sources, even if they had been accessible, were very scanty. The knowledge of Christ's exact origin and character was known in an express form only to Joseph and Mary, who were reticent on the subject (Luke ii. 33, 51), and to Elizabeth, John's mother, who being old, must have died soon after John's birth. By the time John was come to discretion, the matter had quieted down. Christ's boyhood and manhood, till thirty, were undistinguished by the supernatural. There was nothing to manifest his Messiahship. His unblemished character was known to John, but not his identity with the coming one. It had been revealed to John, that on whomsoever, in the act of baptism, the Holy Spirit should descend, that same was the Messiah ; and on this his attention was fixed. Hence, his declaration, to which Mr. Bradlaugh's objection has reference : "I knew him not ; but He that sent me to baptize with water, the same said unto me, Upon whom thou shalt see the Spirit descending and remaining on him, the same is he that baptizeth with the Holy Spirit."—(John i. 33.)

Then Mr. Bradlaugh wants to know if the story of Sodom and Gomorrah is consistent with the omniscience or goodness of God. On the first point, he points out that "God is represented as saying that the report has reached Him about Sodom and Gomorrah, and that He is going down to enquire, and will know." The objection may be presumed to be expressed in the question, "If God is everywhere present, why did he want to come down to know ?" In answer to this, it is sufficient to refer to what is written a few pages back (page 128), on the subject of angels and the use of the term "God," in describing their instrumental relation to things done by them in obedience to the Creator's mandate. What is there written furnishes the explanation to this objection. God in the case was the angels, undoubtedly, as anyone will see who will take the trouble to peruse the narrative, *e.g.*, Gen. xix. 1 : "And there came two angels to Sodom at even." Though the Creator is omniscient, it does not

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follow the angels are. Peter (1 Pet. i. 12) hints in a contrary direction in saying, "Which things the angels desire to look into." The fact that the angels "do the commandments" (Psalm ciii. 20) is evidence of their limitation. Consequently, Mr. Bradlaugh's objection is founded on misapprehension. These remarks apply in other cases where Mr. Bradlaugh raises a similar objection.

As to his objection to the destruction of Sodom on the score of goodness, remarks already written on page 127 supply the answer. The destruction of the wicked, so far from being inconsistent with goodness, is a part of it. The eternal toleration of evil would be the frustration of eternal goodness. The wicked are useful in their place, their existence supplying one of the conditions of the probation of the opposite class; but goodness requires their final destruction. Consequently, the destruction of the Sodomites proves the very thing that Mr. Bradlaugh quotes it to disprove. The same remark applies to the deluge.

Mr. Bradlaugh's allusion to the Garden of Eden as "a damnation trap in which to catch the whole human race, so that God might punish them," is mere clap trap, or a trap to catch the claps of his shallow and ribald supporters. Even with the Calvinistic theory of pre-destinated eternal hell-fire for tormented millions in view, such a description of a matter only possibly involving important truth, is utterly reprehensible. But when directed against the Bible account of the matter, it is the rave of insanity. Adam was simply placed under a higher will than his own, and taught that submission to that will was imperative, and that revolt against it was so serious that nothing short of death would be the consequence. Mr. Bradlaugh may deny the existence of that superior will, but he cannot deny that the Bible theory of the fall, to which only his criticism can apply, involves it, and that therefore the matter is to be considered and judged on the theory of its existence. Looking at it in this way, the transaction of Eden certainly appears in a different light from that in which Mr. Bradlaugh's coarse description would make it appear. Subjection to God is the highest condition of human well being. It is the necessity of his nature when his nature is fully developed in all its faculties. It is also an element in divine pleasure and a prerogative of the divine right. Consequently an arrangement that brought that subjection visibly and consciously to bear on Adam, so far from being "monstrous," appears in the light of kindness and wisdom, whether in relation to God or man. The representation of the appointment of such an arrangement is in fact one of many proofs of the divinity of the Scriptures. A human conception of the beginning of things would certainly have represented man as free to do what he liked and as he liked. God's authority to which the human mind is naturally averse would not have been brought to bear at the very start of human existence in a humanly-invented version of the facts. Adam did not submit implicitly to the law in which divine authority embodied itself: conseqnently, there came on him, and therefore on his descendants who inherit his being, the consequences belonging to rebellion. Even had the transaction stopped here, there would have been no room for Mr. Bradlaugh's objection: for surely if a military officer may in Mr. Bradlaugh's estimation, legitimately shoot an insubordinate soldier, he cannot deny the Creator's right to deal as he likes with a disobedient creature. But we have to take the sequel into account. That sequel shows God making use of the evil result of the fall, as a means of developing at last the highest good on earth. Doubtless, the understanding of the truth is necessary to qualify a man to see this; and as Mr. Bradlaugh does not possess this understanding, he is not competent to judge the matter which he so harshly condemns. In any system of truth, a man must understand the system as a whole before he is qualified to rightly estimate any part of it in detail. This is peculiarly and emphatically true of the Bible as a whole. With regard to the "story of the fall" in the way Mr. Bradlaugh puts it, Mr. Bradlaugh can only succeed with those who are ignorant of the Bible. He and his disciples may know something of the trashy writers of ecclesiastical antiquity, and perhaps something of the ever-changing speculations of crude superficial scientists; but a man must be ignorant of the Bible or morally incapable of appreciating its system of teaching, who speaks of the garden of Eden as a "damnation trap."

Mr. Bradlaugh made some smart observations on the case of Jacob and Esau; but the smartness was in the way of marshalling his words, rather than in justly or logically treating the facts as they stand. He declared Jacob to be a rascal, a liar, a

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robber, a cheat, and asked whether God loved Jacob because of these things or in spite of them. He omitted to show that Jacob was all these. He referred to certain recorded incidents, but these do not prove his contention. A liar is a man who is in the habit of lying: a rascal is a man who is in the habit of defrauding. A man's character is not to be described by isolated acts or incidents. A man may in the main be very different from some act in particular he has committed. Jacob's character in the main was such as to please God. In certain transactions he acted with human weakness. The record of the weakness is evidence of the genuineness of the record, for an invented history of Jacob would have suppressed them. Jacob was "a plain man dwelling in tents." He was docile and God-fearing, while Esau was a wild roving man, cognising the facts of nature merely as an animal does, without any recognition of the contriver and proprietor of nature. This constitutes the difference between men whom God is pleased with and those He is not pleased with. So it is revealed: "To this man will I look, who is humble and of a contrite heart, and who trembleth at my word." Mr. Bradlaugh may despise the fact; but it is not in his power, either to show it is not the fact or why it should not be the fact. Wise men are content with facts, whatever speculative theory they may have formed as to what things ought to be. The fact in this case is that the God of the Bible has declared He is pleased with those men who appreciate him, and will forgive their iniquities. The case of Jacob is an illustration of this revealed fact, instead of being a contradiction to it. And so also is the case of David on which Mr. Bradlaugh harped so much. He was emphatically "a man after God's own heart." Mr. Bradlaugh asks how could this be when he was a murderer and adulterer, and died with vindictive words in his mouth towards Shimei, Joab, and others. A "man after God's own heart" is a man who answers to the definition given by God Himself: "To this man will I look, to him that is poor and of contrite spirit, and *trembleth at my word*."—(Isaiah lxvi. 2.) David answered exactly to this description. God's word in anything commanded his profoundest reverence and regard; and when convinced of wrong-doing, he was penitent to the utmost abasement. He would not sanction the killing of Saul by Abishai, because Saul was the Lord's anointed.—(1 Sam. xxvi. 9-11.) He made instant confession and reparation in the matter of Uriah the Hittite. Towards God he was "as a little child," while, towards man, he was "a mighty man of valour." When he sinned, he confessed and forsook his sins. Thus he was a man after God's own heart. In considering his directions to Solomon concerning Shimei, Joab, &c., it must be remembered that David sat in the seat of judgment for God, and that the men in question had sinned against God in the several matters of their offence. If David had been personally vindictive, he would not have spared them as he did. As absolute monarch of Israel, under God, he had the power to take away their lives, which he would have done if characterised by the disposition suggested in the objection. Instead of that, he allowed them to live so long as he himself was alive, but left the judicial punishment of their crimes to the wisdom of Solomon.

This exhausts the scriptural difficulties referred to by Mr. Bradlaugh on the first night. He referred to them several times during the other nights, so that there will be the less to answer in the review of those nights.

Two other points will conclude this notice of the first night. Mr. Bradlaugh expressed surprise that Mr. Roberts should have assumed the admissibility of certain evidence in the debate, instead of coming prepared to prove it, link by link. "His business is," said Mr. Bradlaugh, "to prove as he goes on," which, of course, sounded very reasonable, but which, as Mr. Bradlaugh applied the axiom was very unreasonable. The thing he asked Mr. Roberts to do would have taken all the time in the doing, and would have left the real argument out in the cold. And it was perfectly unnecessary to do it. Everybody knows of the existence and authenticity of the books he asked Mr. Roberts to prove. The abundance of early forgeries does not interfere with this fact. He might as well have asked proof of the fact that King James's English Version of the Bible was a translation of the original. But, of course, Mr. Bradlaugh's cue was to entangle the debate with extraneous matters, like a counsel in a bad case, who harasses his opponent with technical objections, and keeps as long away from the merit as possible. On this principle, doubtless, he also tried

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to make the differences between the Hebrew Scriptures and the Septuagint to appear much more serious than they are. The mere alteration of numerals he put forward as indicating extensive and radical dissimilarity, which does not exist. The Septuagint is the substantial counterpart in Greek of the Hebrew Scriptures; but, of course, it was Mr. Bradlaugh's aim to hide this as much as possible.

SECOND NIGHT.

MR. ROBERTS'S ARGUMENT

THE argument on this evening, taking the three speeches and the questions together, was more complete than the argument on the first night. In brief it amounted to this: There is no question that Christ was crucified. There is no question that his disciples afterwards preached his resurrection. How came they to do so, and how came thousands of those who had crucified him to believe? If Christ rose, there is an explanation. If Christ did not rise, the apostles declared what they knew to be false, and must have had a motive in doing so. What motive could they have? It brought them into collision with Jew and Pagan, and exposed them to incessant disadvantage. The only other alternative is: they may have sincerely believed that Christ rose though he never did; but this alternative is inconsistent with the facts. They did not expect Christ to die. When he died, they did not expect him to rise. When he rose they did not believe it. All this shows there was no predisposition to entertain a fantasy on the subject. What, then, led them to believe and preach the resurrection of Christ? The reason given for the change is a reasonable account of the change: Christ appeared to them, spoke to them, ate with them, asked them to handle him, stayed with them six weeks, and finally sent power to work miracles upon them. If this *occurred* there is an explanation of all that transpired afterwards. If this did not occur, there is no explanation of the great fact that a few poor men, whose doctrine was that they should not resist their enemies, succeeded in subverting Judaism and Paganism in the teeth of the organised opposition of both, and the effect of whose work is a fact of the present moment, inwrought with the life of all civilised nations, evidenced in every legal document which has to state in what "year *of our Lord*" the matter originates. The New Testament account exhibits a cause adequate to the establishment of that system in the world. If that is denied, we have an effect for which no efficient cause is shown.

MR. BRADLAUGH'S ARGUMENT.

The only attempt Mr. Bradlaugh made to answer this was a loose allusion to the Mahommedans and Buddhists. "I do not dispute the existence of the Mahommedans, said he, but I should be very sorry to accept that as a proof of the authenticity and divinity of the Koran." The cases are not parallel; and Mr. Bradlaugh's assumption that they are, shows either that he did not understand, or that he chose to ignore his opponent's argument.

The existence of the Mahommedans is a proof of effectual means having been taken to establish Mahommedanism in the world. We examine the facts, and we see the nature and operation of these means at once. As has been truly said, Mahomet took the way to succeed. He gave his followers a commission to exterminate the infidel, and offered life and protection to everyone who should embrace Islamism. The system is embodied in the Koran. This Koran is in the hands of millions of Mahommedans in the present day, which proves it to be Mahomet's work, for no other than Mahomet's work could have obtained currency amongst them at the start, and none but the book current at the start could have obtained currency among their succeeding generations. Thus the existence of the Mahommedans with the Koran in their hands is a proof of the authenticity of the Koran; and an examination of their history and their documents explains their rise and success, and proves them not divine, for

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Mahomet in the Koran admits the divinity of Abraham, the prophets and Christ, and thereby destroys his own claim, even if there were no other disproof; for the divinity of Christ excludes the divinity of any other "prophet, priest and king," which Mahomet was probably unaware of.

The argument of Mr. Bradlaugh's opponent was that when the history and literature of Christianity are examined in the same way, its divinity follows as a logical result. The present existence of professing Christians is only the first step in the argument. It is a great fact, calling for explanation. The explanation is contained in the book in the hands of Christians, the authenticity of which is proved exactly in the same way as the Koran (only that there is a large amount of collateral evidence, which is awanting in the case of the Koran). No other than the genuine writings of the apostles could have obtained universal currency among Christians at the start, and none but the writings universally current at the start could have obtained universal circulation among the succeeding generations, from which it follows that the book now in the hands of universal Christendom is the authentic work of the apostles. The testimony of early and doubtful Christian writers can be dispensed with in this argument. When, in the next place, we come to look at the facts connected with the rise and progress of the system established by them, we have no such explanation as exists in the case of Mohammedanism. While Mahomet took the way to succeed, Christ took the way to fail if no miracle was employed; for he prohibited his disciples from using the sword, and taught them to eschew in every form the physical resistance of their enemies. As a matter of fact, they did not resist, but fled from persecution, and suffered themselves, when caught, to be slain in large numbers. The State authorities employed their whole power against them; yet in spite of this, they finally planted Christianity in the world on the ruins of Paganism. Now, as a mere matter of common reason, there must have been a cause equal to this success. It cannot be found in the nature of the principles inculcated, for these are opposed to the natural tendencies of human nature. But it is found in that which they allege in their writings to have been the cause:—their testimony that Christ rose from the dead, and endowed them with supernatural gifts in attestation of their testimony. The first fact explains the constancy of the apostles, during years of suffering for their testimony. The second fact explains the great and widespread conviction produced by the testimony. Take away these facts, and there is no rational explanation of an undoubted historic fact, constituting the greatest revolution the world has ever seen.

Mr. Bradlaugh either did not see or evaded the force of this argument. He tried to pooh-pooh it by the general and absurd allusion to Mahommedanism already referred to. In quieter hours, the reader will, perhaps, be able to appreciate it at its true value.

Mr. Bradlaugh tried in the same way to reduce the evidence of Tacitus and Pliny to nothing. He said there was nothing in either of them to prove the authenticity and divinity of the Scriptures. They were not quoted to prove this by themselves, and, therefore, a statement like this does not get rid of them. They were quoted to prove the existence of a widely-scattered and persecuted community of Christians at the end of the first and beginning of the second centuries; and this they do prove most conclusively. And the proving of this establishes one step in the argument by which the authenticity and divinity of the Scriptures is proved. Therefore, the testimony of Tacitus and Pliny is of great importance in its place. Only an undiscriminating or a reckless opponent would assert it to be otherwise.

Mr. Bradlaugh asserted on the second night, and several times subsequently, that there is "tolerable evidence" "that the whole of the sacred books of the Jews were destroyed during the captivity, and had to be re-written." Mr. Bradlaugh made this statement with the view of casting discredit on the Old Testament part of the Bible; but the statement is not true. The testimony of Eusebius to this effect is a mere re-echo of a statement in the Book of Esdras; and though it might be valuable in proving Eusebius's acquaintance with Esdras, and, therefore, of the antiquity of Esdras, if that were called in question, just as his quotations from the New Testament are good evidence of the existence and authenticity of the New Testament, as against men like Mr. Bradlaugh, who find it necessary to deny that the New Testament was produced in the first century, it is of no weight

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whatever in determining the truth of the statement of Esdras. We must consider that statement on its own merits. That the author of the Book of Esdras made the statement is without doubt; and it gives Mr. Bradlaugh a convenient peg on which to hang the theory that the Scriptures of the Old Testament are the production of Esdras, and not of Moses, and the other various writers to whom they are ascribed. But the merest comparison of any part of the Old Testament with the writings of Esdras is sufficient to convince minds of the most ordinary penetration, that the theory is without foundation. The author of the drivelling inanities of Esdras could never have written the lucid and majestic utterances of Deuteronomy. There is no more in common between Esdras and the Bible than there is between the doggerel rhymester of a village newspaper and the writings of Milton or Shakespear. If Esdras wrote the books of the Old Testament, Esdras would have imparted his own qualities to them, and Esdras and the Bible would have been manifestly from the same hand. Instead of this, they are as dissimilar as possible. It may be said that Esdras wrote the books of Moses, &c., from memory, and that this would account for the difference between his own productions and the Scriptures of Moses and the prophets. Granted the possibility of an extraordinary verbal memory equal to the feat of reproducing burnt books; but in that case, the proof for the prior existence and authenticity of the books so re-produced would be the same as if they had not been burnt. The only difference would be, that instead of existing with an unbroken continuity in a literary form, they existed, for a short time, in the brain of a man who was thoroughly familiar with them.

But there is positive evidence that the Scriptures were not destroyed at the destruction of Jerusalem by Nebuchadnezzar. That many copies were destroyed is highly probable, and that many Jewish persons may have supposed that these comprehended every copy is also possible, which may have given rise to the tradition reflected in the pages of Esdras. But there is evidence that this notion, if it existed, was a wrong notion. There were two deportations of captives from Jerusalem before the destruction of that city by Nebuchadnezzar.—(Jer. lii. 28-30.) Among them was Daniel, who *says* of himself: "In the first year of Darius (at the close of the seventy years' captivity), I, Daniel *understood by books* the number of the years, whereof the word of the Lord came to *Jeremiah the prophet, &c.*"—(Dan. ix. 2.) Here is Jeremiah at least in the possession of Daniel seventy years after the destruction of Jerusalem, and before Esdras was written; and if the book of Jeremiah was in his possession, the other Scriptures would be in his possession also; for the reason that would lead him to have one part would lead him to have all. The probability is that he took them with him when carried from Jerusalem amongst other notable captives to Babylon.

Then we have "The Book of the Law of Moses" in the custody of those who returned from the captivity at Babylon. It was read to the congregation on their return to Jerusalem (Nehemiah xiii. 1), which establishes the conclusion to be inferred from the case of Daniel, that the Scriptures were in safe preservation, in the custody of such as feared God among the captives in Babylon, notwithstanding the destruction that befel the temple and its contents. That such should be the case is most natural, in view of the special duty that devolved on the priests to take charge of and instruct the people in the holy writings, as has already been shown in the review of the first night.

If it is objected that the evidence is derived from the books said to have been destroyed and re-written by Esdras, it only shows the falsity of that idea all the more forcibly; for had the statement been true, the internal evidence of the books said to have been reproduced, and for such a reason, would have supported and not confuted it. Mr. Bradlaugh is very willing to believe Eusebius when he supposes his statements are damaging to the Scriptures; but, fortunately, there is evidence that Eusebius' borrowed information on this point is incorrect. Finally, even if true, it would not weaken the foundation on which the validity of the Scriptures rests; for Christ endorsed them; and if his resurrection is proved, his endorsement of them would be proof of the authenticity and divinity of the Scriptures, even if they had, at one time, been annihilated, and required to be reproduced by Esdras or anybody else.

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The God Revealed in the Bible.

We next pass to Mr. Bradlaugh's remarks on the God revealed in the Bible. It is, doubtless, true that the Bible reveals "something much clearer than" that He is the "primal creative energy." The statement that he was the primal creative energy was an accommodation to those who ask for God from the merely scientific point of view. It was advanced as a definition at once the simplest and most unassailable by those who deny Him. It was not intended to express all that is revealed of Him; but it does express the primary fact that all things are *εξ αυτου*, out of Him (1 Cor. viii. 6; Rom. xi. 36); that they exist and subsist in Him (Acts xvii. 28), and that they are sustained by the word of His power, which is universal (Heb. i. 3; Ps. cxxxix. 7-12.) The definition, however, does not exclude nor conflict with other things that are revealed concerning Him; and those other things are not of the contradictory character which Mr. Bradlaugh's reckless allegation would make them appear. The Bible reveals "a God who is everywhere, and who lives somewhere above," without teaching an anomaly; for its teaching on the subject is that the universal "spirit" and the Father dwelling in heaven are one God (Ps. cxxxix. 1-12; 1 Cor. ii. 10-11; Matt. vi. 4, 9; x. 20.) Mr. Bradlaugh and his friends may not be able to comprehend this idea; but it is not altogether inconceivable to those who realise the unity subsisting between the sun and the light of the sun diffused through space—two things absolutely one in nature and connection, and yet capable of being spoken of as two things. If the sun can be in heaven, and people on earth can yet talk of letting the sun in at their windows, it is not necessarily a contradiction to teach that "God lives somewhere above," and is yet everywhere present. The one is a visible fact; the other is an attested fact, though invisible, and this is all the difference as regards their relation to our understanding. They are both equally inscrutable and both equally reasonable. There is something subtler than light. Scientific men call it "force;" and to this force they ascribe all manifestations of force, light itself included. What it is, they know not and cannot conceive; but its existence is none the less apparent to their understandings. Consequently the Bible, in teaching an universal inscrutable Spirit, teaches no more than we are compelled scientifically to receive; only it adds what science cannot know or find out—that this universal primal force has focal centre in a Supreme Personal Intelligence of tangible glory and form. Such as Mr. Bradlaugh can only say they don't believe it; they cannot disprove it, and they cannot show a reason why it should not be so. No reason can be given for the primary and the absolute. It may as well be one thing as another, so far as our conceptions or inductions are concerned. Our simple duty is to find out what it is and believe. It is for the earnest mind to decide whether the Bible does not reveal it. Mr. Bradlaugh's contradiction does not get rid of it. Its revealing that God is everywhere and yet in heaven, instead of proving the Bible undivine, is an evidence in the other direction; for human reason would not have conceived of a thing so apparently contradictory.

As to its revealing "a God who could be seen and who could not be seen," that is explained by the fact developed early in the review—that while angels, bearing the name of God as His representative to men, were often seen, the Eternal Father Himself is invisible to mortal eye, "dwelling in the light which no man can approach unto."—(1 Tim. vi. 16.) So also with its representations of "a God who knew everything and did not know some things:" the Eternal Father knows all things: but "the angels who do His commandments, hearkening to the voice of His word," (Psalm ciii. 20,) and who, bearing His name, are sent forth to execute His behests, they do not necessarily know all things. Even the Son of God was limited in his knowledge, (Mark xiii. 32,) though he could say "I and the Father *are one*."—(John x. 30.) Mr. Bradlaugh makes havoc of the general teaching of the Bible from ignorance of the details of what it reveals. He is like a child telling a professor of electrical science that he contradicts himself because he says electricity binds together and rends asunder. There is a well-known saying about certain who rush in where angels fear to tread. The saying is not inapplicable to those who criticise in Mr. Bradlaugh's ferocious and blundering style.

As to the Bible teaching "a God who is unchangeable, continually changing," the

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charge is not true. It has already been dealt with and it is unnecessary to repeat; we notice it merely to make our review of the second night complete.

Mr. Bradlaugh makes great capital out of the slavery clauses of the Mosaic code. He does this by an illegitimate treatment of the subject only. He makes no allowance for the prerogative of God, as the proprietor of all things, to dispose of men as He chooses; nor of His right and ability to give laws adapted to such special ends as He might have in view at any particular time. No candid man could be guilty of this mistake. It is expressly declared in Ezekiel that the Mosaic statutes were designedly otherwise than good. Thus: "Because they had not executed my judgments, but had despised my statutes and polluted my sabbaths, and their eyes were after their fathers' idols, wherefore *I gave them also statutes* THAT WERE NOT GOOD and judgments whereby they should not live."—(Ezekiel xx. 24–25.) Peter also speaks of the Mosaic law as "a yoke which neither they nor their fathers were able to bear," (Acts xv. 10,) and Paul describes it as "a ministration of death."—(2 Cor. iii. 7.) Mr. Bradlaugh may say it was unreasonable that God should give a law of this defective and oppressive nature, (though such a criticism would be the height of presumption,) but he cannot say that the Bible puts it forward as an absolutely good thing in its entirety. Consequently, he is precluded from founding any argument against the Bible on its non-goodness in any particular. The Bible professes it was not good in some of its statutes, and perhaps these included the slave laws on which Mr. Bradlaugh founded his inuendo. The fact that it should declare some of them to be "not good" (and that because of Israel's sin) is another of the many indirect proofs of its divinity; for merely human writers would never have spoken thus of their own law, especially for such a reason.

Mr. Bradlaugh tries to make light of the Septuagint as a witness to the authenticity and reliability of the Hebrew Scriptures. This literary monument is self-evidently a witness of the most valuable kind, notwithstanding the doubts raised by learning. The opponents of the Bible would certainly feel themselves relieved of a great difficulty if the Septuagint ceased to exist. As Mr. Bradlaugh laid stress on the fact *that* Mr. Roberts did not read the extract from Josephus in support of it, the extract from Josephus is here set forth as follows:

"When Alexander had reigned twelve years, and after him Ptolemy Soter forty years, Philadelphus then took the kingdom of Egypt, and held it forty years within one. . . . Demetrius Phalerius, who was library keeper to the king, was now endeavouring, if it were possible, to gather together all the books that were in the habitable earth, and buying whatsoever was anywhere valuable, or agreeable to the king's inclination, (who was very earnestly set upon collecting of books,) to which inclination of his, Demetrius was zealously subservient. And when once Ptolemy asked him how many ten thousands of books he had collected, he replied, that he had already about twenty times ten thousand. But he said he had been informed that there were many books of laws among the Jews worthy of inquiring after, and worthy of the king's library, but which, being written in characters and in a dialect of their own, will cause no small pains in getting them translated into the Greek tongue: that the character in which they are written seems to be like that which is the proper character of the Syrians, and that its sound when pronounced, is like to theirs also; and that this sound appears to be peculiar to themselves. Wherefore, he said that nothing hindered why they might not get those books translated to be also; for while nothing is wanting that is necessary for that purpose, we may have their books also in this library. So the king thought that Demetrius was very zealous to procure him abundance of books, and that he suggested what was exceeding proper for him to do; and therefore he wrote to the Jewish high priest that he should act accordingly. . . . Ptolemy wrote, and that in the manner following:—'King Ptolemy to Eleazar the high priest, sendeth greeting . . . I have determined to procure an interpretation of your law, and to have it translated out of Hebrew into Greek, and to be deposited in my library. Thou wilt therefore do well to choose out and send to me men of a good character, who are now elders in age, and six in number out of every tribe. These by their age, must be skilful in the laws and of abilities to make accurate interpretation of them; and when this shall be finished, I shall think that I have done a

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work glorious to myself; and I have sent to thee Andreas, the captain of my guard and Aristeus, men whom I have in very great esteem; by whom I have sent those first-fruits which I have dedicated to the temple, and to the sacrifices, and to other uses, to the value of a hundred talents; and if thou wilt send to us, to let us know what thou wouldest have further, thou wilt do a thing acceptable to me?

"When this epistle of the king was brought to Eleazar, he wrote an answer to it with all the respect possible:—'Eleazar the high priest to king Ptolemy, sendeth greeting. If thou and thy queen Arsinoe, and thy children, be well, we are entirely satisfied. When we received thy epistle, we greatly rejoiced at thy intentions; and when the multitude were gathered together we read it to them, and thereby made them sensible of the piety thou hast towards God. We also showed them the twenty vials of gold, and thirty of silver, and the five large basins, and the table for the shew-bread; as also the hundred talents for the sacrifices, and for making what shall be needful at the temple: which things Andreas and Aristeus, those most honourable friends of thine have brought us; and truly they are persons of an excellent character, and of great learning, and worthy of thy virtue. Know then, that we will gratify thee in what is for thy advantage, though we do what we used not to do before; for we ought to make a return for the numerous acts of kindness which thou hast done to our countrymen. We immediately, therefore, offered sacrifices for thee and for thy sister, with thy children and friends; and the multitude made prayers that thy affairs may be to thy mind; and that thy kingdom may be preserved in peace, and that the translation of our law may come to the conclusion thou desirest, and be for thy advantage. We have also chosen six elders out of every tribe, whom we have sent, and the law with them. It will be thy part out of thy piety and justice, to send back the law when it hath been translated; and to return those to us who bring it, in safety.—Farewell?

"This was the reply which the high priest made; but it does not seem to me to be necessary to set down the names of the seventy (two) elders who were sent by Eleazar, and carried the law, which yet were subjoined at the end of the epistle . . . And when they were come to Alexandria, and Ptolemy heard that they were come, and that the seventy elders were come also, he presently sent for Andreas and Aristeus, his ambassadors, who came to him, and delivered him the epistle which they brought him from the high priest, and made answers to all the questions he put to them by word of mouth. He then made haste to meet the elders that came from Jerusalem for the interpretation of the laws. . . . And when they had gone over the bridge he proceeded to the northern parts, and showed them where they should meet, which was in a house which was built near the shore, and was a quiet place, and fit for their discoursing together about their work. When he had brought them thither, he entreated them (now they had all things about them which they wanted for the interpretation of their law,) that they would suffer nothing to interrupt them in their work. Accordingly, they made an accurate interpretation, with great zeal and great pains; and this they continued to do till the ninth hour of the day; after which time they relaxed and took care of their body, while their food was provided for them in great plenty; besides, Dorotheus, at the king's command, brought them a great deal of what was provided for the king himself. But in the morning they came to the court, and saluted Ptolemy, and then went away to their former place, where, when they had washed their hands, and purified themselves, they betook themselves to the interpretation of the laws. Now when the law was transcribed, and the labour of interpretation was over, which came to its conclusion in seventy-two days, Demetrius gathered all the Jews together to the place where the laws were translated and where the interpreters were, and read them over. . . . So the king rejoiced when that his design of this nature was brought to perfection to so great advantage, and he was chiefly delighted with hearing the laws read to him and was astonished at the deep wisdom and meaning of the legislator."

So much for Josephus's intelligent account of the origin of the Septuagint.

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Mr. Bradlaugh's allusion to the Darghestan roll is illustrative of his sense of the value of the Septuagint to the defenders of the Bible; and it also illustrates the facility with which he can lay hold of an utterly worthless argument when the case he is opposing fails to admit of reasonable objection. He says, "There is no Pentateuch roll which can be carried back earlier than the famous Darghestan roll, and that comes nearly 600 years on this side of the Christian era, by the contention of its best men—580 odd years." This has nothing to do with the question. The question is not as to the age of a particular document, in the antiquarian sense, but the age of the Septuagint as a literary production. Surely our confidence in the authorship of a book does not depend upon the possession of the manuscript he wrote, or any other MS. of a particular age. If it does, how comes Mr. Bradlaugh to receive so implicitly the writings of Philo, on which he founds his preposterous theory of Christianity originating with the Essenes? Philo wrote 1,800 years ago, and, probably, the oldest copy of his works is not a fourth of the age of "the famous Darghestan roll" of the Pentateuch. Yet Mr. Bradlaugh, who receives Philo in the absence of ancient copies, makes it an objection in the case of the Pentateuch, that the oldest copy is more than a thousand years old! This is mere child's play. The Darghestan roll, the oldest of ancient copies of the Pentateuch, is only the survivor of a family of similar documents, whose origin, in a literary sense, is traceable to the incident recorded by Josephus, who wrote 1,800 years ago.

Mr. Bradlaugh makes some proper remarks on the subject of martyrdom, without, however, weakening the force of the argument arising from the martyrdom of the apostles. "Martyrdom," he says, "is no voucher for the divinity" of the thing for which the martyr suffers death. "There have been martyrs for every heresy." True; but martyrdom is an evidence of sincerity; and this sincerity becomes an important affair to consider when the question involved is a question of fact, in which the sufferer was a personal witness of the fact alleged. If a man suffers death for an opinion, his death is no proof that his opinion was right, but it is a proof he sincerely held it, and may lead thoughtful people to investigate the grounds on *which* it was held. But the case is different in an instance like the apostles. They suffered persecution not for an opinion, but for declaring they had seen Christ alive after his crucifixion. This was a question of fact. Their suffering death for such a cause is proof that they believed the fact; and the only question left to be investigated is as to whether they were mistaken in their belief. An investigation of this question, conducted on the ordinary principles of evidence, leaves no room for doubt; and the only ground of opposition that can be taken to their testimony is the one that was taken by a gentleman on board the *Aleppo*, who being pressed on this point, admitted that he could not get rid of the evidence of Christ's resurrection, but that he could not receive it, because it testified to a thing that was out of the region of his experience. The absurd nature of this position has already been noticed.

The very circumstance which Mr. Bradlaugh cites in opposition to their testimony is a proof of its reliability. He says: "I will show you that when Jesus was in danger, his disciples ran away, and his most trusty disciple denied him over and over again." It is true that the disciples fled when the officers came to apprehend Jesus, and that Peter denied him three times. Yet all the disciples (and Peter in particular) afterwards bore witness to his resurrection, and suffered for their testimony, as the same account tells us. This leads to two questions, which cannot be reasonably answered without affording proof of the truth of Christ's resurrection. How came men who deserted Christ in the presence of danger, to afterwards brave death by their testimony to his resurrection? Such men must have had a good reason for taking a course which amounted to walking into the jaws of death itself. If Christ rose and appeared to them, there is a reason which explains all. If Christ did not rise, we have the inconceivable phenomena of proved cowards acting the part of heroes on behalf of a lie, and succeeding, without the use of force, in establishing the Christian faith, in the face of armed opposition on the part of the two great religious organizations of the age—Judaism and Paganism. The other question is, How comes the New Testament to record that "the disciples ran away and his most trusty disciple denied him over and over again?" If the apostolic work was not divine, it was a human work conceived with human objects and established by human means. In that case, the New Testament was written for the purpose of

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establishing the credit of the apostles and the prestige of their work, from a human point of view. On such a supposition, it is impossible to understand the desertion of the disciples and the unfaithfulness of Peter being placed on record. It is an unknown thing in the history of imposture or fanaticism, that pretenders labouring to establish the credit of an imposture, should publish facts tending to throw discredit on it; least of all, that the leader of the movement should be held up, at one time, as a traitor to the cause, in the very documents intended to establish its reputation! But if Christ rose from the dead, all is explained. We then see that these things are placed on record, first because they happened, and, secondly, because their occurrence was wholesome to be known, both as regarded the apostles themselves, who were liable, in their privileged position to be exalted above measure, and believers in general who might be tempted to regard the apostles as free from human frailty.

Mr. Bradlaugh objects to the statement that both Jew and Gentile admit that the body of Christ could not be found after his crucifixion. He thinks such an assertion reckless, and illustrative of carelessness in the use of words. He challenges the production of any Rabbinical admission to the effect that the body of Christ could not be found. The answer is that this is one of many things which are obviously true without being capable of technical demonstration. There are demonstrations that are more conclusive than technical demonstrations. In this case, we have an illustration. The Jews, to this day, say the disciples of Christ stole the body of Christ, and then raised the report that he had risen. What is this but an admission that the body could not be found? If the body of Christ could have been found, would this story, which dates away back to the very beginning of the "Christian Era," have been invented? On the contrary, would not the body have been produced, to the utter confutation of the apostolic testimony in that and all subsequent times? This question acquires increased force, in view of the fact that the apostles were apprehended and imprisoned by the very council of priests that obtained the crucifixion of Jesus. When the apostles were brought before them as prisoners at the bar, what did the apostles say? "The God of our fathers raised up Jesus, whom YE SLEW AND HANGED ON A TREE. Him hath God exalted with *His* right hand to be a prince and a Saviour, for to give repentance to Israel and remission of sins. And *we are witnesses of these things*, and so is also the Holy Spirit, whom God hath given to them that obey Him." The apostles accused their judges of being the slayers of Jesus. Their judges, it is added, "were cut to the heart, and took counsel to slay them."—(Acts v. 33). Now, in such a state of mind, would not their judges have obtained possession of the body of Jesus had it been obtainable, and, by its production, have silenced for ever the intolerable testimony of the disciples, who fled from Christ in the hour of darkness, but were now so bold? The fact that they did not do so is in itself proof that the body of Christ could not be found, and that they admitted it. This is proof that will be conclusive to most minds, even if Mr. Bradlaugh requires the evidence of "Rabbinical writings" for it, which even if produced, would be scouted by him as freely as other more unimpeachable writings were.

THIRD NIGHT.

MR. ROBERTS'S ARGUMENT.

THE argument on Paul's case was fairly developed. It lacked entire fulness, however, owing to the absence of some things which time did not admit the introduction of. This applies to both arguments used and to arguments not used. As to the arguments used, they might be made fuller and richer and stronger: but the length to which the review has already gone compels us to be content to allow them to go as they are.

The arguments not used were those which go to show the impossibility of Paul's case being explained on any hypothesis except the one that he was a true man. And

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these can only now be indicated in a brief manner. For their full elucidation, the reader is referred to Lord Lyttelton's treatise on the case of Paul. Mr. Roberts intended to submit had time admitted, that Paul was either,

1.—An impostor who declared what he knew to be untrue for selfish ends.

2.—A self-deceived enthusiast.

3.—An enthusiast deceived by others, or

4.—A true man undeceived by himself or others, who related what actually occurred, to whom Christ actually appeared, who really wrought miracles, and who is therefore a true witness of the resurrection of Christ, and therefore of the divinity of the Scriptures.

Paul must have been one of these four. Taking them one by one, it was intended to be argued—

1.—That he could not have been an impostor, aiming by falsehood at selfish ends, because, as a matter of fact, his testimony cost him everything dear to man: fortune, friends, reputation, and at last life itself (Phil. iii. 8, "For whom I have suffered the loss of all things, and do count them but dung that I may win Christ;" also see 1 Cor. iv. 9-13.) Also, because his demeanour is inconsistent with the character of an impostor, as illustrated by his life as recorded by Luke in the Acts, of which this is a fair specimen: "And as we tarried there (at Cæsarea) many days, there came down from Judea a certain prophet named Agabus. And when he was come unto us, he took Paul's girdle and bound his own hands and feet and said, Thus saith the Holy Spirit, so shall the Jews at Jerusalem bind the man that owneth this girdle, and shall deliver him into the hand of the Gentiles. And when we heard these things, both we and they of that place besought him not to go up to Jerusalem. Then Paul answered, What mean ye to weep and to break mine heart? For I am ready not to be bound only, but also to die at Jerusalem for the name of the Lord Jesus. And when he would not be persuaded, we ceased, saying, The will of the Lord be done."—(Acts xxi. 10-14.) Anyone who can imagine an impostor enacting this part has no acquaintance with human nature. Again, take the speech which Paul addressed to the elders of the Ephesian Church at Miletus, on the occasion of parting from them for the last time: "Ye know that from the first day I came into Asia, after what manner I have been with you at all seasons, serving the Lord with all humility of mind and many tears and temptations which befel me by lying in wait of the Jews. And how I kept back nothing that was profitable unto you, but showed you, and have taught you publicly, and from house to house, testifying both to the Jews and also to the Greeks, repentance towards God and faith towards our Lord Jesus Christ. And now, behold, I go bound in the Spirit unto Jerusalem, not knowing the things that shall befall me there, save that the Holy Spirit witnesseth in every city, saying that bonds and afflictions abide me. But none of these things move me, neither count I my life dear unto myself, so that I might finish my course with joy, and the ministry which I have received of the Lord Jesus to testify the gospel of the grace of God." . . . I have coveted no man's silver or gold or apparel. Yea; ye yourselves know that these hands have ministered unto my necessities, and to them that were with me. I have showed you all things how that so labouring, ye ought to support the weak, and to remember the words of the Lord Jesus: how he said, It is more blessed to give than to receive."—(Acts xx. 18-24; 33-35.) These are not the words of an impostor. Neither were Paul's doctrines by possibility the doctrines of an impostor. For a fair example of them, the 2nd chapter of his epistle to Titus may be read.

It was then intended to be argued that he could not have been a self-deceived enthusiast (that is, a man victimised by a feverish mental illusion, which impelled him, in a state of semi-madness to declare things that he thought true, but which were not true). 1, Because the convictions he entertained were not such as the laws of hallucination would have predisposed him to entertain, if he were of that temperament. The conviction that a crucified claimant of the Messiahship was really the Christ, was opposed to his education as a Jew and a Pharisee, and opposed to his natural bent as a combative and energetic upholder of the law of Moses. His education as a Jew would implant the view that the Messiah, when he appeared, would be immortal, and that therefore, Jesus, as having been crucified, could not be he; while, on the other hand, his conviction that the law of Moses was divine, and

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his ardent desire to signalise himself in its defence, would incline him strongly to set himself against a doctrine that a crucified Christ was the end of the law. To oppose the apostles would naturally appear to such a man to be doing God service. Hallucination in a case like Paul's, according to the law of that disease, would have taken a form in harmony with these Judaic proclivities. The vision seen as the result of hallucination would have been a vision instructing him to extirpate the Christians and championize the cause of Judaism throughout the world. Instead of that he was arrested in the very act of giving effect to all his cherished convictions. On an expedition to destroy the Christians, he saw something which went directly in the teeth of his education —something that was in direct opposition to his purpose, and which diverted his whole energy into the very opposite channel, becoming a preacher of the faith which formerly he destroyed. 2. The nature of the work to which he set himself was not what a self-deceived enthusiast would have undertaken, and certainly one he would not have succeeded in. He sought to turn the pagans from idolatry, the Jews from their stereotyped and lifeless Judaism, and all men from sin, with the object in all cases "that they might receive forgiveness of sins and inheritance," in a kingdom to be set up by Christ at his return. In the execution of this work, he shewed none of the egotism of an enthusiast. He did not seek to bring attention to himself. On the contrary, he objected to those among the Corinthians who said "I am of Paul." His remark on this point was "Who is Paul, and who is Appolos, but ministers by whom ye believed?"—(1 Cor. iii. 5.) Then Paul's success is evidence that he was no mere enthusiast. That he was successful cannot be denied. The modern existence of Christendom is evidence of it. His success involved the bringing over of "a great company of the priests," of the temple (Acts vi. 7,) and the turning away of all the lesser Asia from idolatry.—(Acts xix. 26.) How could an enthusiast, with nothing else than ignorant heated words have achieved such results? But if Paul saw Christ and had a word of salvation from him, and if "God wrought special miracles by the hands of Paul," the success is accounted for; and in that case, Paul was no mere enthusiast. His words are not the words of heated enthusiasm in any case. We have them in his letters and speeches written and delivered under many circumstances, and they are all cool, sober, logical words, such as a man who had seen Christ, and who was endowed with the spirit of God would write, and never such as the victim of hallucination would write. 3. This introduces the next disproof of his having been a self-deceived enthusiast. His doings and sayings are those of a clear-headed, courteous, reasonable man, accommodating himself to circumstances as the interests of the object he had in view required, which is an entire contrast to the deportment of a self-deceived victim of a deranged imagination. Thus he is personally respectful to Felix, Festus and Agrippa, and temperate and coherent in the defence he was called upon to offer in answer to the accusation of the Jews. Let any one doubting this, read the 24th, 25th and 26th chapters of Acts. Thus also he adapted himself to the various classes with whom he came in contact in such a way as their several cases required, in regard to their acceptance of the gospel. His testimony on this point is this: "Though I be free from all men, yet have I made myself servant unto all, that I might gain the more. And unto the Jews I became as a Jew that I might gain the Jews, to them that are under the law as under the law, that I might gain them that are under the law. To them that are without the law as without law . . . that I might gain them that are without law. To the weak became I as weak that I might gain the weak. I am made all things to all men that I might by all means save some."—(1 Cor. ix. 19-22.) These are not the tactics of an illusionist, but of a sensible man with an important work in hand. Enthusiasts, who are so to the extent of being victims of self-deception, do not work in this rational way. The same feature of calm good sense is illustrated by his avoidance of the martyrdom which the Jews were prepared to bestow upon him. The Jews formed a plot for his destruction at the time he was a prisoner in the hands of the Romans.—(Acts xxiii. 12.) Paul got to know of it, and informed the Roman captain. The captain sent him to Cæsarea under guard, transferring him to the jurisdiction of Felix, and afterwards of Festus. Festus sent for the Jewish council to prefer their accusation against Paul at Cæsarea. When they came they asked Festus to try Paul's case at Jerusalem, intending to kill him on the way thither. Paul said he was not unwilling to die if he was proved worthy of death; but he objected to be given into the hands of the Jews, as

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appealed to be reserved to the hearing of Cæsar at Rome. This was not the action of an enthusiast, who would have rushed with bravado into the jaws of death. It was the action of a reasonable man who felt and tried to avoid the calamities incident to his position as an apostle, but who, nevertheless, persevered in the testimony that brought them, because he knew it was true. The same remarks apply to the case in which he made use of his status as a Roman citizen to avoid examination by scourging.—(Acts xxii. 25.) It was the act of a cool and astute and sensible man and not of an enthusiast, who would simply have blundered himself into difficulties in a heated and irrational manner, and lacked capacity or desire to extricate himself in a sensible way. 4. Enthusiasts are usually vain, and have a conceit of their personal importance in relation to whatever hobby they have in hand. Paul's letters exhibit the reverse of this. He says of himself that he "was not meet to be called an apostle" (1 Cor. xv. 9), and this not in a mawkish spirit of self-depreciation, but for a reason which he immediately adds, "because I persecuted the church of God." For the same reason he styles himself "less than the least of all saints" (Eph. iii. 8), and also "the chief of sinners."—(1 Tim. i. 15.) In 1 Cor. xi. he apologises for having to indulge in self-vindication in defence against the slanders of traducers. These are not the expressions of a self-deceived and egotistic enthusiast: they are just the sort of expressions to be expected from a capable man who had committed a great mistake through ignorance, but who, with all his faculties about him, had seen his mistake, and, under a deep sense of humiliation, was striving to undo the mistake by a lifetime of exertion.

The facts of the case distinctly exclude the theory of Paul being a self-deceived enthusiast. Therefore the only enquiry remaining, is whether he was deceived by others, to which the answer is brief. This was perhaps sufficiently touched on the third night of the debate. It was shown that the occurrence which changed him from a persecutor into a defender of the Christian faith, was of such a nature as not to admit of the operation of third parties in the way of deception.—(Acts ix.; xxvi.) As Paul afterwards said to Agrippa, it was a thing "not done in a corner," but in the presence of a band of officers, and in the full blaze of the noon-day sun. Paul and the whole company were struck to the earth by a light "above the brightness of the sun." A communication was made to Paul in their presence, audible to them all, but intelligble only to Paul, as it was made in "the Hebrew tongue." They heard the voice, but saw no man. The attempt of Mr. Bradlaugh to make a contradiction between the account which says they heard the voice and the account which says they did not hear the voice, was disposed of in the debate. They heard the voice but could not make out the words. So may we dispose of Mr. Bradlaugh's attempt to make a difficulty of the fact that one account says they all fell to the earth and another that "they stood speechless." The two statements are perfectly reconcilable if we suppose the company were felled to the earth by the first burst of the brightness, and afterwards rose and stood speechless while Paul received the communication addressed to him. This is not a gratuitous supposition; for that they did rise to their feet after falling is certain, seeing they afterwards led Paul by the hand to Damascus. Two truthful accounts must be consistent one with another, even if they appear contradictory; and the lover of truth is not to be scared away from the endeavour to establish their consistency by the irrational dogmatism (unconcerned to find the truth), which says there ought to be nothing to reconcile. When the incident was at an end, Paul was found to be blind and remained blind for three days, and only had his sight restored by the healing interposition of one of the Christian disciples of Damascus whom he had come to destroy. This evidence of the reality of the revelation to Paul was left behind in a way that made doubt impossible. The whole event was of a character that did not admit of third parties interposing as deceivers of Paul. Consequently, the theory that he was an enthusiast deceived by others has no standing ground. Only the fourth hypothesis remains, that he was a true man, undeceived by himself or others, who relates what actually occurred, to whom Christ actually appeared, who really wrought miracles, and who is, therefore, a true witness of the resurrection of Christ, and, therefore, of the divinity of the Scriptures.

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MR. BRADLAUGH'S ARGUMENT.

Mr. Bradlaugh made no attempt to explain Paul's case in harmony with the atheistic theory. He simply refused to look at it. He said he had no evidence that Paul ever existed, although, inconsistently enough, he refused to say, when pressed on the point, that Paul's letters were forgeries. He rightly defined literary forgery to be the writing of any document in another man's name: yet he would not commit himself to the affirmation that the epistles of Paul were forgeries. If he could have substantiated the notion that they are forgeries, he would have asserted it gladly, of course. His refusal to assert it is, therefore, evidence that he knows the notion that they are forged cannot be maintained (as indeed the whole world of critics, if not Mr. Bradlaugh, is well aware). Therefore, the fact that Paul wrote the epistles is proved by the very tactics of the man who professed to doubt that there ever was such a man. Consequently, the case of Paul is a fact. The nature of the case was pressed upon Mr. Bradlaugh's attention, and he was asked for an explanation of it on his hypothesis; but he did not advance an explanation. His not advancing an explanation is proof that he could not explain it, and his inability to explain it is a proof that the case is inexplicable on atheistic grounds, and that the only explanation of it that can be given is the explanation given many times by Paul himself, that Christ appeared to him and endowed him with power to execute a mission in his name to the nations of the earth—in which case, Christ rose from the dead, and the Scriptures are the authentic and reliable records of Divine revelation.

In default of dealing with Paul's case, Mr. Bradlaugh contented himself with repeating, in a rabid and offensive style, the alleged inconsistencies and contradictions in the Bible he had enumerated on the previous evenings. As these have been answered in the review of the first and second evenings, it is not necessary to notice them here. It is sufficient to supply the proof which he demanded, that the apostles were ignorant men. It is to be found in Acts iv. 13: "Now when they (the rulers) saw the boldness of Peter and John, *and perceiving that they were* UNLEARNED AND IGNORANT MEN, they marvelled."

The only other point really calling for notice is Mr. Bradlaugh's attempt to make the Bible responsible for the doctrine of eternal torments. For the full treatment of this subject, including a scriptural exegesis of the terms on which Mr. Bradlaugh relied as proving this, the reader had better refer to *Everlasting Punishment not Eternal Torment:* being an answer to the "Rev." Dr. Angus, by R. Roberts. It is to be had at the office mentioned on the cover of this pamphlet, price 8d.

FOURTH NIGHT.

MR. ROBERTS'S ARGUMENT.

MR. ROBERTS was somewhat diverted from the argument he had intended to elaborate this evening, by the stress laid by Mr. Bradlaugh on the absence (as he alleged) of contemporary witness to the currency of the apostolic writings in the first century and first half of the second century. The objection was of little weight even if well founded; because a book might exist from remote antiquity, and bear internal proof of its having done so, without our being able to find other books of a similar age in which it should be mentioned. The absence of such other books would be no disproof of the book we have. It would only prove that no other books had survived for the same number of ages, and this fact would not be wonderful in view of the now public character of the New Testament, and the private character of the books alleged to be absent. But though the point was of no great weight in true logic, Mr. Roberts felt it might seem weighty to some, and therefore occupied a considerable part of the time in showing that contrary to Mr. Bradlaugh's assertion, there were books, traceable back to the first and second centuries, in which the contemporary existence of the New Testament was distinctly recognised. The doing this, prevented him from saying all he intended to say

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in support of the affirmation to which he had intended to devote the evening, viz: "That the literary and moral peculiarities of the Bible—the character of its sentiments, so entirely alien to the universal tendencies of human nature.—Jew and Gentile;—Its clear, chaste, vigorous and concise diction;—its agreement one part with another, notwithstanding the great intervals of time at which its different parts were produced; and its perfectly artless candour in the record of facts irrespective of their bearing for or against the interests involved—are totally at variance with the supposition that the book is the production of ignorant and designing men; and prove that its existence is due to that divine initiative and guidance in the writers to which both Paul and Peter attributed it."

In support of this proposition, Mr. Roberts intended a line of argument which was only partly carried out. The omitted parts may be briefly indicated.

The internal constitution of the Bible is the strongest evidence of its divinity. This argument is the least capable of being made palpable, especially to those unacquainted with the Bible and unaccustomed to the line of thought which it involves. The proposition falls at first with little weight on the ear; but its weight increases with increasing experience of human nature and human literature, until at last the thinking mind can dispense with all other evidence of the Bible's divinity. Its contents are found sufficient.

Some features of those contents were noticed in the debate. Its revelation concerning God is first in rank. This is distinguished from all human conceptions of Deity, as reflected in the polytheisms of confessedly unenlightened men. The gods imagined by men were limited like men. The God revealed in the Bible is declared *unsearchable*. The different powers of nature were, by the ignorant, attributed to different gods, which superficially seemed probable. The Bible attributed all to ONE GOD. Science has confirmed the Bible revelation of God to this extent, that it has shown all power to be ONE at the root, and that root "unknowable," which is only another word for the Bible term "unsearchable."

Then as to man: the philosophers taught that man was constitutionally an immaterial immortal being, underlying and distinct from the body, and capable of existence apart from it, a fallacy from which came their doctrine of *post-mortem* rewards and punishments in the elysian fields and tartarus, and a consequent rejection of the doctrine of the resurrection. This notion, succinctly defined as "the immortality of the soul," was, like their polytheism, a plausible deduction from appearances—universal among the ancients, beginning with the Egyptians, notwithstanding his association with whom, Moses, by the admission of Gibbon, is untainted with the notion. The prophets and apostles are likewise free of this philosophic speculation, and, on the contrary, teach human mortality as expounded by Tyndall and other scientists of the modern era. The doctrine of immortality which they teach is the hope of resurrection to a future existence on the earth. Science does not teach this, because science only deals with *what is*, and can throw no light on what is to be. With the doctrine of human mortality all Scripture agrees, as the reader may find proved in *Twelve Lectures*, by R. Roberts. Consequently, the Bible is in harmony with science on the subject of man as well as God: that is, as regards his present constitution. That the Bible should teach a doctrine in harmony with science in an age when all the world was dreaming about natural immortality of speculative induction, is another proof of the Bible's divinity. This arugment has been obscured by orthodox religion, which accepts the Pagan view, and, by consequence, teaches the eternal torment of the unrighteous—a doctrine which gives the argument for unbelief an advantage that does not belong to it.

The Bible's depreciation of human nature, and exaltation of God, were both noticed in the debate. These peculiarities stamp it as of Divine origin. The sentiments are foreign to human nature. Their prominence in the mouths of the prophets explain the Jewish treatment of the prophets; and that treatment reacts in confirmation of the Divine origin of the sayings of the prophets. Jesus refers to it thus: "O Jerusasalem, Jerusalem, *which killest the prophets, and stonest them that are sent unto thee, &c.*" (Luke xiii. 34). There was a class of prophet that received different treatment, to which Jesus also refers: "Woe unto you when all men speak well of you, for *so did their fathers to* THE FALSE PROPHETS."—(Luke vi. 26). The false prophets spoke smooth or pleasant things, which ensured popularity: the true prophets spoke things that

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were disagreeable to human nature, and brought destruction on themselves. Yet the Scriptures of the disagreeable prophets, which testify against the wickedness of Israel, are preserved, while the Scriptures of the false prophets have perished: in which also there is evidence of God at work.

The aversion of Israel to the teaching of the true prophets, and their relish for those who led them to idolatry, is very effectually illustrated in the case of Elijah, who, on Mount Carmel single-handed, confronted four hundred prophets of Baal. This case may be taken as the history of the subject condensed into a single incident. The Jews have always been on the side of those who drew them aside from the One God, and against the few faithful men who in different ages have striven, under Divine command, to bring them back to the paths of Moses. This is in harmony with the work of the prophets being a Divine work; and inconsistent with the notion that they acted on their own uninspired volition; for a human volition merely would have led them in a human and popular direction.

Why did the Jews prefer idolatry to the Divine institutions? This brings us to another argument. The Mosaic worship was contrary to human inclinations. It called on them to serve *an invisible God:* it required faith at their hands. Other nations had gods they could see, and whose worship they made the occasion of licence and delight. To these foreign gods, Israel turned aside from the beginning of their history, as soon as Joshua and his contemporaries were dead (Judges ii. 11-13); which is proof that their God was no invention of their own; or the outcome of a national idiosyncrasy. Other nations have always been faithful to their invented gods, because they continued subject to the taste and fancy that led to the invention. Such a thing as a nation changing its gods is unknown. This very fact is made the basis of expostulation by God with Israel, through the prophet Jeremiah: "Pass over to the Isles of Chittim and see, and send unto Kedar and consider diligently, and see if there be such a thing: *hath a nation changed their gods*, which are yet no gods? But my people hath changed their glory for that which doth not profit."—(Jer. ii. 10). This fact of itself—that the Jews as a nation continually departed from the God of their fathers, while no other nation deviated from their traditional idolatries—goes a *long* way, in a logical process of treatment, to prove that the religion of the Jews was *not* a religion of Jewish origin, in the sense of its being the invention of the Jews; but was higher than they, namely, what it professes to be: a system Divinely communicated to them by the hand of Moses.

There is next the agreement of one part of the Bible with another throughout, notwithstanding the long intervals during which its different parts were produced. If it were a human production, each successive contributor would have imparted his own sentiments to it, and we should have that diversity of character which belongs to every human work in which many actors have been engaged during a series of ages. Instead of this, the book is absolutely one. Whether you take Moses, Malachi or Christ, there is the same depreciation of human nature; the same supreme exaltation of God; the same stern enunciation of duty; the same uncompromising rebuke of departure from the way of right. The spirit of the book in this respect is identical throughout, and this cannot be said of any literature under the sun, in which a variety of writers of different ages have been employed, nor is there any book under the sun characterised by the sentiments just enumerated. The Bible stands absolutely alone in this respect, like a majestic mountain among hillocks of rubbish.

Then there is the same hope, in all the books of the Bible, of a coming age in which Christ, as King of Israel, shall rule on earth universally, and mankind be blessed. A few illustrations of this must suffice. Genesis speaks of a promise to Abraham, that in him and his seed (a great personage who should possess the gate of his enemies), at a future time, should all the families of the earth be blessed.—(Gen. xxii. 17-18.) Moses speaks of a prophet like unto himself, whom God should raise up to Israel whom they should hear.—(Deut. xviii. 15-18.) Isaiah speaks of a king who should rise in the line of David, and reign over all nations, with the result of abolishing the art of war from the studies of mankind.—(Is. xi. 1-9; ii. 4; xxxii. 1-8.) Daniel speaks of one like the Son of Man who should appear, and whom all peoples, nations and languages should serve and obey.—(Dan. vii. 14.) Paul speaks of a day in which God should judge the world in righteousness by Christ (Acts xvii. 31), and when the people of Christ would reign and judge the world with him.—(1 Cor. vi. 2; 2 Tim. ii.

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12.) Revelations speaks of the kingdoms of this world becoming the kingdoms of God and His Christ, who shall reign for ever and ever.—(Rev. ii. 26; xi. 15.)

If the Bible were a merely human production, there would not be this absolute identity of hope among writers, extending over three thousand years. The existence of this identity is a proof of the controlling presence of a common guidance in all the writers, even the guidance professed in the book itself: "Holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Spirit."—(2 Pet. i. 21.) The force of this argument will be appreciated by those who realise the endless and contradictory diversities of human authorship of different ages. Its force is somewhat hidden by the corruptions of orthodox Christendom, which has long ago abandoned the one apostolic "hope of Israel," common to the whole Scriptures, and embraced the miserable substitute of an imagined *post mortem* beatification of an imaginary personal invisibility, in regions above the stars.

Then there is evidence of divinity in the Bible scheme of future life. This scheme defers all reward till an appointed era, to be inaugurated by the personal re-appearance of Christ in the earth, when many generations shall have yielded—first, to the grave and then to the resurrection—their quota of tried men—tried in necessary times of evil. The vastness and splendour of this scheme stamps it as divine. Man would never have invented such a scheme. This is not the place to prove that this is the scheme. The reader must be referred to *Twelve Lectures*, before mentioned for its full illustration.

Next there is the perfect candour of the Bible narratives, which is never characteristic of human histories. David's crime is chronicled in sober and merciless truth, although he was king when the record was written. So with the fathers before him. The naked truth is told. The very things which Mr. Bradlaugh makes use of against the Bible, are in this respect one of the highest evidences of its genuine character, for had the Bible been written by king-flatterers and sycophants, as his senseless tirades imply, there would have been a suppression of things that do not stand to the credit of those for whom they are supposed by him to have been written. Then the writers say things that never would have been said by men writing to prop up a pretended revelation. Matthew, for instance, records that at an interview with Christ after his resurrection, some of his disciples "doubted."—(Matt. xxviii. 17.) A bolsterer up of a pretended revelation would never have written this. It is written because it is true; and the fact that some doubted is an element in the self-evident truthfulness of the narrative, for it is just what would happen with real living men who, not expecting Christ to die, had seen Christ crucified and now saw him alive. In their partly-enlightened state, his death was a puzzle and his resurrection a puzzle also, and "doubt" the natural consequence. And had there been no farther evidence, the doubt of the "some" might have continued. But their doubt did not continue; all doubt vanished with the outpouring of the Spirit and display of miraculous gifts. The fact that they previously "doubted" made their subsequent confidence all the more reliable, because it showed the reason of their doubt had disappeared. Certainly, a forger, writing a fictitious narrative to obtain credit for Christ's resurrection, would never have represented any of the disciples in the act of doubting but rather in an ecstacy of adoring confidence, after the style of Roman Catholic fables.

Similar remarks apply to the statement of John that at a certain time, "many of his disciples went back and walked no more with him." This is a candid record of a fact which there could be no object in publishing, but rather in suppressing, as the fact itself was capable of yielding a damaging effect to some who might argue like Mr. Bradlaugh: "If men who saw his miracles deserted him, how can you expect me to believe, &c." Its record is an evidence of truth; and the occurrence of the fact recorded is in harmony with our acquaintance with human nature. Men get accustomed to anything. Marvels cease to be marvels when they are of common occurrence. It is easy to understand that men, drawn after Christ in the first instance by the sensational attraction of his miracles, would easily become disaffected when doctrines unpleasant to human nature were propounded for their acceptance. It is human nature to the life. A fictitious writer would never have imagined it possible for any human being to desert the Christ of his narrative: he would be certain to represent every one as awe-struck and spell-bound for ever.

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And even if he could have imagined another possibility, he would have been careful to conceal it from a narrative intended to create confidence in a Christ that never existed. The record that many ceased to be his disciples is one among many strong proofs of the genuineness of the narrative.—There is a number of such candid statements. In fact, they abound throughout the Scriptures and constitute an evidence in the very opposite direction to that to which such as Mr. Bradlaugh make them point. We must be content with the two examples cited.

Then the literary character of the Bible is evidence of a more than human authorship. Its diction is chaste, dignified, vigorous, free of redundancy or irrelevant details. It is unlike all other books in the nature of its historic narratives. It never puts on record the kind of occurrences that come under the category of story and adventure. It never shows any regard for the curiosity of the reader. It never ministers to the taste that finds pleasure in the mere knowledge of what happens. It confines itself to matters having relation to the main purpose in hand. If it ever diverges from its condensed historical style, and enters into personal particulars, it is because those personal particulars have a bearing on some subsequent event of public importance, or to illustrate the operation of some truth important to be known. The story of Amon and Tamar is an example: it led up to the rebellion of Absalom. The story of David and Uriah is another: it led to a public revolution in the punishment of David. The story of the Ephraimite and his concubine is another: it led to the near extirpation of a tribe, and the slaughter of multitudes in Israel in punishment of their sins. In no case is a story told for its own sake. In this the Bible differs from all human books: and the difference is inexplicable if the Bible be a human book; because if a human book, it would show the universal taste for mere incident, in the liking for which, Jew and Gentile are alike, as shown by the writings of Josephus. The following is a good specimen of the Bible's historical conciseness: "Then were the people of Israel divided into two parts; half of the people followed Tibni, the son of Ginath, to make him king; and half followed Omri. But the people that followed Omri prevailed against the people that followed Tibni, the son of Ginath; so Tibni died, and Omri reigned."—(1 Kings xvi. 21.) A human account of this matter would have entered upon the intrigues and the fightings, and the adventures incident to the triumph of Omri, with a due admixture of trumpet blowings over this one's intrepidity, and that one's wonderful generalship, &c. This argument in its full force will only be appreciated by those who possess a thorough acquaintance with the Scriptures, and some acquaintance with human writings of all ages. With such it is of great weight. To others, it may be evident by a comparison between the Bible itself and all imitations that have been attempted, such as the Apocrypha and Apocryphal New Testament.

Finally, the character and precepts of Christ as displayed in the New Testament, are themselves conclusive evidence of the divinity of the Scriptures. No man could have imagined such a character; no man could have invented such precepts, least of all such men as those who wrote the gospel narrative—poor fishermen, "unlearned and ignorant men." The only way such a narrative could come to be written (even if men who are called "learned," had been the writers)—is by the appearance of such a man as Christ, and the presence with the writers of such a guidance in the writers as Christ promised he would send them after his departure—the guidance of the Holy Spirit which should "bring all things to their remembrance whatsoever he had said unto them."

MR. BRADLAUGH'S ARGUMENT.

There was little in Mr. Bradlaugh's argument on the fourth night calling for any further notice than what it received in Mr. Roberts's replies. It was in the nature of a feint to draw the other side from a strong position. He raised a great outcry against the ecclesiastical writers of the first, second and third centuries, whose works Mr. Roberts referred to merely to show that there was external evidence of the existence of the New Testament at the time it professes to have been produced. Many things he said that were misleading, and some that were positively untrue. Such, for instance, as his remark, "It is simple impertinence (for Mr. Roberts) to read

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names to us and tell us he has got the books here when those books do not exist in the world." "Mr. Roberts said he would quote to you from Tatian. There is not a scrap of Tatian existing. . ." Mr. Roberts did not pretend to have books that do not exist. He did not pretend to have even all the books that do exist. When he said he produced "five witnesses" to a particular date, he meant in the sense of producing them in argument. Tatian's existence as an author is proved by quotations from him in Eusebius, who wrote shortly after the end of the third century. On the same authority we know that Tatian was born before A.D. 150, and that he wrote a book entitled *A Harmony of the Four Gospels.* The fact that we do not possess this *Harmony of the Four Gospels* does not weaken the evidence arising from the fact of Tatian writing such a work. His writing such a work shows that the four gospels existed in his day, and also that they had existed as a universally-accepted authority among Christians for a long time before, for men do not write harmonies of unknown and newly-produced books. But Mr. Bradlaugh sought to obscure the argument by making a great outcry about the absence of Tatian's books, and, no doubt, he succeeded with some lacking penetration, but the truth calmly remains for all that.

Mr. Bradlaugh also made a point of the dates adduced being "disputed dates." In the sense that they lack the definiteness and certainty of a registrar's certificate of birth, no doubt they may be disputed; but they are undisputed in the substantial sense. That is they are substantial approximations to truth, and even allowing for a few years' uncertainty, one side or another, the argument founded on the writings of the men remain untouched. The argument is that men living within a few years of the dates mentioned could not quote the New Testament familiarly, which they all do, if the New Testament had not existed as a widely-accepted authority. Mr. Bradlaugh's tactics merely amounted to throwing so much dust over this point. His reckless declarations will have no weight with those who are calmly in search of truth and reason.

Mr. Bradlaugh made great use of the literary forgeries that were undoubtedly common in the third and fourth centuries. He asked among so many forgeries, how was he to know the true? He might have been excused on the score of inability of discernment had he rested there: but when he went on to deny the existence of true apostolic writings, it had simply to be shown that he was going against all reason; for surely the very existence of forgeries prove that there must have been something originally true and valuable to imitate. Mr. Bradlaugh's answer to this was, "If Mr. Roberts's contention is true, the existence of a false gospel of Barnabas would be evidence of an imitation of a true gospel of Barnabas." The rejoinder is, first, perhaps there was a true gospel of Barnabas, for Luke testifies (Luke i. 1) that "many" had taken in hand to set forth an account of the things believed among the Christians, and perhaps Barnabas was among the number. But, secondly, it would at least prove the existence either of Barnabas or of the New Testament allusion to Barnabas. And it would prove that the writing of a gospel was according to the imitator's conception of what Barnabas was likely to do: and this conception must have been founded on the fact that the apostles and their companions did write gospels. So that even in this way, a false gospel of Barnabas, while perhaps not proving a true gospel of Barnabas, would prove that there were true gospels somewhere. We notice this point because it is one of the few arguments of Mr. Bradlaugh's which seemingly had something in them. Mr. Bradlaugh tried to make a great deal out of the fact that Mr. Roberts did not read extracts from the books of the early ecclesiastical writers, in support of his assertion that they quoted from the New Testament. He even said unjustifiable and untrue things on the subject; as for instance, that these writers "do not say a word of what Mr. Roberts thought they said." The best answer to this will be to quote a few samples of their sayings, with references to the works where they may be found. This is done by the aid of Dr. Brewer's compilation, which was produced at the discussion.

1.—Clement of Alexandria,

Who was born somewhere about the middle of the second century: died about A.D. 213.

He wrote several works in Greek, and among others *Pædagogus* (The Instructor),

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and *Stromata* (Sundries). From these two the following are extracts: "This passage is not to be found in any of the FOUR GOSPELS, but is taken from the (spurious) gospel to the Egyptians."—(*Strom.* iii. 465. D.) "As Luke in *the Acts of the Apostles* records Paul to have said."—(*Strom.* v. 588. B.) "In like manner writes Paul in his *Epistle to the Romans*."—(*Strom.* iii. 457. B.) "The blessed Paul, in his First Epistle to the Corinthians, says, Brethren, be not children in understanding: howbeit in malice be ye children."—(*Pæd.* i. 96. D.)

2.—THEOPHILUS OF ANTIOCH,

Who was born early in the second century, and died A.D. 181.

He wrote three books, to "Autolychus," in defence of the Christian religion. The following are extracts: "These things the Holy Scriptures teach us: for JOHN says, In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God." (Book ii. 100 C.) The gospel says "Love your enemies, and pray for them that despitefully use you, for if ye love them that love you, what reward have ye? Do not even publicans the same?"—(Book iii. 126, B.C.)

3.—ATHENAGORAS, THE ATHENIAN PHILOSOPHER,

Who flourished in the second half of the second century.

He wrote a petition to the Emperor on behalf of the Christians whom he had joined: also a treatise on the resurrection. The following are extracts: "To convince you we are not Atheists, hear the maxims in which we are instructed:" "I say unto you, love your enemies: bless them that curse you and pray for them that persecute you, that ye may be the children of your Father in heaven, who maketh His sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust."—(*Petition*, page 11. B.C.) "The corruptible must put on incorruption" (*The Resurrection*, page 61 C).

4.—IRENÆUS, OF LYONS,

Who was born about A.D. 130, *and died A.D.* 202.

He wrote a work "against heresies" in five books. The following are extracts: "Matthew, among the Jews, wrote a gospel in their own language while Peter and Paul were preaching the gospel at Rome. After the death of the fore-named apostles, Mark, the disciple and interpreter of Peter, delivered to us in writing the things that Peter had preached. Next Luke, Paul's companion, put down in a book the gospel preached by Paul. Lastly John, the beloved disciple, published his gospel while he was dwelling at Ephesus" (*Adv. Hær.* iii. 1). "This same disciple (John) says in his epistle, little children, it is the last time"—(*Adv. Hær.* iii. 16). Irenæus also mentions by name thirteen of Paul's epistles, and quotes copiously from them in the course of his argument, and speaks of "The Revelation of John," the disciple of the Lord.

5.—MELITO OF SARDIS,

Who flourished in the second half of the second century.

He wrote several works in Greek, and among others, one entitled *Extracts of the Law and the Prophets*, in his preface to which he says: "When I went into the East, I procured an accurate account of the books of *The Old Testament*," which is, of course, an indirect recognition of the New Testament.

6.—TATIAN,

Who was born about A.D. 130, *and died about the close of the second century.*

He wrote several works, only one of which is now extant, viz., *Oration to the*

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Greeks, in which he quotes from the epistles. Eusebius mentions the name of one of Tatian's other works, which furnishes evidence of the existence of the gospels in Tatian's day, viz., *A Harmony of the Four Gospels.*

7.—JUSTIN MARTYR,

Who was born about the beginning of the second century and died about A.D. 167.

He wrote three works, viz., an *Apology* to the Emperor Antoninus Pius, on behalf of the Christians; an *Apology* to the Emperor Marcus Aurelius with the same object, and a *Dialogue with Trypho.* His quotations from the New Testament are very numerous. The following are specimens:—"Christ said, Unless a man be born again, he cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven."—(*Apology*, 94A.) "Before the Lord was crucified, he said, 'The Son of Man must suffer many things and be rejected of the Scribes and Pharisees, and be crucified, and the third day he shall rise again.'"—(*Dialogue*, 327A.) "Paul, in his address to the Greeks, saith thus: 'Be you as I am, for I am as ye are.'"—(*Dialogue*, 40D.)

8.—PAPIAS,

Who was born early in the second century and died about A.D. 153.

He wrote *Five Books of Commentaries on the Sayings of our Lord.* In his preface he says: "If at any time I met with one who had conversed with the elders, I enquired of the sayings of those elders. I asked him what Andrew or Peter said, what Philip said, what Thomas or James had said, what John had said, what Matthew had said or any other of the Lord's apostles. What they told me by word of mouth have I here set down in writing, and nothing in these Commentaries has been taken from books." Of Matthew, he says: "It was written in Hebrew and was termed *the Lord's sayings*;" and of Mark: "Mark was the interpreter and follower of Peter, and the *gospel which bears his name* was composed from Peter's own words."—(Book iii. 31.)

9.—POLYCARP,

Who was born about A.D. 80, *and died A.D.* 167.

He wrote an epistle to the Philippians. The following are extracts recognising the existence of the New Testament: "Do we not know that the saints shall judge the world, as Paul teaches?" (cap. xi). "Neither I nor any one like me can come up to the wisdom of the blessed Paul, who wrote to you a letter, being absent in body but present in spirit."—(Cap. iii.) "Remember what the Lord said, Judge not that ye be not judged; forgive and ye shall be forgiven; be merciful that ye may obtain mercy."—(Cap. ii.)

10.—IGNATIUS,

Who was born about A.D. 35, *and died abaut A.D.* 107.

He wrote seven epistles in which the existence of the New Testament is recognised thus: "You are the companions of St. Paul, who *throughout his whole epistle to you* (the Ephesians), mentions you with praise."—(Epistle to the Ephesians, sec. 12.) He many times quotes, without acknowledgment, the words of the New Testament. Thus: "The tree is known by its fruits" (to the Eph. xiv.): "Be wise as serpents and harmless as doves" (to *Polycarp* 2.) "Christ was baptised of John to fulfil all righteousness (to Smyrna 1.)

11.—HERMAS,

Who flourished before the end of the first century.

He wrote a book entitled *The Shepherd*, in which there are some fifty quotations from

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the New Testament, without naming the books from which the quotations are drawn. The following are specimens: "No man cometh unto the Father but through the Son."—(*Similitude* ix. 12.) "The body is the temple of the Holy Spirit: and if thou defile the temple of God thou shalt die."—(*Sim.* v. 7.) "If ye resist the devil he will flee from you."—(*Precept* xii. 5.)

12.—Clement of Rome,

Who was born about A.D. 30 *and died A.D.* 100.

He wrote an epistle to the Corinthians, in which the Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians is expressly referred to thus: "Take into your hands *the epistle of Paul the apostle, and see what he wrote to you.*"—(ch. xlvii.) He quotes many times from the New Testament, without referring to the source, thus: "With what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again"—(ch. xiii.) "Remember the words of the Lord Jesus, how he said, Woe to that man by whom offences come. It were better for that man if he had not been born."—(ch. xlvi.) "Whom the Lord loveth He chasteneth, and scourgeth every son whom He receiveth."—(ch. lvi.)

13.—Barnabas,

Who is supposed to have been born at the beginning of the first century, and to have died A.D. 61.

The epistle bearing his name, whether written by him or not, was extant in the first century, as proved by the allusions of other writers to it. He quotes from Matthew, Luke, Acts, Romans, Corinthians, Ephesians, Hebrews, 1 Pet. and Revelations. Examples: "Let us beware, lest it should happen unto us; many are called but few chosen"—(ch. iv.). "He came not to call the righteous but sinners to repentance."—(ch. v.) "Give to every one that asketh thee."—(ch. xix.)

FIFTH NIGHT.

MR. ROBERTS'S ARGUMENT.

The argument on the origin of the Jewish nation as involved in the writings of Moses, was fairly indicated, but only partly illustrated. It is capable of being worked out in great detail with convincing results. The authenticity of the writings is sufficiently established by the testimony of Christ and the voice of the Jewish nation, as pointed out and proved in the debate. We have therefore merely to consider the history set forth. This history, like the history of Christianity, is only intelligible with God in it. This will be seen by anyone fairly looking into it. With such a view only can we understand the entire absence of any endeavour in any part of it, to ascribe the law to Moses or any credit of any part of the transactions to him, or to the Jewish nation. So far from taking credit, Moses expressly said to the people, "I have not done these things of mine own mind" (Num. xvi. 8). It is a popular habit to ascribe the Jewish law to the wisdom of Moses as if he were the author of it. This habit is totally at variance with the scriptural representation. God is always kept in the foreground and Moses appears as His servant only. This peculiarity is not confined to the language of Moses, but belongs to the events connected with the organization of the nation. It is particularly manifest in the incident on which Moses based his claim to Israel's submission to the law. He did not, like an impostor, merely report that so and so had happened to him privately, and that the result was this law which they had to obey. He based his claim to their submission on an open and public event of which they were all witnesses. "He brought forth the people out of the camp *to meet with God*, and they stood at the

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nether part of the mount. And Mount Sinai was altogether in a smoke because the Lord descended upon it in fire, and the smoke thereof went up as the smoke of a furnace, and the whole mount quaked greatly"—(Ex. xix. 17). The people were afraid at the manifestation. "And all the people saw the thunderings and the lightnings and the noise of the trumpet and the mountain smoking, and when the people saw it, they removed and stood afar off. And they said unto Moses, speak thou with us and we will hear, but let not God speak with us lest we die."—(Ex. xx. 18, 19.) Afterwards referring to this, Moses asks them to remember it: "Specially the day that thou stoodest before the Lord thy God in Horeb when the Lord said unto me, Gather me the people together and I will make them HEAR my word *that they may learn to fear* ME all the days that they shall live upon the earth . . . and the Lord spake unto you out of the midst of the fire. Ye heard the voice of the Lord, but saw no similitude: only ye heard a voice . . . Did ever people hear the voice of God as thou hast heard and live? . . . Out of heaven, He made Thee to hear His voice that He might instruct thee: and upon earth He shewed thee His great fire and thou heardest His voice out of the midst of the fire."—(Deut. iv. 10-12; 33, 36.) It was this public demonstration that laid the foundation of the authority over a rebellious nation like Israel, of Moses, whom they several times sought to destroy. This was the object of it. It is so stated: "The Lord said unto Moses, Lo, I come unto thee in a thick cloud, *that the people may hear when I speak with thee* AND BELIEVE THEE FOR EVER."—(Ex. xix. 9.) When the event was over, "The Lord said unto Moses, thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, *Ye have seen* that I have talked with you from heaven."—(Ex. xx. 22.)

Now for the present argument, it matters not whether these things really happened, or were invented by a writer who narrated them to establish the credit of Moses. The great fact connected with them lies here: *they base the authority of the law on the command of God and never on the wisdom of Moses.* And the argument arising from this fact is that such a thing is inexplicable on the hypothesis of the Mosaic writings being writings of a merely human origin, for written with a human origin, they would have been written with a human aim like all other human writings; and the aim would have been to show that the law was due to the superior sagacity of Moses, and to set forth the constant loyalty of the Israelites to it. Of course, the argument is strengthened a hundred fold when it is shown that Moses was the writer.

The nature of the sentiment pervading the law, is inconsistent with the idea of a human origin. We know what human nature is in the thousand instances of experience, history and political institutions. To glorify the leader or the nation, is the tendency of all men in every country and age; and the Jews, as we know them in their speeches and literature, are no exception. But the Mosaic institutions offer a complete contrast to this tendency. Instead of boasting in ancestry and the exploits of their armies, they were taught, for instance, to speak depreciatingly of their origin on the presentation of the first-fruits; and to refer their deliverance to God. They were taught to say, "A Syrian ready to perish was my father, and he went down into Egypt and sojourned there with a few, and became there a nation great, mighty and populous. And the Egyptians evilly entreated us and afflicted us, and laid upon us hard bondage. And when we cried unto the Lord God of our fathers, the Lord heard our voice, and looked on our affliction, and our labour and our oppression. And *the Lord brought us forth out of Egypt* with a mighty hand, and with an outstretched arm, and with great terribleness, and with signs and wonders. And He hath brought us into this place."—(Deut. xxvi. 5). The deliverance of Israel is never ascribed to Israelitish prowess. The style of allusion is well illustrated in Psalm xliv. 1-3: "We have heard with our ears, O God: our fathers have told us what work Thou didst in their days, in the times of old, how Thou didst drive out the heathen with Thy hand, and plantedst them: how Thou didst afflict the people and cast them out. For *they got not the land in possession by their own sword, neither did their own arm save them;* but THY RIGHT HAND AND THINE ARM and the light of Thy countenance, because Thou hadst a favour unto them."

This peculiarity is intelligible enough if God spake to Moses and did all the mighty works by which Israel was delivered from Egyptian thraldom. On any other principle, it is unintelligible. Particularly is this the case with certain matters of detail. There are features in the law which could not have originated with men

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legislating out of their own heads. For instance, Israel was commanded to let the land lie untended and unsown every seventh year; and we read this in connection with it: "And if ye shall say, What shall we eat the seventh year? Behold, we shall not sow nor gather in our increase. Then I will command my blessing upon you in the sixth year, and *it shall bring forth fruit for* THREE YEARS."—(Lev. xxv. 2.) What man or men would have been mad enough to append to a public law a provision beyond all human control (affecting the weather and the crops), and subject to the test of experience once in every seven years? For inventors to have enacted such a law would have been to make the detection of their imposture inevitable; and that in a short time, for once in every seven years it would be found whether, as a matter of fact, the enhanced production took place. Take God out of this law, and its enactment is inexplicable; but if God spake by Moses, it is perfectly intelligible.

So with the attendance at the periodical feasts exacted of all Israel. Three times a year were they all to assemble at the chosen centre. In the natural order, obedience to this would expose their country to the danger of invasion, while they were absent, but this assurance was associated with the law. "Neither shall any man desire thy land when thou shalt go up thrice in the year to appear before the Lord thy God."—(Ex. xxxiv. 24.) If God gave the law, this is intelligible, because, as with the weather and the crops, so with the matter of human desires, it is in His power to regulate their operation; but if this law was a human invention, it is impossible to conceive how a promise came to be introduced as to affairs beyond human control, and the truthfulness of which was open to test every year.

There is a variety of incidents and other matters of detail to which the same general remarks apply, viz., that their record is inexplicable on any theory short of the narrative being a true one. The length to which the review has already extended forbids more than a brief reference to one or two of them. Prominent among them is the reason given for Moses, who led them out of Egypt, not being allowed to take the children of Israel over Jordan into the Land of Promise and not being allowed to enter there himself. Moses alluding to this reason in his rehearsal on the plains of Moab, says: "The Lord was *angry with me* for your sakes, saying, Thou also shalt not go in thither. But Joshua, the son of Nun, which standeth before thee, he shall go in thither; encourage him, for he shall cause Israel to inherit it."—(Deut. i. 37.) The incident to which Moses alludes is described in detail in Num. xx. 7-13; and expressly referred to in Num. xxvii. 12-14. On the reading of these parts, it will be found that the incident in brief was this: under the irritation caused by the continual discontent and insubordination of the people, Moses, when directed by God to bring water for them out of the rock, struck the rock twice with his rod, and took the credit of bringing out the water. "Hear now, ye rebels," he exclaimed, "*must* WE fetch you water out of this rock?" This was an offence to God in standing between Him and Israel, and is thus condemned by God: "Because ye believed Me not, to sanctify Me in the eyes of the children of Israel, therefore ye shall not bring this congregation into the land which I have given them."—(Num. xx. 12.) Let there be read in connection with this matter the account of the death of Moses in Deut. xxxii. 48-52 and xxxiv. 1-6: such a story is intelligible if true: but if not true, for what purpose could it have been invented? We must judge of the theory of invention in such a case by the history of invention universally. Invention is resorted to always with an object: and in a case like this (the leader of a nation), the object is to establish the credit and reputation of the man concerned. But here is an incident having the very opposite effect. Here is an account of the death of Moses, showing his career cut short in punishment for the unfaithful use of divine power in a certain matter. The man who can believe such a story to have been invented must either have a very poor acquaintance with mankind, or a poor capacity for judging of e simplest facts. Invention, in such a case, if required to account for the death f Moses before the completion of his work, would be likely to have taken the form f representing that God had told him he (Moses) was too good and great a man to e allowed to enter upon the hard and bloody work of conquering the Canaanitish natio ; and that, therefore, he would let him go to rest. The "patriotic" inventor wou l never have represented Moses an offender against the majesty of God, and still le , that he became so through the inveterate stubbornness of the people he was leadi ; from Egypt. Such a story is self-evidently a true one; it is evidence that God wroug t

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with Israel, and that therefore the Scriptures are the authentic and reliable records of divine revelation.

Other incidents of a like nature are the death of Aaron's sons, Nadab and Abihu, by fire, for non-compliance with a divine command (Lev. x. 3); and the discouraging report of the spies sent to search the land; the people's endorsement of it; their proposal to stone Moses, and appoint another captain, under whom they might return to Egypt: the sentence that they must as a punishment wander forty years in the wilderness, till the whole of the adults should be worn out by death (Num. xiii and xiv. the whole of the chapters); the murmuring of the people for flesh, and the distress of Moses at the burden of his position over them (Num. xi. 1-15); the insurrection of Korah, Dathan and Abiram and the people's sympathy with them, even after their destruction (Num. xvi.)—all of these, and others which will occur to the reflective reader of the Scriptures, are passages in the history of Israel that are inexplicable as to how they came to be recorded, except on the one simple principle that they happened: for the tendency of them is to blacken the national character of Israel, and to take away all ground of even the commonest human satisfaction in the contemplation of their history. The invention of records having such a tendency is inconsistent with the universally known character of man, Jew and Gentile. Where invention is resorted to, it is to heighten the credit of a nation or its leaders. These things cannot have been invented. They are recorded because they happened; and in that case, God wrought with Israel in all their generations, from Moses to Christ, and, therefore, the Scriptures are the authentic and reliable records of divine revelation.

MR. BRADLAUGH'S ARGUMENT.

Mr. Bradlaugh made no attempt to meet his opponent's argument, but wasted his time with the technicalities of the evidence of the so-called "Christian fathers," whose writings are extraneous to the main subject. It was, perhaps, a clever diversion—an attempt to draw the enemy from a strong position; but not the course of an earnest man, persuaded of the truth of his argument, and prepared and anxious to grapple with all difficulties on their merits. Mr. Bradlaugh aims no higher than legal strategy. His tactics were well described by a friend of his who intended the description as a compliment, but which will hardly be regarded in that light by earnest men. The friend in question, signing himself "T. Evans," described Mr. Bradlaugh as "most skilful of fence," remarking that had he not been so, "he would have been 'cornered' several times."—*National Reformer*, July 2, 1876. "Fence" is all very well in the conduct of a law case in court, where the aim is to avoid by hook or by crook material damage; but when it is resorted to in a process which concerns the investigation of truth for its own sake, it becomes an illegitimate and contemptible art, which only men bent upon a personal triumph would use. It really means the art of obscuring as much as possible the facts which the other side may seek to exhibit, and of evading the logical results of facts that have to be admitted. The employment of such an art amounts to the intrusion of brute force upon the domain of reason, and the arrest of the process of evidence by mechanical obstruction—an art cultivated by a certain class of the legal profession, but not to be considered admissible in the field of candid polemics.

An illustration of it was furnished in the very instance on which Mr. Bradlaugh's friend in question particularly complimented him, in a letter appearing at the time of the discussion in the columns of the *National Reformer*. The instance concerned the extract from Athenagoras, which was cited by Mr. Roberts to show that the New Testament existed in the days of Athenagoras, inasmuch as Athenagoras cites one of the precepts of Christ, drawn from Matt. v. 44-45. Athenagoras does not give a reference to Matthew, he uses the words of Matthew, which is the material argument in the case. But in Dr. Brewer's compilation, from which Mr. Roberts quoted the extract, the reference is supplied, not as part of the quotation but as a mere guide to the student, by which he may prove whether the words quoted are Matthew's words or no. Mr. Bradlaugh holding the book in his hand, seized hold of this feature and declared with much vehemence that the reference to Matthew was not in Athenagoras at all, but had been added by Dr. Brewer; which, of course, was true, but did not dispose of the evidence of Athenagoras at all. The evidence

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of Athenagoras consisted in *his using words that are in Matthew, in describing to the Emperor the precepts in which the Christians were taught.* But Mr. Bradlaugh concealed, or sought to conceal this evidence by declaiming about the reference which had never been put forward at all! His manner of doing it betrayed a consciousness that he was indulging in artifice; but of course the unthinking portion of the audience, unable on the spot to discern between the one thing and the other, could not see the wince either in the manner or the argument, but thought a strong point had been made, while the correspondent in the *National Reformer* spoke of Mr. Bradlaugh disposing of Athenagoras "as easily as an athlete would overthrow a child." "It was shown," said he, "that the *material words* of reference had been added." The writer of these words either did not comprehend "the material words" in the argument or he deliberately lent himself to a false note of triumph. This is a fair specimen of the kind of sophistry by which thousands are daily hoodwinked, and apparently glad to be so.

The instances in which Mr. Bradlaugh did touch on the merits of the argument were few. Referring to the statement in the Mosaic account of the exodus, that the clothes of the children of Israel did not wax old during the forty years' sojourn in the wilderness, he asked the audience to imagine a man at the end of the forty years wearing the clothes he had when a baby. Of course the audience laughed; but the folly at which they laughed was Mr. Bradlaugh's—not the Bible's. Babies' clothes might be of unwasting stuff without being used for those who had outgrown them. Sensible mothers would put bye the undecaying articles for the babies to come after; and it is only Mr. Bradlaugh's reckless logic that requires us to suppose that the Jewish mothers that came out of Egypt were less sensible than the Jewish mothers of to-day.

So when he points to John the Baptist sending disciples to Jesus to know whether he were the Christ or no, and asks how this is consistent with John having heard a voice from heaven at the Jordan, declaring at Christ's baptism that he was the Son of God, he only appears to strike a blow at the New Testament account. No better proof than this very circumstance could be given that the New Testament narrative is an unconcocted and true narrative. A concoctor of such a story would have imagined and represented John the Baptist as, of course, animated by a sublime and indomitable confidence that no circumstances could affect. But the narrative being true, we find John subject to the weakness of human nature. Shut up in prison at a time when, in common with all the disciples, he "thought the kingdom of God would immediately appear" (Luke xix. 11), the overpowering effect of confinement and hope inexplicably deferred, is seen in an embassage to Christ to re-assure himself. And Christ's answer, instead of being inconsistent with truth, must appear in the opposite light to every reflecting mind. Mr. Bradlaugh asks why he did not remind John of the heavenly voice at his baptism. Jesus did better than that. He did not appeal to faltering human memory of an event already doubted; he appealed to *what was actually transpiring.* "Go and tell John WHAT YE SEE: how that the dead are raised," &c. If the story had been concocted, no doubt the narrative which, in the first place, would never have represented John in doubt, would, in the case of that supposition, have made Christ appeal triumphantly to the events of the Jordan.

The same train of confirmatory thought is suggested in relation to that other and more painful scene in the history of Christ, which Mr. Bradlaugh desecrated with his blasphemous declamation: viz., the agony of his expiring moments, when he exclaimed: "My God, my God, why hast Thou forsaken me?" Mr. Bradlaugh asked how such an exclamation could come from the lips of a man who knew that his death was to be the salvation of the world; and whether the words are not a confutation of his professed character. The question derives its piquancy from the assumption that the tranquillity and mental composure of the Saviour ought to have been imperturbable. No doubt, in the case of an invented Christ, it would have been so represented. We should have had the sort of demeanour imputed to him that is alleged of the canonized "saints" of Roman Catholic fable. We should have had the spectacle of a transfixed man, looking placid and at ease, and delivering himself, in beatific trance, of an unnatural speech, calling upon heaven and earth to witness his confidence and submission without murmur or wince to a death which was necessary for the salvation of men. Instead of that, we have "the man Christ Jesus," showing all the suscepti-

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bilities of a human being. We have him approaching death the day before with a fearful apprehension that caused him to "sweat as if it were great drops of blood." We have him praying earnestly that if it were possible, the cup might pass from him: "yet not my will but Thine be done." After this, we have him unresistingly submitting to apprehension and condemnation and crucifixion. And then we see him transfixed on the cross, suspended in the most agonizing position in which it is possible for a human being to be placed, with the whole weight of his body bearing upon his out-stretched and lacerated hands and feet. We see him endure for six hours the fierce agonies of crucifixion, and at the end of that time, it is no unnatural sound we hear when with a loud wail of agony, he exclaims "My God! my God! why hast Thou forsaken me?" Is such a wail inconsistent with his previous knowledge in hours of calmness that God required him to die? Nay, is it inconsistent even with the continuance of that knowledge? Was it not the fact that God had forsaken him in the sense of leaving him in the hands of his enemies, and in the sense, too, of withdrawing from him that overshadowing and immeasurable presence of the Spirit that had been with him during all the days of his ministry? The "why" may seem to express surprise where expectation ought to have excluded it, but we have to think that although the fact of his death was known to him beforehand, it may be that he did not realise to himself all the horrors of the ordeal till the dark cloud actually came upon him; and that in the weakness of the hour (for he was crucified through, in or out of weakness—2 Cor. xiii. 4), his mental vision may have become clouded with the shadow of death, and caused him to ask what he would not have asked in the calm prospect of the event itself. The whole picture is thoroughly unartificial. It is such as men depicting an imaginary or invented Christ would never have drawn. No stronger evidence exists of the truth of Christ's profession and mission than those very dying words which Mr. Bradlaugh made the subject of his coarse enquiries.

SIXTH NIGHT.

MR. ROBERTS'S ARGUMENT.

In nature, the argument was satisfactory, but not in extent. This was inevitable from a vast subject having to be crowded into a very small compass. Its vastness may be inferred from the fact that Bishop Newton, in attempting to illustrate the fulfilment of Bible prophecy, filled a volume of hundreds of pages.

However, its logical essence is not weakened by brevity. Its pith lies in the fact of the universal impossibility of prophecy. It is impossible to lay too much stress on this fact. The foretelling of an eclipse is not a prediction: it is merely an arithmetical deduction from known rates of progress. The predictions which belong to the Bible have to do with the state of countries, the fortunes of races, the destinies of individuals—all matters quite beyond human calculation. The results in these cases depend upon so many unknown contingencies that only a Power having control of those contingencies could say what will happen. It will convince anyone of this if they try to foretel the issues of the Eastern Question; the future of France; the fate of the Disraeli Ministry, or the destiny of the Prince Imperial.

The notion that Moses and the prophets were only astute men who by a large discernment of human affairs, were able to foretel what should happen centuries afterwards, is not only absolutely gratuitous, but it is opposed to all experience of men. There are probably as astute men living in our day as in any age, and where is the man that can tell us a day ahead what shall be? On the natural discernment theory, there ought to be better prophets now than at any time, because there is so much larger a stock of human experience to go by than at any former time. But in point of fact, there is not the least ability anywhere to fortel the future. The future is a dead wall to the human eye. No man can forecast even the markets for a day ahead, let alone political destines which are so peculiarly liable to unknown contingency. This inability to penetrate the future is appealed to in the Scriptures

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as the evidence of imposture on the part of those in Israel who falsely pretended to be divine. The challenge is put in this form: "Let them bring forth and *show us what shall happen* . . . SHOW THE THINGS THAT ARE TO COME HEREAFTER that we may know that ye are gods."—(Isa. xli. 22-23.) In contrast to this, we have the following declaration from God: "I am God, and there is none like me, *declaring the end from the beginning* and from ancient times, *the things that are not yet done*, saying, my counsel shall stand and I will do all my pleasure." "Behold the former things are come to pass, and new things do I declare: BEFORE THEY SPRING FORTH, I TELL YOU OF THEM" (Isa. xlvi. 9; xlii. 9). Moses and the prophets foretold the fate of the Jews thousands of years ahead, and also the leading developments of Gentile power in their relation to God's further purpose on earth. It cannot be said that the ability to do this was a Jewish faculty: for the Jews are as helpless to-day as their Gentile neighbours. They have had no prophets among them since God forsook them for their iniquities, and dispersed them through the countries. There is only one possible explanation of the prophecies in the case, and that is the explanation given by the prophets themselves, when they represent that God spoke to them what they said and wrote, and in that case, the Scriptures are the authentic and reliable records of Divine revelation.

MR. BRADLAUGH'S ARGUMENT.

Mr. Bradlaugh simply evaded the issue, and sought to cover his retreat by a great outcry against the alleged prurient character of the Bible. This was sufficiently met in the debate. It is one of the proofs of the Bible's divinity that it speaks of things as they are without reference to human delicacies, which in most cases are a mere recoil from appearances not founded on an intrinsic aversion to wrong. Many minds easily shocked at a breach of human manners, are absolutely insensible to impressions of righteousness. The Bible deals with facts and truth; and if these may sometimes appear prurient, it is only because of the prurient fastidiousness of mankind, and not because of the use made of the facts. If the Bible ever makes delicate allusions, it is never in the spirit of lust, but always as a mere matter of literal and colourless fact. In this there is a vast difference between the Bible and other books with which Mr. Bradlaugh most unreasonably sought to class it. Shakespeare and Byron would have no fascination for prurient readers if their allusions were like the Bible's. Mr. Bradlaugh's inuendo would have more force against medical books than against the Bible: but the fact is, there is no reason in the objection whatever. It was one of several instances in which Mr. Bradlaugh's reckless logic allowed him to appear in the unnatural character of an indignant virtuoso against a book which, in spite of all his diatribes, teaches a virtue beyond the capacity of the majority of men to understand or appreciate.

The only other thing calling for notice is Mr. Bradlaugh's remark, that in the case of there having been a pre-Adamite race, Adam was not "the first man" which 1 Cor. xv. 44 calls him. The answer is, first, the pre-Adamite race are not spoken of as man but as "the angels which sinned" (2 Pet. ii. 4), and that, therefore, there is no inconsistency in describing Adam as "the first *man*." And, secondly, even if the pre-Adamite race had been human, Adam was "the first man" of the present race, and as this is the sense in which Paul uses the phrase, it is in no way inconsistent with the pre-Adamite existence of another race of which he was not then speaking.

CONCLUSION.

The Review is now at an end. Mr. Roberts thanks Mr. Bradlaugh for permitting him to add to it the report of the discussion. Mr. Roberts has offered Mr. Bradlaugh the opportunity of writing a rejoinder to it for appearance in the same pamphlet, but Mr. Bradlaugh has not accepted the offer; and, therefore, the report and the review go forth without the reply from him that he might be able to give; but Mr. Bradlaugh has other means of letting his friends know his mind, of which he

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will, doubtless, avail himself should he consider it necessary to take notice of anything appearing herein.

It is only fair to Mr. Bradlaugh to add that as far as the report of the last three nights of the debate is concerned, he has not revised it, though offered the opportunity of doing so. He considers the reporting of that part of the debate badly done. In fact he stated this to be the reason for his declining the task of revision. The labour required, he said, would be too great to be accomplished within a reasonable time. It is right to say that the part of the debate in question was reported by a man appointed by Mr. Bradlaugh's own agent; and that the first half of the debate which Mr. Bradlaugh commended as well done, was reported for Mr. Hodgkinson, of Norman Cross, by Mr. Arthur Andrew, with Mr. Pulbrook, 28, Threadneedle Street, London.

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TWELVE LECTURES

ON THE

TEACHING OF THE BIBLE IN RELATION TO THE FAITHS OF CHRISTENDOM:

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OF BIRMINGHAM.

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between the order, the method, and the plan of nature, and what we see when we watch a mechanician working according to a plan, to produce a designed result. The only real parallel would be our perception by sense of a world slowly evolving from chaos, according to a plan previously foreseen. From the product you are at liberty to infer a producer only after having seen a similar product formerly produced. But the product which supplies the basis of this argument is unique and unparalleled; 'a singular effect,' in the language of Hume, whose reasoning on this point has never been successfully assailed. And the main difficulty which confronts the Theist, and which Theism essays to remove, is precisely that which the consideration of design does not touch—viz., the origin, and not the arrangement, of the universe. The teleological analogy is, therefore, worthless. There is no parallel, we repeat, between the process of manufacture and product of creation, between the act of a carpenter working with his tools to construct a cabinet and the evolution of life in nature. On the contrary, there are many marked and sharply-defined contrasts between them. In the latter case there is fixed and ordered regularity, no deviation from law; in the former, contingency enters, and often alters and mars, the work. Again, the artificer simply uses the materials which he finds lying to hand in nature. He *detaches* them from their natural connections. He arranges them in a special fashion. But in nature, in the successive evolution of her organisms, there is no detachment, no displacement, no interference, or isolation. All things are linked together. Every atom is dependent on every other atom, while the organisms seem to grow and develop 'after their kind' by some vital force, but by no manipulation similar to the architect's or builder's work. And yet, again, in the one case the purpose is comprehensible. The end is foreseen from the beginning. We know what the mechanician desires to effect; but in the other case we have no clue to the 'thought' of the architect. Who will presume to say that he has adequately followed the purposes of nature in the adjustment of her phenomena to one another? But (3) the only valid inference from the phenomena of design would be that of a phenomenal first cause. The inference of a personal divine agent or substance, from the observation of the mechanism of the universe, is invalid. What link connects the traces of mind which are [said to be] discernible in nature with

an agent who produced them? There is no such like. And thus the divine personality remains unattested. The same may be said of the divine unity. Why should we rest in our inductive inference of one designer from the [alleged] phenomena of design, when these are [claimed to be] so varied and so complex? Or grant that in all we observe a subtle and pervading unity is found, and as a consequence all existing arrangements point to one designer, why may not that designer have been at some remote period himself designed? And so on *ad infinitum* (see on this 'Paley Refuted in his Own Words,' by George Jacob Holyoake; and, *per contrâ*, 'Theism,' by John Orr).

"But, in the second place, not only is the argument defective (admitting its validity as far as it goes), even partial validity cannot be conceded to it. The phenomena of design not only limit us to a finite designer, not only fail to lead us to the originator of the world, or to a personal first cause, but they confine us within the network of observed designs, and do not warrant faith in a being detached from, or independent of, these designs, and therefore able to modify them with a boundless reserve of power. These designs only suggest mechanical agency working in fixed forms according to prescribed law. In other words, the phenomena of the universe, which distantly resemble the operations of man, do not in the least suggest an agent exterior to themselves. We are not intellectually constrained to ascribe the arrangement of means to ends in nature to anything supra-mundane." Why may not the phenomena of the universe be the mere endless evolution of the universe itself? "But if the inference from design is valid at all, it must be valid everywhere; all the phenomena of the world must yield it equally. No part of the universe is better made than any other part. Every phenomenon is adjusted to every other phenomenon nearly, or remotely, as means to ends. Therefore, if the few phenomena, which our teleologists single out from the many, are a valid index to the character of the source whence they have proceeded, everything that exists must find its counterpart in the divine nature. If we are at liberty to infer an Archetype above, from the traces of mind beneath, must not the phenomena of moral evil and sin be on the same principle carried upwards by analogy? a procedure which would destroy the notion of Deity which the teleologists advocate. If we are at liberty to conclude that a few phenomena, which

seem to us designed, proceed from and find their counterpart in God, reason must be shown why we should select a few and pass over other phenomena of the universe. In other words, if the constructor of the universe designed one result from the agency which he has established, must he not have designed all the results that actually emerge? and if the character of the architect be legitimately deduced from one or a few designs, must we not take all the phenomena which exist to help out our idea of his character? Look, then, at these phenomena as a whole. Consider the elaborate contrivances for inflicting pain, and the apparatus so exquisitely adjusted to produce a wholesale carnage of the animal tribes. They have existed from the very dawn of geologic time. The whole world teems with the proofs of such intended carnage. Every organism has parasites which prey upon it; and not only do the superior tribes feed upon the inferior (the less yielding to the greater), but the inferior prey at the very same time no less remorselessly upon the superior. If, therefore, the inference of benevolence be valid, the inference of malevolence is at least equally valid: and as equal and opposite the one notion destroys the other" (*British Quarterly Review*, No. cvii., p. 52).

Victor Cousin, in his 25th Lecture ("History of Modern Philosophy," pp. 418 to 426), examining Locke's "Essay on the Human Understanding," takes occasion to sum up, from a Theistic point of view, the various arguments for the existence of God; but all his points having been already touched on here, it is unnecessary to do more than to refer the student to him.

We come now to the fourth division of our subject (see page 121). Sir William Hamilton says ("Discussions on Philosophy," p. 623): "The only valid arguments for the existence of a God and for the immortality of the human soul rest on the ground of man's moral nature." It is with a phase of this argument that Kant's name is especially associated. Immanuel Kant was born at Königsberg, 22nd April, 1724, died 12th February, 1804. Unquestionably one of the greatest thinkers of the eighteenth century, Kant is very differently judged by opposing readers. His words are difficult to comprehend, partly because of his special terminology, and partly because his style is extremely involved. Kant was a Theist, but his notions of future life seem occasionally to savour of the doctrine of

metempsychosis. Victor Cousin says that, "after having commenced by a little idealism, Kant ends in Scepticism" ("History of Modern Philosophy," vol. i., p. 132); and it is affirmed that, questioned towards the close of his life as to his ideas on a future state, the Prussian philosopher responded, "I have no notion of a future state" ("Biographie Universelle," vol. vii., p. 92). But see on this "Life and Works of Kant," by A. G. Henderson, p. liii., introduction to Victor Cousin's "Lectures on the Philosophy of Kant." De Quincey rather recklessly declares of Kant that "he exulted in the prospect of our absolute and ultimate annihilation; that he planted his glory in the grave, and was ambitious of rotting for ever."

Before stating the ethico-theological argument, it will be well to show how Kant deals with the first and second divisions of the Theistic evidences ("Philosophy of Kant," by Victor Cousin, translated by A. G. Henderson, p. 120):

"Speculative reason has but three species of arguments to demonstrate the existence of God; Kant calls them *physico-theological*, *cosmological*, and *ontological*.

"The two first set out from experience; in the *physico-theological* proof we examine the order and beauty of the world, and establish the existence of God as an explanation of this order and beauty." [We have already fully stated the objections both to the "order and beauty" assumed, and the conclusion sought to be deduced from this alleged order and beauty, and in restating, in Cousin's words, the three classes of arguments, we need only ask the reader to bear this in mind.] "In the *cosmological* proof we take no account of the harmony revealed to us by experience; it is sufficient that this experience should attest any contingent existence to enable us to pass from this contingent existence to that of an existence absolutely necessary Finally, in the third proof, the *ontological*, we throw aside all experience, and conclude from the *idea* of perfect being to its existence.

"Kant begins by discussing the *ontological* proof, because, according to him, the two others rest upon this one.

"This proof is no other than that of St. Anselm. It was introduced into modern philosophy by Descartes, and the last form under which it appears was given to it by Leibnitz. It is under this form that Kant considers it, and undertakes to refute it; perfect being contains all reality, and it is admitted that such a being is possible—that is to say, that

its existence implies no contradiction. Now, all reality supposes existence. There is therefore a thing possible, in the concept of which is comprised existence. If this thing be denied, the possibility of its existence is also denied, which is contradictory to the preceding. You see here Leibnitz's argument, viz., God is, if he is possible, since his possibility—that is to say, his very essence—carries with it his existence; and thus to admit it as possible, and not, at the same time, to admit it as existing, is a contradiction. Kant attacks this argument in the following manner:— First, we must carefully distinguish between logical necessity, or that species of necessity which connects together an attribute with its subject, with the real necessity of things, and guard ourselves from concluding the second from the first. When I say a triangle is a figure which has three angles, I indicate a necessary relation in such a way that, the subject once given, the attribute is inevitably linked with it. But, although it is contradictory to suppose a triangle after suppressing in thought the three angles, it involves no contradiction to suppress both one and the other, both subject and predicate. In like manner, though it is a contradiction to deny omnipotence when we suppose God, it is no contradiction to deny both; here all disappears, attribute and subject, and there is no longer any possible contradiction. If it be said that there is such a subject which cannot be suppressed, and should therefore remain, the answer is, that this is reaffirming an absolutely necessary subject, and is begging the question.

"Kant insists that there is no contradiction in the negation of God's existence. When we say of such and such a thing, whose existence we regard as possible, that such a thing exists, what species of proposition is employed? Do we employ an analytical or a synthetical proposition? If, in affirming the existence of anything, an analytical proposition be employed, we add nothing to the idea we have of it, and we consequently affirm this existence only because it is already in the idea which we have already of the thing itself, which is but a repetition. It proves nothing in reference to the *real* existence, for it is not already given as existent. On the other hand, is the proposition which affirms the existence of any certain thing synthetical? In that case there is no contradiction in suppressing the predicate of existence; for analytical propositions are the only ones in which, according to Kant, any contradiction is implied by a

denial of the predicate, the subject being once given. It is by this means that we recognise such propositions. It is thus a contradiction to suppose a triangle, if in thought we suppress the three angles—to suppose God, if we deny omnipotence; because these propositions, a triangle is a figure which has three angles, God is omnipotent, are analytical propositions. But if the proposition which affirms the existence of God be synthetical, how can it involve any contradiction to suppose the non-existence of God? The contradiction would only be possible on the supposition that the proposition is analytical, and this can only be on the condition of its proving nothing.

"Again, how can we conclude, from the mere conception of a perfect being, that it exists, so long as the existence itself is not an attribute, a predicate which determines the idea of the subject? Now, existence cannot be regarded as an attribute, whose idea, added to that which we have of the subject, developes it, completes it, determines it. When I say God is all powerful, the attribute all-powerful determines the idea of God; but when I conceive God as simply possible or real, the idea of him rests the same in both cases. Here it is certain that the real involves nothing more than the possible; if it were otherwise, the idea which we have of anything would not be complete until we had conceived it as possible. It follows that if I conceive a being as perfect, I may perplex myself as much as I please by trying to evolve from the idea the real existence. The question of existence always remains, and it is not from the conception of the object, conceived as possible, that we can draw the concept of its reality. We are, therefore, obliged to quit the concept of an object if we would accord to it any real existence. This conclusion, if just, upsets the ontological argument, since this argument pretends to conclude from the idea of a perfect being, conceived as possible, its reality. 'Thus,' says Kant, 'Leibnitz is far from having done what he intended, though he may have arrived at the knowledge *à priori* of the possibility of the existence of an ideal being so elevated. In this celebrated ontological proof for the existence of a supreme being, all labour is in vain; and a man no more augments his knowledge by ideas than a merchant augments his fortune by adding a few cyphers to the sum which expresses his capital.'

"But though the argument which has just been examined

may prove nothing, and may not establish the real existence of God, may we not hope to succeed by adopting a different mode of argument? No, according to Kant; and here reappears the difficulty, insoluble according to him, which the transcendental dialectic opposes to the validity of human knowledge. As the existence of God, or of the perfect being, is placed beyond the conditions of experience, we have no right either to deny or affirm it; to suppose it, is to make a supposition which may be useful, perhaps necessary to the development and perfection of intelligence, but which can in no other manner be justified, at least under the actual conditions of human existence."

Again (page 130): "The argument which Kant calls *cosmological* is that which Leibnitz has named *à contingentiâ mundi*. Kant thus presents it: 'If anything whatever exists, then there must exist an absolutly necessary being; now, something does exist, as, for example, myself, therefore an absolutely necessary being exists. The minor contains an experimental fact, and the major concludes from an experimental fact in general to the existence of a necessary being. The proof thus sets out from experience, and is not, therefore, *à priori* or ontological.

"Kant makes necessary being a sort of monstrosity. 'The absolute necessity,' he says, 'which we seem to consider so indispensable a thing as the last support of all things, is the veritable gulf of human reason. Eternity itself, however sublime and however terrible, as depicted by Haller, turns the brain less, for it but measures the duration of things, and does not attempt to sustain them. We can neither banish the thought, nor can we support it, that a being, which we represent to ourselves as the highest of all possible beings, might say to himself, 'I am from all eternity; out of me nothing exists but as I will. *But whence am I, then?* Here we are lost.'"

Dr. John Pye Smith says ("First Lines of Christian Theology," p. 170):

"It is one of the fundamental principles of the moral philosophy of Kant that we cannot but perceive a *connection*, constant and inseparable, between virtue and happiness; that this connection is totally *independent* of ourselves—we did not make it, it has a manifest existence (though debilitated and confined) under the most unfavourable circumstances, and we cannot abrogate it; and that, therefore, it is *communicated by God*, the Being of Supreme

Perfection, and to whom moral goodness must be necessarily and always agreeable."

"The sovereign good," says Kant ("Philosophy of Kant," p. liv.), "is not possible in the world unless we admit a Supreme Being, endowed with a causality conformable to moral intention. Now, a being which is capable of acting according to the representation of certain laws is an intelligence (a rational being), and the causality of such a being, as determined by this representation, is a will. Therefore, the supreme cause of nature, as a condition of the sovereign good, is a being who is the cause of nature, as intelligence and will (consequently the author of nature)—that is to say, *God*." This assumed "sovereign good" exists only in the imagination of Kant. We can only measure the goodness of any given act by its tendency to happiness. If a "supreme being" be assumed as "cause of nature," cause of "sovereign good," then no state should exist, which is not within those words. The existence of any "guilt" or "misery" is conclusive against a supreme cause sufficient for universal "sovereign good."

In a dialogue between a preceptor and scholar, Kant says (p. lxi.):

"P. Has reason any ground for believing it *as real*, any such supreme power, dealing out happiness and misery according to desert and guilt, having sway over the whole physical system, and governing the world with the most unerring wisdom—in other words, that God exists?

"S. Yes; for we discover in those works of nature that we can judge of, marks of wisdom so vast and profound that we can account for it only by ascribing it to the unsearchable will of a Creator, from whom we deem ourselves entitled to expect an equally admirable adjustment of the moral order of the world—that is, a harmony between virtue and happiness—and that we may hereafter hope to become partakers of this happiness, provided we do not, by a neglect of our duty, render ourselves unworthy of it." This is no more than saying that to account for uncomprehended phenomena we invent "the unsearchable will;" these words really meaning nothing whatever.

"The thinking subject," says Kant (p. 90), "is the object of psychology, the union of all phenomena (the world) is the object of cosmology; and that which contains the supreme condition of the possibility of all that can be thought, the being of all beings, is the object of theology.

Thus, the pure reason furnishes the ideas of a transcendental science of the soul *(rational psychology)*, a transcendental science of the world *(rational cosmology)*, and, lastly, a transcendental science of God *(transcendental theology)*."

"Let us add," says Victor Cousin (p. 177), "that Kant's God, or, at least, the God of his metaphysic, is not the God of humanity. What, indeed, is he? A pure ideal, at the summit of human knowledge, which allows the mind to raise it to the highest possible unity, but which can have no legitimate value. Is it this ideal, destitute of reality; is it this hypothetical object of a regulative idea, which all men look up to as the cause and primitive substance of all things, the Being of Beings, and the Father of the human race?"

Victor Cousin is right in his objection to Kant's God as "destitute of reality;" but the same objection is, we submit, equally potent against M. Cousin's "Being of Beings and Father of the human race." There is surely no more reality in the one "ideal" than in the other. There is no legitimate value in the phrase "Father of the human race," and we maintain that the words, if submitted to analysis, contain no truth. Kant presents us with an unsatisfactory array of subtle word-play; and it is sometimes difficult to imagine that he was earnestly enlisted on either side, so much do his reasonings tell for and against both positions. This is remarkably illustrated in his four antimonies.

The four antimonies of Kant are ("Philosophy of Kant," p. 106):—First, the *thesis* is: "The universe has had a beginning in time, and has a boundary in space." To establish this thesis, Kant shows that the contrary supposition is inadmissible, and that it is impossible to regard the universe as not having a beginning. In fact, if it never had a beginning, it follows that every moment is in eternity—in other words, that at each instant the successive state of things in the universe form an infinite series. Now, the characteristic of an infinite series is this, that it can never be completed by a successive synthesis. Consequently, this infinite series of successive states is impossible. Therefore, we have a right to conclude that the world has had a beginning. In the same manner, it may be established that space is limited, by showing the impossibility of its being unlimited. If the world fills space entirely, we can only conceive it as an infinite number of parts. If this composition (of parts), which can only be successive, requires a time

proportioned to it, viz., an infinite time, it supposes an infinite time already passed, and we thus admit the hypothesis that has already been rejected; therefore, the world is limited in space.

"Such are the arguments in favour of the thesis. Those in favour of the antithesis, that *the world has not had a beginning in time, and that it has no limits in space*, are as conclusive. To establish the thesis, Kant has previously shown the impossibility of admitting the antithesis; now, in order to establish the antithesis, he shows the impossibility of admitting the thesis. If the world has had a beginning, the time which preceded its existence must have been void. Now in such a time nothing can begin to be, because existence in such a case must be as unconditional as non-existence; and we are driven to the supposition of things either passing from nothing to existence of themselves, or by the action of a foreign cause. On the other hand, if the world be limited in space, there is an empty space which limits it, which empty space is impossible. In fact, space, as we have seen, is simply the form of external intuition; its existence vanishes the moment it is considered independently of objects; consequently, though there may exist a relation amongst things in space, there cannot exist a relation of things to space, which it would be necessary to admit, under the supposition that the world is limited. It is, therefore, infinite.

"Second Antimony.—*Thesis:* 'Every compound substance is made up of simple parts; and everything in the universe is either simple or composed of simple elements.' If we suppose that compound substances are not composed of simple elements, these substances once decomposed, there would exist neither compound nor simple—there would, in fact, be nothing; and, consequently, the existence of substance itself might be denied, which is absurd. It follows that all substances are simple, and that compound bodies must be composed of simple parts, which demonstrates the thesis. But here is the antithesis: 'No compound thing is made up of simple parts, and nowhere do any such parts exist.' Suppose a compound body to be composed of simple parts, all such parts, like the compound body itself, must exist in space. Now, space itself, not being composed of simple parts, everything which occupies a space must have elements external to each other, and must consequently be compound. The simple would, therefore, be compound,

which is a contradiction. Besides, we can have no intuition of an ultimate uncomposed object; a simple substance is, therefore, but an idea, to which, in the sensible world, nothing corresponds. It may, therefore, be affirmed that no simple bodies exist in the world.

"Third Antimony.—*Thesis:* 'Everything that happens in the world cannot depend upon natural laws alone; we must admit the action of a free cause.' If there be only physical and natural laws, every event succeeds some anterior state. But this anterior state must have had a beginning, and, therefore, it supposes a state anterior to itself, and we arrive at a series of successive states, each engendering the other; so that we can never arrive at a commencement, and thus the series remains without any absolute condition. Now, it is a law that nothing happens without an efficient cause; it is, therefore, a contradiction to admit only the causality of nature; we must also admit an absolute and primitive causality, producing a series of phenomena by its absolute spontaneity—that is to say, a free cause. *Antithesis:* 'There is no such thing as liberty; everything in the world submits blindly to the laws of nature.' In any given moment, a cause is operative only on condition of its being itself previously uncaused. Now, either these two states of action and inertia are related to each other, or they are not. If one engenders the other, it may be asked, whence comes the first in its turn? and in this infinite series of causes, which we are obliged to acknowledge, the liberty of the agent disappears. If, on the contrary, these two states are independent of each other, then an effect may take place without a cause, which is absurd. Therefore, everything in the world is governed by the fatality of natural laws.

"Fourth Antimony.—*Thesis:* 'A necessary condition for the existence of the world is, that there should exist at the same time, whether in the world as making part of it, or out of the world as its cause, a necessarily existent being.' The sensible world, considered as an assemblage of phenomena, contains at the same time a series of changes. Now every change, every contingent phenomenon, implies an anterior condition; and reason obliges us to ascend from condition to condition until we arrive at something which does not depend upon any other—that is to say, something necessary. But this necessary being belongs himself to the sensible world, otherwise he would not exist in time, and could not in any sense be said to be the cause of a series

of events. There is, therefore, in the world something absolutely necessary, which is either the totality of the phenomena or simply a part of them. *Antithesis:* 'There is nowhere, neither in the world nor out of it, as its cause an absolutely necessary being.' Suppose that the world should either be itself, or contain in itself, a necessary being; there is then in the series of changes a beginning absolutely necessary, which is freed from the law of causality, or the series itself is without any beginning; and although all the parts are contingent, the union is necessary, which is contradictory. And, again, we cannot suppose a being placed *out* of the world, whose action takes place in time, who is himself consequently in time—that is to say, *in* the world. There is, then, nowhere a necessary being."

As there is very much difference of opinion as to Kant, and as Victor Cousin is charged with "having flagrantly misunderstood him on certain points," the reader is referred to the splendid summary by Mr. G. H. Lewes, in his "Biographical History of Philosophy" (vol. ii., ninth epoch), from which the scope of this work allows only a limited quotation:

"From Spinoza to Kant," writes Mr. Lewes (Lewes's "Biographical History of Philosophy." vol. ii., pp. 441-445), "the great question we have seen to be this: Have we any ideas which can be accepted as objective truths, and which, removed from the possible illusions of the senses and the understanding, may be made the basis of a philosophy revealing the realities of existence?

"This question, variously answered, resolved itself into the more definite question: Have we any ideas independent of experience?

"It had become evident that, before we could determine the objective value of our knowledge, we were bound to investigate the nature and conditions of the knowing faculties. Ontology thus was, for a time, superseded by psychology. Locke, Hume, the Sensational School, the Scotch School, and Gall, all these proclaim experience the foundation of knowledge; and yet, inasmuch as experience led irresistibly to scepticism, this was a dilemma which seemed only to be avoided by seeking refuge in common sense, *i.e.*, a denial of philosophy. Kant declined this refuge. He said it was the notable invention of modern times, whereby the emptiest noodle could place himself on a level with the profoundest thinker (*'Prolegomena: Vorrede,'* werke iii.,

170). He saw two conceptions of the world to be logically tenable : Materialism and Scepticism. He rejected both, and strove to reconcile what was true in both with what was true in the *à priori* doctrine. He called his system a *Criticism*. His object was to examine into the nature of this experience which led into scepticism. While men were agreed that experience was the source of all knowledge, Kant asked himself, What is this experience ? what are its elements ?

"The problem he set himself to solve was but a new aspect of the problem of Locke's *Essay*. On this deep and intricate question of human knowledge two opposite parties nad been formed—the one declaring that all our knowledge was given in experience, and that all the materials were derived from sensation, and reflection upon those materials ; the other declaring that these only furnished a portion of our knowledge. This second part maintained that there were elements of knowledge which not only were never derived from sensation, but which absolutely *transcended* all sensation ; such, for instance, is the idea of substance. Experience only informs us of *qualities*. To these qualities we add a substratum, which we call substance ; and this idea of a substratum, which, we are *compelled* to add, Locke himself confesses we never gained through any sensation of matter. Other ideas, such as causality, infinity, eternity, &c., are also independent of experience ; *ergo*, said this school, antecedent to it.

"In the course of inquiry, the untenableness of the theory of innate ideas has become apparent. Descartes himself, when closely pressed by his adversaries, gave it up. Still, the fact of our possessing ideas apparently *not* derivable from experience remained, and this fact was to be explained. To explain it, Leibnitz asserted that, although all knowledge *begins with* sensation, it is not all *derived from* sensation—the mind furnishes its quota; and what it furnishes has the character of universality, necessity, consequently of truth, stamped on it. This doctrine, slightly modified, is popularly known as the doctrine of 'original instincts,' of 'fundamental laws of belief.'

"Kant also recognised the fact insisted on by the adversaries of the Sensational School ; and this fact he set himself carefully to examine. His first object was, therefore, a criticism of the operations of the mind.

"Kant considered that his conception of a purely critical

philosophy was entirely original. No one before him had thought of thus subjecting reason itself to a thoroughly critical investigation, in order to reach answers to such questions as: Are *à priori* synthetic judgments possible? Is a science of metaphysics possible? And here may be noted an illustration of what was said at the opening of this section respecting Kant's originality. Certainly, no one had isolated the *à priori* elements of knowledge from those given in experience, as Kant isolated them, to build a system thereon; nevertheless the whole tendency of speculative development, since Hobbes, has been, as we have seen, towards the investigation of the grounds of certitude, *i.e.*, towards a criticism of the knowing faculties.

"On interrogating his consciousness, Kant found that neither of the two ordinary explanations would account for the phenomena; certain ideas, such as time, space, causality, &c., could not be resolved into experience alone; nor, on the other hand, although *à priori*, could they be supposed absolutely *independent* of experience, being, as it were, only the *forms* (necessary conditions) of our experience.

"There are not *two* sources of knowledge, said he: on the one side external objects, and on the other human understanding. Knowledge has but *one* source, and that is the *union* of object and subject; it is the function of two co-efficients. Thus, water is the union of oxygen and hydrogen; but you cannot say that water has two causes, oxygen and hydrogen. These are its conditions *(Bedingungen)*, its co-efficients; it has only one cause, namely, the union of the two.

"In this conception the existence of the two distinct factors is assumed. 'That all our knowledge begins with experience,' he says, 'there can be no doubt. For how is it possible that the faculty of cognition should be awakened into exercise otherwise than by means of objects which affect our senses, and partly of themselves produce representations *(Vorstellungen)*, partly rouse our powers of understanding into activity, to compare, to connect, or to separate these, and so to convert the raw material of our sensuous impressions into a knowledge of objects which is called experience? In respect of time, therefore, no knowledge of ours is antecedent to experience, but begins with it. But although all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that it arises out of experience. For, on the contrary, it is quite possible that our empirical knowledge

(Erfahrungserkenntniss) is a compound of that which we receive through impressions, and that which the faculty of cognition supplies from itself (sensuous impressions giving merely the *occasion*), an addition which we cannot distinguish from the original element given by sense, till long practice has made us attentive to and skilful in separating it. It is, therefore, a question which requires close investigation, and is not to be answered at first sight: Whether there exists a knowledge altogether independent of experience, and even of all sensuous impressions?'"

Mr. Lewes says of Kant (Lewes's "Biographical History of Philosophy," vol. ii., pp. 461-462):

"His object was to give a theory of all the pure elements, *à priori*, which enter into knowledge as distinguished from the *à posteriori* elements. He advances four fundamental propositions:

"1. That experience does not furnish the whole of our knowledge.

"2. That what it does furnish has the character of contingency and variability.

"3. That the mind also furnishes an element, which element is an inseparable condition of all knowledge; without it knowledge could not be.

"4. That this element has the character of universality and necessity.

"5. And that the principle of all certitude is precisely this universality and necessity.

"He set himself to examine the nature of the mind, and to trace the distinctive characters of each element of knowledge, *i.e.*, the objective and the subjective. Instead of saying, with the Sensational School, all our knowledge is derived from the senses, Kant said, *Half* of our knowledge is derived from the senses, and the half which has another origin, is *indissolubly bound up with the former half.* Thus, instead of saying with the Cartesians, that, besides the ideas acquired through the sense, we have also certain ideas, which are innate and irrespective of sense, Kant said *all* our ideas have a double origin, and this two-fold co-operation of object and subject is *indispensable* to all knowledge."

"*First Result* (Lewes's "Biographical History of Philosophy," vol. ii., pp. 471-473).—A knowledge of things *per se (Dinge an sich)* is impossible, so long as knowledge remains composed as at present. Consequently ontology, as a

science, is impossible. But it may be asked, if we never knew noumena *(Dinge an sich)*, how do we know that they exist? The answer is simple: Their existence is a necessary postulate. Although we can only know the appearances of things, we are forced to conclude that the things exist. Thus, in the case of a rainbow, we discover that it is only the appearance of certain drops of water. These drops of water, again, although owing their shape, colour, &c., to our sensibility, nevertheless exist. They do not exist *as* drops of water, because drops of water are but phenomena; but there is an unknown something which, when affecting our sensibility, appears to us as drops of water. Of this unknown something we can affirm nothing, except that it necessarily exists because it affects us. We are conscious of being affected; we are conscious also that that which affects us must be something different from ourselves. This the law of causation reveals to us. A phenomenon, inasmuch as it is an appearance, pre-supposes a noumenon—a thing *which appears;* but this noumenon, which is a necessary postulate, is only a negation to us. It can never be positively known; it can only be known under the conditions of sense and understanding—*ergo*, as a phenomenon.

"*Second Result.*—The existence of an external world is a necessary postulate; but its existence is only logically affirmed. From the foregoing, it appears that we are unable to know anything respecting things *per se;* consequently, we can never predicate of our knowledge that it has objective truth. But our knowledge being purely subjective and relative, can we have no certainty? are we to embrace scepticism? No.

"*Third Result.*—Our knowledge, though relative, is *certain.* We have ideas independent of experience, and these ideas have the character of universality and necessity. Here we see the effect of confusing cognitions with conditions of cognition. It is not ideas that are independent of experience, but organic conditions on which ideas depend. Although we are not entitled to conclude that our subjective knowledge is completely true as an expression of an objective fact, yet we are forced to conclude that within its own sphere it is true.

"*Fourth Result.*—The veracity of consciousness is established.

"*Fifth Result.*—With the veracity of consciousness is

established the certainty of morals. It is here we see the importance of Kant's analysis of the mind. Those who reproach him with having ended, like Hume, in scepticism, can only have attended to his *Critique of the Pure Reason*, which certainly does, as we said before, furnish a scientific basis for scepticism. It proves that our knowledge is relative; that we cannot assume things external to us to be as we conceive them; in a word, that ontology is impossible.

"So far Kant goes with Hume. This is the goal they both attain; this is the limit they agree to set to the powers of the mind. But the different views they took of the nature of mind led to the difference we before noted respecting the certainty of knowledge. Kant having shown that consciousness, as far as it extended, was veracious, and having shown that in consciousness certain elements were given which were not derived from experience, but which were necessarily *true;* it followed that whatever was found in consciousness, independent of experience, was to be trusted without dispute.

"If in consciousness I find the ideas of God and Virtue, I cannot escape believing in God and Virtue. This belief of mine is, I admit, practical, not theoretical; it is founded on a *certainty*, not on a *demonstration;* it is an ultimate fact, from which I cannot escape—it is not a conclusion deduced by reason.

[The answer simply is, that you do not find in consciousness the ideas of "God" and "virtue," except as artificial results, each of the words varying in their significance in different individuals (see page 118); the word "God" generally being the equivalent for all uninvestigated cause, and the word "virtue" sometimes being the exact equivalent in the mind of one person for conduct for which the word "vice" is the equivalent in the mind of another.]

"The attempt to demonstrate the existence of God is an impossible attempt. Reason is utterly incompetent to the task. The attempt to penetrate the essence of things—to know things *per se*—to know noumena—is also an impossible attempt. And yet, that God exists, that the world exists, are irresistible convictions.

[Here the difficulty is, that "world" is used for the substance of all phenomena, and "God" is a sign of three letters, with no meaning attached.]

"There is another certitude, therefore, besides that

derived from demonstration, and this is moral certitude, which is grounded upon belief. I cannot say, 'It is morally certain that God exists;' but I must say, 'I am morally certain that God exists.'"

"After having shown (Lewes's 'Biographical History of Philosophy,' vol. ii., pp. 486-487), as he conceives, the vanity of all theology based on the intellect and Speculative Reason, Kant professes to restore what he had apparently destroyed, by means of the moral or Practical Reason. Relying upon this, he reintroduces to us the theological doctrine, that the world is governed by a Personal God, a righteous Judge, who awards to men after death the lot which they deserve; appropriate misery to the bad, and appropriate bliss to the good.

"But if the principles employed in the critique of the Speculative Reason are correct, how can judgments obtained by means of the Practical Reason possess any absolute truth? It is urged that they have a character of necessity or universality, and that judgments having this character should be regarded as absolutely true. If the critique is correct, it has been shown that the character in question may arise simply from the fact that our minds are constituted in a particular way; and that it does not authorise us to believe that other beings think or judge in like manner. If this be the case, the judgments in question, however useful they may be for the regulation of our conduct, cannot authorise us to affirm the existence of an unseen noumenon, wholly beyond the field of experience, and to affirm that this noumenon governs the universe according to our idea of justice.

"Further, it is evident that when Kant, in his moral theology, affirms God to exist, to be a righteous Governor of the Universe, rewarding the good and punishing the bad, he sets quite at nought the principle laid down in his critique; that categories and conceptions have no valid application, except to phenomena and to objects of experience. For it is uniformly assumed by Kant that God is a noumenon, not a phenomenon, and that he does not lie within the field of possible experience. Were this otherwise, all Kant's critique of rational theology would fall to the ground. If, then, we can legitimately predicate of God existence, goodness, righteousness, power, and the attributes of a moral governor, we can legitimately make application of categories and conceptions to a noumenon, and

that, too, not merely problematically, but assertorically."

To again use the acute Theistic writer in the *British Quarterly* (p. 74): "The Kantian argument is more intricate and much less satisfactory than the common evidence from the phenomena of conscience itself. It is founded on the moral law, with its 'categorical imperative,' asserting that certain actions are right and others wrong, in a world in which the right is often defrauded of its legitimate awards, and the wrong is temporarily successful. This, however, says Kant, points to a future, in which the irregularity will be redressed, and, *therefore*, to a Supreme Moral Power, able to effect it. The argument is altogether inferential. It is circuitous, its conclusion being, in a sense, an appendix to the doctrine of immortality, and it has only a secondary connection with the data of the moral law itself."

We do not feel sure that we have either fairly stated Kant's position, or efficiently replied to so much as we have stated. In condensing within the limits of this Text-Book the views of a writer so involved in his expressions as is Immanuel Kant, we may have failed both in exposition and answer, but have the consolation that we, at any rate, place before our readers the sources of completer knowledge.

We now arrive at the last division of the Theistic arguments, quoting here again the able anonymous writer to whose thoughts we have been so much indebted, and to whom specially we are now to attempt some reply (*British Quarterly Review*, No. CVII., p. 54).

The "evidence of intuition" is urged by the writer as "of greatest value," although he fairly states some of the arguments against it—viz., "that it is at best only valid for the individual who may happen to feel its force; that it is not a universal endowment (as it should be, if trustworthy), but often altogether wanting; and that it can never yield us certainty, because its root is a subjective feeling or conviction, which cannot be verified by external test. These charges," says the Theistic writer, "cannot be ignored or lightly passed over. And for the Theist merely to proclaim, as an ultimate fact, that the human soul has an intuition of God, that we are endowed with a faculty of apprehension of which the correlative object is divine, will carry no conviction to the Atheist. Suppose he replies: 'This intuition may be valid evidence for you, but I have no such irrepressible instinct; I see no evidence in favour of innate

ideas in the soul, or of a substance underneath the phenomena of nature of which we can have any adequate knowledge;' we may close the argument by simple re-assertion, and vindicate our procedure on the ground that, in the region of first principles, there can be no farther proof. [But, if the "argument" be thus closed, it is because the alleged intuition is only asserted, is not proved, and there is really no proof at all; see page 114.] We may also affirm that the instinct, being a sacred endowment, and delicate in proportion to the stupendous nature of the object it attests, it may, like every other function of the human spirit, collapse from mere disuse. [But, at least, then, this delicate sacred endowment should be found clear and complete in the child. Is it so found? and what is meant by a sacred intuition collapsing by disuse?] But if we are to succeed in even suggesting a doubt in the mind of our opponent as to the accuracy of his analysis, we must verify one primary belief, and exhibit its credentials so far as that is possible."

To the anticipated answer, that the Atheist has no such intuition, the answer is, that the mind starts with "gifts in embryo. They are not full-formed powers, so much as the capacities and potentialities of mental life. [But a capacity to think is not a thought, and may never be exercised.] Their growth to maturity is most gradual, and the difference between their adult and their rudimentary phases is as wide as the interval between a mature organisation and the egg from which it springs. It is, therefore," he contends, "no evidence against the reality or the trustworthiness of the intuition to which we appeal, that its manifestations are not uniform, or that it sometimes seems absent in the abnormal states of consciousness, or among the ruder civilisations of the world." An "intuition," which sometimes "seems absent," and the "manifestations" of which differ in the same individual at different stages, is, we submit, scarcely a very reliable witness.

Mrs. Besant, in her "True Basis of Morality," has sharply attacked the intuition theory, and we avail ourselves here of the argument she states:—"One fatal defect promptly disposes of the claims of intuition as a safe and reliable basis. Intuition, to be of any real value, must be fairly universal in its testimony: but it turns out to be as variable as the various nations of the earth. It depends on race civilisation, on custom, on habit; intuition does not speak *one*

language, it speaks in many tongues; it varies its dictates according to the use of the people. To say that intuition is God's voice in the soul of man, and then to exalt one set of intuitions as the rule for the world, is simply to juggle with words, and to set up a new *authority* on the pedestal whence the old has been taken down. If one intuition be pronounced to speak justly, then all other intuitions, speaking at variance with it, must be held to be false; and the reason and judgment of one man will choose differently from the reason and judgment of his neighbour; and so there will be many divine voices contradicting each other, a result not consonant either with reason or with reverence. Besides, if intuition deceives our fellow creatures on all sides, are we wise, or even safe, in trusting it in our own cases? Is there any particular reason why *our* intuition should be *the* intuition? The real truth is, that what is called intuition is only the result of transmitted tendencies; it is a conveniently vague word under which to group certain phenomena of the mind, which are governed by laws at present very imperfectly known to us. Instinct and intuition only denote the tendency to do certain actions, or to think certain thoughts, and this tendency, which may be easily nullified or modified by changed conditions, arises from our ancestors having done these actions for generation after generation, until the doing became a habit, the predisposition to which is transmitted from parent to child. Instinct is the accumulated experience of the race impressed upon the yet unborn creature, and, unless checked, moulding many of its habits before any personal thought or experience comes in. And so intuition represents the result of the cumulated experience of the race, transmitted to the individual."

"We admit," the Theistic writer says (p. 55), "that it is difficult for the uninitiated to trace any affinity between its normal and its abnormal manifestations, when it is modified by circumstances to any extent. We farther admit that, while never entirely absent, it may sometimes seem to slumber, not only in stray individuals, but in a race or an era, and be transmitted from generation to generation in a latent state. It may hibernate, and then awake as from the sleep of years, arising against the will of its possessor, and refusing to be silenced. Almost any phenomenon may call it forth, and no single phenomenon can quench it. It is the spontaneous utterance of the soul in presence of the object whose existence it attests, and as such it is necessarily prior to any act

of reflection upon its character, validity, or significance. Reflex thought, which is the product of experience, cannot in any case originate an intuition, or account for those phenomena which we may call by that name, supposing them to be delusive. Nothing in us, from the simplest instinct to the loftiest intuition, could in any sense create the object it attests, or after which it seeks and feels. And all our ultimate principles, irreducible by analysis, simply attest and assert.

"The very existence of the intuition of which we now speak is itself a revelation, because pointing to a Revealer within or behind itself. And, however crude in its elementary forms, it manifests itself in its highest and purest state at once as an act of intelligence and of faith. [On page 114 we have already quoted from Mr. George H. Lewes on intuition. We not only deny the possibility of intuition, independent of or preceding experience, but we urge that the writer, in saying that "any phenomenon may call it forth," really admits that what he calls intuition is a judgment on events.] It proclaims a supreme existence without and beyond the mind, which it apprehends in the act of revealing itself."

But the nature of the proclamation depends on the inherited thought-ability and predisposition, and on the conditions of thought-activity; and the "proclamation" varies with each individual variation. The acute writer seems to overlook that he alleges "God" revealing himself directly to the individual in the intuition, and yet speaks of abnormal manifestations of this revelation, and concedes that the revelation may seem to slumber in a race or an era. To ourselves—denying, as we do, the possibility of intuition, except as explained on page 114—the writer's own candid admissions are fatal to his case. Seeking to describe in some degree the character of the intuition to which he appeals as evidence, he says (p. 57): "It is one thing to create or evolve (even unconsciously) a mental image of ourselves, which we vainly attempt to magnify to infinity, and thereafter worship the image that our minds have framed; it is another to discern for a moment an august Presence *other than the human*, through a break in the clouds which usually veil him from our eyes. And it is to the inward recognition of this self-revealing object that the Theist makes appeal. What he discerns is at least not a 'form of his mind's own throwing;' while his know-

ledge is due not to the penetration of his own finite spirit, but to the condescension of the infinite."

This is an emotional declaration, not a reasonable argument; no reply can be given to it, for it advances no plea capable of analysis for the existence of God.

"Our knowledge," says the writer, p. 58, "of the object which intuition discloses is at first, in all cases, necessarily unreflective. In the presence of that object, the mind does not double back upon itself, to scrutinise the origin and test the accuracy of the report that has reached it. And thus the truth which it apprehends is at first only presumptive. It remains to be afterwards tested by reflection, that no allusion be mistaken for reality. What, then, are the tests of our intuitions? There are sundry elements in every intuition on which we do not here enlarge, as they are necessary features rather than criteria, characteristics rather than tests. Two of them may be merely stated: 1st., Every intuition is ultimate, and carries its own evidence within itself; it cannot appeal to any higher witness beyond itself: and, 2nd., The fact or facts which it proclaims, while irreducible by analysis, must be incapable of any other explanation."

Here there is no fact proclaimed, the words "supreme existence," "august presence," are not the counters for expressing concepts of fact; they are only fine sounds which avoid instead of proclaiming, which hide instead of making clear.

"The following seem sufficient criteria of their validity and trustworthiness: 1st. The persistence with which they appear and reappear after experimental reflection upon them, the obstinacy with which they reassert themselves when silenced, the tenacity with which they cling to us. 2nd. Their historical permanence; the confirmation of ages and of generations. The hold they have upon the general mind of the race is the sign of some 'root of endurance' planted firmly in the soil of human nature. If 'deep in the general heart of men, their power survives,' we may accept them as true, or interpret them as a phase of some deeper yet kindred truth, of which they are the popular distortion. [Unlike Schelling, who contended for an intellectual intuition not common to all men, but the endowment only of a few of the privileged (George H. Lewes' "History of Philosophy," vol. ii., p. 521), the Theistic writer we are quoting contends for an intuition "common

to all," but he fails to furnish an atom of evidence either of the existence or of the "historical permanence" of any such intuition.] 3rd. The interior harmony which they exhibit with each other, and with the rest of our psychological nature; each of the intuitions being in harmony with the entire circle, and with the whole realm of knowledge. If any alleged intuition should come into collision with any other and disturb it, there would be good reason for suspecting its genuineness; and in that case the lower and less authenticated must always yield to the higher and better attested. But if the critical intellect carrying our intuition (if we may so speak in a figure) round the circle of our nature, and in turn placing it in juxtaposition with the rest, finds that no collision ensues, we may safely conclude that the witness of that intuition is true. [No clear intuitions have even been alleged by the writer; it is, therefore, impossible to plead harmony between them. The Theistic writer even admits that the special intuition, which is his whole evidence, is on its first use "crude, dim, and inarticulate." Dim and inarticulate intuitions can hardly be expected to come into collision with each other.] 4th. If the results of its action and influence are such as to elevate and etherealise our nature, its validity may be assumed. This is no test by itself, for an erroneous belief might for a time even elevate the mind that held it; as the intellectual life evoked by many of the erroneous theories and exploded hypotheses of the past has been great. But no error could do so permanently. No illusion could survive as an educative and elevating power over humanity; and no alleged instinct could sustain its claim, and vindicate its presumptive title, if it could not stand the test we mention. [The answer here is that the "Theistic faith" has not been found "permanently educative and elevating." Its moral leverage is not denied, but is affirmed to have been injurious. Education and elevation have been in degree proportionate to the emancipation of the mind from Theistic faith.] A theoretic error is seen to be such when we attempt to reduce it to practice; as a hidden crack or fissure in a metal becomes visible when a strain is applied, or the folly of an ideal Utopia is seen in the actual life of a mixed commonwealth. Many of those scientific guesses which have served as good provisional hypotheses, have been abandoned in the actual working of them out; and so the flaw that lurks within an alleged intuition (if there be a flaw), will become apparent

when we try to apply it in actual life, and take it as a regulative principle in action. Thus, take the belief in the divine existence, attested, as we affirm, by intuition, and apply it in the act of worship or adoration. Does that belief (which fulfils the conditions of our previous tests, for it appears everywhere and clings tenaciously to man, and comes into collision with no other normal tendency of our nature, or defrauds any instinct of its due) does it elevate the nature of him who holds it? The reply of history is conclusive, and its attestation is abundantly clear. The power of the Theistic faith over the rest of human nature is such that it has quickened the other faculties into a more vigorous life. Its moral leverage has been vast, while it has sharpened the æsthetic sense to some of its more delicate perceptions, and in some instances brought a new accession of intellectual power."

Though we have stated the tests and criteria of the argument sought to be maintained in favour of intuition so fully that we believe the Theistic writer will be satisfied with our fairness, it will be seen that we utterly deny that any intuition has been shown to exist coming within those tests. Every fact alleged to be evidenced by intuition can be reduced and explained by analysis, unless the alleged fact be so vaguely stated that it is utterly useless and impracticable to attempt its examination.

The Theistic writer adds (p. 59):—"It is not only essential to the validity of the Theistic intuition that the human mind has a positive though imperfect knowledge of the infinite, but the assertion of this is involved in the very intuition itself. If we had no positive knowledge of the source it seeks to reach, the instinct, benumbed as by an intellectual frost, and unable to rise, would be fatally paralysed; or if it could move along its finite area, it would wander helplessly, feeling after its object, 'if haply it might find it.' And it will be found that all who deny the validity of our intuition, either limit us to the knowledge of phenomena, or, while admitting that we have a certain knowledge of finite substance, adopt the cold theory of nescience."

"Comte, Lewes, Mill, Mr. Bain, Herbert Spencer, and the majority of our best scientific guides (however they differ in its detail) agree in the common postulate that all that man can know, and intelligibly reason about, are phenomena, and the laws of these phenomena, 'that which doth appear.'"

On this the reader is especially referred to the chapter on "The Relativity of Human Knowledge," by J. S. Mill, in his Examination of Sir W. Hamilton.

"With us," says the *British Quarterly Review* writer (p. 62,) "the relativity of knowledge is a first principle in philosophy. But to affirm it, is merely to assert that all that is known occupies a fixed relation to the knower. It is to affirm nothing as to the character or contents of his knowledge. As regards the objects known, we further maintain that they are apprehended only in their differences and contrasts. We know self only in its contrast with what is not self, a particular portion of matter only in its relation to other portions which surround and transcend it. So also, and for the same reason, with the finite and infinite. The one is not a positive notion, and the other negative; the one clear, and the other obscure. Both are equally clear, both sharply defined, so far as they are given us in relation. If the one notion suffers, the other suffers with it. In short, if we discharge any notion from all relation with its opposite or contrary, it ceases to be a notion at all. The finite, if we take it alone, is as inconceivable as the infinite, if we take it alone; phenomena by themselves are as incogitable as substance by itself, and the relative as a notion cut off from the absolute which antithetically bounds it, is not more intelligible than the absolute as an essence absolved from all relations. And thus the entire fabric of our knowledge being founded on contrasts, and arising out of differences, involving in its every datum another element hidden in the background, may be said to be a vast double chain of relatives mutually complementary. It looks ever in two directions, without and within, above and beneath, before and after.

"We maintain, therefore, that we have positive knowledge of the infinite. Whosoever says that the infinite cannot be known contradicts himself. For he must possess a notion of it before he can deny that he has a positive knowledge of it, before he can predict aught regarding it. And so he says he cannot know what he says, though in another fashion, that he does know. It could never have come within the horizon of hypothetical knowledge, never have become the subject of discussion, unless positively (though inadequately) known; and thus the infinite stands as the antithetic background of the finite."

If by taking the finite "alone" is meant thinking any

phenomena as entirely sole and utterly out of relation to ourselves or any other phenomenon or phenomena, then undoubtedly "the finite if we take it alone is inconceivable;" but if it is meant that an ounce of lead taken alone is as inconceivable as an illimitable number of undefined quantities of undescribed material, then we deny the writer's position. Positive knowledge of the indefinable is a contradiction in terms.

"But," answers the *British Quarterly Review* writer (p. 64), "it is objected that as human knowledge is always finite, we can never have a positive apprehension of an infinite object; that as the subject of knowledge is necessarily finite, its object must be the same. Let us sift this objection.

"I may know an object in itself as related to me the knower, or I may know it in its relation to other objects also known to me the knower. But in both and all cases, knowledge is limited by the power of the knower; therefore, it is always finite knowledge. But it may be finite knowledge of an infinite object, incomplete knowledge of a complete object, partial knowledge of a transcendent object. The boundary or fence may be within the faculty of the knower, while the object he imperfectly grasps may not only be infinite, but be known to transcend his faculties in the very act of conscious knowledge. For example, I may know that a line is infinite, while I have only a finite knowledge of the points along which that line extends. And similarly my knowledge of the Infinite Mind is partial and incomplete, but it is clear and defined. It is a definite knowledge of an indefinite object. We may have a partial knowledge not only of a part, but of the whole. Thus I have a partial knowledge of a circle, because I know only a few of its properties; but it is not to a part of the circle that my partial knowledge extends, but to the whole which I know in part. In like manner, as the Infinite Object has no parts, it is not of a portion of his being that we possess a partial knowledge, but of the whole. We know him as we know the circle, inadequately yet directly, immediately, though in part."

Here again we have a trick of words. I cannot know more of a line than my knowledge "of the points along which that line extends." I may believe there is a beyond; I do not know it, because each point known is an addition to my finite line. Then there is no fair transition in thought from the line finite to the line infinite. The first is think-

able, the second is unthinkable, for one point of the line, being always in reach of the thinker, the line cannot accurately be termed infinite; the knowledge of the thinker limits it in one part, and a limitation of the infinite is, again, a contradiction in terms. Still less can this be urged as evidence of "knowledge of infinite mind," for the last two words are meaningless.

"Again," argues the writer in the *British Quarterly Review* (p. 64), "it is said that to know the infinite is to know the sum of all reality, and as that would include the universe and its source together, it must necessarily include, on the one hand, the knower along with his knowledge, and on the other, all the possibilities of existence. The possibility of our knowing the Infinite Being as distinct from the universe is denied, since infinite existence is said to be co-extensive with the whole universe of things. But that the source of the universe must necessarily exhaust existence, and contain within himself all actual being, is a mere theoretic assumption. The presence of the finite does not limit the infinite, as if the area of the latter were contracted by so much of the former as exists within it. For the relation of the infinite being to the finite is not similar to the relation between infinite space and a segment of it. It is true that so much of finite space is so much cut out of the whole area of infinite space—though, if the remainder is infinite, the portion removed will not really limit it. [First, space is only conceivable as the area of extension of some object, or the measure of distance between two or more objects, or as the area beyond some object. Infinite space is unthinkable, except as the area of extension of some unmeasured object. We cannot, except by a misuse of words, speak of cutting "so much" "out of the *whole* area of infinite space." The word "whole" is definite. The word "infinite" is the equivalent for inability to define.] But as our intuition of the infinite has no resemblance to our knowledge of space, we believe that the relations which their respective objects sustain have no affinity with each other. The intuition of God is a purely spiritual revelation, informing us not of the quantity, but of the quality, of the Supreme Being in the universe. And to affirm that the finite spirit of man standing in a fixed relation to the infinite spirit of God limits it, by virtue of that relation, is covertly to introduce a partial concept into a region to which it is utterly foreign, and which it has no right to enter." But if spiritual knowledge of

God deals with his quality only, and not with his quantity, why should a word be employed to describe him which is usable of quantity only and not of quality? To speak of a spirit as "infinite" does not tell us anything of its quality; it might be good, bad, or indifferent, loving or hating, holy or wicked, and yet, if boundless, would rightly be described as infinite. But, however admirable the quality, the spirit is not infinite unless boundless, not only in our ignorance of its bounds, but in reality. To employ the term *infinite* as though it were an equivalent of *perfect*, is a loose use of words which destroys all accuracy of thought.

"Similarly," continues the Theistic writer of the above *Review*, "with the action of the infinite and absolute *cause*. The creative energy of that cause is not inconsistent with its changelessness. To say so, is to introduce a quantitative notion into a sphere when quality is alone to be considered. A cause in action is the force which determines the changes which occur in time. But the *primum mobile*, the first cause, need not be itself changed by the forth-putting of its causal power.

"We therefore maintain, in opposition to the teachers of nescience, that a positive knowledge of the infinite is competent to man, because involved in his very consciousness of the finite. And when psychologically analysed, this intuition explains and vindicates itself."

Our answer is, that man has no conception whatever, either innate or acquired, of "infinite God." Thus Sir William Hamilton (in his "Discussions on Philosophy" page 12) says: "The unconditioned is incognisable and inconceivable, its notion being only the negative of the conditioned, which last can alone be positively known or conceived.....The unconditionally unlimited, or the infinite, cannot possibly be construed to the mind."

Mansel says: "To be conscious, we must be conscious of something; and that something can only be known, as that which it is, by being distinguished from that which it is not. But distinction is necessarily limitation; for, if one object is to be distinguished from another, it must possess some form of existence which the other has not, or it must not possess some form which the other has.....A consciousness of the Infinite as such thus necessarily involves a self-contradiction; for it implies the recognition, by limitation and difference, of that which can only be given as unlimited and indifferent. That a man can be conscious of the infi-

nite is thus a supposition which, in the very terms in which it is expressed, annihilates itself. Consciousness is essentially a limitation; for it is the determination of the mind to one actual out of many possible modifications. But the infinite, if it is to be conceived at all, must be conceived as potentially everything and actually nothing; for, if there is anything in general which it cannot become, it is thereby limited; and, if there is anything in particular which it actually is, it is thereby excluded from being any other thing. But, again, it must also be conceived as actually everything and potentially nothing; for an unrealised potentiality is likewise a limitation. If the infinite can be that which it is not, it is by that very possibility marked out as incomplete, and capable of a higher perfection. If it is actually everything, it possesses no characteristic feature by which it can be distinguished from anything else, and discerned as an object of consciousness. This contradiction, which is utterly inexplicable on the supposition that the infinite is a positive object of human thought, is at once accounted for when it is regarded as [or rather admitted to be] the mere negation of thought. If all thought is limitation—if whatever we conceive is, by the very act of conception, regarded as finite—the *infinite*, from a human point of view, is merely a name for the absence of those conditions under which thought is possible. To speak of a *conception of the infinite* is, therefore, at once to affirm those conditions and to deny them. The contradiction which we discover in such a conception is only that which we have ourselves placed there, by tacitly assuming the conceivability of the inconceivable. The condition of consciousness is distinction, and the condition of distinction is limitation. We can have no consciousness of Being in general which is not some Being in particular: a thing, in consciousness, is one thing out of many. In assuming the possibility of an infinite object of consciousness, I assume, therefore, that it is at the same time limited and unlimited—actually something, without which it could not be an object of consciousness, and actually nothing, without which it could not be infinite" (Bampton Lectures, by Dean Mansel, pp. 71—73).

The whole of the foregoing division of Theistic argument is based on the fallacy of innate ideas. Locke, in his "Essay on Understanding," took plain stand against this fallacy. "If it shall be demanded," he says, "when a man begins to have any ideas? I think the true answer is, when he first

has any sensation." Lewes, in his "Problems of Life and Mind," vol. i. p. 236, says: "Neither observation nor reflection warrants the supposition that the infant.....has on entering the world innate ideas.....What is i nate or connate, is the structure which will react under stimulus in certain definite ways, and these reactions will depend on the degree of development which the structure has acquired .....all perception, consequently all conception, is the product of the reaction of the organism stimulated by the cosmos, which is saying in other words that all ou knowledge had its origin in experience—the registration of such reactions. And this is further confirmed by the fact that on the one hand the development of the organism has its prescribed course, any interference with the series of successive stages causing another form of structure to result, while, on the other hand, any interference with the normal course of experience will correspondingly affect the result; so that even results, which have the fixed character of instincts, may be frustrated by an interruption of the prescribed course of evolution."

Leaving the pure Theistic argument, we take another phase of the pleading for religion.

Joseph Butler, Bishop of Durham, born 1692, died 1752, in his famous "Analogy of Religion," has some points which here require notice, rather from the reputation of the writer than for the real merit of his arguments. It must not be forgotten that Butler's "Analogy" is only available in the hands of the orthodox, and for use against persons already believing in a God, for he takes it "for proved that there is an intelligent author of nature and natural governor of the world" (Introduction, p. xxviii.).

Chapter 1 of Part I. of the "Analogy of Religion" treats of a future life, and professes to argue from the analogy of nature. Bishop Butler never says what he means by the word *nature*, and he sometimes uses it in senses inconsistent with the fashion which he gives to it at other times. By nature, as before explained (see page 112), we mean the totality of existence, including in this all actual and past phenomena, all possible phenomena, and all that is or has been necessary for the happening of phenomena. Bishop Butler says, section 1, that "we find it to be a general law of nature" that human beings "should exist in degrees of life, in one period of their being greatly different from those appointed them in another," and adds, "therefore that we

are to exist hereafter in a state as different (suppose from our present) as this is from our former, is but according to the analogy of nature." Here "law of nature" is not defined, but, most clearly, it is not meant to signify merely "observed order of event," which is the definition we should give to it, for Bishop Butler uses the word "appointed," which, read by the light of his assumption "that there is an intelligent author of nature and natural governor," would make "law of nature" equivalent to a commandment issued to nature by this author and governor. The argument fails; the analogy is rather that, as the human being commences, grows, arrives at his prime, decays and finishes, so the death or finish will be the end, as the generation was the beginning. To make any analogy, Bishop Butler ought to show the individual life before the body began, as a ground for presuming the individual life continuing after the body had finished.

In section 2 of the same chapter the Bishop writes: "We know that we are endowed with capacities of action, of happiness, and misery. Now that we have these powers and capacities before death is a presumption that we shall retain them through and after death; indeed a probability of it abundantly sufficient to act upon, unless there be some positive reason to think that death is the destruction of those living powers." This argument would be quite as valid if it ran: "that we have these powers and capacities after birth is a presumption that we possessed them before birth." The words "living powers," in this argument, are loosely substituted for "capacities of action," and two paragraphs later these living powers get changed into "living agents." Giving the Bishop credit for sincerity of intention, these changes of phraseology are most unfortunate, as they obscure the argument and confuse the reader. A bucket has a capacity for holding water; knocking out the bottom of the bucket finishes the capacity; no such capacity belongs to the bottomless pail, and no sane person would think of arguing that the holding capacity was a holding power, or holding agent, enduring after the pail had been knocked to pieces.

The Bishop says that "destruction of living powers is a manner of expression unavoidably ambiguous;" but that it is used in the sense of "the destruction of a living being, so as that the same living being shall be incapable of ever perceiving or acting again at all."

To prevent as far as possible the misapprehension likely

to arise from the repetition of undefined words, we deny any "living powers" other than "life;" and, excluding vegetable life, define life to mean the total normal organic functional activity of each animal—varying in different animals, and varying in the same animal at different dates between its generation and death. The separate individual life commences with the birth, and death is the cessation of life. Dr. Maudsley ("Body and Mind," p. 162), after arguing that vitality is not a special principle but a result, which will be ultimately explainable by operation of so-called molecular forces, says :—"It is desirable to examine into that which is generally deemed to constitute the specialty of life. Now it is certain, when we consider the vast range of vitality, from the simple life of a molecule or cell to the complex life of man, that valid objections may be made to any definition of life. If it be wide enough to comprise all forms, it will be too vague to have any value; if narrow enough to be exact, it will exclude the most lowly forms. The problem is, to investigate the conditions of the manifestation of life. A great fault in many attempted definitions has been the description of life as a resistance or complete contrast to the rest of nature, which was supposed to be continually striving to destroy it. But the elements of organic matter are not different from those of the inorganic, whence they are derived, and to which they return; and the chemical and mechanical forces of these elements cannot be suspended or removed within the organism. What is special is the manner of composition of the elements; there is a concurrence of manifold substances, and they are combined or grouped together in a very complex way. Such union or grouping is, however, only a further advance upon, and by no means a contrast to, the kind of combination which is met with in inorganic bodies. Life is not a contrast to non-living nature, but a further development of it. The more knowledge advances, the more plainly is it shown that there are physical and chemical processes upon which life depends. Heat is produced by combustion in the organism, as it is in the fire; starch is converted into sugar there, as it is in the chemical laboratory; urea, which is so constant a product of the body's chemistry, can be formed artificially by the chemist; and the process of excitation in a nerve, on the closure of a constant stream, appears to be analogous to the process of electrolysis, in which hydrogen is given off at the negative pole. The peculiarity of life is the complexity of combina-

tion in so small a space, the intimate operation of many simultaneously acting forces in the microcosm of the organic cell."

An anonymous writer says: "Life is that state of an organised body in which all the organs concerned perform their individual and collective functions. Health is that state of an organised body in which *all* the organs perform their individual and collective functions, and perform them well. Disease is that state of an organised body in which one or more of the organs fail to perform their functions, or to perform them well. Death is that state of an organised body in which all the organs of life cease to perform the functions of life" ("Biology *versus* Theology," No. 6).

Unfortunately, Bishop Butler not only refrains from any definition, but uses the words "living powers" and "living agents," without regard to accuracy. With him "living agent" is repeated, without any proof, as if it were an identifiable spiritual entity. On this point Dr. Maudsley well puts it: "The burden of proving that the *Deus ex machinâ* of a spiritual entity intervenes somewhere, and where it intervenes, clearly lies upon those who make the assertion, or who need the hypothesis. They are not justified in arbitrarily fabricating an hypothesis entirely inconsistent with experience of the orderly development of nature, which even postulates a domain of nature that human senses cannot take any cognisance of, and in then calling upon those who reject their assumption to disprove it" ("Body and Mind," p. 162).

A confusion more complete, arising from the loose use of words, is even found in the same section (2) of Butler's "Analogy," when the Bishop, arguing for the presumption of continuance, says: "It seems our only reason for believing that any one substance now existing will continue to exist a moment longer—the self-existent substance only excepted." This assumes, without any proof, that there are several substances, and that there is one substance distinguishable from the others as "the self-existent." Probably the Bishop used the words, "any one substance," relatively, of phenomena, but he says nothing to that effect; and his "self-existent substance" is either the "intelligent author of nature," or exists besides nature and its author.

The apprehension of death, as the end of living, "must arise," we are told, "either from the reason of the thing, or from the analogy of nature."

"But," says Bishop Butler, "we cannot argue, from the reason of the thing, that death is the destruction of living agents, because we know not at all what death is in itself, but only some of its effects, such as the dissolution of flesh, skin, and bones; and these effects do in nowise appear to imply the destruction of a living agent." A billiard ball rolls, a man lives; break the billiard ball perfectly in half, neither of the halves will roll; knock off the man's head, he cannot live. Just as there is no "rolling agent" other than the striker and his cue, so there is no living agent other than the food and necessary sustenance for the living man. As an argument from analogy, Bishop Butler's is worthless.

The Bishop further urges that "sleep, or a swoon, shows us that not only these (living) powers exist when they are not exercised, as the passive power of motion does in inanimate matter, but shows also that they exist when there is no present capacity of exercising them; or that the capacity of exercising them for the present, as well as the actual exercise of them, may be suspended, and yet the powers themselves remain undestroyed." Life is not suspended in sleep; and the analogy here is utterly wanting. In a perfect swoon there is no consciousness, but there is not suspended vitality; the person in the swoon continues to live, although the activity of some of the functions is suspended.

"Nor," says the Bishop, "can we find anything through the whole analogy of nature to afford us even the slightest presumption that animals ever lose their *living powers;* much less, if it were possible, that they lose them by death; for we have no faculties wherewith to trace any beyond or through it, so as to see what becomes of them." If for the two words italicised the word "life" be substituted, as it ought properly to be, for no living powers have been shown other than life, then the utter nonsense of the Bishop's position becomes apparent. Go into a slaughter-house, and watch the butcher. Is there no presumption that the oxen, calves, and sheep he slaughters lose their lives? Oh! answers Bishop Butler, death "destroys the sensible proof which we had before their death of their being possessed of living powers, but does not appear to afford the least reason to believe that they are then, or by that event, deprived of them. And our knowing that they were possessed of these powers up to the very period to which we have faculties

capable of tracing them is itself a probability of their retaining them beyond it."

"All presumption," says the Bishop, "of death's being the destruction of living beings must go upon the supposition that they are compounded, and so discerptible. But, since consciousness is a single and indivisible power, it should seem that the subject in which it resides must be so too." "Consciousness" is used by Bishop Butler as identical with "perception;" and "perceptive power" is used at meaning "the power of consciousness;" and "the subject in which it resides" is termed "the conscious being." In truth, consciousness is a varying quantity, being the sum of our remembered perceptions, and of our thinkings on such perceptions. On this question of consciousness Lewes says ("Biog. Hist. of Philosophy," vol. i., p. 369): "Perception is nothing more than a state of the percipient—*i.e.*, a state of consciousness. This state may be occasioned by some external cause, and may be as complex as the cause is complex; but it is still nothing more than a state of consciousness—an effect produced by an adequate cause. Of every change in our sensation we are conscious, and in time we learn to give definite names and forms to the causes of these changes. But in the fact of consciousness there is nothing beyond consciousness. In our perceptions we are conscious only of the changes which have taken place within us: we can never transcend the sphere of our own consciousness; we can never go out of ourselves, and become aware of the objects which caused these changes. All we can do is to identify certain external appearances with certain internal changes—*e.g.*, to identify the appearance we name 'fire' with certain sensations we have known to follow our being placed near it. Turn the fact of consciousness how we will, we can see nothing in it but the change of a sentient being operated by some external cause. Consciousness is no mirror of the world; it gives no faithful reflection of things as they are *per se;* it only gives a faithful report of its own modification as excited by external things."

Having thus affirmed "a single and indivisible power," and asserted that "it is as easy to conceive that we may exist out of bodies as in them," Bishop Butler goes on:—"We see by experience, that men may lose their limbs, their organs of sense, and even the greatest part of their bodies, and yet remain the same living agents. And persons can trace up the existence of themselves to a time

when the bulk of their bodies was extremely small, in comparison with what it is in mature age; and we cannot but think that they might then have lost a considerable part of that small body, and yet have remained the same living agents, as they may now lose great part of their present body and remain so." First, it is not true that the "life" continues, or has continued, the same. "Life" is increased with the growth from babyhood, and is diminished by every diminution of body. Although it may be difficult to estimate the change in thinking-ability consequent on the loss of "any organ of sense," yet, as perceptive ability is certainly the foundation of all consciousness, injury must necessarily result to consciousness from loss of organs of perception. It is not true that men lose their spines, their heads, or their hearts, and continue to live at all; yet Bishop Butler goes on to say, "We have already, several times over, lost a great part, or perhaps the whole, of our body, according to certain common established laws of nature, yet we remain the same living agents; when we shall lose as great a part, or the whole, by another common established law of nature, death, why may we not also remain the same." It will, of course, be replied that the Bishop does not mean a total sudden loss, but a gradual change. In truth, with his usual looseness of expression, the Bishop applies "lose" to a limb, meaning that the limb is totally and suddenly lost, while in the same sentence the word "lose" only expresses extremely slow and almost imperceptible change in the whole body. Dr. Maudsley says ("Body and Mind," page 127.): "When we are told that every part of the body is in a constant state of change, that within a certain period every particle of it is renewed, and yet that amidst these changes a man feels that he remains essentially the same, we perceive nothing inconsistent with the idea of the action of a material organ; for it is not absurd to suppose that in the brain the new series of particles take the pattern of those which they replace, as they do in other organs and tissues which are continually changing their substance yet preserve their identity. Even the scar of a wound on the finger is not often effaced, but grows as the body grows; why, then, assume the necessity of an immaterial principle to prevent the impression of an idea from being lost?"

In the second chapter Bishop Butler nominally deals with the government of God by rewards and punishments;

and he maintains that "the whole analogy of nature, the whole present course of things, most fully shows that there is nothing incredible in the general doctrine of religion, that God will reward and punish men for their actions hereafter; nothing incredible, I mean, arising out of the notion of rewarding and punishing, for the whole course of nature is a present instance of His exercising that government over us, which implies in it rewarding and punishing."

The argument on the Bishop's assumption "that there is an intelligent author of nature and natural governor of the world" is only maintainable by ignoring a whole series of contradictions. Punishment is only justifiable as a deterrent from future vicious conduct; but, according to the Bishop, the punishment is to come when there is no longer any possibility of continued vicious conduct. The punishment is not for "the government of the world," but is simply vengeance for past conduct. If God is "governor," either all acts result from his government, or there are some which occur in spite of it. In the last case he is not omnipotent, and in the first case the act is not one that ought to be punished. The Bishop strives to meet this and similar objections by urging (Part I., cap. 7) that analogy "makes it credible that his (God's) moral government must be a scheme quite beyond our comprehension." But, surely, the utter incomprehensibility of a scheme ought not to be urged as a ground for its acceptance. See on the question of punishment Emile de Girardin's "Droit de Punir," and Jeremy Bentham's works especially.

The theory of government by rewards and punishments is very vaguely stated by Bishop Butler. "Pain," as the "consequence" of certain actions, seems to be regarded by the Bishop as arranged by God; but pain may be incurred in doing a good action. A courageous man breaks his collar bone in rescuing some people from that which, without his interference, would have been almost certain death. According to the theory of Bishop Butler, the pain of the broken collar bone is a punishment knowingly inflicted by the intelligent author of nature on the brave rescuer. In chapter 6 the Bishop treats of "necessity as influencing practice," and as this seems inseparable from the problem of punishment, we here give, with slight modification, two extracts from John Stuart Mill—one on Freewill, the other on Punishment—first remarking that Necessitarianism and Fatalism are no co-equivalent terms. The Fatalist says what is, is,

and must be, could not have been otherwise, and cannot be altered. The Necessitarian says what is, is, and must have resulted from such and such conditions; but the conditions might have been varied, and the results would then have been different:—

"What experience makes known is the fact of an invariable sequence between every event and some special combination of antecedent conditions—in such sort that, wherever and whenever that union of antecedents exists, the event does not fail to occur. Any *must* in the case, any necessity, other than the unconditional universality of the fact we know nothing of.

"Now, the so-called Necessitarians demand the application of the same rule of judgment to our volitions. They maintain that there is the same evidence for it. They affirm, as a truth of experience, that volitions do, in point of fact, follow determinate antecedents with the same uniformity, and (when we have sufficient knowledge of the circumstances) with the same certainty as other effects follow their causes" ("Examination of Sir W. Hamilton," p. 561).

"The feeling of liability to punishment is of two kinds. It may mean expectation that, if we act in a certain manner, punishment will actually be inflicted upon us by our fellow-creatures or by a Supreme Power. Or it may only mean, knowing that we shall deserve that infliction.

"The first of these cannot, in any correct meaning of the term, be designated as a consciousness. If we believe that we shall be punished for doing wrong, it is because the belief has been taught to us by our parents and tutors, or by our religion, or is generally held by those who surround us, or because we have ourselves come to the conclusion by reasoning, or from the experience of life. This is not consciousness. And, by whatever name it is called, its evidence is not dependent on any theory of the spontaneousness of volition. The punishment of guilt in another world is believed with undoubting conviction by Turkish Fatalists and by professed Christians, who are not only Necessitarians, but believe that the majority of mankind were divinely predestined from all eternity to sin, and to be punished for sinning. It is not, therefore, the belief that we shall be *made* accountable, which can be deemed to require or presuppose the freewill hypothesis; it is the belief that we ought so to be; that we are justly accountable; that guilt deserves punishment" (p. 571).

"The real question is one of justice—the legitimacy of retribution or punishment. On the theory of necessity, we are told, a man cannot help acting as he does; and it cannot be just that he should be punished for what he cannot help. Not if the expectation of punishment enables him to help it, and is the only means by which he can be enabled to help it?

"To say that he cannot help it is true or false, according to the qualification with which the assertion is accompanied. Supposing him to be of a vicious disposition, he cannot help doing the criminal act, if he is allowed to believe that he will be able to commit it unpunished. If, on the contrary, the impression is strong on his mind that a heavy punishment will follow, he can, and in most cases does, help it.

"The question deemed to be so puzzling is, how punishment can be justified, if men's actions are determined by motives, among which motives punishment is one. A more difficult question would be, how it can be justified if they are not so determined? Punishment proceeds on the assumption that the will is governed by motives. If punishment had no power of acting on the will, it would be illegitimate, however natural might be the inclination to inflict it. Just so far as the will is supposed free—that is, capable of acting *against* motives—punishment is disappointed of its object and deprived of its justification.

"There are two ends which, on the Necessitarian theory, are sufficient to justify punishment: the benefit of the offender himself, and the protection of others. The first justifies it, because to benefit a person cannot be to do him an injury. To punish him for his own good, provided the inflictor has any proper title to constitute himself a judge, is no more unjust than to administer medicine. As far, indeed, as respects the criminal himself, the theory of punishment is that, by counterbalancing the influence of present temptations or acquired bad habits, it restores the mind to that normal preponderance of the love of right which many moralists and theologians consider to constitute the true definition of our freedom. In its other aspect, punishment is a precaution taken by society in self-defence. To make this just, the only condition required is, that the end which society is attempting to enforce by punishment should be a just one. Used as a means of aggression by society on the just rights of the individual, punishment is unjust. Used to protect the just rights of others against unjust aggression

by the offender, it is just. If it is possible to have just rights (which is the same thing as to have rights at all), it cannot be unjust to defend them. Freewill or no free-will, it is just to punish so far as is necessary for this purpose, as it is just to put a wild beast to death (without unnecessary suffering) for the same object" (p. 578).

A writer in the *Westminster Review* for April, 1876, p. 459, says:—"Punishment, as a human institution, is warranted by our very helplessness, by the inability in which we are of producing, otherwise than through the infliction of suffering, that mental change in an offender which alone can render him compatible with the existence of his fellow creatures. But what ground shall we assign for punishment when we suppose it inflicted by a Deity? Granting all the previous difficulties solved, putting aside the question of the origin of evil, putting aside the hypothesis of a creator, still more so of an omnipotent creator, and considering the Deity simply as a ruler, what reason would he have for instituting suffering? Does he institute it in his own defence, or solely in the interest of transgressors? On either supposition the end might be secured by better means. The infliction of punishment is regarded as a defect, even by our poor human educators; their business is to govern by developing the sympathies, by moral suasion, by the influence of high example, and in proportion as they fail in this, they give the measure of their incapacity. How much more, then, must severity be discreditable to a Deity? If our penal legislators find that it is possible to reform criminals, even when taken at maturity, if the progress of our civilisation has been marked by a progressive mildness in our codes, and if the duration of each penalty is being made, as far as possible, dependent on the offender's own behaviour, must we not expect a policy benigner still from God, who has the moulding of his charges from their earliest hour, and who can act directly on their minds? If, with such an expectation, we turn to Christianity, our disappointment will indeed be great. Not one of God's punishments is educational; all have the character of wanton ferocity. They are neither made to depend on the offender's subsequent behaviour, nor do they exhibit any proportionality to the transgression; the code of providence is infinitely worse than Draco's, since even death is not allowed to put an end to the transgressor's sufferings. Adam, having sinned once, is punished

for ever; and as the punishment is maximum, whatever subsequent disobedience Adam may commit, he cannot deserve worse than eternal damnation. We might at least imagine that if this first infliction is not intended as a check on Adam's conduct, it is intended as a check on his descendants. Not at all, the maximum penalty is pronounced for Adam's sin on his descendants also! We shall pursue no further; the exposition of such a scheme as this is an outrage on the reader's understanding."

In chapter 3 Bishop Butler says:—"When we speak of God's natural government of the world, it implies government of the very same kind with that which a master exercises over his servant, or a civil magistrate over his subjects." Surely there is no analogy here, the master does not create his servant, the civil magistrate is neither omniscient nor omnipotent. The subject may rebel to overthrow the civil governor; the servant may escape from the control of the master. Does Bishop Butler mean that any similar contingencies are conceivable of God and his creatures? But adds Bishop Butler:—"This alone does not appear, at first sight, to determine anything certainly concerning the moral character of the author of nature, considered in this relation of governor, does not ascertain his government to be moral, or to prove that he is the righteous judge of the world. Moral government consists, not barely in rewarding and punishing men for their actions, which the most tyrannical person may do; but in rewarding the righteous and punishing the wicked; in rendering to men according to their actions, considered as good or evil. And the perfection of moral government consists in doing this, with regard to all intelligent creatures, in an exact proportion to their personal merits or demerits.'

One answer alone is needed to this, viz., that in no sense can the award of "eternal torment" be considered as "in an exact proportion to the offence for which it is the punishment."

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THE TWLEVE APOSTLES

BY

CHARLES BRADLAUGH

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THE TWELVE APOSTLES

BY CHARLES BRADLAUGH.

ALL good Christians, indeed all Christians — for are there any who are not models of goodness? — will desire that their fellow-creatures who are unbelievers should have the fullest possible information, biographical or otherwise, as as to the twelve persons specially chosen by Jesus to be his immediate followers. The believer, of course, would be equally content with his faith in the absence of all historic vouchers. Indeed a pious worshipper would cling to his creed not only without testimony in its favor, but despite direct testimony against it. It is to those not within the pale of the church that I shall seek to demonstrate the credibility of the history of the twelve apostles. The short biographical sketch here presented is extracted from the first five books of the New Testament, two of which at least are attributed to two of the twelve. It is objected, by heretical men who go as far in their criticisms on the Gospels as Colenso does with the Pentateuch, that not one of the gospels is original or written by any of the apostles; that, on the contrary, they were preceded by numerous writings, since lost or rejected, these in their turn having for their basis the oral tradition which preceded them. It is alleged that the four gospels are utterly anonymous, and that the fourth gospel is subject to strong suspicions of spuriousness. To use on this part of the words of the author of "Supernatural Religion," applied by him to the Acts of the Apostles: "As a general rule, any documents so full of miraculous episodes and supernatural occurrences would, without hesitation, be characterized as fabulous and incredible, and would not, by any sober-minded reader, be for a moment accepted as historical. There is no other testimony." It would be useless to combat, and I therefore boldly ignore these attacks on the authenticity of the text, and proceed with my history. The names of the twelve are as follows — Simon, surnamed Peter; Andrew, his brother; James and John, the sons of Zebedee; Andrew, Philip; Bartholomew; Matthew; James, the son of Alphteus; Simon, the Canaanite; Judas Iscariot; and a twelfth, as to whose name there is some uncertainty; it was either Lebbæus, Thaddæus, or Judas. It is in Matthew alone (x, 3) that the name of Lebbæus is mentioned thus — "Lebbæus, whose surname was Thaddæus." We are told, on this point, by able Biblicists, that the early MSS have not the words "whose surname was Thaddæus," and that these words have probably been inserted to reconcile the gospel according to Matthew with that attributed to Mark. How good must have been the old fathers who sought to improve upon the Holy Ghost by making clear that which inspiration had left doubtful! In the English version of the Rheims Testament used in

this country by our Roman Catholic brethren, the reconciliation between Matthew and Mark is completed by omitting the words "Lebbæus whose surname was," leaving only the name "Thaddæus" in Matthew's text. This omission must be correct, being by the authority of an infallible church, and Dr. Newman shows us that when the church pronounces all doubt is damnable. If Matthew x, 3, and Mark iii, 18, be passed as reconciled, although the first calls the twelfth disciple Lebbæus, and the second gives him the name Thaddæus, there is yet the difficulty that in Luke vi, 16, corroborated by John xiv, 22, there is a disciple spoken of as "Judas, . . not Iscariot." "Judas, *the brother* of James." Commentators have endeavored to clear away this last difficulty by declaring that Thaddæus is a Syriac word, having much the same meaning as Judas. This has been answered by the objection that if Matthew's Gospel uses Thaddæus in lieu of Judas, then he ought to speak of Thaddæus Iscariot, which he does not; and it is further objected also that while there are some grounds for suggesting a Hebrew original for the gospel atttributed to Matthew, there is not the slightest pretence for alleging that Matthew wrote in Syriac. It is to be hoped that the unbelieving reader will not stumble on the threshold of his study because of a little uncertainty as to a name. What is in a name? The Jewish name which we read as Jesus is really Joshua, but the name to which we are most accustomed seems the one we should adhere to.

Simon Peter being the first named amongst the disciples of Jesus, deserves the first place in this notice. The word "Simon" may be rendered, if taken as a Greek name, *flat-nose* or *ugly*. Some of the ancient Greek and Hebrew names are characteristic of peculiarities in the individual, but no one now knows whether Peter's nose had anything to do with his name. Simon is rather a Hebrew name, but Peter is Greek, signifying a rock or stone. Peter is supposed to have the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and his second name may express his stony insensibility to all appeals by infidels for admittance to the celestial regions. Lord Byron's "Vision of Judgment" is the highest known authority as to Saint Peter's celestial duties, but this nobleman's poems are only fit for very pious readers. Peter, ere he became a parson, was by trade a fisher, and when Jesus first saw Peter, the latter was in a vessel fishing with his brother Andrew, casting a net into the sea of Galilee. The calling of Peter and Andrew to the apostleship was sudden, and apparently unexpected. Jesus walking by the sea said to them — "Follow me, and I will make you fishers of men." (Matthew iv, 18-22) The two brothers did so, and they became Christ's disciples. The successors of Peter have since reversed the apostle's early practice: instead of now casting their nets into the sea, the modern representatives of the disciples of Jesus draw the sees into their nets, and, it is believed, find the result much more

profitable. When Jesus called Peter no one was with him but his brother Andrew; a little further on the two sons of Zebedee were in a ship with their father mending nets. This is the account of Peter's call given in the gospel according to Matthew, and as according to the Church Matthew was inspired by the Holy Ghost, who is identical with God the Father, who is one with God the Son, who is Jesus, the account must be free from error. In the Gospel according to John, which is likewise inspired in the same manner, from the same source, and with similar infallibility, we learn that Andrew was originally a disciple of John the Baptist, and that when Andrew first saw Jesus Peter was not present, but Andrew went and found Peter who, if fishing, must have been angling on land, telling him "we have found the Messiah," and that Andrew then brought Peter to Jesus, who said: "Thou art Simon, the son of Jonas; thou shalt be called Cephas." There is no mention in this gospel narrative of the sons of Zebedee being a little further on, or of any fishing in the sea of Galilee. This call is clearly on land, whether or not near the sea of Galilee does not appear. In the Gospel according to Luke, which is as much inspired as either of the two before-mentioned gospels, and, therefore, equally authentic with each of them, we are told (Luke v, 1-11) that when the call took place Jesus and Peter were both at sea. Jesus had been preaching to the people, who, pressing upon him, he got into Simon's ship, from which he preached. After this he directed Simon to put out into the deep and let down the nets. Simon answered: "Master, we have toiled all night, and taken nothing; nevertheless, at thy word I will let down the net." No sooner was this done than the net was filled to breaking, and Simon's partners, the two sons of Zebedee, came to help, when, at the call of Jesus, they brought their ships to land, and followed him. From these accounts the unbeliever may learn that when Jesus called Peter either both Jesus and Peter were on the land, or one was on land and the other on the sea, or both of them were at sea. He may also learn that the sons of Zebedee were present at the time, having come to help to get in the great catch, and were called with Peter; or that they were further on, sitting mending nets with their father, and were called afterwards; or that they were neither present nor near at hand. He may also be assured that Simon was in his ship when Jesus came to call him, and that Jesus was on land when Andrew, Simon's brother, found Simon and brought him to Jesus to be called. The unbeliever must not hesitate because of any apparent incoherence or contradiction in the narrative. The greater the difficulty in believing, the more deserved the reward which only comes to belief. With faith it is easy to harmonise the three narratives above quoted, especially when you know that Jesus had visited Simon's house before the call of Simon, (Luke iv, 38) but did not go to Simon's house until after Simon had been

called (Matthew viii, 14). Jesus went to Simon's house and cured his wife's mother of a fever. Robert Taylor,[1] commenting on the fever-curing miracle, says — "St. Luke tells us that this fever had taken the woman, not that the woman had taken the fever, and not that the fever was a very bad fever, or a yellow fever, or a scarlet fever, but that it was a great fever — that is, I suppose, a fever six feet high at least; a personal fever, a rational and intelligent fever, that would yield to the power of Jesus's argument, but would never have given way to James's powder. So we are expressly told that Jesus rebuked the fever — that is, he gave it a good scolding; asked it, I dare say, how it could be so unreasonable as to plague the poor old woman so cruelly, and whether it wasn't ashamed of itself; and said, perhaps, *Get out, you naughty wicked fever, you*; and such like objurgatory language, which the fever, not being used to be rebuked in such a manner, and being a very sensible sort of fever, would not stand, but immediately left the old woman in high dudgeon." This Robert Taylor, although a clergyman of the Church of England, has been convicted of blasphemy and imprisoned for writing in such wicked language about the Bible. Simon Peter, as a disciple, performed many miracles, some when in company with Jesus, and more when separately by himself. These miracles, though themselves unvouched by any reliable testimony, and disbelieved by the people amongst whom they were worked, are strong evidence in favor of the apostolic character claimed for Peter.

On one occasion the whole of the disciples were sent away by Jesus in a ship, the Savior remaining behind to pray. About the fourth watch of the night, when the ship was in the midst of the sea, Jesus went unto his disciples, walking on the sea. Though Jesus went unto his disciples, and, as an expeditious way, I suppose, of arriving with them, he would have passed by them, but they saw him, and supposing him to be a spirit, cried out. Jesus bid them be of good cheer, to which Peter answered, (Matthew xiv, 23) "Lord, if it be thou, bid me come unto thee." Jesus said, "Come," and Peter walked on the water to go to Jesus. But the sea being wet and the wind boisterous, Peter became afraid, and instead of walking on the water began to sink into it, and cried out "Lord save me," and immediately Jesus stretched out his hand and caught Peter.

Some object that the two gospels according to John and Mark, which both record the feat of water-walking by Jesus, omit all mention of Peter's attempt. Probably the Holy Ghost had good reasons for omitting it. A profane mind might make a jest of an Apostle "half seas over," and ridicule an apostolic gatekeeper who could not keep his head above water.

Peter's partial failure in this instance should drive away all unbelief, as the text will show that it was only for lack of faith that

Peter lost his buoyancy. Simon is called Bar-Jonah, that is, son of Jonah, but I am not aware that he is any relation to the Jonah who lived under water in the belly of a fish three days and three nights.

It was Simon Peter who, having told Jesus he was the Son of God, was answered "Blessed art thou, Simon Bar-Jonah, flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee." (Matthew xvi, 17) We find a number of disciples shortly before this, and in Peter's presence, telling Jesus that he was the Son of God, (Matthew xiv, 33) but there is, of course, no real contradiction between the two texts. It was on this occasion that Jesus said to Simon, "Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it, and I will give thee the keys of the kingdom of Heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in Heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in Heaven." Under these extraordinary declarations from the mouth of God the Son, the Bishops of Rome have claimed, as successors of Peter, the same privileges, and their pretensions have been acceded to by some of the most powerful monarchs of Europe.

Under this claim the Bishops, or Popes of Rome, have at various times issued Papal Bulls, by which they have sought to bind the entire world. Many of these have been very successful; but in 1302, Philip the Fair, of France, publicly burned the Pope Boniface's Bull after an address in which the States-General had denounced, in words more expressive than polite, the right of the Popes of Rome to Saint Peter's keys on earth. Some deny that the occupiers of the episcopal seat in the seven-hilled city are really of the Church of Christ, and they point to the bloody quarrels which have raged between men, contending for the Papal dignity. They declare that those Vicars of Christ have more than once resorted to fraud, treachery, and murder, to secure the Papal dignity. They point to Stephen VII, the son of an unmarried priest, who cut off the head of his predecessor's corpse; to Sergius III, convicted of assassination; to John X, who was strangled in the bed of his paramor Theodora; to John XI, son of Pope Sergius III, famous only for his drunken debauchery; to John XII, found assassinated in the apartments of his mistress; to Benedict IX, who both purchased and sold the Pontificate; to Gregory VII, the pseudo lover of the Countess Matilda, and the author of centuries of war carried on by his successors. And if these suffice not, they point to Alexander Borgia, whose name is but the echo of crime, and whose infamy will be as lasting as history. It is answered: "By the fruit ye shall judge of the tree." It is useless to deny the vine's existence because the grapes are sour. Peter, the favored disciple, it is declared was a rascal, and why not his successors? They have only to repent, and there is more joy in heaven over one sinner that repenteth than over ninety and nine righteous men. Such language is

very terrible, and arises from allowing the carnal reason too much freedom.

All true believers will be familiar with the story of Peter's sudden readiness to deny his Lord and teacher in the hour of danger, and will easily draw the right moral from the mysterious lesson here taught; but unbelievers may be a little inclined to agree with the common infidel objections on this point. These objections, therefore, shall be first stated, and then refuted in the most orthodox fashion. It is objected that all the denials were to take place before the cock should crow, (Matthew xxvi, 34; Luke xxii, 34; John xiii, 38) but that only one denial actually took place before the cock crew (Mark xiv, 68). That the first denial by Peter that he knew Jesus, or was one of his disciples, was at the door to the damsel, (John xviii, 17) but was inside while sitting by the fire, (Luke xxii, 57) that the second denial was to a man, and apparently still sitting by the fire (Luke xvii, 58), but was to a maid when he was gone out into the porch. That these denials, or at any rate, the last denial, were all in the presence of Jesus (Luke xvii, 61), who turned and looked at Peter, but that the first denial was at the door, Jesus being inside the palace, the second denial out in the porch, Jesus being still inside (Mark xiv, 69), and the third denial also outside. The refutation of these paltry objections is so simple, that any little child could give it, and none but an infidel would need to hear it, we therefore refrain from penning it. None but a disciple of Paine, or follower of Voltaire, would permit himself to be drawn to the risk of damnation on the mere question as to when some cock happened to crow, or as to the particular spot on which a recreant apostle denied his master. It is the merest justice to Peter to add that his disloyalty to Jesus was shared by his co-apostles. When Jesus was arrested "all the disciples forsook him and fled" (Matthew xxvi, 56). The true believer may sometimes be puzzled that Peter should so deny Jesus after he, Peter, had seen (Matthew xvii, 3-5) Moses and Elias, who had been dead many centuries, talking with Jesus, and had heard "a voice out of the cloud which said, this is my beloved son, in whom I am well pleased." The unbeliever must not allow himself to be puzzled by this. Two of the twelve apostles, whose names are not given, saw Jesus after he was dead, on the road to Emmaus, but they did not know him; towards evening they knew him, and he vanished out of their sight. In broad daylight they did not know him, at evening time they knew him. While they did not know him they could see him, when they did know him they could not see him. Well may true believers declare that the ways of the Lord are wonderful. One of the apostles, Thomas, called Didymus, set the world an example of unbelief. He disbelieved the other disciples when they said to him, "we have seen the Lord," and required to see Jesus, though dead, alive in the flesh, and touch the body of his crucified

master. Thomas the apostle had his requirements complied with — he saw, he touched, and he believed. The great merit is to believe without any evidence — "He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved, he that believeth not shall be damned." How it was that Thomas the apostle did not know Jesus when he saw him shortly after near the sea of Tiberias, is another of the mysteries of the Holy Christian religion. The acts of the apostles after the death of Jesus deserve treatment in a separate paper; the present essay is issued to aid the members of the Church Congress in their endeavors to stem the rising tide of infidelity.

ENDNOTES

[1] "Devil's Pulpit," vol. i, p. 148.

PRICE ONE PENNY

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A TREATISE ON THE POPULATION QUESTION

By Charles Knowlton

Edited by Charles Bradlaugh and Annie Besant

PUBLISHERS' PREFACE.

The pamphlet which we now present to the public is one which has been lately prosecuted under Lord Gampbell's Act, and which we republish, in order to test the right of publication. It was originally written by Charles Knowlton, M. D., whose degree entitles him to be heard with respect on a medical question. It was first published in England, about forty years ago, by James Watson, the gallant radical, who came to London and took up Richard Carlile's work, when Carlile was in jail. He sold it, unchallenged, for many years, approved it, and recommended it. It was printed and published by Messrs. Holyoake & Co., and found its place, with other works of a similar character, in their "Freethought Directory," of 1853, and was thus identified with freethought literature at the then leading freethought _depot_ Mr. Austin Holyoake, working in con-junction with Mr. Bradlaugh at the _National Reformer_ office, Johnson's Court, printed and published it in his turn, and this well-known freethought advocate, in his "Large or Small Families," selected this pamphlet, together with R. D. Owen's "Moral Physiology" and the "Elements of Social Science," for special recommendation. Mr. Charles Watts, succeeding to Mr. Austin Holyoake's business, continued

the sale, and, when Mr. Watson died, in 1875, he bought the plates of the work (with others) from Mrs. Watson, and continued to advertise and to sell it until December 23, 1876. For the last forty years the book has thus been identified with freethought, advertised by leading freethinkers, published under the sanction of their names, and sold in the headquarters of freethought literature. If, during this long period, the party has thus--without one word of protest--circulated an indecent work, the less we talk about freethought morality the better; the work has been largely sold, and, if leading freethinkers have sold it--profiting by the sale--through mere carelessness, few words could be strong enough to brand the indifference which thus scattered obscenity broadcast over the land. The pamphlet has been withdrawn from circulation in consequence of the prosecution instituted against Mr. Charles Watts, but the question of its legality or illegality has not been tried; a plea of "Guilty" was put in by the publisher, and the book, therefore, was not examined, nor was any judgment passed upon it; no jury registered a verdict, and the judge stated that he had not read the work.

We republish this pamphlet, honestly believing that on all questions affecting the happiness of the people, whether they be theological, political or social, fullest right of free discussion ought to be maintained at all hazards. We do not personally indorse all that Dr. Knowles says: his "Philosophical Proem" seems to us full of philosophical mistakes, and--as we are neither of us doctors--we are not prepared to indorse his medical views; but since progress can only be made through discussion, and no discussion is possible where differing opinions are suppressed, we claim the right to publish all opinions, so that the public, enabled to see all sides of a question, may have the materials for forming a sound judgment.

The alterations made are very slight, the book was badly printed, and errors of spelling and a few clumsy grammatical expressions have been corrected; the subtitle has been changed, and in one case four lines have been omitted, because they are repeated word for word further on. We have, however, made some additions to the pamphlet, which are in all cases kept distinct from the original text. Physiology has made great strides during the past forty years, and not considering it right to circulate erroneous physiology, we submitted the pamphlet to a doctor in whose accurate knowledge we have the fullest confidence, and who is widely known in all parts of the world as the author of the "Elements of Social Science;" the notes signed "G. B." are written by this gentleman. References to other works are given in foot-notes for the assistance of the reader, if he desires to study up the subject further.

Old Radicals will remember that Richard Carlile published a work entitled "Every Woman's Book," which deals with the same subject and advocates the same object as Dr. Knowlton's pamphlet R. D. Owen objected to the "style and tone" of Carlile's "Every Woman's Book," as not being in "good taste," and he wrote his "Moral Physiology" to do in America what Carlile's work was intended to do in England. This work of Carlile's was stigmatized as "indecent" and "immoral," because it advocated, as does Dr. Knowlton's, the use of preventive checks to population. In striving to carry on Carlile's work, we cannot expect to escape Carlile's reproach; but, whether applauded or condemned, we mean to carry it on, socially as well as politically and theologically.

We believe, with the Rev. Mr. Malthus, that population has a tendency to increase faster than the means of existence, and that _some_ checks must therefore exercise control over population. The checks now exercised are semi-starvation and preventable disease; the enormous mortality among the infants of the poor is one of the checks which now keep down the population. The checks that ought to control population are scientific, and it is these which we advocate. We think it more moral to prevent the

conception of children than, after they are born, to murder them by want of food, air and clothing. We advocate scientific checks to population, because, so long as poor men have large families, pauperism is a necessity, and from pauperism grow crime and disease. The wages which would support the parents and two or three children in comfort and decency, is utterly insufficient to maintain a family of twelve or fourteen, and we consider it a crime to bring into the world human beings doomed to misery or to premature death. It is not only the hard-working classes which are concerned in this question. The poor preacher, the struggling man of business, the young professional man, are often made wretched for life by their inordinately large families, and their years are passed in one long battle to live; meanwhile, the woman's health is sacrificed and her life embittered from the same cause. To all of these we point the way of relief and happiness; for the sake of these we publish what others fear to issue; and we do it confident that if we fail the first time, we shall succeed at last, and that the English public will not permit the authorities to stifle a discussion of the most important social question which can influence a nation's welfare.

Charles Bradlaugh.

Annie Besant.

PHILOSOPHICAL PROEM

Consciousness is not a "principle" or substance of any kind, nor is it, strictly speaking, a property of any substance or being. It is a peculiar action of the nervous system, and the system is said to be sensible, or to possess the property of sensibility, because those sentient actions which constitute our different consciousnesses may be excited in it. The nervous system includes not only the brain and spinal marrow, but numerous soft white cords, called nerves, which extend from the brain and spinal marrow to every part of the body in which a sensation can be excited.

A sensation is a sentient action of a nerve and the brain; a thought or idea (both the same thing) is a sentient action of the brain alone. A sensation or a thought is consciousness, and there is no consciousness but that which consists either in a sensation or a thought.

Agreeable consciousness constitutes what we call happiness, and disagreeable consciousness constitutes misery. As sensations are a higher degree of consciousness than mere thought, it follows that agreeable sensations constitute a more exquisite happiness than agreeable thoughts. That portion of happiness which consists in agreeable sensations is commonly called pleasure. No thoughts are agreeable except those which were originally excited by or have been associated with agreeable sensations. Hence, if a person never had experienced any agreeable sensations, he could have no agreeable thoughts, and would, of course, be an entire stranger to happiness.

There are five species of sensations--seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting and feeling. There are many varieties of feeling--as the feelings of hunger, thirst, cold, hardness, etc. Many of these feelings are excited by agents that act upon the exterior of the body, such as solid substances of every kind, heat, and various chemical irritants. These latter feelings are called _passions_.

Those passions which owe their existence chiefly to the state of the brain, or to causes acting directly upon the brain, are called the moral

passion. They are grief, anger, love, etc. They consist of sentient actions, which commence in the brain and extend to the nerves in the region of the stomach, etc. But when the cause of the internal feeling of passion is seated in some organ remote from the brain, as in the stomach, genital organs, etc., the sentient action which constitutes the passion commences in the nerves of such organ and extends to the brain, and the passion is called an _appetite, instinct, or desire_. Some of these passions are natural, as hunger, thirst, the reproductive instinct, the desire to urinate, etc. Others are gradually acquired by habit A _hankering_ for stimulants, as spirits, opium and tobacco, is one of these.

Such is the nature of things that our most vivid and agreeable sensations cannot be excited under all circumstances, nor beyond a certain extent under any circumstances, without giving rise in one way or another to an amount of disagreeable consciousness or misery, exceeding the amount of agreeable consciousness which attends such ill-timed or excessive gratification. To excite agreeable sensations to a degree not exceeding this certain extent is temperance; to excite them beyond this extent is intemperance; not to excite them at all is mortification or abstinence. This certain extent varies with different individuals, according to their several circumstances, so that what would be temperance in one person may be intemperance in another.

To be free from disagreeable consciousness is to be in a state which, compared with a state of misery, is a happy state; yet absolute happiness does not exist in the absence of misery, if it does, rocks are happy. It consists, as aforesaid, in agreeable consciousness. That which enables a person to excite or maintain agreeable consciousness is not happiness; but the _idea_ of having such in one's possession is agreeable, and of course is a portion of happiness. Health and wealth go far in enabling a person to excite and maintain agreeable consciousness. That which gives rise to agreeable consciousness is _good_, and we desire it. If we use it intemperately, such use is bad, but the thing itself is still good. Those acts (and intentions are acts of that part of man which intends) of human beings which tend to the promotion of happiness are good, but they are also called _virtuous_, to distinguish them from other things of the same tendency. There is nothing for the word _virtue_ to signify, but virtuous actions. Sin signifies nothing but sinful actions, and sinful, wicked, vicious, or bad actions are those which are productive of more misery than happiness.

When an individual gratifies any of his instincts in a _temperate_ degree, he adds an item to the sum total of human happiness, and causes the amount of human happiness to exceed the amount of misery farther than if he had not enjoyed himself, therefore it is virtuous, or, to say the least, it is not vicious or sinful for him to do so. But it must ever be remembered that this temperate degree depends on circumstances; that one person's health, pecuniary circumstances, or social relation may be such that it would cause more misery than happiness for him to do an act which being done by a person under different circumstances would cause more happiness than misery. Therefore, it would be right for the latter to perform such act, but not for the former.

Again: owing to his _ignorance_, a man may not be able to gratify a desire without causing misery (wherefore it would be wrong for him to do it), but with knowledge of means to prevent this misery, he may so gratify it that more pleasure than pain will be the result of the act, in which case the act, to say the least, is justifiable. Now, therefore, it is virtuous, nay, it is the _duty_, for him who has a knowledge of such means, to convey it to those who have it not, for by so doing he furthers the cause of human happiness.

Man by nature is endowed with the talent of devising means to remedy

or prevent the evils that are liable to arise from gratifying our appetites; and it is as much the duty of the physician to inform mankind of the means to prevent the evils that are liable to arise from gratifying the productive instinct as it is to inform them how to keep clear of the gout or dyspepsia. Let not the old ascetic say we ought not to gratify our appetites any further than is necessary to maintain health and to perpetuate the species. Mankind will not so abstain, and if any means to prevent the evils that may arise from a farther gratification can be devised, they _need not_. Heaven has not only given us the capacity of greater enjoyment, but the talent of devising means to prevent the evils that are liable to arise therefrom, and it becomes us, "with thanksgiving," to make the most of them.

FRUITS OF PHILOSOPHY.

CHAPTER I. TO LIMIT AT WILL THE NUMBER OF THEIR OFFSPRING

Showing how desirable it is, both in a political and a social point of view, for mankind to be able to limit at WILL THE NUMBER OF THEIR OFFSPRING, WITHOUT SACRIFICING THE PLEASURE THAT ATTENDS THE GRATIFICATION OF THE REPRODUCTIVE INSTINCT.

First.---_In a political point of view_.--If population be not restrained by some great physical calamity, such as we have reason to hope will not hereafter be visited upon the children of men, or by some _moral restraint_, the time will come when the earth cannot support its inhabitants. Population unrestrained will double three times in a century. Hence, computing the present population of the earth at 1,000 millions, there would be at the end of 100 years from the present time, 8,000 millions.

At the end of 200 years, 64,000 millions.

" " 300 " 512,000 "

And so on, multiplying by eight for every additional hundred years. So that in 500 years from the present time there would be thirty-two thousand seven hundred and sixty eight times as many inhabitants as at present. If the natural increase should go on without check for 1,500 years, one single pair would increase to more than _thirty-five thousand one hundred and eighty-four_ times as many as the present population of the whole earth!

Some check then there must be, or the time will come when millions will be born but to suffer and to perish for the necessaries of life. To what an inconceivable amount of human misery would such a state of things give rise! And must we say that vice, war, pestilence and famine are desirable to prevent it? Must the friends of temperance and domestic happiness stay their efforts? Must peace societies excite to war and bloodshed? Must the physician cease to investigate the nature of contagion, and to search for the means of destroying its baneful influence? Must he that becomes diseased be marked as a victim to die for public good, without the privilege of making an effort to restore him to health? And in case of a failure of crops in one part of the world, must the other parts withhold the means of supporting life that the far greater evil of excessive population throughout the world may be prevented? Can there be no effectual moral restraint, attended with far less human misery than such physical calamities as these? Most surely

there can. But what is it? Malthus, an English writer on the subject of population, gives us none but celibacy to a late age. But how foolish it is to suppose that men and women will become as monks and nuns during the very holiday of their existence, and abjure during the fairest years of life the nearest and dearest of social relations, to avert a catastrophe which they and perhaps their children will not live to witness. But, besides being ineffectual, or if effectual, requiring a great sacrifice of enjoyment, this restraint is highly objectionable on the score of its demoralizing tendency. It would give rise to a frightful increase of prostitution, of intemperance and onanism, and prove destructive to health and moral feelings. In spite of preaching, human nature will ever remain the same; and that restraint which forbids the gratification of the reproductive instinct will avail but little with the mass of mankind. The checks to be hereafter mentioned are the only moral restraints to population known to the writer that are unattended with serious objections.

Besides starvation, with all its accompanying evils, overpopulation is attended with other public evils, of which may be mentioned, ignorance and slavery. Where the mass of the people must toil incessantly to obtain support, they must remain ignorant; and where ignorance prevails, tyranny reigns.*

> * The scientific part of Malthus' Doctrine of Population is not very clearly or correctly given in the above passages. His great theory, now or generally held by the most eminent political economists, is that the increase of population is always powerfully checked in old countries by the difficulty in increasing the supply of food; that the existing evils of poverty and low wages are really at bottom caused by this check, and are brought about by the pressure of population on the soil, and the continual overstocking of the labor markets with laborers; and hence that the only way in which society can escape from poverty, with all its miseries, is by putting a strong restraint on their natural powers of multiplication. "It is not in the nature of things," he says, "that any permanent and general improvement in the condition of the poor can be effected without an increase in the preventive checks to population."--G. R.

Second--_In a social point of view_.--"Is it not notorious that the families of the married often increase beyond which a regard for the young beings coming into the world, and the happiness of those who give them birth, would dictate. In how many instances does the hard-working father, and more especially the mother, of a poor family remain slave throughout their lives, tugging at the oar of incessant labor, toiling to live, and living to toil; when, if their offspring had been limited to two or three only, they might have enjoyed comfort and comparative affluence? How often is the health of the mother, giving birth every year to an infant--happy if it be not twins--and compelled to toil on, even at those times when nature imperiously calls for some relief from daily drudgery,--how often is the mother's comfort, health, nay, even her life, thus sacrificed? Or if care and toil have weighed down the spirit, and at length broken the health of the father; how often is the widow left unable, with the most virtuous intentions, to save her fatherless offspring from becoming degraded objects of charity, or profligate votaries of vice!

"Nor is this all. Many women are so constituted that they cannot give birth to healthy, sometimes not to living children. Is it desirable, is it moral, that such women should become pregnant? Yet this is continually the case. Others there are who ought never to become parents; because, if they do, it is only to transmit to their offspring grievous hereditary diseases, which render such offspring mere subjects

of misery throughout their sickly existence. Yet such women will not lead a life of celibacy. They marry. They become parents, and the sum of human misery is increased by their doing so. But it is folly to expect that we can induce such persons to live the lives of Shakers. Nor is it necessary; all that duty requires of them is to refrain from becoming parents. Who can estimate the beneficial effect which a rational moral restraint may thus have on the health and beauty and physical improvement of our race throughout future generations?"

Let us now turn our attention to the case of unmarried youth.

"Almost all young persons, on reaching the age of maturity, desire to marry. That heart must be very cold, or very isolated, that does not find some object on which to bestow its affections. Thus, early marriage would be almost universal did not prudential consideration interfere. The young man thinks, 'I cannot marry yet; I cannot support a family. I must make money first, and think of a matrimonial settlement afterwards.'

"And so he goes to making money, fully and sincerely resolved in a few years to share it with her whom he now loves. But passions are strong and temptations great. Curiosity, perhaps, introduces him into the company of those poor creatures whom society first reduces to a dependence on the most miserable of mercenary trades, and then curses for being what she has made them. There his health and moral feelings are alike made shipwreck. The affections he had thought to treasure up for their first object are chilled by dissipation and blunted by excess. He scarcely retains a passion but avarice. Years pass on--years of profligacy and speculation--and his wish is accomplished, his fortune is made. Where now are the feelings and resolve of his youth?

> 'Like the dew on the mountain,
> Like the foam on the river,
> Like the bubbles on the fountain,
> They are gone--and forever.'

"He is a man of pleasure, a man of the world. He laughs at the romance of his youth, and marries a fortune. If gaudy equipage and gay parties confer happiness, he is happy. But if these be only the sunshine on the stormy sea below, he is a victim to that system of morality which forbids a reputable connection until the period when provision has been made for a large expected family. Had he married the first object of his choice, and simply delayed becoming a father until his prospects seemed to warrant it, how different might have been his lot. Until men and women are absolved from the fear of becoming parents, except when they themselves desire it, they will ever form mercenary and demoralizing connections, and seek in dissipation the happiness they might have found in domestic life.

"I know that this, however common, is not a universal case. Sometimes the heavy responsibilities of a family are incurred at all risks; and who shall say how often a life of unremitting toil and poverty is the consequence. Sometimes, if even rarely, the young mind does hold its first resolves. The youth plods through years of cold celibacy and solitary anxiety, happy if, before the best hours of his life are gone and its warmest feelings withered, he may return to claim the reward of his forbearance and his industry. But even in this comparatively happy case, shall we count for nothing the years of ascetic sacrifice at which after happiness is purchased? The days of youth are not too many, nor its affections too lasting. We may, indeed, if a great object require it, sacrifice the one and mortify the other. But is this, in itself, desirable? Does not wisdom tell us that such a sacrifice is a dead loss--to the warm-hearted often a grievous one? Does not wisdom bid us temperately enjoy the springtimes of life, 'while the evil day come not,

nor the years draw nigh, when we shall say we have no pleasure in them?'

"Let us say, then, if we will, that the youth who thus sacrifices the present for the future, chooses wisely between the two evils, profligacy and asceticism. This is true. But let us not imagine the lesser evil to be good. It is _not_ good for man to be alone. It is for no man or woman's happiness or benefit that they should be condemned to Shakerism. It is a violence done to the feelings and an injury to the character. A life of rigid celibacy, though infinitely preferable to a life of dissipation, is yet fraught with many evils. Peevishness, restlessness, vague longings and instability of character, are amongst the least of these. The mind is unsettled, and the judgment warped. Even the very instinct which is thus mortified assumes an undue importance, and occupies a portion of the thoughts which does not of right or nature belong to it, and which, during a life of satisfied affection, it would not obtain."

In many instances, the genital organs are rendered so irritable by the repletion to which unnatural continency gives rise, and by the much thinking caused by such repletion, as to induce a disease known to medical men by the name of _Gonorrhoea Dormientium_. It consists in an emission or discharge of the semen during sleep. This discharge is immediately excited in most instances by a lascivious dream, but such dream is caused by the repletion and irritability of the genital organs. It is truly astonishing to what a degree of mental anguish the disease gives rise in young men. They do not understand the nature, or rather, the cause of it. They think it depends on a weakness--indeed, the disease is often called a "seminal weakness"--and that the least gratification in a natural way would but serve to increase it. Their anxiety about it weakens the whole system. This weakness they erroneously attribute to the discharges; they think themselves totally disqualified for entering into or enjoying the married state. Finally, the genital and mental organs act and react upon each other so perniciously as to cause a degree of nervousness, debility, emaciation and melancholy--in a word, wretchedness that sets description at defiance. Nothing is so effectual in curing this diseased state of a body and mind in young men as marriage. All restraint, fear and solicitude should be removed.

"Inasmuch, then, as the scruples of incurring heavy responsibilities deter from forming moral connections and encourage intemperance and prostitution, the knowledge which enables man to limit the number of his offspring would, in the present state of things, save much unhappi-ness and prevent many crimes. Young persons sincerely attached to each other, and who might wish to marry, should marry early, merely resolving not to become parents until prudence permitted it. The young man, instead of solitary toil and vulgar dissipation, would enjoy the society and the assistance of her he has chosen as his companion; and the best years of life, whose pleasures never return, would not be squandered in riot, nor lost through mortification."*

> * The passages quoted are from Robert Dale Owen's "Moral Physiology."

CHAPTER II. ON GENERATION

I hold the following to be important and undeniable troths: That every man has a natural right both to receive and convey a knowledge of all the facts and discoveries of every art and science, excepting such only as may be secured to some particular person or persons by copyright or patent; that a physical truth in its general effect cannot be a moral

evil; that no fact in physics or in morals ought to be concealed from the inquiring mind.

Some may make a misuse of knowledge, but that is their fault; and it is not right that one person should be deprived of knowledge, of spirits, of razors, or of anything else which is harmless in itself and may be useful to him, because another may misuse it.

The subject on generation is not only interesting as a branch of science, but it is so connected with the happiness of mankind that it is highly important in a practical point of view. Such, to be sure, is the custom of the age, that it is not considered a proper subject to investigate before a popular assembly, nor is it proper to attend the calls of nature in a like place; yet they must and ought to be attended to, for the good, the happiness of mankind require it; so, too, for like reason, the subject of generation ought to be investigated until it be rightly understood by all people, but at such opportunities as the good sense of every individual will easily decide to be proper. This, I presume to say, not simply upon the abstract principle that all knowledge of Nature's workings is useful, and the want of it disadvantageous, but from the known moral fact that ignorance of this process has in many instances proved the cause of a lamentable "mishap," and more especially as it is essential to the attainment of the great advantage, which it is the chief object of this work to bestow upon mankind.

People generally, as it was the case with physicians until late years, entertain a very erroneous idea of what takes place in the conception. Agreeably to this idea the "check" which I consider far preferable to any other, would not be effectual, as would be obvious to all. Consequently, entertaining this idea, people would not have due confidence in it. Hence, it is necessary to correct a long-held and widely extended error. But this I cannot expect to do by simply saying it is an error. Deeply rooted and hitherto undisputed opinions are not so easily eradicated. If I would convince any one that the steps in one of the most recondite processes of nature are not such as he has always believed, it will greatly serve my purpose to show what these steps are. I must first prepare him to be reasoned with, and then reason the matter all over with him. I must point out the facts which disprove his opinion, and show that my own is unattended with difficulties.

But what can be more obvious than that it is absolutely impossible to explain any process or function of the animal economy, so as to be understood, before the names of the organs which perform this function have been defined, that is, before the organs themselves have been described. Now it is well known to every anatomist, and indeed it may be obvious to all, that in describing any organ or system of organs, we must always begin with some external and known parts, and proceed regularly, step by step, to the internal and unknown. As in arithmetic, "everything must be understood as you go along."*

> * This is an Americanism, which appears to us to convey a false idea. If it refers to the cases used as illustrations, Dr. Knowlton is more sparing in his use of them than either Dr. Bull or Dr. Chavasse.--Publishers' Note.

Fully to effect the objects of this work, it is, therefore, a matter of necessity that I give an anatomical description of certain parts--even external parts--which some, but imagine what I have just said, might think it useless to mention. It is not to gratify the idle curiosity of the light-minded that this book is written; it is for _utility_ in the broad and truly philosophical sense of the term; nay, farther, it shall with the exception of here and there a little spicing*, have confined to _practical utility_. I shall, therefore, endeaver to treat of the

subject in this chapter so as to be understood, without giving any description of the male organs of generation; though I hold it an accomplishment for one be able to speak of those organs, as diseases often put them under the necessity of doing, without being compelled use low and vulgar language. But I must briefly describe the female organs; in doing which I must, of course, speak as do other anatomists and physiologists; and whoever objects to this will discover more affectation and prudery than good sense and good will to mankind.

The adipose, or fatty matter, immediately over the share bone, forms a considerable prominence in females, which, at the age of puberty, is covered with hair, as in males. This prominence is called Mons Veneris.

The exterior orifice commences immediately below this. On each side of this orifice is a prominence continued from the mons veneris, which is largest above and gradually diminishes as it descends. These two prominences are called the Labia Externa, or external lips. Near the latter end of pregnancy they become somewhat enlarged and relaxed, so that they sustain little or no injury during parturition. Just within the upper or anterior commissure, formed by the junction of these lips, a little round oblong body is situated. The body is called the clitoris. Most of its length is bound down, as it were, pretty closely to the bone; and it is of very variable size in different females. Instances have occurred where it was so enlarged as to allow the female to have venereal commerce with others; and in Paris this fact was once made a public exhibition to the medical faculty. Women thus formed appear to partake in their general form of the male character, and are called hermaphrodites. The idea of human beings, called hermaphrodites, which could be either father or mother, is, doubtless, erroneous. The clitoris is analogous in its structure to the penis, and like it, is exquisitely sensitive, being, as it is supposed, the principal seat of pleasure. It is subject to erection or distension, like the penis, from like causes.

The skin which lines the internal surface of the external lips is folded in such manner as to form two flat bodies, the exterior edges of which are convex. They are called the nymphse. They extend downward, one on each side, from the clitoris to near the middle of the external orifice, somewhat diverging from each other. Their use is not very evident The orifice of the urethra (the canal, short in females, which leads to the bladder) is situated an inch or more farther inward than the clitoris, and is a little protuberant.

Passing by the external lips, the clitoris, the nymphse and the orifice of the urethra, we come to the membrane called the hymen. It is situated just at, or a trifle behind the orifice of the urethra. It is stretched across the passage, and were it a complete septum, it would close up the anterior extremity of that portion of the passage which is called the vagina. But the instances in which the septum or partition is complete are very rare, there being, in almost all cases, an aperture either in its center, or frequently in its anterior edge, giving the membrane the form of a crescent Through this aperture passes the menstrual fluid. Sometimes, however, this septum is complete, and the menstrual fluid is retained month after month, until appearances and symptoms much like those of pregnancy are produced, giving rise to perhaps unjust suspicions. Such cases require the simple operation of dividing the hymen. In many instances the hymen is very imperfect, insomuch that some have doubted whether it is to be found in the generality of virgins. Where it exists it is generally ruptured in the first intercourse of the sexes, and the female is said to lose her virginity. In some rare instances it is so very strong as not to be ruptured by such intercourse, and the nature of the difficulty not being understood, the husband has sued for a divorce. But everything may be put to rights by a slight surgical operation. The parts here described are among those called the external parts of generation.

The internal organs of generation consist in the female of the Vagina, the Uterus, the Ovaries and their appendages.

The Vagina is a membranous canal commencing at the hymen and extending to the uterus. It is a little curved, and extends backward and upward between the bladder, which lies before and above it, and that extreme portion of the bowels called the rectum, which lies behind it. The coat of membrane which lines the internal surface of the vagina forms a number of transverse ridges. These are to be found only in the lower or anterior half of the vagina, and they do not extend all round the vagina, but are situated on its anterior and posterior sides, while their lateral sides are smooth. I mention these ridges because a knowledge of them may lead to a more effectual use of one of the checks to be made known hereafter.

The uterus or womb is also situated between the bladder and the rectum, but above the vagina. Such is its shape that it has been compared to a pear with a long neck. There is, of course, considerable difference between the body and the neck, the first being twice as broad as the last. Each of these parts is somewhat flattened. In subjects of mature age, who have been pregnant, the whole of the uterus is about two inches and a half in length, and more than an inch and a half in breadth at the broadest part of the body. It is near an inch in thickness. The neck of the uterus is situated downward, and may be said to be inserted into the upper extremity of the vagina. It extends down into the vagina the better part of an inch. In the uterus is a cavity which approaches the triangular form, and from which a canal passes down through the neck of the uterus into the vagina. This cavity is so small that its sides are almost in contact So that the uterus is a thick, firm organ for so small a one. Comparing the cavity of the uterus to a triangle, we say the upper side or line of this triangle is transverse with respect to the body, and the other two lines pass downward and inward, so that they would form an angle below, did they not before they meet take a turn more directly downward to form the canal just mentioned. In each of the upper angles there is an orifice of such size as to admit of a hog's bristle. These little orifices are the mouths of two tubes, called the Fallopian tubes, of which more will be said presently. The canal which passes through the neck of the uterus, connecting the cavity of this organ with that of the vagina, is about a quarter of an inch in diameter. It is different from other ducts, for it seems to be a part of the cavity from which it extends, inasmuch as when the cavity of the uterus is enlarged in the progress of pregnancy, this canal is gradually converted into a part of that cavity.

The lower extremity of the neck of the uterus is irregularly convex and tumid. The orifice of the canal in it is oval, and so situated that it divides the convex surface of the lower extremity of the neck in two portions, which are called the lips of the uterus. The anterior is thicker than the posterior. The orifice itself is called _os tincæ_ or _os uteri_, or in English, the mouth of the womb. When the parts are in a weak, relaxed state, the mouth or neck of the uterus is quite low, and in almost all oases it may be reached by a finger introduced into the vagina, especially by a second person, who carries the hand behind.

The Ovaries are two bodies of a flattened or oval form, one of which is situated on each side of the uterus at a little distance from it, and about as high up as where the uterus becomes narrow to form its neck. The longest diameter of the ovarium is about an inch. Each ovarium has a firm coat of membrane. In those who have not been pregnant, it contains from ten to twenty _vesicles_, which are little round bodies, formed of a delicate membrane, and filled with a transparent fluid. Some of these vesicles are situated so near the surface of the ovarium as to be prominent on its surface. They are of different sizes, the largest

nearly a quarter of a inch in diameter.*

> * The vesicles here mentioned are the so-called Graafian vesicles, or ovisacs, each of which contains in its interior a little ovum or egg. In the human female the ovum is extremely minute, so as only to be visible with the aid of a lens. The Graafian vesicles are not limited to a certain small number, as was formerly thought, but continue to be formed in the ovaries, and to discharge at intervals mature ova during the whole of the fruitful period.--G. R.

In those in whom conception has ever taken place, some of these vesicles are removed, and in their place a cicatrix or scar is formed which continues through life. However, the number of cicatrices does not always correspond with the number of conceptions. They often exceed it, and are sometimes found where conception has not been known to take place. The Fallopian Tubes are two canals four or five inches in length, proceeding from the upper angles of the cavity of the uterus, in a transverse direction in respect to the body. Having so proceeded for some distance they turn downward toward the ovaries. At their commencement in the uterus they are very small, but they enlarge as much as they progress. The large ends, which hang loose, terminate in open mouths, the margins of which consist of fimbriated processes, and nearly touch the ovaria.

We are now prepared to treat of conception. Yet, as menstruation is closely connected with it, and as a knowledge of many things concerning menstruation may contribute much to the well-being of females, for whom this work is at least as much designed as for males, I shall first briefly treat of this subject.

Menstruation.--When females arrive at the age of puberty they begin to have a discharge once every month, by way of the vagina, of the color of blood. This discharge is termed the menses. To have it is to menstruate. The age at which menstruation commences varies with different individuals, and also in different climates. The warmer the climate the earlier it commences and ceases. In temperate climates it generally commences at the age of fourteen or fifteen, and it ceases at forty-four, or a little later. *

Whenever it commences the girl acquires a more womanly appearance. It is a secretion of the uterus, or, in other words, the minute vessels distributed to the inner coat of uterus, select as it were, from the blood, and pour out in a gradual manner the materials of this fluid. It has one of the properties, color, of blood, but it does not coagulate, or separate into different parts like blood, and cannot properly be called blood.**

> * Dr. Chavasse, on p. 94 of his "Advice to a Wife" published by W. H. Smith & Son gives instances of very early menstruation and consequent fecundity.--Publishers' note,

> ** "The menstrual discharge," says Dr. Kirkes, "consists of blood effused from the inner surface of the uterus, and mixed with mucus from the uterus, vagina, and the external parts of the generative apparatus. Being diluted by this admixture, the menstrual blood coagulates less perfectly than ordinary blood; and the frequent acidity of the vaginal mucus tends still further to diminish its coagulability."--Handbook of Physiology, 8th ed., p. 727, 1874.--G. R.

When this discharge is in all respects regular, it amounts in most females to six or eight ounces, and from two to four days' continuance.

During its continuance the women is said to be unwell, or out of order. Various unpleasant feelings are liable to attend it; but when it is attended with severe pain, as it not infrequently is, it becomes a disease, and the woman is not likely to conceive until it is cured. During the existence of the "turns," or "monthlies," as they are often called, indigestible food, dancing in warm rooms, sudden exposure to cold or wet, and mental agitations, should be avoided as much as possible. The "turns" do not continue during pregnancy, nor nursing, unless nursing be continued after the "turns" recommence. Some women, it is true, are subject to a slight hemorrhage that sometimes occurs with considerable regularity during pregnancy, and which has led them to suppose they have their turns at such times; but it is not so; the discharge at such times is real blood.*

* Consult on the whole of this Dr. Chavasse's book, pp. 91-101, where full details are given.--Publishers' note.

The use of the menstrual discharge seems to be to prepare the uterine system for conception. For females do not become pregnant before they commence, nor after they cease having turns; nor while they are suppressed by some disease, by cold or by nursing. Some credible women, however, have said that they become pregnant while nursing, without having had any turn since their last lying-in. It is believed that in these oases they had some discharge, colorless, perhaps, which they did not notice, but which answered the purposes of the common one. Women are not nearly so likely to conceive during the week before a monthly as during the week immediately after.* But although the use of this secretion seems to be to prepare for conception, it is not to be inferred that the reproductive instinct ceases at the "turn of life," or when the woman ceases to menstruate. On the contrary, it is said that this passion often increases at this period, and continues in a greater or less degree to an extreme age.

* See, however, Dr. Bull's "Hints to Mothers," pp. 31-58, and 127-129 (published by Longmans, Green & Co.)--Publishers' note.

Conception.--The part performed by the male in the reproduction of the species consists in exciting the organism of the female, and depositing the semen in the vagina. Before I inquire what takes place in the females I propose to speak of the semen.

This fluid, which is secreted by the testicles, may be said to possess three kinds of properties, physical, chemical, physiological. Its physical properties are known to every one--it is a thickish, nearly opaque fluid, of a peculiar odor, saltish taste, etc. As to its chemical properties, it is found by analysis to consist of 900 parts of water, 60 of animal muscilage, 10 of soda, 30 of phosphate of lime. Its physiological property is that of exciting the female genital organs in a peculiar manner.

When the semen is examined by microscope, there can be distinguished a multitude of small animalculæ, which appear to have a rounded head and a long tail. These animalculæ move with a certain degree of rapidity. They appear to avoid the light and to delight in the shade. Leeuwenhoek, if not the discoverer of the seminal animalculse, was the first who brought the fact of their existence fully before the public. With respect to their size, he remarked that ten thousand of them might exist in a space not larger than a grain of sand. They have a definite figure, and are obviously different from the animalculse found in any other fluid.*

* See Dr. Carpenter's "Animal Physiology," p. 558 (published by H. G. Bonn); Nichol's "Human Physiology," pp. 253-255 (published by Trubner & Co.)--Publishers' note.

Leeuwenhoek believed them to be the beginnings of future animals--that they are of different sexes, upon which depends the future sex of the foetus. Be this as it may, it appears to be admitted on all hands that the animalculæ are present in the semen of the various species of male animals, and that they cannot be detected when either from age or disease the animals are rendered sterile. "Hence," says Bostock, "we can scarcely refuse our assent to the position that these animalculæ are in some way or other instrumental to the production of the foetus." The secretion of the semen commences at the age of puberty. Before this period the testicles secrete a viscid, transparent fluid, which has never been analyzed, but which is doubtless essentially different from semen. The revolution which the whole economy undergoes at this period, such as the tone of the voice, and development of hairs, the beard, the increase of the muscles and bones, etc., is intimately connected with the testicles and the secretion of this fluid.* "Eunuchs preserve the same form as in childhood; their voice is effeminate, they have no beard, their disposition is timid; and finally their physical and moral character very nearly resembles that of females. Nevertheless, many of them take delight in venereal intercourse, and give themselves up with ardor to a connection which must always prove unfruitful."**

* Nichol's "Human Physiology," pp. 256-257.
--Publishers' note

** Magendic's Physiology.--Author's note.

The part performed by the female in the reproduction of the species is far more complicated than that performed by the male. It consists, in the first instance, in providing a substance which, in connection with the male secretion, is to constitute the foetus; in furnishing a suitable situation in which the foetus may be developed; in affording due nourishment for its growth; in bringing it forth, and afterward furnishing it with food especially adapted to the digestive organs of the young animal. Some parts of this process are not well understood, and such variety of hypotheses have been proposed to explain them that Drelincourt, who lived in the latter part of the seventeenth century, is said to have collected two hundred and sixty hypotheses of generation.

It ought to be known that women have conceived when the semen was merely applied to the parts anterior to the hymen, as the internal surface of the external lips, the nymphæ, etc. This is proved by the fact that several cases of pregnancy have occurred when the hymen was entire. The fact need not surprise us, for, agreeable to the theory of absorption, we have to account for it only to suppose that some of the absorbent vessels are situated anterior to the hymen--a supposition by no means unreasonable.

There are two peculiarities of the human species respecting conception which I will notice. First, unlike other animals they are liable, and for what has been proved to the contrary, equally liable--to conceive at all seasons of the year. Second, a woman rarely, if ever, conceives until after having several sexual connections; nor does one connection in fifty cause conception in the matrimonial state, where the husband and wife live together uninterruptedly. Public women rarely conceive, owing probably to a weakened state of the genital system, induced by too frequent and promiscuous intercourse.

It is universally agreed, that some time after a fruitful connection, a vesicle (two in case of twins) of one or the other ovary becomes so enlarged that it bursts forth from the ovary and takes the name of ovum, which is taken up, or rather received, as it bursts forth, by the fimbriated extremity of the Fallopian tube, and is then conducted along the tube into the uterus, to the inner surface of which it attaches

itself.*

> * Since Dr. Knowlton's work was written, the very important fact has been discovered that ova are periodically discharged from the ovaries in the human female and other animals, not in consequence of fruitful connection having taken place, as was formerly believed, but quite independently of intercourse with the male. Such a discharge of ova occurs in the lower animals at the time of heat or rut, and in women during menstruation. At each menstrual period, a Graafian vesicle becomes enlarged, bursts, and lets the ovum which it contains escape into the Fallopian tube, along which it passes to the uterus. "It has long been known," says Dr. Kirke, "that in the so-called oviparous animals, the separation of ova from the ovary may take place independently of impregnation by the male, or even of sexual union. And it is now established that a like maturation and discharge of ova, independently of coition, occurs in Mammalia, the periods at which the matured ova are separated from the ovaries and received into the Fallopian tubes being indicated in the lower Mammalia by the phenomena of _heat_ or _rut_; in the human female by the phenomena of _menstruation_. Sexual desire manifests itself in the human female to a greater degree at these periods, and in the female of mammiferous animals at no other time. If the union of the sexes takes place, the ovum may be fecundated, and if no union occur, it perishes. From what has been said it may therefore be concluded that the two states, heat and menstruation, are analogous, and that the essential accompaniment of both is the maturation and extrusion of ova."--"Handbook of Physiology," page 724.--G. R.

Here it becomes developed into a full grown foetus, and is brought forth about forty-two weeks from the time of conception by a process termed parturition. But one grand question is, how the semen operates itself, or any part thereof reaches the ovary, and if so, in what way it is conveyed to them. It was long the opinion that the semen was ejected into the uterus in the act of coition, and that it afterward, by some unknown means, found its way into and along the Fallopian tubes to the ovary. But there are several facts which weigh heavily against this opinion, and some that entirely forbid it. In the first place, there are several well attested instances in which impregnation took place while the hymen remained entire, where the vagina terminated in the rectum, where it was so contracted by a cicatrix as not to admit the penis. In all these cases the semen could not have been lodged anywhere near the mouth of the uterus, much less ejected into it. Secondly, it has followed a connection where from some defect in the male organs, as the urethra terminating some inches behind the end of the penis, and it is clear that the semen could not have been injected into the uterus, nor even near its mouth. Third, the neck of the unimpregnated uterus is so narrow as merely to admit a probe, and is filled with a thick tenacious fluid, which seemingly could not be forced away by any force which the male organ possesses of ejecting the semen, even if the mouth of the male urethra were in opposition with that of the uterus. But fourth, the mouth of the uterus is by no means fixed. By various causes it is made to assume various situations, and probably the mouth of the urethra rarely comes in contact with it.

Fifth. "The tenacity of the male semen is such as renders its passage through the small aperture in the neck of the uterus impossible, even by a power of force much superior to that which we may rationally suppose to reside in the male organs of generation."

Sixth. "Harvey and DeGraaf dissected animals at almost every period

after coition for the express purpose of discovering the semen, but were never able to detect the smallest vestige of it in the uterus in any one instance."*

* Dewees' Essay on Superfoetation.--Author's note.

Aware of the insurmountable objection to this view of the manner in which the semen reaches the ovary, it has been supposed by some physiologists that the semen is absorbed from the vagina into the great circulating system, where it is mixed, of course, with the blood, and goes the whole round of the circulation subject to the influence of those causes which produce great changes in the latter fluid.

To this hypothesis it may be objected, that while there is no direct evidence in support of it, it is exceedingly unreasonable, inasmuch as we can scarcely believe that the semen can go the whole round of circulation, and then find its way to the ovary in such a pure unaltered state as the experiments of Spallanzani prove it must be in, that it may impregnate.

A third set of theorists have maintained that an imperceptible something, which they have called _aura seminalis_, passes from the semen lodged in the vagina to the ovary, and excites those actions which are essential to the development of an ovum. Others, again, have told us that it is all done by sympathy. That neither the semen nor any volatile part of it finds its way to the ovary; but that the semen excites the parts with which it is in contact in a peculiar manner, and by the law of animal economy, termed sympathy, or consent of parts, a peculiar action commences in the ovary, by which an ovum is developed.

To both these conjectures it may be objected that they have no other foundation but the supposed necessity of adopting them, to account for the effect of impregnation; and, further, they "make no provision for the formation of mules; for the peculiarities of, and likeness to, parents, and for the propagation of predisposition to disease, from parent to child; for the production of mulattoes," etc.

A fifth, and to me far more satisfactory view of the subject than any other, is that advanced by our distinguished countryman, Dr. Dewees, of Philadelphia. It appears to harmonize with all known facts relating to the conception and something from analogy may also be drawn in its favor. It is this, that there is a set of absorbent vessels, leading directly from the inner surface of the _labia externa_ and the vagina, to the ovaries, the whole office of which vessels is to absorb the semen and convey it to the ovaries.* I do not know that these vessels have yet been fully discovered, but in a note on the sixteenth page of his "Essays on Various Subjects," the doctor says: "The existence of these vessels is now rendered almost certain, as Dr. Gartner, of Copenhagen, has discovered a duct leading from the ovary to the vagina."

* This view is not held at the present day. The commonly received doctrine now is that the seminal fluid enters the uterus, whether during the intercourse or after it, and passes along the Fallopian tubes to the ovaries; and that fecundation takes place at some point of this course, most frequently in the tubes, but also at times in the ovary itself, or even, perhaps, in the uterus. It is essentially necessary for fecundation that the spermatozoa should come into actual contact with the ovum. "That the spermatozoa make their way toward the ovarium, and fecundate the ovum either before it entirely quits the ovisac or very shortly afterward," says Dr. Carpenter, "appears to be the general rule in regard to the Mammalia; and their power of movement must obviously be both vigorous and long continued to enable

> them to traverse so great an extent of mucous membrane, especially when it is remembered that they ascend in opposition to the direction of the ciliary movement of the epithelial cells and to the downward peristaltic action of the Fallopian tubes. * * * There can be no doubt that it is the contact of the spermatozoa with the ovum, and in the changes which occur as the immediate consequence of that contact, that the act of fecundation essentially consists." --"Principles of Human Physiology," 8th ed., p. 961,1876.--G.R.

Another question of considerable moment relating to generation is from which parent are the first rudiments of the foetus derived.

The earliest hypothesis with which we are acquainted, and which has received the support of some of the most eminent of the moderns, ascribes the original formation of the foetus to the combination of particles of matter derived from each of the parents. This hypothesis naturally presents itself to the mind as the obvious method of explaining the necessity for the cooperation of the two sexes, and the resemblance in external form, and even in mind and character, which the offspring often bears to the male parent. "The principal objections," says Bostock, "to his hypothesis, independent of the want of any direct proof of a female seminal fluid, are of two descriptions, those which depend upon the supposed impossibility of unorganized matter forming an organized being, and those which are derived from observations and experiments of Haller and Spallanzani, which they brought forward in support of their theory of pre-existent germs."

In relation to these objections I remark, first those whose experience has been with hale females, I suspect, can have no doubt but that the female organism increases like that of the male, until an emission of fluid of some kind or other takes place. But whether this secretion may properly be called semen, whether any part of it unites with the male semen in forming the rudiments of the foetus, is another question. For my part I am inclined to the opinion that it does not.* I rather regard it as the result of exalted excitation, analogous to the increased secretion of other organs from increased stimulation; and if it may be for any object or use, as it probably is, it is that of affording nature a means of relieving herself; or, in other words, of quieting the venereal passion. If this passion, being once roused, could not by some means or other be calmed, it would command by far too great a portion of our thoughts, and with many constitutions the individuals, whether male or female, could not conduct themselves with due decorum. One fact which leads me to think that the female secretion in the act of coition is not essential to impregnation is, that many females have conceived, if their unbiased testimony may be relied on, when they experienced no pleasure. In these cases it is more than probable that there was no orgasm, nor any secretion or emission of fluid on the part of the female.

> * With regard to this secretion in the female, which has nothing of a seminal character, Dr. Carpenter observes: "Its admixture with the male semen has been supposed to have some connection with impregnation; but no proof whatever has been given that any such admixture is necessary."--"Human Physiology," p. 991.--G. R.

As to the objection of the supposed impossibility of unorganized matter forming an organized being, I do not believe such a thing takes place, even if we admit that "the original formation of the foetus is a combination of particles of matter derived from each of the parents." What do, or rather what ought we to mean by organized matter? Not, surely, that it exhibits some obvious physical structure, unlike what is to be found in inorganic matter, but that it exhibits phenomena, and of course may be said to possess properties unlike any kind of inorganic

matter. Matter unites with matter in three ways, mechanically, chemically and organically, and each mode of union gives rise to properties peculiar to itself. When matter unites organically, the substance or being so formed exhibits some phenomena essentially different from what inorganic bodies exhibit. It is on this account that we ascribe to organic bodies certain properties, which we call physiological properties, such as contractility, sensibility, life, etc. When, from any cause, these bodies have undergone such a change that they no longer exhibit the phenomena peculiar to them, they are said to have lost these properties, and to be dead. A substance need not possess all the physiological properties of an animal of the higher orders to entitle it to the name of an organized or living substance, nor need it possess the physical property of solidity. The blood, as well as many of the secretions, does several things, exhibits several phenomena, which no mechanical or mere chemical combinations of matter do exhibit. We must therefore ascribe to it certain physiological properties, and regard it as an organized, a living fluid, as was contended by the celebrated John Hunter. So with respect to the semen, it certainly possesses physiological properties, one in particular peculiar to itself, namely, the property of impregnating the female; and upon no sound principle can it be regarded in any other light than as an organized, and of course a living fluid. And if the female secretion or any part of it unite with the male secretion in the formation of the rudiments or the foetus in a different manner than any other substance would, then it certainly has the property of doing so, whether we give this property a name or not; and a regard to the soundest principles of physiology compels us to class this property with the physiological or vital, and of course to regard this secretion as an organized and living fluid So, then, unorganized matter does not form an organized being, admitting the hypothesis before us as correct.

That organized being should give rise to other organized beings under favorable circumstances as to nourishment, warmth, etc., is no more wonderful than that fire should give rise to fire when air and fuel are present. To be sure, there are some minute steps in the processes which are not fully known to us; still, if they ever should be known, we should unquestionably see that there is a natural cause for every one of them; and that they are all consonant with certain laws of the animal economy. We should see no necessity of attempting to explain the process of generation by bringing to our aid, or rather to the darkening of the subject, any imaginary principle, as the _visus formaticus_ of Blumenbach.

As to the "observations and experiments of Haller and Spallanzani," I think, with Dr. Bostock, that they weigh but little, if any, against the theory before us. I shall not be at the labor of bringing them forward and showing their futility as objections to this theory, for I am far from insisting on the correctness of it; that is, I do not insist that any part of the female secretion, during coition, unites with the male semen in the formation of the rudiments of the foetus.

The second hypothesis or theory, I shall notice, as to the rudiments of the foetus, is that of Leeuwenhoek, who regarded the seminal animalculse of the male semen as the proper rudiments of the foetus, and thought that the office of the female is to afford them a suitable receptacle where they may be supported and nourished until they are able to exist by the exercise of their own functions. This is essentially the view of the subject which I intend to give more particularly presently.

I know of no serious objections to this hypothesis, nothing but the "extreme improbability," as its opponents say, "that these animalculæ should be the rudiments of being so totally dissimilar to them." But I wish to know if there is more difference between a foetus and a seminal animalcule than there is between a foetus and a few material particles

in some other form than that of such animalcule?

The third hypothesis, or that of pre-existing germs, proceeded upon a precisely opposite view of the subject to that of Leeuwenhoek, namely, that the foetus is properly the production of the female; that it exists previous to the sexual congress, with all its organs, in some parts of the uterine system; and that it receives no proper addition from the male, but that the seminal fluid acts merely by exciting the powers of the foetus, or endowing it with vitality.

It is not known who first proposed this hypothesis; but strange as it may appear, it has had the support of such names as Bonnet, Haller and Spallanzani, and met with a favorable reception in the middle of the last century. Agreeable to this hypothesis, our common mother, Eve, contained a number of homuncules (little men) one within another, like a nest of boxes, and all within her ovaries, equal to all the number of births that have ever been, or ever will be, not to reckon abortions. Were I to bring forward all the facts and arguments that have been advanced in support of this idea, it seems to me I should fail to convince sound minds of its correctness; as to arguments against it, they surely seem uncalled for. Having now presented several hypotheses of generation, some as to the manner in which the semen reaches or influences the ovary, and others as to the rudiments of the foetus, I shall now bring together those views which, upon the whole, appear to me the most satisfactory.

I believe, with Dr. Dewees, that a set of absorbent vessels extend from the innermost surface of the _labia externa_, and from the vagina to the ovary, the whole office of which is to take up the semen or some part thereof, and convey it to the ovary. I believe, with Leeuwenhoek, that the seminal animalculæ are the proper rudiments of the foetus, and are perhaps of different sexes; that in cases of impregnation one of them is carried not only to, but into a vesicle of an ovary, which is in a condition to receive and be duly affected by it.* It is here surrounded by the albuminous fluid which the vesicle contains. This fluid being somewhat changed in its qualities by its new-comer, stimulates the minute vessels of the parts which surround it, and thus causes more of this fluid to be formed; and while it affords the animalcule material for its development, it puts the delicate membrane of the ovary which retains it in its place upon the stretch, and finally bursts forth surrounded probably by an exceedingly delicate membrane of its own. This membrane, with the albuminous fluid it contains and the animalcule in the center of it, constitutes the ovum or egg. It is received by the fimbriated extremity of the Fallopian tube, which by this time has grasped the ovary, and is by this tube slowly conveyed into the uterus, to the inner surface of which it attaches itself, through the medium of the membrane, which is formed by the uterus itself in the interim between impregnation and the arriving of the ovum in the way I have just mentioned.

> * The opinion that the spermatozoa of seminal filaments are real animalculæ is now abandoned, but it is held by Dr. Carpenter and other authorities that they actually, as here stated, penetrate into the interior of the ovum. "The nature of impregnation," says Dr. Hermann, "is as yet unknown. In all probability it is, above all, essential, in order that it should occur, that one or more spermatozoa should penetrate the ovum. At any rate, spermatozoa have been found within the fecundated eggs of the most diverse species of animals."--Elements of "Human Physiology," translated from the 5th ed., by Dr. Gamgee, p. 534, 1875.--G. R.

The idea that a seminal animalcule enters an ovum while it remains in the ovary, was never before advanced to my knowledge; hence I consider

it incumbent upon me to advance some reason for the opinion.

First, it is admitted on all hands that the seminal animalculæ are essential to impregnation, since "they cannot be detected when either from age or disease the animal is rendered sterile."

Second, the ovum is impregnated while it remains in the ovary. True, those who never met with Dr. Dewees' theory, and who, consequently, have adopted the idea that the semen is ejected into the uterus, as the least improbable of any with which they were acquainted, have found it very difficult to dispose of the fact that the ovum is impregnated in the ovary, and have consequently presumed this is not generally the case. They admit it is certainly so sometimes, and that it is difficult to reject the conclusion that it is always so. Dr. Bostock--who, doubtless, had not met with Dewees' theory at the time he wrote, and who admits it impossible to conceive how the semen can find its way along the Fallopian tubes, how it can find its way toward the ovary, farther, at most, than into the uterus, and, consequently, cannot see how the ovum can be impregnated into the ovary--says, "Perhaps the most rational supposition may be that the ovum is transmitted to the uterus in the unimpregnated state; but there are certain facts which seem almost incompatible with this idea, especially the cases which not infrequently occur of perfect foetuses having been found in the tubes, or where they escaped them into the cavity of the abdomen. Hence it is demonstrated the ovum is occasionally impregnated in the tubes (why did he not say ovaria?), and we can scarcely resist the conclusion that it must always be the case."..."Haller discusses this hypothesis (Bostock's 'most natural supposition, perhaps') and decides against it."..."The experiments of Cruikshank, which were very numerous, and appear to have been made with the requisite degree of skill and correctness, led to the conclusion that the rudiment of the young animal is perfected in the ovarium."... "A case is detailed by Dr. Granville, of a foetus which appears to have been lodged in the body of the ovarium itself, and is considered by its author as a proof that conception always takes place in this organ."

The above quotations are from the third volume of Bostock's Physiology.

Now, as the seminal animalculæ are essential to impregnation, and as the ovum is impregnated in the ovarium, what more probable conjecture can we form than that an animalcule, as the real proper rudiment of the foetus, enters the ovum, where, being surrounded with albuminous fluid with which it is nourished, it gradually becomes developed? It may be noticed that Leeuwenhoek estimates that ten thousand animalculæ of the human semen may exist in a space not larger than a grain of sand. There can, therefore, be no difficulty in admitting that they may find their way along exceedingly minute vessels from the vagina, not only to, but into the ovum while situated in the ovarium.

I think no one can be disposed to maintain that the animalculæ merely reaches the surface of the ovum and thus impregnates it. But possibly some may contend that its sole office is to stimulate the ovum, and in this way set going that train of actions which are essential to impregnation. But there is no evidence in favor of this last idea, and certainly it does not so well harmonize with the fact that the offspring generally partakes more or less of the character of its male parent. As Dr. Dewees says of the doctrine of sympathy, "It makes no provision for the formation of mules; for the peculiarities of and likeness of parents; and for the propagation of predisposition to disease from parent to child; for the production of mulattoes," etc.

Considering it important to do away with the popular and mischievous error that the semen must enter the uterus to effect impregnation, I shall, in addition to what has been already advanced, here notice the

experiments of Dr. Haighton. He divided the Fallopian tubes in numerous instances, and that after the operation a foetus is never produced, but that _corpora lutea_ were formed. The obvious conclusions from these facts are that the semen does not traverse the Fallopian tubes to reach the ovaria; yet, that the ovum becomes impregnated while in the ovarium and, consequently, that the semen reaches the ovum in some way, except by the uterus and Fallopian tubes. I may remark, however, that a _corpus luteum_ is not positive proof that impregnation at some time or other has taken place; yet they are so rarely found in virgins that they were regarded as such proofs until the time of Blumenbach, a writer of the present century.*

> * A _corpus luteum_ is a little yellowish body, formed in the ovary by changes that take place in the Graafian vesicle after it has burst and discharged its contents. _Corpora lutea_ were formerly considered a sure sign of impregnation, as they were thought to be developed only or chiefly in cases of pregnancy, but it is now known that they occur in all cases where a vesicle has been ruptured and an ovum discharged; though they attain a larger, size and are longer visible in the ovary when pregnancy takes place than when it does not.--G. R.

"Harvey and DeGraaf dissected animals at most every period after coition for the express purpose of discovering the semen, but were never able to detect the smallest vestige of it in the uterus in any one instance."--Dewells Essay on Superfoetation. The fact of superfoetation furnishes a very strong argument against the idea that the semen enters the uterus in impregnation.

A woman being impregnated while she is already impregnated constitutes superfoetation. It is established beyond a doubt that such instances have occurred, yet those who have supposed that it is necessary for the semen to pass through the mouth of the uterus to produce conception have urged that superfoetation could not take place, because, say they--and they say correctly--"so soon as impregnation shall have taken place, the _os uteri_ closes and becomes impervious to the semen ejected in subsequent acts of coition."

Dr. Dewees related two cases, evidently cases of superfoetation, that occurred to his own personal knowledge. The first shows that, agreeable to the old theory, the semen must have met with other difficulties than a closed month of the uterus,--it must have passed through several membranes, as well as the waters surrounding the foetus, to have reached even the uterine extremity of a Fallopian tube. The second case I will give in his own words:

"A white woman, servant to Mr. H., of Abington township, Montgomery county, was delivered about five and twenty years since of twins, one of which was perfectly white, the other perfectly black. When I resided in that neighborhood I was in the habit of seeing them almost daily and also had frequent conversations with Mrs. H. respecting them. She was present at their birth, so that no possible deception could have been practiced respecting them. The white girl is delicate, fair-skinned, light-haired and blue eyed, and is said very much to resemble the mother. The other has all the characteristic marks of the African; short of stature, flat, broad-nosed, thick-lipped, woolly-headed, flat-footed, and projecting heels; she is said to resemble a negro they had on the farm, but with whom the woman would never acknowledge an intimacy; but of this there was no doubt, as both he and the white man, with whom her connection was detected, ran from the neighborhood as soon as it was known the girl was with child."

I am aware that some have thought that they had actually discovered

semen in the uterus, while Ruysch, an anatomist of considerable eminence, who flourished at the close of the seventeenth century, asserted in the most unequivocal manner that he found the semen in its gross white state in one of the Fallopian tubes of a woman, who died very soon after, or during the act of coition; but says Dewees, "the semen, after it has escaped from the penis, quickly loses its albuminous appearance and becomes as thin and transparent as water. And we are certain that Ruysch was mistaken. Some alteration in the natural secretion of the parts was mistaken for semen. This was nowise difficult for him to do, as he had a particular theory to support, and more especially as this supposed discovery made so much for it. It is not merely speculative when we say that some change in the natural secretion of the parts may be mistaken for semen, for we have the testimony of Morgani on our side. He tells us he has seen similar appearances in several instances in virgins and others, who have been subject during their lives to leucorrhæ, and that it has been mistaken by some for male semen."

On the whole I would say, that in some instances, where the mouth of the uterus is uncommonly relaxed, the semen may, as it were, accidentally have found its way into it; but that is not generally the case, nor is it essential to impregnation; and further, that whatever semen may at any time be lodged in the uterus, has nothing to do with conception. It is not consistent with analogy to suppose that the uterus has vessels for absorbing the semen and conveying it to the ovaria, considering the other important functions which we know it performs.

The circumstances under which a female is most likely to conceive are, first, when she is in health; second, between the ages of twenty-six and thirty; third, after she has for a season been deprived of those intercourses she had previously enjoyed; fourth, soon after menstruating. Respect-ing this latter circumstance, Dr. Dewees remarks, "Perhaps it is not erring greatly to say, that the woman is liable to conceive at any part of the menstrual interval. It is generally supposed, however, that the most favorable instant is immediately after the catamenia have ceased." Perhaps this is so as a general rule, but it is certainly liable to exceptions,* and he relates the following case which occurred to his own notice:

> * This view, which concerns a question of the utmost practical importance, is held at the present day by the great physiologists. It is believed that although conception may occur at other times, it is much more likely to happen from intercourse a few days before or after the menstrual periods; that is to say, during the time when ova are in process of being ripened and detached from the ovaries, and before they perish and are conveyed out of the body. "There is good reason to believe," says Dr. Carpenter, "that in the human female the sexual feeling becomes stronger at the period of menstruation; and it is quite certain that there is a greater aptitude for conception immediately before and after that epoch, than there is at any immediate period. This question has been made the subject of special inquiry by M. Raciborski, who affirms that the exceptions to the rule--that conception occurs immediately before or after or during menstruation--are not more than six or seven per cent. Indeed, in his latest work on the subject, he gives the details of fifteen cases, in which the date of conception could be accurately fixed, and the time of the last appearance of the catamenia was also known, and in all but one of them the correspondence between the periods was very close."--"Human Physiology," p. 959. So, too, Dr. Kirkes remarks, that "although conception is not confined to the periods of menstruation, yet it is more likely to occur

within a few days after cessation of the menstrual flux than at other times."--"Handbook of Physiology," p. 725.

"The husband of a lady who was obliged to absent himself many months in consequence of the embarrassment of his affairs, returned one night clandestinely, his visit being only known to his wife, his mother, and myself. The consequence of this visit was the impregnation of his wife. The lady was at that time within a week of her menstrual period; but as this did not fail to take place, she was led to hope that she had not suffered by the visit of her husband. But her catamenia not appearing at the next period, gave rise to a fear that she had not escaped! and the birth of a child nine months and thirteen days from the night of the clandestine visit proved her apprehensions too well grounded."

I think this case is an exception to a general rule; and, furthermore, favors an idea which reason and a limited observation, rather than positive knowledge, has led me to advance, the above, namely, that a woman is more likely to conceive, other things being the same, after being deprived for a season of those intercourses she had previously enjoyed. Had this lady's husband remained constantly at home, she would probably either not have conceived at all, or have done so a fortnight sooner than she did.

This case is also remarkable for two other facts: one, "that a woman in perfect health, and pregnant with a healthy child, may exceed the period of nine months by several days; the other, that a check is not always immediately given to the catamenial flow by an ovum being impregnated." Probably it is not so generally so as many suppose.

The term of utero-gestation, or the length of time from conception to the commencement of labor, is not precisely determined by physiologists. "It seems, however," says Dr. Dewees, "from the best calculations that can be made, that nine calendar months, or forty weeks, approaches the truth so nearly that we can scarcely need or desire more accuracy, could it be obtained." Unquestionably, however, some cases exceed this period by many days, or even weeks, and it has been a question much agitated, how far this period is ever exceeded. It is a question of some moment in a legal point of view. Cases are reported where the usual period was exceeded by five or six months; cases, too, where the circumstances attending them and the respectability of their reporters are such as to command our belief. Dr. Dewees has paid much attention to this subject, and he declares himself entirely convinced "that the commonly fixed period may be extended from thirteen days to six weeks, under the influence of certain causes or peculiarities of constitution."*

* See tables in Dr. Bull's "Hints to Mothers," pp. 130-141. --Publishers' note.

These occasional departures from the general rule will, perhaps, be the more readily admitted when we consider that they are not confined to the human species. From the experiments of Tessier, it appears that the term of utero-gestation varies greatly with the cow, sheep, horse, swine and other animals to which his attention was directed.

Properly connected with the subject of generation are the signs of pregnancy. Dr. Dewees remarks that "our experience furnishes no certain mark by which the moment conception takes place is to be distinguished. All appeals by the women to particular sensations experienced at the instant should be very guardedly received, for we are certain they cannot be relied upon; for enjoyment and indifference are alike fallacious. Nor are certain nervous tremblings, nausea, palpitation of the heart, the sensation of something flowing from them during coition, etc, more to be relied upon." Burns, however, says, "Some women feel, immediately after conception, a peculiar sensation, which apprises them

of their situation, but such instances are not frequent, and generally the first circumstances which lead a woman to suppose herself pregnant are the suppression of the menses;" a fickle appetite, some sickness, perhaps vomiting, especially in the morning; returning qualms, or languor in the afternoon; she is liable to heartburn, and to disturbed sleep. The breasts at first often become smaller and sometimes tender; but about the third month they enlarge, and occasionally become painful. The nipple is surrounded with an aureole or circle of a brown color, or at least of a color sensibly deeper or darker than before. She loses her looks, becomes paler, and the under part of the lower eyelid is often somewhat of a leaden hue. The features become sharper, and sometimes the whole body begins to emaciate, while the pulse quickens. In many instances particular sympathies take place, causing salivation, toothache, jaundice, etc. In other cases very little disturbance is produced, and the woman is not certain of her condition until the time of quickening, which is generally about four months from conception. It is possible for a woman to mistake the effects of wind for the motion of the child, especially if they have never borne children, and be anxious for a family; but the sensation produced by wind in the bowels is not confined to one spot, but is often felt at a part of the abdomen where the motion of a child could not possibly be felt. Quite as frequently, perhaps, do fleshy women think themselves dropsical, and mistake motions of the child for movements of water within the abdominal cavity. The motion of the child is not to be confounded with the sensation sometimes produced by the uterus rising out of the pelvis, which produces the feeling of fluttering. At the end of the fourth month, the uterus becomes so large that it is obliged to rise out of the pelvis, and if this elevation takes place suddenly, the sensation accompanying it is pretty strong, and the woman at the time feels sick or faint, and in irritable habits; even a hysterical fit may accompany it After this the morning sickness and other sympathetic effects of pregnancy generally abate, and the health improves.

Very soon after impregnation, if blood be drawn and suffered to stand a short time undisturbed, it will become sizy, of a yellowish or bluish color, and somewhat of an oily appearance. But we cannot from such appearances of the blood alone pronounce a woman pregnant, for a suppression of the menses, accompanied with a febrile state, may give the blood a like appearance as pregnancy, so also may some local disease. Of the above-mentioned symptoms, perhaps there is no _one_ on which we can place more reliance than the increased color of the circle around the nipple.*

> * See "Advice to a Wife," P. H. Chavasse, pp. 115-124, where many details are given.--Publishers' note.

Six or eight weeks after conception, the most sure way of ascertaining pregnancy is to examine the mouth and neck of the uterus, by way of the vagina. The uterus will be found lower down than formerly, its mouth is not directed so much forward as before impregnation, and is more completely closed, and the neck is felt to be thicker, or increased in circumference. When raised on the finger it is found to be heavier or more resisting. Whoever makes this examination must have examined the same uterus in an unimpregnated state, and retained a tolerably correct idea of its feeling at that time, or he will be liable to uncertainty, because the uterus of one woman is naturally different in magnitude from another, and the uterus is frequently lower down than natural from other causes than pregnancy.*

> * No one but a doctor, or one trained in physiology could, of course, make any such examination with safety and utility.--Publishers' note.

It has not been fully ascertained how long it is after a fruitful

connection before an effect is produced upon the ovaria, that is before any alteration could be discovered, were the female to be dissected. But Brighton's experiments have established the fact, that with rabbits, whose term of utero-gestation is but thirty days, no effect is propagated to the ovaria until nearly fifty hours after coition; we should judge, therefore, that with the human species it must be several days, and it is generally estimated by physiologists that the ovum does not reach the uterus until the expiration of twenty days from the time of connection.*

> * "The time occupied in the passage of the ovum from the ovary to the uterus," says Dr. Kirkes, "occupies probably eight or ten days in the human female."--"Handbook of Physiology," p. 741.--G. R.

It is probable that in all cases in which any matter is absorbed from any part of the animal system, some little time is required for such matter, after its application, to stimulate and arouse the absorbent vessels to action; hence it is probable that after the semen is lodged in the vagina, it is many minutes, possibly some hours, before any part of it is absorbed.

CHAPTER III. OF PROMOTING AND CHECKING CONCEPTION

Sterility depends either on imperfect organization, or imperfect action of the organs of generation. In the former cases, which are rare, the menses do not generally appear, the breasts are not developed, and the sexual desire is inconsiderable. There is no remedy in these cases.

The action may be imperfect in several respects. The menses may be obstructed or sparing, or they may be too profuse or frequent. It is extremely rare for a woman to conceive who does not menstruate regularly. Hence where this is the case the first step is to regulate this periodical discharge. For this purpose the advice of a physician will generally be required, for these irregularities depend upon such various causes and require such a variety of treatment that it would be inconsistent with the plan of this work to give instructions for remedying them. A state of exhaustion or weakness of the uterine system, occasioned by too frequent intercourse, is a frequent cause of sterility. The sterility of prostitutes is attributed to this cause, but I doubt it being the only one. With females who are apparently healthy, the most frequent cause is a torpor, rather than weakness of the genital organs.

For the removal of sterility from this cause, I shall give some instructions, and this I do the more readily because the requisite means are such as will regulate the menses in many cases, where they do not appear so early in life, so freely or so frequently as they ought.

In the first place, it will generally be necessary to do something toward invigorating the system by exercise in the open air, by nourishing food of easy digestion, by sufficient dress, particularly flannel, and especially by strict temperance in all things. With this view, also, some scales which fall from the blacksmith's anvil, or some steel filings may be put into old cider or wine (cider the best), and after standing a week or so, as much may be taken two or three times a day as can be borne without disturbing the stomach.

All the while the bowels are to be kept rather open by taking from one to three of _Pill rufi_ every night on going to bed. These pills consist of four parts of aloes, two parts of myrrh, and one of saffron, by

weight.

These measures having been regularly pursued until the system be brought into a vigorous state, medicines which are more particularly calculated to arouse the genital organs from a state of torpor may be commenced, and continued for months if necessary. The cheapest, most simple (and I am not prepared to say it is not the most effectual in many cases) is cayenne. All the virtues of this article are not generally known even to physicians. I know it does not have the effect upon the coats of the stomach that many have conjectured. It may be taken in the quantity of from one to two rising teaspoonsful, or even more, everyday up on food or on any liquid vehicle. Another medicine of much efficacy is Dewees' Volatile Tincture of Guaiac. It is generally kept by apothecaries, and is prepared as follows:

Take of Gum Guaicum, in powder, eight ounces; carbonate of Potash, or of Soda, or (what will answer) Saleratus, three drachms; Allspice, in powder, two ounces; any common spirits of good strength, two pounds, or what is about the same two pints and a gill. Put all into a bottle, which may be shaken now and then, and use of it may be commenced in a few days. To every gill of this, at least a large teaspoon-ful of Spirits of Ammonia is to be added. A teaspoonful is to be taken for a dose, three times a day, in a glass of milk, cider or wine. It is usually given before eating; but if it should chance to offend the stomach when taken before breakfast, it may in this case be taken an hour after.

Dr. Dewees found this tincture, taken perhaps for months, the most effectual remedy for painful menstruation, which is an obstinate complaint. If there be frequent strong pulse, heat, thirst, florid countenance, etc., it is not to be taken until these symptoms be removed by low diet, a few doses of salts, and bleeding, if required.

A third medicine for arousing the genital organs, is tincture of Spanish Flies. But I doubt its being equal, in sterility, to the above mentioned medicines, though it may exceed them in some cases, and may be tried if these fail. A drachm of them may be put to two gills of spirits. Dose, 25 drops, in water, three times a day, increasing each one by two or three drops, until some degree of stranguary occurs, then omit until this pass off, as it will in a day or two. Should the stranguary be severe, drink freely of milk and water, slippery elm, or flaxseed tea.

In many cases of sterility, where the general health is considerably in fault, and especially when the digestive organs are torpid, I should have much faith in a Thomsonian course. It is calculated to arouse the capillary vessels throughout the whole system, and thus to open the secretions, to remove obstructions, and free the blood of those effete and phlegmy materials which nature requires to be thrown off. The views of the Thomsonian as to heat and cold appear to me unphilosophical. But this has nothing to do with the efficiency of their measures.

In relation to sterility, I would here bring to mind, what has before been stated, that a woman is most likely to conceive immediately after a menstrual turn. And now, also, let me suggest the idea that Nature's delicate beginnings may be frustrated by the same means that put her a going. This idea is certainly important when the woman is known to have miscarried a number of times. Sterility is sometimes to be attributed to the male, though he apparently be in perfect health. It would be an interesting fact to ascertain if there be no seminal animalculæ in these cases; and whether medicines of any kind are available.

It has been ascertained that a male and female may be sterile in relation to each other, though neither of them be so with others.

The foregoing measures for sterility are also suitable in cases of impotency. This term, I believe, is generally con-lined to, and defined as a want of desire or ability, or both on the part of the male; but I see no good reason why it should not comprehend the case in which there is neither desire nor pleasure with the female. Such females, it is true, may be fruitful; but so, on the other hand, the semen may not have lost its fecundating property. Impotency, at a young or middle age, and in some situations in life especially, is certainly a serious misfortune, to say the least of it. The whole evil by no means consists, in every case, in the loss of a source of pleasure. All young people ought to be apprised of the causes of it--causes which, in many instances, greatly lessen one's ability of giving and receiving that pleasure which is the root of domestic happiness. I shall allude to one cause, that of premature, and especially solitary gratification, in another place. Intemperance in the use of spirits is another powerful cause. Even a moderate use of spirits, and also of tobacco, in any form, have some effect It is a law of animal economy, that no one part of the system can be stimulated or excited, without an expense of vitality, as it is termed. The part which is stimulated draws the energy from other parts. And hence it is, that close and deep study, as well as all the mental passions when excessive, impair the venereal appetite. All excesses, all diseases and modes of life which impair the general health, impair this appetite, but some things more directly and powerfully than others.

As to the remedies for impotency, they are much the same as for sterility. It is of the first importance that the mind be relieved from all care and anxiety. The general health is to be improved by temperance, proper exercise in the open air, cheerful company, change of scenery, or some occupation to divert the mind without requiring much exercise of it; nourishing food of easy digestion; flannel worn next to the skin. The cold bath may be tried, and if it be followed by agreeable feelings, it will do good. The bowels may be gently stimulated by the pills before mentioned; and the preparation of iron also, already mentioned, should be taken.

To stimulate the genital organs more directly, cayenne, Dewees' tincture of guaiac, or tincture of flies, may be taken. I have given directions for making and taking the tincture of flies, chiefly because it is esteemed one of the best remedies for impotency caused by or connected with nocturnal emissions, to which I have before alluded.

It is in cases where little or no pleasure, nor erection, attend these emissions--cases brought on by debauchery, or in elderly persons--that I would recommend tincture of flies, and the other measures above mentioned. In some bad cases, enormous doses of this tincture are required, say two or three hundred drops. Yet the best rule for taking it is that already given, namely, begin with small doses, and gradually increase until some stranguary be felt, or some benefit be received. In this affection, as well as in all cases of impaired virility, the means I have mentioned are to be pursued for a long time, unless relief be obtained. These have cured after having been taken for a year or more without the result. In all cases of impotency not evidently depending upon disease of some part besides the genital organs, I should have much confidence in blisters applied to the lower part of the spine.

Occasional nocturnal emissions, accompanied with erection and pleasure, are by no means to be considered a disease, though they have given many a one such uneasiness. Even if they be frequent, and the system considerably debilitated, if not caused by debauch, and the person be young, marriage is the proper measure.

There have been several means proposed and practiced for checking conception. I shall briefly notice them, though a knowledge of the best

is what most concerns us. That of withdrawal immediately before emission is certainly effectual, if practiced with sufficient care. But if (as I believe) Dr. Dewees' theory of conception be correct, and as Spallanzani's experiments show that only a trifle of semen, even largely diluted with water, may impregnate by being injected into the vagina, it is clear that nothing short of entire withdrawal is to be depended upon. But the old notion that the semen must enter the uterus to cause conception, has led many to believe that a partial withdrawal is sufficient, and it is on this account that this error has proved mischievous, as all important errors generally do. It is said by those who speak from experience that the practice of withdrawal has an effect upon the health similar to intemperance in eating. As the subsequent exhaustion is probably mainly owing to the shock the nervous system sustains in the act of coition, this opinion may be correct. It is further said that this practice serves to keep alive those fine feelings with which married people first come together. Still, I leave it for every one to decide for himself whether this check be so far from satisfactory as not to render some other very desirable.

As to the baudruche, which consists in a covering used by the male, made of very delicate skin, it is by no means calculated to come into general use. It has been used to secure immunity from syphilitic affections.

Another check which the old idea of conception has led some to recommend with considerable confidence, consists in introducing into the vagina, previous to connection, a very delicate piece of sponge, moistened with water, to be immediately afterward withdrawn by means of a very narrow ribbon attached to it, But, as our views would lead us to expect, this check has not proved a sure preventive. As there are many little ridges or folds in the vagina, we cannot suppose the withdrawal of the sponge would dislodge all the semen in every instance. If, however, it were well moistened with some liquid which acted chemically upon the semen, it would be pretty likely to destroy the fecundating property of what might remain. But if this check were ever so sure, it would, in my opinion, fall short of being equal, all things considered, to the one I am about to mention--one which not only dislodges the semen pretty effectually, but at the same time destroys the fecundating property of the whole of it.

It consists in syringing the vagina immediately after connection with a solution of sulphate of zinc, of alum, pearl-ash, or any salt that acts chemically on the semen, and at the same time produces no unfavorable effect on the female.

In all probability a vegetable astringent would answer--as an infusion of white oak bark, of red rose leaves, of nut-galls, and the like. A lump of either of the above-mentioned salts, of the size of a chestnut, may be dissolved in a pint of water, making the solution weaker or stronger, as it may be borne without any irritation of the parts to which it is applied. These solutions will not lose their virtues by age. A female syringe, which will be required in the use of the check, may be had at the shop of an apothecary for a shilling or less. If preferred, the semen may be dislodged as far as it can be, by syringing with simple water, after which some of the solution is to be injected, to destroy the fecundating property of what may remain lodged between the ridges of the vagina, etc.

I know the use of this check requires the woman to leave her bed for a few moments, but this is its only objection; and it would be unreasonable to suppose that any check can ever be devised entirely free of objections. In its favor it may be said, it costs nearly nothing; it is sure; it requires no sacrifice of pleasure; it is in the hand of the female; it is to be used after, instead of before the connection, a weighty consideration in its favor, as a moment's reflection

will convince any one; and last, but not least, it is conducive to cleanliness, and preserves the parts from relaxation and disease. The vagina may be very much contracted by a persevering use of astringent injections, and they are constantly used for this purpose in cases of _procidentia uteri_, or a sinking down of the womb; subject as women are to _fluor albus_, and other diseases of the genital organs, it is rather a matter of wonder that they are not more so, considering the prevailing practices. Those who have used this check (and some have used it, to my certain knowledge with entire success for nine or ten years, and under such circumstances as leave no room to doubt its efficacy) affirm that they would be at the trouble of using injections merely for the purposes of health and cleanliness.

By actual experiment it has been rendered highly probable that pregnancy may, in many instances, be prevented by injections of simple water, applied with a tolerable degree of care. But simple water has failed, and its occasional failure is what we should expect, considering the anatomy of the parts, and the results of Spallanzani's experiments heretofore alluded to.

This much did I say respecting this check in the first edition of this work. That is what I call the chemical check. The idea of destroying the fecundating property of the semen was original, if it did not originate with me. My attention was drawn to the subject by the perusal of "Moral Physiology." Such was my confidence in the chemical idea that I sat down and wrote this work in July, 1831. But the reflection that I did not know that this check would never fail, and that if it should, I might do someone an injury in recommending it, caused the manuscript to lie on hand until the following December. Some time in November I fell in with an old acquaintance, who agreeably surprised me by stating that to his personal knowledge this last check had been used as above stated. I have since conversed with a gentleman with whom I was acquainted, who stated that, being in Baltimore some few years ago, he was there informed of this check by those who have no doubt of its efficacy. From what has as yet fell under my observation, I am not warranted in drawing any conclusion. I can only say that I have never known it to fail. Such are my views on the whole subject, that it would require many instances of its reputed failure to satisfy me that such failures were not owing to an insufficient use of it. I even believe that quite cold water alone, if thoroughly used, would be sufficient. In Spallanzani's experiments warm water was unquestionably used. As the seminal animalcule are essential to impregnation, all we have to do is to change the condition of, or, if you will, to kill them; and as they are so exceedingly small and delicate, this is doubtless easily done, and hence cold water may be sufficient.

What has now been advanced in this work will enable the reader to judge for himself or herself of the efficacy of the chemical or syringe check, and time will probably determine whether I am correct in this matter. I do know that those married females who have much desire to escape will not stand for the little trouble of using this check, especially when they consider that on the score of cleanliness and health alone it is worth the trouble.

A great part of the time no check is necessary, and women of experience and observation, with the information conveyed by this work, will be able to judge pretty correctly when it is and when it is not. They may rest assured that none of the salts mentioned will have any deleterious effect. The sulphate of zinc is commonly known by the name of white vitriol. This, as well as alum, have been extensively used for leucorrhæ. Acetate of lead would doubtless be effectual--indeed, it has proven to be so; but I do not recommend it, because I conceive it possible that a long continued use of it might impair the instinct.

I hope that no failures will be charged of efficacy of this check which ought to be attributed to negligence or insufficient use of it. I will therefore recommend at least two applications of the syringe, the sooner the surer, yet it is my opinion that five minutes' delay would not prove mischievous--perhaps not ten.

CHAPTER IV. REMARKS ON THE REPRODUCTIVE INSTINCT

I scarcely need observe that by this instinct is meant the desire for sexual intercourse. Blumenbach speaks of this instinct as "superior to all others in universality and violence." Perhaps hunger is an exception. But surely no instinct commands a greater proportion of our thoughts or has a greater influence upon happiness for better or for worse. "Controlled by reason and chastened by good feelings, it gives to social intercourse much of its charm and zest, but directed by selfishness or governed by force, it is prolific of misery and degradation. In itself it appears to be the most social and least selfish of all instincts. It fits us to give even while we receive pleasure, and among cultivated beings the former power is even more highly valued than the latter. Not one of our instincts perhaps affords larger scope for the exercise of disinterestedness, or fitter play for the best moral feelings of our race. Not one gives birth to relations more gentle, more humanizing and endearing; not one lies more immediately at the root of the kindliest charities and most generous impulses that honor and bless human nature. It is a much more noble, because less purely selfish, instinct than hunger or thirst. It is an instinct that entwines itself around the warmest feelings and best affections of the heart"--_Moral Physiology_. But too frequently its strength, together with a want of moral culture, is such that it is not "controlled by reason;" and consequently, from time immemorial, it has been gratified, either in a mischievous manner, or to such an intemperate degree, or under such improper circumstances, as to give rise to an incalculable amount of human misery. For this reason it has, by some, been regarded as a low, degrading and "carnal" passion, with which family life must be ever at war. But in the instinct itself the philosopher sees nothing deserving of degrading epithets. He sees not that nature should war against herself. He believes that in savage life it _is_, and in wisely organized society of duly enlightened and civilized beings it should be the source of ten-fold more happiness than misery.

A part of the evil consequences to which this instinct is daily giving rise under the present state of things, it belongs more particularly to the moralist to point out; whilst of others it falls within the province of the physician to treat. But let me first remark that physicians have hitherto fallen far short of giving those instructions concerning this instinct which its importance demands. In books, pamphlets, journals, etc., they have laid much before the public respecting eating, drinking, bathing, lacing, air, exercise, etc., but have passed by the still more important subject now before us, giving only here and there spine faint allusion to it This, it is true, the customs, not to say pruderies, of the age have compelled them to do, in publications designed for the public eye, yet, in some small work, indicated by its title to be for private perusal, they might, with the utmost propriety, have embodied much highly useful instruction in relation to this instinct.

This instinct is liable to be gratified at improper times, to an intemperate degree, and in a mischievous manner.

True philosophy dictates that this and all other appetites be so gratified as will most conduce to human happiness--not merely the

happiness attending the gratification of one of the senses, but all the senses--not merely sensual happiness, but intellectual--not merely the happiness of the individual, but of the human family.

First.--Of the times at which this instinct ought not to be gratified. With females it ought not to be gratified until they are seventeen or eighteen years of age, and with males not until they are a year or two older. The reason is, if they refrain until these ages, the passion will hold out the longer, and they will be able to derive much more pleasure from it in after life, than if earlier gratified, especially to any great extent A due regard to health also enjoins with most persons some restraint on this instinct--indeed, at all times, but especially for a few years after the above-mentioned ages. It ought not to be rashly gratified at first. Begin temperately, and as the system becomes more mature, and habituated to the effects naturally produced by the gratification of this instinct, it will bear more without injury. Many young married people, ignorant of the consequences, have debilitated the whole system--the genital system in particular; have impaired their mental energies; have induced consumptive and other diseases; have rendered themselves irritable, unsocial, melancholy and finally much impaired, perhaps destroyed their affection for each other by an undue gratification of the reproductive instinct. In almost all diseases, if gratified at all, it should be very temperately. It ought not to be gratified during menstruation, as it might prove productive to the man of symptoms similar to those of syphilis, but more probably to the woman of a weakening disease called _fluor albus_. In case of pregnancy a temperate gratification for the first two or three months may be of no injury to the woman or the coming offspring. But it ought to be known that the growth of the foetus in utero may be impaired, and the seeds of future bodily infirmity and mental imbecility of the offspring may be sown by much indulgence during utero-gestation or pregnancy, especially when the woman experiences much pleasure in such indulgences.

Having already glanced at some of the bad effects of an undue gratification of this instinct, I have but little more to offer under the head of Intemperate Degree. It will be borne in mind that intemperance in this thing is not to be decided by numbers, but that it depends on circumstances; and what would be temperance in one, may be intemperance in another. And with respect to an individual, too, what he might enjoy with impunity, were he a laboring man, or a man whose business requires but little mental exercise, would, were he a student, unfit him for the successful prosecution of his studies. Intemperance in the gratification of this instinct has a tendency to lead to intemperance in the use of ardent spirits. The languor, depression of spirits, in some instances faintness and want of appetite, induced by intemperate gratification, call loudly for some stimulus, and give a relish to spirits. Thus the individual is led to drink. This inflames the blood, the passions, and leads to further indulgence. This again calls for more spirits; and thus two vicious habits are commenced, which mutually increase each other. Strange as it may appear to those unacquainted with the animal economy, an intemperate indulgence sometimes gives rise to the same disease--so far as the name makes it so--that is frequently cured by a temperate indulgence; viz, nocturnal emissions.

Every young married woman ought to know that the male system is exhausted in a far greater degree than the female by gratification. It seems, indeed, to have but little effect, comparatively, upon some females. But with respect to the male, it has been estimated by Tissot that the loss of one ounce of semen is equal in its effects upon the system of forty ounces of blood. As it respects the immediate effects, this estimation, generally speaking, may not be too great. But a man living on a full meat diet might, doubtless, part with fifty ounces of semen in the course of a year, with far less detriment to the system

than with 2,000 ounces of blood. It is a fact, that mode of living, independent of occupation, makes a great difference with respect to what the system will bear. A full meat diet, turtles, oysters, eggs, spirits, wine, etc., certainly promote the secretion of semen, and enable the system to bear its emission. But a cool vegetable and milk diet calms all the passions, the venereal especially. Most men adopting such a diet as this will suffer no inconvenience in extending the intervals of their gratification to three or four weeks; on the contrary, they will enjoy clear intellect, and a fine flow of spirits. This is the diet for men of literary pursuits, especially the unmarried.

As to the mischievous manner, it consists in the unnatural habit of onanism, or solitary gratification; it is an antisocial and demoralizing habit, which, while it proves no quietus to the mind, impairs the bodily powers as well as mental, and not infrequently leads to insanity.

While the gratification of the reproductive instinct in such manner as mentioned leads to bad consequences, a temperate and natural gratification, under proper circumstances, is attended with good, besides the mere attendant pleasure, which alone is enough to recommend such gratification. I admit that human beings might be so constituted that if they had no reproductive instinct to gratify, they might enjoy health; but being constituted as they are, this instinct cannot be mortified with impunity. It is a fact universally admitted, that unmarried females do not enjoy so much good health and attain to so great an age as the married; notwithstanding that the latter are subject to the diseases and pains incident to child-bearing. A temperate gratification promotes the secretions, and the appetite for food; calms the restless passions; induces pleasant sleep; awakens social feeling; and adds a zest to life which makes one conscious that life is worth preserving.

APPENDIX

> [I here connect with this work, by way of Appendix, the following extract from an article which appeared in the Boston Investigator, a paper which, _mirabile dictu_, is so "crazy" as to be open to the investigation of all subjects which mightily concern mankind.]

The only seeming objection of much weight that can be brought against diffusing a knowledge of checks is, that it will serve to increase illegal connections. Now, this is exactly the contrary effect of that which those who have diffused such knowledge most confidently believe will arise from it. To diminish such connections is indeed one of the grand objects of this publication,--an object which laws and prisons cannot, or, at least, do not, accomplish. Why is there so much prostitution in the land? The true answer to the question is not, and never will be, Because the people have become acquainted with certain facts in physiology; it is because there are so many unmarried men and women,--men of dissipation and profligacy, owing to their not having married in their younger days and settled down in life. But why are there so many unmarried people in the country? Not because young hearts when they arrive at the age of maturity do not desire to marry; but because prudential considerations interfere. The young man thinks: I cannot marry yet; I cannot support a family; I must make money first, and think of a matrimonial settlement afterward. And so it is, that through fear of having a family, before they have made a little headway in the world, and of being thereby compelled to "tug at the oar of incessant labor throughout their lives," thousands of young men do not marry, but go abroad into the world and form vicious acquaintances

and practices. The truth, then, is this,--there is so much illegal connection in the land, because the people had not, twenty years ago, that very information which, it would seem, some, doubtless through want of due reflection, are apprehensive will increase this evil. I might quote pages to the point from "Every Woman's Book," but I fear my communication would be too lengthy. I content myself with a few lines. "But when it has become the custom here as elsewhere to limit the number of children, so that none need have more than they wish, no man will fear to take a wife; all will marry while young; debauchery will diminish; while good morals and religious duties will be promoted."

It has been asked if a general knowledge of checks would not diminish the general increase of population? I think that such would not be the result in this country until such result would be desirable. In my opinion the effect would be a good many more families (and, on the whole, as many births), but not so many overgrown and poverty-stricken ones. It has been said, It is better to let Nature take her course. Now, in the broadest sense of the word "Nature," I say so too. In this sense there is nothing unnatural in the universe. But if we limit the sense of the word Nature so as not to include what we mean by art, then is civilized life one continued warfare against Nature. It is by art that we subdue the forest; by art we contend against the elements; by art we combat the natural tendency of disease, etc.

As to the outrageous slander which here and there one has been heard to utter against the fair sex, in saying that fear of conception is the foundation of their chastity, it must be the sentiment of a "carnal heart," which has been peculiarly unfortunate in its acquaintances. "To the pure, all things are pure." Chastity, as well as its opposite, is in a great degree constitutional; and ought, in a like degree, to be regarded as a physical property, if I may so say, rather than a moral quality. Where the constitution is favorable a very indifferent degree of moral training is sufficient to secure the virgin without the influence of the above-mentioned fear; but where it is the reverse you may coop up the individual in the narrow dark cage of ignorance and fear, as you will, but still you must watch. An eminent moralist has said, "That chastity which will not bear the light [of physiology] is scarcely worth preserving." But verily, I believe there is very little such in the market. What there be is naturally short-lived, and, after its demise, the unhappily constituted individual stands in great need of this light to save her from ignominy. What might it not have prevented in the Fall River affair? And if one of two things must happen--either the destruction of fecundity or the destruction of life--which of the two is the greater evil? In these cases alone this light is calculated to do sufficient good to counterbalance all the evil that would arise from it; so that we should have its important advantages to the married in a political, a domestic and a medical point of view, as so much clear gain. This, of course, is my opinion; but since I have probably reflected more upon the subject than all the persons concerned in my imprisonment put together, until it can be shown that I have not as clear a head and as pure a heart as any of them, I think it entitled to some weight.

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HERESY: ITS MORALITY & UTILITY

A PLEA and A JUSTIFICATION.

CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

What is heresy that it should be so heavily punished? Why is it that society will condone many offences, pardon many vicious practices, and yet have such scant mercy for the open heretic, who is treated as though he were some horrid monster to be feared and hated? Most religionists, instead of endeavouring with kindly thought to provide some solution for the difficulties propounded by their heretical brethren, indiscriminately confound all inquirers "in one common category of censure; their views are dismissed with ridicule as sophistical and fallacious, abused as infinitely dangerous, themselves denounced as heretics and infidels, and libelled as scoffers and Atheists." With some religonists all heretics are Atheists. With the Pope of Rome, Garibaldi

and Mazzini are Atheists. With the Religious Tract Society, Voltaire and Paine were Atheists. Yet in neither of the above-named cases is the allegation true. Voltaire and Paine were heretics, but both were Theists. Garibaldi and Mazzini are heretics, but neither of them is an Atheist. With few exceptions, the heretics of one generation become the revered saints of a period less than twenty generations later. Lord Bacon, in his own age, was charged with Atheism, Sir Isaac Newton with Socinianism, the famous Tillotson was actually charged with Atheism, and Dr. Burnet wrote against the commonly received traditions of the fall and deluge. There are but few men of the past of whom the church boasts to-day, who have not at some time been pointed at as heretics by orthodox antagonists excited by party rancour. Heresy is in itself neither Atheism nor Theism, neither the rejection of the Church of Rome, nor of Canterbury, nor of Constantinople; heresy is not necessarily of any ist or ism. The heretic is one who has selected his own opinions, or whose opinions are the result of some mental effort; and he differs from others who are orthodox in this:--they hold opinions which are often only the bequest of an earlier generation unquestioningly accepted; he has escaped from the customary grooves of conventional acquiescence, and sought truth outside the channels sanctified by habit.

Men and women who are orthodox are generally so for the same reason that they are English or French--they were born in England or France, and cannot help the good or ill fortune of their birth-place. Their orthodoxy is no higher virtue than their nationality. Men are good and true of every nation and of every faith; but there are more good and true men in nations where civilisation has made progress, and amongst faiths which have been modified by high humanising influences. Men are good not because of their orthodoxy, but in spite of it; their goodness is the outgrowth of their humanity, not of their orthodoxy. Heresy is necessary to progress; heresy in religion always precedes an endeavour for political freedom. You cannot have effectual political progress without wide-spread heretical thought. Every grand political change in which the people have played an important part, has been preceded by the popularisation of heresy in the immediately earlier generations.

Fortunately, ignorant men cannot be real heretics, so that education must be the hand-maiden to heresy. Ignorance and superstition are twin sisters. Belief too often means nothing more than prostration of the intellect on the threshold of the unknown. Heresy is the pioneer, erect and manly, striding over the forbidden line in his search for truth. Heterodoxy develops the intellect, orthodoxy smothers it. Heresy is the star twinkle in the night, orthodoxy the cloud which hides this faint gleam of light from the weary travellers on life's encumbered pathway. Orthodoxy is well exemplified in the dark middle ages, when the mass of men and women believed much and knew little, when miracles were common and schools were rare, and when the monasteries on the hill tops held the literature of Europe. Heresy speaks for itself in this nineteenth century, with the gas and electric light, with cheap newspapers, with a thousand lecture rooms, with innumerable libraries, and at least a majority of the people able to read the thoughts the dead have left, as well as to listen to the words the living utter.

The word heretic ought to be a term of honour; for honest, clearly uttered heresy is always virtuous, and this whether truth or error; yet it is not difficult to understand how the charge of heresy has been generally used as a means of exciting bad feeling. The Greek word [------] which is in fact our word heresy, signifies simply, selection or choice. The he etiq philosopher was the one who had searched and found, who, not content with the beaten paths, had selected a new road, chosen a new fashion of travelling in the inarch for that happiness all humankind are seeking.

Heretics are usually called "infidels," but no word could be more

unfairly applied, if by it is meant anything more than that the heretic does not conform to the State Faith. If it meant those who do not profess the faith, then there would be no objection, but it is more often used of those who are unfaithful, and then it is generally a libel. Mahomedans and Christians both call Jews infidels, and Mahomedans and Christians call each other infidels. Each religionist is thus an infidel to all sects but his own; there is but one degree of heresy between him and the heretic who rejects all churches. Each ordinary orthodox man is a heretic to every religion in the world except one, but he is heretic from the accident of birth without the virtue of true heresy.

In our own country heresy is not confined to the extreme platform adopted as a standing point by such a man as myself. It is rife even in the state-sustained Church of England, and to show this one does not need to be content with such illustrations as are afforded by the Essayists and Reviewers, who discover the sources of the world's education rather in Greece and Italy than in Judea, who reject the alleged prophecies as evidence of the Messianic character of Jesus; who admit that in nature and from nature, by science and by reason, we neither have, nor can possibly have any evidence of a deity working miracles; but declare that for that we must go out of nature and beyond science, and in effect avow that Gospel miracles are always _objects_, not _evidences_, of faith; who deny the necessity of faith in Jesus as saviour to peoples Who could never have such faith; and who reject the notion that all mankind are individually involved in the curse and perdition of Adam's sin; or even by the Rev. Charles Voysey, who declines to preach "the God of the Bible," and who will not teach that every word of the Old and New Testament is the word of God; or by the Rev. Dunbar Heath, who in defiance of the Bible doctrine, that man has only existed on the earth about 6,000 years, teaches that unnumbered chiliads have passed away since the human family commenced to play at nations on our earth; or by Bishop Colenso, who in his impeachment of the Pentateuch, his denial of the literal truth of the narratives of the creation, fall, and deluge, actually impugns the whole scheme of Christianity (if the foundation be false, the superstructure cannot be true); or by the Rev. Baden Powell, who declared "that the whole tenor of geology is in entire contradiction to the cosmogony delivered from Mount Sinai," and who denied a "local heaven above and a local hell beneath the earth;" or by the Rev. Dr. Giles, who, not content with preceding Dr. Colenso in his assaults on the text of the Pentateuch, also wrote as vigorously against the text of the New Testament; or by the Rev. Dr. Wall, who, unsatisfied with arguments against the admittedly incorrect authorised translation of the Bible, actually wrote to prove that a new and corrected Hebrew text was necessary, the Hebrew itself being corrupt; or by the Rev. Dr. Irons, who teaches that not only are the Gospel writers unknown, but that the very language in which Jesus taught is yet to be discovered, who declares that prior to the Esraic period the literal history of the Old Testament is lost, who does not find the Trinity taught in Scripture, and who declares that the Gospel dees not teach the doctrine of the Atonement; or by the late Archbishop Whately, to whom is attributed a Latin pamphlet raising strong objections against the truth of the alleged confusion of tongues at Babel.

We may fairly allege, that amongst thinking clergymen of the Church of England, heresy is the rule and not the exception. So soon as a minister begins to preach sermons which he does not buy ready lithographed--sermons which are the work of his brain--so soon heresy more or less buds out, now in the rejection of some church doctrine or article of minor importance, now in some bold declaration at variance with major and more essential tenets. Even Bishop Watson's so famous for his Bible Apology, declared that the church articles and creeds were not binding on any man. "They may be true, they may be false," he wrote.

Today scores of Church of England clergymen openly protest against, or groan in silence under the enforced subscription of Thirty-nine unbelievable Articles. Sir William Hamilton declares that the heads of Colleges at Oxford well knew that the man preparing for the Church "will subscribe Thirty-nine Articles which he cannot believe, who swears to do and to have done a hundred articles which he cannot or does not perform."

In scientific circles the heresy of the most efficient members is startlingly apparent. Against members of the Anthropological Society charges of Atheism are freely levelled, and although such a charge does not seem to be justified by any reports of their meetings, or by their printed publications, it is clear that not only out of doors, but even amongst their own circle it is felt that their researches conflict seriously with the Hebrew writ. The Society has been preached against and prayed against, and yet it is simply a society for discovering everything possible about man, prehistoric as well as modern. It has, however, an unpardonable vice in the eyes of the orthodox--it encourages the utterance of facts without regard to their effect on faiths.

The Ethnological Society is kindred to the last named in many of its objects, and hence some of its most active members have been direct assailants of the Hebrew Chronology, which, limits man's existence to the short space of 6,000 years; they have been deniers(sp.) of the origin of the human race from one pair, of the confusion of tongues at Babel, and of the reduction of the human race to one family by the Noachian deluge.

Geological science has a crowd of heretics amongst its professors, men who deny the sudden origin of fauna and flora; who trace the gradual development of the vegetable and animal kingdoms through vast periods of time; and who find no resting place in a beginning of existence, but are obliged to halt in face of a measureless past, inconceivable in its grandeur. Geology, to quote the words of Dr. Kalisch, declares "the utter impossibility of a creation of even the earth alone in six days." Mr. Goodwin says in the "Essays and Reviews:" "The school-books of the present day, while they teach the child that the earth moves, yet assure him that it is a little less than six thousand years old, and that it was made in six days. On the other hand, geologists of all religious creeds are agreed that the earth has existed for an immense series of years--to be counted by millions rather than by thousands; and that indubitably more than six days elapsed from its first creation to the appearance of man upon its surface."

Astronomy has in the ranks of its professors many of its most able minds who do not believe in the sun and moon as two great lights, who cannot accept the myriad stars as fixed in the firmament solely to give light upon the earth, who refuse to believe in the heaven as a fixed firmament to divide the waters above from the waters beneath, who cannot by their telescopes discover the local heaven above or the local hell beneath, although their science marks each faint nebulosity crossing, or crossed by the range of the watcher's vision. To quote again from Mr. Goodwin:--"On the revival of science in the sixteenth century, some of the earliest conclusions at which philosophers arrived, were found to be at variance with popular and long established belief. The Ptolemaic system of astronomy, which had then full possession of the minds of men, contemplated the whole visible universe from the earth as the immovable centre of things. Copernicus changed the point of view, and placing the beholder in the sun, at once reduced the earth to an inconspicuous globule, a merely subordinate member of a family of planets; which the terrestrials had, until then, fondly imagined to be but pendants and ornaments of their own habitation. The Church, naturally, took a lively interest in the disputes which arose between the philosophers ot the new school, and those who adhered to the old doctrines, inasmuch as the

Hebrew records, the basis of religious faith, manifestly countenanced the opinion of the earth's immobility, and certain other views of the universe, very incompatible with those propounded by Copernicus. Hence arose the official proceedings against Galileo, in consequence of which he submitted to sign his celebrated recantation, acknowledging that 'the proposition that the sun is the centre of the world and immovable from its place, is absurd, philosophically false, and formally heretical, because it is expressly contrary to the Scripture;' and that 'the proposition that the earth is not the centre of the world, nor immovable, but that it moves, and also with a diurnal motion, is absurd, philosophically false, and at least erroneous in faith.'"

Why is it that society is so severe on heresy? Three hundred years ago it burned heretics, till thirty years ago it sent them to jail; even in England and America to-day it is content to harass, annoy, and slander them. In the United States a candidate for the Governorship of a State, although otherwise admittedly eligible, was assailed bitterly for his suspected Socinianism. Sir Sidney Waterlow, standing for a Scotch seat, was sharply catechised as to when he had last been inside the Unitarian Chapel, and only saved his seat by not too boldly avowing his opinions. Lord Amberley, who was "unwise" enough to be honest in some of his answers, did not obtain his seat for South Devon in consequence of the suspicion of heresy excited against him. It is chiefly to the _odium theologicum_ that Mr. Mill may attribute his rejection at Westminster; and it is supposed to have also damaged Sir John Lubbock in West Kent. I only refrain from enlarging on my own case, because I learn from the Press that it is chiefly the vulgarity and coarseness of my heresy with which they are indignant. To reply that I have sought to avoid being coarse and vulgar is worse than useless, I am judged untried, condemned unheard; evidence is unnecessary in the case of a man who thus puts himself outside the pale.

Sir William Drummond says, "Early associations are generally the strongest in the human mind, and what we have been taught to credit as children we are seldom, disposed to question as men. Called away from speculative inquiries by the common business of life, men in general possess neither the inclination, nor the leisure to examine _what_ they believe or _why_ they believe. A powerful prejudice remains in the mind; ensures conviction without the trouble of thinking; and repels doubt without the aid or authority of reason. The multitude then is not very likely to applaud an author, who calls upon it to consider what it had hitherto neglected, and to stop where it had been accustomed to pass on. It may also happen that there is a learned and formidable body, which, having given its general sanction to the literal interpretation of the Holy Scriptures, may be offended at the presumption of an unhallowed layman, who ventures to hold, that the language of those Scriptures is often symbolical and allegorical, even in passages which both the Church and the Synagogue consider as nothing else than a plain statement of fact. A writer who had sufficient boldness to encounter such obstacles, and to make an appeal to the public, would only expose himself to the invectives of offended bigotry, and to the misrepresentations of interested malice. The press would be made to ring with declamations against him, and neither learning, nor argument, nor reason, nor moderation on his side, would protect him from the literary assassination which awaited him. In vain would he put on the heaven-tempered panoply of truth. The weapons which could neither pierce his buckler nor break his casque, might be made to pass with envenomed points through the joints of his armour. Every trivial error which he might commit, would be magnified into a flagrant fault; and every insignificant mistake into which he might fall, would be represented by the bigotted, or by the hireling critics of the day as an ignorant, or as a perverse deviation from the truth." Both by the Statute Law and Common Law, heresy is punishable, and many are punished for it even in the second half of the nineteenth century. A man who has been educated

in, or made profession of Christianity, and who shall then deny any of the Thirty-nine Articles, is liable to indictment and imprisonment, but this course is seldom pursued; the more common practice is for the Christian to avail himself of the heretic's want of belief in order to object to his competency as a witness. Repeated instances have occurred recently in which the proposed witness has been rejected as untrustworthy, because he was too honest to pretend to hold a faith he in truth denied. Besides such open persecution, there is the constant, unceasing, paltry, petty persecuting spirit which refuses to trade with the heretic; which declines to eat with him; which will not employ him; which feels justified in slandering him, which seeks to set his wife's mind against him, and to take away the affection of his children from him.

For those who do not believe this, I will instance two clergymen of the Church of England: one (who as my teacher when a boy) set a kind father's heart against me, and drove me further in heresy than I then dreamed of marching; and the other, who in cruel wickedness tried to wound me as a man through the feelings of my wife and children, whom he most vilely and basely slandered. The first is yet unpunished, the second escaped condign punishment only by writing himself down libeller, and praying pardon for the slanderous coinage of his brain. And yet this latter Church of England clergyman, who had written a strong letter thanking me for my generous forbearance, and who from his own pulpit pretended to express his sorrow, is actually the first and only man in my neighbourhood to cry "Atheist" against me, when I mingle in political life, and he thinks the phrase may wound and injure me.

CHAPTER II. THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

It requires a more practised pen than mine to even faintly sketch the progress of heresy during the past three centuries, but I trust to say enough to give the reader an idea of its rapid growth and wide extension. I say of the past three centuries, because it is only during the past three hundred years that heresy has made the majority of its converts amongst the mass of the people. In earlier times heretics were not only few, but they talked to the few, and wrote to the few, in the language of the few; and indeed it may be fairly said, that it is only during the last hundred years that the greatest men have sought to make heresy "vulgar;" that is, to make it common. One of our leading scientific men admitted recently that he had been reproved by some of his more orthodox friends, for not confining to the Latin language such of his geological opinions as were supposed to be most dangerous to the Hebrew records. The starting-point of the real era of popular heresy may be placed at the early part of the sixteenth century, when the memories of Huss and Ziska (who had really inoculated the mass with some spirit of heretical resistance a century before) aided Luther in resisting Rome.

Martin Luther, born at Eisleben in Saxony, in 1483, was one of the heretics who sought popular endorsement for his heresy, and who following the example of the Ulrich Zuingle, of Zurich, preached to the people in rough plain words. While others were limited to Latin, he rang out in plain German his opposition to Tetzel and his protectors. I know that to-day, Martin Luther is spoken of by orthodox Protestants as if he were a saint without blemish, and indeed I do not want to deprive the Christian Church of the honour of his adherence; he is hardly good enough and true enough for a first-class heretic. Yet in justification of my ranking him even so temporarily amongst the heretics of the sixteenth century, it will be sufficient to mention that he regarded "the books of the Kings as more worthy of credit than the books of the

Chronicles," that he wrote as follows:--"The book of Esdras I toss into the Elbe." "I am so an enemy to the book of Esther I would it did not exist." "Job spake not therefore as it stands written in his book." "It is a sheer _argumentum fabulæ_" "The book of the Proverbs of Solomon has been pieced together by others," of Ecclesiastes "there is too much of broken matter in it; it has neither boots nor spurs, but rides only in socks." "Isaiah hath borrowed his whole art and knowledge from David." "The history of Jonah is so monstrous that it is absolutely incredible." "The Epistle to the Hebrews is not by St. Paul, nor indeed by any Apostle." "The Epistle of James 1 account the writing of no Apostle," and "is truly an Epistle of sham." The Epistle of Jude "allegeth sayings or stories which have no place in Scripture," "of Revelation I can discover no trace that it is established by the Holy Spirit." If Martin Luther were alive to-day, the Established Church of England, which pretends to revere him, would prosecute him in the English Ecclesiastical Courts if he ventured to repeat the foregoing phrases from her pulpits. What would the writers who attack me for coarseness, say of the following passage, which occurs with reference to Melancthon, whom Luther boasts that he raised miraculously from the dead? "Melancthon," says Sir William Hamilton, to whose essay I am indebted for the extracts here given, "had fallen ill at Weimar from contrition and fear for the part he had been led to take in the Landgrave's polygamy: his life was even in danger." "Then and there," said Luther, "I made our Lord God to smart for it. For I threw down the sack before the door, and rubbed his ears with all his promises of hearing prayer, which I knew how to recapitulate from Holy Writ, so that he could not but hearken to me, should I ever again place any reliance on his promises." Martin Luther, with his absolute denial of free-will, and with his double code of morality for princes and peasants--easy for one and harsh for the other--may be fairly left now with those who desire to vaunt his orthodoxy; here his name is used only to illustrate the popular impetus given to nonconformity by his quarrel with the papal authorities. Luther protested against the Romish Church, but established by the very fact the right for some more advanced man than Doctor Martin to protest in turn against the Lutheran Church. The only consistent church in Christendom is the Romish Church, for it claims the right to think for all its followers. The whole of the Protestant Churches are inconsistent, for they claim the right to think and judge against Rome, but deny extremer Nonconformists the right to think and judge against themselves. Goethe, says Froude, declares that Luther threw back the intellectual progress of mankind by using the passions of the multitude to decide subjects which should have been left to the learned. I do not believe this to be wholly true, for the multitude once having their ears fairly opened, listened to more than the appeal to their passions, and examined for themselves propositions which otherwise they would have accepted or rejected from habit and without inquiry. Martin Luther's public discussions with pen and tongue, in Wittemberg, Augsburg, Liebenwerd, and Lichtenberg, and the protest he encouraged against Rome, were the commencement of a vigorous controversy, in which the public (who heard for the first time sharp controversial sermons preached publicly in the various pulpits by Lutheran preachers on free-will and necessity, election and predestination, &c.) began to take real part and interest; and which is still going on, and will in fact never end until the unholy alliance of Church and State is everywhere annulled, and each religion is left to sustain itself by its own truth, or to fall from its own weakness, no man being molested under the law on account of his opinions on religious matters. While Luther undoubtedly gave an impetus to the growth of Rationalism by his own appeal to reason and his reliance on reason for himself, it is not true that he contended for the right of general freedom of inquiry, nor would he have left unlimited the privileges of individual judgment for others. He could be furious in his denunciations of reason when a freer thinker than himself dared to use it against his superstitions. It is somewhat remarkable that while on the one hand one man, Luther, was detaching from the Church of Rome

a large number of minds, another man, Loyola, was about the same time engaged in founding that powerful society (the Society of Jesuits), which has done so much to check free inquiry and maintain the priestly domination over the human intellect. That which Luther commenced in Germany roughly, inefficiently, and perhaps more from personal feeling for the privileges of the special order to which he belonged than from desire for popular progress, was aided in its permanent effect by Descartes, in England by Bacon, in France by Montaigne, and in Italy by Bruno.

Francis Bacon, Lord Verulam, was born on the 22nd January, 1561, and died 1626. His mother, Anne, daughter of Sir Anthony Cooke, was a woman of high education, and certainly with some inclinations favourable to Freethought, for she had herself translated into English some of the sermons on fate and free-will of Bernard Ochino, or Bernardin Ochinus, an Italian Reforming Heretic, alike repudiated by the powers at Rome, Geneva, Wittemberg, and Zurich. Ochino, in his famous disquisition "touching the freedom or bondage of the human will, and the foreknowledge, predestination, and liberty of God," after discussing, with great acuteness, and from different points of view, these important topics, comes to the conclusion that there is no outlet to the mazes of thought in which the honest speculator plunges in the endeavour to solve these problems. Although, like other writers of that and earlier periods, many of Bacon's works were published in Latin, he wrote and published also in English, and if I am right in numbering him as one of the heretics of the sixteenth century, he must be also counted a vulgar heretic--i.e., one who wrote in the vulgar tongue, who preached his heresy in the language which the mass understood. Lewes says, "Bacon and Descartes are generally recognised as the Fathers of Modern Philosophy, although they themselves were carried along by the rapidly-swelling current of their age, then decisively setting in the direction of science. It is their glory to have seen visions of the coming greatness, to have expressed in terms of splendid power, the thoughts which were dimly stirring the age, and to have sanctioned the new movement by their authoritative genius." Bacon was the populariser of that method of reasoning known as the inductive, that method which seeks to trace back from the phenomena of the moment to the eternal noumenon or noumena--from the conditioned to the absolute. Nearly two thousand years before, the same method had been taught by Aristotle in opposition to Plato, and probably long thousands of years before the grand Greek, pre-historic schoolmen had used the method; it is natural to the human mind. The Stagirite was the founder of a school, Bacon the teacher and populariser for a nation. Aristotle's Greek was known to few, Bacon's eloquent English opened out the subject to the many whom he impregnated with his own confidence in the grand progressiveness of human thought. Lewes says; "The spirit of his philosophy was antagonistic to Theology, for it was a spirit of doubt and search; and its search was for visible and tangible results." Bacon himself, in his essay on Superstition, says: "Atheism leaves a man to sense, to philosophy, to natural piety, to laws, to reputation, all which may be guides to an outward moral virtue, though religion were not; but superstition dismounts all these, and erecteth an absolute monarchy in the minds of men: therefore Atheism did never perturb states; for it makes men wary of themselves, as looking no further; and we see the times inclined to Atheism, as the time of Augustus Caesar were civil times; but superstition hath been the confusion of many states, and bringeth in a new _primum mobile_ (the first motive cause), that ravisheth all the spheres of government." It is true that he also wrote against Atheism, and this in strong language, but his philosophy was not used for the purpose of proving theological propositions. He said: "True philosophy is that which is the faithful echo of the voice of the world, which is written in some sort under the dictation of things, which adds nothing of itself, which is only the rebound, the reflection of reality." It has been well said that the words "Utility and Progress" give the keynotes of Bacon's teachings.

With one other extract we leave his writings. "Crafty men," he says, "contemn studies, simple men admire them, and wise men use them; for they teach not their own use; but that is a wisdom without them, and above them, won by observation. Read not to contradict and confute, nor to believe and take for granted, nor to find talk and discourse; but to weigh and consider. Some books are to be tasted, others to be swallowed, and some few to be chewed and digested. Reading maketh a full man; conference a ready man; and writing an exact man; and therefore, if a man write little, he need have a great memory; if he confer little, he need have a present wit; and if he read little, he had need have much cunning, to seem to know that he doth not. Histories make men wise; poets witty; the mathematics subtle; natural philosophy deep; moral, grave; logic and rhetoric, able to contend." He was the father of experimental philosophy. In one of his suggestions as to the force of attraction of gravitation may be found the first aid to Sir Isaac Newton's later demonstrations on this head; another of his suggestions, worked out by Torricelli, ended in demonstrating the gravity of the atmosphere. But to the method he so popularised may be attributed the grandest discoveries of modern times. It is to be deplored that the memory of his moral weakness should remain to spoil the praise of his grand intellect.

Lord Macaulay, in the _Edinburgh Review_, after contrasting at some length the philosophy of Plato with that of Bacon, said;--"To sum up the whole: we should say that the aim of the Platonic philosophy was to exalt man into a god. The aim of the Baconian philosophy was to provide man with what he requires while he continues to be man. The aim of the Platonic philosophy was to raise us far above vulgar wants. The aim of the Baconian philosophy was to supply our vulgar wants. The former aim was noble; but the latter was attainable. Plato drew a good bow; but, like Acestes in Virgil, he aimed at the stars; and therefore, though there was no want of strength or skill, the shot was thrown away. His arrow was indeed followed by a track of dazzling radiance, but it struck nothing. Bacon fixed his eye on a mark which was placed on the earth and within bowshot, and hit it in the white. The philosophy of Plato began in words and ended in words--noble words in deed-words such as were to be expected from the finest of human intellects exercising boundless dominion over the finest of human languages. The philosophy of Bacon began in observations and ended in arts."

In France the political heresy of Jean Bodin--who challenged the divine right of rulers; who proclaimed the right of resistance against oppressive decrees of monarchs; who had words of laudation for tyrannicide, and yet had no conception that the multitude were entitled to use political power, but on the contrary wrote against them--was very imperfect, the conception of individual right was confounded in the habit of obedience to monarchical authority. Bodin is classed by Mosheim amongst the writers who sowed the seeds of scepticism in France; but although he was far from an orthodox man, it is doubtful if Bodin ever intended his views to be shared beyond the class to which he belonged. To the partial glimpse of individual right in the works of Bodin add the doctrine of political fraternity taught by La Boetie, and then this political heresy becomes dangerous in becoming popular.

The most decided heretic and doubter of the sixteenth century was one Sanchez, by birth a Portuguese, and practising as a physician at Toulouse; but the impetus which ultimately led to the spread and popularity of sceptical opinions in relation to politics and theology, is chiefly due to the satirical romances of Rabelais and the essays of Montaigne. "What Rabelais was to the supporters of theology," says Buckle, "that was Montaigne to the theology itself. The writings of Rabelais were only directed against the clergy, but the writings of Montaigne were directed against the system of which the clergy were the offspring."

Montaigne was born at Bordeaux 1533, died 1592. Louis Blanc says of his words, "Et ce ne sont pas simples discours d'un philosophe à des philosophes. Montaigne s'addresse à tous." Montaigne's words were not those of a philosopher talking only to his own order, he addressed himself to mankind at large, and he wrote in language the majority could easily comprehend. Voltaire points out that Montaigne as a philosopher was the exception in France to his class; he having succeeded in escaping that persecution which fell so heavily on others. Montaigne's thoughts were like sharp instruments scattered broadcast, and intended for the destruction of many of the old social and conventional bonds; he was the advocate of individualism, and placed each man as above society, rather than society as more important than each man. Montaigne mocked the reasoners who contradicted each other, and derided that fallibility of mind which regarded the opinion of the moment as infallibly true, and which was yet always temporarily changed by an attack of fever or a draught of strong drink, and often permanently modified by some new discovery. Less fortunate than Montaigne, Godfrey a Valle was burned for heresy in Paris in 1572, his chief offence having been that of issuing a work entitled "De Arte Nihil Credendi."

Heresy thus championed in France, Germany, and England, had in Italy its sixteenth century soldiers in Pomponatius of Mantua, Giordano Bruno, and Telesio, both of Naples, and in Campanella of Calabria, a gallant band, who were nearly all met with the cry of "Atheist," and were either answered with exile, the prison, or the faggot.

Pomponatius, who was born 1486 and died 1525, wrote a treatise on the Soul, which was so much deemed an attack on the doctrine of immortality despite a profession of reverence for the dogmas of the Church, that the work was publicly burned at Venice, a special bull of Leo X. being directed against the doctrine.

Bernard Telesio was born at Naples in 1508, and founded there a school in which mathematics and philosophy were given the first place. During his lifetime he had the good fortune to escape persecution, but sites his death his works were proscribed by the Church; Telesio was chiefly useful in educating the minds of some of the Neapolitans for more advanced thinking than his own.

This was well illustrated in the case of Thomas Campanella, born 1568, who, attracted by the teachings of Telesio, wrote vigorously against the old schoolmen and in favor of the new philosophy. Despite an affected reverence for the Church of Rome, Campanella spent twenty-seven years of his life in prison. Campanella has been, as is usually the case with eminent writers, charged with atheism, but there seems to be no fair foundation for the charges He was a true heretic, for he not only opposed Aristotle; but even his own teacher Telesio. None of these men, however, yet strove to reach the people, they wrote to and of one another, not to or of the masses. It is said that Campanella was fifty times arrested and seven times tortured for his heresy.

One Andrew de Bena, a profound scholar and eminent preacher of the Church of Rome, carried away by the spirit of the time, came out into the reformed party; but his mind once set free from the old trammels, found no rest in Luther's narrow church, and a poetic Pantheism was the result.

Jerome Cardan, a mathematician of considerable ability, born at Pavia 1601, has been fiercely accused of atheism. His chief offence seems to have been rather in an opposite direction; astrology was with him a favourite subject. While the strange views put forward in some of his works served good purpose by provoking inquiry, we can hardly class Cardan otherwise than as a man whose undoubted genius and erudition were

more than counterbalanced by his excessively superstitious folly.

Giordano Bruno was born near Naples about 1550. He was burned at Rome for heresy on the 17th February, 1600. Bruno was burned for alleged atheism, but appears rather, to have been a Pantheist. His most prominent avowal of heresy was the disbelief in eternal torment and rejection, of the common orthodox ideas of the devil. He wrote chiefly in Italian, his vulgar tongue, and thus effectively aided the grand march of heresy by familiarising the eyes of the people with newer and truer forms of thought. Bruno used the tongue as fluently as the pen. He spoke in Italy until he had roused an opposition rendering flight the only possibly escape from death. At Geneva he found no resting place, the fierce spirit of Zuingle and Calvin was there too mighty; at Paris he might have found favour, with the King, and at the Sorbonne, but he refused to attend mass, and delivered a series of popular lectures, which won many admirers; from Paris he went to England, where we find him publicly debating at Oxford and lecturing on theology, until he excited an antagonism which induced his return to Paris, where he actually publicly discussed for three days some of the grand problems of existence. Paris orthodoxy could not permit his onslaughts on established opinions, and this time it was to Germany Bruno turned for hospitality; where, after visiting many of the different states, lecturing freely but with general success, he drew upon himself a sentence of excommunication at Helmstadt. At last he returned to Italy and spoke at Padua, but had at once to fly thence from the Inquisition; at Venice he found a resting place in prison, whence after six years of dungeon, and after the tender mercy of the rack, he was led out to receive the final refutation of the faggot. There is a grand heroism in the manner in which he received his sentence and bore his fiery punishment. No cry of despair, no prayer for escape, no flinching at the moment of death. Bruno's martyrdom may favourably contrast with the highest example Christianity gives us.

It was in the latter half of the sixteenth century, that Unitarianism or Socinianism assumed a front rank position in Europe, having its chief strength in Poland, with considerable force in Holland and England. In 1524, one Lewis Hetzer had been publicly burned at Constance, for denying the divinity of Jesus; but Hetzer was more connected with the Anabaptists than with the Unitarians. About the same time a man named Claudius openly argued amongst the Swiss people, against the doctrine of the trinity, and one John Campanus contended at Wittemberg, and other places, against the usually inculcated doctrines of the Church, as to the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.

In 1566, Valentine Gentilis, a Neapolitan, was put to death at Rome, for teaching the superiority of God the Father, over the Son and the Holy Ghost. Modern Unitarianism appears to have had as its founders or chief promoters, Lælius Socinus, and his nephew Faustus Socinus; the first having the better brain and higher genius, but marred by a timid and irresolute character; the second having a more active nature and bolder temperament. From Cracow and Racow, during the latter half of this century, the Unitarians (who drew into their ranks many men of advanced minds.) issued a large number of books and pamphlets, which were circulated amongst the people with considerable zeal and industry. Unitarianism was carried from Poland into Transylvania by a physician, George Blandrata, and a preacher Francis David, or Davides, who obtained the support and countenance of the then ruler of the country. Davides, unfortunately for himself, became too unitarian for the Unitarians; he adopted the extreme views of one Simon Budnffius, who, in Lithuania, entirely repudiated any sort, of religious worship in reference to Jesus. Budnæus was excommunicated by the Unitarians themselves, and Davides was imprisoned for the rest of his life. As the Unitarians were persecuted by the old Romish and new Lutheran Churches, so they in turn persecuted seceders from and opposers of their own movement. Each

man's history involved the widening out of public thought; each act of persecution illustrated a vain endeavour to check the progress of heresy; each new sect marked a step towards the destruction of the old obstructive faiths.

About the close of the sixteenth century, Ernestius Sonerus, of Nuremberg, wrote against the doctrine of eternal torment, and also against the divinity of Jesus, but his works were never very widely circulated. Amongst the distinguished Europeans of the sixteenth century whom Dr. J. F. Smith mentions as either atheists or favouring atheism, were Paul Jovius, Peter Aretin, and Muretus. Rumour has even enrolled Leo X. himself in the atheistical ranks. How far some of these men had warranted the charge other than by being promoters of literature and lovers of philosophy, it is now difficult to say. A determined resistance was offered to the spread of heretical opinions in the South of Europe by the Roman Church, and it is alleged that some thousands of persons were burned or otherwise punished in Spain, Portugal, and Naples during the sixteenth century. The Inquisition or Holy Office was in Spain and Portugal the most prominent and active persecutor, but persecution was carried on vigorously in other parts of Europe by the seceders from Rome. Zuingle, Luther, and Calvin, were as harsh as the Pope towards those with whom they differed.

Michael Servetus, or Servede, was a native of Arragon, by profession a physician; he wrote against the ordinary doctrines of the Trinity, but was far from ordinary Unitarianism.

He was burned at Geneva, at the instance of Calvin. Calvin was rather fond of burning heretical opponents; to the name of Servetus might be added that of Gruet, who also was burned at the instance of Calvin, for denying the divinity of the Christian religion, and for arguing against the immortality of the soul.

It is worth notice that while heresy in this sixteenth century began to branch out openly, and to strike its roots down firmly amongst the people, ecclesiastical historians are compelled to record improvement in the condition of society. Mosheim says, "In this century the arts and sciences were carried to a pitch unknown to preceding ages, and from this happy renovation of learning, the European churches derived the most signal and inestimable advantages." "The benign influence of true science, and its tendency to improve both the form of religion and the institutions of civil policy, were perceived by many of the states." The love of literature is the most remarkable and characteristic form of advancing civilisation. Instead of being the absorbing passion of the learned few, it becomes gradually the delight and occupation of increasing numbers. This cultivation of literary pursuits by the mass is only possible when enough of heresy has been obtained to render their scope of study wide enough to be useful. Rotterdam gave life to the polished Erasmus, Valentia to Ludovico Vivez, Picardy to Le Fevre, and France to Rabelais.

In the latter half of this century, giants in literature grew out, giants who wrote for the people. William Shakespeare wrote even for those who could not read, but who might learn while looking and listening. His comedies and tragedies are at the same time pictures for the people of diverse phases of English life and character, with a thereunto added universality of pourtrayal and breadth in philosophy, which it is hardly too much to say, that no other dramatist has ever equalled. Italy boasts its Torquato Tasso, whose "Jerusalem Delivered," the grand work of a great poet, marks, like a mighty monument, the age capable of finding even in a priest-ridden country, an audience amongst the lowest as well as the highest, ready to read and sing, and finally permeated with the poet's outpourings. In astronomy, the name of Tycho Brahé stands out in the sixteenth century like one of the first

magnitude stars whose existence he catalogued.

CHAPTER III. THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

The seeds of inquiry sown in the sixteenth century resulted in a fruitful display of advanced opinions during the next age. In the page of seventeenth century history, more names of men, either avowedly heretics, or charged by the orthodox with heresy, or whose labours can be shown to have tended to the growth of heresy, may probably be recorded than can be found during the whole of the previously long period during which the Christian Church assumed to dominate and control European thought. The seventeenth century muster-roll of heresy is indeed a grand one, and gloriously filled. One of its early martyrs was Julius Caesar Vanini, who was burned at Toulouse, in the year 1619, aged 34, as "an impious and obstinate Atheist." Was he Atheist, or was he not? This is a question, in answering which the few remains of his works give little ground for sharing the opinion of his persecutors. Yet many writers agree in writing as if his Atheism were of indisputable notoriety. He was a poor Neapolitan priest, he preached a sort of Pantheism; unfortunately for himself, he believed in the utility of public discussion on theological questions, and thus brought upon his head the charge of seeking to convert the world to Atheism.

In 1611, two men, named Legat and Whitman, were burned in England for heresy. "But," says Buckle, "this was the last gasp of expiring bigotry; and since that memorable day, the soil of England has never been stained by the blood of a man who has suffered for his religious creed."

Peter Charron, of Paris, ought perhaps to have been included in the sixteenth century list, for he died in 1603, but his only known work, "La Sagesse," belongs to the seventeenth century, in which it circulated and obtained reputation.

He urged that religion is the accidental result of birth and education, and that therefore variety of creed should not be cause of quarrel between men, as such variety is the result of circumstances over which the men themselves have had no control; and he urges that as each sect claims to be the only true one, we ought to rise superior to all sects, and without being terrified by the fear of future punishment, or allured by the hope of future happiness, "be content with such practical religion as consists in performing the duties of life." Buckle, who speaks in high terms of Charron, says, "The Sorbonne went so far as to condemn Charron's great work, but could not succeed in having it prohibited."

René Descartes Duperron, a few years later than Bacon (he was born in 1596, at La Haye, in Touraine, died 1650, at Stockholm) established the foundations of the deductive method of reasoning, and applied it in a manner which Bacon had apparently carefully avoided. Both Descartes and Bacon addressed themselves to the task of substituting for the old systems, a more comprehensive and useful spirit of philosophy; but while Bacon sought to accomplish this by persuading men to experiment and observation, Descartes commenced with the search for a first and self-evident ground of all knowledge. This, to him, is found in consciousness. The existence of Deity was a point which Bacon left untouched by reason, yet with Descartes it was the first proposition he sought to prove. He says, "I have always thought that the two questions of the existence of God and the nature of the soul, were the chief of those which ought to be demonstrated rather by philosophy than by theology, for although it is sufficient for us, the faithful, to believe in God, and that the soul does not perish with the body, it does not

seem possible ever to persuade the infidels to any religion unless we first prove to them these two things by natural reason." To prove this existence of God and the immortality of the soul, Descartes needed a firm starting point, one which no doubt could touch, one which no argument could shake. He found this point in the fact of his own existence. He could doubt everything else, but he could not doubt that he, the thinking doubter, existed. His own existence was the primal fact, the indubitable certainty, which served as the base for all other reasonings, hence his famous "Cogito ergo sum:" I think, therefore I am. And although it has been fairly objected that Descartes did not exist because he thought, but existed and thought; it is nevertheless clear that it is only in the thinking that Descartes had the consciousness of his existence. The fact of Descartes' existence was, to him, one above and beyond all logic, Evidence could not add to the certitude, no scepticism could impeach it. Whether or not we agree with the Cartesian philosophy, or the reasonings used to sustain it, we must admire the following four rules which he has given us, and which, with the view of consciousness in which we do not entirely concur, are the essential features of the basis of a considerable portion of Descartes' system;--

"1. Never to accept anything as true but what is evidently so; to admit nothing but what so clearly and distinctly presents itself as true, that there can be no reason to doubt it.

"2. To divide every question into as many separate parts as possible, that each part being more easily conceived, the whole may be more intelligible.

"3. To conduct the examination with order, beginning by that of objects the most simple, and therefore the easiest to be known, and ascending little by little up to knowledge of the most complex.

"4. To make such exact calculations, and such circumspections as to be confident that nothing essential has been omitted."

"Consciousness being the basis of all certitude, everything of which you are clearly and distinctly conscious must be true: everything which you clearly and distinctly conceive, exists, if the idea involve existence."

It should be remarked that consciousness being a state of condition of the mind, is by no means an infallible guide? Men may fancy they have clear ideas, when their consciousness, if carefully examined, would prove to have been treacherous. Descartes argued for three classes of ideas--acquired, compounded, and innate. It is in his assumption of innate ideas that you have one of the radical weaknesses of his system. Sir William Hamilton points out that the use of the word idea by Descartes, to express the object of memory, imagination, and sense, was quite a new usage, only one other writer, David Buchanan, having previously used the word idea with this signification.

Descartes did not write for the mass, and his philosophy would have been limited to a much narrower circle had its spread rested on his own efforts. But the age was one for new thought, and the contemporaries and successors of Descartes carried the Cartesian logic to extremes he had perhaps avoided, and they taught the new philosophy to the world in a fearless spirit, with a boldness for which Descartes could have given them no example. Descartes, who in early life had travelled much more than was then the custom, had probably made the personal acquaintance of most of the leading thinkers of Europe then living; it would be otherwise difficult to account for the very ready reception given by them to his first work. Fortunately for Descartes, he was born with a fair fortune, and escaped such difficulties as poorer philosophers must needs submit to. There is perhaps a _per contra_ side. It is more than possible that if the needs of life had compelled him, Descartes'

scientific predilections might have resulted in more immediate advantage to society. His philosophy is often pedantic to weariness, and his scientific theories are often sterile. The fear of poverty might have quickened some of his speculations into a more practical utterance. Buckle reminds us that Descartes "was the first who successfully applied algebra to geometry; that he pointed out the important law of the sines; that in an age in which optical instruments were extremely imperfect, he discovered the changes to which light is subjected in the eye by the crystalline lens; that he directed attention to the consequences resulting from the weight of the atmosphere, and that he detected the causes of the rainbow." "Descartes," says Saintes, "throwing off the swaddling clothes of scholasticism, resolved to owe to himself alone the acquisition of the truth which he so earnestly desired to possess. For what else is the methodical doubt which he established as the starting point in his philosophy, than an energetic protest of the human mind against all external authority? Having thus placed all science on a philosophical basis, no matter what, he freed philosophy herself from her long servitude, and proclaimed her queen of the intellect. Hence every one who has wished to account to himself for his existence, every one who has desired to know himself to know nature, and to rise to its author; in a word, all who have wished to make a wise use of their intellectual faculties, to apply them, not to hollow speculations which border on nonentity, but to sensible and practical inquiries, have taken and followed some direction from Descartes." It is almost amusing when philosophers criticise their predecessors. Mons. Henri Bitter denies to Descartes any originality of method or even of illustration, while Hegel describes him as the founder of modern philosophy, whose influence upon his own age and on modern times it is impossible to exaggerate. To attempt to deal fully and truly with Descartes in the few lines which can be spared here, is impossible; all that is sought is to as it were catalogue his name in the seventeenth century list. Whether originator or imitator, whether founder or disciple, it is certain that Descartes gave a sharp spur to European thought, and mightily hastened the progress of heresy. It is not the object or duty of the present writer to examine or refute any of the extraordinary views entertained by Descartes as to vortices. Descartes himself is reported to have said "my theory of vortices is a philosophical romance." Science in the last three centuries has travelled even more rapidly than philosophy; and most of the physical speculations of Descartes are relegated to the region of grandly curious blunderings. There is one point of error held by Descartes sufficiently entertained even to-day--although most often without a distinct appreciation of the position--to justify a few words upon it. Descartes denied mental faculties to all the animal kingdom except mankind. All the brute kingdom he regarded as machines without intelligence. In this he was logical, even in error, for he accorded a soul to man which he denied to the brute. Soul and mind with him are identified, and thought is the fundamental attribute of mind. To admit that a dog, horse, or elephant can think, that it can remember what happened yesterday, that it can reason ever so incompletely, would be to admit that that dog, horse, or elephant, has some kind of soul; to avoid this he reduces all animals outside the human family to the position of machines. To-day science admits in animals, more or less according to their organisation, perception, memory, judgment, and even some sort of reason. Yet orthodoxy still claims a soul for man even if he be a madman from his birth, and denies it to the sagacious elephant, the intelligent horse, the faithful dog, and the cunning monkey. His proof of the existence of Deity is thus stated by Lewes:--"Interrogating his consciousness, he found that he had the idea of God, understanding by God, a substance infinite, eternal, immutable, independent, omniscient, omnipotent. This, to him, was as certain a truth as the truth of his own existence. I exist: not only do I exist, but exist as a miserably imperfect finite being, subject to change, greatly ignorant, and incapable of creating anything. In this, my consciousness, I find by my finitude that I am not the All; by my imperfection, that I am not

perfect. Yet an infinite and perfect being must exist, because infinity and perfection are implied as correlatives in my ideas of imperfection and finitude. God therefore exists: his existence is clearly proclaimed in my consciousness, and can no more be a matter of doubt, when fairly considered, than my own existence. The conception of an infinite being proves his real existence; for if there is not really such a being, I must have made the conception; but if I could make it, I can also unmake it, which evidently is not true; therefore there must be, externally to myself an archetype from which the conception was derived. All that we clearly and distinctly conceive as contained in anything, is true of that thing. Now we conceive, clearly and distinctly, that the existence of God is contained in the idea we have of him--_Ergo_, God exists." It may not be out of place to note at this demonstration, that the Jesuit writer, Father Hardouin, in his "Atheists Unmasked," as a recompense for this demonstration of the existence of Deity, places Descartes and his disciples, le Grand and Regis, in the first rank of atheistical teachers. Voltaire, commenting on this, remarks, "The man who had devoted all the acuteness of his extraordinary intellect to the discovery of new proofs of the existence of a God, was most absurdly charged with denying him altogether." Speaking of the proof of the existence of Deity, "Demonstrations of this kind," says Froude, "were the characteristics of the period. Descartes had set the example of constructing them, and was followed by Cudworth, Clarke, Berkeley, and many others besides Spinoza. The inconclusiveness of the method may perhaps be observed most readily in the strangely opposite conceptions formed by all these writers of the nature of that Being whose existence they nevertheless agreed, by the same process, to gather each out of their ideas. It is important, however, to examine it carefully, for it is the very keystone of the Pantheistic system. As stated by Descartes, the argument stands something as follows:--God is an all-perfect Being, perfection is the idea which we form of Him, existence is a mode of perfection, and therefore God exists. The sophism, we are told, is only apparent, existence is part of the idea--as much involved in it as the equality of all lines drawn from the centre to the circumference of a circle is involved in the idea of a circle. A non-existent all-perfect Being is as inconceivable as a quadrilateral triangle. It is sometimes answered that in this way we may prove the existence of anything, Titans, Chimaeras, or the Olympian gods; we have but to define them as existing, and the proof is complete. But this objection is summarily set aside; none of these beings are by hypothesis absolutely perfect, and, therefore, of their existence we can conclude nothing. With greater justice, however, we may say, that of such terms as perfection and existence we know too little to speculate. Existence may be an imperfection for all we can tell, we know nothing about the matter. Such arguments are but endless _petitiones principii_--like the self-devouring serpent, resolving themselves into nothing. We wander round and round them, in the hope of finding some tangible point at which we can seize their meaning; but we are presented everywhere with the same impracticable surface, from which our grasp glides off ineffectual."

Thomas Hobbes, of Malmesbury, is one of those men more often freely abused than carefully read; he was born April 5th, 1588, died 1679. He was "the subtlest dialectician of his time," and one of the earliest English advocates of the materialistic limitation of mind; he denies the possibility of any knowledge other than as resulting from sensation; his doctrine is in direct negation of Descartes' theory of innate ideas, and would be fatal to the orthodox dogma of mind as spiritual. "Whatever we imagine," he says, "is finite. Therefore, there is no idea, no conception of anything we call infinite." In a brief pamphlet on his own views, published in 1680, in reply to attacks upon him, he writes, "Besides the creation of the world there is no argument to prove a Deity," and "that it cannot be decided by any argument that the world had a beginning;" but he professes to admit the authority of the

Magistrate and the Scriptures to override argument. He says that he does not "believe that the safety of the state depends upon the safety of the church." Some of Hobbes' pieces were only in Latin, others were issued in English. In one of those on Heresy, he mentions that by the statute of 1 Edward VI. cap 12, there is provision for the repeal of all former acts of parliament "made to punish any manner of doctrine concerning religion."

In the following extracts the reader will find the prominent features of that sensationalism which to-day has so many adherents:--"Concerning the thoughts of man, I will consider them first singly, and afterwards in a train or dependence upon one another. Singly they are every one a representation or appearance of some quality or other accident of a body without us, which is commonly called an object. Which object worketh on the eyes, ears, and other parts of a man's body, and by diversity of working, produceth diversity of appearances. The original of them all is that which we call sense, for there is no conception in a man's mind which hath not at first totally or by parts been begotten upon the organs of sense. The rest are derived from that original." The effect of this is to deny any possible knowledge other than as results from the activity of the sensative faculties, and is also fatal to the doctrine of a soul. "According," says Hobbes, "to the two principal parts of man, I divide his faculties into two sorts--faculties of the body, and faculties of the mind. Since the minute and distinct anatomy of the powers of the body is nothing necessary to the present purpose, I will only sum them up in these three heads--power nutritive, power generative, and power motive, Of the powers of the mind there be two sorts--cognitive, imaginative, or conceptive, and motive. For the understanding of what I mean by the power cognitive, we must remember and acknowledge that there be in our minds continually certain images or conceptions of the things without us. This imagery and representation of the qualities of the things without, is that which we call our conception, imagination, ideas, notice, or knowledge of them; and the faculty, or power by which we are capable of such knowledge, is that I here call cognitive power, or conceptive, the power of knowing or conceiving." All the qualities called sensible are, in the object that causeth them, but so many several motions of the matter by which it presseth on our organs diversely. Neither in us that are pressed are they anything else but divers motions; for motion produceth nothing but motion. Because the image in vision, consisting of colour and shape, is the knowledge we have of the qualities of the objects of that sense; it is no hard matter for a man to fall into this opinion that the same colour and shape are the very qualities themselves, and for the same cause that sound and noise are the qualities of the bell or of the air. And this opinion hath been so long received that the contrary must needs appear a great paradox, and yet the introduction of species visible and intelligible (which is necessary for the maintenance of that opinion) passing to and fro from the object is worse than any paradox, as being a plain impossibility. I shall therefore endeavour to make plain these points. That the subject wherein colour and image are inherent, is not the object or thing seen. That there is nothing without us (really) which we call an image or colour. That the said image or colour is but an apparition unto us of the motion, agitation, or alteration which the object worketh in the brain, or spirits, or some internal substance of the head. That as in visions, so also in conceptions that arise from the other senses, the subject of their inference is not the object but the sentient. Strange to say Hobbes was protected from his clerical antagonists by the favour of Charles II., who had the portrait of the philosopher of Malmesbury hung on the walls of his private room at Whitehall.

Lord Herbert, of Cherbury (one of the friends of Hobbes) born 1581, died 1648, is remarkable for having written a book "De Veritate," in favour of natural--and against any necessity for revealed--religion; and yet at

the same time pleading a sort of special sign or revelation to himself in favour of its publication.

Peter Gassendi, a native of Provence, born 1592, died 1655, was one of the opponents of Descartes and of Lord Herbert, and was an admirer of Hobbes; he advocated the old philosophy of Epicurus, professing to reject "from it everything contrary to Christianity." "But," asks Cousin, "how could he succeed in this? Principles, processes, results, everything in Epicurus is sensualism, materialism, atheism." Gassendi's works were characterised by great learning and ability, but being confined to the Latin tongue, and written avowedly with the intent of avoiding any conflict with the church, they gave but little immediate impetus to the great heretical movement. Arnauld charges Gassendi with overturning the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, in his discussion with Descartes, and Leibnitz charges Gassendi with corrupting and injuring the whole system of natural religion by the wavering nature of his opinions. Buckle says, "The rapid increase of heresy in the middle of the seventeenth century is very remarkable, and it greatly aided civilisation in England by encouraging habits of independent thought." In February 1646, Boyle writes from London, "There are few days pass here, that may not justly be accused of the brewing or broaching of some new opinion. If any man have lost his religion, let him repair to London, and I'll warrant him he shall find it: I had almost said too, and if any man has a religion, let him but come hither now and he shall go near to lose it."

About 1655, one Isaac La Peyrere wrote two small treatises to prove that the world was peopled before Adam, but being arrested at Brussels, and threatened with the stake, he, to escape the fiery refutation, made a full recantation of his views, and restored to the world its dearly prized stain of natural depravity, and to Adam his position as the first man. La Peyrere's forced recantation is almost forgotten, the opinions he recanted are now amongst common truths.

Baruch D'Espinoza or Benedict Spinoza, was born Nov. 24,1632, in Amsterdam; an apt scholar, he, at the early age of fourteen, had mastered the ordinary tasks set him by his teacher, the Babbi Morteira, and at fifteen puzzled and affrighted the grave heads of the synagogue, by attempting the solution of problems which they themselves were well content to pass by. As he grew older his reason took more daring flights, and after attempts had been made to bribe him into submissive silence, when threats had failed to check or modify him, and when even the knife had no effect, then the fury of disappointed fanaticism found vent in the bitter curse of excommunication, and when about twenty-four years of age, Spinoza found himself outcast and anathematised. Having no private means or rich patrons, and differing in this from nearly every one whose name we have yet given our hero subsisted as a polisher of glasses, microscopes, &c., devoting his leisure to the study of languages and philosophy. There are few men as to whom modern writers have so widely differed in the description of their views, few who have been so thoroughly misrepresented. Bayle speaks of him as a systematic Atheist. Saintes says that he laid the foundations of a Pantheism as destructive to scholastic philosophy as to all revealed religion. Voltaire repeatedly writes of Spinoza as an Atheist and teacher of Atheism. Samuel Taylor Coleridge speaks of Spinoza as an Atheist, and prefaces this opinion with the following passage, which we commend to more orthodox, and less acute writers:--"Little do these men know what Atheism is. Not one man in a thousand has either strength of mind, or goodness of heart to be an Atheist. I repeat it--Not one man in a thousand has either goodness of heart, or strength of mind, to be, an Atheist." "And yet," says Froude, "both in friend and enemy alike, there has been a reluctance to see Spinoza as he really was. The Herder and Schleiermacher school have claimed him as a Christian, a position which no little disguise was necessary to make tenable; the orthodox

Protestants and Catholics have called him an Atheist, which is still more extravagant; and even a man like Novalis, who, it might have been expected, would have said something reasonable, could find no better name for him than a 'Gott trunkener mann,' a God intoxicated man; an expression which has been quoted by everybody who has since written on the subject, and which is about as inapplicable as those laboriously pregnant sayings usually are. With due allowance for exaggeration, such a name would describe tolerably the transcendental mystics, a Toler, a Boehmen, or a Swedenborg; but with what justice can it be applied to the cautious, methodical Spinoza, who carried his thoughts about with him for twenty years, deliberately shaping them, and who gave them at last to the world in a form more severe than with such subjects had ever been so much as attempted before? With him, as with all great men, there was no effort after sublime emotions. He was a plain, practical person; his object in philosophy, was only to find a rule by which to govern his own actions and his own judgment; and his treatises contain no more than the conclusions at which he arrived in this purely personal search, with the grounds on which he rested them." Spinoza, who was wise enough to know that it was utterly useless to expect an unfettered examination of philosophical problems by men who are bound to accept as an infallible arbiter any particular book, and who knew that reasonings must be of a very limited character which took the alleged Hebrew Revelation as the centre and starting point for all inquiry, and also as the circling, limitation line for all investigation--devoted himself to the task of examining how far the ordinary orthodox doctrines as to the infallibility of the Old Testament were fairly maintainable. It was for this reason he penned his "Tractatus Theologico-Politicus," wherein he says--"We see that they who are most under the influence of superstitious feelings, and who covet uncertainties without stint or measure, more especially when they fall into difficulty or danger, cannot help themselves, are the persons, who, with vows and prayers and womanly tears, implore the Divine assistance; who call reason, blind, and human wisdom vain; and all, forsooth, because they cannot find an assured way to the vanities they desire." "The mainspring of superstition is fear; by fear too is superstition sustained and nourished." "Men are chiefly assailed by superstition When suffering from fear, and all they then do in the name of a vain religion is, in fact, but the vaporous product of a sorrowful spirit, the delirium of a mind overpowered by terror." He proceeds, "I have often wondered that men who boast of the great advantage they enjoy under the Christian dispensation--the peace, the joy they experience, the brotherly love they feel towards all in its exercise--should nevertheless contend with so much acrimony, and show such intolerance and unappeasable hatred towards one another. If faith had to be inferred from action rather than profession, it would indeed be impossible to say to what sect or creed the majority of mankind belong." He laid down that "No one is bound by natural law to live according to the pleasure of another, but that every one is by natural title the rightful asserter of his own independence," and that "he or they govern best who concede to every one the privilege of thinking as he pleases, and of saying what he thinks." Criticising the Hebrew prophets, he points out that "God used no particular style in making his communications; but in the same measure as the prophet possessed learning and ability, his communications were either concise and clear, or on the contrary, they were rude, prolix, and obscure." The representations of Zechariah, as we learn from the accounts themselves, were so obscure that without an explanation they could not be understood by himself; and those of Daniel were so dark, that even when explained, they were still unintelligible, not to others only, but also to the prophet himself. He argues entirely against miracles, as either contrary to nature or above nature, declaring any such to be "a sheer absurdity," "_merum esse absurdum_" Of the Scriptures themselves he points out that the ancient Hebrew is entirely lost. "Of the authors, or, if you please, writers, of many books, we either know almost nothing, or we entertain grave doubts as to the correctness with which the several books are

ascribed to the parties whose names they bear." "Then we neither know on what occasion, nor at what time those books were indited, the writers of which are unknown to us. Further, we know nothing of the hands into which the books fell; nor of the codices which have furnished such a variety of readings, nor whether, perchance, there were not many other variations in other copies." Voltaire says of Spinoza, "Not only in the character of a Jew he attacks the New Testament, but in the character of a scholar he ruins the Old." The logic of Spinoza was directed to the demonstration of one substance with infinite attributes, for which one substance with infinite attributes he had as equivalent the name "God." Some who have since followed Spinoza, have agreed in his one substance, but have denied the possibility of infinite attributes. Attributes or qualities, they urge, are attributes of the finite or conditioned, and that you cannot have attributes of substance except as attributes of its modes. You have in this distinction the division line between Spinozism and Atheism. Spinoza recognises infinite intelligence, but Atheism cannot conceive intelligence except in relation as quality of the conditioned, and not as the essence of the absolute. Spinoza denied the doctrine of freewill, as with him all phenomena are of God, so he rejects the ordinary notions of good and evil. The popular views of Spinoza in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were chiefly derived from the volumes of his antagonists; men learned his name because priests abused him, few had perused his works for themselves. To-day we may fairly say that Spinoza's logic and his biblical criticisms gave a vigour and force to the heresy of the latter half of the seventeenth and beginning of the eighteenth century; a directness and effectiveness theretofore wanting.

As for the Bible, there was no longer an affected reverence for every yod or comma, church traditions were ignored wherever inconsistent with reason, and the law itself was boldly challenged when its letter was against the spirit of human progress.

One of the greatest promoters of heresy in England was Ralph Cudworth, born 1617, died 1688. He wrote to combat the atheistical tenets which were then commencing to obtain popularity in England, and was a controversialist so fair and candid in the statement of the opinions of his antagonists, that he was actually charged with heresy himself, and the epithets of Arian, Socinian, Deist, and even Atheist were freely levelled against him. "He has raised," says Dryden, "such strong objections against the being of a God and Providence, that many think he has not answered them." The clamour of bigotry seems to have discouraged Cudworth, and he left many of his works unprinted. Cousin describes him as "a Platonist, of a firm and profound mind, who bends somewhat under the weight of his erudition."

Thomas Burnet, born 1635, died 1715, a clergyman of the Church of England, who, though high in favour with King William and the famous Archbishop Tillotson, is said to have been shut out from preferment in the church chiefly, if not entirely, on account of his many heterodox views. He did not accept the orthodox notions on the Mosaic account of the creation, fall, and deluge. Regarding the account of the fall as allegorical, he argued for the ultimate salvation of everyone, and of course denied the doctrine of eternal torment.

In a curious passage relating to the equivocations of a large number of the clergy in openly taking the oath of allegiance to William III., while secretly supporting James as King, Burnet says, "the prevarication of too many in so sacred a matter contributed not a little to fortify the growing atheism of the time."

As Descartes and Spinoza had been foremost on the continent, so was Locke in England, and no sketch of the progress of heresy during the seventeenth century would be deserving serious regard which did not

accord a prominent place to John Locke, whom G. H. Lewes calls "one of the wisest of Englishmen," and of whom Buckle speaks as "an innovator in his philosophy, and an Unitarian in his creed." He was born in 1632, and died 1704. Locke, according to his own fashion, was a sincere and earnest Christian; but this has not saved him from being furiously assailed for the materialistic character of his philosophy, and many have been ready to assert that Locke's principles "lead to Atheism." In politics Locke laid down, that unjust and unlawful force on the part of the government might and ought to be resisted by force on the part of the citizens. He urged that on questions of theology there ought to be no penalties consequent upon the reception or rejection of any particular religious opinion. How far those were right who regarded Locke's metaphysical reasoning as; dangerous to orthodoxy may be, judged by the following extract on the origin of ideas:--: "Follow a child from its birth and observe the alterations that time makes, and you shall find, as the mind by the senses comes more and more to be furnished with ideas, it comes to be more and more awake; thinks more, the more it has matter to think on. After some time, it begins to know the objects, which being most familiar with it, have made lasting impressions. Thus it comes, by degrees, to know the persons it daily converses with, and distinguish them from strangers; which are instances and effects of its coming to retain and distinguish the ideas the senses convey to it; and so we may observe, how the mind, by degrees improves in these, and advances to the exercise of those other faculties of enlarging, compounding, and abstracting its ideas, and of reasoning about them, and reflecting upon all these.

"If it shall be demanded then, when a man begins to have any ideas? I think the true answer is, when he first has any sensation. For since there appear not to be any ideas in the mind, before the senses have conveyed any in, I conceive that ideas in the understanding are coeval with sensation; which is such an impression or emotion, made in some part of the body, as produces some perception in the understanding. It is about these impressions made on our senses by outward objects, that the mind seems first to employ itself in such operations as we call perception, remembering, consideration, reasoning, &c.

"In time, the mind comes to reflect on its own operations, about the ideas got by sensation, and thereby stores itself with a new set of ideas, which I call ideas of reflection. These are the impressions that are made on our senses by outward objects, that are extrinsical to the mind; and its own operations, proceeding from powers intrinsical and proper to itself, which, when reflected on by itself, becoming also objects of its contemplation, are, as I have said, the original of all knowledge. Thus the first capacity of human intellect is, that the mind is fitted to receive the impressions made on it, either through the senses, by outward objects, or by its own operations, when it reflects on them. This is the first step a man makes towards the discovery of anything, and the groundwork whereon to build all those notions which ever he shall have naturally in this world. All those sublime thoughts which tower above the clouds, and reach as high as heaven itself, take their rise and footing here: in all that good extent wherein the mind wanders, in those remote speculations, it may seem to be elevated with, it stirs not one jot beyond those ideas which sense or reflection have offered for its contemplation.

"In this part, the understanding is merely passive; and whether or no it will have these beginnings, and, as it were, materials of knowledge, is not in its own power. For the objects of our senses do, many of them, obtrude their particular ideas upon our minds, whether we will or no; and the operations of our minds will not let us be without, at least, some obscure notions of them. No man can be wholly ignorant of what he does when he thinks. These simple ideas, when offered to the mind, the understanding can no more refuse to have, nor alter, when they are

imprinted, nor blot them out and make new ones itself, than a mirror can refuse, alter, or obliterate the images or ideas which the objects set before it do therein produce. As the bodies that surround us do diversely affect our organs, the mind is forced to receive the impressions, and cannot avoid the perception of those ideas that are annexed to them."

The distinction pointed out by Lewes between Locke and Hobbes and Gassendi, is that the two latter taught that all our ideas were derived from sensations, while Locke said there were two sources, not one source, and these two were sensation and reflection. Locke was in style a more popular writer than Hobbes, and the heretical effect of the doctrines on the mind not being so immediately perceived in consequence of Locke's repeated declarations in favour of Christianity, his metaphysical productions were more widely read than those of Hobbes; but Locke really teaches the same doctrine as that laid down by Robert Owen in his views on the formation of character; and his views on sensation, as the primary source of ideas, are fatal to all notions of innate ideas and of freewill. Voltaire, speaking of Locke, says:--"'We shall, perhaps, never be capable of knowing whether a being purely material thinks or not.' This judicious and guarded observation was considered by more than one divine, as neither more nor less than a scandalous and impious declaration, that the soul is material and mortal. Some English devotees, after their usual manner, sounded the alarm. The superstitious are in society what poltroons are in an army--they both feel and excite causeless terror. The cry was, that Mr. Locke wished to overturn religion; the subject, however, had nothing to do with religion at all; it was purely a philosophical question, and perfectly independent of faith and revelation."

One clergyman, the Rev. William Carrol, wrote, charging Atheism as the result of Locke's teachings. The famous Sir Isaac Newton even grew so alarmed with the materialistic tendency of Locke's philosophy, that when John Locke was reported sick and unlikely to live, it is credibly stated that Newton went so far as to say that it would be well if the author of the essay on the Understanding were already dead. In 1689, one Cassimer Leszynski, a Polish knight, was burned at Warsaw for denying the being and providence of a God; but there are no easy means of learning whether the charge arose from prejudice on the part of his accusers, or whether this unfortunate gentleman really held Atheistic views.

Peter Bayle, born at Carlat, in Foix, 1647, died in Holland, 1706, was a writer of great power and brilliancy and wide learning. Without standing avowedly on the side of scepticism, he did much to promote sceptical views amongst the rapidly growing class of men of letters. He declared that it was better to be an Atheist, than to have a false or unworthy idea of God; that a man can be at the same time an Atheist and an honest man, and that a people without a religion is capable of good order. Bayle's writings grew more heretical towards the latter part of his career, and he suffered considerable persecution at the hands of the Church, for having spoken too plainly of the character of David. He said that "if David was the man after God's own heart, it must have been by his penitence, not by his crimes." Bayle might have added, that the record ot David's penitence is not easily discoverable in any part of the narrative of his life.

Matthew Tindal, born 1656, died 1733, was, though the son of a clergyman of the Established Church, one of the first amongst the school of Deistical writers who became so prominent in the beginning of the eighteenth century. Dr. Pye Smith catalogues him as "an Atheist," but we know no ground for this. He was a zealous controversialist, and commencing by attacking priests, he continued his attack against the revelation they preached. He was a frequent writer, but his "Christianity as old as the Creation" is his chief work, and the one

which has provoked the greatest amount of discussion. It was published nearly at the close of his life, and after he had seen others of his writings burned by the common hangman. Dr. Matthew Tindal helped much to shake belief in the Bible, those who wrote against him did much more; if no one had replied to Tindal, his attacks on; revelation would have been read by few, but in answering the heretic, Bishop Waterland and his _confreres_ gave wider circulation to Tindal's heresy.

John Toland was born Nov. 30,1670, at Londonderry, but was educated in Scotland. He died 1722. His publications were all about the close of the seventeenth and commencement of the eighteenth centuries, and the ability of his contributions to popular instruction may be judged by the abusive epithets heaped upon him by his opponents. While severely attacking the bulk of the clergy as misleaders of the people, and while also assailing some of the chief orthodox notions, he yet, either in order to escape the law, or from the effect of his religious education, professed a respect for what he was pleased to call true Christianity, but which we should be inclined to consider, at the least, somewhat advanced Unitarianism. At last, however, his works were ordered to be burned by the common hangman, and to escape arrest and prosecution he had to flee to the Continent. Dr. J. Pye Smith describes Toland as a Pantheist, and calls his Pantheisticon "an Atheistic Liturgy." In one of Toland's essays he laments "how hard it is to come to a truth yourself, and how dangerous a thing to publish to others." The publications ot Toland were none of them very bulky although numerous, and as most of them were fiercely assailed by the orthodox clergy, they helped to excite popular interest in England, in the critical examination of the Scriptures and the doctrines therein taught.

Besides the few authors to whom attention is here drawn, there were numerous men who--each for a little while, and often coming out from the lower ranks of the people themselves--stirred the hitherto almost stagnant pool of popular thought with some daring utterance or extravagant statement. Fanatics some, mystics some, alchemists some, materialists some, but all crude and imperfect in their grasp of the subject they advocated, they nevertheless all helped to agitate the human mind, to render it more restless and inquiring, and thus they all promoted the march of heresy.

One feature of the history of the seventeenth century shows how much philosophy had gained ground, and how deep its roots were striking throughout the European world--viz., that nearly all the writers wrote in the vulgar tongue of their country, or there were published editions of their works in that tongue. A century earlier, and but few escaped from the narrow bonds of learned Latin: two centuries before, and none got outside the Latin folios; but in this century theology, metaphysics, philosophy, and politics are discussed in French, German, English, and Italian. The commonest reader may peruse the most learned author, for the writing is in a language which he cannot help knowing.

There were in this century a large number of writers in England and throughout Europe, who, taking the Bible as a starting-point and limitation for their philosophy, broached wonderful theories as to creation, &c, in which reason and revelation were sought to be made harmonious. Enfield, a most orthodox writer, in his "History of Philosophy" says, "Who does not perceive, from the particulars which have been related concerning these Scriptural philosophers, that their labours, however well intended, have been of little benefit to philosophy? Their fundamental error has consisted in supposing that the sacred Scriptures were intended, not only to instruct men in all things necessary to their salvation, but to teach the true principles of physical and metaphysical science." How pregnant the admission that revelation and science cannot be expected to accord--an admission which in truth declares that in all philosophical research it is necessary

to go beyond the Bible, if not to go against it--an admission which involves the declaration, that so long as men are bound by the letter of the Bible, so long all philosophical progress is impossible.

In this century the English Church lost much of the political power it had hitherto wielded. It was in 1625, that William, Bishop of Lincoln, was dismissed from the office of Lord Keeper, and since his day no ecclesiastic has held the great seal of England, and to-day who even in the Church itself would dream of trying to make a bishop Lord Chancellor? The church lost ground in the conflict with Charles, but this it might perhaps have recovered, but it suffered irretrievably loss of prestige in its struggle with William.

CHAPTER IV. THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

The eighteenth century deserves that the penman who touches its records shall have some virility; for these records contain, not only the narrative of the rapid growth of the new philosophy in France, England, and Germany, where its roots had been firmly struck in the previous century, but they also give the history of a glorious endeavour on the part of a down-trodden and long-suffering people, weakened and degraded by generations of starvation and oppression, to break the yoke of tyranny and superstition. Eighteenth century historians can write how the men of France, after having been cursed by a long race of kings, who never dreamed of identifying their interests with those of the people; after enduring centuries of tyranny from priests, whose only Gods were power, pleasure, and Mammon, and at the hands of nobles, who denied civil rights to their serfs; at last, could endure no longer, but electrified into life by eighteenth century heresy, "spurned under foot the idols of tyranny and superstition," and sought "by the influence of reason to erect on the ruins of arbitrary power the glorious edifice of civil and religious liberty." Why Frenchmen then failed in giving permanent success to their heroic endeavour, and why France, despite the wonderful recent progress in thought, is even yet cursed with corrupt imperialism and state superstition, is not difficult to explain, when we consider that every tyranny in Europe united against that young republic to which the monarchy had bequeathed a legacy of a wretched pauper people, a people whose minds had been hitherto wholly in the hands of the priests, whose passions had revolted against wrong, but whose brains were yet too weak for the permanent enjoyment of the freedom temporarily resulting from physical effort. Eighteenth century heresy is especially noticeable for its immediate connection with political change. For the first time in European history, the great mass commenced to yearn for the assertion in government of democratic principles. The French Republican Revolution which overthrew Louis XVI. and the Bastile, was only possible because the heretical teachers who preceded it, had weakened the divine right of kingcraft; and it was ultimately unsuccessful, only because an overwhelming majority of the people were as yet not sufficiently released from the thraldom of the church, and therefore fell before the allied despotisms of Europe, who were aided by the Catholic priests, who naturally plotted against the spirit which seemed likely to make men too independent to be pious.

In Germany the liberation of the masses from the dominion of the Church of Rome was effected with the, at first, active believing concurrence of the nation; in England this was not so, Protestantism here was the result rather of the influence and interests of the King and Court, and of the indifference of the great body of the people. The Reformed Church of England, sustained by the crown and aristocracy, has generally left the people to find their own way to heaven or hell, and has only required abstinence from avowed denial of, or active opposition to, its

tenets. Its ministers have usually preached with the same force to a few worshippers scattered over their grand cathedrals and numerous churches as to a thronging crowd, but in each these there has been a lack of vitality in the sermon. It is only when the material interests of the church have been apparently threatened that vigour has been shown on the part of its teachers.

It is a curious fact, and one for comment hereafter, that while in the modern struggle for the progress of heresy, its sixteenth century pages present many most prominent Italian names, when we come to the eighteenth century, there are but few such names worthy special notice; it is no longer from the extreme South, but from France, Germany, and England that you have the great array of Freethinking warriors. Those whom Italy boasts too are now nearly all in the Idealistic ranks.

We commenced the list by a brief reference to Bernard Mandeville, a Dutch physician, born at Dordrecht in 1670 and who died in 1733; a writer with great power as a satirist, whose fable of the "Bees, or Private Vices made Public Benefits," not only served as source for much of Helvetius, but had the double honour of an indictment at the Middlesex session, and an answer from the pen of Bishop Berkeley.

One of the early, and perhaps one of the most important promoters of heresy in the United Kingdom, was George Berkeley, an Irishman by birth. He was born on the 12th of March, 1684, at Kilcrin, and died at Oxford in 1753. It was this writer to whom Pope assigned "every virtue under heaven," and of whom Byron wrote:--

> "When Bishop Berkeley said 'there was no matter,'
> And proved it--'twas no matter what he said:
> They say his system 'tis in vain to batter,
> Too subtle for the airiest human head;
> And yet who can believe it?"

A writer in the _Encyclopedia Metropolitana_ describes him as "the one, perhaps, whose heart was most free from scepticism, and whose understanding was most prone to it." Berkeley is here dealt with as one specially contributing to the growth of sceptical thought, and not as an Idealist only. Arthur Collier published, about the same time as Berkeley, several works in which absolute Idealim is advocated. Collier and Berkeley were mouthpieces for the expression of an effort at resistance against the growing Spinozistic school. They wrote against substance assumed as the "noumenon lying underneath all phenomena--the substratum supporting all qualities--the something in which all accidents inhere." Collier and his writings are almost unknown; Berkeley's name has become famous, and his arguments have served to excite far wider scepticism than have those of any other Englishman of his age. Most religious men who read him misunderstand him, and nearly all misrepresent his theory. Hume, speaking of Berkeley, says, "Most of the writings of that very ingenious philosopher form the best lessons of scepticism which are to be found, either among the ancient or modern philosophers, Bayle not excepted. He professes, however, in his title page (and undoubtedly with great truth) to have composed his book against the sceptics, as well as against the Atheists and Freethinkers. But that all his arguments, though otherwise intended, are in reality merely sceptical, appears from this, that they admit of no answer, and produce no conviction," Berkeley wrote for those who "want a demonstration of the existence and immateriality of God, or the natural immortality of the soul," and his philosophy was intended to check materialism. The key-note ot his works may be found in his declaration, "The only thing whose existence I deny, is that which philosophers call Matter or corporeal substance." The definition given by Berkeley of matter is one which no materialist will be ready to accept, i.e.f "an inert, senseless substance in which extension, figure, and motion do

actually exist." The "Principles of Human Knowledge" is the work in which Berkeley's Idealism is chiefly set forth, and many have been the volumes and pamphlets written in reply. Whatever might have been Berkeley's intention as to refuting scepticism, the result of his labours was to increase it in no ordinary degree; Dr. Pye Smith thug summarises Berkeley's views:--"He denied the existence of matter as a cause of our perceptions, but firmly maintained the existence of created and dependent spirits, of which every man is one; that to suppose the existence of sensible qualities and of a material world, is an erroneous deduction from the fact of our perceptions; that those perceptions are-nothing but ideas and thoughts in our minds; that these are produced in perfect uniformity, order, and consistency in all minds, so that their occurrence is according to fixed rules which may be called the laws of nature; that that Deity is either the immediate or the mediate cause of these perceptions, by his universal operation on created minds; and that the created mind has a power of managing these perceptions, so that volitions arise, and all the phenomena of moral action and responsibility. The great reply to this is, that it is a hypothesis which cannot be proved, which is highly improbable, and which seems to put upon the Deity the inflicting on man a perpetual delusion."

The weakness of Berkeley's system as a mere question of logic is, that while he requires the most rigorous demonstration of the existence of what he defines as matter, he assumes an eternal spirit with various attributes, and also creates spirits of various sorts. He creates the states of mind resulting from the sensation of surrounding phenomena into ideas, existing independent of the _ego_, when in truth, man's ideas are not in addition to man's mind; but the aggregate of sensative ability, and the result of its exercise is the mind, just as the aggregate of functional ability and activity is life. The foundation of Berkeley's faith in the invisible "eternal spirit" in angels as "created spirits," is difficult to discover, when you accept his argument for the rejection of visible phenomena. He in truth should have rejected everything save his own mind, for the mental processes are clearly not always reliable. In dreams, in delirium, in insanity, in temporary disease of particular nerves of sensation, in some phases of magnetic influence, the ideas which Berkeley sustains so forcibly are admittedly delusions. As in George Berkeley, so we have in Bishop Butler, an illustration of the endeavour to check the rapidly enlarging scepticism of this century. Joseph Butler was born in 1692, died 1752, and will be long known by his famous work on the "Analogy of Religion" to the course of nature. In this place it is not our duty to do more than point out a few features of the argument, observing that this elaborate piece of special pleading for natural and revealed religion, is evidence that danger was apprehended by the clergy, from the spread of Freethought views amongst the masses. A popular reply was written to provide against the growing popular objection; Bishop Butler argues that "we know that we are endued with certain capacities of action, of happiness and misery; for we are conscious of acting, of enjoying pleasure, and of suffering pain. Now that we have these powers and capacities before death, is a presumption that we shall retain them through, and after death; indeed a probability of it abundantly sufficient to act upon, unless there be some positive reason to think that death is the destruction of those living powers." It may be fairly submitted in reply, that here the argument from analogy is as utterly faulty, as if in the spring season a traveller should say of a wayside pool, it is here before the summer sun shines upon it, and will be here during and after the summer drought, when ordinary experience would teach him that as the pool is only gathered during the rainy season in the hollow ground, so in the dry hot summer days, it will be gradually evaporated under the blazing rays of the July sun. As to the human capacities, experience teaches us that they have changed with the condition of the body; emotional feelings and animal passions, the gratification of which ensured temporary pleasure or pain, have varied, have been newly felt,

and have died out in different periods and conditions of our lives, and the presumption is against the complete endurance of all these "capacities for action," &c., even during the whole life, and much more strongly, therefore, against their endurance after death. Besides which--continuing the argument from analogy--my "capacities" having only been manifested since my body has existed, and in proportion to my physical ability, the presumption is rather that the manifestation which commenced with the body, will finish as the body finishes. Further, it is fair to presume that "death is the destruction of those living powers," for death is the cessation of organic functional activity; a cessation consequent on some change or destruction of organisation. Of course, the word "destruction" is not here used in any sense of annihilation of substance, but as meaning such a change of condition that vital phenomena are no longer manifested. But, says Butler, "we know not at all what death is in itself, but only some of its effects, such as the dissolution of flesh, skin, and bones, and these effects do in nowise appear to imply the destruction of a living agent." Here, perhaps, there is an unjustifiable assumption in the words "living agent," for if by living agent is only meant the animal which dies, then the destruction of flesh, skin, and bones does fairly imply the destruction of the living agent, but if by living agent is intended more than this, then the argument is speciously and unfairly worded. But beyond this, if Bishop Butler's argument has any value, it proves too much. He says--"Nor can we find anything throughout the whole analogy of nature, to afford us even the slightest presumption that animals ever lose their living powers.... by death." That is, Bishop Butler applies his argument for a future state of existence, not only to man, but to the whole animal kingdom; and it may be fairly conceded that there is as much ground to presume that man will live again, as there is that the worm will live again, which, being impaled upon a hook, is eaten by the gudgeon, or that the gudgeon will live again which, threaded as a bait, is torn and mangled to death by a ravenous pike, or that the pike will live again after it has been kept out of water till rigid, then gutted, scaled, stuffed with savoury condiments, broiled, and ultimately eaten by Piscator and his family. Bishop Butler's argument, that because pleasure or pain is uniformly found to follow the acting or not acting in some particular manner, there is presumptive analogy in favour of future rewards and punishments by Deity, appears weak in the extreme. According to Butler, God is the author of nature. Nature's laws are such, that punishment, immediate or remote, follows non-observance, and reward, more or less immediate, is the result of observance; and because God is by Butler's argument, assumed as the author of nature, and has therefore already punished or rewarded once; we are following Butler, to presume that he will after death punish or reward again for an action upon which he has already adjudicated. In his chapter on the Moral Government of God, Butler says, "As the manifold appearances of design and of final causes in the constitution of the world, prove it to be the work of an intelligent mind, so the particular final causes of pleasure and pain distributed amongst his creatures, prove that they are under his government--what may be called his natural government of creatures endowed with sense and reason." But taking Bishop Butler's own position, what sort of government is demonstrated by this argument from analogy? God, according to Bishop Butler's reasoning, designed the whale to swallow the Clio Borealis, which latter he designed to be so swallowed, but which he nevertheless invested with some 300,000 suckers, to enable it in its turn to seize the minute animalcule on which it lives. God designed Brutus to kill Caesar, Orsini to be beheaded by Louis Napoleon. These, according to Butler, would be all under the special control of God's government. Deity would guide the Clio Borealis into the mouth of the whale, guide the dagger of Brutus, and arrange for the enjoyment of the cancan by princes of the blood royal. Bishop Butler's theory that our present life is a state of trial and probation, is met by the difficulty, that while he assumes the justice and benevolence of God as moral governor, he has the fact, that many exist with organisations and

capacities so originally different, that it is manifestly most unfair to put one and the same reward, or one and this same publishment for all. The Esquimaux or Negro is not on a level at the outset of life with the Caucasian races. How from analogy can any one argue in favour of the doctrine that an impartial judge who had started them in the race of life unfairly matched, would put the same prize before all, none of the starters being handicapped? Bishop Butler's argument on the doctrine of necessity, is that which one might expect to find from a hired _nisi prius_ advocate, but which is read with regret coming from the pen of a gentleman, who ought to be striving to convince his erring brethren by the words of truth alone. He says, suppose a child to be educated from his earliest youth in the principles of "fatalism," what then? The reply is, that a necessitarian knowing that a certain education of the human mind was most conducive to human happiness, would strive to impart to his children education of that character. That a worse "fatalism" is inculcated in the doctrine of a fore-ordaining and ever-directing providence, planning and controlling every one of the child's actions, than ever was taught in necessitarian essays. That the child would be taught the laws of existence, and would be shown how certain conduct resulted in pleasure, and certain other conduct was during life attended with pain, and that the result of such teaching would be far more efficacious in its moral results, than the inculcation of a present responsibility, and an ultimate heaven and hell, in which latter doctrine, nearly all Christians profess to believe, but nearly all act as if it were not of the slightest consequence whether any such paradise or infernal region exists.

Henry St. John, Lord Bolingbroke, born October 1,1672, died November 15,1751, may be taken as one of the school of polished deistical writers, who, though comparatively few, fairly enough represent the religious opinions of the large majority of the journalists of the present day. In the course of Bolingbroke's "Letters on the Study of History," a strong sceptical spirit is manifested, and he speaks in one of "the share which the divines of all religions have taken in the corruption of history." In another he thus deals with the question of the Bible:--"It has been said by Abbadie, and others, 'that the accidents which have happened to alter the texts of the Bible, and to disfigure, if I may say so, the scriptures in many respects, could not have been prevented without a perpetual standing miracle, and that a perpetual standing miracle is not in the order of providence.' Now I can by no means subscribe to this opinion. It seems evident to my reason that the very contrary must be true; if we suppose that God acts towards men according to the moral fitness of things; and if we suppose that he acts arbitrarily, we can form no opinion at all. I think these accidents would not have happened, or that the scriptures would have been preserved entirely in their genuine purity notwithstanding these accidents, if they had been entirely dictated by the Holy Ghost: and the proof of this probable proposition, according to our clearest and most distinct ideas of wisdom and moral fitness, is obvious and easy. But these scriptures are not so come down to us: they are come down broken and confused, full of additions, interpolations; and transpositions, made we neither know when, nor by whom; and such, in short, as never appeared on the face of any other book, on whose authority men have agreed to rely. This being so, my lord, what hypothesis shall we follow? Shall we adhere to some such distinction as I have mentioned? Shall we say, for instance, that the scriptures were originally written by the authors to whom they are vulgarly ascribed, but that these authors writ nothing by inspiration, except the legal, the doctrinal, and the prophetical parts, and that in every other respect their authority is purely human, and therefore fallible? Or shall we say that these histories are nothing more than compilations of old traditions, and abridgements of old records, made in later times, as they appear to every one who reads them without prepossession and with attention?"

It has been alleged that Pope's verse is but another rendering of Bolingbroke's views without his "aristocratic nonchalance," and that some passages of Pope regarded as hostile to revealed religion, were specially due to the influence of Bolingbroke; and more than one critic has professed to trace identities of thought and expression in order to show that Pope was largely indebted to the published works of St. John.

David Hume was born at Edinburgh, 26th April, 1711, and died 1776. He created a new school of Freethinkers, and is to-day one of the most esteemed amongst sceptical authors. He was a profound thinker, and an easy, elegant writer, who did much to give a force and solidity to extreme heretical reasonings, which they had hitherto been regarded as lacking. His heretical essays have had a far wider circulation since his death, than they enjoyed during his life. Many volumes have been issued in the fruitless endeavour to refute him, and all these have contributed to widen the circle of his readers. He adopted and advocated the utilitarian and necessitarian theory of morals, and wrote of ordinary theism and religion, as arising from personification of unknown causes, for general or special phenomena. He held and advanced the idea, which Buckle so fully states, and endeavours to prove in his "History of Civilisation"--viz., that general laws operate amongst peoples, and influence and determine their so-called moral conduct, much as other laws do the orbits of planets, the occurrences of eclipses, &c. His arguments against miracles, as evidences for revealed religion, remain unrefuted, although they have been made the subject of many attacks. He contends, in effect, that in each account of a miraculous occurrence, there is always more _prima facie_ probability of error, or bad faith on the part of the narrator, than of interference with those invariable sequences known as natural laws, and there was really no reply in the conclusion of Dr. Campbell, to the effect that we have equally to trust human testimony for an account of the laws of nature and for the narratives of miracles, for in truth you never have the same character of human testimony for the latter as for the former. And, further, while in the case of human testimony as to natural events, it is evidence which you may test and compare with your own experience. This is not so as to miracles, declared at once to be out of the range of all ordinary experience. "Men," he says, "are carried by a natural instinct or prepossession to repose faith in their senses. When they follow this blind and powerful instinct of nature, they always suppose the very images presented to the senses to be the external objects, and never entertain any suspicion that the one are nothing but representatives of the other. But this universal and primary opinion of all men is soon destroyed by the slightest philosophy, which teaches us that nothing can ever be present to the mind but an image or perception. So far, then, we are necessitated by reasoning to contradict the primary instincts of nature, and to embrace a new system with regard to the evidence of our senses. But here philosophy finds herself extremely embarrassed, when she would obviate the cavils and objections of the sceptics. She can no longer plead the infallible and irresistible instinct of nature, for that led us to quite a different system, which is acknowledged fallible, and even erroneous, and to justify this pretended philosophical system by a chain of clear and convincing argument, or even any appearance of argument, exceeds the power of all human capacity. Do you follow the instinct and propensities of nature in assenting to the veracity of the senses? But these lead you to believe that the very perception or sensible image is the external object--(Idealism.) Do you disclaim this principle in order to embrace a more rational opinion, that the perceptions are only representations of something external? You here depart from your natural propensities, and more obvious sentiments; and yet are not able to satisfy your reason, which can never find any convincing argument from experience to prove that the perceptions are connected with external objects--(Scepticism.)"

Charles de Secondat Baron de Montesquieu, born in 1689 near Bordeaux,

died at Paris 1755, who earned considerable fame by his "Lettres Persanes," is more famous for his oft-referred to work "L'Esprit des Lois." Victor Cousin describes him as "the man of our country who has best comprehended history, and who first gave an example of true historic method." In the publication of certain of his ideas on history, Montesquieu was the layer of the foundation-stone for an edifice which Buckle would probably have gloriously crowned had his life been longer. Voltaire, who sharply criticises Montesquieu, declares that he has earned the eternal gratitude of Europe by his grand views and his bold attacks on tyranny, superstition, and grinding taxation. Montesquieu urged that virtue is the true essence of republicanism, but misled by the mistaken notions of honour held by his predecessors and contemporaries, he declared honour to be the principle of monarchical institutions. Voltaire reminds him that "it is in courts that men, devoid of honour, often attain to the highest dignities; and it is in republics that a known dishonourable citizen is seldom trusted by the people with public concerns." Montesquieu wrote in favour of a constitutional monarchy such as then existed in England, and his work shadowed forth a future for the middle class in France.

Francois Marie Arouet Voltaire, born 20th February, 1694, at Chatenay, died 30th May, 1778, may be fairly written of as the man to whose fertile brain and active pen, to whose great genius, fierce irony, and thorough humanity, we owe much more of the rapid change of popular thought in Europe during the last century than to any other man. His wit, like the electric flash, spared nothing; his love for his kind would have made him the protector of everything weak, his desire to protect himself from the consequences of his truest utterances, often dims the hero-halo with which his name is surrounded. Born and trained amongst a corrupt and selfish class, it is not wonderful that we find some of their pernicious habits clinging to parts of his career. On the contrary, it is more wonderful to find that he has shaken off so much of the consequences of his education. Neither in politics nor in theology was he so very extreme in his utterances as many deemed him, for while he occasionally severely handled individual monarchs, we do not find him the preacher of republicanism. On the contrary, he is often severe against some of the advanced political views of Jean Jacques Rousseau. He nevertheless suggests that it might have been "the art of working metals which originally made kings, and the art of casting cannons which now maintains them," and as a commentary on kingly conduct in the matter of taxation, declares that "a shepherd ought to shear his sheep, and not to flay them." In theological controversy he wrote as a Theist, and declares "Atheism and Fanaticism" to be "two monsters which may tear society in pieces, but the Atheist preserves his reason, which checks his propensity to mischief, while the fanatic is under the influence of a madness constantly urging him on." For the ancient Jews, and for the Hebrew records, Voltaire entertained so thorough a feeling of contemptuous detestation, that in his "Defense de mon Oncle," and his articles and letters on the Jews, we find utter disbelief in them as a chosen people, and the strongest abhorrence of their brutal habits, heightened in expression by the scathing satire of his phrases. To the more modern descendants of Abraham he said: "We have repeatedly driven you away through avarice; we have recalled you through avarice and stupidity; we still, in more towns than one, make you pay for liberty to breathe the air; we have, in more kingdoms than one, sacrificed you to God; we have burned you as holocausts--for I will not follow your example, and dissemble that we have offered up sacrifices of human blood; all the difference is, that our priests, content with applying your money to their own use, have had you burned by laymen; while your priests always immolated their human victims with their own sacred hands. You were monsters of cruelty and fanaticism in Palestine; we have been so in Europe."

Writing on miracles, Voltaire asks: "For what purpose would God perform

a miracle? To accomplish some particular design upon living beings? He would then, in reality, be supposed to say--I have not been able to effect by my construction of the universe, by my divine decrees, by my eternal laws, a particular object; I am now going to change my eternal ideas and immutable laws, to endeavour to accomplish what I have not been able to do by means of them. This would be an avowal of his weakness, not of his power; it would appear in such a being an inconceivable contradiction. Accordingly, therefore, to dare to ascribe miracles to God is, if man can in reality insult God, actually offering him that insult. It is saying to him--You are a weak and inconsistent being. It is therefore absurd to believe in miracles; it is, in fact, dishonouring the divinity."

Those who are inclined to attack the character of Voltaire, should read the account of his endeavours for the Calas family. How, when old Calas had been broken alive on the wheel at Toulouse, and his family were ruined, Voltaire took up their case, aided them with means, spared no effort of his pen or brain, and ultimately achieved the great victory of reversing the unjust sentence, and obtaining compensation for the family. It, then, these Voltaire-haters have not learned to love this great heretic, let them study the narrative of his even more successful endeavours on behalf of the Sirvens; more successful, because in this case he took up the fight before an unjust judgment could be delivered, and thus prevented the repetition of such an iniquitous execution as had taken place in the Galas case. The cowardly slanders as to his conduct when dying are not worth notice; those spit on the grave of the dead who would not have dared to look in the face of the living.

Claud Adrian Helvetius was born at Paris 1715, and died December 1771. His best known works are "De l'Esprit," published 1758; "Essai sur l'Origine des Connaissances Humaines," 1746; "Traite des Systemes," 1749; "Traite des Sensations," 1758. Rousseau wrote in reply to Helvetius, but when the Parliament of Paris condemned the work "De l'Esprit," and it was in consequence burned by the common hangman, Rousseau withdrew his refutatory volume. Helvetius argues that any religion, of which the chiefs are intolerant, and the conduct of which is expensive to the state, "cannot long be the religion of an enlightened and well governed nation. The people that submit to it will labour only to maintain the ease and luxury of the priesthood; each of its inhabitants will be nothing more than a slave to the sacerdotal power. A religion to be good should be tolerant and little expensive. Its clergy should have no authority over the people. A dread of the priest debases the mind and the soul, makes the one brutish and the other slavish. Must the ministers of the altar always be armed with the sword of the state? Can the barbarities committed by their intolerance ever be forgotten? The earth is yet drenched with the blood they have spilled. Civil tolerance alone is not sufficient to secure the peace of nations. Every dogma is a seed of discord and injustice sown amongst mankind."

"Why do you make the Supreme Being resemble an eastern tyrant? Why make him punish slight faults with eternal torment? Why thus put the name of the Divinity at the bottom of the portrait of the devil? Why oppress the soul with a load of fear, break its springs, and of a worshipper of Jesus make a vile, pusillanimous slave? It is the malignant who paint a malignant G-od. What is their devotion? A veil for their crimes."

"Let not the rewards of heaven be made the price of trifling religious operations, which convey a diminutive idea of the Eternal and a false conception of virtue; its rewards should never be assigned to fasting, haircloth, a blind submission, and self-castigation. The man who places these operations among the virtues, might as well place those of leaping, dancing, and tumbling on the rope." "Humility may be held in veneration by the dwellers in a monastery or a convent, it favours the

meanness and idleness of a monastic life. But ought the humility to be regarded as the virtue of the people? No." Speaking of the Pagan systems, Helvetius says, "All the fables of mythology were mere emblems of certain principles of nature."

Baron d'Holbach, a native of the Palatinate, born January 1723, died 21st January, 1789, deserves special notice, as being the man whose house was the gathering place of the knot of writers and thinkers, who struck light and life into the dark and deadened brain of France. He is generally reputed to have been the author of that well-known work, the "System of Nature," which was issued as if by Mirabaud. This work, although it was fiercely assailed at the time, by the pen of Voltaire, and by the _plaidorie_ of the prosecuting Avocat-General, and has since been attacked by hundreds who have never read it, yet remains a wonderfully popular exposition of the power-gathering heresy of the century, and, as far as we are aware, has never received efficient reply. Probably next to Paine's works, it had in England during the second quarter of this century, the widest circulation of any anti-theological book, and this circulation extending through the manufacturing ranks. In the eighteenth century Mirabaud could, in England, only be found in the hands of the few, but fifty years had wondrously multiplied the number of readers.

Joseph Priestley was born near Leeds, 13th March, 1733, and being towards the latter part of his life driven out of England, by the persecuting spirit evinced towards him, and which had been specially excited by his republican tendencies, he died at Northumberland, Pennsylvania, on the 6th Feb., 1804. Originally a Church of England clergyman, his first notable inclination to heterodoxy manifested itself in hesitation as to the doctrine of the atonement. He ultimately rejected the immortality and immateriality of the soul, argued for necessitarianism, and earned considerable unpopularity by the boldness of some of his sentiments on political as well as theological matters. Priestley was one of the rapidly multiplying instances of heresy alike in religion and politics, but he provoked the most bitter antagonism. His works were burned by the common hangman, his house, library, and scientific instruments were destroyed by an infuriate and pious mob. Despite all this, his heresy, according to his own view of it, was not of a very outrageous character, for he believed in Deity, in revealed religion, and in Christianity, rather putting the blame on misconduct of alleged Christians. He said: "The wretched forms under which Christianity has long been generally exhibited, and its degrading alliance with, or rather its subjection to a power wholly heterogeneous to it, and which has employed it for the most unworthy purposes, has made it contemptible and odious in the eyes of all sensible men, who are now everywhere casting off the very profession and every badge of it. Enlightened Christians must themselves, in some measure, join with unbelievers in exposing whatever will not bear examination in or about religion." His writings on scientific topics were most voluminous; his most heretical volumes are those on "Matter and Spirit."

Edward Gibbon was born at Putney, the 27th April, 1737, and died 16th January, 1794. He was a polished and painstaking writer, aristocratic in his tendencies and associations, who had educated himself into a disbelief in the principal dogmas of Christianity, but who loved the peace and quietude of an easy life too much to enter the lists as an active antagonist of the Church. His works, especially the fifteenth and sixteenth chapters of "The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire," have been regarded as infidel in their tendency, rather from what has been left unsaid than from the direct statements against Christianity. The sneer at the evidence of prophecy, or the doubt of the reality of miraculous evidences, is guardedly expressed. It is only when Gibbon can couch his lance against some reckless and impudent forger of Christian Evidences, such as Eusebius, that you have anything like a bold

condemnation. A prophecy or a miracle is treated tenderly, and if killed, it is rather with over-affectionate courtesy than by rough handling. In some parts of his vindications of the attacked passages, Gibbon's scepticism finds vent in the collection and quotation of unpleasantly heretical views of others, but he carefully avoids committing himself to very distinct personal declarations of disbelief; he claims to be the unbiassed historian recording fact, and leaving others to form their own conclusions. It would perhaps be most appropriate to express his convictions as to the religions of the world, in nearly the same words as he used to characterise the various modes of worship at Rome, "all considered by the people as equally true, by the philosopher as equally false, and by the magistrate as equally useful."

Pierre John George Cabanis, born at Conac, near Breves, 6th June, 1757, died 6th May, 1808, following Condillac in many respects, was one of those whose physiological investigations have opened out wide fields of knowledge in psychology, and who did much to promote the establishment in France, America, and England, of a new school of Freethinkers. "Subject to the action of external bodies," he says, "man finds in the impressions these bodies make on his organs, at once his knowledge and the causes of his continued existence, for to live is to feel; and in that admirable chain of phenomena which constitute his existence, every want depends on the development of some faculty; every faculty by its very development satisfies some want, and the faculties grow by exercise, as the wants extend with the facility of satisfying them. By the continual action of external bodies on the senses of man, results the most remarkable part of his existence. But is it true that the nervous centres only receive and combine the impressions which reach them from the bodies? Is it true that no image or idea is formed in the brain, and that no determination of the sensitive organ takes place, other than by virtue of these same impressions on the senses strictly so-called? The faculty of feeling and of spontaneous movement forms the character of animal nature. The faculty of feeling consists in the property possessed by the nervous system of being warned by the impressions produced on its different parts, and notably on its extremities. These impressions are internal or external. External impressions, when perception is distinct, are called sensations. Internal impressions are very often vague and confused, and the animal is then only warned by their effects, and does not clearly distinguish their connection with the causes. The former result from the application of external objects to the organs of sense, and on them ideas depend. The latter result from the development of the regular functions, or from the maladies to which each organ is subject; and from these issue those determinations which bear the name of instincts. Feeling and movement are linked together. Every movement is determined by an impression, and the nerves, as the organs of feeling, animate and direct the motor organs. In feeling, the nervous organ reacts on itself. In movement it reacts on other parts, to which it communicates the contractile faculty, the simple and fecund principle of all animal movement. Finally, the vital functions can exercise themselves by the influence of some nervous ramifications, isolated from the system--the distinctive faculties can develope themselves, even when the brain is almost wholly destroyed, and when it seems wholly inactive. But for the formation of thoughts, it is necessary that the brain should exist, and be in a healthy condition; it is the special organ of thought." Thomas Paine, the most famous Deist of modern times, was born at Thetford on the 29th January, 1737, and died 8th June, 1809. It will hardly be untrue to say that the famous "rebellious needleman" has been the most popular writer in Great Britain and America against revealed religion, and that his works, from their plain, clear language, have in those countries had, and still have, a far wider circulation than those of any other modern sceptical author. His anti-theology was allied to his republicanism; he warred alike against church and throne, and his impeachment of each was couched in the plainest Anglo-Saxon. His name became at the same time a word

of terror to the aristocracy and to the clergy. In England numerous prosecutions were commenced against the vendors of his political and theological works, and against persons suspected of giving currency to his views. The peace-officers searched poor men's houses to discover his dreaded works. Lancashire and Yorkshire artisans read him by stealth, and assembled in corners of fields that they might discuss the "Age of Reason," and yet be safe from surprise by the authorities. Heavy sentences were passed upon men convicted of promulgating his opinions; but all without effect, the forbidden fruit found eager gatherers. Paine appears to have been tinged with scepticism from his early boyhood, but it was as a democratic writer that he first achieved literary fame. His "Age of Reason" was the culminating blow which the dying eighteenth century aimed at the Hebrew and Christian records. Theretofore scholarly philosophers, metaphysicians, and critics had written for their fellows, and whether or not any of the mass read and understood, the authors cared but little. Now the people were addressed by one of themselves in language startling in its plainness. Paine was not a deep examiner of metaphysical problems, but he was terribly in earnest in his rejection of an impossible creed.

Charles Prangois Dupuis was born near Chaumont, in France, the 16th Oct., 1742, died 29th Sept., 1809. He played a prominent part in the great revolutionary movement, and was Secretary to the National Convention. His famous work, "L'Origine de tous les Cultes," is one of the grand heresy marks of the eighteenth century. Himself a Pantheist, he searched through the mythic traditions of the Greeks, the Egyptians, the Hindoos, and the Hebrews, and as a result, sought to demonstrate a common origin for all religions. Dr. John Pye Smith classes Dupuis as an Atheist, but this is most certainly an incorrect classification. He did not believe in creation, nor could he go outside the universe to search for its cause, but he regarded God as "la force universelle et eternellement active" and which permeated and animated everything. Dupuis was an example of a new and rapidly increasing class of Freethinking writers--i.e., those who, not content with doubting the divine origin of the religions they attacked, sought to explain the source and progress of the various systems. He urges that all religions find their base in the attempts at personification of some one or other, or of the whole of the forces of the universe, and shows what an important part the sun and moon have been made to play in the Egyptian, Greek, and Hindoo Mythologies. He argues that the fabulous biographies of Hercules, Bacchus, Osiris, Mithra, and Jesus, find their common origin in the sun-worship, thus cloaked and hidden from the vulgar in each country. He does not attack the Hebrew Records as simply inaccurate, but endeavours to show clear Sabaistic foundation for many of the most important narratives. The works of Dupuis and Dulaure should be read together; they contain the most complete amongst the many attempts to trace out the common origins of the various mythologies of the world. In the ninth chapter of Dupuis' great work, he deals with the "fable made upon the sun adored under the name of Christ," "_un dieu qui ait mange autrefois sur la terre, et qu'on y mange aujourd'hui,_" and unquestionably urges strange points of coincidence. It is only astrologically that the 25th of December can be fixed, he argues, as the birthday of Mithra and of Jesus, then born of the celestial Virgin. Our Easter festivities for the resurrection of Jesus, are but another form of the more ancient rejoicings at that season for Adonis, the sun-God, restored to the world after his descent into the lower regions. He recalls that the ancient Druidic worship recognised the Virgin suckling the child, and gathers together many illustrations favourable to his theory. Here we do no more than point out that while reason was rapidly releasing itself from priestly thraldom, heretics were not content to deny the divine origin of Christianity, but sought to trace its mundane or celestial source, and strip it of its fabulous plumage.

Constantine Francis Chassebeuuf Count Volney, born at Craon in Anjou,

February 3rd, 1757, died 1820. He was a Deist. In his two great works, "The Ruins of Empires," and "New Researches on Ancient History," he advances many of the views brought forward by Dupuis, from whom he quotes, but his volumes are much more readable than those of the author of the "Origin of all Religions." Volney appears to have been one of the first to popularise many of Spinoza's Biblical criticisms. He denied the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch. He wrote most vigorously against kingcraft as well as priestcraft, regarding all systems of monarchy and religion as founded on the ignorance and servility, the superstition and weakness of the people. He puts the following into the mouth of Ma-hommedan priests replying to Christian preachers: "We maintain that your gospel morality is by no means characterised by the perfection you ascribe to it. It is not true that it has introduced into the world new and unknown virtues; for example, the equality of mankind in the eyes of God, and the fraternity and benevolence which are the consequence of this equality, were tenets formerly professed by the sect of Hermetics and Samaneans, from whom you have your descent. As to forgiveness of injuries, it had been taught by the Pagans themselves; but in the latitude you give to it, it ceases to be a virtue, and becomes an immorality and a crime. Your boasted precept, to him that strikes thee on thy right cheek turn the other also, is not only contrary to the feelings of man, but a flagrant violation of every principle of justice; it emboldens the wicked by impunity, degrades the virtuous by the servility to which it subjects them; delivers up the world to disorder and tyranny, and dissolves the bands of society--such is the true spirit of your doctrine. The precepts and parables of your Gospel also never represent God other than as a despot, acting by no rule of equity; than as a partial father treating a debauched and prodigal son with greater favour than his obedient and virtuous children; than as a capricious master giving the same wages to him who has wrought but one hour, as to those who have borne the burthen and heat of the day, and preferring the last comers to the first. In short, your morality throughout is unfriendly to human intercourse; a code of misanthropy calculated to give men a disgust for life and society, and attach them to solitude and celibacy. With respect to the manner in which you have practised your boasted doctrine, we in our turn appeal to the testimony of fact, and ask, was it your evangelical meekness and forbearance which excited those endless wars among your sectaries, those atrocious persecutions of what you call heretics, those crusades against the Arians, the Manichseans, and the Protestants, not to mention those which you have committed against us, nor the sacrilegious associations still subsisting among you, formed of men who have sworn to perpetuate them?* Was it the charity of your Gospel that led you to exterminate whole nations in America, and to destroy the empires of Mexico and Peru; that makes you still desolate Africa, the inhabitants of which you sell like cattle, notwithstanding the abolition of slavery that you pretend your religion has effected; that makes you ravage India whose domain you usurp; in short, is it charity that has prompted you for three centuries past to disturb the peaceful inhabitants of three continents, the most prudent of whom, those of Japan and China, have been constrained to banish you from their country, that they might escape your chains and recover their domestic tranquillity?"

> * The oath taken by the Knights of the Order of Malta is to kill, or make the Mahometans prisoners, for the glory of God.

During the early part of the eighteenth century, magazines and other periodicals began to grow apace, and pamphlets multiplied exceedingly in this country. Addison, Steele, Defoe, and Dean Swift all helped in the work of popular education, and often in a manner probably unanticipated by themselves. Dean Swifts satire against scepticism was fiercely powerful; but his onslaughts against Roman Catholics and Presbyterians made far more sceptics than his other writings had made churchmen.

During the latter portion of the eighteenth century, a new phase of popular progress was exhibited in the comparatively lively interest taken in political questions by the great body of the people inhabiting large towns. In America, France, and England, this was strongly marked; it is however in this country that we find special evidences of the connection between heresy and progress, as contradistinguished from orthodoxy and obstructiveness manifested in the struggle for the liberty of the press and platform; a struggle in which some of the boldest efforts were made by poor and heretical self-taught men. The dying eighteenth century witnessed, in England, repeated instances of State prosecutions, in which the charge of entertaining or advocating the views of the Republican heretic, Paine, formed a prominent feature, and there is little doubt that the efforts of the London Corresponding Society (which the Government of the day made strenuous endeavours to repress) to give circulation to some of Paine's political opinions in Yorkshire, Lancashire, and the North, had for result the familiarising many men with views they would have otherwise feared to investigate. The step from the "Rights of Man" to the "Age of Reason" was but a short stride for an advancing inquirer. In France the end of the eighteenth century was marked by a frightful convulsion. A people starved and degraded for generations, rose in the very desperation of despair, and with a mighty force broke the yoke of traditional feudalism and habitual monarchic reverence; but in the case of France, the revolution was too sudden to be immediately beneficial or enduring, the people were as a mass too poor, and therefore too ignorant to wield the power so rapidly wrested from the class who had so long monopolised it. It is far better to grow out of a creed by the sure and gradual consciousness of the truths of existence, than to dash off a religious garb simply from abhorrence of the shameful practices of its professors, or sudden conviction of the falsity of many of the testimonies in its favour. So it is a more permanent and more complete revolution which is effectuated by educating men to a sense of the majesty and worth of true manhood, than is any mere sudden overturning a rotten or cruel usurpation. Monarchies are most thoroughly and entirely destroyed--not by pulling down the throne, or by decapitating the king, but by educating and building up with a knowledge of political duty, each individual citizen amongst the people.

It is here that heresy has its great advantage. Christianity says, "the powers that be are ordained of God, he that resisteth the power resisteth the ordinance of God." Heresy challenges the divine right of the governor, and declares that government should be the best contrivance of national wisdom to promote the national weal, to provide against national want, and alleviate-national suffering--that government which is only a costly machinery for conserving class privileges, and preventing popular freedom, is a tyrannical usurpation of power,which it is the duty of true men to destroy.

I have briefly and imperfectly alluded to a few of the men who stand out as the sign-posts of heretical progress during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries; in some future publication of wider scope fairer tribute may be paid to the memories of some of these mighty warriors in the Freethought army. My object is to show that the civilisation of the masses is in proportion to the spread of heresy amongst them, that its effect is seen in an exhibition of manly dignity and self-reliant effort which is utterly unattainable amongst a superstitious people. Look at the lazzaroni of the Neapolitan States, or the peasant of the Campagna, and you have at once the fearful illustration of demoralisation by faith in the beggar, brigand, and believer.

It is sometimes pretended that such advantages of education and position as the people may boast in England, their civil rights and social

advancement, are owing to their Christianity, but in point of fact the reverse is the case. For centuries Christianity had done little but fetter tightly the masses to Church and Crown, to Priest and Baron; the enfranchisement is comparatively modern. Even in this very day, in the districts where the people are entirely in the hands of the clergy of the Established Church, there they are as a mass the most depraved. Take the agricultural counties and the agricultural labourers: there are no heretical books or papers to be seen in their cottages, no heretical speakers come amongst them to disturb their contentment; the deputy-lieutenant, the squire, and the rector wield supreme authority--the parish church has no rival. But what are the people as a mass? They are not men, they are not women, they lack men's and women's thoughts and aspirations: they are diggers and weeders, hedgers and ditchers, ploughmen and carters; they are taught to be content with the state of life, in which it has pleased God to place them.

My plea is, that modern heresy, from Spinoza to Mill, has given brain-strength and dignity to every one it has permeated--that the popular propagandists of this heresy, from Bruno to Carlile, have been the true redeemers and saviours, the true educators of the people. The redemption is yet only at its commencement, the education only lately begun, but the change is traceable already; as witness the power to speak and write, and the ability to listen and read, which have grown amongst the masses during the last 100 years. And if to-day we write with higher hope, it is because the right to speak and the right to print has been partly freed from the fetters forged through long generations of intellect-prostration, and almost entirely freed from the statutory limitations which, under pretence of checking blasphemy and sedition, have really gagged honest speech against Pope and Emperor, against Church and Throne.

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*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK WHEN WERE OUR GOSPELS WRITTEN? ***

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WHEN WERE OUR GOSPELS WRITTEN?

By Charles Bradlaugh

[Fourth Edition]

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1881.

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PREFATORY NOTE TO FOURTH EDITION.

> Since this pamphlet was originally penned in 1867, the author of "Supernatural Religion" has in his three volumes placed a very storehouse of information within the easy reach of every student, and many of Dr. Teschendorf's reckless statements have been effectively dealt with in that masterly work. In the present brief pamphlet there is only the very merest index to matters which in "Supernatural Religion" are exhaustively treated. Part II. of "The Freethinkers' Text-Book," by Mrs Besant, has travelled over the same ground with much care, and has given exact reference to authorities on each point.

The Religious Tract Society, some time since, issued, prefaced with their high commendation, a translation of a pamphlet by Dr. Constantine

Tischendorf, entitled "When were our Gospels Written?" In the introductory preface we are not unfairly told that "on the credibility of the four Gospels the whole of Christianity rests, as a building on its foundations." It is proposed in this brief essay to deal with the character of Dr. Tischendorf's advocacy, then to examine the genuineness of the four Gospels, as affirmed by the Religious Tract Society's pamphlet, and at the same time to ascertain, so far as is possible in the space, how far the Gospel narrative is credible.

The Religious Tract Society state that Dr. Tischendorf's _brochure_ is a repetition of "arguments for the genuineness and authenticity of the four Gospels," which the erudite Doctor had previously published for the learned classes, "with explanations" now given in addition, to render the arguments "intelligible" to meaner capacities; and as the "Infidel" and "Deist" are especially referred to as likely to be overthrown by this pamphlet, we may presume that the society considers that in the 119 pages--which the translated essay occupies--they have presented the best paper that can be issued on their behalf for popular reading on this question. The praise accorded by the society, and sundry laudations appropriated with much modesty in his own preface by Dr. Constantine Tischendorf to himself, compel one at the outset to regard the Christian manifesto as a most formidable production. The Society's translator impressively tells us that the pamphlet has been three times printed in German and twice in France; that it has been issued in Dutch and Russian, and is done into Italian by an Archbishop with the actual approbation of the Pope. The author's preface adds an account of his great journeyings and heavy travelling expenses incurred out of an original capital of a "few unpaid bills," ending in the discovery of a basketful of old parchments destined for the flames by the Christian monks in charge, but which from the hands of Dr. Teschendorf are used by the Religious Tract Society to neutralise all doubts, and to "blow to pieces" the Rationalistic criticism of Germany and the coarser Infidelity of England. Doubtless Dr. Teschendorf and the Society consider it some evidence in favor of the genuineness and authenticity of the four Gospels that the learned Doctor was enabled to spend 5,000 dollars out of less than nothing, and that the Pope regards his pamphlet with favor, or they would not trouble to print such statements. We frankly accord them the full advantage of any argument which may fairly be based on such facts. An autograph letter of endorsement by the Pope is certainly a matter which a Protestant Tract Society--who regard "the scarlet whore at Babylon" with horror--may well be proud of.

Dr. Tischendorf states that he has since 1839 devoted himself to the textual study of the New Testament, and it ought to be interesting to the orthodox to know that, as a result of twenty-seven years' labor, he now declares that "it has been placed beyond doubt that the original text.... had in many places undergone such serious modifications of meaning, as to leave us in painful uncertainty as to what the apostles had actually written," and that "the right course to take" "is to set aside the received text altogether and to construct a fresh text."

This is pleasant news for the true believer, promulgated by authority of the managers of the great Christian depot in Paternoster Row, from whence many scores of thousands of copies of this incorrect received text have nevertheless been issued without comment to the public, even since the society have published in English Dr. Tischendorf s declaration of its unreliable character.

With the modesty and honorable reticence peculiar to-great men, Dr. Tischendorf records his successes in reading hitherto unreadable parchments, and we learn that he has received approval from "several learned bodies, and even from crowned heads," for his wonderful performances. As a consistent Christian, who knows that the "powers that be are ordained of God," our "critic without rival," for so he prints

himself, regards the praise of crowned heads as higher in degree than that of learned bodies.

The Doctor discovered in 1844 the MS. on which he now relies to confute audacious Infidelity, in the Convent of St. Catherine at Sinai; he brought away a portion, and handed! that portion, on his return, to the Saxon Government--they paying all expenses. The Doctor, however, did not then divulge where he had found the MS. It was for the advantage of humankind that the place should be known at once, for, at least, two reasons. First, because by aid of the remainder of this MS.--"the most precious Bible treasure in existence"--the faulty text of the New Testament was to be reconstructed; and the sooner the work was done the better for believers in Christianity. And, secondly, the whole story of the discovery might then have been more easily confirmed in every particular.

For fifteen years, at least, Dr. Tischendorf hid from the world the precise locality in which his treasure had been discovered. Nay, he was even fearful when he knew that other Christians were trying to find the true text, and he experienced "peculiar satisfaction" when he ascertained that his silence had misled some pious searchers after reliable copies of God's message to all humankind; although all this time he was well aware that our received copies of God's revelation had undergone "serious modifications" since the message had been delivered from the Holy Ghost by means of the Evangelists.

In 1853, "nine years after the original discovery," Dr. Tischendorf again visited the Sinai convent, but although he had "enjoined on the monks to take religious care" of the remains of which they, on the former occasion, would not yield up possession, he, on this second occasion, and apparently after careful search, discovered "eleven short lines," which convinced him that the greater part of the MS. had been destroyed. He still, however, kept the place secret, although he had no longer any known reason for so doing; and, having obtained an advance of funds from the Russian Government, he, in 1859, tried a third time for his "pearl of St. Catherine," which, in 1853, he felt convinced had been destroyed, and as to which he had nevertheless, in the meantime, been troubled by fears that the good cause might be aided by some other than Dr. Teschendorf discovering and publishing the "priceless treasure," which, according to his previous statements, he must have felt convinced did not longer exist. On this third journey the Doctor discovered "the very fragments which, fifteen years before, he had taken out of the basket," "and also other parts of the Old Testament, the New Testament complete, and, in addition, Barnabas and part of Hermas."

With wonderful preciseness, and with great audacity, Dr. Tischendorf _refers_ the transcription of the discovered Bible to the first half of the fourth century. Have Dr. Tischendorf's patrons here ever read of MSS. discovered in the same Convent of St. Catherine, at Sinai, of which an account was published by Dr. Constantine Simonides, and concerning which the _Westminster Review_ said, "We share the suspicions, to use the gentlest word which occurs to us, entertained, we believe, by all competent critics and antiquarians."

In 1863 Dr. Tischendorf published, at the cost of the Russian Emperor, a splendid but very costly edition of his Sinaitic MS. in columns, with a Latin introduction. The book is an expensive one, and copies of it are not very plentiful in England. Perhaps the Religious Tract Society have not contributed to its circulation so liberally as did the pious Emperor of all the Russias. Surely a text on which our own is to be re-constructed ought to be in the hands at least of every English clergyman and Young Men's Christian Association.

"Christianity," writes Dr. Tischendorf, "does not, strictly speaking,

rest on the moral teaching of Jesus;" "it rests on his person only." "If we are in error in believing in the person of Christ as taught in the Gospels, then the Church herself is in error, and must be given up as a deception." "All the world knows that our Gospels are nothing else than biographies of Christ." "We have no other source of information with respect to the life of Jesus." So that, according to the Religious Tract Society and its advocate, if the credibility of the Gospel biography be successfully impugned, then the foundations of Christianity are destroyed.

It becomes, therefore, of the highest importance to show that the biography of Jesus, as given in the four Gospels, is absolutely incredible and self-contradictory.

It is alleged in the Society's preface that all the objections of infidelity have been hitherto unavailing. This is, however, not true. It is rather the fact that the advocates of Christianity when defeated on one point have shuffled to another, either quietly passing the topic without further debate, or loudly declaring that the point abandoned was really so utterly unimportant that it was extremely foolish in the assailant to regard it as worthy attack, and that, in any case, all the arguments had been repeatedly refuted by previous writers.

To the following objections to the Gospel narrative the writer refuses to accept as answer, that they have been previously discussed and disposed of.

The Gospels which are yet mentioned by the names popularly associated with each do not tell us the hour, or the day, or the month, or--save Luke--the year, in which Jesus was born. The only point on which the critical divines, who have preceded Dr. Teschendorf, generally agree is, that Jesus was not born on Christmas day. The Oxford Chronology, collated with a full score of recognised authorities, gives us a period of more than seven years within which to place the dale. So confused is the story as to the time of the birth, that while Matthew would make Jesus born in the lifetime of Herod, Luke would fix the period of Jesus's birth as after Herod's death.

Christmas itself is a day surrounded with curious ceremonies of pagan origin, and in no way serving to fix the 25th December as the natal day. Yet the exact period at which Almighty God, as a baby boy, entered the world to redeem long-suffering humanity from the consequences of Adam's ancient sin, should be of some importance.

Nor is there any great certainty as to the place of birth of Christ. The Jews, apparently in the very presence of Jesus, reproached him that he ought to have been born at Bethlehem. Nathaniel regarded him as of Nazareth. Jesus never appears to have said to either, "I was born at Bethlehem." In Matthew ii., 6, we find a quotation from the prophet: "And thou Bethlehem, in the land of Judah, art not the least amongst the princes of Juda, for out of thee shall come a Governor that shall rule my people Israel." Matthew lays the scene of the birth in Bethlehem, and Luke adopts the same place, especially bringing the child to Bethlehem for that purpose, and Matthew tells us it is done to fulfil a prophecy. Micah v., 2, the only place in which similar words occur, is not a prophecy referring to Jesus at all. The words are: "But thou Beth-lehem Ephratah, though thou be little among the thousands of Judah, yet out of thee shall he come forth unto me that is to be ruler in Israel, whose goings forth have been from of old, from everlasting." This is not quoted correctly in Matthew, and can hardly be said by any straining of language to apply to Jesus. The credibility of a story on which Christianity rests is bolstered up by prophecy in default of contemporary corroboration. The difficulties are not lessened in tracing the parentage. In Matthew i., 17, it is stated that "the generations

from Abraham to David are fourteen generations, and from David until the carrying away into Babylon are fourteen generations, and from the carrying away into Babylon unto Christ are fourteen generations." Why has Matthew made such a mistake in his computation of the genealogies--in the last division we have only thirteen names instead of fourteen, even including the name of Jesus? Is this one of the cases of "painful uncertainty" which has induced the Religious Tract Society and Dr. Tischendorf to wish to set aside the _textus receptus_ altogether?

From David to Zorobabel there are in the Old Testament twenty generations; in Matthew, seventeen generations; and in Luke, twenty-three generations. In Matthew from David to Christ there are twenty-eight generations, and in Luke from David to Christ forty-three generations. Yet, according to the Religious Tract Society, it is on the credibility of these genealogies as part of the Gospel history that the foundation of Christianity rests. The genealogy in the first Gospel arriving at David traces to Jesus through Solomon; the third Gospel from David traces through Nathan. In Matthew the names from David are Solomon, Roboam, Abia, Asa, Josaphat, Joram, Ozias; and in the Old Testament we trace the same names from David to Ahaziah, whom I presume to be the same as Ozias. But in 2nd Chronicles xxii., 11, we find one Joash, who is not mentioned in Matthew at all. If the genealogy in Matthew is correct, why is the name not mentioned? Amaziah is mentioned in chap, xxiv., v. 27, and in chap, xxvi., v. 1, Uzziah, neither of whom are mentioned in Matthew, where Ozias is named as begetting Jotham, when in fact three generations of men have come in between. In Matthew and Luke, Zorobabel is represented as the son of Salathiel, while in 1 Chronicles iii., 17--19, Zerubbabel is stated to be the son of Pedaiah, the brother of Salathiel. Matthew says Abind was the son of Zorobabel (chap, i., v. 13). Luke iii., 27, says Zorobabel's son was Rhesa. The Old Testament contradicts both, and gives Meshollam, and Hananiah, and Shelomith, their sister (1 Chronicles iii, 19), as the names of Zorobabel's children. Is this another piece of evidence in favor of Dr. Tischendorf's admirable doctrine, that it is necessary to reconstruct the text?

In the genealogies of Matthew and Luke there are only three names agreeing after that of David, viz., Salathiel, Zorobabel, and Joseph--all the rest are utterly different. The attempts at explanation which have been hitherto offered, in order to reconcile these genealogies, are scarcely creditable to the intellects of the Christian apologists. They allege that "Joseph, who by nature was the son of Jacob, in the account of the law was the son of Heli. For Heli and Jacob were brothers by the same mother, and Heli, who was the elder, dying without issue, Jacob, as the law directed, married his widow; in consequence of such marriage, his son Joseph was reputed in the law the son of Heli." This is pure invention to get over a difficulty--an invention not making the matter one whit more clear. For if you suppose that these two persons were brothers, then unless you invent a death of the mother's last husband and the widow's remarriage Jacob and Heli would be the sons of the same father, and the list of the ancestors should be identical in each genealogy. But to get over the difficulty the pious do this. They say, although brothers, they were only half-brothers; although sons of the same mother, they were not sons of the same father, but had different fathers. If so, how is it that Salathiel and Zorobabel occur as father and son in both genealogies? Another fashion of accounting for the contradiction is to give one as the genealogy of Joseph and the other as the genealogy of Mary. "Which?"

"Luke," it is said. Why Luke? what are Luke's words? Luke speaks of Jesus being, "as was supposed, the son of Joseph, which was the son of Heli." When Luke says Joseph, the son of Heli, did he mean Mary, the daughter of Heli? Does the Gospel say one thing and mean another? because if that argument is worth anything, then in every case where

a man has a theory which disagrees with the text, he may say the text means something else. If this argument be permitted we must abandon in Scriptural criticism the meaning which we should ordinarily intend to convey by any given word. If you believe Luke meant daughter, why does the same word mean son in every other case all through the remainder of the genealogy? And if the genealogy of Matthew be that of Joseph, and the genealogy of Luke be that of Mary, they ought not to have any point of agreement at all until brought to David. They, nevertheless, do agree and contradict each other in several places, destroying the probability of their being intended as distinct genealogies. There is some evidence that Luke does not give the genealogy of Mary in the Gospel itself. We are told that Joseph went to Bethlehem to be numbered because he was of the house of David: if it had been Mary it would have surely said so. As according to the Christian theory, Joseph was not the father of Jesus, it is not unfair to ask how it can be credible that Jesus's genealogy could be traced to David in any fashion through Joseph?

So far from Mary being clearly of the tribe of Judah (to which the genealogy relates) her cousinship to Elisabeth would make her rather appear to belong to the tribe of Levi.

To discuss the credibility of the miraculous conception and birth would be to insult the human understanding. The mythologies of Greece, Italy, and India, give many precedents of sons of Gods miraculously born. Italy, Greece, and India, must, however, yield the palm to Judea. The incarnate Chrishna must give way to the incarnate Christ. A miraculous birth would be scouted to-day as monstrous; antedate it 2,000 years and we worship it as miracle.

Matt, i., 22, 23, says: "Now all this was done, that it might be fulfilled which was spoken of the Lord by the prophet, saying, Behold, a virgin shall be with child, and shall bring forth a son, and they shall call his name Emmanuel, which being interpreted is, God with us." This is supposed to be a quotation from Isaiah vii., 14--16: "Therefore the Lord himself shall give you a sign; Behold a virgin shall conceive, and bear a son, and shall call his name Immanuel. Butter and honey shall he eat, that he may know to refuse the evil, and choose the good. For before the child shall know to refuse the evil and choose the good, the land that thou abhorrest shall be forsaken of both her kings."

But in this, as indeed in most other cases of inaccurate quotation, the very words are omitted which would show its utter inapplicability to Jesus. Even in those which are given, the agreement is not complete. Jesus was not called Emmanuel. And even if his mother Mary were a virgin, this does not help the identity, as the word [----] OLME in Isaiah, rendered "virgin" in our version, does not convey the notion of virginity, for which the proper word is [------] BeThULE; OLME is used of a youthful spouse recently married. The allusion to the land being forsaken of both her kings, omitted in Matthew, shows how little the passage is prophetic of Jesus.

The story of the annunciation made to Joseph in one Gospel, to Mary in the other, is hardly credible on any explanation. If you assume the annunciations as made by a God of all-wise purpose, the purpose should, at least, have been to prevent doubt of Mary's chastity; but the annunciation is made to Joseph only after Mary is suspected by Joseph. Two annunciations are made, one of them in a dream to Joseph, when he is suspicious as to the state of his betrothed wife; the other made by the angel Gabriel (whoever that angel may be) to Mary herself, who apparently conceals the fact, and is content to be married, although with child not by her intended husband. The statement--that Mary being found with child by the Holy Ghost, her husband, not willing to make her a public example, was minded to put her away privily--is quite incredible. If Joseph found her with child _by the Holy Ghost_, how

could he even think of making a public example of her shame when there was nothing of which she could be ashamed--nothing, if he believed in the Holy Ghost, of which he need have been ashamed himself, nothing which need have induced him to wish to put her away privily. It is clear--according to Matthew--that Mary was found with child, and that the Holy Ghost parentage was not even imagined by Joseph until after he had dreamed about the matter.

Although the birth of Jesus was specially announced by an angel, and although Mary sang a joyful song consequent on the annunciation, corroborated by her cousin's greeting, yet when Simeon speaks of the child, in terms less extraordinary, Joseph and Mary are surprised at it and do not understand it. Why were they surprised? Is it credible that so little regard was paid to the miraculous annunciation? Or is this another case of the "painful uncertainty" alluded to by Dr. Teschendorf?

Again, when Joseph and Mary found the child Jesus in the temple, and he says, "Wist ye not that I must be about my father's business?" they do not know what he means, so that either what the angel had said had been of little effect, or the annunciations did not occur at all. Can any reliance be placed on a narrative so contradictory? An angel was specially sent to acquaint a mother that her son about to be born is the Son of God, and yet that mother is astonished when her son says, "Wist ye not I must be about my father's business?"

The birth of Jesus was, according to Matthew, made publicly known by means of certain wise men. These men saw his star in the East, but it did not tell them much, for they were obliged to come and ask information from Herod the King. Is astrology credible? Herod inquired of the chief priests and scribes; and it is evident Jeremiah was right, if he said, "The prophets prophecy falsely and the priests bear rule by their means," for these chief priests misquoted to suit their purposes, and invented a false prophecy by omitting a few words from, and adding a few words to, a text until it suited their purpose. The star, after they knew where to go, and no longer required its aid, went before them, until it came and stood over where the young child was. The credibility of this will be better understood if the reader notice some star, and then see how many houses it will be over. Luke does not seem to have been aware of the star story, and he relates about an angel who tells some shepherds the good tidings, but this last-named adventure does not appear to have happened in the reign of Herod at all. Is it credible that Jesus was born twice? After the wise men had left Jesus, an angel warned Joseph to flee with him and Mary into Egypt, and Joseph did fly, and remained there with the young child and his mother until the death of Herod; and this, it is alleged, was done to fulfil a prophecy. On referring to Hosea xi., 1, we find the words have no reference whatever to Jesus, and that, therefore, either the tale of the flight is invented as a fulfilment of the prophecy, or the prophecy manufactured to support the tale of the flight. The Jesus of Luke never went into Egypt at all in his childhood. Directly after the birth of the child his parents instead of flying away because of persecution into Egypt, went peacefully up to Jerusalem to fulfil all things according to the law, returned thence to Nazareth, and apparently dwelt there, going up to Jerusalem every year until Jesus was twelve years of age.

In Matthew ii., 15, we are told that Jesus remained in Egypt, "That it might be fulfilled which was spoken of the Lord by the prophet saying, Out of Egypt have I called my son." In Hosea ii., 1, we read, "When Israel was a child, then I loved him, and called my son out of Egypt." In no other prophet is there any similar text. This not only is not a prophecy of Jesus, but is, on the contrary, a reference to the Jewish Exodus from Egypt. Is the prophecy manufactured to give an air of credibility to the Gospel history, or how will the Religions Tract Society explain it? The Gospel writings betray either a want of good

faith, or great incapacity on the part of their authors in the mode adopted of distorting quotations from the Old Testament?

When Jesus began to be about thirty years of age he was baptised by John in the river Jordan. John, who, according to Matthew, knew him, forbade him directly he saw him; but, acccording to the writer of the fourth Gospel, he knew him not, and had, therefore, no occasion to forbid him. God is an "invisible" "spirit," whom no man hath seen (John i., 18), or can see (Exodus xxxiii., 20); but the man John saw the spirit of God descending like a dove. God is everywhere, but at that time was in heaven, from whence he said, "This is my beloved son, in whom I am well pleased." Although John heard this from God's own mouth, he some time after sent two of his disciples to Jesus to inquire if he were really the Christ (Matthew xi., 2, 3). Yet it is upon the credibility of this story, says Dr. Teschendorf, that Christianity rests like a building on its foundations.

It is utterly impossible John could have known and not have known Jesus at the same time. And if, as the New Testament states, God is infinite and invisible, it is incredible that as Jesus stood in the river to be baptised, the Holy Ghost was seen as it descended on his head as a dove, and that God from heaven said, "This is my beloved son, in whom I am well pleased." Was the indivisible and invisible spirit of God separated in three distinct and two separately visible persons? How do the Religious Tract Society reconcile this with the Athanasian Creed?

The baptism narrative is rendered doubtful by the language used as to John, who baptised Jesus. It is said, "This is he that was spoken of by the prophet Esaias, saying, The voice of one crying in the wilderness, prepare ye the way of the Lord, make his paths straight." Isaiah xl., 1--5, is, "Comfort ye, comfort ye my people, saith your God. Speak ye comfortably to Jerusalem, and cry unto her that her warfare is accomplished, that her iniquity is pardoned; for she hath received of the Lord's hand double for all her sins. The voice of him that crieth in the wilderness, Prepare ye the way of the Lord, make straight in the desert a highway for our God. Every valley shall be exalted, and every mountain and hill shall be made low: and the crooked shall be made straight, and the rough places plain: and the glory of the Lord shall be revealed." These verses have not the most remote relation to John? And this manufacture of prophecies for the purpose of bolstering up a tale, serves to prove that the writer of the Gospel tries by these to impart an air of credibility to an otherwise incredible story.

Immediately after the baptism, Jesus is led up of the Spirit into the wilderness to be tempted of the Devil. There he fasts forty days and forty nights.

John says, in chapter i., 35, "Again, the next day after, John stood and two of his disciples; and looking upon Jesus as he walked, he said, behold the Lamb of God. And the two disciples heard him speak, and they followed Jesus." Then, at the 43rd verse, he says, "The day following Jesus would go forth into Galilee, and findeth Philip, and saith unto him, follow me." And in chapter ii., 1, he says, "And the third day there was a marriage in Cana of Galilee, and the mother of Jesus was there; and both Jesus was called and his disciples unto the marriage." According to Matthew, there can be no doubt that immediately after the baptism Jesus went into the wilderness to be tempted of the Devil. And we are to believe that Jesus was tempted of the Devil and fasting in the wilderness, and at the same time feasting at marriage in Cana of Galilee? Is it possible to believe that Jesus actually did fast forty days and forty nights? If Jesus did not fast in his capacity as man, in what capacity did he fast? And if Jesus fasted, being God, the fast would be a mockery; and the account that he became a hungered must be wrong. It is barely possible that in some very abnormal condition or

cataleptic state, or state of trance, a man might exist, with very slight nourishment or without food, but that a man could walk about, speak, and act, and, doing this, live forty days and nights without food is simply an impossibility.

Is the story that the Devil tempted Jesus credible? If Jesus be God, can the Devil tempt God? A clergyman of the Church of England writing on this says: "That the Devil should appear personally to the Son of God is certainly not more wonderful than that he should, in a more remote age, have appeared among the sons of God, in the presence of God himself, to torment the righteous Job. But that Satan should carry Jesus bodily and literally through the air, first to the top of a high mountain, and then to the topmost pinnacle of the temple, is wholly inadmissable, it is an insult to our understanding, and an affront to our great creator and redeemer." Supposing, despite the monstrosity of such a supposition, an actual Devil--and this involves the dilemma that the Devil must either be God-created, or God's co-eternal rival; the first supposition being inconsistent with God's goodness, and the second being inconsistent with his power; but supposing such a Devil, is it credible that the Devil should tempt the Almighty maker of the universe with "all these will I give thee if thou wilt fall down and worship me?"

In the very names of the twelve Apostles there is an uncertainty as to one, whose name was either Lebbæus, Thaddæus, or Judas. It is in Matthew x., 3, alone that the name of Lebbæus is mentioned, thus--"Lebbæus, whose surname was Thaddæus." We are told, on this point, by certain: Biblicists, that some early MSS. have not the words "whose surname was Thaddæus," and that these words have probably been inserted to reconcile the Gospel according to Matthew with that attributed to Mark. In the English version of the Rheims Testament used in this country by our Roman Catholic brethren, the reconciliation between Matthew and Mark is completed by omitting the words-"Lebbæus whose surname was," leaving only the name "Thaddæus" in Matthew's text. The revised version of the New Testament now agrees with the Rheims version, and the omission will probably meet with the entire concurrence of Dr. Tischendorf and the Religious Tract Society, now they boast autograph letters of approval from the infallible head of the Catholic Church. If Matthew x., 3, and Mark hi., 18, be passed as reconciled, although the first calls the twelfth disciple Lebbæus, and the second gives him the name Thaddæus; there is yet the difficulty that in Luke vi., 16, corroborated by John xiv., 22, there is a disciple spoken of as "Judas, not Iscariot," "Judas, _the brother_ of James." Commentators have endeavored to clear away this last difficulty by declaring that Thaddæus is a Syriac word, having much the same meaning as Judas. This has been answered by the objection that if Matthew's Gospel uses Thaddæus in lieu of Judas, then he ought to speak of Thaddæus Iscariot, which he does not; and it is further objected also that while there are some grounds for suggesting a Hebrew original for the Gospel attributed to Matthew, there is not the slightest pretence for alleging that Matthew wrote in Syriac. The Gospels also leave us in some doubt as to whether Matthew is Levi, or whether Matthew and Levi are two different persons.

The account of the calling of Peter is replete with contradictions. According to Matthew, when Jesus first saw Peter, the latter was in a vessel fishing with his brother Andrew, casting a net into the sea of Galilee. Jesus walking by the sea said to them--"Follow me, and I will make you fishers of men." The two brothers did so, and they became Christ's disciples. When Jesus called Peter no one was with him but his brother Andrew. A little further on, the two sons of Zebedee were in a ship with their father mending nets, and these latter were separately called. From John, we learn that Andrew was originally a disciple of John the Baptist, and that when Andrew first saw Jesus, Peter was not present, but Andrew went and found Peter who, if fishing, must have been

angling on land, telling him "we have found the Messiah," and that Andrew then brought Peter to Jesus, who said, "Thou art Simon, the son of Jonas; thou shalt be called Cephas." There is no mention in John of the sons of Zebedee being a little further on, or of any fishing in the sea of Galilee. This call is clearly on land. Luke's Gospel states that when the call took place, Jesus and Peter were both at sea. Jesus had been preaching to the people, who pressing upon him, he got into Simon's ship, from which he preached. After this he directed Simon to put out into the deep and let down the nets. Simon answered, "Master, we have toiled all night and taken nothing; nevertheless at thy word I will let down the net." No sooner was this done, than the net was filled to breaking, and Simon's partners, the two sons of Zebedee, came to help, when at the call of Jesus, they brought their ships to land, and followed him.

Is it credible that there were three several calls, or that the Gospels being inspired, you could have three contradictory versions of the same event? Has the story been here "painfully modified," or how do Dr. Tischendorf and the Religious Tract Society clear up the matter? Is it credible that, as stated in Luke, Jesus had visited Simon's house, and cured Simon's wife's mother, before the call of Simon, but did not go to Simon's house for that purpose, until after the call of Simon, as related in Matthew? It is useless to reply that the date of Jesus's visit is utterly unimportant, when we are told that it is upon the credibility of the complete narrative that Christianity must rest. Each stone is important to the building, and it is not competent for the Christian advocate to regard as useless any word which the Holy Ghost has considered important enough to reveal.

Are the miracle stories credible? Every ancient nation has had its miracle workers, but modern science has relegated all miracle history to realms of fable, myth, illusion, delusion, or fraud. Can Christian miracles be made the exceptions? Is it likely that the nations amongst whom the dead were restored to life would have persistently ignored the author of such miracles? Were the miracles purposeless, or if intended to convince the Jews, was God unable to render his intentions effective? That five thousand persons should be fed with five loaves and two fishes, and that an apparent excess should remain beyond the original stock, is difficult to believe; but that shortly after this--Jesus having to again perform a similar miracle for four thousand persons--his own disciples should ignore his recent feat, and wonder from whence the food was to be derived, is certainly startlingly incredible. If this exhibition of incredulity were pardonable on the part of the twelve apostles, living witnesses of greater wonders, how much more pardonable the unbelief of the sceptic of to-day, which the Religious Tract Society seek to overcome by a faint echo of asserted events all contrary to probability, and with nineteen centuries intervening.

The casting out the devils presents phenomena requiring considerable credulity, especially the story of the devils and the swine. To-day insanity is never referable to demoniacal possession, but eighteen hundred years ago the subject of lunacy had not been so patiently investigated as it has been since. That one man could now be tenanted by several devils is a proposition for which the maintainer would in the present generation incur almost universal contempt; yet the repudiation of its present possibility can hardly be consistent with implicit credence in its ancient history. That the devils and God should hold converse together, although not without parallel in the book of Job, is inconsistent with the theory of an infinitely good Deity; that the devils should address Jesus as son of the most high God, and beg to be allowed to enter a herd of swine, is at least ludicrous; yet all this helps to make up the narrative on which Dr. Tischendorf relies. That Jesus being God should pray to his Father that "the cup might pass" from him is so incredible that even the faithful ask us to regard it as

mystery. That an angel from heaven could strengthen Jesus, the almighty God, is equally mysterious. That where Jesus had so prominently preached to thousands, the priests should need any one like Judas to betray the founder of Christianity with a kiss, is absurd; his escapade in flogging the dealers, his wonderful cures, and his raising Lazarus and Jairus's daughter should have secured him, if not the nation's love, faith, and admiration, at least a national reputation and notoriety. It is not credible if Judas betrayed Jesus by a kiss that the latter should have been arrested upon his own statement that he was Jesus. That Peter should have had so little faith as to deny his divine leader three times in a few hours is only reconcilable with the notion that he had remained unconvinced by his personal intercourse with the incarnate Deity. The mere blunders in the story of the denial sink into insignificance in face of this major difficulty. Whether the cock did or did not crow before the third denial, whether Peter was or was not in the same apartment with Jesus at the time of the last denial, are comparatively trifling questions, and the contradictions on which they are based may be the consequence of the errors which Dr. Tischendorf says have crept into the sacred writings.

Jesus said, "as Jonah was three days and three nights in the belly of the whale, so shall the son of man be three days and three nights in the heart of the earth." Jesus was crucified on Friday, was buried on Friday evening, and yet the first who went to the grave on the night of Saturday as it began to dawn towards Sunday, found the body of Jesus already gone. Did Jesus mean he should be three days and three nights in the grave? Is there any proof that his body remained in the grave for three hours? Who went first to the grave? was it Mary Magdalene alone, as in John, or two Maries as in Matthew, or the two Maries and Salome as in Mark, or the two Maries, Joanna, and several unnamed women as in Luke? To whom did did Jesus first appear? Was it, as in Mark, to Mary Magdalene, or to two disciples going to Emmaus, as in Luke, or to the two Maries near the sepulchre, as in Matthew? Is the eating boiled fish and honeycomb by a dead God credible? Did Jesus ascend to heaven the very day of his resurrection, or did an interval of nearly six weeks intervene?

Is this history credible, contained as it is in four contradictory biographies, outside which biographies we have, as Dr. Tischendorf admits, "no other source of information with respect to the life of Jesus"? This history of an earth-born Deity, descended through a crime-tainted ancestry, and whose genealogical tree is traced through one who was not his father; this history of an infinite God nursed as a baby, growing through childhood to manhood like any frail specimen of humanity; this history, garnished with bedevilled men, enchanted fig tree, myriads of ghosts, and scores of miracles, and by such garnishment made more akin to an oriental romance than to a sober history; this picture of the infinite invisible spirit incarnate visible as man; immutability subject to human passions and infirmities; the creator come to die, yet wishing to escape the death which shall bring peace to his God-tormented creatures; God praying to himself and rejecting his own prayer; God betrayed by a divinely-appointed traitor; God the immortal dying, and in the agony of the death-throes--stronger than the strong man's will--crying with almost the last effort of his dying breath, that he being God, is God forsaken!

If all this be credible, what story is there any man need hesitate to believe? Dr. Teschendorf asks how it has been possible to impugn the credibility of the four Gospels, and replies that this has been done by denying that the Gospels were written by the men whose names they bear. In the preceding pages it has been shown that the credibility of the Gospel narrative is impugned because it is uncorroborated by contemporary history, because it is self-contradictory, and because many of its incidents are _prima facie_ most improbable, and some of them

utterly impossible. Even English Infidels are quite prepared to admit that the four Gospels may be quite anonymous; and yet, that their anonymous character need be of no weight as an argument against their truth. All that is urged on this head is that the advocates of the Gospel history have sought to endorse and give value to the otherwise unreliable narratives by a pretence that some of the Evangelists, at least, were eyewitnesses of the events they refer to. Dr. Teschendorf says: "The credibility of a writer clearly depends on the interval of time which lies between him and the events which he describes. The farther the narrator is removed from the facts which he lays before us the more his claims to credibility are reduced in value." Presuming truthfulness in intention for any writer, and his ability to comprehend the facts he is narrating, and his freedom from a prejudice which may distort the picture he intends to paint correctly with his pen: we might admit the correctness of the passage we have quoted; but can these always be pre-turned in the case of the authors of the Gospels? On the contrary, a presumption in an exactly opposite direction may be fairly raised from the fact that immediately after the Apostolic age the Christian world was flooded with forged testimonies in favor of the biography of Jesus, or in favor of his disciples.

A writer in the _Edinburgh Review_ observes: "To say nothing of such acknowledged forgeries as the Apostolic constitutions and liturgies, and the several spurious Gospels, the question of the genuineness of the alleged remains of the Apostolic fathers, though often overlooked, is very material. Any genuine remains of the 'Apostle' Barnabas, of Hermas, the contemporary (Romans xvi., 14), and Clement, the highly commended and gifted fellow laborer of St. Paul (Phil, iv., 3), could scarcely be regarded as less sacred than those of Mark and Luke, of whom personally we know less. It is purely a question of criticism. At the present day, the critics best competent to determine it, have agreed in opinion, that the extant writings ascribed to Barnabas and Hermas are wholly spurious--the frauds of a later age. How much suspicion attaches to the 1st Epistle of Clement (for the fragment of the second is also generally rejected) is manifest from the fact, that in modern times it has never been allowed the place expressly assigned to it among the canonical books prefixed to the celebrated Alexandrian MS., in which the only known copy of it is included. It must not be forgotten that Ignatius expressly lays claim to inspiration, that Irenasus quotes Hermas as Scripture, and Origen speaks of him as inspired, while Polycarp, in modestly disclaiming to be put on a level with the Apostles, clearly implies there would have been no essential distinction in the way of his being ranked in the same order. But the question is, how are these pretensions substantiated?" So far the _Edinburgh Review_, certainly not an Infidel publication.

Eusebius, in his "Ecclesiastical History," admits the existence of many spurious gospels and epistles, and some writings put forward by him as genuine, such as the correspondence between Jesus and Agbaras, have since been rejected as fictitious. It is not an unfair presumption from this that many of the most early Christians considered the then existing testimonies insufficient to prove the history of Jesus, and good reason is certainly afforded for carefully examining the whole of the evidences they have bequeathed us. On p. 48, Dr. Teschendorf quotes Irenæus, whose writings-belong to the extreme end of the second century, as though that Bishop must be taken as vouching the four Gospels as we now have them. Yet, if the testimony of Irenaeus be-reliable ("Against Heresies," Book III., cap. i.) the Gospel attributed to Matthew was believed to have been composed in Hebrew, and Irenæus says that as the Jews desired a Messiah of the royal line of David, Matthew having the same desire to a yet greater degree, strove to give them full satisfaction. This may account for some of the genealogical curiosities to which we have drawn attention, but hardly renders Matthew's Gospel more reliable; and how can the suggestion that Matthew wrote in Hebrew prove that Matthew

penned the first Gospel, which has only existed in Greek? Irenæus, too, flatly contradicts the Gospels by declaring that the ministry of Jesus extended over ten years and that Jesus lived to be fifty years of age ("Against Heresies," Book II., cap. 22).

If the statement of Irenæus ("Against Heresies," Book III., cap. 11) that the fourth Gospel was written to refute the errors of Cerinthus and Nicolaus, have any value, then the actual date of issue of the fourth Gospel will be considerably after the others. Dr. Tischendorf's statement that Polycarp has borne testimony to the Gospel of John is not even supported by the quotation on which he relies. All that is said in the passage quoted (Eusebius, "Ecc. Hist.," Book V., cap. 20) is that Irenæus when he was a child heard Polycarp repeat from memory the discourses of John and others concerning Jesus. If the Gospels had existed in the time of Polycarp it would have been at least as easy to have read them from the MS. as to repeat them from memory. Dr. Tischendorf might also have added that the letter to Florinus, whence he takes the passage on which he relies, exists only in the writings of Eusebius, to whom we are indebted for many pieces of Christian evidence since abandoned as forgeries. Dr. Tischendorf says: "Any testimony of Polycarp in favor of the Gospel refers us back to the Evangelist himself, for Polycarp, in speaking to Irenæus of this Gospel as the work of his master, St. John, must have learned from the lips of the apostle himself, whether he was its author or not." Now, what evidence is there that Polycarp ever said a single word as to the authorship of the fourth Gospel, or of any Gospel, or that he even said that John had penned a single word? In the Epistle to the Philippians (the only writing attributed to Polycarp for which any genuine character is even pretended), the Gospel of John is never mentioned, nor is there even a single passage in the Epistle which can be identified with any passage in the Gospel of John.

Surely Dr. Tischendorf forgot, in the eager desire to make his witnesses bear good testimony, that the highest duty of an advocate is to make the truth clear, not to put forward a pleasantly colored falsehood to deceive the ignorant. It is not even true that Irenæus ever pretends that Polycarp in any way vouched our fourth Gospel as having been written by John, and yet Dr. Tischendorf had the cool audacity to say "there is nothing more damaging to the doubters of the authenticity of St John's Gospel than this testimony of St. Polycarp." Do the Religious Tract Society regard English Infidels as so utterly ignorant that they thus intentionally seek to suggest a falsehood, or are the Council of the Religious Tract Society themselves unable to test the accuracy of the statements put forward on their behalf by the able decipherer of illegible parchments? It is too much to suspect the renowned Dr. Constantino Tischendorf of ignorance, yet even the coarse English sceptic regrets that the only other alternative will be to denounce him as a theological charlatan.

Dr. Mosheim, writing on behalf of Christianity, says that the Epistle of Polycarp to the Philippians is by some treated as genuine and by others as spurious, and that it is no easy matter to decide. Many critics, of no mean order, class it amongst the apostolic Christian forgeries, but whether the Epistle be genuine or spurious, it contains no quotation from, it makes no reference to, the Gospel of John.

To what is said of Irenæus, Tertullian, and Clement of Alexandria, it is enough to note that all these are after a.d. 150. Irenæus may be put 177 to 200, Tertullian about 193, and Clement of Alexandria as commencing the third century.

One of Dr. Tischendorf's most audacious flourishes is that (p. 49) with reference to the Canon of Muratori, which we are told "enumerates the books of the New Testament which, from the first, were considered

canonical and sacred," and which "was written a little after the age of Pius I, about a.d; 170."

First the anonymous fragment contains books which were never accepted as canonical; next, it is quite impossible to say when or by whom it was written or what was its original language. Muratori, who discovered the fragment in 1740, conjectured that it was written about the end of the second or beginning of the third century, but it is noteworthy that neither Eusebius nor any other of the ecclesiastical advocates of the third, fourth, or fifth centuries, ever refers to it. It may be the compilation of any monk at any date prior to 1740, and is utterly valueless as evidence.

Dr. Teschendorf's style is well exemplified by the positive manner in which he fixes the date a.d. 139 to the first apology of Justin, although a critic so "learned" as the unrivalled Dr. Teschendorf could not fail to be aware that more than one writer has supported the view that the date of the first apology was not earlier than a.d. 145, and others have contended for a.d. 150. The Benedictine editors of Justin's works support the latter date. Dr. Kenn argues for a.d. 155--160. On page 63, the Religious Tract Society's champion appeals to the testimony of Justin Martyr, but in order not to shock the devout while convincing the profane, he omits to mention that more than half the writings once attributed to Justin Martyr are now abandoned, as either of doubtful character or actual forgeries, and that Justin's value as a witness is considerably weakened by the fact that he quotes the acts of Pilate and the Sybilline Oracles as though they were reliable evidence, when in fact they are both admitted specimens of "a Christian forgery." But what does Justin testify as to the Gospels? Does he say that Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John were their writers? On the contrary, not only do the names of Matthew,-Mark, Luke, and John never occur as Evangelists in the writings of Justin, but he actually mentions facts and sayings as to Jesus, which are not found in either of the four Gospels. The very words rendered Gospels only occur where they are strongly suspected to be interpolated, Justin usually speaking of some writings which he calls "memorials" or "memoirs of the Apostles."

Dr. Tischendorf urges that in the writings of Justin the Gospels are placed side by side with the prophets, and that "this undoubtedly places the Gospels in the list of canonical books." If this means that there is any statement in Justin capable of being so construed, then Dr. Tischendorf was untruthful. Justin does quote specifically the Sybilline oracles, but never Matthew, Mark, Luke, or John. He quotes statements as to Jesus, which may be found in the apocryphal Gospels, and which are not found in ours, so that if the evidence of Justin Martyr be taken, it certainly does not tend to prove, even in the smallest degree, that four Gospels were specially regarded with reverence in his day. The Rev. W. Sanday thinks that Justin did not assign an exclusive authority to our Gospels, and that he made use also of other documents no longer extant. ("Gospels in 2nd Century," p. 117.)

On p. 94 it is stated that "as early as the time of Justin the expression 'the Evangel' was applied to the four Gospels." This statement by Dr. Tischendorf and its publication by the Religious Tract Society call for the strongest condemnation. Nowhere in the writings of Justin are the words "the Evangel" applied to the four Gospels.

Lardner only professes to discover two instances in which the word anglicised by Tischendorf as "Evangel," occurs; [_____ _____], the second being expressly pointed out by Schleiermacher as an interpolation, and as an instance in which a marginal note has been incorporated with the text; nor would one occurrence of such a word prove that any book or books were so known by Justin, as the word is merely a compound of good and message; nor is there the slightest

foundation for the statement that in the time of Justin the word Evangel was ever applied to designate the four Gospels now attributed to Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John.

Dr. Tischendorf (p. 46) admits that the "faith of the Church.... would be seriously compromised" if we do not find references to the Gospels in writings between a.d. 100 and a.d. 150; and--while he does not directly assert--he insinuates that in such writings the Gospels were "treated with the greatest respect," or "even already treated as canonical and sacred writings;" and he distinctly affirms that the Gospels "did see the light" during the "Apostolic age," "and before the middle of the second century our Gospels were held in the highest respect by the-Church," although for the affirmation, he neither has nor advances the shadow of evidence.

The phrases, "Apostolic age" and "Apostolic fathers" denote the first century of the Christian era, and those-fathers who are supposed to have flourished during that period, and who are supposed to have seen or heard, or had the opportunity of seeing or hearing, either Jesus or someone or more of the twelve Apostles. Barnabas, Clement, Hermas, Ignatius, and Polycarp, are those whose names figure most familiarly in Christian evidences as Apostolic fathers. But the evidence from these Apostolic fathers is of a most unreliable character. Mosheim ("Ecclesiastical History," cent. 1, cap. 2, sec. 3,17) says that "the Apostolic history is loaded with doubts, fables, and difficulties," and that not long after Christ's ascension several histories were current of his life and doctrines, full of "pious frauds and fabulous wonders." Amongst these were "The Acts of Paul," "The Revelation of Peter," "The Gospel of Peter," "The Gospel of Andrew," "The Gospel of John," "The Gospel of James," "The Gospel of the Egyptians," etc. The attempts often made to prove from the writings of Barnabas, Ignatius, etc., the prior existence of the four Gospels, though specifically unnamed, by similarity of phraseology in quotations, is a failure, even admitting for the moment the genuineness of the Apostolic Scriptures, if the proof is intended to carry the matter higher than that such and such statements were current in some form or other, at the date the fathers wrote. As good an argument might be made that some of the Gospel passages were adopted from the fathers. The fathers occasionally quote, as from the mouth of Jesus, words which are not found in any of our four Gospels, and make reference to events not included in the Gospel narratives, clearly evidencing that even if the four documents ascribed to Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John, were in existence, they were not the only sources of information from which some of the Apostolic fathers derived' their knowledge of Christianity, and evidencing also that the four Gospels had attained no such specific superiority as to entitle them to special mention by name.

Of the epistle attributed to Barnabas, which is supposed by its supporters to have been written in the latter part of the first century, which, Paley says, is _probably_ genuine, which is classed by Eusebius as spurious ("Ecclesiastical History," book iii., cap. 25), and which Dr. Donaldson does not hesitate for one moment in refusing to ascribe to Barnabas the Apostle ("Ante-Nicene Fathers," vol. i., p. 100), it is only necessary to say that so far from speaking of the Gospels with the greatest respect, it does not mention by name any one of the four Gospels. There are some passages in Barnabas which are nearly identical in phraseology with some Gospel passages, and which it has been argued are quotations from one or other of the four Gospels, but which may equally be quotations from other Gospels, or from writings not in the character of Gospels. There are also passages which are nearly identical with several of the New Testament epistles, but even the great framer of Christian evidences, Lardner, declares his conviction that none of these last-mentioned passages are quotations, or even allusions, to the Pauline or other epistolary writings. Barnabas makes many quotations

which clearly demonstrate that the four Gospels, if then in existence and if he had access to them, could not have been his only source of information as to the teachings of Jesus (E. G., cap. 7).

"The Lord enjoined that whosoever did not keep the fast should be put to death." "He required the goats to be of goodly aspect and similar, that when they see him coming they may be amazed by the likeness to the goat." Says he, "those who wish to behold me and lay hold of my kingdom, must through tribulation and suffering obtain me" (cap. 12). And the Lord saith, "When a tree shall be bent down and again rise, and when blood shall flow out of the wound." Will the Religious Tract Society point out from which of the Gospels these are quoted?

Barnabas (cap. 10) says that Moses forbade the Jews to eat weasel flesh, "because that animal conceives with the mouth," and forbad them to eat the hyena because that animal annually changes its sex. This father seems to have made a sort of _melange_ of some of the Pentateuchal ordinances. He says (cap. 8) that the Heifer (mentioned in Numbers) was a type of Jesus, that the _three_ (?) young men appointed to sprinkle, denote Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, that _wool was put upon a stick_ because the kingdom of Jesus was founded upon the cross, and (cap. 9) that the 818 men _circumcised_ by Abraham stood for Jesus crucified. Barnabas also declared that the world was to come to an end in 6,000 years ("Freethinkers' Text Book" part ii., p. 268). In the Sinaitic Bible, the Epistle of St. Barnabas has now, happily for misguided Christians, been discovered in the original Greek. To quote the inimitable style of Dr. Tischendorf, "while so much has been lost in the course of centuries by the-tooth of time and the carelessness of ignorant monks, an invisible eye had watched over this treasure, and when it was on the point of perishing in the fire, the Lord had decreed its-deliverance;" "while critics have generally been divided between assigning it to the first or second decade of the second century, the Sinaitic Bible, which has for the first time cleared up this question, has led us to throw its composition as far back as the last decade of the first century." A fine specimen of Christian evidence writing, cool assertion without a particle of proof and without the slightest reason-given. How does the Siniatic MS., even if it be genuine, clear up the question of the date of St. Barnabas's Epistle? Dr. Tischendorf does not condescend to tell us what has led the Christian advocate to throw back the date of its composition? We are left entirely in the dark: in fact, what Dr. Tischendorf calls a "throw back," is if you look at Lardner just the reverse. What does the epistle of Barnabas prove, even if it be genuine? Barnabas quotes, by name, Moses and Daniel, but never Matthew, Mark, Luke or John. Barnabas specifically refers to Deuteronomy and the prophets, but never to either of the four Gospels.

There is an epistle attributed to Clement of Rome, which has been preserved in a single MS. only where it is coupled with another epistle rejected as spurious. Dr. Donaldson ("Ante-Nicene Fathers," vol. i., p. 3) declares that who the Clement was to whom these writings are ascribed cannot with absolute certainty be determined. Both epistles stand on equal authority; one is rejected by Christians, the other is received. In this epistle while there is a distinct reference to an Epistle by Paul to the Corinthians, there is no mention-by name of the four Gospels, nor do any of the words attributed by Clement to Jesus agree for any complete quotation with anyone of the Gospels as we have them. The Rev. W. Sanday is frank enough to concede "that Clement is not quoting directly from our Gospels."

Is it probable that Clement would have mentioned a writing by Paul, and yet have entirely ignored the four Gospels, if he had known that they had then existed? And could they have easily existed in the Christian world in his day without his knowledge? If anyone takes cap. xxv. ef this epistle and sees the phoenix given as a historic fact, and as

evidence for the reality of the resurrection, he will be better able to appreciate the value of this so-called epistle of Clement.

The letters of Ignatius referred to by Dr. Teschendorf are regarded by Mosheim as laboring under many difficulties, and embarrassed with much obscurity. Even Lardner, doing his best for such evidences, says, that if we find matters in the Epistles inconsistent with the notion that Ignatius was the writer, it is better to regard such passages as interpolations, than to reject the Epistles entirely, especially in the "_scarcity_" of such testimonies.

There are fifteen epistles of which eight are undisputedly forgeries. Of the remaining seven there are two versions, a long and a short version, one of which must be corrupt, both of which may be. These seven epistles, however, are in no case to be accepted with certainty as those of Ignatius. Dr. Cureton contends that only three still shorter epistles are genuine ("Ante-Nicene Fathers," vol. i., pp. 137 to 143). The Rev. W. Sanday treats the three short ones as probably genuine, waiving the question as to the others ("Gospels in Second Century," p. 77, and see preface to sixth edition "Supernatural Religion"). Ignatius, however, even if he be the writer of the epistles attributed to him, never mentions either of the four Gospels. In the nineteenth chapter of the Epistles to the Ephesians, there is a statement made as to the birth and death of Jesus, not to be found in either Matthew, Mark, Luke, or John.

If the testimony of the Ignatian Epistles is reliable, then it vouches that in that early age there were actually Christians who denied the death of Jesus. A statement as to Mary in cap. nineteen of the Epistle to the Ephesians is not to be found in any portion of the Gospels. In his Epistle to the Trallians, Ignatius, attacking those who denied the real existence of Jesus, would have surely been glad to quote the evidence of eye witnesses like Matthew and John, if such evidence had existed in his day. In cap. eight of the Epistles to the Philadelphians, Ignatius says, "I have heard of some who say: Unless I find it in the archives I will not believe the Gospel. And when I said it is written, they answered that remains to be proved." This is the most distinct reference to any Christian writings, and how little does this support Dr. Tischendorf s position. From which of our four Gospels could Ignatius have taken the words, "I am not an incorporeal demon," which he puts into the mouth of Jesus in cap. iii., the epistle to the Smyrnaeans? Dr. Tischendorf does admit that the evidence of the Ignatian Epistles is not of decisive value; might he not go farther and say, that as proof of the four Gospels it is of no value at all?

On page 70, Dr. Tischendorf quotes Hippolytus without any qualification. Surely the English Religious Tract Society might have remembered that Dodwell says, that the name of Hippolytus had been so abused by impostors, that it was not easy to distinguish any of his writings. That Mill declares that, with one exception, the pieces extant under his name are all spurious. That, except fragments in the writings of opponents, the works of Hippolytus are entirely lost. Yet the Religious Tract Society permit testimony so tainted to be put forward under their authority, to prove the truth of Christian history. The very work which Dr. Tischendorf pretends to quote is not even mentioned by Eusebius, in the list he gives of the writings of Hippolytus.

On page 94, Dr. Tischendorf states that Basilides, before a.d. 138, and Valentinus, about a.d. 140, make use of three out of four Gospels, the first using John and Luke, the second, Matthew, Luke, and John. What words of either Basilides or Valentinus exist anywhere to justify this reckless assertion? Was Dr. Tischendorf again presuming on the utter ignorance of those who are likely to read his pamphlet? The Religious Tract Society are responsible for Dr. Tischendorfs allegations, which it is impossible to support with evidence.

The issue raised is not whether the followers of Basilides or the followers of Valentinus may have used these gospels, but whether there is a particle of evidence to justify Dr. Tischendorf s declaration, that Basilides and Valentinus themselves used the above-named gospels. That the four Gospels were well known during the second half of the first century is what Dr. Tischendorf undertook to prove, and statements attributed to Basilides and Valentin us, but which ought to be attributed to their followers, will go but little way as such proof (see "Supernatural Religion" vol. ii., pp. 41 to 63).

It is pleasant to find a grain of wheat in the bushel of Tischendorf chaff. On page 98, and following pages, the erudite author applies himself to get rid of the testimony of Papias, which was falsified and put forward by Paley as of great importance. Paley says the authority of Papias is complete; Tischendorf declares that Papias is in error. Paley says Papias was a hearer of John, Tischendorf says he was not. We leave the champions of the two great Christian evidence-mongers to settle the matter as best they can. If, however, we are to accept Dr. Tischendorf's declaration that the testimony of Papias is worthless, we get rid of the chief link between Justin Martyr and the apostolic age. It pleases Dr. Tischendorf to damage Papias, because that father is silent as to the gospel of John; but the Religious Tract Society must not forget that in thus clearing away the second-hand evidence of Papias, they have cut away their only pretence for saying that any of the Gospels are mentioned by name within 150 years of the date clfor the birth of Jesus. In referring to the lost work of Theophilus of Antioch, which Dr. Tischendorf tells us was a kind of harmony of the Gospels, in which the four narratives are moulded and fused into one, the learned Doctor forgets to tell us that Jerome, whom he quotes as giving some account of Theophilus, actually doubted whether the so-called commentary was really from the pen of that writer. Lardner says: "Whether those commentaries which St. Jerome quotes were really composed by Theophilus may be doubted, since they were unknown to Eusebius, and were observed by Jerome to differ in style and expression from his other works. However, if they were not his, they were the work of some anonymous ancient." But if they were the work of an anonymous ancient after Eusebius, what becomes of Dr. Tischendorf's "as early as a.d. 170?"

Eusebius, who refers to Theophilus, and who speaks of his using the Apocalypse, would have certainly gladly quoted the Bishop of Antioch's "Commentary on the Four Gospels," if it had existed in his day. Nor is it true that the references we have in Jerome to the work attributed to Theophilus, justify the description given by Dr. Teschendorf, or even the phrase of Jerome, "_qui quatuor Evangelist arum in unum opus dicta compingens_." Theophilus seems, so far as it is possible to judge, to have occupied himself not with a connected history of Jesus, or a continuous discourse as to his doctrines, but rather with mystical and allegorical elucidations of occasional passages, which ended, like many pious commentaries on the Old or New Testament, in leaving the point dealt with a little less clear with the Theophillian commentary than without it. Dr. Tischendorf says that Theodoret and Eusebius speak of Tatian in the same way--that is, as though he had, like his Syrian contemporary, composed a harmony of the four Gospels. This is also inaccurate. Eusebius talks of Tatianus having found a certain body and collection of Gospels, "I know not how," which collection Eusebius does not appear even to have ever seen; and so far from the phrase in Theodoret justifying Dr. Tischendorf's explanation, it would appear from Theodoret that Tatian's Diatessaron was, in fact, a sort of spurious gospel, "The Gospel of the Four" differing materially from our four Gospels of Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John. Neither Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria, or Jerome, who refer to other works of Tatian, make any mention of this. Dr. Tischendorf might have added that Diapente, or "the Gospel of the Five," has also been a title applied to this work of

Tatian.

In the third chapter of his essay, Dr. Tischendorf refers to apocryphal writings "which bear on their front the names of Apostles" "used by obscure writers to palm off" their forgeries. Dr. Tischendorf says that these spurious books were composed "partly to embellish" scripture narratives, and "partly to support false doctrine;" and he states that in early times, the Church was not so well able to distinguish true gospels from false ones, and that consequently some of the apocryphal writings "were given a place they did not deserve." This statement of the inability of the Church to judge correctly, tells as much against the whole, as against any one or more of the early Christian writings, and as it may be as fatal to the now received gospels as to those now rejected, it deserves the most careful consideration. According to Dr. Tischendorf, Justin Martyr falls into the category of those of the Church who were "not so critical in distinguishing the true from the false;" for Justin, says Tischendorf, treats the Gospel of St. James and the Acts of Pilate, each as a fit source whence to derive materials for the life of Jesus, and therefore must have regarded the Gospel of St. James and the Acts of Pilate, as genuine and authentic writings; while Dr. Tischendorf, wiser, and a greater critic than Justin, condemns the Gospel of St. James as spurious, and calls the Acts of Pilate "a pious fraud;" but if Dr. Tischendorf be correct in his statement that "Justin made use of this Gospel" and quotes the "Acts of Pontius Pilate," then, according to his own words, Justin did not know how to distinguish the true from the false, and the whole force of his evidence previously used by Dr. Tischendorf in aid of the four Gospels would have been seriously diminished, even if it had been true, which it is not, that Justin Martyr had borne any testimony on the subject.

Such, then, are the weapons, say the Religious Tract Society, by their champion, "which we employ against unbelieving criticism." And what are these weapons? We have shown in the preceding pages, the _suppressio veri_ and the _suggestio falsi_ are amongst the weapons used. The Religious Tract Society directors are parties to fabrication of evidence, and they permit a learned charlatan to forward the cause of Christ with craft and chicane. But even this is not enough; they need, according to their pamphlet, "a new weapon;" they want "to find out the very words the Apostles used." True believers have been in a state of delusion; they were credulous enough to fancy that the authorised version of the Scriptures tolerably faithfully represented God's revelation to humankind. But no, says Dr. Tischendorf, it has been so seriously modified in the copying and re-copying that it ought to be set aside altogether, and a fresh text constructed. Glorious news this for the Bible Society. Listen to it, Exeter Hall! Glad tidings to be issued by the Paternoster Row saints! After spending hundreds of thousands of pounds in giving away Bibles to soldiers, in placing them in hotels and lodging-houses, and shipping them off to negroes and savages, it appears that the wrong text has been sent through the world, the true version being all the time in a waste-paper heap at Mount Sinai, watched over by an "invisible eye." But, adds Dr. Tischendorf, "if you ask me whether any popular version contains the original text, my answer is Yes and No. I say Yes as far as concerns your soul's salvation." If these are enough for the soul's salvation, why try to improve the matter? If we really need the "full and clear light" of the Sinaitic Bible to show us "what is the Word written by God," then most certainly our present Bible is not believed by the Religious Tract Society to be the Word written by God. The Christian advocates are in this dilemma: either the received, text is insufficient, or the proposed improvement is unnecessary. Dr. Tischendorf says that "The Gospels, like the only begotten of the Father, will endure as long as human nature itself," yet he says "there is a great diversity among the texts," and that the Gospel in use amongst the Ebionites and that used amongst the Nazarenes have been "disfigured here and there with certain arbitrary changes." He admits,

moreover, that "in early times, when the Church was not so critical in distinguishing the true from the false," spurious Gospels obtained a credit which they did not deserve. And while arguing for the enduring character of the Gospel, he requests you to set aside the received text altogether, and to try to construct a new revelation by the aid of Dr. Tischendorf's patent Sinaitic invention.

We congratulate the Religious Tract Society upon their manifesto, and on the victory it secures them over German Rationalism and English Infidelity. The Society's translator, in his introductory remarks, declares that "circumstantial evidence when complete, and when every link in the chain has been thoroughly tested, is as strong as direct testimony;" and, adds the Society's penman, "This is the kind of evidence which Dr. Tischendorf brings for the genuineness of our Gospels." It would be difficult to imagine a more inaccurate description of Dr. Tischendorf's work. Do we find the circumstantial evidence carefully tested in the Doctor's boasting and curious narrative of his journeys commenced on a pecuniary deficiency and culminating in much cash? Do we find it in Dr. Tischendorf s concealment for fifteen years of the place, watched over by an invisible eye, in which was hidden the greatest biblical treasure in the world? Is the circumstantial evidence shown in the sneers at Renan? or is each link in the chain tested by the strange jumbling together of names and conjectures in the first chapter? What tests are used in the cases of Valentinus and Basilides in the second chapter? How is the circumstantial testimony aided by the references in the third chapter to the Apocryphal Gospels? Is there a pretence even of critical testing in the chapter devoted to the apostolic fathers? All that Dr. Tischendorf has done is in effect to declare that our authorised version of the New Testament is so unreliable, that it ought to be got rid of altogether, and a new text constructed. And this declaration is circulated by the Religious Tract Society, which sends the sixpenny edition of the Gospel with one hand, and in the other the shilling Tischendorf pamphlet, declaring that many passages of the Religious Tract Society's New Testament have undergone such serious modifications of meaning as to leave us in painful uncertainty as to what was originally written.

The very latest contribution from orthodox sources to the study of the Gospels, as contained in the authorised version, is to be found in the very candid preface to the recently-issued revised version of the New Testament, where the ordinary Bible receives a condemnation of the most sweeping description. Here, on the high authority of the revisers, we are told that, with regard to the Greek text, the translators of the authorised version had for their guides "manuscripts of late date, few in number and used with little critical skill." The revisers add what Freethinkers have long maintained, and have been denounced from pulpits for maintaining, viz., "that the commonly received text needed thorough revision," and, what is even more important, they candidly avow that "it is but recently that materials have been acquired for executing such a work with even approximate completeness." So that not only "God's Word" has admittedly for generations not been "God's Word" at all, but even now, and with materials not formerly known, it has only been revised with "approximate completeness," whatever those two words may mean. If they have any significance at all, they must convey the belief of the new and at present final revisers of the Gospel, that, even after all their toil, they are not quite sure that god's revelation is quite exactly rendered into English. So far as the ordinary authorised version of the New Testament goes--and it is this, the law-recognised, version which is still used in administering oaths--we are told that the old translators "used considerable freedom," and "studiously adopted a variety of expressions which would now be deemed hardly consistent with the requirements of faithful translation." This is a pleasant euphemism, but a real and direct charge of dishonest translation by the authorised translators. The new revisers add, with sadness, that "it cannot be

doubted that they (the translators of the authorised version) carried this liberty too far, and that the studied avoidance of uniformity in the rendering of the same words, even when occurring in the same context, is one of the blemishes of their work." These blemishes the new revisers think were increased by the fact that the translation of the authorised version of the New Testament was assigned to two separate companies, who never sat together, which "was beyond doubt the cause of many inconsistencies," and, although there was a final supervision, the new revisers add, most mournfully: "When it is remembered that the supervision was completed in nine months, we may wonder that the incongruities which remain-are not more numerous."

Nor are the revisers by any means free from doubt and misgiving on their own work. They had the "laborious task" of "deciding between the rival claims of various readings which might properly affect the translation," and, as they tell us, "Textual criticism, as applied to the Greek New Testament, forms a special study of much intricacy and difficulty, and even now leaves room for considerable variety of opinion among competent critics." Next they say: "the frequent inconsistencies in the authorised version have caused us much embarrassment," and that there are "numerous passages in the authorised version in which.... the studied variety adopted by the Translators of 1611 has produced a degree of inconsistency that cannot be reconciled with the principle of faithfulness." So little are the new revisers always certain as to what god means that they provide "alternative readings in difficult or debateable passages," and say "the notes of this last group are numerous and largely in excess of those which were admitted by our predecessors." And with reference to the pronouns and other words in italics we are told that "some of these cases.... are of singular intricacy, and make it impossible to maintain rigid uniformity." The new revisers conclude by declaring that "through our manifold experience of its abounding difficulties we have felt more and more as we went onward that such a work can never be accomplished by organised efforts of scholarship and criticism unless assisted by divine help." Apparently the new revisers are conscious that they did not receive this divine help in their attempt at revision, for they go on: "We know full well that defects must have their place in a work so long and so arduous as this which has now come to an end. Blemishes and imperfections there are in the noble translation which we have been called upon to revise; blemishes and imperfections will assuredly be found in our own revision;... we cannot forget how often we have failed in expressing some finer shade of meaning which we recognised in the original, how often idiom has stood in the way of a perfect rendering, and how often the attempt to preserve a familiar form of words, or even a familiar cadence, has only added another perplexity to those which have already beset us."

THE END.

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WERE ADAM AND EVE OUR FIRST PARENTS?

BY

CHARLES BRADLAUGH

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WERE ADAM AND EVE OUR FIRST PARENTS?

BY CHARLES BRADLAUGH

THIS question, Were Adam and Eve our first parents? is indeed one of vital importance. A negative answer is a denial of the whole Christian scheme. The Christian theory is that Adam, the common father of the whole human race, sinned, and by his sin dragged down all his posterity to a state from which redemption was needed, and that Jesus is, and was, the Redeemer, by whom all mankind are, and were, saved from the consequences of the fall of Adam. If Adam therefore be not the first man, if it is not to Adam the various races of mankind are indebted for their origin, then the whole hypothesis of fall and redemption fails.

It is impossible in the space of this pamphlet to give any statement and analysis of the various hypotheses as to the origin of the human race; that I have done at some length in my volume on "Genesis: its Authorship and Authenticity." Personally I incline to favor the doctrine of a plurality of sources for the various types of the human race. That wherever the conditions for life have been, there also has been the degree of life resultant on those conditions. My purpose here is not to demonstrate the correctness of my own thinking, but rather to illustrate the incorrectness of the Genesaical teaching. Were Adam and Eve our first parents? On the one hand, an affirmative answer can be obtained from the Bible, which, though in Genesis v, 2, using Adam as a race-name, specifically asserts (ii, 22) Adam and Eve to be the first man and woman made by God, and in the authorised version fixes the date of their making about 6,000 years, little more or less, from the present time. On the other hand, science emphatically declares man to have existed on the earth for a far more extended period, affirms that as far as we can trace man historically, we find him in isolated groups, diverse in type, till we lose him in the ante-historic period; and with nearly equal distinctness denies that the various existing races find their common parentage in one pair. It is only on the first point that I attack the Bible chronology of man's existence. I am aware that calculations based upon the authorised version of the Old Testament Scriptures are open to objection, and that while from the Hebrew 1,656 years represent the period from Adam to the Deluge generally acknowledged, the Samaritan Pentateuch only yields for the same period 1,307 years, while the Septuagint version furnishes 2,242 years; but a most erudite Egyptologist, states a fatal objection to the Septuagint chronology — *i.e.,* that it makes Methuselah outlive the Flood.[1] The Deluge occurred, according to the Septuagint, in the year of the world 2,242, and by adding up the generations previous to his (Methuselah's) birth — Adam, 230; Seth, 205; Enos, 190; Cainan, 170; Mahaleel,

165; Jared, 162; Enoch, 165; = 1,287 — Methuselah was born in the year of the world 1287. He lived 969 years, and therefore died in 2256. But this is fourteen years after the Deluge.

The Rev. Dr. Lightfoot, who wrote about 1644, fixes the month of creation at September, 5,572 years preceding the date of his book, and says that Adam was expelled from Eden on the day on which he was created.[2] In my volume on Genesis (pp. 29-36) the reader will find the chronology of Genesis carefully examined. For our immediate purpose we will take the ordinary English Bible, which gives the following result: From Adam to Abraham (Genesis v and xi), 2,008; Abraham to Isaac (Genesis xxi, 5), 100; Isaac to Jacob (Genesis xxv, 26), 60; Jacob going into Egypt (Genesis xlvii, 9), 130; Sojourn in Egypt (Exodus xii, 41), 430; Duration of Moses' leadership (Exodus vii, 7; xxxi, 2), 40; thence to David, about 400; from David to Captivity, 14 generations (27), about 22 reigns, 473; Captivity to Jesus, 14 generations, about 5,934 = 234; less disputed 230 years of sojourn in Egypt, 230 = 4,004.

These dates follow the Bible statement, and there is no portion of the orthodox text, except the period of the Judges, which will admit any considerable extension of the ordinary Oxford chronology.

The Book of Judges is not a book of history. Everything in it is recounted without chronological order. It will suffice to say that the cyphers which we find in the Book of Judges and in the First Book of Samuel yield us, from the death of Joshua to the commencement of the reign of Saul, the sum-total of 500 years, which would make, since the exodus from Egypt, 565 years; whereas the First Book of Kings counts but 480 years, from the going out of Egypt down to the foundation of the temple under Solomon. According to this we must suppose that several of the judges governed simultaneously.[3]

Alfred Maury, in his profound essay on the classification of tongues, traces back some of the ancient Greek mythologies to a Sanscrit source. He has the following remark, worthy of earnest attention: "The God of heaven, or the sky, is called by the Greek *Zeus Pater*; and let us have notice that the pronunciation of Z resembles very much that of D, inasmuch as the word Zeus becomes in the genitive *Dios*. The Latins termed the same God, *Dies-piter*, or Jupiter. Now in the Veda, the God of heaven is called Dyashpitai." What is this but the original of our own Christian God the father, the יהוה (*Jeue*) *pater* of the Old Testament? The Hebrew Records, whether or not God-inspired, are certainly not the most antique. Neither is it true that the Hebrew mythology is the most ancient, nor the Hebrew language the most primitive; on the contrary, the mythology is clearly derived, and the language in a secondary or tertiary state.

The word Adam is first written as a proper name in Genesis ii, 19, but the word written Adam is אדם and this is found in Genesis i, 26, and in several other verses. In i, 27, the word is used as if it meant not one man only, but "male and female;" indeed v. 2, says, "male and female created he them and blessed them and called their name Adam." Genesis ii, 18, treats the man as alone, and 19 his name as Adam.

What is the value of this Book of Genesis, the sole authority for the hypothesis that Adam and Eve, about 6,000 years ago, were the sole founders of the peoples now living on the face of the earth? Written we know not by whom, we know not when, and we know not in what language. Eusebius, Chrysostom, and Clemens Alexandrinus alike agree that the name of Moses should not stand at the head of Genesis as the author of the book. Origen did not hesitate to declare the contents of the first and second chapters of Genesis to be purely figurative. Our translation of it has been severely criticised by the learned and pious Bellamy, and by the more learned and less pious Sir William Drummond. It has been amended and revised in our own day. Errors almost innumerable have been pointed out, the correctness of the Hebrew text itself questioned, and yet this book is claimed as an unerring guide to the students of ethnology. They may do anything, everything, except stray out of the beaten track. We have, on the one hand, an anonymous book, which, for the development of the diversities of the human family, does not even take us back so much as 6,000 years. At least 1,600 years must be deducted for the alleged Noachian deluge, when the world's inhabitants were again reduced to one family, one race, one type. On the other hand, we have now existing Esquimaux men, of the Arctic realm — Chinamen, of the Asiatic realm — Englishmen, of the European realm — Sahara negroes, of the African realm — Fuegians, of the American realm — New Zealanders, of the Polynesian realm — the Malay, representative of the realm which bears his name — the Tasmanian, of the Australian realm — with other families of each realm, too numerous for mention here; dark and fair; black-skinned and 'white-skinned; woolly-haired and straight-haired; low forehead, high forehead; Hottentot limb, Negro limb, Caucasian limb. Do all these different and differing structures and colors trace their origin to one pair? To Adam and Eve, or rather to Noah and his family? Or are they (the various races) indigenous to their native soils, and climates? And are these various types naturally resultant, with all their differences, from the differing conditions for life persistent to and consistent with them?

The question is really this — Have the different races of man all found their common parent in Noah, about 4,300 years ago? Assuming the unity of the races or species of men now existing,

there are but three suppositions on which the diversity now seen can be accounted for: —

"1st. A miracle or direct act of the Almighty, in changing one type into another.

"2nd. The gradual action of physical causes, such as climate, food, mode of life, etc.

"3rd. Congenital or accidental varieties."[4]

We may fairly dismiss entirely the question of miracle. Such a miracle is nowhere recorded in the Bible, and it lies upon anyone hardy enough to assert that the present diversity has a miraculous origin, to show some kind of reasons for his faith, some kind of evidence to warrant our conviction. Until this is done we need not dwell on the first hypothesis.

Of the durability of type under its own life conditions we have overwhelming proof in the statue of an ancient Egyptian scribe, taken from a tomb of the fifth dynasty, 5,000 years old, and precisely corresponding to the Fellah of the present day.[5] The sand had preserved the color of the statuette, which, from its portrait-like beauty, marks a long era of art-progress preceding its production. It antedates the orthodox era of the Flood, carries us back to a time when, if the Bible were true, Adam was yet alive, and still we find before it kings reigning and ruling in mighty Egypt. Can the reader wonder that these facts are held to impeach the orthodox faith?

On the second point Dr. Nott writes: "It is a commonly received error that the influence of a hot climate is gradually exerted on successive generations, until one species of mankind is completely changed into another This idea is proven to be false. . . . A sunburnt cheek is never handed down to succeeding generations. The exposed parts of the body are alone tanned by the sun, and the children of the white-skinned Europeans in New Orleans, Mobile, and the West Indies are born as fair as their ancestors, and would remain so if carried back to a colder climate.[6]

Pure negroes and negresses, transported from Central Africa to England, and marrying among themselves, would never acquire the characteristics of the Caucasian races; nor would pure Englishmen and Englishwomen, emigrating to Central Africa, and in like manner intermarrying, ever become negroes or negresses. The fact is, that while you don't bleach the color out of the dark-skinned African by placing him in London, you bleach the life out of him; and *vice versa* with the Englishman.[7] For a long time there has been ascribed to man the faculty of adapting himself to every climate. The following facts will show the ascription a most erroneous one, though human adaptability is very great: "In Egypt the austral negroes are, and the Caucasian Memlooks were, unable to raise up even a third generation; in Corsica French families vanish beneath Italian summers. Where are the descendants of the Ro-

mans, the Vandals, or the Greeks in Africa? In Modern Arabia, after Mahomed Ali had got clear of the Morea War, 18,000 Arnaots (Albanians) were soon reduced to some 400 men. At Gibraltar, in 1817, a negro regiment was almost annihilated by consumption. In 1814, during the three weeks on the Niger, 130 Europeans out of 145 caught African fever, and 40 died; out of 158 negro sailors only eleven were affected, and not one died. In 1809 the British expedition to Welchereen failed in the Netherlands through marsh fever. About the same time, in St. Domingo, about 15,000 French soldiers died from malaria. Of 30,000 Frenchmen, only 8,000 survived exposure to that Antillian island; while the Dominicanised African negro, Toussaint l'Overture, retransported to Europe, was perishing from the chill of his prison in France."

On the third point, again quoting Dr. Nott: —

"The only argument left, then, is that of congenital varieties or peculiarities, which are said to spring up and be transmitted from parent to child, so as to form new races. Let us pause for a moment to illustrate this fanciful idea. The negroes of Africa, for example, are admitted not to be offsets from some other race which have been gradually blackened and changed in a moral and physical type by the action of climate; but it is asserted that 'once, in the flight of ages' some genuine little negro, or rather many such, were born of Caucasian, Mongol, or other light-skinned parents, and then have turned about and changed the type of the inhabitants of a whole continent. So in America, the countless aborigines found on this continent, who we have reason to believe were building mounds before the time of Abraham, are the offspring of a race changed by accidental or congenital varieties. Thus, too, old China, India, Australia, Oceana, etc., all owe their types, physical and mental, to congenital and accidental varieties, and are descended from Adam and Eve! Can human credulity go farther, or human ingenuity invent any argument more absurd?"

But even supposing these objections to the second and third suppositions set aside, there are two other propositions which, if affirmed, as I believe they may be, entirely overthrow the orthodox assertion: "That Adam and Eve, six thousand years ago, were the first pair; and that all diversities now existing must find their common source in Noah — less than four thousand three hundred years from the present time." These two are as follows:

1. That man may be traced back on the earth long prior to the alleged Adamic era.

2. That there are diversities traceable as existing amongst the human race four thousand five hundred years ago, as marked as in the present day.

To illustrate the position that man may be traced back to a period long prior to the Adamic era, we refer our readers to the

chronology of the late Baron Bunsen, who, while allowing about 22,000 years for man's existence on earth, fixes the following dates after a patient examination of the Nilotic antiquities: —

Egyptians under a republican form	10,000 B.C.
Ascension of Bytis, the Theban, 1st Priest King	9,085
Elective Kings in Egypt	7,230
Hereditary Kings in Upper and Lower Egypt, a double empire form	5,143[1] [8]

The assertion of such an antiquity for Egypt is no modern hypothesis. Plato puts language into the mouth of an Egyptian, first claiming in that day an antecedent of 10,000 years for painting and sculpture in Egypt. This has long been regarded as fabulous, because it was contrary to the Hebrew chronology.

There are few who now pretend that the whole *creation* (?) took place 6,000 years ago, although, if it be true that God made all in six days, and man on the sixth, then the universe would only be more ancient than Adam by some five days. To state the age of the earth at 6,000 years is simply preposterous when it is estimated that it would require about 4,000,000 of years for the formation of the fossiliferous rocks alone, and 15,000,000 of years have been stated as a moderate estimate for the antiquity of our globe. The deltas of the great rivers of Hindustan afford corroboration as to man's antiquity. In Egypt the delta of the Nile, formed by immense quantities of sedimentary matter, which in like manner is still carried down and deposited, has not perceptibly increased during the last 3,000 years. "In the days of the earliest Pharaohs, the delta, as it now exists, was covered with ancient cities and filled with a dense population, whose civilisation must have required a period going back far beyond any date that has yet been assigned to the deluge of Noah, or even to the creation of the world."[9]

From borings which have been made at New Orleans to the depth of 600 feet, from excavations for public works, and from examinations in parts of Louisiana, where the range between high and low water is much greater than it is at New Orleans, no less than ten distinct cypress forests, divided from each other by eras of aquatic plants, etc., have been traced, arranged vertically above each other, and from these and other data it is estimated by Dr. Benet Dowler that the age of the delta is at least about 158,000 years, and in the excavations above referred to, human remains, have been found below the further forest level, making it appear that the human race existed in the delta of the Mississippi more than 57,000 years ago.[10]

It is further urged by the same competent writer that human bones discovered on the coast of Brazil, near Santas, and on the borders of a lake called Lagoa Santa, by Captain Elliott and Dr. Lund, thoroughly incorporated with a very hard breccia, every one in a fossil state, demonstrate that aboriginal man in America ante-

dates the Mississippi alluvia, and that he can even boast a geological antiquity, because numerous species of animals have become extinct since American humanity's first appearance.[11]

With reference to the possibility of tracing back the diversities of the human race to an antediluvian date, it is amply sufficient to point on the one side to the remains of the American Indian disentombed from the Mississippi forests, and on the other to the Egyptian monuments, tombs, pyramids, and stuccoes, revealing to us Caucasian men and Negro men, their diversities as marked as in the present day. Sir William Jones in his day, claimed for Sanscrit literature a vast antiquity, and asserted the existence of the religions of Egypt, Greece, India, and Italy, prior to the Mosaic Era. So far as Egypt is concerned the researches of Lepsius, Bunsen, Champollion, Lenormant, Gliddon, and others have fully verified the position of the learned president of the Asiatic Society. In "Genesis: its Authorship and Authenticity," pp. 88-21, I have collected other testimony on this point.

We have Egyptian statues of the third dynasty, going back far beyond the 4,300 years which would give the orthodox era of the deluge, and taking us over the 4,500 years fixed by our second proposition. The fourth dynasty is rich in pyramids, tombs, and statues; and according to Lepsius, this dynasty commenced 3,426 B.C., or about 5,287 years from the present date.

Works on the orthodox side constantly assume that the long chronologists must be in error, because their views do not coincide with orthodox teachings. Orthodox authors treat their heterodox brethren as unworthy of credit, because of their heterodoxy. One writer asserts,[12] that the earliest reference to Negro tribes is in the era of the 12th dynasty. Supposing for a moment this to be correct, what even then will be the state of the argument? The 12th dynasty, according to Lepsius ends about 4,000 years ago. The orthodox chronology fixes the deluge about 300 years earlier. Will any sane man argue that there was sufficient lapse of time in three centuries for the development of Caucasian and Negro man from one family?

We trace back the various types of man now known, not to one centre, not to one country, not to one family, not to one pair, but we trace them to different centres, to distinct countries, to separate families, probably to many pairs. Wherever the conditions for life are found, there are living beings also. The conditions of climate, soil, etc., of Central Africa differ from those of Europe. The indigenous races of Central Africa differ from those of Europe. Geology has helped us very little as to the prehistoric types of man, but its aid has nevertheless been sufficient to far outdate the one man Adam of 6,000 years ago.

I challenge the ordinary orthodox assertion of Adamic unity of origin accompanied as it is by threats of pains and penalties if re-

jected; I am yet ready to examine it, if it can be presented to me associated with facts, and divested of those future hell-fire torments and present societarian persecutions which now form its chief, if not sole, supports.

The rejection of the Bible account of the peopling of the world involves also the rejection of the entire scheme of Christianity. According to the orthodox rendering of both New and Old Testament teaching, all men are involved in the curse which followed Adam's sin. But if the account of the Fall be mythical, not historical; if Adam and Eve — supposing them to have ever existed — were preceded on the earth by many nations and empires, what becomes of the doctrine that Jesus came to redeem mankind from a sin committed by one who was not the common father of all humanity?

Reject Adam, and you cannot accept Jesus. Refuse to believe Genesis, and you cannot give credence to Matthew, Mark, Luke, John, and Paul. The Old and New Testaments are so connected together, that to dissolve the union is to destroy the system. The account of the Creation and Fall of Man is the foundation-stone of the Christian Church — if this stone be rotten, the superstructure cannot be stable.

ENDNOTES

[1] Sharpe's "History of Egypt," p. 196.
[2] Harmony of the Four Evangelists, and Harmony of the Old Testament."
[3] Munks' "Palestine," p.231
[4] "Types of Mankind," Dr. Nott, p. 57.
[5] M. Pulzsky on Iconography — "Indigenous Races," p. 111.
[6] "Types of Mankind," p. 58.
[7] "Indigenous Races of the Earth," p. 458. The alleged discovery of white-skinned negroes in Western Africa does not affect this question; it is not only to the color of the skin but also to the general negro characteristics that the above remarks apply.
[8] Nott and Gliddon, "Indigenous Races," p. 587.
[9] Gliddon's "Types of Mankind," p. 335.
[10] "Types," p. 336 to 369.
[11] "Types," pages 350 and 357.
[12] "Archaia," p. 406."

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NEW LIFE OF ABRAHAM

BY

CHARLES BRADLAUGH

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NEW LIFE OF ABRAHAM

MOST undoubtedly father Abraham is a personage whose history should command attention, if only because he figures as the founder of the Jewish race — a race which, having been promised protection and favor by Deity, appear in the large majority of cases to have experienced little else besides the sufferance of misfortune and misery themselves, or its infliction upon others. Men are taught to believe that God, following out a solemn covenant made with Abraham, suspended the course of nature to aggrandise the Jews; that he promised always to bless and favor them if they adhered to his worship and obeyed the priests. The promised blessings were usually: political authority, individual happiness and sexual power, long life, and great wealth; the threatened curses for idolatry or disobedience: disease, loss of property and children, mutilation, death. Amongst the blessings: the right to kill, plunder, and ravish their enemies, with protection, whilst pious, against any subjection to retaliatory measures. And all this because they were Abraham's children!

Abraham is especially an important personage to the orthodox Church-going Christian. Without Abraham, no Jesus, no Christianity, no Church of England, no bishops, no tithes, no church-rates. But for Abraham, England would have lost all these blessings. Abraham was the great-grandfather of Judah, the head of the tribe to which God's mother's husband, Joseph, belonged.

In gathering materials for a short biographical sketch, we are at once comforted and dismayed by the fact that the only reliable account of Abraham's career is that furnished by the book of Genesis, supplemented by a few brief references in other parts of the Bible, and that, outside "God's perfect and infallible revelation to man," there is no reliable account of Abraham's existence at all. We are comforted by the thought that, despite the new edition of the "Encyclopædia Britannica," Genesis is unquestioned by the faithful, and is at present protected by Church and State against heretic assaults; but we are dismayed when we think that, if Infidelity, encouraged by Colenso, Kalisch, Professor Robertson Smith, and Professor Wellhausen, upsets Genesis, Abraham will have little historical support. The Talmudical notices of Abraham are too wonderful for irreverent criticism. Some philologists have asserted that Brama and Abraham are alike corruptions of Abba Rama, or Abrama, and that Sarah is identical with Sarasvati. אברם, Abram, is a Chaldean compound, meaning father of the elevated, or exalted father. אברהם is a compound of Chaldee and Arabic, signifying father of a multitude. In part v. of his work, Colenso mentions that Adonis was formerly identified with Abram, "high father," Adonis being the personified sun.

Leaving incomprehensible problems in philology for the ordinary authorised version of our Bibles, we find that Abraham was the son of Terah. The Talmud[1] says that Abraham's mother was Amathlai, the daughter of Karnebo (Bava Bathra, fol. 1, col. 1.) The text does not expressly state where Abraham was born, and I cannot therefore describe his birth-place with that accuracy of detail which a true believer might desire, but he "dwelt in old time on the other side of the flood" (Joshua xxiv, 2 and 3). Abraham was born when Terah, his father, was seventy years of age; and, according to Genesis, Terah and his family came forth out of Ur of the Chaldees, and went to Haran and dwelt there. We turn to the map to look for Ur of the Chaldees, anxious to discover it as possibly Abraham's place of nativity, but find that the translators of God's inspired word have taken a slight liberty with the text by substituting "Ur of the Chaldees" for "Aur Kasdim," the latter being, in plain English, *the light of the magi, or conjurors, or astrologers.* אורכשדים is stated by Kalisch to have been made the basis for many extraordinary legends, as to Abraham's rescue from the flames. In the Talmud P'sachim, fol. 118, col. 1, it is written that "At the time when Nimrod the wicked had cast our Father Abraham into the fiery furnace, Gabriel stood forth in the presence of the Holy one — blessed be He! — and said, 'Lord of the universe, let me, I pray thee, go down and cool the furnace, and deliver that righteous one from it.'"

Abraham, being born — according to Hebrew chronology, 2,083 years after the creation, and according to the Septuagint 3,549 years after that event — when his father was seventy, grew so slowly that when his father reached the good old age of 205 years, Abraham had only arrived at 75 years, having, apparently, lost no less than 60 years' growth during his father's fife-time. St. Augustine and St. Jerome gave this up as a difficulty inexplicable. Calmet endeavors to explain it, and makes it worse. It is surely impossible Abraham could have lived 135 years, and yet be only 75 years of age?

"The Lord" spoke to Abraham, and promised to make of him a great nation, to bless those who blessed Abraham, and to curse those who cursed him. I do not know precisely which Lord it was that spake unto Abraham, the Hebrew says it was יהוה, Jeue, or, as our translators call it, Jehovah, but as God said (Exodus vi, 2) that by the name "Jehovah was I not known" to either Abraham, Isaac, or Jacob, either the omniscient Deity had forgotten the matter, or a counterfeit Lord had assumed the name. The word Jehovah, which the book of Exodus says Abraham did not know, is nearly always the name by which Abraham addresses, or speaks of, the Jewish Deity.

Abraham having been promised protection by the God of Truth, initiated his public career with a diplomacy of statement

worthy Talleyrand. He represented his wife Sarah as his sister, which, if true, is a sad reproach to the marriage. The Talmud, when Abram came into Egypt, asks: "Where was Sarah? He confined her in a chest, into which he locked her, lest anyone should gaze on her beauty. When he came to the receipt of custom, he was summoned to open the chest, but declined, and offered payment of the duty. The officers said: 'Thou carryest garments;' and he offered duty for garments. 'Nay, it is gold thou carriest;' and he offered the impost laid on gold. Then they said: 'It is costly silks, belike pearls, thou concealest;' and he offered the custom on such articles. At length the Egyptian officers insisted, and he opened the box. And when he did so, all the land of Egypt was illumined by her beauty"(Bereshith Rabba, chap. 40). The ruling Pharaoh, hearing the beauty of Sarah commended, took her into his house, she being at that time a fair Jewish dame, between 60 and 70 years of age, and he entreated Abraham well for her sake, and he had sheep and oxen, asses and servants, and camels. We do not read that Abraham objected in any way to the loss of his wife. The Lord, who is all-just, finding out that Pharaoh had done wrong, not only punished the king, but also punished the king's household, who could hardly have interfered with his misdoings. Abraham got his wife back, and went away much richer by the transaction. Whether the conduct of father Abraham in pocketing quietly the price of the insult — or honor — offered to his wife, is worthy modern imitation, is a question only within the competence of episcopal authority. After this Abraham was very rich in "silver and gold." So was the Duke of Marlborough after the Duke of York had taken his sister in similar manner into his house. In Gen. xii, 19, there is a curious mistranslation in our version. The text is: "It is for that I had taken her for my wife;" our version has: "I *might have taken* her." The Douay so translates as to take a middle phrase, leaving it doubtful whether or not Pharaoh actually took Sarah as his wife. In any case, the Egyptian king acted far the better of the twain. Abraham plays the part of a timorous, contemptible hypocrite. Strong enough to have fought for his wife, he sold her. Yet Abraham is blessed, and his conduct is our pattern!

Despite his timorousness in the matter of his wife, Abraham was a man of wonderful courage and warlike ability. To rescue his relative, Lot — with whom he could not live on the same land without quarrelling, both being religious — he armed 318 servants, and fought with four powerful kings, defeating them and recovering the spoil. Abraham's victory was so decisive, that the King of Sodom, who fled and fell (xiv, 10) in a previous encounter, now met Abraham alive (see verse 17), to congratulate him on his victory. Abraham was also offered bread and wine by Melchisedek, King of Salem, priest of the Most High God. Where

was Salem? Some identify it with Jerusalem, which it cannot be, as Jebus was not so named until after the time of the Judges (Judges xix, 10). How does this King of this unknown Salem, never heard of before or after, come to be priest of the Most High God? These are queries for divines — orthodox disciples believe without inquiring. Melchisedek was most unique as far as genealogy is concerned. He had no father. He was without mother also; he had no beginning of days or end of life, and must be therefore at the present time an extremely old gentleman, who would be an invaluable acquisition to any antiquarian Bible Evidence Association fortunate enough to cultivate his acquaintance. God having promised. Abraham a numerous family, and the promise not having been in any part fulfilled, the patriarch grew uneasy, and remonstrated with the Lord, who explained the matter thoroughly to Abraham when the latter was in a deep sleep, and a dense darkness prevailed. Religious explanations come with greater force under these or similar conditions. Natural or artificial light and clear-sightedness are always detrimental to spiritual manifestations.

Abraham's wife had a maid named Hagar, and she bore to Abraham a child named Ishmael; at the time Ishmael was born, Abraham was 86 years of age. Just before Ishmael's birth Hagar was so badly treated that she ran away. As she was only a slave, God persuaded Hagar to return and humble herself to her mistress. Thirteen years afterwards God appeared to Abraham, and instituted the rite of circumcision — which rite had been practised long before by other nations — and again renewed the promise. The rite of circumcision was not only practised by nations long anterior to that of the Jews, but appears in many cases not even to have been pretended as a religious rite. (See Kalisch, Genesis, p. 386; Cahen, Genese, p. 43.) After God had "left off talking with him, God went up from Abraham." As God is infinite, he did not, of course, go up; but still the Bible says God went up, and it is the duty of the people to believe that he did so, especially as the infinite Deity then and now resides habitually in "heaven" wherever that may be. Again the Lord appeared to Abraham, either as three men or angels or as one of the three, and Abraham, hospitably inclined, invited the three to wash their feet and to rest under the tree, and gave butter and milk and dressed calf, tender and good, to them, and they did eat; and after the enquiry as to where Sarah then was, the promise of a son is repeated. Sarah — then by her own admission an old woman, stricken in years — laughed when she heard this, and the Lord said: "Wherefore did Sarah laugh?" and Sarah denied it; but the Lord said: "Nay, but thou didst laugh." The three men then went toward Sodom, and Abraham with them as a guide; and the Lord explained to Abraham that some sad reports had reached him about Sodom and Gomorrah, and that he was then going to find out whether the report was

reliable. God is omnipresent, and was always therefore at Sodom and Gomorrah, but had apparently been temporarily absent; he is omniscient, and therefore knew everything which was happening at Sodom and Gomorrah, but he did not know whether or not the people were as wicked they had been represented to him. God, Job tells us, "put no trust in his servants, and his angels he charged with folly." Between the rogues and the fools, therefore, the all-wise and all-powerful God seems to be liable to be misled by the reports made to him. Two of the three men or angels went on to Sodom, and left the Lord with Abraham, who began to remonstrate with Deity on the wholesale destruction contemplated, and asked him to spare the city if fifty righteous should be found within it. God said: "If I find fifty righteous within the city, then will I spare the place for their sakes." God, being all-wise, knew there were not fifty in Sodom, and was deceiving Abraham. By dint of hard bargaining in thorough Hebrew fashion Abraham, whose faith seemed to be tempered by distrust, got the stipulated number reduced to ten, and then "the Lord went his way."

Jacob Ben Chajim, in his introduction to the Rabbinical Bible (p. 28), tells us that the Hebrew text used to read in verse 22: "And Jehovah still stood before Abraham;" but the scribes altered it, and made Abraham stand before the Lord, thinking the original text offensive to Deity.

Genesis xviii has given plenty of work to the divines. Augustine contended that God can take food, though he does not require it. Justin compared "the eating of God with the devouring power of the fire." Kalisch sorrows over the holy fathers "who have taxed all their ingenuity to make the act of eating compatible with the attributes of Deity."

In the Epistle to the Romans Abraham's faith is greatly praised. We are told (iv, 19 and 20) that: "Being not weak in faith, he considered not his own body now dead, when he was about an hundred years old, neither yet the deadness of Sarah's womb. He staggered not at the promise of God through unbelief; but was strong in faith, giving glory to God." Yet, so far from Abraham giving God glory, Genesis xvii, 17, says that: "Abraham fell upon his face and laughed, and said in his heart, Shall a child be born unto him that is an hundred years old? and shall Sarah, that is ninety years old, bear?" The Rev. Mr. Boutell says that "the declaration which caused Sarah to 'laugh' shows the wonderful familiarity which was then permitted to Abraham in his communications with God."

After the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, Abraham journeyed south and sojourned in Gerar, and, either untaught or too well taught by his previous experience, again represented his wife as his sister, and Abimelech, king of Gerar, sent and took Sarah. As before, we find neither remonstrance nor resistance re-

corded on the part of Abraham. This time God punished the women in Abimelech's house for an offence they did not commit, and Sarah was again restored to her husband, with sheep, oxen, men-servants, women-servants, and money. Infidels object that the Bible says Sarah "was old and well stricken in age;" that "it had ceased to be with her after the manner of women;" that she was more than 90 years of age; and that it is not likely King Abimelech would fall in love with an ugly old woman; but if Genesis be true, it is clear that Sarah had not ceased to be attractive, as God resorted to especial means to protect her from Abimelech. At length Isaac was born, and his mother Sarah urged Abraham to expel Hagar and her son, "and the thing was very grievous in Abraham's sight because of his son;" the mother being only a bondwoman does not seem to have troubled him. God, however, approving Sarah's notion, Hagar was expelled, "and she departed and wandered in the wilderness, and the water was spent in the bottle, and she cast the child under one of the shrubs." She had apparently carried the child, who — being at least more than 14, and according to some calculations as much as 17 years of age — must have been a heavy child to carry in a warm climate.

The Talmud says: "On the day when Isaac was weaned Abraham made a great feast, to which he invited all the people of the land. Not all of those who came to enjoy the feast believed in the alleged occasion of its celebration, for some said contemptuously, 'This old couple have adopted a foundling, and provided a feast to persuade us to believe that the child is their own offspring.' What did Abraham do? He invited all the great men of the day, and Sarah invited their wives, who brought their infants, but not their nurses, along with them. On this occasion Sarah's breasts became like two fountains, for she supplied, of her own body, nourishment to all the children. Still some were unconvinced, and said, 'Shall a child be born to one that is a hundred years old, and shall Sarah, who is ninety years old, bear?' (Gen. xvii, 17). Whereupon, to silence this objection, Isaac's face was changed, so that it became the very picture of Abraham's; then one and all exclaimed, 'Abraham begat Isaac'" (Bara Metzia, fol. 87, col. 1).

God never did tempt any man at any time, but he "did tempt Abraham" to kill Isaac by offering him as a burnt offering. The doctrine of human sacrifice is one of the holy mysteries of Christianity, as taught in the Old and New Testament. Of course, judged from a religious or Biblical stand-point, it cannot be wrong, as, if it were, God would not have permitted Jephtha to sacrifice his daughter by offering her as a burnt offering, nor have tempted Abraham to sacrifice his son, nor have said in Leviticus, "None devoted, which shall be devoted of men, shall be redeemed; but shall surely be put to death" (xxvii, 29), nor have in the New

Testament worked out the monstrous sacrifice of his only son Jesus, at the same time son and begetting father.

Abraham did not seem to be entirely satisfied with his own conduct when about to kill Isaac, for he not only concealed from his servants his intent, but positively stated that which was not true, saying, "I and the lad will go yonder and worship, and come again to you." If he meant that he and Isaac would come again to them, then he knew that the sacrifice would not take place. Nay, Abraham even deceived his own son, who asked him where was the lamb for the burnt offering? But we learn from the New Testament that Abraham acted in this and other matters "by faith," so his falsehoods and evasions, being results and aids of faith, must be dealt with in an entirely different manner from transactions of every day life. Just as Abraham stretched forth his hand to slay his son, the angel of the Lord called to him from heaven, and prevented the murder, saying, "Now I know that thou fearest God, seeing thou hast not withheld thy son." This conveys the impression that up to that moment the angel of the Lord was not quite certain upon the subject.

In Genesis xiii God says to Abraham, "Lift up now thine eyes, and look from the place where thou art northward, and southward, and eastward, and westward. For all the land which thou seest, to thee will I give it, and to thy seed for ever. Arise, walk through the land, in the length of it, and in the breadth of it, for I will give it unto thee." Yet, as is admitted by the Rev. Charles Boutell, in his "Bible Dictionary," "The only portion of territory in that land of promise, of which Abraham became possessed," was a graveyard, which he had bought and paid for. Although Abraham was too old to have children *before* the birth of Isaac, he had many children after Isaac [was] born. He lived to "a good old age" and died "full of years," but was yet younger than any of those who preceded him, and whose ages are given in the Bible history, except Nahor.

According to the Talmud, as Abraham was very pious so were his very camels, for they would not enter into a place where there were idols (Avoth d' Rabbi Nathan, chap. 8).

Abraham gave "all that he had to Isaac," but appears to have distributed the rest of the property amongst his other children, who were sent to enjoy it somewhere down East.

According to the New Testament, Abraham is now in Paradise, but Abraham in heaven is scarcely an improvement upon Abraham on earth. When he was entreated by an unfortunate in hell for a drop of water to cool his tongue, father Abraham replied: "Son, remember that in thy lifetime thou receivedst thy good things, and now thou art tormented," as if the reminiscence of past good would alleviate present and future continuity of evil.

Rabbi Levi says that Abraham sits at the gate of hell and does not permit any circumcised Israelite to enter (Yalkut Shimoni, fol. 33, col. 2, sec. 18).

The Talmud declares that "Abraham was a giant of giants; his height was as that of *seventy-four* men put together. His food, his drink, and his strength were in the proportion of seventy-four men's to one man's. He built an iron city for the abode of his seventeen children by Keturah, the walls of which were so lofty that the sun never penetrated them; he gave them a bowl full of precious stones, the brilliancy of which supplied them with light in the absence of the sun "(Sophrim, chap. 21).

ENDNOTES

[1] The quotations are taken from Hershon's Talmudical Miscellany.

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A PLEA FOR ATHEISM.

BY C. BRADLAUGH.

GILLESPIE says that "an Atheist propagandist seems a nondescript monster created by nature in a moment of madness." Despite this opinion, it is as the propagandist of Atheism that I pen the following lines, in the hope that I may succeed in removing some few of the many prejudices which have been created against not only the actual holders of Atheistic opinions, but also against those wrongfully suspected of entertaining such ideas. Men who have been famous for depth of thought, for excellent wit, or great genius, have been recklessly assailed as Atheists, by those who lacked the high qualifications against which the spleen of the calumniators was directed. Thus, not only has Voltaire been without ground accused of Atheism, but Bacon, Locke, and Bishop Berkeley himself, have, amongst others, been denounced by thoughtless or unscrupulous pietists as inclining to Atheism, the ground for the accusation being that they manifested an inclination to improve human thought.

It is too often the fashion with persons of pious reputation to speak in unmeasured language of Atheism as favouring immorality, and of Atheists as men whose conduct is necessarily vicious, and who have adopted atheistic views as a desperate defiance against a Deity justly offended by the badness of their lives. Such persons urge that amongst the proximate causes of Atheism are vicious training, immoral and profligate companions, licentious living, and the like. Dr. John Pye Smith, in his "Instructions on Christian Theology," goes so far as to declare that "nearly all the Atheists upon record have been men of extremely debauched and vile conduct." Such language from the Christian advocate is not surprising, but there are others who, professing great desire for the spread of Freethought,

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and with pretensions to rank amongst acute and liberal thinkers, declare Atheism impracticable, and its teachings cold, barren, and negative. In this brief essay I shall except to each of the above allegations, and shall endeavour to demonstrate that Atheism affords greater possibility for human happiness than any system yet based on Theism, or possible to be founded thereon, and that the lives of true Atheists must be more virtuous, because more human, than those of the believers in Deity, the humanity of the devout believer often finding itself neutralised by a faith with which it is necessarily in constant collision. The devotee piling the faggots at the *auto da fé* of an heretic, and that heretic his son, might, notwithstanding, be a good father in every respect but this. Heresy, in the eyes of the believer, is highest criminality, and outweighs all claims of family or affection.

Atheism, properly understood, is in nowise a cold, barren negative; it is, on the contrary, a hearty, fruitful affirmation of all truth, and involves the positive assertion and action of highest humanity.

Let Atheism be fairly examined, and neither condemned —its defence unheard—on the *ex parte* slanders of the professional preachers of fashionable orthodoxy, whose courage is bold enough while the pulpit protects the sermon, but whose valour becomes tempered with discretion when a free platform is afforded and discussion claimed; nor misjudged because it has been the custom to regard Atheism as so unpopular as to render its advocacy impolitic. The best policy against all prejudice is to assert firmly the verity. The Atheist does not say "There is no God," but he says, "I know not what you mean by God; I am without idea of God; the word 'God' is to me a sound conveying no clear or distinct affirmation. I do not deny God, because I cannot deny that of which I have no conception, and the conception of which, by its affirmer, is so imperfect that he is unable to define it to me." If you speak to the Atheist of God as creator, he answers that the conception of creation is impossible. We are utterly unable to construe it in thought as possible that the complement of existence has been either increased or diminished, much less can we conceive an absolute origination of substance. We cannot conceive either, on the one hand, nothing becoming something,

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or on the other, something becoming nothing. The Theist who speaks of God creating the universe, must either suppose that Deity evolved it out of himself, or that he produced it from nothing. But the Theist cannot regard the universe as evolution of Deity, because this would identify Universe and Deity, and be Pantheism rather than Theism. There would be no distinction of substance—in fact no creation. Nor can the Theist regard the universe as created out of nothing, because Deity is, according to him, necessarily eternal and infinite. His existence being eternal and infinite, precludes the possibility of the conception of vacuum to be filled by the universe if created. No one can even think of any point of existence in extent or duration and say, here is the point of separation between the creator and the created. Indeed, it is not possible for the Theist to imagine a beginning to the universe. It is not possible to conceive either an absolute commencement, or an absolute termination of existence; that is, it is impossible to conceive beginning before which you have a period when the universe has yet to be; or to conceive an end, after which the universe, having been, no longer exists. It is impossible in thought to originate or annihilate the universe. The Atheist affirms that he cognises to-day effects, that these are at the same time causes and effects—causes to the effects they precede, effects to the causes they follow. Cause is simply everything without which the effect would not result, and with which it must result. Cause is the means to an end, consummating itself in that end. The Theist who argues for creation must assert a point of time, that is, of duration, when the created did not yet exist. At this point of time either something existed or nothing; but something must have existed, for out of nothing nothing can come. Something must have existed, because the point fixed upon is that of the duration of something. This something must have been either finite or infinite; if finite, it could not have been God, and if the something were infinite, then creation was impossible, as it is impossible to add to infinite existence.

If you leave the question of creation and deal with the government of the universe, the difficulties of Theism are by no means lessened. The existence of evil is then a terrible stumbling-block to the Theist. Pain, misery,

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crime, poverty, confront the advocate of eternal goodness, and challenge with unanswerable potency his declaration of Deity as all-good, all-wise, and all-powerful. Evil is either caused by God, or exists independently; but it cannot be caused by God, as in that case he would not be all-good; nor can it exist independently, as in that case he would not be all-powerful. Evil must either have had a beginning, or it must be eternal; but, according to the Theist, it cannot be eternal, because God alone is eternal. Nor can it have had a beginning, for if it had it must either have originated in God, or outside God; but, according to the Theist, it cannot have originated in God, for he is all-good, and out of all-goodness evil cannot originate; nor can evil have originated outside God, for, according to the Theist, God is infinite, and it is impossible to go outside of or beyond infinity.

To the Atheist this question of evil assumes an entirely different aspect. He declares that evil is a result, but not a result from God or Devil. He affirms that by conduct founded on knowledge of the laws of existence it is possible to ameliorate and avoid present evil, and, as our knowledge increases, to prevent its future recurrence.

Some declare that the belief in God is necessary as a check to crime. They allege that the Atheist may commit murder, lie, or steal without fear of any consequences. To try the actual value of this argument, it is not unfair to ask—Do Theists ever steal? If yes, then in each such theft, the belief in God and his power to punish has been inefficient as a preventive of the crime. Do Theists ever lie or murder? If yes, the same remark has further force—hell-fire failing against the lesser as against the greater crime. The fact is that those who use such an argument overlook a great truth—*i.e.*, that all men seek happiness, though in very diverse fashions. Ignorant and miseducated men often mistake the true path to happiness, and commit crime in the endeavour to obtain it. Atheists hold that by teaching mankind the real road to human happiness, it is possible to keep them from the by-ways of criminality and error. Atheists would teach men to be moral now, not because God offers as an inducement reward by and by, but because in the virtuous act itself immediate good is ensured to the doer and the circle surrounding him. Atheism would preserve

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man from lying, stealing, murdering now, not from fear of an eternal agony after death, but because these crimes make this life itself a course of misery.

While Theism, asserting God as the creator and governor of the universe, hinders and checks man's efforts by declaring God's will to be the sole directing and controlling power, Atheism, by declaring all events to be in accordance with natural laws—that is, happening in certain ascertainable sequences—stimulates man to discover the best conditions of life, and offers him the most powerful inducements to morality. While the Theist provides future happiness for a scoundrel repentant on his death-bed, Atheism affirms present and certain happiness for the man who does his best to live here so well as to have little cause for repenting hereafter.

Theism declares that God dispenses health and inflicts disease, and sickness and illness are regarded by the Theist as visitations from an angered Deity, to be borne with meekness and content. Atheism declares that physiological knowledge may preserve us from disease by preventing our infringing the law of health, and that sickness results not as the ordinance of offended Deity, but from ill-ventilated dwellings and workshops, bad and insufficient food, excessive toil, mental suffering, exposure to inclement weather, and the like—all these finding root in poverty, the chief source ot crime and disease; that prayers and piety afford no protection against fever, and that if the human being be kept without food he will starve as quickly whether he be Theist or Atheist, theology being no substitute for bread.

When the Theist ventures to affirm that his God is an existence other than and separate from the so-called material universe, and when he invests this separate, hypothetical existence with the several attributes of omniscience, omnipresence, omnipotence, eternity, infinity, immutability, and perfect goodness, then the Atheist, in reply, says—"I deny the existence of such a being."

It becomes very important, in order that injustice may not be done to the Theistic argument, that we should have —in lieu of a clear definition, which it seems useless to ask for—the best possible clue to the meaning intended to be conveyed by the word God. If it were not that the word is an arbitrary term, invented for the ignorant, and the

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notions suggested by which are vague and entirely contingent upon individual fancies, such a clue could be probably most easily and satisfactorily obtained by tracing back the word "God," and ascertaining the sense in which it was used by the uneducated worshippers who have gone before us; collating this with the more modern Theism, qualified as it is by the superior knowledge of to-day. Dupuis says—"Le mot *Dieu* parâit destiné à exprimer l'idée de la force universelle et eternellement active qui imprime le mouvement à tout dans la Nature, suivant les lois d'une harmonie constant et admirable, qui se developpe dans les diverses formes que prend la matière organisée, qui se mêle à tout, anime tout, et qui semble être une dans ses modifications infiniment variées, et n'appartenir qu'à elle-même." "The word God appears intended to express the force universal, and eternally active, which endows all nature with motion according to the laws of a constant and admirable harmony; which develops itself in the diverse forms of organised matter, which mingles with all, gives life to all; which seems to be one through all its infinitely varied modifications, and inheres in itself alone."

In the "Bon Sens" of Curé Meslier, it is asked, "Qu'est-ce que Dieu?" and the answer is "C'est un mot abstrait fait pour designer la force cachée de la nature; ou c'est un point mathematique qui n'a ni longueur, ni largeur, ni profundeur." "It is an abstract word coined to designate the hidden force of nature, or rather it is a mathematical point having neither length, breadth, nor thickness."

The orthodox fringe of the Theism of to-day is Hebraistic in its origin—that is, it finds its root in the superstition and ignorance of a petty and barbarous people nearly destitute of literature, poor in language, and almost entirely wanting in high conceptions of humanity. It might, as Judaism is the foundation of Christianity, be fairly expected that the ancient Jewish Records would aid us in our search after the meaning to be attached to the word "God." The most prominent words in Hebrew rendered God or Lord in English are יהוה *Jeue*, and אלהים *Aleim*. The first word Jeue, called by our orthodox Jehovah, is equivalent to "that which exists," and indeed embodies in itself the only possible trinity in unity—*i.e.*, past, present, and future. There is nothing in this Hebrew word to help you to any such defini-

tion as is required for the sustenance of modern Theism. The most you can make of it by any stretch of imagination is equivalent to the declaration "I am, I have been, I shall be." The word יהוה is hardly ever spoken by the religious Jews who actually in reading substitute for it, Adonai, an entirely different word. Dr. Wall notices the close resemblance in sound between the word *Yehova* or *Yeue*, or Jehovah, and Jove. In fact Ζεύς πατὴρ Jupiter and Jeue—pater (God the father) present still closer resemblance in sound. Jove is also Ζεύς or Θεὸς or Δεύς, whence the word Deus and our Deity. The Greek mythology, far more ancient than that of the Hebrews, has probably found for Christianity many other and more important features of coincidence than that of a similarly sounding name. The word Θεὸς traced back affords us no help beyond that it identifies Deity with the universe. Plato says that the early Greeks thought that the only Gods (ΘΕΟΎΣ) were the sun, moon, earth, stars, and heaven. The word אֱלֹהִים, Aleim, assists us still less in defining the word God, for Parkhurst translates it as a plural noun signifying "the curser," deriving it from the verb אָלָה (Ale) *to curse*. Finding that philology aids us but little, we must endeavour to arrive at the meaning of the word "God" by another rule. It is utterly impossible to fix the period of the rise of Theism amongst any particular people, but it is notwithstanding comparatively easy, if not to trace out the development of Theistic ideas, at any rate to point to their probable course of growth amongst all peoples.

Keightley, in his "Origin of Mythology," says—"Supposing, for the sake of hypothesis, a race of men in a state of total or partial ignorance of Deity, their belief in many gods may have thus commenced. They saw around them various changes brought about by human agency, and hence they knew the power of intelligence to produce effects. When they beheld other and greater effects, they ascribed them to some unseen being, similar but superior to man." They associated particular events with special unknown beings (gods), to each of whom they ascribed either a peculiarity of power, or a sphere of action not common to other gods. Thus one was god of the sea, another god of war, another god of love, another ruled the thunder and lightning;

and thus through the various elements of the universe and passions of humankind, so far as they were then known.

This mythology became modified with the advancement of human knowledge. The ability to think has proved itself oppugnant to and destructive of the desire to worship. Science has razed altar after altar heretofore erected to the unknown gods, and pulled down deity after deity from the pedestals on which ignorance and superstition had erected them. The priest who had formerly spoken the oracle of God lost his sway, just in proportion as the scientific teacher succeeded in impressing mankind with a knowledge of the facts around them. The ignorant who had hitherto listened unquestioning during centuries of abject submission to their spiritual preceptors, at last commenced to search and examine for themselves, and were guided by experience rather than by church doctrine. To-day it is that advancing intellect challenges the reserve guard of the old armies of superstition, and compels a conflict in which humankind must in the end have great gain by the forced enunciation of the truth.

From the word "God" the Theist derives no argument in his favour; it teaches nothing, defines nothing, demonstrates nothing, explains nothing. The Theist answers that this is no sufficient objection, that there are many words which are in common use to which the same objection applies. Even admitting that this were true, it does not answer the Atheist's objection. Alleging a difficulty on the one side, is not a removal of the obstacle already pointed out on the other.

The Theist declares his God to be not only immutable, but also infinitely intelligent, and says:—"Matter is either essentially intelligent, or essentially non-intelligent; if matter were essentially intelligent, no matter could be without intelligence; but matter cannot be essentially intelligent, because some matter is not intelligent, therefore matter is essentially non-intelligent: but there is intelligence, therefore there must be a cause for the intelligence, independent of matter—this must be an intelligent being—*i.e.*, God." The Atheist answers, I do not know what is meant, in the mouth of the Theist, by "matter." "Matter," "substance," "existence," are three words having the

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same signification in the Atheist's vocabulary. It is not certain that the Theist expresses any very clear idea when he uses the words "matter" and "intelligence.' Reason and understanding are sometimes treated as separate faculties, yet it is not unfair to presume that the Theist would include them both under the word intelligence. Perception is the foundation of the intellect. The perceptive faculty, or perceptive faculties, differs or differ in each animal: yet in speaking of matter the Theist uses the word "intelligence" as though the same meaning were to be understood in every case. The recollection of the perceptions is the exercise of a different faculty from the perceptive faculty, and occasionally varies disproportionately; thus an individual may have great perceptive faculties, and very little memory, or the reverse—yet memory, as well as perception, is included in intelligence. So also the faculty for comparing between two or more perceptions; the faculty of judging and the faculty of reflecting—all these are subject to the same remarks, and all these and other faculties are included in the word intelligence. We answer, then, that "God" (whatever that word may mean) cannot be intelligent. He can never perceive; the act of perception results in the obtaining a new idea, but if God be omniscient, his ideas have been eternally the same. He has either been always, and always will be perceiving, or he has never perceived at all. But God cannot have been always perceiving, because if he had he would always have been obtaining fresh knowledge, in which case he must have some time had less knowledge than now, that is, he would have been less perfect; that is—he would not have been God: he can never recollect or forget, he can never compare, reflect, nor judge. There cannot be perfect intelligence without understanding; but following Coleridge, "understanding is the faculty of judging according to sense." The faculty of whom? Of some person, judging according to that person's senses? But has "God" senses? Is there anything beyond "God" for "God" to sensate? There cannot be perfect intelligence without reason. By reason we mean that faculty or aggregation of faculties which avails itself of past experience to predetermine, more or less accurately, experience in the future, and to affirm truths which sense perceives, experiment verifies, and experience

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confirms. To God there can be neither past nor future, therefore to him reason is impossible. There cannot be perfect intelligence without will, but has God will? If God wills, the will of the all-powerful must be irresistible; the will of the infinite must exclude all other wills.

God can never perceive. Perception and sensation are identical. Every sensation is accompanied by pleasure or pain. But God, if immutable, can neither be pleased nor pained. Every fresh sensation involves a change in mental and perhaps in physical condition. God, if immutable, cannot change. Sensation is the source of all ideas, but it is only objects external to the mind which can be sensated. If God be infinite there can be no objects external to him, and therefore sensation must be to him impossible. Yet without perception where is intelligence?

God cannot have memory or reason—memory is of the past, reason for the future, but to God immutable there can be no past, no future. The words past, present, and future imply change; they assert progression of duration. If God be immutable, to him change is impossible. Can you have intelligence destitute of perception, memory, and reason? God cannot have the faculty of judgment—judgment implies in the act of judging a conjoining or disjoining of two or more thoughts, but this involves change of mental condition. To God the immutable, change is impossible. Can you have intelligence, yet no perception, no memory, no reason, no judgment? God cannot think. The law of the thinkable is, that the thing thought must be separated from the thing which is not thought. To think otherwise would be to think of nothing—to have an impression with no distinguishing mark, would be to have no impression. Yet this separation implies change, and to God, immutable, change is impossible. Can you have intelligence without thought? If the Theist replies to this, that he does not mean by infinite intelligence as an attribute of Deity, an infinity of the intelligence found in a finite degree in humankind, then he is bound to explain, clearly and distinctly, what other "intelligence" he means, and until this be done the foregoing statements require answer.

The Atheist does not regard "substance" as either essentially intelligent or the reverse. Intelligence is the result of

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certain conditions of existence. Burnished steel is bright—that is, brightness is the necessity of a certain condition of existence. Alter the condition, and the characteristic of the condition no longer exists. The only essential of substance is its existence. Alter the wording of the Theist's objection. Matter is either essentially bright, or essentially non-bright. If matter were essentially bright, brightness should be the essence of all matter; but matter cannot be essentially bright, because some matter is not bright, therefore matter is essentially non-bright; but there is brightness, therefore there must be a cause for this brightness independent of matter—that is, there must be an essentially bright being—*i.e.*, God.

Another Theistic proposition is thus stated:—"Every effect must have a cause; the first cause universal must be eternal: *ergo*, the first cause universal must be God." This is equivalent to saying that "God" is "first cause." But what is to be understood by cause? Defined in the absolute, the word has no real value. "Cause," therefore, cannot be eternal. What can be understood by "first cause?" To us the two words convey no meaning greater than would be conveyed by the phrase "round triangle." Cause and effect are correlative terms—each cause is the effect of some precedent; each effect the cause of its consequent. It is impossible to conceive existence terminated by a primal or initial cause. The "beginning," as it is phrased, of the universe, is not thought out by the Theist, but conceded without thought. To adopt the language of Montaigne, "Men make themselves believe that they believe." The so-called belief in Creation is nothing more than the prostration of the intellect on the threshold of the unknown. We can only cognise the ever-succeeding phenomena of existence as a line in continuous and eternal evolution. This line has to us no beginning; we trace it back into the misty regions of the past but a little way, and however far we may be able to journey, there is still the great beyond. Then what is meant by "universal cause?" Spinoza gives the following definition of cause, as used in its absolute signification, "By cause of itself I understand that, the essence of which involves existence, or that, the nature of which can only be considered as existent." That is, Spinoza treats "cause" absolute and "existence" as two words having the same meaning. If his mode of defining the word

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be contested, then it has no meaning other than its relative signification of a means to an end. "Every effect must have a cause." Every effect implies the plurality of effects, and necessarily that each effect must be finite; but how is it possible from a finite effect to logically deduce an universal—*i.e.*, infinite cause?

There are two modes of argument presented by Theists, and by which, separately or combined, they seek to demonstrate the being of a God. These are familiarly known as the arguments *a priori* and *a posteriori*.

The *a posteriori* argument has been popularised in England by Paley, who has ably endeavoured to hide the weakness of his demonstration under an abundance of irrelevant illustrations. The reasoning of Paley is very deficient in the essential points where it most needed strength. It is utterly impossible to prove by it the eternity or infinity of Deity. As an argument founded on analogy, the design argument, at the best, could only entitle its propounder to infer the existence of a finite cause, or rather of a multitude of finite causes. It ought not to be forgotten that the illustrations of the eye, the watch, and the man, even if admitted as instances of design, or rather of adaptation, are instances of eyes, watches, and men, designed or adapted out of pre-existing substance, by a being of the same kind of substance, and afford, therefore, no demonstration in favour of a designer, alleged to have actually created substance out of nothing, and also alleged to have created a substance entirely different from himself.

The *a posteriori* argument can never demonstrate infinity for Deity. Arguing from an effect finite in extent, the most it could afford would be a cause sufficient for that effect, such cause being possibly finite in extent and duration. And as the argument does not demonstrate God's infinity, neither can it, for the same reason, make out his omniscience, as it is clearly impossible to logically claim infinite wisdom for a God possibly only finite. God's omnipotence remains unproved for the same reason, and because it is clearly absurd to argue that God exercises power where he may not be. Nor can the *a posteriori* argument show God's absolute freedom, for as it does nothing more than seek to prove a finite God, it is quite consistent with the argument

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that God's existence is limited and controlled in a thousand ways. Nor does this argument show that God always existed; at the best the proof is only that some cause, enough for the effect, existed before it, but there is no evidence that this cause differs from any other causes, which are often as transient as the effect itself. And as it does not demonstrate that God has always existed, neither does it demonstrate that he will always exist, or even that he now exists. It is perfectly in accordance with the argument, and with the analogy of cause and effect, that the effect may remain after the cause has ceased to exist. Nor does the argument from design demonstrate one God. It is quite consistent with this argument that a separate cause existed for each effect, or mark of design discovered, or that several causes contributed to some or one of such effects. So that if the argument be true, it might result in a multitude of petty deities, limited in knowledge, extent, duration, and power; and still worse, each one of this multitude of gods may have had a cause which would also be finite in extent and duration, and would require another, and so on, until the design argument loses the reasoner amongst an innumerable crowd of deities, none of whom can have the attributes claimed for God.

The design argument is defective as an argument from analogy, because it seeks to prove a Creator God who designed, but does not explain whether this God has been eternally designing, which would be absurd; or, if he at some time commenced to design, what then induced him so to commence. It is illogical, for it seeks to prove an immutable Deity, by demonstrating a mutation on the part of Deity.

It is unnecessary to deal specially with each of the many writers who have used from different stand-points the *a posteriori* form of argument in order to prove the existence of Deity. The objections already stated apply to the whole class; and, although probably each illustration used by the theistic advocate is capable of an elucidation entirely at variance with his argument, the main features of objection are the same. The argument *a posteriori* is a method of proof in which the premises are composed of some position of existing facts, and the conclusion asserts a position antecedent to those facts. The argument is from given effects

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to their causes. It is one form of this argument which asserts that man has a moral nature, and from this seeks to deduce the existence of a moral governor. This form has the disadvantage that its premises are illusory. In alleging a moral nature for man, the theist overlooks the fact that the moral nature of man differs somewhat in each individual, differs considerably in each nation, and differs entirely in some peoples. It is dependent on organisation and education: these are influenced by climate, food, and mode of life. If the argument from man's nature could demonstrate anything, it would prove a murdering God for the murderer, a lascivious God for the licentious man, a dishonest God for the thief, and so through the various phases of human inclination. The *a priori* arguments are methods of proof in which the matter of the premises exists in the order of conception antecedently to that of the conclusion. The argument is from cause to effect. Amongst the prominent theistic advocates relying upon the *à priori* argument in England are Dr. Samuel Clarke, the Rev. Moses Lowman, and William Gillespie. As this last gentleman condemns his predecessors for having utterly failed to demonstrate God's existence, and, as his own treatise on the "Necessary Existence of God" comes to us certified by the praise of Lord Brougham and the approval of Sir William Hamilton, it is to Mr. William Gillespie that the reader shall be directed.

The propositions are first stated entirely, so that Mr. Gillespie may not complain of misrepresentation:—

1. Infinity of extension is necessarily existing.

2. Infinity of extension is necessarily indivisible.

Corollary.—Infinity of extension is necessarily immovable.

3. There is necessarily a being of infinity of extension.

4. The being of infinity of extension is necessarily of unity and simplicity.

Sub-proposition.—The material universe is finite in extension.

5. There is necessarily but one being of infinity of expansion.

Part 2, *Proposition* 1.—Infinity of duration is necessarily existing.

2. Infinity of duration is necessarily indivisible.

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Corollary.—Infinity of duration is necessarily immovable.

3. There is necessarily a being of infinity of duration.

4. The being of infinity of duration is necessarily of unity and simplicity.

Sub-proposition.—The material universe is finite in duration.

Corollary.—Every succession of substances is finite in duration.

5. There is necessarily but one being of infinity of duration.

Part 3, *Proposition* 1.—There is necessarily a being of infinity of expansion and infinity of duration.

2. The being of infinity of expansion and infinity of duration is necessarily of unity and simplicity.

Division 2, *Part* 1.—The simple sole being of infinity of expansion and of duration is necessarily intelligent and all-knowing.

Part 2.—The simple sole being of infinity of expansion and of duration, who is all-knowing, is necessarily all-powerful.

Part 3.—The simple sole being of infinity of expansion and of duration, who is all-knowing and all-powerful, is necessarily entirely free.

Division 3.—The simple sole being of infinity of expansion and of duration, who is all-knowing, all-powerful, and entirely free, is necessarily completely happy.

Sub-proposition.—The simple sole being of infinity of expansion and of duration, who is all-knowing, all-powerful, entirely free, and completely happy, is necessarily perfectly good.

The first objection against the foregoing argument is, that it seeks to prove too much. It affirms one existence (God) infinite in extent and duration, and another entirely different and distinct existence (the material universe) finite in extent and duration. It therefore seeks to substantiate everything and something more. The first proposition is curiously worded, and the argument to demonstrate it is undoubtedly open to more than one objection.

Mr. Gillespie has not defined infinity, and it is possible therefore his argument may be misapprehended in this paper. Infinite signifies nothing more than indefinite. When a person speaks of infinite extension he can only

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mean to refer to the extension of something to which he has been unable to set limits. The mind cannot conceive extension *per se*, either absolute or finite. It can only conceive something extended. It might be impossible mentally to define the extension of some substance. In such a case its extension would be indefinite; or, as Mr. Gillespie uses the word, infinite. No one can therefore possibly have any idea of infinity of extension. Yet it is upon the existence of such an idea, and on the impossibility of getting rid of it, that Mr. Gillespie grounds his first proposition. If the idea does not exist, the argument is destroyed at the first step.

Mr. Gillespie argues that it is utterly beyond the power of the human mind to conceive infinity of extension non-existent. He would have been more correct in asserting that it is utterly beyond the power of the human mind to conceive infinity of extension at all, either existent or non-existent. Extension can only be conceived as quality of substance. It is possible to conceive substance extended. It is impossible in thought to limit the possible extension of substance. Mr. Gillespie having asserted that we cannot but believe that infinity of extension exists, proceeds to declare that it exists necessarily. For, he says, everything the existence of which we cannot but believe, exists necessarily. It is not necessary at present to examine what Mr. Gillespie means by existing necessarily; it is sufficient to have shown that we do not believe in the existence of infinity of extension, although we may and do believe in the existence of substance, to the extension of which we may be unable to set limits. But, says Mr. Gillespie, "everything the existence of which we cannot but believe is necessarily existing." Then as we cannot but believe in the existence of the universe (or, to adopt Mr. Gillespie's phrase, the material universe), the material universe exists necessarily. If by "anything necessarily existing," he means anything the essence of which involves existence, or the nature of which can only be considered as existent, then Mr. Gillespie, by demonstrating the necessary existence of the universe, refutes his own later argument, that God is its creator. Mr. Gillespie's argument, as before remarked, is open to misconception, because he has left us without any definition of some of the most important words he uses. To avoid the

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same objection, it is necessary to state that by substance or existence I mean that which is in itself and is conceived *per se*—that is, the conception of which does not involve the conception of anything else as antecedent to it. By quality, that by which I cognise any mode of existence. By mode, each cognised condition of existence. Regarding extension as quality of mode of substance, and not as substance itself, it appears absurd to argue that the quality exists otherwise than as quality of mode.

The whole of the propositions following the first are so built upon it, that if it fails they are baseless. The second proposition is, that infinity of extension is necessarily indivisible. In dealing with this proposition, Mr. Gillespie talks of the *parts* of infinity of extension, and winds up by saying that he means parts in the sense of partial consideration only. Now not only is it denied that you can have any idea of infinity of extension, but it is also denied that infinity can be the subject of partial consideration. Mr. Gillespie's whole proof of this proposition is intended to affirm that the parts of infinity of extension are necessarily indivisible from each other. I have already denied the possibility of conceiving infinity in parts; and, indeed, if it were possible to conceive infinity in parts, then that infinity could not be indivisible, for Mr. Gillespie says that, by indivisible, he means indivisible, either really or mentally. Now each part of anything conceived is, in the act of conceiving, mentally separated from, either other parts of, or from the remainder of, the whole of which it is part. It is clearly impossible to have a partial consideration of infinity, because the part considered must be mentally distinguished from the unconsidered remainder, and, in that case, you have, in thought, the part considered finite, and the residue certainly limited, at least, by the extent of the part under consideration.

If any of the foregoing objections are well-founded, they are fatal to Mr. Gillespie's argument.

The argument in favour of the corollary to the second proposition is, that the parts of infinity of extension are necessarily immovable amongst themselves; but if there be no such thing as infinity of extension—that is, if extension be only a quality and not necessarily infinite; if infinite mean only indefiniteness or illimitability, and if infinity cannot have parts, this argument goes for very little. The acceptance of the

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argument that the parts of infinity of extension are immovable, is rendered difficult when the reader considers Mr. Gillespie's sub-proposition (4), that the parts of the material universe are movable and divisible from each other. He urges that a part of the infinity of extension or of its substratum must penetrate the material universe and every atom of it. But if infinity can have no parts, no part of it can penetrate the material universe. If infinity have parts (which is absurd), and if some part penetrate every atom of the material universe, and if the part so penetrating be immovable, how can the material universe be considered as movable, and yet as penetrated in every atom by immovability? If penetrated be a proper phrase, then, at the moment when the part of infinity was penetrating the material universe, the part of infinity so penetrating must have been in motion. Mr. Gillespie's logic is faulty. Use his own language, and there is either no penetration, or there is no immovability.

In his argument for the fourth proposition, Mr. Gillespie —having by his previous proposition demonstrated (?) what he calls a substratum for the before demonstrated (?) infinity of extension—says, "it is intuitively evident that the substratum of infinity of extension can be no more divisible than infinity of extension." Is this so? Might not a complex and divisible substratum be conceived by us as possible to underlie a (to us) simple and indivisible indefinite extension, if the conception of the latter were possible to us? There cannot be any intuition. It is mere assumption, as, indeed, is the assumption of extension at all, other than as the extension of substance. In his argument for proposition 5, Gillespie says that "any one who asserts that he can suppose two or more necessarily existing beings, each of infinity of expansion, is no more to be argued with than one who denies, Whatever is, is. Why is it more difficult to suppose this than to suppose one being of infinity, and, in addition to this infinity, a material universe? Is it impossible to suppose a necessary being of heat, one of light, and one of electricity, all occupying the same indefinite expansion? If it be replied that you cannot conceive two distinct and different beings occupying the same point at the same moment, then it must be equally impossible to conceive the material universe and God existing together.

The second division of Mr. Gillespie's argument is also open

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to grave objection. Having demonstrated to his own satisfaction an infinite substance, and also having assumed in addition a finite substance, and having called the first, infinite "being;" perhaps from a devout objection to speak of God as substance, Mr. Gillespie seeks to prove that the infinite being is intelligent. He says, "Intelligence either began to be, or it never began to be. That it never began to be is evident in this, that if it began to be, it must have had a cause; for whatever begins to be must have a cause. And the cause of intelligence must be of intelligence; for what is not of intelligence cannot make intelligence begin to be. Now intelligence being before intelligence began to be, is a contradiction. And this absurdity following from the supposition, that intelligence began to be, it is proved that intelligence never began to be: to wit, is of infinity of duration." Mr. Gillespie does not condescend to tell us why "what is not of intelligence cannot make intelligence begin to be;" but it is not unfair to suppose that he means that of things which have nothing in common one cannot be the cause of the other. Let us apply Mr. Gillespie's argument to the material universe, the existence of which is to him so certain that he has treated it as a self-evident proposition.

The material universe—that is, matter, either began to be, or it never began to be. That it never began to be, is evident in this, that if it began to be, it must have had a cause; for whatever begins to be must have a cause. And the cause of matter, must be of matter; for what is not of matter, cannot make matter begin to be. Now matter being before matter began to be, is a contradiction. And this absurdity following from the supposition that matter—*i.e.*, the material universe, began to be, it is proved that the material universe never began to be—to wit, is of indefinite duration.

The argument as to the eternity of matter is at least as logical as the argument for the eternity of intelligence. Mr. Gillespie may reply, that he affirms the material universe to be finite in duration, and that by the argument for his proposition, part 2, he proves that the one infinite being (God) is the creator of matter. His words are, "As the material universe is finite in duration, or began to be, it must have had a cause; for, whatever begins to be must have

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a cause. And this cause must be [Mr. Gillespie does not explain why], in one respect or other, the simple sole being of infinity of expansion and duration, who is all-knowing [the all-knowing or intelligence rests on the argument which has just been shown to be equally applicable to matter] inasmuch as what being, or cause independent of that being, could there be? And therefore, that being made matter begin to be." Taking Mr. Gillespie's own argument, that which made matter begin to be, must be of matter, for what is not matter, cannot make matter begin to be; then Mr. Gillespie's infinite being (God) must be matter. But there is yet another exception to the proposition, which is, that the infinite being (God) is all-powerful. Having as above argued that the being made matter, he proceeds, "and this being shown, it must be granted that the being is, necessarily, all-powerful." Nothing of the kind need be granted. If it were true that it was demonstrated that the infinite being (God) made matter, it would not prove him able to make anything else; it might show the being cause enough for that effect, but does not demonstrate him cause for all effects. So that if no better argument can be found to prove God all-powerful, his omnipotence remains unproved.

Mr. Gillespie's last proposition is that the being (God) whose existence he has so satisfactorily (?) made out, is necessarily completely happy. In dealing with this proposition, Mr. Gillespie talks of unhappiness as existing in various kinds and degrees. But, to adopt his own style of argument, Unhappiness either began to be, or it never began to be. That it never began to be is evident in this, that whatever began to be must have had a cause; for whatever begins to be must have a cause. And the cause of unhappiness must be of unhappiness, for what is not of unhappiness cannot make unhappiness begin to be. But unhappiness being before unhappiness began to be, is a contradiction; therefore unhappiness is of infinity of duration. But proposition 5, part 2, says there is but one being of infinity of duration. The one being of infinity of duration is therefore necessarily unhappy. Mr. Gillespie's arguments recoil on himself, and are destructive of his own affirmations.

In his argument for the sub-proposition, Mr. Gillespie says that God's motive, or one of his motives to create, must be believed to have been a desire to make happiness, besides

his own consummate happiness, begin to be. That is God, who is consummate happiness everywhere for ever, *desired* something. That is, he wanted more than then existed. That is, his happiness was not complete. That is, Mr. Gillespie refutes himself. But what did infinite and eternal complete happiness desire? It desired (says Mr. Gillespie) to make more happiness—that is, to make more than an infinity of complete happiness. Mr. Gillespie's proof, on the whole, is at most that there exists necessarily substance, the extension and duration of which we cannot limit. Part of his argument involves the use of the very *a posteriori* reasoning justly considered regarded by himself as utterly worthless for the demonstration of the existence of a being with such attributes as orthodox Theism tries to assert.

If Sir William Hamilton meant no flattery in writing that Mr. Gillespie's work was one of the "very ablest" on the Theistic side, how wretched indeed must, in his opinion, have been the logic of the less able advocates for Theism. Every Theist must admit that if a God exists, he could have so convinced all men of the fact of his existence that doubt, disagreement, or disbelief would be impossible. If he could not do this, he would not be omnipotent, or he would not be omniscient—that is, he would not be God. Every Theist must also agree that if a God exists, he would wish all men to have such a clear consciousness of his existence and attributes that doubt, disagreement, or belief on this subject would be impossible. And this, if for no other reason, because that out of doubts and disagreements on religion have too often resulted centuries of persecution, strife, and misery, which a good God would desire to prevent. If God would not desire this, then he is not all-good—that is, he is not God. But as many men have doubts, a large majority of mankind have disagreements, and some men have disbeliefs as to God's existence and attributes; it follows either that God does not exist, or that he is not all-wise, or that he is not all-powerful, or that he is not all-good.

Every child is born into the world an Atheist; and if he grows into a Theist, his Deity differs with the country in which the believer may happen to be born, or the people amongst whom he may happen to be educated. The belief is the result of education or organisation. Religious

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belief is powerful in proportion to the want of scientific knowledge on the part of the believer. The more ignorant, the more credulous. In the mind of the Theist "God" is equivalent to the sphere of the unknown; by the use of the word he answers without thought problems which might otherwise obtain scientific solution. The more ignorant the Theist, the greater his God. Belief in God is not a faith founded on reason; but a prostration of the reasoning faculties on the threshold of the unknown. Theism is worse than illogical; its teachings are not only without utility, but of itself it has nothing to teach. Separated from Christianity with its almost innumerable sects, from Mahomedanism with its numerous divisions, and separated also from every other preached system, Theism is a Will-o'-the-wisp, without reality. Apart from othodoxy, Theism is a boneless skeleton; the various mythologies give it alike flesh and bone, otherwise coherence it hath none. What does Christian Theism teach? That the first man made perfect by the all-powerful, all-wise, all-good God, was nevertheless imperfect, and by his imperfection brought misery into the world, where the all-good God must have intended misery should never come. That this God made men to share this misery, men whose fault was their being what he made them. That this God begets a son, who is nevertheless his unbegotten self, and that by belief in the birth of God's eternal son, and in the death of the undying who died to satisfy God's vengeance, man may escape the consequences of the first man's error. Christian Theism declares that belief alone can save man, and yet recognises the fact that man's belief results from teaching, by establishing missionary societies to spread the faith. Christian Theism teaches that God, though no respector of persons, selected as his favourites one nation in preference to all others; that man can do no good of himself or without God's aid, but yet that each man has a free will; that God is all-powerful, but that few go to heaven and the majority to hell; that all are to love God, who has predestined from eternity that by far the largest number of human beings are to be burning in hell for ever. Yet the advocates for Theism venture to upraid those who argue against such a faith.

It is not pretended that this inefficient Plea for Atheism contains either a refutation of all or even the majority of

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Theistic arguments, or that it offers an explanation of every objection against Atheism; but it is hoped that enough is here stated to induce some one of ability on the Theistic side to write for the better instruction of such as entertain the views here advocated—views held sincerely, views propagated actively, and views which are permeating more widely than is generally supposed.

Either Theism is true or false. If true, discussion must help to spread its influence; if false, the sooner it ceases to influence human conduct the better for human kind. It will be useless for the clergy to urge that such a pamphlet deserves no reply. It is true the writer is unimportant, and the language in which his thoughts find expression lacks the polish of a Macaulay, and the fervour of a Burke; but they are nevertheless his thoughts, uttered because it is not only his right, but his duty to give them utterance. And this Plea for Atheism is put forth challenging the Theists to battle for their cause, and in the hope that the strugglers being sincere, truth may give laurels to the victor and the vanquished; laurels to the victor in that he has upheld the truth; laurels still welcome to the vanquished, whose defeat crowns him with a truth he knew not of before.

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The Atheistic Platform.

VII.

SOME OBJECTIONS TO SOCIALISM.

BY

CHARLES BRADLAUGH.

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SOME OBJECTIONS TO SOCIALISM.

By CHARLES BRADLAUGH.

THE great evils connected with and resulting from poverty—evils which are so prominent and so terrible in old countries, and especially in populous cities—have, in our own land compelled the attention, and excited the sympathy, of persons in every rank of society. Many remedies have been suggested and attempted, and from time to time, during the present century, there have been men who, believing that the abolition of individual private property would cure the misery abounding, have advocated Socialism. Some pure-hearted and well-meaning men and women, as Robert Owen, Abram Combe, and Frances Wright, have spent large fortunes, and devoted much of their lives in the essay to test their theories by experiments. As communities, none of these attempts have been permanently successful, though they have doubtless, by encouraging and suggesting co-operative effort in England, done something to modify the fierceness of the life struggle, in which too often the strongest and most unscrupulous succeeded by destroying his weaker brother. Some Socialistic associations in the United States,[1] as the Shakers and the Oneida community, have been held together in limited numbers as religious societies, but only even apparently successful, while the numbers of each community remained comparatively few. Some communities have for many years bravely endured the burden of debt, penury, and discomfort, to be loyal to the memory of their founder, as in the case at Icaria of the followers of Cabet. But

[1] Particulars of all existing Socialistic communities in the United States are given in the works of Mr. Hinds and Mr. Nordhoff.

in none of these was the sense of private property entirely lost; the numbers were relatively so small that all increase of comfort was appreciable, and in nearly all the communities there was option of the withdrawal of the individual, and with him of a proportion of the property he had helped to create or increase.

During the past generation, Socialistic theory has been specially urged in Germany, and the Socialist leaders there have acquired greater influence because of the poverty of the people, and because too of the cruel persecution to which Social Reformers, as well as Socialists, have been subjected by Prince Bismarck's despotic government.

A difficulty arising from the repressive measures resorted to in Germany has been that German emigrants to the United States and to Great Britain, speak and write as if precisely the same wrongs had to be assailed in the lands of their adoption as in the land of their birth.

Very recently in England—and largely at the instance of foreigners—there has been a revival of Socialist propaganda, though only on a small scale compared with fifty years ago, by persons claiming to be "Scientific Socialists," who declare that such Socialists as Robert Owen and his friends were utopian in thinking that any communities could be successfully founded while ordinary society exists. These Scientific Socialists—mostly middle-class men—declare their intense hatred of the *bourgeoisie*, and affirm that the Social State they desire to create can only be established on the ruins of the present society, by a revolution which they say must come in any event, but which they strive to accelerate. These Scientific Socialists deny that they ought to be required to propound any social scheme, and they contemptuously refuse to discuss any of the details connected with the future of the new Social State, to make way for which the present is to be cleared away. Most of the points touched on in this lecture were raised in the discussion on Socialism between myself and Mr. Hyndman recently held in St. James's Hall. Others of the questions have been raised in my articles in *Our Corner*, and in the reply there by Mr. Joynes.

The Socialists of the Democratic Federation say that "Socialism is an endeavor to substitute an organised co-operation for existence" for the present strife, but they refuse to be precise as to the method or character of the organisation, or the lines upon which it is to be carried out. Their reason is, probably, that they have not even made the slightest effort to frame any plan, but would be content to try first to destroy all existing government. I suggest that this want and avoidance of foresight is, in the honest, folly, and in the wise, criminality. They mix up some desirable objects which are not all Socialistic with others that are not necessarily Socialistic, and add to these declarations which are either so vague as to be meaningless, or else in the highest degree Socialistic and revolutionary.

Whilst Mr. Hyndman, one of the prominent members of the Democratic Federation, thus speaks of Socialism as endeavoring "to substitute an organised co-operation," Mr. E. Belfort Bax, another prominent member and co-signatory of the manifesto, emphatically says, "no 'scientific' socialist pretends to have any 'scheme' or detailed plan of organisation." When organisation can be spoken of as possible without any scheme or detailed plan, it shows that words are used without regard to serious meaning.

These Socialists declare that there must be "organisation of agricultural and industrial armies under State control," and that the exchange of all production must be controlled by the workers; but they decline to explain how this control is to be exercised, and on what principles. We agree that there are often too many concerned in the distribution of the necessaries of life, and that the cost to the consumer is often outrageously augmented; but we suggest that this may be reformed gradually and in detail by individual effort through local societies, and that it ought not to be any part of the work of the State. We point to the fact that there are now in Great Britain—all established during the present reign—nearly one thousand distributive co-operative societies, with more than half a million members, with over seventeen and three-quarter millions of pounds of yearly sales, with two and a half

millions of stock-in-trade, with five and a quarter millions of working capital, and dividing one and a half millions of annual profit ; and that these societies, each keeping its own property, still further co-operate with one another to reduce loss in exchange by having a wholesale co-operative society in England, with sales in 1882 exceeding three and a half millions sterling, and another similar wholesale society in Scotland, with transactions in the same year to nearly one million sterling. We say the way to render the cost of exchange of products less onerous to the laborer is by the extension and perfection of this organisation of co-operative distribution, and that this may be and is being done successfully and usefully, ameliorating gradually the condition and developing the self-reliance of the individual workers who take part in such co-operative stores, and thus inciting and inducing other individuals to join the societies already founded, or to establish others, and so educating individual after individual to better habits of exchange. We say that this is more useful than to denounce as idlers and robbers "the shopkeepers and their hangers on," as is done by the present teachers of Socialism. We object that the organisation of all industry under State control must paralyse industrial energy and discourage and neutralise individual effort.

The Socialists claim that there shall be "collective ownership of land, capital, machinery and credit by the complete ownership of the people," and yet they object that they are misrepresented when told that they want to take the private economies of millions of industrious wage-earners in this kingdom for the benefit of those who may have neither been thrifty nor industrious. The truth is that, if language is to have any meaning, the definitions must stand given by me and unchallenged by my opponent in the St. James's Hall debate, viz. : (1) "Socialism denies all individual private property, and affirms that society, organised as the state, should own all wealth, direct all labor, and compel the equal distribution of all produce." (2) "A Socialistic State would be a State in which everything would be held in common, in which the labor of each individual would be directed and controlled by the

State, to which would belong all results of such labor." The realisation of a Socialistic State in this country would, as I then urged, require (1) a physical force revolution, in which all the present property owners unwilling to surrender their private properties to the common fund would be forcibly dispossessed. This revolution would be in the highest degree difficult, if not impossible, for property holders are the enormous majority.

Mr. Joynes, in an article published in *Our Corner*, does challenge my definition, and says that the immediate aim of Socialism "is not the abolition of private property, but its establishment by means of the emancipation of labor on the only sound basis. It is private capital we attack, the power to hire laborers at starvation wages, and not the independent enjoyment of the fruits of labor by the individual who produces them." And he refers me to a paragraph previously dealt with by me as an illustration of contradictory statement, in which he and his cosignatories write: "Do any say we attack private property? We deny it. We only attack that private property for a few thousand loiterers and slave-drivers, which renders all property in the fruits of their own labor impossible for millions. We challenge that private property which renders poverty at once a necessity and a crime." But surely this flatly contradicts the declaration by Mr. Hyndman in the debate, of "the collective ownership of land, capital, machinery, and credit." I am afraid that Mr. Joynes has in his mind some other unexplained meaning for the words "capital" and "property." To me it seems impossible that if everything be owned collectively, anything can be owned individually, separately, and privately.

Mr. Joynes, however, apparently concedes that it is true that the private property of "a few thousand loiterers and slave-drivers" is attacked. Though he does not in his reply explain who these "few thousand" are, I find in "The Summary of the Principles of Socialism," signed by Mr. Joynes, that they are "the capitalist class, the factory owners, the farmers, the bankers, the brokers, the shopkeepers, and their hangers-on, the landlords." But these make much

more than a "few thousand." The census returns for England and Wales alone show under the headings professional classes, 647,075 ; commercial classes, 980,128 (and these do not include the ordinary shopkeepers) ; farmers and graziers, 249,907 ; and unoccupied males over twenty, 182,282. Add to these proportional figures for Scotland and Ireland, and it is at once seen how misleading it is to speak of these as a "few thousand." Mr. Joynes disapproves of my "small army of statistics." I object that he and his friends never examine or verify the figures on which they found their allegations. Mr. Joynes says that it is not private property, the fruits of labor, that is attacked by the Socialists, but "private capital, the power to hire laborers." Does that mean that £30 saved by an artisan would not be attacked so long as he kept it useless, but that if he deposited it with a banker who used it in industrial enterprise, or if he invested it in railway shares, it would be forfeited ? If an artisan may, out of the fruits of his labor, buy for £3 and keep as his own a silver watch, why is the £3 to be confiscated when it gets into the hands of the Cheapside or Cornhill watch dealer ?

A property owner is not only a Rothschild, a Baring, or an Overstone, he is that person who has anything whatever beyond that which is necessary for actual existence at the moment. Thus, all savings however moderate ; all household furniture, books, indeed everything but the simplest clothing are property, and the property owners belong to all classes. The wage-earning classes, being largely property owners, viz., not only by their household goods, but by their investments, building societies, their small deposits in savings banks, their periodical payments to their trade societies and friendly societies, they would naturally and wisely defend these against confiscation. If the physical force revolution were possible, because of the desperate energy of those owning nothing, its success would be achieved with serious immediate crime, and would be attended with consequent social mischief and terrible demoralisation extending over a long period.

Mr. Hyndman has written that "force, or fear of force, is, unfortunately, the only reasoning which can

appeal to a dominant estate, or will ever induce them to surrender any portion of their property." I read these words to him in the debate, and he made no reply to them. I object that a Socialistic State to be realised by force can only be so realised after a period of civil war shocking to contemplate, and one in which the wisest would go near madness.

But a Socialistic State, even if achieved, could not be maintained without a second (mental) revolution, in which the present ideas and forms of expression concerning property would have to be effaced, and the habit of life (resulting from long-continued teachings and long-enduring traditions) would have to be broken. The words "my house," "my coat," "my horse," "my watch," "my book," are all affirmations of private property which would have to be unlearned. The whole current of human thought would have to be changed.

In a Socialistic State there would be no inducement to thrift, no encouragement to individual saving, no protection for individual accumulation, no check upon, no discouragement to waste.

Nor, if such a Socialistic State be established, is it easy to conceive how free expression of individual opinion, either by press or platform, can be preserved and maintained. All means of publicity will belong to, and be controlled by, the State. But what will this mean? Will a Socialistic government furnish halls to its adversaries, print books for its opponents, organise costly journals for those who are hostile to it? If not, there must come utter stagnation of opinion.

And what could the organisation and controlling of all labor by the State mean? In what could it end? By whom, and in what manner, would the selection of each individual for the pursuit, profession, or handicraft for which he was fittest be determined?

I object that the Socialistic advocates exaggerate and distort real evils, and thus do mischief to those who are seeking to effect social reforms. For example, they declare that the whole of the land of the country is held by "a handful of marauders," who ought to be dispossessed, and when told that there are 852,438 persons owning on an average less than one fifth of an acre each, holding probably in the neighborhood of

towns, and that more than half a million of these persons are members of building societies, paying for their small properties out of their wage-earnings, they only say: "Do you suppose those who hold building allotments will be dispossessed?" But if they are not dispossessed, if their private property is left to them, then "collective ownership" must have a new meaning. Pressed with the fact that there are 205,358 owning on an average fifteen acres each, they make no other answer. Yet this 1,037,896, representing with their families more than four millions of human beings, are clearly not a "handful," nor is there any evidence offered that they are "marauders." My complaint is that the possibility of early Land Law Reform is injured and retarded by such rashness. It is an undoubted evil that in this crowded kingdom so few as 2,238 persons should own 39,924,232 acres of land, and that the enormous holdings should be inadequately taxed, but we need the influence of the one million small landowners to enable us legally to reform and modify those obnoxious land laws which have facilitated the accumulation of such vast estates in so few hands. In the debate with myself, Mr. Hyndman spoke very contemptuously of the "small ownerships" and "paltry building allotments," yet he ought to know that the holders of these houses are law-abiding, peace-promoting citizens, who are encouraged by these slight possessions, which give promise of comfort in life, to strive so that the comfort shall be extended and secured.

A sample of the wild and extraordinary exaggeration indulged in by the Democratic Federation may be found on p. 48 of the "Summary of the Principles of Socialism," where it is gravely declared that the "idlers who eat enormously and produce not at all form the majority of the population," and this may be fairly contrasted with another statement by the same persons that the present conditions of labor have "brought luxury for the few, misery and degradation for the many." If the latter be accurate, the former must be a perversion.

The Socialists say that there are a few thousand persons who own the National Debt, and they recommend

its extinction ; usually leaving it in doubt as to whether this is to be by wholesale or by partial repudiation. When reminded that there are an enormous number of small depositors (at least 4,500,000 accounts in one year) owning through the ordinary savings banks £45,403,569, and through the Post Office Savings Bank, £36,194,495, they neither explain the allegation as to the few thousands, nor do they condescend to offer the slightest explanation as to how any savings have been possible if all the wealth created by labor has been "devoured only by the rich and their hangers-on." Repudiation of the National Debt would ruin the whole of these. The Socialist leader says that the small ownership of land and these small savings do not really benefit the working classes, for that in times of depression the savings are soon used up. That may often be true, but if there were no savings, then it must be starvation, pauperism, or crime ; at least the saving mitigates the suffering. When told that there are 2,300,000 members of friendly societies, who must represent at least 9,000,000 of the inhabitants of this country, and that these, amongst other investments, have £1,397,730 in the National Debt, we are answered that these are mere details. On this point I think Mr. Joynes a little fails in candor. He takes one set of my figures, and says "the share of each individual is on the average a little more than £3 3s., and the dividend which annually accrues to each of these propertied persons is slightly over 2s. It does not require a very high standard of intelligence to enable a man to perceive that Socialists who intend to deprive him of these 2s., and at the same time to secure him the full value of his work, are proposing not to diminish his income, but to raise it in a very high degree." Let me first say that the friendly society represents to each artisan investor, not the 2s. per year, but his possible sick money, gratuity on disablement, allowance whilst unemployed, etc.; next, that here Mr. Joynes does in this actually admit an attack on the private property of the laborer, and does propose to take away the accumulated "fruits of labor" from the independent enjoyment of the individual who earned it. And the working-man's house ? and his savings in the savings-

bank, or in the co-operative store? Are these to be taken too? If not, why not? and if yes, of how much of the fruits of his labor is the laborer to be left by the Socialists in "independent enjoyment"? When pressed that the confiscation of the railways "without compensation," would bankrupt every life assurance company, and thus destroy the provision made for hundreds of thousands of families, because in addition to about £5,262,000 in the Funds, and about £75,000,000 invested on mortgages of houses and land, the life insurance companies are extensive holders of railway securities—the advocates of Socialism only condescend to say: "Who are the shareholders in the railways? Do they ever do any good in the world? They are simply using the labor of the dead in order to get the labor of the living." But is this true? The shareholders originally found the means to plan, legalise, and construct the railway, to buy the land, to pay the laborer day by day his wage, whilst yet the railway could bring no profit, to buy the materials for the permanent way, to purchase and maintain the rolling stock. Many hundreds of shareholders in unsuccessful lines have never received back one farthing of what they paid to the laborer. No laborer worked on those unsuccessful lines without wage. Some railway shareholders have got too much, but there are thousands of comparatively poor shareholders who are to be ruined by the seizure of their shares without compensation. It is not at all true that railway shareholders use "the labor of the dead in order to get the labor of the living." On the contrary, during the last few years the tendency on lines like the Midland, has been to afford the widest facilities, and the greatest possible comfort consistent with cheapness, to working-folk travelling for need or pleasure. That all railway managers are not equally far-seeing is true, that much more might be done in this direction is certain, that some managing directors are over-greedy is clear, but that the change has been for the better during the past twenty years none would deny who had any regard for truth. That railway porters, pointsmen, guards, firemen, and drivers are, as Mr. Joynes well urges, often badly paid, and nearly always overworked, is true, but

making the railways State property would not necessarily improve this. The Post Office is controlled by the State for the State, and the letter-carriers and sorters are as a body disgracefully remunerated.

Mr. Joynes complains that I have not met the question of the "surplus value" of labor, which he says "is the keystone of the Socialistic argument." He does not explain upon what basis the alleged surplus value is calculated, but shelters himself behind a vague, and I submit incorrect, reference to a declaration by Mr. Hoyle, the well-known earnest temperance advocate. Mr. Joynes says that in one and a-half hours the laborer earns enough for subsistence. Mr. Hoyle's often-repeated declaration is in substance to the effect, that if the whole drink traffic of the country were abolished, and neither wines, beers, nor spirits drunk by any of the industrial classes, then that the working men could earn enough for comfort in very much less time than they now do. Mr. Joynes here entirely overlooks the substance of Mr. Hoyle's declaration, which is, in effect, that the working men do now receive, and then spend wastefully, what would keep them. I have always contended that in nearly every department of industry labor has been insufficiently paid, in some cases horribly paid, and I have claimed for the laborer higher wages, and tried to help to teach him, through trades' unions and otherwise, how to get these higher wages; but if Mr. Joynes and his friends mean anything, wages are to disappear altogether, and the State is to apportion to each a sort of equal subsistence, without regard to the skill or industry of the individual laborer, so that the skilled engineer, the unskilled hod-carrier, the street sweeper, the ploughman, and the physician, would each, in the Socialistic State, have neither less nor more than the other.

The Socialists say "the laborers on the average replace the value of their wages for the capitalist class in the first few hours of their day's work; the exchange value of the goods produced in the remaining hours of the day's work constitutes so much embodied labor which is unpaid; and this unpaid labor so embodied in articles of utility, the capitalist class, the factory owners, the farmers, the bankers, the brokers,

the shopkeepers, and their hangers-on, the landlords, divide amongst themselves in the shape of profits, interests, discounts, commissions, rent, etc." But without the capitalist where would be the workshop, the plant, or the raw material? It would be better if in co-operative production workmen would be their own capitalists, but surely the owner of capital is entitled to some reward? If not how is he to be persuaded to put it into fixed capital as factory and plant? Why should he beforehand purchase raw material on which labor may be employed, subsist labor while so employed, and take the risk of loss as well as profit in exchanging the article produced? And why is not the farmer to be sustained by the laborers if that farmer grows the food the laborer requires? Why should not the shopkeeper be rewarded for bringing ready to the laborer articles which would be otherwise in the highest degree difficult to procure? If the laborer procured his own raw material, fashioned it into an exchangeable commodity, and then went and exchanged it, there are many to whom the raw material would be inaccessible, and more who would lose much of the profits of their labor in fruitless efforts to exchange. The vague declarations by the Socialist that production and exchange are to be organised are delusive without clear statement of the methods and principles of the organisation. Robert Owen is called "Utopian" by these Democratic Federation Socialists, but at least he did try to reduce to practice his theories of production and exchange. The Democratic Federation say that "surplus value" is produced by "labor applied to natural objects under the control of the capitalist class." I object that but for capital, fixed and circulating, there are many natural objects which would be utterly inaccessible to labor; many more which could only be reached and dealt with on a very limited scale. That but for capital the laborer would often be unable to exist until the object had exchangeable value, or until some one was found with an equivalent article ready to exchange, and I submit that the banker, the shopkeeper, the broker may and do facilitate the progress of labor, and would and could not do so without the incentive of profit.

We agree that "wage" is often much too low, and we urge the workers in each trade to join the unions already existing, and to form new unions, so that the combined knowledge and protection of the general body of workers as to the demand for, and value of, the labor, may be at the service of the weakest and most ignorant. We would advocate the establishment of labor bureaux, as in Massachusetts, so that careful and reliable statistics of the value of labor and cost of life may be easily accessible. We would urge the more thorough experiment on, and establishment of, co-operative productive societies in every branch of manufacture, so that the laborers furnishing their own capital and their own industry, may not only increase the profit result of labor to the laborer, but also afford at least a reasonable indication as to the possible profit realised by capitalists engaged in the same industries. We would increase wage (if not in amount, at any rate in its purchasing power), by diminishing the national and local expenditure, and thus also decreasing the cost of the necessaries of life. We would try to shift the pressing burden of taxation more on to land, and to the very large accumulation of wealth.

We contend that he or she who lives by the sale of labor should, with the purchase money, be able to buy life, not only for the worker, but for those for whom that worker is fairly bread-winner. And life means not only healthy food, reasonable clothing, cleanly, healthy shelter, education for the children until they are so sufficiently grown that labor shall not mean the crippling of after life—but also leisure. Leisure for some enjoyment, leisure for some stroll in the green fields, leisure for some look into the galleries of paintings and sculpture, leisure for some listening to the singer, the actor, the teacher; leisure that the sunshine of beauty may now and then gild the dull round of work-a-day life; and we assert that in any country where the price of honest earnest industry will not buy this, then that if there are any in that country who are very wealthy, there is social wrong to be reformed. But this is the distinction between those with whom I stand and the Socialists.

We want reform, gradual, sure, and helpful. They ask for revolution, and know not its morrow.

Revolution may be the only remedy in a country where there is no free press, no free speech, no association of workers, no representative institutions, and where the limits of despotic outrage are only marked by the personal fear of the despot. But in a country like our own, where the political power is gradually passing into the hands of the whole people, where, if the press is not entirely free it is in advance of almost every European country, and every shade of opinion may find its exponent, here revolution which required physical force to effect it would be a blunder as well as a crime. Here, where our workmen can organise and meet, we can claim reforms and win them. The wage-winners of Durham and Northumberland, under the guidance of able and earnest leaders, have won many ameliorations during the past twenty years. Each year the workers' Parliament meets in Trades Union Congress, to discuss and plan more complete success, and to note the gains of the year. Every twelve months, in the Co-operative Congresses, working men and women delegates gather together to consult and advise. Each annual period shows some progress, some advantage secured, and though there is much sore evil yet, much misery yet, much crime yet, much—far too much—poverty yet, to-day's progress from yesterday shows day-gleam for the people's morrow.

Printed by Annie Besant and Charles Bradlaugh, at 63, Fleet Street, London, E.C.—1884.

SECULARISM:

Unphilosophical, Immoral, and Anti-Social.

VERBATIM REPORT

OF A

THREE NIGHTS' DEBATE

BETWEEN THE

Rev. Dr. McCANN and CHARLES BRADLAUGH,

IN THE

HALL OF SCIENCE, LONDON,

On DECEMBER 7th, 14th, and 21st, 1881.

[*Corrected by both Disputants.*]



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SECULARISM:

UNPHILOSOPHICAL, IMMORAL, AND ANTI-SOCIAL.

Verbatim Report of a Three Nights' Debate between the REV. DR. MCCANN *and* CHARLES BRADLAUGH, *on December 7th, 14th, and 21st*, 1881.

FIRST NIGHT.—W. BARNARD, ESQ., in the Chair.

The Chairman having read the conditions of Debate, the Rev. Dr. MCCANN said:—Another debate on Secularism! And why another? Surely there have been enough, and more than enough, on that subject already, without adding to their number. Can anything be urged on either side that has not been urged before? Such may be the thoughts of many; and I grant, not unreasonable ones; still, though I may not have much that is fresh to bring before you, I may arrange the old materials in such form that it will be readily seen whether my opponent is following my lead, as he is bound to do, or whether he is chalking out a new course for himself, and leaving my reasonings to take care of themselves. In such a discussion as this, it is of the utmost importance that the audience should be able to see at a glance whether the disputants are sticking to the point, or whether they are fighting shy of it. I have therefore arranged what I have to say in a series of propositions which are simple of apprehension and consecutive in thought, but the importance of which must be patent to all who read them. In order that the debate might be as thorough as possible, I sent a copy of them to Mr. Bradlaugh about a month ago, so that he is perfectly aware of the line of argument I propose adopting. (Cheers.) I base my views regarding Secularism on what I believe to be sufficient reasons. Mr. Bradlaugh doubtless does the same; we have now to show whose are the superior reasons, and in doing this I

hope that each will personally respect the other as a searcher for truth (cheers); but while doing this, I may state so far as our reasonings are concerned, I give no quarter and I ask none.

To proceed then to our subject. My first proposition is that Secularism is Atheism. This, I fancy, Mr. Bradlaugh will not dispute, still it is important that I should have it acknowledged. Understand that I am not discussing whether Atheism be true or false, with that we have no concern at present, my only contention is that Secularism is Atheism. In reference to this Mr. Bradlaugh said in his debate with Mr. Harrison (p. 13): "there is another point that I do not think I need trouble to discuss, whether Secularism is Atheism or not, because I think it is. I have always said so, I believe, for the last thirteen years of my life, whenever I have had an opportunity of doing so." That Mr. Bradlaugh has not changed his opinion is shown by the *National Reformer* for October 16th, 1881, in which he writes: "I am, too, an Atheist, and I hold that the logical and ultimate consequence of adopting Secularism must be Atheism," and I perfectly agree with him, for the principles of the British Secular Union seem to me to be logically absurd. To say, as they do, that outside the concerns of "the present life, Secularist members are free to hold any opinions, and to promulgate such opinions on their own responsibility," seems to me to be very like quiet banter, for what opinions can be outside the concerns of this present life on any possible subject, philosophical or scientific? I therefore hold most thoroughly that the position of Mr. Bradlaugh is the only logical one, that is to say, that Secularism is Atheism.

My next proposition is that Secularism is Necessitarianism. Necessitarianism denies that we have freedom to will, and consequently affirms that our actions are not within our own control. The doctrine as stated by Mr. Mill (Examination, 562) is that "A volition is a moral effect, which follows the corresponding moral causes as certainly and invariably as physical effects follow their physical causes. Whether it must do so, I acknowledge myself to be entirely ignorant, be the phænomena moral or physical: and I condemn accordingly the word necessity as applied to either case." You will observe that he places mental acts and

physical in the same category of invariable sequence; that is, that there is no more freedom in the volition of a man than in the growth of a flower. He condemns the word necessity, as do all his school, but why? Because he does not know that any happening must happen; he does not know that if a cannon ball strike a wall with any amount of force the wall must fall; he only knows it does fall. Indeed Professor Bain states this explicitly when he says that ("Mental and Moral Science," 406), "To express causation we need only name one thing, the antecedent or cause, and another thing the effect; a flying cannon shot is a cause, the tumbling down of a wall is the effect." Messrs. Mill and Bain would tell us that they do not know that the wall must fall, they only know that it does fall; it is not knocked down, it tumbles down. This being their only reason for objecting to the term necessity, I shall continue to use it, as I have a very strong conviction that the wall is under the necessity of falling.

Necessitarianism then denies that we can in any degree originate our own actions. It affirms that these are the invariable effects of certain unavoidable causes. It denies that we are in any true sense of the term, agents, or have any self-determination, or any self-control. There is none in the flower, there is none in the wall, and Necessitarianism holds equal sway in all such cases. We are merely links in the chain of happenings, as much the creatures of circumstances as the links of any cable of a ship. We are told that circumstances, over which we have no control, originate our motives, and our motives produce our actions; we being only the channels through which flows the stream of antecedents and consequents; we are as helpless in the matter, and have as little to do with their nature, as has a river bed with the water that flows through it. In perfect harmony with this is the teaching of Mr. Bradlaugh, as it is bound to be. His words are (Cooper debate, p. 43): "He (Mr. Cooper) says that man is a free agent, for he can sin against his own conscience. I say he cannot sin. Man cannot resist the circumstances that result in volition." Understand this clearly as it is of the utmost importance, and it shall give direction to all I may hereafter say. I am not now attempting to disprove Necessitarianism. My present purpose is to explain it, and I hope

not unfairly. Mr. Bradlaugh has put the whole question as concisely as possible—that man cannot resist the circumstances that result in volition. In other words, man has no power of resistance ; not only can he not overcome them, he cannot even resist them. I would not press this word "resist" so strongly were it merely a word used incautiously in the heat of debate ; but as it is the exact expression of the views of that school, I am justified in making what use of it I choose. We certainly fancy we sometimes resist, and resist pretty steadily too—so steadily as eventually to overcome the temptation. It is all a mistake, say our friends ; there is no resisting the circumstances that result in volition! You see a man coming out of a public house perfectly drunk. There was no help for it ; he could not resist. Poor fellow, he was the victim of antecedents and consequents. Don't blame him. Blame him! You cannot blame him if your antecedents do not produce blame. You cannot help it if they do. Your judgment of his drunkenness is no affair of yours or his ; it is the necessary effect of the circumstances that have resulted in volition! Mr. Bradlaugh is here a Secularist leader and a defender of their cause. But why here? Not because he has thought out the matter carefully for himself, and has determined to cast in his lot with theirs. Not so ; it has been all determined, not by himself, but for him, in the chain of causation. According to my friend's teaching, he has no more power to be aught but an Atheist than I have to be aught but a Theist. No praise to him, no blame to me. We are what we are, because by no personal possibility could we have been otherwise. I do not fancy it can be a pleasant thought for Mr. Bradlaugh that he never does, but is always done. But that is the fundamental principal of Necessitarianism ; and as he must be a Necessitarian, being an Atheist, he has no help for it.

Necessitarians, however, acknowledge a difference between physical and mental causation. Professor Bain writes, "Mental and Moral Science," p. 399 :—"The speciality of voluntary action as compared with the powers of the inanimate world is, that the antecedent and the consequent are conscious or mental states (coupled, of course, with bodily states)." According to this, voluntary action means that you know what you are doing. If a man

compels me to drink a cup of poison, Bain would tell me I do it voluntarily, because I know I am drinking it! The only volitional difference, then, between the actions of a rose and those of a man is, that the one knows what is being done and the other does not. So far, I think, the rose has the best of it, for the rose, when blooming but poorly, does not know what a poor-looking wretch it is, but the drunkard is perfectly aware he is making a fool of himself, yet has no power to resist it. It will not do for Mr. Bradlaugh to say that this is not his teaching, but that of Professor Bain, and therefore he is not responsible for it. The words may not be his, but the thought is an integral part of his system. He affirms we are not free in any degree to self-determine our own course in life—that we are not agents but instruments; of course he will acknowledge that we are conscious of what we are doing, while the flower is not; consequently, whatever may be said of the teaching of Mr. Bain on this subject, applies to the teaching of Mr. Bradlaugh and of all logical Secularists. If there be any difference between Mr. Bradlaugh and Mr. Bain on this point, it will be regarding the consciousness of the flower, as Mr. Bradlaugh seems a little in doubt on that subject. When asked by Dr. Baylee (page 50) the question, "Is a cabbage stalk non-intelligent?" his answer was, "If you mean has a cabbage the power of thinking, I have no evidence." Still, I have a strong impression that, in spite of this answer, he will agree with Professor Bain.

We must not, however, imagine that while Necessitarians deny all freedom in volition, they deny it everywhere; that would be impolitic, because the word freedom, and the thought freedom exist, and so a place must be found for them somewhere, consequently a place has been found, and a very queer place it is. It is not within our mental life at all, but altogether outside of it. It is thus explained by Bain (p. 398): "The capital objection to free-will is the unsuitability, irrevalence, or unpropriety of the metaphor 'freedom' in the question of the sequence of motive and act in volition. The proper meaning of 'free' is the absence of external compulsion; every sentient being, under a motive to act, and not interfered with by any other being, is to all intents free; the fox impelled by hunger, and proceeding unmolested to a poultry yard, is a free agent." This is significant, and

somewhat racy. You will observe in the first place that freedom in the selection of action is a "metaphor." The fox is not free to decline paying the hens a visit, he is only free to go on till he is stopped; if he be caught in a trap he is free no longer. Most decidedly not. And this is Secularist freedom, the freedom of Necessitarians, mere absence of PHYSICAL restraint! Take another illustration, perhaps more to the point. The man compelled by circumstances which he could not resist goes for drink, goes home drunk. Compelled by circumstances which he could not resist—by hunger—he demands his supper. There being none for him, compelled by circumstances which he could not resist, he raises his fist to strike his wife. So far there is no freedom in the case. Now, however, he is free, for there is no external obstacle in the way of his arm; at least there was not, till his wife caught it with one of her hands, and, compelled by circumstances which she could not resist, gave him a stunner with the other. Poor fellow! he soon lost the little freedom he had; first floored by whiskey, and then by his wife, without the power to resist either.

But this aspect of the question has another application. If freedom means absence of external compulsion, and if no man in England is externally compelled to think in one way rather than in another, then every man in England is a freethinker. So let our friends, the Secularists, be consistent, and give the right hand of fellowship to every thinker in England as a brother freethinker.

But if Secularism be Necessitarianism, then it must be also Fatalism, for to my mind they are exactly the same. I know that Mr. Bradlaugh denies this. He writes ("Freethinker's Text Book"): "The Fatalist says what is, is, and must be, could not have been otherwise, and cannot be altered. The Necessitarian says what is, is, and must have resulted from such and such conditions, but the conditions might have been varied, and the results would then have been different." The only difference, then, even according to Mr. Bradlaugh, is that the conditions might have been varied in the past. So far as the present life is concerned they are identical, but how could the conditions have been varied in the past? If our volitions spring from our conditions, which we have no power to alter, neither could our ancestors have altered theirs, and so could not have

altered ours. Consequently, Fatalism and Necessitarianism are the same thing. The application of all this—that is, of Secularism, to the affairs of life, will occupy our next evenings. Meantime, I claim to have shown what Necessitarianism is; also that Secularism is Atheism, that Atheism involves Necessitarianism or Fatalism, and that consequently all logical Secularists must be Atheists; being Atheists, must be Necessitarians or Fatalists. Mr. Bradlaugh will shortly have the opportunity of showing whether I have in any way misrepresented the theory or whether my illustrations have been in any degree unfair. It will not do to say they have been, the fallacies or the unfairness must be clearly exposed, and until they are, I hold that I have proved my first and second propositions.

My next proposition is, that Secularism, in so far as it is Necessitarianism, is unphilosophical and therefore untrue. It is evident that if there be any ultimate standard of truth, whatever contradicts that must be false, and by the fact of contradiction is proved false. Is there such a standard? I hold there is, and that it is found in Consciousness. In other words, whatever consciousness affirms is, and must be, true, because its authority is unquestionable. On this subject Sir William Hamilton (Lectures I., 265) writes: "Now, it is at once evident that philosophy, as it affirms its own possibility, must affirm the veracity of consciousness, for as philosophy is only a scientific development of the facts which consciousness reveals, it follows that philosophy, in denying or doubting the testimony of consciousness, would deny or doubt its own existence. So far there is, and can be, no dispute; if philosophy be possible, the evidence of consciousness is authentic." This position is so self-evident that it is not easy to imagine the possibility of anyone attempting to deny it. Yet the feat has been attempted by Mr. Bradlaugh, who apparently saw very clearly that he must either invalidate the testimony of consciousness or give up his Necessitarianism and his Secularism. In his discussion with Mr. Lawson (p. 25) he writes: "A maniac peasant deems himself a prince; to himself he is a prince; his consciousness does it not deceive him?" Surely the fact that he has to go to a maniac for an illustration ought to have aroused his suspicions regarding its worth. Mr. Buckle, whom he quotes in confirmation of his views, goes to a man in delirium tremens

for his illustration, and states that he is conscious of seeing spectres and phantoms that do not exist. Just fancy anyone being conscious of seeing the non-existent! We may believe in that which has no existence, or imagine it, but to be conscious of it is inherently absurd. A peasant conscious that he is a prince! Surely Mr. Bradlaugh is too acute to believe anything so foolish. He is apparently confounding consciousness with the interpretation of consciousness. We are conscious of our own mental states, but the inference from that state is not given in consciousness. It is perfectly true that the peasant is conscious of the belief that he is a prince, but that is a very different matter from being conscious that he is one. Consciousness is not responsible for false judgments, or for variety of dispositions, or for disturbance of brain. But it seems useless to dwell upon this point, because we must either admit the truthfulness of consciousness or give up all reasoning as useless, or impossible, in a word, we commit philosophical suicide.

Next to the consciousness of our own existence is the consciousness that we are intelligent agents capable of a certain amount of self-determination. I do not say that I am convinced that I am free, but that I know that I am. The conviction is a later thing than the knowledge, and must be founded on evidence. But where is this evidence? Only in the preceding knowledge, for it could be found nowhere else, it never could be found outside myself, but always in my own processes. Each one knows himself in some degree the author of his own actions. I say in some degree, because no one contends that any human being is perfectly unwarped by his inherited tendencies, his education, and his surroundings; but I do contend that every one knows that all these things still leave him a certain amount of freedom of self-control, that amount may not be alike in any two individuals, but in all sane persons it is found in some degree. Bearing this in mind I say that we know as a fact that when we are deciding between alternative courses, we are deciding the matter ourselves, and it is not decided for us by some remote antecedence. I know that my being here to night is in part my action, and not wholly the action of my ancestors. I am conscious I am not a mere force driven helplessly to and fro by the winds of circumstances,

without any power to control myself. I know in certain cases that I am controlling myself. If there be one fact in my life more clearly apprehended by me than another, it is this, that I am the cause of my own actions; that, in spite of Mr. Bradlaugh's assertion, I can sin if I will, or I can struggle against it if I will—that if another tempt me to wrong, I may yield, or I may reject the suggestion; but if I yield, I yield, and have myself to blame, and must not throw that blame on some remote event, and console myself by saying what is, is, and could not have been otherwise. I feel assured that whatever Mr. Bradlaugh may feel himself compelled to say on this platform, by the exigencies of theory, in practical life if he saw any man steal, for example, he would not say to him, "it is all right, you could not help it, you are only the victim of your antecedents." Because he would be perfectly aware that the thief would consider he was being laughed at, as he would know better than this. Of course we have reasons and motives for our conduct, we do not act irrationally, but the will is not by them constrained, the strongest motive does not determine the will, but the will determines what motives shall be allowed to gain strength, by its control of intelligence and attention. Reason as we may on this matter, we must ultimately refer the results to consciousness, and if they be inconsistent with its facts, they must be rejected as untrue. That Mr. Bradlaugh feels his reasonings on this subject to be inconsistent with it, is pretty evident from the fact that he tries to shake our belief in the authority of consciousness, or rather tries to shake our knowledge of ourselves, a task no one would attempt unless compelled by a dire necessity.

But this theory of the constrained action of the will is easily tested by experiment and its fallacy exposed. Suppose I were to ask you all to raise your right hand, and in response to my appeal a certain number of arms arose, would you not laugh at me if I told you that it was not you who raised them or who kept them from rising, that they were raised but not by you? Would you not know the action was your own? If you knock a man down purposely, what does your consciousness tell you? Why it seems useless to argue the point; it is too palpable to admit of dispute. Do we not know we are not talking nonsense when we say "I will," "I shall," "I choose," "I determine," and other words in the vocabu-

lary of freedom? Yet, if my friend be correct, they must be nonsense, and the whole language of volition had better be abolished, and not allowed to remain any longer to puzzle and deceive us. In the name of honesty let us be thorough in this matter, and either acknowledge Necessitarianism to be nonsense, or banish all the words that contradict it, and construct a vocabulary applicable to animated machines. In other words form a new language altogether, for most assuredly our own present language, as are all languages, is in harmony with consciousness, and not in antagonism to it. And as language is the prôduct of the convictions and needs of those who construct it, this fact is of the utmost significance, and greatly strengthens my position, if it need strengthening, which I do not think it does; for I think that, apart from the testimony of language altogether, I have abundantly proved that Necessitarianism is in direct antagonism to the facts of consciousness, and is consequently unphilosophical and false. I have now given what appear to me sufficient reasons for affirming that Secularism is Atheism, that Secularism or Atheism is Necessitarianism, and that Necessitarianism is unphilosophical. I now give place to Mr. Bradlaugh, with the very earnest wish that our discussion may do something to aid the cause of truth, may do something to help our brother men to fight nobly the battle of life, may do something to help them onwards, upwards, manwards. (Cheers.)

Mr. Bradlaugh, who was received with cheers, said:—It is perfectly correct that about a month ago the Rev. Dr. McCann was good enough to write me with the proposition that Secularism was Unphilosophical, Atheistic, Necessitarian, and Anti-social, but he did no more; and therefore although I do not say that I am in any degree unprepared for the debate, the notice that he was good enough to give me did not enlighten me any more than those words would enlighten anybody else. I am quite sure that Dr. McCann will bear in mind that when he wrote, I had, some weeks previously to that—when he was good enough to invite me to consider this question—told him that I should define Secularism as it was defined by the National Secular Society (and as you will find it in the Society's Almanack). I shall, to-night, so define it and explain it. I shall then follow Dr. McCann in some of the number of points—which

are well worthy of consideration—which he put before us. I may say that the view of Secularism which I shall give you is not altogether my own view, but is a view which has been carefully considered by a committee of Secularists appointed at a national meeting of Freethinkers, a committee which considered the matter for about twelve months and which carefully drew up the propositions I shall read you. Their report was endorsed by a conference of Secularists—many of them holding very different opinions upon Secularism—held at Nottingham, who ultimately voted that which I shall put before you. I shall, in reading, call them Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, so as to distinguish them for identification.

"1. "The National Secular Society has been formed to maintain the principles and rights of Freethought, and to direct their application to the secular improvement of this life. By the principle of Freethought is meant the exercise of the understanding upon relevant facts independently of penal or priestly intimidation."

Now what we mean by that is, that there are constantly recurring instances of penal and priestly intimidation, instances in which we think that the exercise of the understanding ought not to be made amenable in the way it is. For example, Richard Vesey came before one of our Metropolitan Coroners to give evidence on an inquiry held on the death of his wife, and happened to say that he did not know anything about god or immortality; he was insulted by the coroner, although he claimed the right to affirm, and although in this case he happened to have the legal right to affirm—for a person with no religious belief now clearly has that right; the coroner probably was so used to insulting Secularists who came before him as jurymen, that he confused the claim of witness-affirmation because he knew jurymen could not exercise that right. We have similar cases as to jurymen happening every day. It is only a week or two ago that one of our Norwich members (Mr. R. A. Cooper) found himself in the same position. I need not give you a long record of these cases, but that is one illustration of what we mean by penal and priestly intimidation. There was a case only the other day in which Mr. Richard Roe was refused by the Recorder of York to be allowed to affirm. At Edmonton two freethought witnesses were in-

sulted by Mr. Alderman Abbiss, on the ground that nothing could bind them, and yet the right of an Atheist witness to affirm under the Evidence Amendments Acts of 1869 and 1870 is clear and indisputable, and has been so held by the Court of Queen's Bench, in a case, in 1875, of a man named Lennard, who said he was an Atheist and sought to affirm but was refused. The National Secular Society fought the case for this poor man, and a mandamus was issued, directing the magistrate to receive the Atheist's evidence. This principle of the National Secular Society urges full scope to the judgment, and claims that it shall be unwarped by penal and priestly intimidation. We hear this week of the case of a poor man who has been called as a witness at Cardiff, who happens to be a Secularist, and who, having claimed the right to affirm, at the present moment is in hourly expectation of being discharged from his occupation under a great company because of his Secularism. We say in this No. 1 principle that we ought to be free from the possibility of penalty for the expression of our views. As Dr. McCann is well aware —Dr. McCann is thoroughly well informed on all these points—by 9 and 10 William III., cap. 32, and by the common law on the matter, I am prosecutable for even the position I am taking and shall take in this debate; and although it is perfectly true that no prosecution for that offence has taken place in England since that of Thomas Pooley, at Bodmin, it has been held to be law by the Court of Exchequer in the case of Cowan *v.* Milburn, where Baron Bramwell held that it might vitiate contracts. We have a case at Bakewell, in Derbyshire, of a man who has been sought to be dismissed from his position as workhouse master simply because it is alleged he held Secularistic views. We have still more of these penal intimidations. I might refer you to the case of the lady beside me, who was deprived of her daughter in consequence of her opinions on religion. At the present moment there is a notice on the Order Book of the House of Commons for the purpose of preventing Dr. E. B. Aveling, for the purpose of preventing Mrs. Besant, for the purpose of preventing my daughters from teaching, as they are entitled to teach, in this Hall—nay, for the purpose of preventing the building itself from being utilised for educational purposes. ("Shame!") I

should have thought that those who cannot agree with us in religious matters would have been glad to see us endeavoring to educate ourselves. I am sure Dr. McCann won't concur in any such intimidation. But our Secularism exists as a militant society for the purpose of relieving Freethinkers from these pains and penalties. Dr. E. B. Aveling has been deprived of his lectureship on Comparative Anatomy at London Hospital because he has publicly identified himself with us. I won't weary you with any further instances, otherwise I might refer to my own case, in which I am kept from my seat in Parliament, and it is actually sought at the present moment, by the aid of a common informer, to ruin me in order to prove that the Secularism which I teach is wrongful and immoral, and some are at present trying to make me bankrupt for penalties for not taking an oath which they compelled me not to take. Now the second proposition I shall read—still from the National Secular Society's principles—is that—

"2. By the rights of Freethought are meant the liberty of free criticism for the security of truth, and the liberty of free publicity for the extension of truth."

On this I put it that there are only two logical positions, one that of absolute submission to authority, or the assertion of the right and duty of private judgment, whatever may be the result of that judgment. In theology the logical extremes are on the one side the Roman Catholic Church, and on the other Atheism. (Cheers.) Now the third proposition is that

"3. Secularism relates to the present existence of man and to actions the issue of which can be tested by experience."

It declares that

"The promotion of human improvements and happiness is the highest duty, and that morality is to be tested by utility."

In this Secularism is guided by, and must be guided by, Anthropology. To know man, it is necessary to learn not only what you are, what the men with whom you come in contact are, but to learn in what they differ; to learn in what, if anything, those differences have been softened down or have been encouraged, or have been productive of benefit or the reverse; to learn what has

been man's history—that is, what have been the histories of the various types and races of mankind—that, so becoming aware of the result of type in consciousness, of type in will, we may see what determines the happiness or misery of man's existence in the place in which he is living. From these researches Secularism learns what events have tended to human improvement and what have not. It examines and compares the various languages and the various religions of the world. And here let me say that I do not accept the definition of language hurriedly given by my friend, and I shall have something more to say about that in its place. Secularism also says:

"4. That, in order to promote effectually the improvement and happiness of mankind, every individual of the human family ought to be well placed and well instructed, and that all who are of a suitable age ought to be usefully employed for their own and the general good."

Secularists cannot help noticing that, until lately, an enormous mass of the people of the world were left almost absolutely without education. Secularism cannot help noticing how the bulk of those who urge that we are immoral and wicked are all the while spending thousands of millions of pounds on killing one another, and until lately were spending, comparatively, only a few pounds on education. Secularism cannot help noticing, whether it be right or wrong, that, while efforts on behalf of infant education, and co-operative effort so far as this nation is concerned, have been limited to the present century in their establishment, they have been associated with men who, on account of their speculative heresies, have been denounced for their immorality. And, finally, the Secularist affirms:

"5. That human improvement and happiness cannot be effectually promoted without civil and religious liberty, and that, therefore, it is the duty of every individual to actively attack all barriers to equal freedom of thought and utterance upon all political, theological and social subjects. The Secularist is one who deduces his moral duties from considerations which pertain to this life, and who, practically recognising the above duties, devotes himself to the promotion of the general good. The object of the National Secular Society is to disseminate the above principles by every legitimate means in its power."

The Secularist, as such, is, politically, neither Imperialist,

Monarchist, nor Republican. I happen to be a Republican, but Secularists claim the right to discuss and examine every form of Government. Theologically, the Secularist claims the same freedom for discussing all creeds, so that if political power should happen to fall into the hands of a Secularist, he would not impose any disability on any sect or creed. (Cheers.) What is true of these political and theological topics is true also of social topics. I happen to be a Republican, but there is nothing in the principles of the society requiring the recognition of Republicanism. There is nothing in the declarations obliging the Secularist to prefer one form of Government to another, unless he happens in his convictions to be of the opinion that a Republican Government tends to the general good and happiness. I happen to be an Atheist, and believe that the free and normal exercise of the understanding on so-called religious problems must tend to Atheism. There are many Secularists who disagree with me. There is no Atheistic pledge in the principles of this Society. If you tell me that every scientific pledge, in result, is an Atheistic pledge, I should be ready to admit it, because I think so. In political economy I happen to be opposed to Socialism, but there is no word in the principles of the Society making any declaration on this head either in its favor or against it. Now I shall, as far as possible, follow the lead which was set me in the opening speech, and although I can travel pretty quickly I shall have to gallop if I catch up my friend. I do not complain of that, because we are not only talking to the crowd assembled in this room (which, I believe, will be a good and well-behaved one), but we are also talking to the people who will read this debate after its conclusion. The first proposition put is that Secularism is Atheism. I happen to think that the consequence of Secularism is Atheism, and I have always said so. Clearly all Secularists are not Atheists. Clearly many people who believe themselves to be sincere Theists can sign the declarations and principles which I have read to you without doing any violation to their honest declaration, but so far as I am concerned personally, and probably many will agree with me, I contend that the result of Secularism is Atheism, and I have no wish to avoid it in this debate. Only do not put it on all. Do not put it on the Society. There are many Atheists in the

Society, and some who are not. I try to make more every day (cheers), and I have some satisfaction in believing that my efforts are not entirely unsuccessful. The second proposition is, that Secularism is Necessitarianism. Well, suppose that be so. I do not know whether our friend means that all Necessitarianism is immoral. I think he does. Then Jonathan Edwards was immoral. I am not saying he was. I am only drawing the conclusion from Dr. McCann's proposition. There have been people Necessitarians who were not Secularists. I think they were sensible people, because I hold the doctrine of Necessitarianism must to all, who really think on the matter, be the ultimate conclusion. I do not mean by that there are not many who honestly and thoughtfully hold the opposite view. I do not mean to imply any sort of contempt for their view. On all those questions, on which the world learns more and more every day, there is a continual fluctuation in opinion as the tide goes backwards and forwards, but still, in reality, ever onwards. Every day there must be some who hold to an opinion which others more accurately discard. The only difference between myself and the Rev. Dr. McCann will be that what he means by Necessitarianism I do not mean. With that exception we are quite at one let me say. I possibly may save some trouble to the Doctor by at once conceding that I draw no distinction between what he calls mental acts and physical acts. I know no mental act that is not a physical act, but I do not, therefore, say that the physical act of a cabbage is the same as that which is now manifesting itself in my speech, any more than I say that a stone of a quarter of a pound weight which is rolled by the sea is exactly the same weight and size as the glacier slowly moving upon the top of Mont Blanc. Things are different, and when different they are not the same. (Cheers.) That is the distinction which was omitted to be drawn in the excellently able speech (one which was carefully prepared) which has just been delivered to us. Now Dr. McCann says that Necessitarianism denies that we can in any degree originate our own actions. No! It does not say "in any degree." So little does it teach you that, that we are now in another part of this building in some small degree trying to help originate the actions of next year. What we do say is this, that a man who is too fat to

get through a small hole cannot get through it, but we do not say that if he undergoes the process of Banting he cannot do so. That is, that what happens must accord with the precedent conditions. Man is one of the precedent conditions and is certainly not passive in originating and determining resultant action. We make only the difference of degree in the case of many animals, we do not locate man alone. I am pleased that considerable attention has been paid by my very talented antagonist to what I have written and said at different times. I am pleased that he thought it worth reading, and I hope others will imitate him, but I must ask him not to take for granted that a few words taken by themselves out of a debate will fairly represent the opinion I was maintaining. I am not at all complaining of the accuracy of any quotations. I am not complaining that it was unfair towards me to quote any words I may have used. I am not seeking to dissociate myself from the distinct obligation which rests on me either to maintain what I have said, or to abandon what I have said on some other occasion. I am only pointing out to you that a skilled speaker might easily take some phrase from a sermon and build a very strong argument upon it, while totally misrepresenting the sermon. I will show you one as an illustration which was quoted from the Cooper debate. "Man cannot resist the circumstances which result in volition." With a less acute person than my able antagonist I should have thought he must have misunderstood it. I know it was not intentional, but I will show you that he has misapprehended it or misappreciated it, and that he has given you an incorrect view, because he says we fancy we had resisted, and sometimes resisted so that we overcame, the temptation. Ah, then, you do not resist the volition. It is some other volition that results. You have not overcome the volition. You have not got the volition, and what is it happens if we resist? Let us take a case. The drunken man has been used to-night over and over again, and I will take that drunken man. Take the case of a man born of fairly healthy parents, and the case of a man unfortunately coming into the world with the blood poison of drink in his veins. Any medical man will tell you that science now verifies thousands of such instances, and I am sorry to say in this land. Blood poison from drink is transmitted through

more than one generation. Take the case of one so tainted from birth, who has around him associations of crime and of filth, of misery and of degradation, and take the other who has healthy organisation to start with, and who has some better knowledge of what is bright in the world than the one I have put to you, surrounded by all that is dark, and with the inherited blackness inside, and I ask you to try the resistance of those men. In some degree it is admitted the action is governed. In what degree? By the degree of the poisoned organisation given to the child at its birth; by the degree of crime that went on for generations before it was born; by the degree of the filthy atmosphere in which it breathes; by the degree of disease and wretchedness which surrounds it up to the moment of volition. By these degrees is it necessitated? The Secularist says prayer does not clear the drain. We show men how, and we give to their brains the tonic of our knowledge. Some take it better than others, some worse than others, but to all it is a new spring, a new ingredient. Men are not helplessly driven to and fro in the sense of being merely passive victims. Each one is an active drop in the waves which make up the ocean of human life, not only making up the wave but making part of its activity, acting on as well as acted on, resisting and inspiring, not dashed "helplessly" but helping to dash. Our friend (and it is a pleasure to be opposed to a gentleman able to make points good-humoredly as our friend does), our friend raised a laugh, in which I was pleased to share, about the intelligence of the cabbage-stalk, and perhaps he will talk of the admission I am now going to make. Between the cabbage and the man I know no break. Between the highest of which I know and the lowest of which I know in the scale of life I know no break. I do not mean to say any difference, but any break. I trace step by step down the ladder until I come where it is impossible for me, for want of technical knowledge, to distinguish between animal and vegetable life. Not only impossible for me, but impossible for the most skilled specialist we have. But there is a large difference between the rose and the cabbage. Yes; as there is a large difference between the Englishman and the Negro; between the Andaman and the Caucasian; and you have no right to talk

of man as though man meant the same everywhere. You have no right to put it as though they were all on one level, on one plain. There are marked degrees of differing ability, and that which is possible in volition for the Negro on given conditions, and that which is possible in volition for me on like conditions, are possibilities which are not the same, are possibilities which differ largely from each other. I have not yet time to deal with the freedom of the will.

The CHAIRMAN here intimated that the time had expired, and Mr. Bradlaugh sat down amidst cheering.

DR. MCCANN: You have had, as you always do have from Mr. Bradlaugh, a very pointed, telling and eloquent speech, but one that has not much to do with the subject for debate. He has referred me to the principles of the National Secular Society for a definition of Secularism. But surely my friend does not fall into the error of supposing that Secularism is co-extensive with the cause of Secularists; that those laws comprehend and involve the whole subject of Secularism. It must be admitted that Secularism is something far wider and far more extensive than the laws of a society existing in this country called the National Secular Society. He has no right to take the laws instituted by the members of that society for their own guidance, and call them Secularism; as well might he call the laws of the Royal Astronomical Society astronomy. Those rules which Mr. Bradlaugh has reproduced are not at all a definition of Secularism. Many of those professed objects of Secularism are in common with other isms. But I want a definition of Secularism which will separate it from all other isms. Towards achieving many of those objects I would work with heart and soul in conjunction with Mr. Bradlaugh. He has alluded to the existence of priestly intimidations at the present time. He, however, only referred to the case of coroner's inquests and has given us no illustrations of priestly intimidations. I perfectly agree with him that the oath ought to be abolished, and with him I hope the time will come when the oath will be abolished both in the courts and in Parliament. But I must have a definition of Secularism which shall differentiate it from any other ism—between that ism and my ism. Mr. Bradlaugh wants civil and religious liberty; I equally hope that

civil and religious liberty will go on widening and increasing, and becoming more powerful the longer we live. Though we disagree in some things we agree in others, and he must not call these things Secularism which, rightly and peculiarly attach also to Christianism. He also stated that Secularism, supposing it came into power to-morrow—which I do not think it will—would not impose any disabilities on any creed or claim. I hope to show you on the next evening, the qualities inherent in Secularism; to show you, for example, that it teaches persecution. My friend has told you that he does not advocate Socialism. For this there was no necessity, for I did not introduce Socialism, either directly or indirectly. As regards the Negroes and their beliefs, we will confine our attention to ourselves and leave the Negroes to look after themselves and their own beliefs. (Hisses.) There are certain matters in our belief which are in common with all human beliefs —the same fundamental conceptions—and there is the same consciousness in the Negro as in the European. He has told you that there are many Secularists who are not Atheists, but this, according to his own statement, is because they have not sufficient brains. He acknowledges that Atheism is the logical consequence of Secularism, therefore all those who are logical Secularists are Atheists, and those who are not Atheists are illogical Secularists. He states that I said that Secularists as Necessitarians are immoral. "If so," he rejoins, "Jonathan Edwards was immoral, for he was a Necessitarian." I accuse no man of immorality. I am here to attack Secularism and not Secularists. I say that Secularism teaches Necessitarianism though a Secularist may be better than his creed. There are doubtless many of them as honest and as upright as their neighbors. I am here to cast no slur upon any human being. I am talking of systems, creeds, and beliefs, and not of the persons who hold those beliefs. Mr. Bradlaugh agrees with me that Secularism is Necessitarianism though, as I understand, he differs from me in my definition of Necessitarianism; but this is an important admission. I am accused of taking certain quotations from Mr. Bradlaugh's previous debates which do not adequately represent his line of teaching. I have not done anything so foolish as to attempt to misquote him, he being too

familiar with his writings to render such an act anything but futile. With regard to the influence of Necessitarianism on our actions, I acknowledge that man is in some degree necessitated, but is also in some degree free. He can so far determine his own actions, and exercise a certain self-control. I acknowledge that man is in some degree necessitated by the circumstances of his birth, his surroundings, and his education. We cannot, for instance, expect the same high tone from one born in vice, surrounded by vice, and inheriting a vicious temperament, as we have a right to expect from anyone situated as I am myself. But whatever may have been the circumstances of man's life, there is still some degree of freedom left, and he can resist up to that degree. In the same degree as he is necessitated is he guiltless. The drunkard may have a very corrupt nature, and very strong temptations, but still he has some power to resist. That there would be more strength, more holiness, more grandeur, in the world if the poor drunkard were cultured by education and training, we acknowledge; but what I do contend is that though possessed of a corrupt nature, there is still left in a man some will to resist. None say that any person is absolutely unbiassed by circumstances, but only that under all circumstances a certain amount of freedom remains. My friend overturns his reasoning by saying that between the cabbage and the man he knows no break; that we are only higher in degree than a cabbage, and not in kind. Now the cabbage cannot determine in the smallest degree its own culture, its own nature, its own growth. The cabbage is irresponsible either for its largeness or its smallness, its beauty or reverse. Consequently, if Mr. Bradlaugh be correct, man has no power of determining his own life; so that, according to him, a cabbage and a man stand on the same level so far as freedom of volition is concerned. Mr. Watts, affirming that freedom is denied both to man and to plants, writes: "Man is as much the consequence of all the causes and circumstances which have affected him in his development previous to and since his birth as any one tree or mountain." Thus it is stated clearly that there is no power in man to resist. The whole theory of Necessitarianism is this: We cannot resist the circumstances that result in volition. They produce our motives, our motives produce our volition, and volitions produce our actions. Will Mr. Bradlaugh explain

where, according to his principle, the freedom between the antecedent and the consequent comes in? Necessitarianism says that you do whatever you are doing because you cannot help it; you live in a certain manner because you have no alternative, no power to overcome circumstances. That man has no more merit than a cabbage is acknowledged by one whose name I do not care to give, as he is dead; but I will shew it to Mr. Bradlaugh afterwards. (Cries of "Name.")

Mr. BRADLAUGH: I am sure that I do not wish anything to be kept secret.

Dr. MCCANN: It was Mr. Austin Holyoake. (Cheers.) He said, when chairman once for Mr. Bradlaugh: "He did not consider any thanks were due to him for what he might have done in a public way during the last twenty years, as he could not help the impulses of his nature; they were beyond his control; but he trusted that what he might do in the future would merit the approbation of his fellow-men." Mr. Bradlaugh will require to point out where is the freedom of will between our antecedent impulses and our subsequent actions.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: If the Rev. Dr. McCann thought that I should travel out of the line by reading to you the principles of the National Secular Society, it was his duty to tell me that when he invited me to debate, and when I told him that those were the principles I should defend. If he wished to debate Atheism, he would not have found me reluctant. I am an Atheist, and I am not ashamed of my Atheism; but my duty here is to defend Secularism. My duty is not only to state my own views as clear as I can, but fairly to represent to you, as far as possible, the general consensus of opinion amongst Secularists. Now, Dr. McCann asks me for a definition which will separate Secularism from all other isms. I can separate it from some isms. It is unnecessary to-night that I should separate it from all. I separate it from Christianism by saying that it holds the opinion that the beliefs of Christians are not absolutely or at all necessary to morality. That is a definition which, I hope, will separate it, and if the definition is required to be explained I will endeavor to explain it; but I will not depart from what he has mapped out for debate unless he wishes it. Then the Rev. Dr. McCann said that we are conscious; and while he said he would leave the Negroes to look after

themselves, he also stated that the consciousness of man was alike in the Negro and the European. I demur to the statement that the consciousness of the Negro is the consciousness of the European; and I am ready to prove that there is no such identity, supposing that that is a point which my antagonist thinks ought to be examined in this debate. Then he says he does not talk about men, but the doctrines; but he objects to my giving you the doctrine. He won't defend the doctrine, and he won't talk about the men. Then he says, if I understood him correctly, that man has a certain degree of freedom of volition. I affirm that man has volitions, and I affirm that each volition of each individual is different from every other volition of that man; and if our friend will select two cases that he would like explained, I will endeavor, so far as I am able, to give the best explanation that occurs to me. The Rev. Dr. McCann has told us that the man born with a low nature is guiltless. I agree in that—that is, guiltless towards whatever gave him that low nature. (Cheers.) If he means anything different from this, I want to know what the word "guiltless" means. Let me say we have had the word sin used several times. Do you mean sin in the shape of disobedience to some regulation of society to which the individual belongs? If you mean more than that, what does it mean? It is of no use using language as sound-coin for concealment of ideas. It will be of still less use our each using language which has a different meaning in our different mouths. I am sure our friend would not use language to conceal ideas; but I am afraid that we are both using words attaching to them different meanings, and therefore we cannot arrive at any good result. Then he said the cabbage and man differ in kind. He did not explain what he meant by "in kind." Did he mean that we are not to judge the one as we should judge the other; that we should not judge them as being both phænomena of the same universe? If he did not mean that what did he mean? Of course when you take different things, each presenting different characteristics, we must, upon those different characteristics, form our judgment. Difference in kind between a cabbage and a man sounds as though it had some semblance of truth about it, but when you go step by step until you reach the lowest recognised form of animal life; then take the lowest

form of recognised vegetable life; then trace from these, when you find animal life without power of locomotion, and vegetable life with it, then you begin to wonder what "difference in kind" means. Our friend was perfectly correct when he distinguished the cabbage from man in degree; that the cabbage has not the power of determining in the smallest degree—I do not dispute it. Then we had some talk about freedom, and he said that freedom—(I am going back to the first speech)—in the language of Necessitarianism, means freedom from physical restraint. First, we know of no restraint which is not physical. Every thought, every phase of the mind, is impossible except as a phase of the activity of the physical organisation with which it is associated. I deny that you can separate from the thinker the thought; from the willer, the will; and when the word "consciousness" is used, it expresses, not an entity, but a phase, which varies daily and hourly—a phase which fluctuates with each new perception, with each new reflection upon that perception. The consciousness of a man to-day is not the consciousness of that man yesterday. Take the case of a child; before it has reached the age of twenty years, new motives created with new thoughts—new motives created with new education—new circumstances growing with new knowledge—influence it, and that man to-day is as different as can be from what the child was twenty years before. So that you may have the individual of six years old and the individual of twenty years old willing in an absolutely contradictory fashion, under what were apparently the same conditions, from which the will previously resulted, because the individual of twenty-six years old is a different individual, with different thinking ability. He is different in capacity and will-power altogether. Then our friend was good enough to say Necessitarianism must be Fatalism. It is true he was frank enough to read my denial of this and my explanation of my denial. There is one case in which Necessitarianism must be Fatalism. Supposing a man happen to believe in an omnipotent ruler of the universe that decreed everything, the Necessitarianism would be Fatalism, because what would be happening would be happening according to a certain decree which could not be avoided; but Necessitarianism is not Fatalism when it teaches that although under given con-

ditions disease is necessitated, that the conditions may be changed, the disease may be avoided, and the knowledge of what will result from certain conditions, is in itself a motive pushing the individual to endeavor to create new conditions. Then he says: "Oh, you cannot alter the conditions of your present life." That is not true. They are altered day by day. The main drainage system, for example, is an alteration. Well, then he says how would you deal with the thief? You would have us say you are the victim of your antecedents. But this is exactly what you do say; and, if your thief be young enough to mould, you try with new conditions to efface the antecedents, and you seek to cure him of, rather than punish him for, his crime. What is the whole of your reformatory legislation for, if not for this? Well, then he says why did I go to a maniac for an illustration of inaccurate consciousness? You always go to abnormal conditions if you want to give illustrations which shall be striking. If you only go to ordinary conditions it is often impossible to distinguish sufficiently accurately. But he says the maniac's consciousness is all right; only his interpretation is wrong. How do you distinguish between the consciousness you have, and the interpretation of that consciousness? I deny that it is impossible to make any such distinguishment. There may be inaccurate expressions of thought, either intentional or unintentional, arising partially through the inability to explain yourselves to others, or it may arise from their inability to understand you; but there is no such distinguishment between consciousness and interpretation of it to yourself, as our friend puts it; but he says: "I know I am free;" so does the maniac know he is Emperor of China. Do you know you are free? "Yes; each one knows that each is in some degree free—in some degree the author of his own actions." In some degree? Only one leg tied. In some degree? In what degree? Free must be free. Limited freedom cannot be introduced like limited liability. Our friend says, in illustration of his freedom: I can sin if I will. What do you mean by "sin" in this phrase? and what do you mean by "will"? (Loud cheers.)

The Rev. Dr. McCann:—Mr. Bradlaugh, in a large portion of his address, had it not been for the great dissimilarity of his voice, would have led me to imagine that it was myself

speaking, for he was so thoroughly in many points echoing my own sentiments. (Laughter.) Mr. Bradlaugh affirms that man has volition. That is not denied by anyone. But the question is, has he freedom of volition? It is not a question of whether a man has a will, but can man will his own actions in any degree? Does freedom of will originate man's actions? I affirm that man has freedom of volition, which is a totally different matter from volition as understood by Mr. Bradlaugh, and I require Mr. Bradlaugh to show me where the break occurs between the antecedent that produces the circumstances resulting in volition and the consequents in action that follow it; for there the freedom is introduced. He represents me as saying that a man with a low nature is guiltless, what I said was that he is guiltless in so far as he is constrained, but no further. All mankind have volition; but Mr. Bradlaugh says that they have not freedom of volition; that they are as the cabbage, which differs not in kind from man. He has, he says, gone step by step from the lowest organisation to the highest—that is to man—and he can find no break in the order; and therefore he wants to know what I mean by "differing in kind" from the cabbage. I reply, that if man has something of which we can find nothing similar in kind in the cabbage—no trace, for example, of its being free—then, so far, man differs in kind from the cabbage. In other words, man has freedom of selection, while the cabbage has none whatever in even the smallest possible degree. This is difference in kind; man can choose between two courses presented to him, while the cabbage cannot. You must begin somewhere; start where you like—start at Adam if you like and go through the whole universe, and the same thing will be abundantly confirmed. Then Mr. Bradlaugh says, "Freedom is freedom from physical restraint." He knows no restraint that is not physical. Well, that is exactly what I tell you is Secular freedom; not freedom of mind, not freedom of self-determination; not freedom of self-control—only freedom where no external restraint exists to compel us in one direction rather than in another. This is not mental restraint, but physical restraint, and therefore its absence is not freedom in the true sense of the term. Then he said an extraordinary and unphilosophical thing—that consciousness varies daily and hourly, and is not the same in any two human beings. I must say that this is the most

startling statement I have ever heard. Why consciousness is the one thing that never varies. You never find a man conscious that he did not exist. How does Mr. Bradlaugh know that he exists? It is only as consciousness tells him. If consciousness lies in one case it might lie in all. I can only know that I am speaking to you by my consciousness. If consciousness be untrustworthy, I am not sure even of this, and therefore all reasoning is useless, and all debate waste of time. We cannot have knowledge of that which does not exist. He is opposed to the best Psychologists who affirm that to deny the veracity of consciousness is to commit philosophical suicide. Then he says that I affirm that we cannot alter the conditions of the present day, and he says that we can alter those conditions by education and by culture. That is exactly what I say. In altering the conditions of a man—in educating that man—I alter the conditions of his life. Take a child, educate it, and it may give it a better character. This is what the libertarians affirm. But the necessitarians say that we cannot alter those conditions voluntarily.

Mr. Bradlaugh tells us why he goes to a maniac for his illustrations — because the abnormal conditions are more striking. That is, he goes to an insane man to illustrate the condition of a sane one; to explain the mental state of healthy mind by the conditions of a lunatic! You go to a mad man to see what a mad man is; to a sane man to see what a sane man is. He affirms that if the interpretation of consciousness be wrong, consciousness itself must be wrong, because consciousness is simply knowledge of a fact. Consciousness gives the knowledge of personal existence. I am conscious that I exist, but I cannot be conscious that I exist as a soldier, tailor, or merchant. Consciousness is knowledge. You cannot know that which does not exist. I know that I am free; I do not infer it. It is knowledge of fact. If consciousness is not true how can you know that.

Mr. Bradlaugh objects to my statement that we are free in some degree. He says, "What do you mean by limited freedom? If we are free we are free." Well, of course we are. We are free in so far as we are not constrained—constrained, that is, up to a certain point, but beyond that point we are free. I am so far constrained in my mode of

life by my surroundings, but that constraint is limited. I have motives and a will. Reason as we may upon this, the ultimate appeal must be to consciousness, and I now appeal to the consciousness of everyone here that if you raise your arm is it you that do so and not your physical antecedents? There is freedom in the physical as well as freedom in the mental acts. But Mr. Bradlaugh will tell you that there is no freedom in either. Every act differs in kind. I am free to select; the lower orders are not free to select —the cabbage for instance; the unconscious world are not free to select, the conscious are.

Mr. Bradlaugh has assented to my first proposition, that Secularism is Atheism; also to my second proposition, that it is Necessitarianism. Therefore, if you are consistent Secularists you must be Necessitarians. He only differs from me in the third proposition so far as to say that consciousness is not reliable; that it varies from day to day; but I hold the philosophical principle that the veracity of consciousness is the basis of philosophy, and therefore in denying this Secularism is unphilosophical.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: If repeating over and over again what I do not say as though I had said it (I do not mean to say there is any wilful misrepresentation, I am sure it is unintentional), will make me say it, then, undoubtedly, our friend is making great progress. There were one or two questions I put to him which he omitted to answer—what he meant by sin? and what he meant by will? It is not true that I affirm one volition for man. I affirm volitions. With me the word volition expresses a state of mind, a mental phase, which is also a physical phase, because every mental phase is a physical phase; nor is it true that I speak of our consciousness as if each had the same consciousness. With me the word consciousness expresses a varying phase of the mind day by day, the measure of each man's knowledge, of his immediate perceptions, of his remembered perceptions, of his reflections upon his remembered perceptions, of his comparison of his perceptions together, of his comparison of his memory of perceptions with others of these, or with his immediate perceptions and of his conceptions founded on such perceptions. These make up his consciousness, an ever varying quantity. Dr. McCann says that the leading Psychologists disagree with me. I am sorry,

for if that be true I am afraid I have not read them, then, with sufficient attention. Some few Psychologists I have read agree with me, and if it is to become a question of what is the evidence of Psychologists, I shall, if required, be ready to put a dozen in the box—as to this I shall be glad to know; but I think it will be better for us, in any case, to agree what we mean here by the words we use. Dr. McCann took an illustration which seems to me to show that he does not yet apprehend what the point between us is. He says that man has the power of selection and the cabbage has none. Let us see. The cabbage is planted; between the seed and the sair is a stone. It grows by degrees, it reaches the stone—but because of it cannot reach the air. It goes round the stone to the air, because it has some capacity of selecting a route; it does not go in a direct line because its capacity is limited by the stone, and if a man were under a two ton stone his capacity would be also limited. Well, then, we are told that consciousness is simply knowledge; but consciousness, we are also told, never varies. Do you mean to put the proposition, that the knowledge of individuals never varies? I do not think that Dr. McCann would say that. But if the knowledge does vary, and consciousness is knowledge—consciousness must vary. (Cheers.) He says that, according to me, consciousness tells lies. I have never said anything of the kind. I do not regard consciousness as being a separate entity able to tell me anything, but I do say that my consciousness may be, and often is, an inaccurate estimate of phænomena. Go to a shooting range and if you are not used to measuring distances you might think that the distance is 400 yards, it would be so according to your consciousness; but a man with a more accurate ability of judging distances from his consciousness, will tell you that it is 300 yards. There is no subject which you can put to yourselves as to which a better trained consciousness cannot give you a better result. Then, so little is it true that the distinction is quite accurate as to the limited capacity of selection, that while we found the cabbage coming through the ground to the light and finding a stone in its way, was turned, warped and twisted, we find not unlike limitations of capacity for selection in man himself. We find, for example, that if a bullet found its way into a man, that then the

growing tissue has only a limited capacity of selection, and is warped and distorted. I need not refer to the case of President Garfield, but go to any hospital and you will find the same thing. Things like cabbages and men are different, and things which differ cannot be the same, but allowing for these differences you get evidence that all results have to be similarly related to the conditions by which they are determined. Nor is it true that every human being is always conscious. He may be made temporarily as unconscious as a cabbage, a poker on his skull may do it. A hundred illustrations might be given of unconsciousness producible by drugs, but I will not weary you with them. I will, however, go a little further and take the illustration which has been given. A man says I will not be useful to my fellow-men, and another says, I will do all the good I can. It is not true that the desire to do good or ill is free in man, or that even with the desire it may have free outcome in volition. There are many who desire to do good but cannot, owing to the circumstances by which they are surrounded; look at a man who is crushed by disease—look at a man who has not inherited physical strength sufficient, who has not the brain quality or ability to think accurately. These men are all limited. But Dr. McCann says, "I am constrained so far but no farther." Tell me how far? and when you speak again in your opening speech tell me how far you are constrained by your inherited qualities, and tell me how for you are constrained by the circumstances which surround you now, and by those changing circumstances which have surrounded you since birth; tell me how far the average man in a city like that in which we are speaking is constrained, and how far he is free. Then our friend is good enough to put it as though I have at some time or other used words which imply less respect for the thinking abilities of other people than I ought to have employed. Well it is perfectly true that I do use strong words. If repeating these makes the case any stronger against me, I will not complain. But otherwise it can serve no useful purpose in this debate. I am content to argue the question out fairly and reasonably. If anyone were to pick up stray words which seem to imply that the speaker used at one time harsher words

from those he had used at another, then I say that such a discussion can do no good. I have had so many debates that I would prefer that the discussion should be useful to others, if not to ourselves. That the discussion of the freedom of the will may be in some degree useful, I will promise that on the next occasion I will submit to you what at least some of the best Psychologists have to say on the subject. I do not mean that I limit my views to the best Psychologists, but I go to those men who have devoted themselves to the study of a special class of phænomena, and have formed their opinions upon what is put before them. We are approaching the end of this evening's debate. Up to the present there has not been one word that either of us need wish unsaid. I occupy to-night rather an usual position for me—the defensive. My friend has a right to attack me on any point he will, and he exercises that right with no unfairness. Let me say that it is many years since Dr. McCann and I met in debate. Let us try as far as possible to speak not only to those who are present, but equally to those who will read the debate. Let us convey to them the impression that we are struggling for the truth, and striving to wrestle truth out of the diverse propositions advanced. We shall have great success if we can add but ever so little to human thought. Truth keeps increasing day by day, and there is more possibility of judging what is truth in the world at the present time than there was ten thousand years ago. Let us in this discussion, at least, endeavor to aid men in the search for truth (cheers). I accepted the invitation which the Rev. Dr. McCann gave me to meet him in this discussion, because I knew him to be a gentleman of ability and high repute, and because it would give me an opportunity of saying something about Secularism which I might not otherwise have had the like opportunity of saying. What I have to say I shall endeavor to make as clear as possible, and its value I must leave for your deliberation and judgment. (Cheers.)

Dr. McCann proposed and Mr. Bradlaugh seconded a vote of thanks to the Chairman, which was unanimously passed and briefly acknowledged.

SECOND NIGHT.—MRS. BESANT in the Chair.

MRS. BESANT, in opening the proceedings, expressed a hope that the audience would make her work as easy as they had made it for the chairman on the previous occasion. The subject for that night's discussion was, of course, a continuation of that of last week, Dr. McCann maintaining that Secularism was Unphilosophical, Immoral and Anti-social, Mr. Bradlaugh standing on the defensive throughout. She would especially ask them not to interrupt either of the speakers with expressions of dissent. Each disputant had the right and the duty of doing the very best he could for his own side; and, while it was always fair to cheer as much as they liked, it was not fair, and they had no right, to hiss or groan at anything which might be said on either side to which they objected. That was the one thing they wished to avoid. (Applause.)

The Rev. Dr. MCCANN, in rising to reopen the debate, was greeted with cheers. He said: I resume the debate this evening by acceding to the request made by Mr. Bradlaugh in his last speech last evening, that I would define will and sin. Will I define as the power of self-determination, and volition as an act of the will directing our present activity. Sin was only casually introduced into my first speech, as it formed part of a quotation from Mr. Bradlaugh. It is not at all necessary in the present discussion, and therefore I am content to mean by it whatever Mr. Bradlaugh meant when he used the word.

I now proceed to reply to what my friend has advanced in opposition to my views, or rather to show how slightly he has opposed me and how completely he has corroborated and illustrated my position, especially in his concluding speech last night. To do this, however, at all satisfactorily, I must go slightly back on what he stated earlier in the evening. He then said: "The only difference between myself and Dr. McCann will be that what he means by Necessitarianism I do not mean." I now show that this difference does not exist, and must be pardoned if I dwell a few minutes on this subject, as it is of the utmost importance. The only alleged difference is thus stated: "Dr. McCann says that Necessitarianism denies that we can in any degree originate

our own actions. No! It does not say 'in any degree.'" According to my friend, therefore, Necessitarianism acknowledges that we can in some degree originate or self-determine our own actions. But Necessitarianism cannot admit that which is not necessitated. Necessitarianism cannot be Libertarianism. If there be any degree of the latter the former must be absent; to adopt Mr. Bradlaugh's own expressive and uncontrovertible words, "Things are different, and when different they are not the same." (Laughter.) Now, I believe there is no man in England who can better distinguish things that differ than our friend, and I believe there is not a lawyer in England who has opposed him who would not say the same with a sigh for his client—(laughter and applause)—and a chuckle for himself as he pocketed his fees. I was, consequently, somewhat surprised at Mr. Bradlaugh's confusion on this point, but that confusion soon passed away, and he remained clear to the last—on my side. (Laughter.) I have read most carefully all he said, for I consider it due to my subject, my audience and my opponent to be as accurate and careful in the matter as I can, and I do not find one single illustration that does not confirm my statement that Necessitarianism denies all self-origination of action, the almost last illustration being the weightiest of all, where he places a brother man under a stone weighing two tons. I am charged with misapprehending his assertion that "Man cannot resist the circumstances which result in volition." The misapprehension is on my friend's part, who, apparently, and considering the rapidity with which I spoke, most excusably, supposed me to say that we resisted the volition. I, however, never said anything so absurd. I referred solely to the circumstances "that resulted in volition," a resistance which I hold not only to be possible, but to be a fact of almost daily occurrence in many lives. Mr. Bradlaugh has asked me how far we are constrained by our inherited qualities and by the circumstances that surround us. This is a question impossible to answer, because no two men are in nature or circumstances exactly alike. He might as well ask me how much are men educated. Each man must answer the question for himself. We now proceed to the illustrations my friend has brought forward to make clear his view of Necessitarianism. In reply to my remark that man has the power of selection while the

cabbage has not, he replies: "Let us see. The cabbage is planted—it grows, and by degrees it reaches a stone, but it cannot reach the air. It goes round the stone because its capacity is limited, and if a man were under a two-ton stone his capacity would be also limited." I should say it would be altogether extinguished. But let us look at this plant first. Because the plant cannot go through the stone, but goes round it, it is said to have a power of selection, limited, no doubt, but still existent. I say the plant has no capacity whatever of selection, that is of self-determination. Its going round the stone is determined for it, and not by it—that is, it is necessitated. The man under the stone is, however, still more necessitated, for he has no power to move at all, either through the stone or round it, so he is under the necessity of remaining where he is, but most assuredly not willingly, for I fancy if alive he would get away if he could. In both cases the restraint or the freedom are necessitated completely, there being no self-action possible. Another case similar to these is that of those who desire to do good, but, owing to the circumstances by which they are surrounded, such as disease or weakness, are unable. In the hurry of speech Mr. Bradlaugh apparently overlooked the very important distinction between desire and will. The weakest man in the world might say "I desire to do good." We should understand his wish and respect him for it; but if, while unable to leave his bed, he said "I will go forth and do good," we should think him mad and keep a sharp look out on him. Desire and will differ, and "things that differ are not the same." One more illustration of my friend's, and I have done with this portion of my reply. Mr. Bradlaugh said: "Men are not helplessly driven to and fro in the sense of being merely passive victims. Each one is an active drop in the waves which make up the ocean of human life, not only making up the wave, but making part of its activity." Well, but what liberty has the drop in all this? Is it not necessitated to receive whatever impulse may be imparted to it, and to pass that on without diminution or increase? And this is what I have been contending for all along—that Necessitarianism denies all self-determination. Drops in the ocean of life! No! We are not. They are not only utterly helpless in all they do, helpless in all their activities when they

are dashing, as when they are frozen, and they are all alike. We are as drops, are we? There sits one man reading his morning paper—he sees that Dr. Aveling has been dismissed from his lectureship, and he says "What a pity," and in the same breath asks for some more buttered toast. (Laughter.) That is one "drop." Mr. Bradlaugh reads the same, and leaping from his chair exclaims, "The rascals! it is a shame"—(cheers)—and I perfectly agree with him it was a shame. (Loud cheers.) He continues, "I shall expose it throughout the land," and so he scatters letters like fireballs, and comes here to orate in a voice of thunder and with the force of a cataract. (Much laughter.) That is the other "drop," and pardon me if I can't help fancying that there was some self-determination in the last "drop" at any rate. (Renewed laughter.)

Thus, therefore, stands the case so far as Necessitarianism is concerned. I stated my views as to what Necessitarianism is, quoting from John Stuart Mill and Professor Bain in support of them. Apparently I did this correctly, as my friend took exception to only one point, the denial of any liberty except external liberty, but so far from substantiating his objection, every single illustration he has used has altogether corroborated my statement and confirmed my views, so that as far as we have gone this debate might be called—not McCann *versus* Bradlaugh, but McCann *plus* Bradlaugh. (Laughter and applause).

I now come to what has been said by my friend about the veracity of Consciousness, especially in his last speech. Whatever difficulty there may be in placing this in its true light will arise from the very peculiar manner in which certain words have been used, such as "knowledge." Mr. Bradlaugh defines Consciousness to be "the varying phase of the mind from day to day," the measure of man's knowledge from his immediate and remembered perceptions, reflections, comparisons, etc. In knowledge Mr. Bradlaugh apparently includes fancies, blunders, ignorant errors of all kinds, as in the case of the man said to be conscious that a target was 400 yards away while it was only 300 yards, or when the maniac knows he is Emperor of China! To me, knowledge means certainty. No wonder Mr. Bradlaugh says that Consciousness is inaccurate, when to him it expresses the measure of all the contents of the mind, includ-

ing the vagaries of the maniac. Increase of knowledge may also, according to this teaching, be a most undesirable thing, as it may mean an increase of insanity, or nonsense, or error. I believe this is a fair—nay, a necessary inference from what my friend has said. I do not much care how hard I hit, but I do care about hitting fairly. (Applause.) If this be his conception of Consciousness I should like to know its use, and also how he could get on without it. Also, if there be a standard of truth, where is it to be found? and if there be no truth on what he bases his arguments, why he gives himself the trouble of arguing at all? To me, as I have already stated, Consciousness never varies, and Consciousness is Knowledge; but Mr. Bradlaugh here became somewhat confused, for he reasons as though I had said all Knowledge was Consciousness. All eagles are birds, but all birds are not eagles. Consciousness may or may not include all knowledge: on this point psychologists differ. For the purpose of this debate, I define Consciousness as the Knowledge of our own mental states. In this discussion I have nothing whatever to do with the question whether we can be also conscious of anything beyond those states. That we are conscious of mental states cannot, I imagine, be denied, even by Mr. Bradlaugh. Again, I should like to ask him a question. How does he know—no! it will not do to say "know," as that may be imagination—how is he certain he has mental states, or any states at all, if Consciousness be inaccurate? When I say that Consciousness never varies, I mean as to its nature. Consciousness is Consciousness all the world over and at all times. The states we are conscious of do vary from day to day. Yesterday I may have been conscious of misery—to-day of happiness; yesterday of ignorance—to-day of learning; yesterday of doubt—to-day of faith; but the Consciousness in each case has been true, for I was in the states of which I was then conscious, as I could not have been conscious of them had the states not been there. If we followed Mr. Bradlaugh's teaching we might say that while we were conscious of being unutterably happy we were really unutterably miserable, Consciousness being inaccurate. Once again, I affirm that Consciousness must be pronounced veracious, or philosophy is impossible; consequently whatever system contradicts Consciousness is

thereby proved unphilosophical and false. Secularism does this; therefore, I hold it to be unphilosophical and false.

I now come to the fresh matter for this evening. The subject for this evening being the Morality of Secularism—a subject, it will be acknowledged, of the utmost importance. I hope Mrs. Besant, who to-night occupies the chair, will excuse me for quoting her, but I have to deal with Secularism, and I do not know that I could quote a higher or a better authority. (Applause.) As Mrs. Besant truly says, ("True Basis of Morality," p. 2): "That which touches morality touches the heart of society; a high and pure morality is the life-blood of humanity." (Cheers.) I perfectly agree with her. My next proposition is consequently one that it behoves me very clearly to prove, as it brings against Secularism the very serious charge that it would poison the life-blood of humanity, for the next proposition is this, that Secularism is immoral; and by this I do not mean merely that Secularism is without morality, but that it is against morality. Understand that I am not bringing any charge against Secularists, with them I have nothing whatever to do. They may be, and doubtless are, as moral as other men, but I shall show that they are moral, not in virtue of their Secularism, but in spite of it. I cannot, of course, in the time at my disposal exhaust the subject, or treat it with anything like the fullness its importance demands, but I hope to say enough to justify the position I have taken.

What then is morality from the Secularist's point of view? I searched the "Freethinkers' Text Book" naturally hoping to find any information I needed regarding Secularism, but here, strange to say, I was doomed to disappointment, for I could not find anything whatever on the subject of Secular morality. It may be there, but I could not discover it; in fact it seemed to me the strangest "Text Book" that ever I read. There was much peculiar writing about other matters, but very little about the positive principles of Freethought. I was, therefore, compelled to search elsewhere, and turned next to Mrs. Besant's "True Basis of Morality," and here I read (page 3): "Morality in the deeper and truer meaning of the word means harmony with natural order; physical morality is harmony with all those laws, obedience to which results in physical vigor; and

moral morality is harmony with all those laws, obedience to which result in moral vigors." The only attempt at a definition here is that of physical morality, which means keeping oneself physically strong, so that eating a chop is a moral action; but we are not told what moral morality is, nay we are rather puzzled by it, for when we speak of moral morality we imply that there might be a morality that was not moral. True, the authoress speaks of "moral vigor," but she does not tell us what moral vigor is. Elsewhere (p. 9) she writes: "That which promotes the general happiness is right; that which lessens or undermines the general happiness is wrong. These are the axioms on which a true morality must be grounded." Still, there is no definition; we are only told on what it must be grounded. I know full well what, by the necessity of the case, the definition must be; still I wish to have it in words, and those words I find in the debate between Mr. Bradlaugh and Mr. King, where Mr. Bradlaugh says, in effect (King Debate, p. 17) that the creed which he accepts as to morals is Utility. It could not be otherwise—there is no other moral creed possible to an Atheist; and this I shall show is not a creed as to morals at all. Now, in the first place, Utilitarianism regards only the uses of things—it concerns itself alone with the results of actions and ignores motives altogether. According to it a moral action is a useful one. Never mind why it was performed, if the tendency of the action was towards human happiness, all is well. According to it the moral man is he who does the useful thing; but I maintain that this is not in accordance with our judgments. We judge a man, not according to the character of the action, but according to the motive prompting it when we know that motive. I care not how useful that action may be, when we know the motive to be a bad one we call the man a bad and immoral man. That cannot be true morality which totally ignores all consideration of motive, as Utilitarianism necessarily does. Again, all personal actions are not necessarily moral even when they contribute to the pleasures of others. If I be a musician and play to amuse another in order that I may pocket so many guineas, it is surely a violation of all our laws of thought to call that a moral action on my part. It may be prudent, or it may be useful, but who, apart from the demands of theory, would call it moral? If, on the

other hand, I play or sing to sooth suffering, or to aid a scheme of benevolence, I am doing not only a useful but also a moral act; for, let this ever be remembered that, while all moral acts are useful, all useful acts are not moral. It does appear to me exceedingly strange how any can persuade themselves that they are correct when they assert that every action which aids happiness, pleasure and agreeableness is, therefore, moral, for all these are the same in Utilitarianism, as is shown by Mrs. Besant's phrase "physical morality," and also by the fact that they are used as synonymous terms by Utilitarian writers. If this be true, the eating of an apple, the preference of grouse to tripe for dinner, the selection of champagne rather than table beer to drink—are all moral actions—(laughter)—and moral because they give us pleasure. It may be said I treat this lightly. I do; because it seems impossible to treat this aspect of morality seriously. It may be the morality of Secularism, but it is not the morality of consciousness, and therefore it is not morality at all. John Stuart Mill felt the unreality of this conception of morality, and although a leader in the school of Utilitarianism, he could not be logically consistent. He was so true to his humanity that he became false to his philosophy, by adding quality of happiness to quantity, and so abandoning the whole position. Apart, however, from all question of motive and quality of pleasure, the very words we use show us that utility and morality are not the same thing. We are perfectly conscious that when we use the word "right" we do not mean useful—that when we describe an action as moral we do not mean only pleasant. That the right, the useful, and the agreeable, denote different qualities of action. Even Hume confesses this when he says: "Had nature made no original constitution of the mind, the words honorable and shameful, lovely and odious, noble and despicable, had never had place in any language; nor could politicians, had they invented these terms, ever have been able to render them intelligible, or make them convey an idea to the audience." And in this he is quite correct. If there be no difference between morality and utility—whence came the two words? Let our Secularist friends be consistent in this matter and banish all such words as "right and wrong," "moral and and immoral," and confine themselves to the words that

express their meaning such as "useful," "prudent," "pleasant," "agreeable," and so on; and if they do, I fancy their system will not require much further refutation, but they know this full well, and so they dare not be true to their own teachings. But, further, this system is called the "selfish system," and truly, because selfishness is the only motive force it can bring to bear on its disciples with any hope of success. You may tell a man to do his best to promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number. He has, however, a perfect right to ask you why he should. He may tell you he does not care for the happiness of the greatest number, or any number except Number One. (Laughter.) In that case there is no alternative but to appeal to his selfishness and try to persuade him that by helping others to happiness he is helping himself—but this is selfishness pure and simple. To imagine that mankind will love their neighbors as themselves and study the happiness of others rather than their own, with no better theory than Utilitarianism to inspire them, is to imagine that which will not be borne out by facts. Mr. John Stuart Mill acknowledges this in so many words where he says (page 137), "the idea of the pain of another is naturally painful; the idea of the pleasure of another is naturally pleasure." Mr. Bradlaugh affirmed the same thing still more explicitly in his debate with Mr. Hutchings (page 49) where he states, "We Secularists say that the act which does not tend to the happiness of your fellows, does not tend to your own, and is wrong." That is, it is not pleasant, then why does he not say so? His next sentence is significant. "Any attempt to murder your fellow man does not tend to his happiness, and does not, therefore, tend to your own." Certainly I do not know any case where the attempt to murder adds to the happiness of the victim, but there are cases where it does add to the happiness, such as it is, of the murderer. Surely, Mr. Bradlaugh does not forget his friends the Thugs? Apart from them, however, our friend tells us that the attempt to murder will not add to our own happiness, and therefore had better not be indulged in. And this is what Secularists call morality! Others would call it by a very different name. (Applause.)

Mr. Bradlaugh, who was received with loud cheers, said: Let me first point out to you that some of you have

utterly disregarded the appeal made to you by Mrs. Besant in interrupting Dr. McCann at several points of his speech by expressions of dissent. While it is perfectly justifiable to applaud Dr. McCann it is quite out of order for anyone to express an opinion of contradiction. Dr. McCann has told you that I had forgotten my friends the Thugs. Well! I have so wide a circle of friends that I can hardly help forgetting some of them occasionally, but Dr. McCann having reminded me of the Thugs I will proceed to deal with them. The Thugs afford instances where, applying Dr. McCann's contention, a bad deed done with a good motive becomes good. The Thug believes that it is good and that his goddess desires that he should do as he does to the unwary traveller he guides, and with this good motive he strangles—say, Dr. McCann—and according to Dr. McCann the good motive governs the action, and he has no right to complain. (Laughter.) There is one thing which Dr. McCann forgot in the interesting and able speech he has just delivered to you, and that is he forgot to give you a definition of morality. Dr. McCann has been good enough to tell us what it is not, and if we go on with the negatives, by a process of elimination we may hope at last to get at what it is; but I would suggest to him that the more desirable and speedier method would be for him to tell us what he holds morality to be. We are told by Dr. McCann that he has looked through a great number of our writings without getting a definition. Will he permit me to refer him to the first speech which I made in this debate, in which it was clearly laid down by me that morality must be tested by utility. He appears, however, to have overlooked this definition, which was drawn up and endorsed by a national meeting of Secularists, and complains that in searching through our writings he cannot find the positive principles of Secularism. I do not complain that he has read from my debates, because I hope for good results from the reading. We are told that drinking champagne instead of a glass of beer is moral with the Secularist, because it is pleasurable, and we are told that Mr. Mill was inconsistent because he added quality to pleasure as well as taking quantity. But may not rather an objector be unfair when he takes away every quality from pleasure except those that suit him, and then says we only mean by it what he chooses

to leave? "Will is the power of self-determination"—the power of whom? The power of what, is it? Upon what ground exercised? By what and in what manner? "Individuals differ"—then will does not mean the same thing in any two individuals. But let us follow this a little. We are told that sin means—whatever I choose it should mean. But I don't choose it should mean anything! Sin in the theological sense has no meaning with me whatever. I can understand offence against the laws, but if you mean sin in the sense of an act originating in the will of an actor entirely apart from and independent of all circumstances extrinsic to that will, then that is to me a phrase without meaning. We are told that it is impossible to say how far men are acted on, as no two men are exactly alike. Is not that an entire abandonment of the whole position? Then again will is distinguished from volition, but I confess I do not understand the distinction as drawn; and the distinguishment is absurd, because here will is spoken of as if will were an entity, and as though volition were some action of that entity. The plant, we are told, has no power of selection. Mrs. Besant, who is much better versed in botany than myself, reminds me that there are some plants which have tendrils which they push into holes, and if they find the holes unsatisfactory to the tendrils they draw them out and try some other. I ask Dr. McCann to describe to me what he considers this? Capacity? or selection? or what? Then we are told in the definition of consciousness that knowledge means certainty. Absolute certainty or relative certainty? If relative, to what and to whom? Then we are told that consciousness is defined as "the knowledge of our own mental states." I ask Dr. McCann to give one case of a mental state in which, and to state by what, he distinguishes between the mental state and the consciousness itself. Then he asked me how I am certain that I have any mental states at all if consciousness is inaccurate. I have never said that all consciousness was inaccurate. On the last occasion Dr. McCann declared that the view I put forward of consciousness was one which was held by no psychologist. In the first volume of *Mind* there is an article by the late George Henry Lewes on "What is Sensation?" and that acute writer answered: "It means sometimes the simple reaction of a sensory organ—as in a sensation of color or of tem-

perature. It sometimes means a complex of many reactions —usually called perceptions—as in a sensation of sight. It sometimes means only one element in a judgment; at other times it means the judgment which groups the present impression with the revived impressions of the other sensory organs," and he adds: "consciousness stands for sensibility in general and also for a particular mode of sensibility, known as reflection, attention or thought." In another article in *Mind*, vol. 2, on "Consciousness and Unconsciousness," the same able thinker says: "Organisms really differ in complexity, yet because they also agree in the cardinal conditions of vitality, among which sensibility is one, we conclude that they all have feeling; but the feeling of the one will differ from that of another, according to the complexity of the sentient mechanism in each. The perfection of this mechanism lies in the co-ordination of its parts, and the consensus of its sentient activities; and disturbance of that consensus must cause a modification in the total consciousness; and when the disturbance is profound the modification is marked by such terms as 'insanity,' 'loss of consciousness,' 'insensibility.' These terms do not imply that the sentient organs have lost their sensibility, but only that the disturbed mechanism has no longer its normal consensus, no longer its normal state of consciousness. Each organ is active in its own way so long as its own mechanism if preserved; but the united action of the organs having been disturbed, their resultant function has been altered." Professor Herzen (of Florence) affirms consciousness to be resultant from special molecular movement induced in the central nervous elements either by an impression from without, conveyed to them by afferent nerves, or by a reflex sensation from within—consciousness, according to Professor Herzen, accompanying the functional disintegration of the nervous elements. W. L. Davidson, in *Mind* for 1881, says with great clearness: "Consciousness is awakeness. In every moment of our conscious being, we exist in some definite state or other. Now we are absorbed in thought, now we are engaged in action, now we are experiencing sensation; but whatever the state at any particular instant may be, it is that particular state and nothing else. There is not both the state and the consciousness of it; the state and the consciousness are identi-

cal." As Dr. McCann contends that consciousness is one and invariable, I will draw his attention to a case recorded in the *Revue Scientifique* for May 20th, 1876, from the report of M. Azam, Professor of Surgery at Bordeaux. This was a case of loss of memory and of double consciousness. The patient, a female, in 1876, aged 33, had since 14 years of age been subject to attacks lasting for two periods each of three years, and also for several shorter periods. In what is called her normal state the patient knows nothing of what passes during these attacks; in her secondary state she remembers what happens in both states. If these facts are accurately recorded, how does Dr. McCann think that this affects his theory of one and invariable consciousness? Another case is given in the *Revue Scientifique* for July 15th, 1876, that of a female patient of Dr. Dufay. Here there was what is sometimes called somnambulism—and I am inclined myself to regard the previous case also as somnambulistic—but attended with abnormal consciousness, so that in the normal state the patient knew nothing of what happened in the somnambulistic state, but in this latter condition she had the double memory of both states. Many cases similar to these might be quoted and are given in the various volumes of *Mind* where the notes of these cases are also translated. Dr. McCann, in the illustration of the lifting the arm, spoke as though visible physical action were the only, or at any rate the best illustration of the result of volition. Indeed he did not seem to separate the volition from the resultant act, although in truth there might have been the intense desire to raise the arm and no physical ability to carry out the volition by action, and it is excessively curious that the very point which I have marked for notice as unsatisfactory on his side he has also drawn attention to in his speech stating that I have not distinguished between desire and volition. (Laughter.) On the contrary I took express pains, but probably I did not succeed, to sketch the various phases of mind antecedent to volition. I hope I did nothing—I certainly did not intend to do anything—that should make the ineffective desire the equivalent of an effective volition. I think that Dr. McCann hardly did justice to me there. Visible action is, however, only one phase of result from will. The influence of volition is often traceable in our thinking. Here volition follows associations as its deter-

minants all being governed by general consciousness. All ordered thought is resultant on volition. Does Dr. McCann mean by free-will "uncaused volition"? If not, what does he mean? I contend that our volitions are, in each case, determined by our antecedent consciousness and the surroundings immediately preceding volition. Ability resultant from what is this power of self-determination of which he spoke? From nothing? If not, then, everything which tends to the exercise of the ability in the mind of Dr. McCann, must be laid before us to enable us to appreciate what his definition means. He tells you I did not distinguish between volition and will. The words to me mean the same. I do not know some big lump "will;" I do not know some ability, marked "will," each activity of which is a volition. I only know in each case the effective volition consequent on antecedent states, generally preceded by intense desire, and I know nothing of these volitions except as phases of the mental states of the willer—neither of these volitions has otherwise the smallest relation to the other. (Applause.) If Dr. McCann contends that volitions are uncaused, will he please say in what the motiveless volition of an indifferent is more or less moral than the determined volition which I maintain? We have got it now that the actions urged by us are immoral, because necessitated. The actions urged on the other side are the actions of persons with "freedom of volition," whatever that may mean—no, not quite—"limited in extent," and the extent of the limitation it is impossible to determine; and if it is impossible to determine the extent of this limitation, where does the freedom begin and the necessity end? (Hear, hear, and applause.) If Dr. McCann holds that volitions are not determined, will he explain how volitions originate? If he holds, as his words seem to convey, that in some cases volitions are either wholly or partly determined, will he give illustrations of these as distinguished from the volitions he describes as free? For example, will he take some illustrations of human beings with whom he is conversant and give me in two cases one in which there is a limited and controlled volition according to him, and one with a volition which is free? and if he says, "by free I mean a self-determined volition," I shall want him to tell me what he means by "self." Dr. Dr. McCann has not told us what he means in each indi-

vidual case by "I" or "me." In his speeches he has often spoken as though with him the "I" or the "me" was thinkable distinct from, or even hostile to, consciousness or volition. "I" is the bodily, living, thinking organism. Every thought process is included in the "I." No so-called mental phase from sensation to volition is separable from it. Each so-called mental phase is the consequence of the so-called physical activity of the "I." If Dr. McCann has any other definition I shall be glad to hear it, and if he asks me why do you say "so-called," I reply that it is one of the misfortunes of every language in the world as well as one of its advantages, that every language in the world is a growing language, and consists not only of the sound coins which men use, but also of the counterfeits, fruits of the ignorance of the past, which are only slowly giving way to the education of the present. I should like Dr. McCann to tell us what he means when he uses the word "sin." It will not do for him to say that it is a piece of luggage he need not have brought with him, and that he can take a ticket for it or not as he pleases. It is part of his baggage and equipment in this debate—(laughter)—and he must deal with it or get rid of it. I come back to the point from which I started. Dr. McCann declares that Secularism is immoral, that is against morality, and he is bound to tell what he means by morality. (Applause.) In my first speech I gave utility as the test of morality. Dr. McCann answers to that, that while all moral actions are useful, all useful ones are not moral. I will ask him to give an illustration of any useful act which is not a moral one. I have given him in my speech utility as the test of morality, and I want in return some test from him. (Hear, hear.) Dr. McCann, for example, says that drinking a glass of champagne or a glass of beer is not moral. Why not? He says it is only pleasurable. Why, being only pleasurable, is it not moral? What do you include under pleasure? You must not take a wide illustration of that kind. There may be well cases in which drinking a glass of champagne or beer is immoral. You must make it specific, so that I may know what I am dealing with. Then what do you mean by pleasurable? That which is pleasurable to all? If so, why is it not moral? If you say you don't mean that, why don't you? (Laughter.) Where is the meaning which you will give

instead? Oh, but you say a selfish act is immoral. Why necessarily so? Why might not a selfish thing be also a moral thing? There are many acts which may be described as selfish which, if you specify them, I may be able to tell you whether I regard them as immoral or not. A selfish act is not necessarily an immoral act. The highest morality is to do good to others, knowing that that will produce good to you; and to do it because you know it will produce good to you means that you know that by increasing the general amount of happiness you increase your own share therein. (Loud applause.) I say that which increases the general amount of happiness is moral—that is my measure and test of morality. That a good motive makes a good act is not true. Go back a century or two, and see men with good motives murdering their fellows for the glory of their god, racking and burning the people who differed from them in opinion in order to prevent the spread of hostile opinion. Their motive to them was good, but their act was very immoral. (Loud and continued applause.)

Dr. McCann: Mr. Bradlaugh asks me to define morality, and I do so in one word—rightness. I regard the rightness of an action as distinct from the utility of an action. Now, with regard to the veracity of consciousness, what I said was that Mr. Bradlaugh's views differed from those of the best psychologists. He affirmed that consciousness was not always reliable, and he has quoted only three psychologists in support of his proposition. I have several here on my side, and one of them is one of those that he has already quoted. I hold in my hand Lewes' "Biographical History of Philosophy," Library Edition, p. 379, and here are Lewes' words on the subject: "If Descartes is wrong, if consciousness is not the ultimate ground of certitude, embracing both objective and subjective, if ideas are not the internal copies of external things, then must philosophy be content to relinquish all claim to certitude, and find refuge again in faith." That is the opinion of Lewes with regard to the certainty of consciousness. Again, he says elsewhere, p. 599: "Consciousness, then, which had for so long formed the basis of all philosophy, was thrown over by Schelling, as incompetent to solve any of its problems. Consciousness was no ground of certitude. Reason was the organ of philosophy, and reason was impersonal. The

identity of being and knowing took the place of consciousness, and became the basis of all speculation. We shall see what it led to in Hegel." He tells us that consciousness was the basis of all philosophy. Lewes' words are as clear, as explicit and as strong as words which can be used by any human writer. I have also here a number of other writers, all on my side, extending from Descartes downwards, because before his time consciousness in philosophy was not a prominent subject. Therefore I say that Mr. Bradlaugh has not proved that the best psychologists are on his side. I define will as being the power of self-determination. I exercise will; I have will; I have self-determination; I have self-control; I have the power of voluntary selection and choice. As no two men, however, are alike in all points, he says that consequently the volitions of men are different. But surely he confounds here things which differ? The power that men exercise in volition, the power to control their own actions, the power they possess over themselves, varies in different individuals, and that varies from day to day. The power is one thing, but the strength of the power is another thing, and no two men have the same degree of power. (Applause.) A large number of my auditors are Secularists, but have you no power to do anything for Secularism because you cannot do so much or speak so well as our friend, Mr. Bradlaugh, does? I never spoke of will being an entity at all; I exercise will; I can determine; I can choose; but it does not follow from what I have said that will is an entity. If I choose I am conscious that it is I who choose—I am conscious of exerting my own power. The statements made by Mr. Bradlaugh with regard to the tendrils of the plant are no doubt perfectly true, but does the plant think that the hole won't suit it, therefore it will try another hole? What does the plant know about it? The plant is wholly unconscious and is absolutely controlled, and once more I say Mr. Bradlaugh's illustration is altogether in my favor. (Laughter.) Mr. Bradlaugh's illustrations would show that we have no power whatever of selection or choice or of control, which is exactly what I assert of his teaching. He also asks me to distinguish between the state and the consciousness. I say the state is not the consciousness. The state is one thing, and the consciousness of the state is another. Mr. Brad-

laugh told you that a blow on the head will render a man insensible for a time. Then, does the man exist in no state when, as is affirmed, he is not conscious of the state. If state and consciousness be one and the same thing, if a man be not conscious he is in no state at all; and, if not, in what state is he? (Laughter.) And if consciousness sometimes tells lies, is sometimes inaccurate, how are you to know when it is accurate and when true—what is to guide us in judging when consciousness is telling "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth"? Then Mr. Bradlaugh refers to double consciousness as an illustration that consciousness is not one and invariable. But what has this to do with the question at all? A person is conscious of one condition of mind to-day and another yesterday. Does it follow that consciousness is false? No, it does not. Then Mr. Bradlaugh still confuses desire and will. Desire is merely the wish to have something which we have not already. Will is a determination to do an action. Will is the power of self-determination. The volition is the will determining. Mr. Bradlaugh asks me here whether the volition is caused. Of course, the volition is caused. Every change is caused. My friends on the other side are they who do not believe in causation; they believe only in antecedents and consequents. My volitions are caused, but not caused by my ancestors, but by myself. It is I who shape my own courses. It is I who choose and not they. I, and not some of my antecedents, am the cause of my own actions. If I am not, then something else must be, and my actions are not my own actions at all. If the actions of my life are mine they can only be mine as I have caused them. If we are partly necessitated and partly free, Mr. Bradlaugh asks me where freedom begins. Freedom begins where necessity ends; if a man's actions are altogether determined there is no freedom. I cannot give my friend the illustration he asks for of a person altogether constrained or of a person altogether free. Every person is partly free and partly not free, and his freedom ends just where necessity commences. (Cries of "Where's that?") I could tell perfectly in my own case where my antecedents were bringing their force to bear upon me. My consciousness tells me exactly when I am resisting temptation and when I am not. Is there anyone here who cannot tell when he is yielding to temptation

and when he is struggling with temptation? Mr. Bradlaugh tells us that language is a growing thing—that every language is a growing language. Very well, then let it grow according to your ideas. That is what I ask you to do. (Laughter.) "Freedom," "liberty," "choice," are according to you only immature words. I say banish them altogether, and use only the full-developed words, "prudence," "pleasure" and "necessity," and we shall see exactly what you are at. I never said that the drinking of a glass of champagne in itself was either moral or immoral. But, according to Mrs. Besant's teaching, it must necessarily be moral if it give pleasure. The drinking of the champagne is justified on the principle of its being pleasanter than drinking a glass of beer, and accordingly more moral. "There are circumstances where it becomes immoral," we are told. Are there? How can it be immoral if you cannot help it? If your antecedents compel you to drink, you have no more responsibility in drinking than in abstaining from drinking.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: I have to object that, while Dr. McCann has used the word "I" at least a dozen times in his last speech, he has taken no objection to my definition of it, and has given none of his own. If he meant by the word "I" what I stated that I meant when using that word, then every phrase he has used is simply without sense—I am not saying it unfairly—and if he meant something else by the word, and wants me to reply to him, he must tell me what he means. We are now told morality is "rightness," but this is mere verbal substitution, which adds nothing. What is the standard of rightness? How am I to know what is right? Where is the test by which I can determine the rightness of any action? You have given me no standard, you have given me no test. Different peoples of the world disagree to-day as to what is right and not right. For example: You hold it to be right to eat beefsteak, but the Hindu thinks it wrong. I must have some test to determine rightness in such a case, or the debate is mere waste of time. The test of utility is objected to—no other test is given. You in this country hold it wrong to have more than one wife; others in other lands hold it right to have as many wives as they can keep. I am not meaning individuals of irregular life, I am meaning nations—peoples

who have professed to be religious, and people who are held up to us by you as models as to religion and morality even to this very moment. I did not understand Dr. McCann last week to say that my definition of consciousness differed from the best psychologists. I understood him to say that there were no psychologists who agreed with me. This, however, is of little importance. But I have to object that it is not fair to quote from Lewes where he is explaining the philosophy of each individual thinker that he is dealing with, as against his own view put separately and distinctly in a later work. Dr. McCann says by power of self-determination he means power of the person. He says, "I have self-determination, I have self-control"; but then he has not defined "I," and my definition included every thought process, included what he calls determination, included what he calls desire, included what I call perception, reflection, judgment, volition. He uses "I" as possibly meaning to him something clear and distinct, but though he has heard me say what I mean by it—and my meaning is fatal to his argument—he does not give me any means of judging what he means by it, and in what sense he uses it. Then we have a proposition which startles me, that consciousness in its nature is always the same, that volition in its own inherent nature is always the same, differing only in degree. I thought from what Dr. McCann said that he regarded consciousness as an entity. If it is an entity, describe it to me. If it is not an entity, why do you speak of its nature? Then, again, I should like to know why you speak of consciousness and volition as distinct from you, and say that, while your knowledge varies from day to day, your consciousness in its own nature is always the same. What is its own, if it has no own? You talk of the power of all men being the same, and different only in degree. There is no thing or entity called power. You may talk of ability of perception, of ability to distinguish between perceptions, of ability to reflect upon them, of ability to form new conceptions, of ability to will or to do—these are all abilities of some person; but to talk of power as though one understood some thing, some entity distinct from the person, and then to say it differs in degree, is simply to use words without having any relevancy in them. Then about the plant. I am asked, What does the plant know? I

don't know. But I do know that it does draw away the tendril when the hole is not suited to it, and puts it somewhere else. You say it can't help it. I don't say it can. (Laughter.) We will take another case. There is a well-known class of plants which exist by capturing and killing animals, and by digesting those animals. Such a plant, if you drop upon it a very small piece of flesh, will close upon that piece of flesh just as it will upon a fly, and ultimately digests the flesh just as it will digest the fly, but if you put a little piece of brickdust instead, it won't do, or attempt to do, anything of the kind. (Laughter and loud applause.) To use your own illustration, What does the plant know about it? Why doesn't it think brick-dust as good as meat? (Laughter.) As a matter of fact, neither is my question fair, nor is the question addressed by my opponent fair. I don't pretend that the plant thinks or that it knows in the same way as we know. But when you tell me that it has not the capacity of drawing its tendril back and putting it out in some other place, experience contradicts that, and you have no right to ask me what the plant knows. On your theory of free volition for man you have to deal with the illustrations right through the range of vital phænomena. Then we are told—and here is a mistake if Dr. McCann will permit me to say so—"To me my state is one thing and consciousness of the state another." Dr. McCann commits an error in supposing that words which are clear to him are necessarily clear to everybody else. Saying it in that way is simply using a form of words which mean nothing whatever. Consciousness and the state of which you are conscious can be distinguished, can they? Let us see the illustration which Dr. McCann gives to serve him. He says when a man is not conscious in what state is he? If he is in a no conscious state is he in any state at all? Does Dr. McCann mean, to me, to other people, or to himself? Other people, finding in the man none of the phænomena associated with consciousness, would describe him as in an unconscious state. If you ask him while unconscious he could not describe it at all, and it would be to him no state at all to him. (Laughter and applause.) I have not Dr. McCann's great ability of jesting on a matter of this kind, and if he will permit me to say it, we want, in dealing with this question of consciousness some-

thing more even than good humor. Dr. McCann asks me how we are to distinguish when consciousness is inaccurate and when it is accurate. I reply, by verifying, so far as is possible to us, each new phase of consciousness. Phases of consciousness with which we are familiar sufficiently verify themselves in their repetition. Our verification is not always complete, it is possibly never infallible, but that is the only possible way in which you can test the veracity of consciousness. There are many facts of consciousness which some individuals are incapable of verifying without assistance from others. Take for instance the case of color-blindness. We have it now shown from investigations in France and other countries, that a very large percentage—a considerable minority—of human beings are affected with color blindness in regard to some colors or others. There the difficulty of verification is sometimes insuperable to the individual unless he is brought in contact with better trained and more accurate abilities than his own, and unless he has himself the ability to appreciate the differences which those others see for him. Then we are asked what double consciousness has to do with the matter. Only this, that it shows that consciousness cannot be one and invariable. If you have one individual who while being able to think, speak, and have apparently all his consciousness about him, is in some states unable to remember a good half of his life, his consciousness is certainly not infallible. Then Dr. McCann says that volition is caused, and I agree with him. But is not that the end of this debate? No! he says; because my volition has been caused by myself. But you have not explained what you mean by myself. Define "I" or "self"—then I shall know what you mean? You tell me that freedom begins where necessity ends. Show me the point of this beginning of freedom. That is what I want! (Loud applause.)

The Rev. Dr. McCann: There are as many points in this room as there are persons. If you will bring me any particular person and allow me to examine him we shall all see it for ourselves. (Oh, oh, and interruption.)

Mr. Bradlaugh rising: Any person interrupting Dr. McCann will have to be expelled from this room. (Applause.)

Dr. McCann continuing: I don't think that Mr. Brad-

laugh can complain very much of you, because I think you have behaved very fairly towards us. But to continue my argument; to suppose that the line between compulsion and freedom is the same in all beings is to suppose what my friend must know is not in accordance with fact. He finds fault with me for speaking about consciousness being an entity, but I do not remember yet having said that it was an entity. Did Mr. Bradlaugh never hear of an action having a nature. An action is not an entity, but we talk of the natures of actions. Why may I not talk of the nature of consciousness? Then Mr. Bradlaugh asks for a definition of "I" or "me." There are certain words which do not require a definition and these it seems to me are two of them. But by "I," I mean my personality — my individual self who is speaking, acting, thinking. The present question, however, is the veracity of consciousness. Secularism being Necessitarianism contradicts consciousness, and therefore is fallacious in philosophy and not true. About that quotation from Lewes I will say that it was a perfectly fair one. The passage I read was one where Lewes is giving his own views. Now, I resume my argument where I left off when discussing the selfishness of Secularism, and showing that as Secularism was selfish it was, therefore, immoral. In complete accordance with this conception is the teaching of Mrs. Besant, who writes: "On what were these laws based except on utility? Murder and theft were forbidden. Why? Because the half savages' intuitions were against them? Not at all; but because men could not live together in security if these things were allowed" ("True Basis of Morality," p. 12). The only reason, therefore, for abstaining from murder, theft, and lying is a prudential one! And this is Secularist morality! Mr. Bradlaugh, however, also says ("Hutching's Debate,") "I honor my wife, I love my wife, and would do all I can to increase her happiness." Now, that sounds very nice and loving, and would have been most satisfactory had he ended there. But, unfortunately for himself, he does not end there. The next words are "because in making her happiness I am adding to my own. I admit it is selfish." Well, so I think. So Mr. Bradlaugh tells us that disinterested love is not possible to a Secularist, that his love for his wife is not love for his wife, but only

for himself. And if this be true with regard to one's wife, how much more true must it be with regard to one's neighbor? He then proceeds to say: "I would be good and do good to men, that being good to men, they may be good to me and those around me, reflecting the good which I give back on myself." All, you will see, is in the same direction. The good is given forth, not for the good of the recipient nor for the love of the good because it is good, but that it may be reflected back on the giver. How generously benevolent all this is! Mr. Bradlaugh advocates the cause of Secularism, not for the good of his fellow men, but for the good of himself. I should not venture to say so, but as Mr. Bradlaugh says it of himself Mr. Bradlaugh knows best. Will he forgive me for saying that I don't believe him. His theory compels him to make himself appear worse than he is, for I am perfectly convinced that he would do good to another without any consideration or hope of a reflected reward. If he saw a hungry child looking into the window of a baker's shop, I know full well he would give it a bun. Why? Because it would reflect pleasure on himself? No! It would do that, but that would not be his motive. His motive, I am convinced, would be kindness to the child. (Applause.) But many men are better than their creed, and Mr. Bradlaugh is one, for he is human, and utility is so low as to be, I think, not only immoral, but inhuman. Professor Bain arranges the matter very systematically, and let me say I would not quote Bain or any other man if he were not in complete accordance with my friend on the left. He says ("Mental and Moral Philosophy," page 392):— "Human pursuit, as a whole, is divided, for important practical reasons, into two great departments. The first embraces the highest and most comprehensive regard to self, and it is designated Prudence, self-love, the search after happiness. The second department of pursuit comprises the regard to others, and is named Duty. It is warred against, not only by the forces inimical to prudence, but also occasionally by prudence itself." This is so plain that it is impossible to mistake its meaning. Prudence first, duty afterwards; and, should a war arise between the two, duty must give way. Once more I return to the words we use, and say, if morality be only utility, "self-love," and "prudence," banish all such words as "benevolence," "philanthropy,"

"generosity," "sympathy," and use only such words as you have a right to use, as "usefulness," "prudence," and "selfishness," and see what your Secularism will come to. This may be utility, but it is not morality. Utility is morality, say our friends; but, as Mr. C. Watts most pertinently says, "An important question here suggests itself. What is utility? and how is it to be judged of and tested? What may appear, it is urged, useful to one man, another may regard as altogether useless; who, therefore, is to decide the utility of an act? The answer to this will be found in the greatest happiness principle" (*Secular Review*, January 10th, 1880). This is no answer at all, for the question still remains, what tends to the greatest happiness? Mr. Bradlaugh practically confesses there is no one to answer the question—there is no standard of morality. He said to Mr. Hutchings: "The reason why I cannot give you a definite system to-day, expressly limiting not only for to-day, but also for the future, the standard of right and wrong, that the knowledge of to-day may teach us a still better system than the knowledge of yesterday, and the knowledge of to-morrow may teach us a still better system than the knowledge of to-day" ("Hutchings Discussion," page 42). Rather an awkward position to be in, not to have a system at any time because a better one may follow after! What utter waste of time to talk about the morality of utility, when there is no one to tell us what utility is, even for to-day; to boast of the greatest happiness for the greatest number, when its advocates do not know what it is, except as a definition. We are all familiar with the great activity of Mr. Bradlaugh, but how unfortunate for him not to know whether his activity is useful or useless, is for happiness or misery, is moral or immoral. The position, therefore, is this: either there is or there is not a test of Secular morality. If there be not, then no one has any right to find fault with any one, no matter what he does. If there be a test, it must either be individual or social. Some Secularists, such as Mr. Lewin, seem to consider it altogether a personal matter. He says: "Nor do I approve of investigation permitted into a man's motives for joining the society, or even an investigation of his personal character before admitting him. A man's morals, like his opinions, are his own affair, and presidents and

secretaries are not competent to sit in judgment on such matters." The very fact, however, that Mr. Lewin has to utter such a complaint shows that it is not generally the teaching of Secularism that a man's morals are his own affair. It would be more than strange if it were. We are consequently shut up to the conclusion that society must decide what is pleasantest for itself—what is to be its morality. Professor Bain puts this with remarkable clearness. He says for the peculiar attribute of rightness: "We must refer to the institution of government or authority." Again: "A moral act is merely an act tending to reconcile the good of the agent with the good of the whole society; it is an act prescribed by social authority, and rendered obligatory on every citizen. Its morality is constituted by its authoritative prescription, and not by its fulfilling the primary ends of the social institution. A bad law is still a law; an ill judged moral precept is still a moral precept, felt as such by every loyal citizen." In other words it is more useful to obey the social authority even when the authority is bad than to disobey it. Whatever social authority decrees to be moral, is thus made moral be its character what it may. It seems a strange position but it is the only logical one open to Secularism. In perfect agreement with this Mr. J. Symes says in the *National Reformer*, of May 18th, 1879: "Society contains everywhere and always all the real and necessary elements and sanctions of morality." . . . . "Public opinion is the standard of morality." "Here then is the standard of morality practically omnipotent in its operation." He further proceeds to argue that public opinion has the right to enforce its dictates even to the point of persecution. He says, "Therefore we must say again that for the individual, whatever public opinion sanctions is right." "But while public opinion justifies the persecution the heretic is justified on the principle of self preservation in resisting that public sentiment, and those laws which no longer protect him, but are bent on his destruction. A simpler case still is the following: A seaman is cast away among cannibals, whose public opinion impels them to eat him if they can; while his principle of self-preservation inspires him to resist and do his best to escape from such a fate. Here also we see utterly irreconcilable elements thrown into violent antagonism,

though both are in a very important sense right." But surely Mr. Symes is not consistent. The cannibals, according to him, were acting morally in trying to eat the sailor, and therefore the sailor must have been an immoral man to oppose their appetite. Except in this little blunder, Messrs. Symes and Bain are perfectly consistent in the standard they give for Secular morals. Mr. Symes, however, is a prudent man, and gives the following advice to his brother Secularists: "When a man differs fundamentally from the community in which he dwells his only safe and prudent course is to be silent or emigrate." Now, that the Secularists do differ fundamentally from the community in which they dwell is beyond controversy. But lest there should be any doubt on the point, we have the authority of Mr. Bradlaugh, who says: "They (the community) have all the wealth, all the power, all the talent, all the logic, all the eloquence." We thank him for the tribute. But if public opinion be the standard of morality, and the Secularists are opposed to "all the wealth, all the power, all the talent, all the logic, all the eloquence," the very things that give value to public opinion, then it necessarily follows according to his own showing that Secularism is immoral; and therefore Mr. Bradlaugh, according to his own showing, ought either to be silent or emigrate; but I am quite sure he will neither be the one or do the other. (Laughter.) Once more I ask the Secularists to be consistent and banish from their vocabulary all such words as morality and immorality, virtue and vice, praise and blame, censure and approval, and in doing so they will banish some of the noblest words we use, and do more to expose the true character of Secularism than months of debate. Expose its character not only to those who are not Secularists, but, what is of far more importance, give its true character to Secularists themselves. If I am not now warranted in asserting that Secularism is immoral, I should much like to know what could possibly give me such right; and if I am warranted I have proved the proposition that Secularism is immoral.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Linking together some words from an article of Mr. Symes's with some words of my own utterly unconnected with it cannot make an argument. We have had no test of "rightness" given in the last speech, and it is utterly impossible to discuss whether Secularism is moral

unless Dr. McCann tells us what he means by "right." I understand him to say he will pass it over till by-and-bye. Then it was not worth while opening the question at all. Unless we each know what is the test which the other claims to apply, the discussion is utterly without meaning. Dr. McCann is good enough to tell us that there are as many points of difference with reference to freedom and necessity in each volition as there are persons in this room, but he did not venture to say where the point of limitation was in any one case. Undoubtedly not only organisations differ, but the antecedents to each volition differ with each individual and each separate volition is the resultant of those organisations and antecedents. He frankly confesses that he cannot generally give the line—the point where liberty commences, necessity ceases. He implied that he could do it in his own case, but he did not. Then he turns upon me and says actions have natures as well as entities—consciousness is an action of mind. What? one and invariable action of mind right through his existence? That definition is an absurdity on the face of it. Activity without change, actions all the same from the very first moment of the child coming from the womb till vitality ceases? What, then, becomes of your one and invariable consciousness only changing in the states? If consciousness be action only what do you mean by states of the action? And then you say "I" means the individual thinking, speaking, acting person. I agree in that. Then is not this consciousness part of the thinking? If it is a part of the thinking it is a part of the person. It changes with each new thought. Consciousness is made up of the totality and sum of thought. It is made up of perception, the memory of perception, the judgment on perceptions. These and various other thought-processes are all different phases of it, and there is constant change; it cannot be one invariable action. (Applause.) You have to distinguish the nature of each of these mental phases to properly define consciousness. Then Dr. McCann says our only reason for abstaining from murder, theft, and lying is a prudential one. You say murder is wrong. Why? We have said it is wrong because it tends to mischief and not to improvement, to misery and not to happiness—because it diminishes the general sum of the well-being of the human race. Give your

reasons, other than these, why murder is wrong. Why should a prudential act be necessarily an immoral one? Dr. McCann says it is "prudence first and duty afterwards." Where did you learn that we thus distinguish between prudence and duty, and where do we put prudence first and duty second? With us prudence is duty, if you know it tends to human well being. Dr. McCann says disinterested love is not possible to a Secularist. Will he give me an instance of any human being of any grade to whom disinterested love is possible? Then Dr. McCann is good enough to disbelieve me with regard to my advocacy of Secularism. He says that I do not advocate Secularism for myself; he says that I advocate Secularism for the benefit of others. But to me the good of others is the good of myself. I cannot separate my good from the good of others. I am a sharer in the general heritage of humanity. As that diminishes I suffer, as it increases I enjoy it. (Applause.) Dr. McCann is quite sure that I would give a hungry child a bun. Not always sure; because if I had reason to suppose that persons were trading upon its misery, I should not give the child the bun, to be carried by it to some lazy idler, and thus encourage the perpetuation of robbery and meanness. Then we are told that prudence first, duty afterwards is not rightness. But what is rightness? You have omitted to tell us. (Hear, hear.) You have changed the word morality to the word rightness. But you have given us no standard or test—you have given us no code where we can find it, and you reproach us with not having a code. You tell us that no one can even to-day say what is useful. To tell us that is not true. It simply is not the fact. We do not say no one can tell us what is useful to-day. But that what people do tell us is useful to-day may be corrected by better knowledge which they or other people may have to-morrow. We can only shape our conduct to-day by the experience of to-day, including in this the stored experience of the long yesterday. Dr. McCann is good enough to quote from a large number of people. He would have me answer for Mr. Walter Lewin, who is hostile to Secularism, and would have me bound by each word of Mr. Symes, while he would not accept the official declaration of the principles of the National Secular Society, carefully drawn up and formally endorsed by the general body. He has never tried to answer what I put

forward as the official declarations of Secularism. Instead of answering my first speech in this debate he builds straw men to demolish. These are the puppets he pulls to amuse you; there is not the slightest attempt to even examine the Secularism I put to you. He has not even troubled to show you that it was not a true representation of Secularism. He has not dealt with it at all. He only complains that we have no code, but does not examine what we have. He introduces funny illustrations, which, if relevant, might make myself, or someone else ridiculous, but may be equally turned against himself. How, according to you, are the cannibals to act who are hungry, with a tender missionary amongst them? (Much laughter.) How, according to you, are they to determine whether it be rightness or not to eat that missionary; and, according to you, what should determine the rightness of the missionary in resisting or otherwise? May he not have been provided as a special breakfast or dinner for these poor hungry cannibals by some ruler who created them and himself, who has sole charge of the morality of the world? (Laughter.) We have got now nearly to the close of two-thirds of this debate, and at any rate there is one satisfaction so far, that my antagonist has treated me with the most perfect courtesy, and has treated you even generously so far as your expressions of dissent are concerned. He speaks here with a large majority hostile to the views he holds; here apparently it is the smaller minority who sympathise with those views. Let me ask you, therefore, that on the closing night, when feelings are likely to get warmer, that you will aid us in preserving the same decorum; that whatever we may disagree about in our discussion of rightness and wrongness, we shall, at any rate, preserve fair respect to each other's reasonings in the enunciation of opinion, feeling certain that patience on each side must tend more to the elucidation of the truth than mere flinging personal words, which serve no purpose but to make bitterness now and to perpetuate that bitterness. (Loud applause.)

A vote of thanks to Mrs. Besant for presiding, proposed by Dr. McCann, seconded by Mr. Bradlaugh, and carried unanimously, closed the proceedings.

THIRD NIGHT.—W. BARNARD, Esq., in the Chair.

THE CHAIRMAN said: We have arrived at the last night of this most interesting debate, and hitherto we have got on very comfortably. You must remember this—those of you who are here to-night for the first time—that debaters do not require to be thwarted in any way, but they require all the assistance you can give them. Debating is a very difficult task, and you know very well that both these gentlemen intend to do their very best—(A voice: "One of them does," and interruption)—and I am quite sure you want to do your best as an audience, so that you will listen to them patiently and attentively, and not interrupt either of the speakers. The first speaker to-night will be Dr. McCann, who will reopen the debate in a speech of half-an-hour; then Mr. Bradlaugh will follow in a speech of half-an-hour; and then each speaker will follow alternately with speeches of a quarter of an hour, and we shall thus get to the close of the two hours, Mr. Bradlaugh taking the last speech.

The Rev. Dr. MCCANN, who was received with hearty applause, then said: As this is the last evening of our debate, my best plan will be to finish what I have to say on the affirmative side, and then occupy the remainder of my time in replying to Mr. Bradlaugh. In continuation of my argument that Secularism is immoral, I have yet one other point to bring forward, and that is that a moral act must be one done voluntarily. We must have the power to do some other act at the time we did the one called moral. In other words, it must be an act of choice; by no fair use of language can that be called a moral act that is thrust upon me, or that I am compelled to perform. The man in the uncomfortable position indicated by my friend, under the two ton stone, could hardly be said to be either moral or immoral for lying there, seeing that he had no power of getting up, although lying there might cause his death. But if the stone were removed, and all physical restraint taken away, and he chose to lie on still, after he had the power to rise, and lying there resulted in his death, then you would say he had acted immorally, and truly so; but you will observe the morality and choice go hand-in-hand. It must be perfectly clear to all that there can be

neither morality nor immorality where there is no liberty of selection. But neither can there be virtue nor vice, praise nor blame. It is impossible to call that virtuous or vicious which could not be avoided, unless indeed a meaning be attached to virtue and vice different from that attached to it by the generality of mankind. No matter what else these words may include they always include freedom of choice. Secularists may use these words in deference to the weakness of mankind, who they imagine still to be in the infancy of thought, and therefore also in the infancy of language, but what meaning do they attach to them? If man "cannot resist the circumstances resulting in volition," or, as Mr. Bradlaugh put it last evening, if "the volition is the resultant of those organisations and antecedents"? I cannot press this point too strongly, that according to my friend's teaching the volition of the man is as the volition of the plant, the resultant of organisation and antecedents. If Secularists speak of virtue or vice in men, why then do they not extend the term to plants, or even to stones, as their actions are also resultant of their structures and their antecedents? Why not speak of a virtuous or vicious diamond, a virtuous or a vicious rose? Secularists have no more right to apply these terms to human beings than they have to all other beings. I hold that if they call men virtuous or vicious and refuse to call roses the same, they are utterly inconsistent. I shall be glad if Mr. Bradlaugh will say whether he will apply these terms to plants and minerals, or if he will not, to tell us why he will not. I have nothing whatever to do with defining virtue or vice. (Much laughter.) They have some meaning, I presume, even to Mr. Bradlaugh. Whatever that meaning be it must be applicable to all similar modes of action whether of plant or man, and must be applicable to plant and man if both act under like conditions as Secularists affirm they do. If these words belong to the infancy of language, and at Mr. Bradlaugh's advanced stage convey no meaning to him, will he kindly say so and save all further discussion of them? I fancy that system will not commend itself to the general judgment of mankind that either says virtue and vice have no meaning, or if they have, it is one that is applicable equally to all modes of minerals, plants, and man. I hope my friend's bye-

play on side issues—(hear, hear)—and his demands for definitions where they are not required, but only hinder the discussion of important points, will not banish "virtue" from his reply. There are, however, other words in frequent use amongst us, and which are also generally supposed to have some definite meaning, such as praise and blame, approval and censure. But whence come they? You cannot praise anyone for doing what he cannot help doing. To force anyone to do a kindness and then praise him for doing it would be mockery of the cruellest kind. As little can we blame anyone if necessitated to any action. If my antecedents and my organism compel me to kill—if they result in the volition that is followed by murder—it is utterly inconsistent to blame me for the act. I think even Mr. Bradlaugh will feel himself compelled to acknowledge this. Would he praise a rose if it were a fine specimen, or blame it if it were a poor one? If not, why not, while he accords praise or blame to the actions of mankind? Will he tell us how, if our actions are determined by our organisation and our antecedents, they can be the object of approval or disapproval of any kind whatever? or whether he will here discard the language usually employed by other men and never speak of either praise or blame? Mr. Austin Holyoake was consistent in the matter when he said that as he could not help the impulses of his nature he did not consider any thanks were due to him. It was rather a rebuke to his brother Secularists for so far forgetting their principles as to award him thanks. Mr. H. G. Atkinson is also consistent when he says: "I am a creature of Necessity. I claim neither merit nor demerit. I feel that I am completely the result of my nature, and compelled to do what I do as the needle to point to the north, or the puppet to move according as the string is pulled. I cannot alter my will or be other than I am, and cannot deserve either reward or punishment." Will Mr. Bradlaugh be equally consistent, and at once acknowledge in so many words what he has already maintained in fact—that we are only puppets moved by the strings of organisation and antecedents, and so deserving neither of praise nor blame? Will he be consistent, and not again take part in what must be to him the farce of proposing or seconding a vote of thanks to our chairman? Will he be consistent? He cannot help being inconsistent

if the string pulls him that way; so that when he proposes a vote of thanks to the chairman this evening, as I presume he will, you will know it is no voluntary action on his part—it is only the string that has pulled him in that direction. (Laughter and applause.) In point of fact it is perfectly impossible to talk consistently in the language of Secularism. (Loud applause and laughter.) Hence Secularism is in reality a bundle of contradictions. (Renewed laughter.) It tells us "that it is the duty of every individual to actively attack all barriers to equal freedom of thought and utterance upon all political, theological, and social subjects." (Hear, hear, and applause.) I think so, but I am puzzled to know how Mr. Bradlaugh can urge this when he has shown so clearly, and by such luxuriance of illustration, that he does not believe in the power of anyone to will action of any kind whatever. (Laughter.) It is, doubtless, possible for Secularists to pass on force, but not to originate it, for we must ever remember that when Mr. Bradlaugh speaks of force, energy, or activity, he is speaking of that which is physical, the same as that which moves stones and stars. Secularists are urged to certain lines of action. They are blamed for their indifference, and, as Mrs. Besant has put it, for their "disgracefully and lamentably small contributions" (*National Reformer*, June 6th, 1879). (Laughter and applause.) But surely this is scarcely fair. Why urge men to do the impossible? As well urge the plant to go through the stone, or digest the brick-dust. If the physical conditions be present—if the right strings are attached to the puppets—they will be pulled the right way without any urging; but if the other strings are attached, all the urging in the world will not be of any avail. Language will require to grow for a long time, at its present rate of growth, before Secularists shall be able to speak so as to be in harmony with their own theories. I want no better illustration of the contradictory character of Secularism than any one of Mr. Bradlaugh's speeches. I now arrive at my next proposition, which is that Secularism is anti-social—in other words, that it is practically opposed to the best interests of society. (Hisses and applause.) My time will not permit me to do much more than restate the principles which I have shown to be those of Secularism, and ask what would be the condition of society if they were

universally adopted. It first affirms Atheism to be the true doctrine of life. (General cries of Hear, hear.) Very well, that is exactly what I have said. (Loud applause.) It next affirms that, all men being the results of their physical conditions and antecedents, have no self-control, consequently if they lie, or steal, or murder, they are not to blame, and cannot be blamed. (Oh, oh!) If, on the other hand, they are true, honest, and good, they deserve not praise any more than does the rose for its bloom. If they aid their brethren they deserve not reward, if they wrong and injure them they deserve not punishment. The strong arm of society may punish them, but they do not deserve it. Let this belief become prevalent in society, and what would be the natural result? Again, it asserts that utility is the highest, the only morality. (Hear, hear.) You see I am quoting accurately the principles of Secularism. (Hear, hear, laughter, and applause.) That morality consists in pleasing ourselves. That selfishness is to be our guide in life. That we are to do good in order to get good—to help others in order that they may help us. That disinterested love is impossible. What would the condition of society be if these beliefs held sway? Men are selfish enough as it is. What would they be then? Secularism, also must ignore virtue and vice as we have seen. Now, what do you suppose would be the effect on society if men could be persuaded that no action of theirs could be either virtuous or vicious? That, no matter how earnest they may be to make the world better than they found it, it is not virtue, and no matter how earnest to make it worse than they found it, it is not vice. That such words as these, and all others of the same family, only express antiquated ideas, having no corresponding reality in life. It would require a cleverer word-painter than I am—(hear, hear, laughter, and applause)—to paint the results of a universal belief in what I consider such terrible fallacies. (Renewed laughter and interruption.)

The CHAIRMAN: Do not interrupt the speaker. If you think he is putting his foot in it by all means let him to do so, and let Mr. Bradlaugh deal with him. It is not for the audience to deal with the speaker. (Hear, hear.)

The Rev. Dr. MCCANN: The following quotations will also help to place the anti-social character of Secularism in a clearer light. They are from an old debate—that with

Dr. Baylee. I would not quote them did I not think that they accurately express the belief of Mr. Bradlaugh to-day, as they did then. I do not think it fair to quote a man to-day against himself ten or twenty years ago, if he says that in the meantime he has altered or modified his views. No man, the Pope excepted, now calls himself infallible. I have changed my own views on many subjects, and should be the last, therefore, to deny to another the right I claim for myself. (Hear, hear.) It is not my wish to snatch any platform triumph, but it is my wish, and my very earnest wish, to have the subject honestly and thoroughly discussed. Dr. Baylee asks Mr. Bradlaugh: "What restraint has an Atheist from stealing a small sum from a wealthy master if his own family be in want?" Mr. Bradlaugh replied: "The cognizance that all actions which do not tend to the general happiness of the human family are immoral." The case was this, an Atheist's family was in want, he was employed by a wealthy master, he saw an opportunity of taking a small sum of money to help his starving family under circumstances that would prevent his master knowing he had taken it, and the only thing to prevent him taking food to his starving children was the knowledge of the proposition that the action was immoral, *i.e.*, useless, because it would not tend to the general happiness of the human family. (Hear, hear.) Remember that the man was an Atheist, and therefore this was the only consideration that could influence him against the taking of the money. But there were many to influence him in its favor—the consideration that if he took it he could not be blamed, nor would he deserve punishment, nor was it vice; the consideration that—as according to the great Utilitarian, Bain, prudence comes first and duty afterwards—he was acting prudently in providing for his starving family. Surely Mr. Bradlaugh, who knows men as well as most, cannot deceive himself into the belief that this would be an effective aid to honesty! Responsibility is also generally supposed to play rather an important part in the working of society. Dr. Baylee asked Mr. Bradlaugh the important question: "To whom is man responsible?" The answer was: "I do not know that he is responsible to anyone." In that case man is not a responsible being—not responsible to anyone for his actions to anyone. Of course, he cannot be if he could not help them. Next question:

"Then, if a man commit adultery is he responsible to no one?" Answer: "If by responsibility you mean does the commission of an immoral"—(that is, useless act)—"tend to misery, Yes; if more than that, No."——

Mr. BRADLAUGH (rising): I do not think the words "useless act" are in my answer.

The Rev. Dr. MCCANN: No, no! I did not say they were. But the prevention of an immoral act tending to misery is not responsibility, therefore Mr. Bradlaugh says, in fact, that an adulterer is responsible to no one. If this be not anti-social, what can be? (Applause.) But may I ask in passing, hoping for an answer, why should an immoral, that is, a useless act, necessarily tend to misery—it may tend to regret—but why to misery? The next question was, "Is he not responsible to the husband?" Reply: "One must have the whole of the circumstances to say yes or no." (Hear, hear, and loud applause.) "Suppose a husband were unkind to his wife?" Then, according to this——

Mr. BRADLAUGH: I think, if you are quoting from the Baylee Debate, it will be better to finish the quotation first, and make your comment afterwards; otherwise there may be misapprehension. (Hear, hear; and a voice: "A jumble.") Give us each answer by itself.

The Rev. Dr. MCCANN: I take each answer, and comment on each answer as I go along. According to this adultery, where the husband is unkind, is justifiable. But who is to decide where the degree of unkindness is to be drawn? Next question: "Is he responsible to a good and kind husband?" Answer: "If by responsible you mean should a good husband take measures to prevent the commission of adultery, yes; if more, what do you mean?" Comment by myself: According to this, therefore, if adultery be committed with the wife of a good and kind husband, all the husband has a right to do is to try and prevent its repetition! He has no right to censure the adulterer; no right to call the deed even vicious; he can only call it useless, and try to prevent the recurrence of the useless act; for do not forget that the immoral and the useless are exactly the same thing, in the Secular creed, at least. Another question was: "Then, in your sense of the word responsibility, is not man responsible to his fellow-men?" Reply: "My own sense

shuts out responsibility; therefore, no." Whether this be social or anti-social I leave others to infer. Yet, I fancied I had read of responsibility somewhere, so I turned to the *National Reformer*, and there I read the remarkable words, "For the opinions expressed in all signed articles the writers alone are morally responsible." (Laughter.) Morally responsible! (Renewed laughter.) Here we have not only responsibility, but moral responsibility. Apparently, if Mr. Bradlaugh's own sense shuts out responsibility, he does not intend that the senses of the writers in his paper shall shut it out. Perhaps he will explain this. (Hear, hear.) A further question was, "What does Atheism teach about marriage?" the reply being, "It teaches that if a man take a woman, he is bound to do everything that a man can for their mutual happiness." (Hear, hear.) "He should be thoughtful before marriage to see that they have a mutually suitable organisation." Comment by myself: Why is he bound to do what he can for their mutual happiness? If he wants her to help him, then, according to what we have already heard, he will help her; but if he does not want happiness from her, as Mr. Bradlaugh has implicitly stated, there is no reason why he should add to hers. Next question: "If their organisation be unsuitable, may they separate at will?" Reply: If they both be of opinion that their continued marriage union would tend to misery, it would be better for them to separate"—(hear, hear, and applause)—let me finish Mr. Bradlaugh's answer, "and that is the tendency of our present legislation." But that this may not be misunderstood, we must see what Mr. Bradlaugh means by marriage. In his debate with Mr. King, he said—

Mr. BRADLAUGH (interrupting): I beg pardon for a moment. I must object to quotations from a debate which I have repudiated, unless it is taken either from the report of the *National Reformer* or the *Bury Times*. The King Debate is one of the grossest misrepresentations that has been printed.

The CHAIRMAN: As Chairman, I think it is better that the person who is opening the discussion shall be allowed to go on in his own way, and I shall use the same argument to Dr. McCann if he interrupts Mr. Bradlaugh. I think it is better that the reply shall come in its proper place.

The Rev. Dr. McCANN: Mr. Bradlaugh may have re-

pudiated the King Debate, but does he repudiate the quotation I have given? Does it, or does it not, express his sentiments? Mr. Bradlaugh says in his debate with Mr. King, "I call every woman a wife who lives with and has children to a man." I do not blame Mr. Bradlaugh for this sentiment: it is a necessary deduction from the Secularistic theory that we are only developed brutes; for if there be no such thing as marriage amongst cattle, why should there be amongst human beings if we are only cattle of a higher order? The effect of such teaching on society, if society believed it, which fortunately society does not, would be to shake the social fabric to its foundation, and turn our country into a pandemonium. I now finish my positive work of affirming and giving my reasons for my affirmations that Secularism is Atheism, is unphilosophical, is immoral and is anti-social. I hoped to have maintained the proposition also that it is anti-secular, but if the propositions I have already advanced be true, then it necessarily follows that it must be anti-secular also, or a system opposed to our best interests for time. I now proceed to reply to some of the discursive remarks made by my opponent on last evening, which I may not have already noticed. I call them discursive, because he has not from the first attempted to follow my reasoning as a whole, but has selected words and phrases here and there, and has concentrated attention on them, as though they were the main body of my argument. Mr. Bradlaugh said that "linking together some words from an article of Mr. Symes with some words of his own could not make an argument." I never thought it could. But having concluded my argument, basing it upon its own merits, some words from Mr. Symes and some words from Mr. Bradlaugh may illustrate and confirm it. This is what I did and nothing more, and this was all Mr. Bradlaugh had to say upon the question whether society had a right to determine its own morality and to enforce its determination. My friend spent much time in asking for a definition of "I," giving one of his own which he knew I could not accept. I thought it a pity to draw off attention from the main line of thought to definitions which were not required for an adequate understanding of the subject. Surely, if my friend were very anxious to have the fundamental practical points discussed,

he would not studiously avoid them, and spend his time, and try to spend mine, on subsidiary and minute details which cannot affect the discussion much either one way or the other. (Applause.) However, I gave him a definition with which he agreed. Then I am asked: "Is not consciousness a part of the thinker—is it part of the person?" No, it is not part of the person. A thought is not an entity, but an action of the thinker. Thought and thinker are not the same, though you cannot separate the thought from the thinker except in thought. Steel is bright, but the brightness is not the steel. My friend has tried hard to get from me some acknowledgment of the untrustworthiness of consciousness, but in vain. Our senses may deceive us, as in the case of color-blindness instanced last evening, and also referred to by Huxley to show that we must rely on consciousness at last; our inferences may be illogical; our judgment warped; but our consciousness, our knowledge of our own mental states—as I have all along said, it is of that consciousness alone I am speaking—this is always trustworthy, always reliable. It is quite natural he should try to overturn this, as it cannot be pleasant for Secularists to have their system demonstrated to be unphilosophical, because they so frequently boast of their philosophical character. But perhaps it is with them as with those in France, who most loudly shouted of "liberty, equality and fraternity" when they had least of it. In reply to my question how we are to distinguish when consciousness is inaccurate and when it is accurate it is answered, "by verifying each new phase of consciousness; our verification is not always infallible, but that is the only possible way in which you can test it." But that is no test at all. You verify an unreliable consciousness by an unreliable verification. An unreliable verification is no verification; therefore, according to my friend, it is impossible to be certain when consciousness is true and when it is false. Most certainly, whatever else it may be, it is not a test of truth to Secularists. Again, I ask where are they to find such a test—a starting point in thought that cannot deceive them? If there be such starting point, where is it? If there be not, what then? (Loud continued applause.)

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Bradlaugh will now have half an hour.

Mr. BRADLAUGH then rose to make his first speech, and was received with demonstrations of enthusiasm. He said: Dr. McCann, in this debate, undertook to show that Secularism was unphilosophical, immoral and anti-social. He has sought to make this out by alleging that Secularism is Atheistic, Necessitarian and Utilitarian. Out of all these words there is only one word which he has sought to define, *i.e.*, the word Necessitarian; and he persists to-night that definitions are unimportant. But if definitions are unimportant, what is the use of using language at all? We may use the words in exactly opposite senses, or we may use the words without comprehending the senses in which we use them. All the other words which have been used by him have been used without the slightest attempt at definition or explanation. I explained at length what the word Secularism meant according to a large number of Secularists and as officially declared by the National Secular Society, but Dr. McCann has, up to the present moment, not thought fit to offer a solitary word of criticism on this explanation. He has only in his last speech used one or two words out of my first speech, but even then has not attempted any answer or criticism. He dismisses the explanation as in no manner concerning him in this debate, although many weeks ago he knew from me in writing that this would be the explanation of Secularism I should defend. He apparently will not take this as Secularism, or even as a presentment of Secularism needing the smallest examination, yet he uses detached phrases of individuals, worthy or unworthy, some of them, as Mr. Walter Lewin, being only remotely connected with Secularism by having attacked it. To-night he has referred to answers—supposed to have been given by me in various debates, and with reference to those taken from my debate with Mr. David King, I regret he has used a report which misrepresents my real views, and which puts into my mouth words which I did not utter. From the very first issue of that report—at the time when it was printed and published by Mr. David King—I denounced it a falsehood, and have repeatedly made the same denunciation. I am sure that Dr. McCann would not have quoted that if he had known that such was the case, and I am rather surprised that so attentive a reader of our literature should not have been acquainted with it. I

am sure that Dr. McCann would have preferred to refer to the *Bury Times* report, in which he would have found something a little more clear and distinct. It is so easy to give a rough turn of words to a phrase and make it seem coarse where it is not, and that is just what has been done in the case of this report published by Mr. David King. Of the word Atheism, although it was declared that Secularism was Atheism, Dr. McCann offered no definition, but was content to leave it as if everyone agreed in its meaning. By "Atheism" I mean Monism, that is the affirmation of one existence, of which existence I only know mode, each mode being distinguished in thought by its qualities. This affirmation is a positive, not a negative, affirmation, and is properly describable as Atheism, because it does not include in it any possibility of Theos. It is, because without God, distinctly an Atheistic affirmation. It is perfectly true that Secularism is without God. The word "immoral," in the question, I have defined by making utility the Secularistic test. Dr. McCann has only substituted one word "rightness" for another word "moral," and does not define either of them. (Loud applause.) Unphilosophical has passed as a big word of condemnation, but not the faintest attempt has been made to explain what is meant by philosophy, or which is the particular philosophy by which Secularism is condemned. Last week, when Dr. McCann read to you from the exposition by the late George Henry Lewes of the views of Descartes on the certitude of consciousness, I suggested that it was hardly fair to put the exposition by Mr. Lewes of the views of Descartes, as against Mr. Lewes's own and later explanation of consciousness. I understood Dr. McCann to reply that what he had read were the views of Mr. Lewes personally. Here Dr. McCann must have been misled either by an imperfect copy of Lewes's brilliant work, or in the hurry of selection he must have misread. If he will turn to the "History of Philosophy," 3rd edition, vol. ii., p. 154, he will find—a few lines lower down than where he concluded his quotation on Descartes' proposition of the certitude of consciousness—these words:—"This is the basis on which Descartes' system is erected; if this basis be rotten, the superstructure must fall. If the root is vitiated the tree will bear no fruit. No thinker, except Spinoza, has so clearly, so frankly, stated

his criterion. And the criterion is fallacious." (Loud applause.) A little lower down on the same page Lewes asks: "What ground can my consciousness afford respecting things which are not me? How does the principle of certitude apply? How far does it extend?" The quotation made by Dr. McCann, from Lewes on Schelling, was still more unhappily selected, for if Dr. McCann had read on vol. ii., p. 529, he would have found these words: "Consciousness, then, which had so long formed the basis of all philosophy, was thrown over by Schelling as incompetent to solve any of its problems. Consciousness was no ground of certitude." (Applause.) As an illustration of the difficulties which occur in defining morality, unless you have a clear test or standard, I may take the expressions of several clergymen of the Church of England in reference to the recent convictions for bribery—(loud applause)—and I am sure Dr. McCann will bear with me if I have any difficulty when I come to deal with the matter of virtue and vice. The Rev. D. Bruce Payne says, writing to the *Daily News*, that "the crime for which these men are picked out from thousands of similar offenders is not moral but political." The Vicar of Deal describes one of the very worst of the bribers as "an upright Christian gentleman." (Oh, oh!) With the Secularist bribery is wrong, not because the law forbids it, but rather because it tends to the demoralisation and degradation of the country where it is practised. (Loud cheers.) The chief briber, on behalf of whom the clergymen at Deal have interested themselves, had, on his own admission, not only bribed, but had sworn falsely, to try to conceal the fact on the trial of the election petition. He had not only taken money wherewith to bribe, but had kept part of the money back for his own profit—(oh!)—and yet here are clergymen of the Church declaring that this person has committed no moral offence, but is "an upright Christian gentleman." (Oh! and laughter.) I have no doubt Dr. McCann would say that bribery, perjury and embezzlement were immoral; but I ask him where is the test and standard by which the moral quality of such perjury, embezzlement and bribery may be determined, if not by utility? To tell me this is subsidiary, to tell me that I avoid the fundamental question in so raising it, is to use language which does not accurately convey the position I

have taken in this debate. Dr. McCann says a moral act must be done voluntarily, but he has never yet answered the question I put to him early in this debate—viz.: Why is the act following a causeless volition more moral than that following a caused volition? Unless he does this it is simply wasting time to repeat phrases about immorality of necessitated volition. Where have Necessitarians ever said that man has no power of control? From beginning to end I have taken man's organisation and antecedents, not as separate from the man, but as the man. Dr. McCann separates these to find his powerless man. Then Dr. McCann speaks of praise and blame being inconsistent with Necessitarianism. What relations have praise and blame to free volition? I can understand that a man who believes that volition is caused may use words which he thinks will change the future volition. But I cannot understand a man talking of praise or blame in reference to free volition, to which praise or blame must be as inapplicable as it is possible for anything to be. Praise and blame—that is, words of appreciation or depreciation of any acts—are used by Secularists, first because they think expressions of enlightened opinion must instruct and reform, and next because they think that expressions of enlightened public opinion may compel in the persons a change of conduct in the future. They don't praise or blame as penalty-punishment for crime in the past; they praise and blame to prevent the recurrence of the crime in the future. (Applause.) Why should you praise or blame a man with uncaused will? What is the use of talking to him at all? His volition is free! Free! Then your words are wasted; your blame is mockery! Praise and blame—that is, words of appreciation or depreciation—words pointing out the mischief or the advantage of a course, are useful when you think that a man's volition is caused. The people who listen to them may be influenced and change their conduct. Dr. McCann thinks that Mr. Bradlaugh's position is that the volition of man is the same as the volition of a plant. Luckily this debate will be in print; luckily it will be read, and one feeling of astonishment will characterise those who read these words of Dr. McCann's. They will turn through the report and they will never find any phrase like it—they will never find a phrase of mine implying any such opinion on my part as

to volition on the part of the plant. You will find phrases implying capability of selection. If you tell me that volition is necessary to that, then it is on you that the affirmation of that proposition comes, because I deal with the capacity I find, and I do not invent abilities for a thing. I wait until I have found evidence of it. But, says Dr. McCann, why not talk of a virtuous or vicious diamond? Because I apply the words virtue and vice to those actions which result in increasing happiness or diminishing it. I have never yet met an acting diamond—(loud laughter)—and have therefore had no reason to characterise its action. If Dr. McCann will give me any illustration of a diamond having done something, then I will tell him whether, in my opinion, the act which the diamond did was an act which tended to the greatest happiness of the greatest number or not. (Laughter.) Until he does that, his question to me is as sensible and as relevant as that alleged to have been put by an arithmetician to his scholars—"If a cart-load of turnips cost £5, how much would a wagon-load of herrings cost? (Laughter.) Dr. McCann says that he is not concerned with the meanings of the words virtue and vice. He declares that you all know what they mean. But, first, you don't all know what they mean. The clergymen whom I read about don't know what the words mean in relation to bribery. If we were discussing this question before these clergymen, we should very likely disagree very strongly as to the meaning of these words. (Laughter.) It is not true that virtue and vice have had a fixed and definite meaning all the world over; it is not true that the same understanding will be had of them to-day in different countries of the world; it is not true that the same understanding has attached itself to them even during a number of centuries in this country. Then Dr. McCann says that I have practically wasted time in this debate by making a demand for definitions where they were not required. I have always thought that definitions were required where it was possible that disputants did not know what they were talking about. Why! you pitch words about here without saying what you mean by them, though on each word there has been wide disagreement. There are no words as to which patient thinkers have differed more than the meaning of right and wrong, moral and immoral, virtuous and vicious—there are

no words which, if you took them round the world and put them with acts, you would find a more astonishing and conflicting variety of actions called into use by each of those very names. Then Dr. McCann says, "You cannot praise or blame." You may if you choose try to reason why we should not: to declare that we cannot is absurd; we do. He says, You cannot praise or blame, because your actions are compelled. Explain why I may not! Oh! you say, my antecedents and organisation compel me. There is no "my antecedents and organisation" apart from "me." Your organisation and antecedents make up the "me." You talk as if the antecedents and organisation were there [pointing to the other end of the Hall], and "me" here. (Loud cheers.) You speak as if poor "me" were the weakly, puny thing, and my antecedents and organisation my separate and irresistible ruler — (applause); and to show that I am not justified in this, Dr. McCann went on to say, "Would Mr. Bradlaugh blame the rose if it was a poor specimen?" No! but I might blame the gardener. (Laughter.) If I met with a Secularist and he were a poor specimen, I would try and change the conditions, so that the next Secularist would be better; and this is what is done by the gardener. They don't praise or blame the rose, but they give it more room in a new pot, fresh mould, more light, new air, fresh soil, less or more of each. They know that as they surround the rose with new conditions so the rose will be changed for better or for worse. (Laughter and applause.) The only difference between myself and Dr. McCann is that he will do with me what he will not do with the rose. He takes away my body, and then he speaks as if the body and the ability of the body were grappling with "me" and making "me" do what they wished. Why! I never propounded such a ridiculous proposition! And then there was a word of good-humored banter respecting why I should propose a vote of thanks to the chairman. If our volition is not free but determined, he says why do I go through the farce of proposing a vote of thanks to the chairman. I will tell you why I do so. I do so because I want the chairman to speak better and more fairly of us in the future—(hear, hear); and I think that the chairman may reason thus about the matter: If Mr. Bradlaugh was good enough and considerate enough to think that my con-

duct as chairman was impartial and deserved thanks, I must try and be at least as good as Mr. Bradlaugh by-and-bye. (Laughter.) Well, now! I may be wrong in that, but still—(renewed laughter)—still that is the sort of reasoning which influences me in proposing that vote. Now we are told that Mr. Bradlaugh has shown that he does not believe in the power of anyone to will any actions. When did I say anything so absurd? The fact is, our friend listens to what I ought to say, according to him, and not to what I do say. He had, with scissors and paste, before he came here, from a huge number of Secularist writings, cut out a man of straw, and he occupies himself in refuting his arguments, and does not touch the arguments I have brought forward in this debate. To say that I do not believe in the power of anyone to will action is to misrepresent the position I have taken in this debate. On the contrary I tried so to define volition—I tried so to picture volition as the phase of mind, often immediately precedent to action—I tried so to put this as to show how each mental phase succeeded until the individual willed. I may have failed; I dare say I did fail, but, at any rate, I never denied man's ability to will any more than I deny man's ability to strike. What we differ about is as to whether the will is in any fashion determined. Our friend says it is free, and then that it is limited to a certain extent, and to the rest of the way it is free—it is tied and it is loosed; and this is the sort of thing which I have to meet in this debate. Then Dr. McCann lays down the proposition that Secularism is anti-social, and that it is practically opposed to the best interests of society; but we have not been told, even in the opinion of Dr. McCann, what the best interests of society are; and I ask, who is to judge them? who is to say what the best interests of society really may be? Take the Irish landlords. There are people alive now who think that the best interests of society consist in maintaining the laws which have enabled them to rob and oppress their fellow-men. It is no use repeating phrases like these about the best interests of society. We must know what they mean. We have been told by Dr. McCann that if a man's volition be determined it is wrong to punish him for acts committed which are injurious to the best interests of society. Permit me to point out that punishment is a different thing from vengeance. Punishment is utterly useless,

except so far as it is administered for the prevention of crime in the future. If it is simply vindictive punishment, then that punishment is in itself a crime. Then he says that we teach that morality consists in pleasing ourselves; but he does not tell you what we mean by pleasure. We teach that the best pleasure to oneself is found in the endeavor to increase the pleasure of those around us. By pleasure we do not mean some low type which he may choose to select. We mean a high—we mean a lofty, a thorough and a clear type; and here I will deal with what Dr. McCann says about disinterested love not being possible to a Secularist. Last week I invited Dr. McCann to give some illustration of what he meant, this he has not done. Of course you may take illustrations of the love of a mother for her child, of a man for his wife, of a woman or man for her or his country, in all of which there may be personal suffering endured through and because of this love. But in each case the individual suffering would be less happy if recreant to the love, although by so being recreant she or he escaped the personal suffering. The happiness of such sacrifice may and does differ in quality, but it is happiness, and I should allege far higher happiness than that of the escape of recreancy. We are told that Secularism denies that any action can be virtuous or vicious. There, again, we have still the putting into my mouth words which put upon me meanings which Dr. McCann invents. I do not mean invents in any unfair sense, that he knows them not to be true, but invents, possibly, because he himself does not understand the position we take. He says, with reference to adultery—he says that according to us there cannot be such things as useless acts. An act cannot be neutral; it must either be for good or for mischief. You say that an act can be neutral. Give me an illustration. It is a question of usefulness or mischief; it is a question of increasing the general happiness or diminishing it. Dr. McCann has introduced another set of acts which are neither virtuous nor vicious, and which he himself has got to explain. He was excessively unfair—I hope he won't think I mean intentionally so—but he was excessively unfair in the comment he made on my answers which he quoted from the Baylee debate. I think I did wrong in rising—Mrs. Besant checked me in so doing;, but I rose because it was so difficult for the audience to understand how

much was comment and how much was quoted. It is perfectly true that Dr. McCann was good enough to state afterwards which was quotation and which was comment; but I have to object that I did not say that it was the duty of a husband to prevent the recurrence of his wife's adultery. You won't find that word "recurrence" there. I said it was the duty of the husband with his wife to prevent the happening; and if the husband loves his wife—if they tried before marriage to understand one another, and to see that they were suited for each other—then the good husband does prevent, not the recurrence of the act, but the possibility of it. (Applause.) I will deal with the responsibility question when I speak again. Then Dr. McCann asks me why is a man bound to do what he can for the mutual happiness of himself and wife? Why? Because in increasing the happiness of the domestic circle he increases the tendency and power of each member of that circle to make happiness in the society to which it belongs. Because each member of that circle may become the centre of such another circle, and so the happiness of one spreads out more and more widely, increasing the general good. You have no such inducement, but the Secularist has. If you say you have, show me where you have. Don't simply fling bricks of opprobrious words at us. Show some stones of your own morality for us to judge. (Loud cheers and cries of "Bravo.")

The Rev. Dr. McCann: I will reply very briefly to what Mr. Bradlaugh has raised in his last speech, and then go on to reply to what he said before. First with regard to Atheism. It does not concern the question what Atheism is. (Oh.) Let Atheism be what it may, it is not the purpose to discuss the truth or falsehood of Atheism in the debate. Secularism is Atheism, let Atheism be what it may. My definition of Secularism was that it is Atheism; that Mr. Bradlaugh has acknowledged, and my work there is ended. (Hisses and interruption.) Mr. Bradlaugh objects to my quotation from Mr. Lewes, which he says does not represent the view of the writer of the History of Philosophy. It was Mr. Lewes' own sentiment that I quoted, and not his statement of the opinions of any other philosopher. He speaks of consciousness being the basis of all philosophy, and he says that if that be rotten the superstructure will fall, but he does not himself hold that that

basis is rotten. He states that Spinoza held that the basis was rotten, but this was not the teaching of Lewes himself. But I have a later work of Lewes' here—"The Problems of Life and Mind;" and, at page 277, vol. i., I read these words, "Consciousness is admitted to be the only ground of certitude." I have here "The Physical Basis of Mind," and at page 334 we read—"We are all agreed that Consciousness is the final arbiter."

Then we have heard a good deal from Mr. Bradlaugh about the opinions of certain clergymen on the bribery question. In reference to that, I will only say that my subject here is the morality of Secularism, and not the morality of clergymen. (Laughter.) Mr. Bradlaugh goes on to ask me "why an uncaused volition should be more moral than a caused volition?" I reply, I do not know, because an uncaused volition I never heard of. All changes are caused. But my friends on the left have no philosophical right to use the word "causation" at all, because their theory is that they know nothing of causation; they only know of antecedents followed by certain consequents. I hold that all changes in the world are caused, and therefore volitions must be caused too. I have contended that utility has nothing whatever to do with the morality of an action; and also if a man's volition be not free he cannot be praised or blamed. I do not say you cannot physically praise or blame; what I do say is, you ought not to do either. (Laughter.) I never denied your physical ability to do so, but what I say is you cannot consistently praise a man for doing what he could not help doing—and you cannot blame a man consistently for doing what he cannot help doing. (Laughter and applause.) I may not dwell the whole evening on this point. I shall now show you that Mr. Bradlaugh denies will altogether of man. He has not spoken of the volition of a plant, but he has referred men and plants to the same category of caused actions. And then he says that if the rose were a poor specimen he would not blame the rose, he would blame the gardener. I blame the gardener, but it is the rose I am talking about—not the gardener. Mr. Bradlaugh, you see, goes outside the rose for blame. You cannot blame the rose. And, therefore, if you are to blame anything, blame something outside me, don't blame me; blame my antecedents if you like, blame my

organisation, but don't blame me—blame the gardener. (Much laughter.) Then our friend found fault with me because I used the term my organisation, my volition, my will; and Mr. Bradlaugh says I speak of these as though they were something beyond "me." Does Mr. Bradlaugh never say my bones, my limbs, my brains, my eye, my hand; and when he does, does it mean his hand is out there beyond him? I still say my organisation, I still say my thought, and my volitions, without, for for one moment, attempting to affirm that consciousness or volition is an entity or not an entity. Then he found fault with me, again, for not defining virtue and vice, and he says that the conceptions regarding virtue and vice vary in different countries. On one point, they have never varied, and never can vary. Wherever there was an action, whether virtuous or vicious, it was a voluntary action. This one point has always been attributed to virtuous and vicious actions—they must be done by the man himself, and not by his antecedents or his organisation—(laughter)—they must be done voluntarily, by exerting his own will, selecting one action rather than another action himself; because, if he did not select the action, then it was not his action at all. The action must be selected by you to become your action, and if it be not your action, you cannot call it a virtue or a vicious action. Now, I will reply to what Mr. Bradlaugh had previously advanced. I have been struggling to get from Mr. Bradlaugh the acknowledgment, in so many words, that men have no will. All his illustrations and his reasonings have involved it; but he did not state it till last night. He then said, "He tells you I did not distinguish between volition and will. The words to me mean the same. I do not know some big lump 'will;' I do not know some complete entity 'will;' I do not know some ability marked 'will,' each activity of which is a volition. I only know the effective volition consequent upon antecedents." There I want nothing more on that subject, as man, it is affirmed, is without "will." In my view will is partly determined and partly free; and once more I say that, asking me for the line of demarcation between the freedom and the determination, is asking me for the impossible. Will Mr. Bradlaugh draw me the line between ignorance and learning, and tell me where ignorance ends and learning

commences? (Applause and laughter.) When he does that I will draw the line between determination and freedom. It is made a ground of complaint against me that when I wanted a definition of morality I did not go to the principles quoted by Mr. Bradlaugh in his first speech, and which were so carefully drawn up by the Committee of the Secular Society. In the first place, it was not for Mr. Bradlaugh to define Secularism; it was for me to define Secularism. He could object to my definition if he chose, but he was to follow my lead; I was not to follow Mr. Bradlaugh's lead. I thought the "Text Book of Freethought" as good a place to go to as any, and now I am glad I did not go to those principles, as it would only have been a waste of time, as there is no definition of morality there whatever. We are told what Secularists consider a test of morality, but we are not told what morality is. Telling me how I can test the presence of an acid is not saying what the acid is. Nitric acid may be a test for gold, but nitric acid is not gold. (Much laughter.) If that be your chemistry, to think nitric acid gold, I have nothing further to say! (Renewed laughter.) The word test, here, is altogether inappropriate. Utility may be to others a test for morality, but not to the Secularist. The Secularist test is the very thing we want to get at, but which apparently does not exist. Mr. Bradlaugh says he knows what is useful to-day, but cannot tell us what may be useful to-morrow. That is, he has a test for the morality of to-day, but none for that of to-morrow; that what is morality to-day may be immorality to-morrow; that what was immorality yesterday may be moral to-day; so that morality is so fluctuating a thing that you never know where to have it. (Oh, oh, and applause). He tells me that I have given him no test for my morality, but he forgets that I am discussing, not my morality, but his. (Hear, hear.) I wish to know about his tests; he has at present no concern with mine. (Oh!) I prefer discussing one subject at a time; and when I say that utility is not morality, I define so far only as to enable him to understand why I say it is not morality. I define morality as rightness, and what I mean by rightness I leave to the general judgment of thinkers. (Oh, oh, and laughter.) I appeal to the practical judgment of mankind. Why! we might spend night after night on logical definitions without being any

the wiser. (Laughter.) All I want to make clear now is, that when we say an action is useful we refer to one quality, but when we say it is right we mean something else—never mind what else—(laughter, and oh, oh)—something else. It is sufficient to show that the words referring to utility and the words referring to morality are not interchangeable terms, and, if not, then morality and utility are not the same thing. But Mr. Bradlaugh further charges me with being unfair because I say that Mr. Mill is inconsistent when he adds quality of pleasure to quantity. Why unfair? I do not take away any quality of pleasure, as is asserted, but I do say that utility has nothing whatever to do with quality of pleasure. Will Mr. Bradlaugh show that it has. If the greatest number should find their happiness in the most grovelling vices, whatever contributes to their happiness must be in harmony with Secular morality. (Hear, hear.) I am asked to give an illustration of a moral act that is not a useful act. I cannot—for, as I have already said, I believe all moral acts are useful. I am also asked to name a useful act that is not moral. Of course, from a Secular point of view it would be impossible, as they are the same things. I could not name even the ripening of an apple, for that is useful and contributes to the happiness of some, and is therefore moral. From my own point of view I have given one in the case of the musician playing only for pay. I am also asked, in reference to champagne, why a pleasurable action may not be a moral act. I see no reason why it should not; but the pleasure is one thing and the morality is another. I see no reason why a red body should not be a round body, but redness is one thing and the roundness another. The further query put to me: "Why should not the selfish thing be also a moral thing?" Because morality, as understood by all but utilitarians, excludes selfishness. Selfishness, however, according to Mr. Bradlaugh, is the highest morality. He will not permit me to say that he does good for its own sake. He said, and with the approval of his followers here, that he would increase the general amount of happiness because by that means he would increase his own. That is, he sells his activities as the baker sells his loaves, for what he can get for them. Mr. Bradlaugh says he never saw an active diamond that gave pleasure. I never saw an inactive diamond, or one that did not.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: I never said that. I never said that I never saw an active diamond that gave happiness. I never saw an active diamond at all. What I said was that I never met with an acting diamond, which is a very different thing from the words which are put into my mouth. I am sure Dr. McCann would not misrepresent me intentionally. May I beg you to be very patient with Dr. McCann in his next speech—the closing one on his part in this debate—so that we may conclude in orderly fashion? Dr. McCann has asked me to draw the line between ignorance and learning, and he asks me to tell him where one finishes and the other commences. Luckily, I had prepared a very small piece bearing upon that, which I will read to you. Dr. McCann, substituting inaccurately knowledge for consciousness, defines knowledge as certainty, and jests with me, that, if not, increase of knowledge may mean increase of error. But what is understood by Dr. McCann in thus using the word knowledge? The Mahomedan knows that there is one God, and that Mahomed is his prophet. The Trinitarian knows that Christ is God. The Unitarian knows that Christ is not God. Dr. McCann may answer that these are not cases of knowledge, but of belief. Therefore I will take another illustration. A man knows that a cloth is red, another man—color-blind—knows that the same cloth is green. If Dr. McCann should say, as he may well do, that these are not illustrations of knowledge, will he give one illustration which he thinks accurate to guide us? Does knowing a thing mean more than that in thought we distinguish the thing perceived from other things—that is, from other phænomena? We so distinguish it, accurately or inaccurately, according to our sensative abilities and their efficiency. The accurate distinguishment of phænomena I should describe as knowledge. Ignorance I should describe as the inaccurate attempt at distinguishment, as the inaccurate result of imperfect distinguishment. Knowledge I should define as commencing when clear and accurate distinguishment is, and that distinguishment is remembered. Dr. McCann says it "does not concern him what Atheism is." "It may be what it likes." No! but is it what I define it? Because, if it be what I define it, all that you said about it amounts to nothing. I am sorry that Dr. McCann, too, did not appreciate what I put as to Lewes.

Either I have misunderstood his answer, or it was not quite accurate. If you refer to the pages of Lewes which I gave, you will see that I have been specifically accurate, and when Dr. McCann spoke of Lewes as if saying that Spinoza was fallacious, and replying that Lewes did not say that, the fallaciousness of Spinoza does not enter into the quotation. The only phrase relating to Spinoza is, "No thinker except Spinoza has so clearly, so frankly stated his criterion." What Lewes meant by that was this: Whether you agree with Spinoza or not, he writes very clearly what he means to convey. Lewes said Spinoza has done this clearly; Descartes did it clearly, too; and the criterion of Descartes so clearly given is fallacious. The words are here, and there is no excuse for saying that I have not correctly represented the quotations and the consequence of them. It will be a matter for you to examine when you read the debate. It is not a question of what is the ground of certitude, but whether consciousness itself is the measure of certitude, and whether that what you determine is your consciousness is therefore certain; because you so put it. Remember that I, myself, have put it that to make up consciousness you have perception, memory of perception, reflection upon these, conception as to and founded on these, judgment and discrimination in relation to perception and conception; and the exactitude of each and all of these goes to make up any certitude there is. But then the question comes, may not there be points in all these stages of inability to distinguish, and of inability to remember the points of distinguishment? Dr. McCann says he does not hold the doctrine of uncaused will. He affirms all changes are caused. By what is volition caused, according to him? If you say you don't know—which you have a perfect right to say—then all this debate is beside the question, and you should never have entered into it. We are told that we cannot consistently praise or blame the man. We can consistently praise or blame the man, that is—and I was careful to put what I meant by praise and blame in my last speech—we can express our appreciation of the act done, and we can apply this with advice to the repetition or advice against the recurrence of the act; because we hold that that advice, and the strong expression of our opinion, may influence the man—may influence the

future action about it. Then with regard to the rose and the gardener. I will not do Dr. McCann the injustice of supposing that he did not listen to what I said. I pointed out why I might blame the gardener. I might see whether or not the gardener had attended to his business—whether or not he knew the best kinds of soil and surroundings for his rose tree, and then I should blame him in the sense of instructing him so that he might do better in the future, and I should especially instruct him in making that point of rose culture better in the future which had been worse in the past. Our friend puts it as though I made—as perhaps he does—some mighty gardener who was responsible for the morality of the world. But, says Dr. McCann, I do distinguish between the organisation and the individual. I spoke of my hand. What did I mean by that? My hand! But you don't say my hand gripped me in spite of myself and put me on the broad of my back—(laughter)—and you did wish to put it as if I urged that the antecedents and the organisation compelled me. You did distinguish and did make them into separate things, whether, in your mind, they are entities or not. Well, then, we are told that there is one thing the world is always agreed about, and that is—it is rather rash to say what the world is altogether agreed about—that all actions, whether they be regarded as moral or immoral, virtuous or vicious, are regarded as voluntary. Will you please tell me, excepting certain reflex actions, on which I would rather express no opinion in this debate, as not affecting its subject-matter, what you mean by a voluntary or an involuntary act. Explain to me, so that I may see that you have formulated, even to yourself, any distinction at all. I should put it to you that all actions are voluntary actions—eliminating, for the moment, and avoiding any declaration that they are not voluntary—all reflex actions. Now Dr. McCann says that I know nothing of volition except as consequent on antecedents, and he seemed to contend from that that I denied volition altogether. I do not see any connection between the two propositions. I make an affirmation of volition of a most distinct character, and it is for you to say anything opposed to that. When you have told me that volition is caused, it is for you to show how that differs from volition consequent on antecedents. Show me what

the difference is between succeeding that which is antecedent to it in consequence of the antecedents having happened, and being caused. (Applause.) Will, then, Dr. McCann say that it was for him to define Secularism and for me to object? But I did object—(laughter)—and I gave what I said was the more accurate definition of it, and you have never answered it. You say you have nothing to do with the Secularism explained in my first speech. You should have told me this when I informed you that the Secularism I should defend would be that of the National Secular Society. Then we are told that I have said we have no code of morality, for what is morality to-day is immorality to-morrow. I think what I said was that we could only judge of what was useful—what was moral—by the knowledge of to-day, but that the knowledge of to-morrow might throw fresh light and teach us that other things were morality which we to-day knew not of. I think I have always distinguished and clearly put it that the only way in which you can estimate the utility of an action is by the best judgment of the period in which the action takes place. But to put it in the way Dr. McCann has done is not answering me, but only misrepresenting what I say. Then he says that utility is not morality, for it must be right as well as useful. What do you mean by right? It is not enough when you say an action is right, and therefore it is morality. What is moral? Oh! he says, never mind what that means. But I do mind what it means. What is the use of debating it if we never mind what it means. Do you know what it means? I don't think you do. I don't think you have refrained from telling us what it means; I think that you have been unable to tell us. I don't think you have any test, any standard, which you are willing to submit to criticism. You may have some code of laws, some standard, which you withhold because you are afraid to submit it to my examination. (Loud continued cheers and cries of bravo.) You may have some language, some decree of some head gardener, and you may not want me to look into it. But except that which you dare not bring here I do not think you have anything at all to produce to us. Then Dr. McCann asks me will I show him what utility has to do with the quality of pleasure. Utility is the greatest happiness of the greatest number. The greatest happiness

is the greatest happiness, the measure of quality is the measure of the greatness of it, and therefore the volition has to do with the quality of happiness. In his first speech Dr. McCann asked me if I did not accept his quotation from the King Debate on marriage to state my real view, and I will, therefore, explain what I mean by marriage, on which subject I have not been fairly represented. I mean by marriage, apart from all churches and chapels—(hear, hear)—apart from all laws, all States, when one man and one woman, honestly, lovingly, and truly unite themselves to one another, intending to try to make the happiness of each more complete through life. (Applause.) I know that some countries have fixed vile ceremonies, that some have added religious forms to marriage. I know that vile customs have been practised with reference to it. I know that in some countries they slit men's faces to mark the act of marriage; and I ask you is it one of these customs or ceremonies you want to put, as making marriage, or what other view of marriage against me dare you put than the one I have given? (Loud continued cheering.)

The Rev. Dr. McCann: Mr. Bradlaugh has objected to my changing the word immoral into useless, because he says there are no acts which are useless acts; and, if you introduce a third class of acts, you acknowledge there are actions which are neither virtuous nor vicious. I at once admit there are acts which are neither useful nor useless—indifferent acts. If I look at a picture, I don't call that action necessarily either virtuous or vicious; it is an example of actions which are neither useful nor pernicious. Then, with reference to my quotation from the Baylee Debate, I have not the pamphlet with me, but, so far as I remember, Dr. Baylee was supposing the case of a man who had committed the act—what responsibility had he to the husband? And the reply is that the husband should do the best to prevent the happening of the action again, or the recurrence of the action. This, at least, is what Mr. Bradlaugh has stated in substance. Then he has defined learning and ignorance, and I can also define necessity and freedom in volition; but that does not tell me where to draw the universal line. We are told that where ignorance ends knowledge begins. Well, of course it does; and where determination ends, there freedom begins. But to say you can draw one

line for all human beings is to say that all human beings are equally ignorant or equally learned. About the veracity of consciousness, Mr. Bradlaugh tell us that one man knows cloth to be red, and another knows that cloth to be green. They know nothing of the kind. I was speaking of subjective and not of objective consciousness. Professor Huxley refers to color-blindness to show that our senses deceive us; we must have something beyond our senses to give us certainty. (Laughter and interruption.) With reference to Lewes, I will only say that the debate will be printed, and the words will be there; and in your calm and quiet moments read the debate and compare one side with the other. I am perfectly content to abide by your verdict. I never intended to imply anything so absurd as that Mr. Bradlaugh had made a mighty gardener, because he said that the blame ought to be given to the gardener, and not to the rose. Then I stated that one quality of every act called virtuous or vicious was that it must, in all cases, be voluntary, and Mr. Bradlaugh asks me, what is voluntary? That does not touch my affirmation. Before a man apprehends an act to be virtuous or vicious it must be what he believes to be a voluntary act; and if the act were believed to be an involuntary one, you would neither call it virtue nor vice. Then with regard to praise and blame. I must explain that I was talking about the praise of a person and not of an act. You may praise an act, and dispraise a person. (Hisses, interruption, and cheers.) I am exclusively speaking now of praising or blaming persons. My part in this debate now draws to a close, and it becomes my duty to epitomise on my side what has been done, and how far I think I have succeeded or failed. But, before doing so, allow me to thank my opponent for the courtesy with which I have been treated. I have done all I could, consistently with my duty, to avoid any personal references that might arouse angry feelings; my friend has done the same. I am always willing to argue, but I cannot condescend to quarrel—(applause)—and if all controversies were conducted as harmoniously as ours has been, it would, I think, be better for the cause of truth. My object in this debate has been not so much to prove the abstract truth or falseness of the Secularist positions, as to have those positions explained and

acknowledged, as I consider this their best refutation. Secularists indulge in so many fine phrases, and profess so much earnestness in the cause of a deluded humanity, and so much heroism in the cause of civil and religious liberty, that it becomes necessary to see whether all this be as fair as it looks, whether the blossom that promises so much be healthy, or whether there be not some hidden worm there that will prevent the blossom setting into fruit. I at once say that my object has been fully attained—(a voice: "How about the gardener?" and laughter)—that my opponent has granted all my important positions—(interruption)—yielding without a struggle what I fancied he would fight for, and only showing fight over some distant outpost which was not of much comparative importance to either party. However, he knew his own forces best, and if he had no hope of capturing my citadel, his best policy was to blaze away at the outer lines. I now proceed to show rapidly that I am justified in saying this. I begin with Mr. Bradlaugh's denials, as they are the fewest in number, in fact the only important one is that consciousness is reliable. This he denies most emphatically, and with a perseverance and reiteration that I thought quite unnecessary when there were other matters to decide. His reasons will form interesting and suggestive reading when the debate is published. It is Mr. Bradlaugh on the one side and the best psychologists on the other. His confessions are almost as complete as I could wish them. He has confessed that Secularism is Atheism with all that Atheism involves; that Secularism is Necessitarianism, denying all will to man, all power of self-control, all choice, all agency in action, reducing him to the level of the plant so far as will is concerned—neither having any; that while man is higher in degree in other respects he is no higher in this—the most important of all; the plant and mineral being only the transmitters of received force. No wonder Mr. Bradlaugh did his very utmost to shake the reliability of consciousness, as consciousness gives the lie direct to degradation such as this. It has been confessed that Secular morality is utility; it knows nothing higher than usefulness—nay, it knows nothing so high, for its usefulness means usefulness ultimately to self. Mr. Bradlaugh told us the highest morality (that is, Secular

morality) is selfishness. Selfishness, then, is the highest motive force of Secularism. But is selfishness the regenerator of society? Is selfishness the purifier of the lives of men? Is selfishness the inspirer of sympathy? Does selfishness keep a mother tending her sick child at the risk of her own life? Does selfishness take the volunteer into the forlorn hope, with almost certain destruction before him? Does selfishness take the miner down the shaft, with suffocation threatening him on every side? Does selfishness man the lifeboat, with death riding on the crest of every wave? (Applause.) Does selfishness, or ever did or could selfishness, do anything great, or grand, or glorious in the world? The fact is, selfishness is nothing more than Epicureanism—(laughter)—nothing more nor less than the desire for pleasure. The only reply to my affirmation that moral actions were voluntary, is the question, What do I mean by voluntary? All I said about virtue and vice is dismissed with the remark, that men have differed as to what is virtuous and what is vicious. I have not been told why if virtue be attributed to men, it should not also be to plants. Praise and blame have been transferred from the rose to the gardener, and from the person to his acts. Nothing has been said in reply to my charge that Secularism is a bundle of contradictions—that Secularism is anti-social. I have abundantly shown by its denial of responsibility between man and man, and the position in which it places virtue and vice, praise and blame. It has not been denied that it contradicts consciousness, has no absolute standard of truth or morality; that society has a right to determine its own morality, and enforce its own determination. What more could be confessed against Secularism than all this my opponent has confessed, I am at loss to imagine. Mr. Bradlaugh has said that he tries to make more Atheists every day. I do not envy him his task. I try to unmake Atheists when I meet them —(hisses and interruption)—therefore I am here to-night because I believe Secularism to be destructive of all that is noblest and best in man. I have stated the reasons of my belief as fairly, as honestly, and as kindly as I could. I hope I may leave no enemy behind me—(hear, hear)—and my final and sincerest utterance is that we may all at last be found on the side of truth. (Loud continued cheers and

cries of bravo, during which Dr. McCann resumed his seat.)

Mr. BRADLAUGH: If the Rev. Dr. McCann is no better acquainted with Secularism than he appears to be with Epicureanism when he says that Epicureanism is selfishness, it is perhaps not surprising that we make little progress in our debate. I won't do Dr. McCann the injustice of supposing that he has read the debate between Dr. Baylee and myself, so I will not accuse him of intentionally misrepresenting me or my views; I can only suppose that he has taken the extracts which he has used against me to-night from a report full of wilful misrepresentations of my utterances—such, for instance, as that published by a wretched scoundrel like Henry Varley—a report which omits every word which will do me any good, and puts in every word which, torn from its context, is likely to do mischief to me. As Dr. McCann was quoting from that debate answers purporting to have been given by myself, I thought that some of the phrases did not seem to be quite complete; but as twenty long years has passed since the debate took place, I hoped my memory might have mislead me. I therefore sent for a copy of the debate, which I now hold in my hand, and from which I will read the answers of which Dr. McCann has only read you disjointed sentences. In so doing I must express my regret that Dr. McCann did not think it worth while to obtain an original report, instead of quoting third or fourth-hand from a sixpenny debate.

Dr. MCCANN was understood to intimate that the edition he quoted from was a report issued by Dr. Baylee.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: This (holding up a pamphlet) is a copy of a report of which some sixty thousand have been sold during the last twenty years, and it is the only report of the existence of which I am aware. If Dr. Baylee has issued one, and has been as dishonest in his representations as Mr. Varley has been, I can only say that I regret there are two of them. I have to thank my co-worker, Mrs. Besant, who pointed out to me that there was a difference between the answers read by Dr. McCann and the report which I hold in my hand, and drew my attention to the difference, so that I should not be burdened with words which I had not uttered; and I will read to you from this report the answers of mine which Dr. McCann partially

quoted, so that you may be able to see for yourselves the misrepresentations of which I complain. Dr. Baylee asks: "To whom is man responsible?"—I reply: "I do not know that he is responsible to anyone." Dr. Baylee: "Then if a man commit adultery is he responsible to no one?"—Answer: "If by responsibility you mean does the commission of an immorality tend to misery, yes; if you mean more than that, no." Dr. Baylee: "Is he not responsible to the husband?"—and here is where you will find a difference occurs—"One must have the whole of the circumstances to say yes or no. Suppose a husband were unkind to his wife,"—and here Dr. McCann stopped, leaving out the next words: "suppose a husband were unkind to his wife, that he turned her into the street for the basest of purposes, would your question apply to such a husband?" (Loud applause.) I rose at that answer, as mutilated by Dr. McCann, because I knew there was something wrong as it was put to you. However, this is not the strongest. Dr. Baylee continues: "Is he responsible to a good and kind husband?"—My answer was: "If by responsible you mean, should a good husband take measure to prevent the commission of adultery, yes; if more, what do you mean?"—that is, prevent the commission, not the recurrence. Dr. Baylee: "After the act of adultery, is he responsible to a good and kind husband?"—Myself: "As you have given no further explanation of what you mean by responsibility, I have no further answer to give." Dr. Baylee: "I mean responsibility in its common, popular sense."—Myself: "You and I disagree as to the common, popular sense of words. Give me your definition of the word 'responsibility.'" Dr. Baylee: "Do you refuse to answer the question?"—Answer: "If you refuse to define the word 'responsibility'—yes." All that was omitted in reading it to you. Dr. Baylee: "What do you suppose will all sane persons judge of your refusal?"—Answer: "That you did not find it convenient to define the word you used, and that I was not foolish enough to answer a question until we both agreed upon its meaning." (Applause and laughter.) Dr. Baylee: "Has the husband a right to inflict any punishment on the adulterer?"—I replied: "I do not understand what you mean by a right; but if a man were to rob me of that which I prize more

than all the world besides, then if I came upon him in hot blood in the excitement of passion, I should probably kill him, because my passions might be stronger than my reason. If I came on him when my passion had cooled, I cannot so certainly speak as to the result. Others might be of stronger organisation, others again of weaker frame, and their conduct would necessarily vary." Dr. Baylee then asked me: "Has society a right to punish the adulterer?" —and I answered him: "Society is bound to do that which will prevent the commission of immoral deeds. Punishment should only be preventive of future crime, not vengeance for that which has passed." (Bravo and applause.) Now, I ask you, was that which was read to you by Dr. McCann a fair representation of my answer? It was not even anything like it. I do Dr. McCann the justice of supposing that—although he appears to be thoroughly well acquainted with all my debates, and that he knows that I have published versions of most of them—I do him the justice of supposing that he was ignorant of the existence of this, or I feel sure that he would have thought it due to me to quote from this report, and not to use one that perverts the views which I take as to marriage with the object of injuring me. In order that you may be perfectly clear as to my utterance in this debate with Dr. Baylee on this important point, I will read to you the answer on marriage to Dr. Baylee's question, for, curiously enough, that was stopped in the same way. Dr. Baylee asks—"What does Atheism teach about marriage?" Answer—"It teaches that if a man take a woman he is bound to do everything that a man can for their mutual happiness, also the woman for the man. It teaches that the man and the woman should be thoughtful before marriage, to see that they have a mutually suitable organisation; that they should endeavour to thoroughly understand and appreciate each other; that the man and the woman have equal rights and duties, that, on the whole, the man is not inferior to the woman, that the woman is not inferior to the man, but in the speciality of each there is much that the other cannot do." Dr. Baylee then asks: "If their organisation be unsuitable, may they separate at will?" To which I replied: "If they both be of opinion that their continued union would tend to misery, it would be better for them to separate than to live

in strife and unhappiness; and that is a principle now fully recognised in the tendency of our present legislation." Surely, when you are trying to represent that our views on marriage are abominable views—surely it would only be just to try and see whether you are giving the most accurate version of them—(Bravo)—or whether you may not possibly, from the hands of a hostile and very unscrupulous antagonist, be taking what we have not said, and may be using an untruth to discredit us. And you must remember that no man has ever yet had to charge me with publishing an incorrect report of any debate that I have ever held. My own reports have been used by my antagonists, and it has never been alleged against me—bad as some of my enemies would make me out to be—that I have descended so low as to publish an inaccurate report. And here let me complain that Dr. McCann persists in substituting the word pleasure for happiness throughout this debate. Whether he thinks that the word pleasure will give you a lower opinion of our creed or not I do not know, but he speaks of the greatest pleasure for the selfish person in such a way as would lead you to suppose that we advocated the pleasure of individuals instead of the happiness of all: thus putting upon us a doctrine we do not hold. Then, Dr. McCann says that there are acts which are neither virtuous nor vicious. If he looks at a picture or reads a poem, that is an act, according to him, which can neither be characterised as a virtuous or a vicious action. Now, it may be either. It may be either a virtuous act or a vicious act. It depends entirely upon the picture and the poetry—(applause)—and the illustration is one of the most unfortunate that could possibly have been used. Then Dr. McCann says that knowledge and ignorance cannot be separated. But surely this is merely to play with words. I defined what I meant by "knowledge," and pointed out the particular point in the definition where I said there was ignorance and where there was not. Then, all through this debate until to-night consciousness, according to Dr. McCann, was one and invariable. To-night, for the first time, we hear of the existence of two consciousnesses—objective and subjective. Not until the last speech in the debate—when he knows no new matter may be introduced in answer by me—does Dr. McCann say one

word about this other consciousness, which has been carefully concealed in a back pocket, and only brought out at the eleventh hour. And then we are asked is selfishness this, that, or the other, and will it take the miner down the shaft of an exploded mine? With selfishness, as such, I am not here concerned; but if you mean, will Secularism do so, yes! When flame burst out in Swaithe Main pit, when the stifling gas rolled up, when men were in peril below, and all round the pit mouth shrunk back; when to descend seemed certain death, and all feared to face it, then it was William Washington, an Atheist, a Secularist, who sprang into the cage, and set the example of perilling life to save those below. (Bravo, and loud applause.) As president of the National Secular Society I had the good fortune to present him with the testimonial which was awarded to him for his brave conduct. (Applause.) You say in answer to my declaration that I tried to make Atheists, that you try to unmake them. Yes; but there is one difference—I succeed. (Loud cheers.) You ask, is Secularism an inspirer of sympathy; will it tend to regenerate the world; will it act as a purifier of the lives of men; will it make a man fling himself into the forlorn hope? Yes it will, and it has done so with me. Name one struggle for liberty within the last twenty-five years in which I have not engaged, one great reform for which I have not labored? When your bishops were voting for an unjust war, when your Christian Jingoes came with bludgeons in favor of war into Hyde Park—when the clergy were silent—it was I, the Secularist, who lifted up my voice for peace at the peril of my life. (Loud applause.) It inspires us to try, because in the very inspiration, in the trying, we have a happiness of which you can know nothing. I do not know whether you have any morality at all. You have kept it from us in this debate if you have any, and you have shown that you did not understand ours. You have said that ours has failed; but you have not shown where. You have indulged in denunciation, repetitions of denunciations, and then you say that I have only attacked your outworks. Outworks! Your very citadel is but a mud fort, fenced about with a few rotten bamboos; it is taken, and in its very midst we have planted the flag of truth, and it flies there and has not been touched. (Loud cheers.)

I cannot pretend to vie with you in figures of speech. I cannot pretend, because I always try to make mine fit in with the subject to which I apply them, and you take a wider license. But we assail the fort of bigotry, of prejudice, of ignorance, the fort held by those who call actions immoral because they do not comprehend them, who denounce those who toil for the greatest happiness of the community without trying to emulate them, who invent, and then blame us for the invention, who take our views from our antagonists, and not from ourselves. I, too, am satisfied with this debate; not as well satisfied as if you had examined the views I hold and demonstrated their error, but satisfied because I take it that from one so able, one so practised, one so thoroughly reputed as of great ability amongst those to whom he belongs, I take it he has said the worst that could be said of Secularism, and those who hear or read will judge its value. They will also rate at its true worth the miserable artifice of quoting something which was not said in a debate twenty years ago, and representing that as Secularism. I do not mean that Dr. McCann has done this—he has been misled by those by whom he is put forward, the Varleys, and the vile things who, in fields and open spaces, where we are not to answer for ourselves, stab our reputation and our children's, and try to make a prejudice against us, that even in the House of Commons itself may be used for want of a better weapon. In this debate I have spoken as the representative of the National Secular Society, and in defending the principles of Secularism I have undertaken no new task. The views I have here defended have been mine for many a long year, and in their defence I have never flinched, I have never wavered. I put them to you to-day, as I did when I was a boy in Bonner's Fields, and I am no more ashamed of them now than I was then. (Prolonged enthusiastic cheering.)

On the motion of Mr. Bradlaugh, seconded by Dr. McCann, the usual vote of thanks was unanimously accorded to the Chairman for presiding, and the proceedings then terminated.

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HUMANITY'S GAIN FROM UNBELIEF.

BY

CHARLES BRADLAUGH.

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HUMANITY'S GAIN FROM UNBELIEF.

As an unbeliever, I ask leave to plead that humanity has been real gainer from scepticism, and that the gradual and growing rejection of Christianity—like the rejection of the faiths which preceded it—has in fact added, and will add, to man's happiness and well being. I maintain that in physics science is the outcome of scepticism, and that general progress is impossible without scepticism on matters of religion. I mean by religion every form of belief which accepts or asserts the supernatural. I write as a Monist, and use the word "nature" as meaning all phænomena, every phænomenon, all that is necessary for the happening of any and every phænomenon. Every religion is constantly changing, and at any given time is the measure of the civilisation attained by what Guizot described as the *juste milieu* of those who profess it. Each religion is slowly but certainly modified in its dogma and practice by the gradual development of the peoples amongst whom it is professed. Each discovery destroys in whole or part some theretofore cherished belief. No religion is suddenly rejected by any people; it is rather gradually out-grown. None see a religion die; dead religions are like dead languages and obsolete customs; the decay is long and—like the glacier march—is only perceptible to the careful watcher by comparisons extending over long periods. A superseded religion may often be traced in the festivals, ceremonies, and dogmas of the religion which has replaced it. Traces of obsolete religions may often be found in popular customs, in old wives' stories, and in children's tales.

It is necessary, in order that my plea should be understood, that I should explain what I mean by Christianity; and in the very attempt at this explanation there will, I think, be found strong illustration of the value of unbelief. Christianity in practice may be gathered from its more ancient forms, represented by the Roman Catholic and the Greek Churches, or from the various churches which have grown up in the last few centuries. Each of these churches calls itself Christian. Some of them deny the right of the others to use the word Christian. Some Christian churches treat, or have treated, other Christian churches as heretics or unbelievers. The Roman Catholics and the Protestants in Great Britain and Ireland have in turn been terribly cruel one to the other; and the ferocious laws of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, enacted by the English Protestants against English and Irish Papists, are a disgrace to civilisation. These penal laws, enduring longest in Ireland, still bear fruit in much of the political mischief and agrarian crime of to-day. It is only the tolerant indifference of scepticism that, one after the other, has repealed most of the laws directed by the Established Christian Church against Papists and Dissenters, and also against Jews and heretics. Church of England clergymen have in the past gone to great lengths in denouncing nonconformity; and even in the present day an effective sample of such denunciatory bigotry may be found in a sort of orthodox catechism written by the Rev. F. A. Gace, of Great Barling, Essex, the popularity of which is vouched by the fact that it has gone through ten editions. This catechism for little children teaches that "Dissent is a great sin", and that Dissenters "worship God according to their own evil and corrupt imaginations, and not according to his revealed will, and therefore their worship is idolatrous". Church of England Christians and Dissenting Christians, when fraternising amongst themselves, often publicly draw the line at Unitarians, and positively deny that these have any sort of right to call themselves Christians.

In the first half of the seventeenth century Quakers were flogged and imprisoned in England as blasphemers; and the early Christian settlers in New England, escaping from the persecution of Old World Christians, showed scant mercy to the followers of Fox and Penn. It is

customary, in controversy, for those advocating the claims of Christianity, to include all good done by men in nominally Christian countries as if such good were the result of Christianity, while they contend that the evil which exists prevails in spite of Christianity. I shall try to make out that the ameliorating march of the last few centuries has been initiated by the heretics of each age, though I quite concede that the men and women denounced and persecuted as infidels by the pious of one century, are frequently claimed as saints by the pious of a later generation.

What then is Christianity? As a system or scheme of doctrine, Christianity may, I submit, not unfairly be gathered from the Old and New Testaments. It is true that some Christians to-day desire to escape from submission to portions, at any rate, of the Old Testament; but this very tendency seems to me to be part of the result of the beneficial heresy for which I am pleading. Man's humanity has revolted against Old Testament barbarism; and therefore he has attempted to disassociate the Old Testament from Christianity. Unless Old and New Testaments are accepted as God's revelation to man, Christianity has no higher claim than any other of the world's many religions, if no such claim can be made out for it apart from the Bible. And though it is quite true that some who deem themselves Christians put the Old Testament completely in the background, this is, I allege, because they are out-growing their Christianity. Without the doctrine of the atoning sacrifice of Jesus, Christianity, as a religion, is naught; but unless the story of Adam's fall is accepted, the redemption from the consequences of that fall cannot be believed. Both in Great Britain and in the United States the Old and New Testaments are forced on the people as part of Christianity; for it is blasphemy at common law to deny the scriptures of the Old and New Testaments to be of divine authority; and such denial is punishable with fine and imprisonment, or even worse. The rejection of Christianity intended throughout this paper, is therefore the rejection of the Old and New Testaments as being of divine revelation. It is the rejection alike of the authorised teachings of the Church of Rome and of the Church of England, as these may be found in the Bible, the creeds, the encyclicals,

the prayer book, the canons and homilies of either or both of these churches. It is the rejection of the Christianity of Luther, of Calvin, and of Wesley.

A ground frequently taken by Christian theologians is that the progress and civilisation of the world are due to Christianity; and the discussion is complicated by the fact that many eminent servants of humanity have been nominal Christians, of one or other of the sects. My allegation will be that the special services rendered to human progress by these exceptional men, have not been in consequence of their adhesion to Christianity, but in spite of it; and that the specific points of advantage to human kind have been in ratio of their direct opposition to precise Biblical enactments.

A. S. Farrar says[1] that Christianity "asserts authority over religious belief in virtue of being a supernatural communication from God, and claims the right to control human thought in virtue of possessing sacred books, which are at once the record and the instrument of the communication, written by men endowed with supernatural inspiration". Unbelievers refuse to submit to the asserted authority, and deny this claim of control over human thought: they allege that every effort at freethinking must provoke sturdier thought.

Take one clear gain to humanity consequent on unbelief, *i.e.*, in the abolition of slavery in some countries, in the abolition of the slave trade in most civilised countries, and in the tendency to its total abolition. I am unaware of any religion in the world which in the past forbade slavery. The professors of Christianity for ages supported it; the Old Testament repeatedly sanctioned it by special laws; the New Testament has no repealing declaration. Though we are at the close of the nineteenth century of the Christian era, it is only during the past three-quarters of a century that the battle for freedom has been gradually won. It is scarcely a quarter of a century since the famous emancipation amendment was carried to the United States Constitution. And it is impossible for any well-informed Christian to deny that the abolition movement in North America was most steadily and bitterly opposed by the religious bodies in the various States. Henry Wilson, in his "Rise and

[1] Farrar's "Critical History of Freethought".

Fall of the Slave Power in America"; Samuel J. May, in his "Recollections of the Anti-Slavery Conflict"; and J. Greenleaf Whittier, in his poems, alike are witnesses that the Bible and pulpit, the Church and its great influence, were used against abolition and in favor of the slave-owner. I know that Christians in the present day often declare that Christianity had a large share in bringing about the abolition of slavery, and this because men professing Christianity were abolitionists. I plead that these so-called Christian abolitionists were men and women whose humanity, recognising freedom for all, was in this in direct conflict with Christianity. It is not yet fifty years since the European Christian powers jointly agreed to abolish the slave trade. What of the effect of Christianity on these powers in the centuries which had preceded? The heretic Condorcet pleaded powerfully for freedom whilst Christian France was still slave-holding. For many centuries Christian Spain and Christian Portugal held slaves. Porto Rico freedom is not of long date; and Cuban emancipation is even yet newer. It was a Christian King, Charles 5th, and a Christian friar, who founded in Spanish America the slave trade between the Old World and the New. For some 1800 years, almost, Christians kept slaves, bought slaves, sold slaves, bred slaves, stole slaves. Pious Bristol and godly Liverpool less than 100 years ago openly grew rich on the traffic. During the ninth century Greek Christians sold slaves to the Saracens. In the eleventh century prostitutes were publicly sold as slaves in Rome, and the profit went to the Church.

It is said that William Wilberforce, the abolitionist, was a Christian. But at any rate his Christianity was strongly diluted with unbelief. As an abolitionist he did not believe Leviticus xxv, 44-6; he must have rejected Exodus xxi, 2-6; he could not have accepted the many permissions and injunctions by the Bible deity to his chosen people to capture and hold slaves. In the House of Commons on 18th February, 1796, Wilberforce reminded that Christian assembly that infidel and anarchic France had given liberty to the Africans, whilst Christian and monarchic England was "obstinately continuing a system of cruelty and injustice".

Wilberforce, whilst advocating the abolition of slavery, found the whole influence of the English Court, and the

great weight of the Episcopal Bench, against him. George III, a most Christian king, regarded abolition theories with abhorrence, and the Christian House of Lords was utterly opposed to granting freedom to the slave. When Christian missionaries some sixty-two years ago preached to Demerara negroes under the rule of Christian England, they were treated by Christian judges, holding commission from Christian England, as criminals for so preaching. A Christian commissioned officer, member of the Established Church of England, signed the auction notices for the sale of slaves as late as the year 1824. In the evidence before a Christian court-martial, a missionary is charged with having tended to make the negroes dissatisfied with their condition as slaves, and with having promoted discontent and dissatisfaction amongst the slaves against their lawful masters. For this the Christian judges sentenced the Demerara abolitionist missionary to be hanged by the neck till he was dead. The judges belonged to the Established Church; the missionary was a Methodist. In this the Church of England Christians in Demerara were no worse than Christians of other sects: their Roman Catholic Christian brethren in St. Domingo fiercely attacked the Jesuits as criminals because they treated negroes as though they were men and women, in encouraging "two slaves to separate their interest and safety from that of the gang", whilst orthodox Christians let them couple promiscuously and breed for the benefit of their owners like any other of their plantation cattle. In 1823 the *Royal Gazette* (Christian) of Demerara said:

"We shall not suffer you to enlighten our slaves, who are by law our property, till you can demonstrate that when they are made religious and knowing they will continue to be our slaves."

When William Lloyd Garrison, the pure-minded and most earnest abolitionist, delivered his first anti-slavery address in Boston, Massachusetts, the only building he could obtain, in which to speak, was the infidel hall owned by Abner Kneeland, the "infidel" editor of the *Boston Investigator*, who had been sent to gaol for blasphemy. Every Christian sect had in turn refused Mr. Lloyd Garrison the use of the buildings they severally controlled. Lloyd Garrison told me himself how honored deacons of

a Christian Church joined in an actual attempt to hang him.

When abolition was advocated in the United States in 1790, the representative from South Carolina was able to plead that the Southern clergy "did not condemn either slavery or the slave trade"; and Mr. Jackson, the representative from Georgia, pleaded that "from Genesis to Revelation" the current was favorable to slavery. Elias Hicks, the brave Abolitionist Quaker, was denounced as an Atheist, and less than twenty years ago a Hicksite Quaker was expelled from one of the Southern American Legislatures, because of the reputed irreligion of these abolitionist "Friends".

When the Fugitive Slave Law was under discussion in North America, large numbers of clergymen of nearly every denomination were found ready to defend this infamous law. Samuel James May, the famous abolitionist, was driven from the pulpit as irreligious, solely because of his attacks on slaveholding. Northern clergymen tried to induce "silver tongued" Wendell Philips to abandon his advocacy of abolition. Southern pulpits rang with praises for the murderous attack on Charles Sumner. The slayers of Elijah Lovejoy were highly reputed Christian men.

Guizot, notwithstanding that he tries to claim that the Church exerted its influence to restrain slavery, says ("European Civilisation", vol. i., p. 110):

"It has often been repeated that the abolition of slavery among modern people is entirely due to Christians. That, I think, is saying too much. Slavery existed for a long period in the heart of Christian society, without its being particularly astonished or irritated. A multitude of causes, and a great development in other ideas and principles of civilisation, were necessary for the abolition of this iniquity of all iniquities."

And my contention is that this "development in other ideas and principles of civilisation" was long retarded by Governments in which the Christian Church was dominant. The men who advocated liberty were imprisoned, racked, and burned, so long as the Church was strong enough to be merciless.

The Rev. Francis Minton, Rector of Middlewich, in his recent earnest volume[1] on the struggles of labor, admits

[1] "Capital and Wages", p. 19.

that "a few centuries ago slavery was acknowledged throughout Christendom to have the divine sanction . . . . . Neither the exact cause, nor the precise time of the decline of the belief in the righteousness of slavery can be defined. It was doubtless due to a combination of causes, one probably being as indirect as the recognition of the greater economy of free labor. With the decline of the belief the abolition of slavery took place."

The institution of slavery was actually existent in Christian Scotland in the 17th century, where the white coal workers and salt workers of East Lothian were chattels, as were their negro brethren in the Southern States thirty years since; they "went to those who succeeded to the property of the works, and they could be sold, bartered, or pawned".[1] "There is", says J. M. Robertson, "no trace that the Protestant clergy of Scotland ever raised a voice against the slavery which grew up before their eyes. And it was not until 1799, after republican and irreligious France had set the example, that it was legally abolished."

Take further the gain to humanity consequent on the unbelief, or rather disbelief, in witchcraft and wizardry. Apart from the brutality by Christians towards those suspected of witchcraft, the hindrance to scientific initiative or experiment was incalculably great so long as belief in magic obtained. The inventions of the past two centuries, and especially those of the 18th century, might have benefitted mankind much earlier and much more largely, but for the foolish belief in witchcraft and the shocking ferocity exhibited against those suspected of necromancy. After quoting a large number of cases of trial and punishment for witchcraft from official records in Scotland, J. M. Robertson says: "The people seem to have passed from cruelty to cruelty precisely as they became more and more fanatical, more and more devoted to their Church, till after many generations the slow spread of human science began to counteract the ravages of superstition, the clergy resisting reason and humanity to the last".

The Rev. Mr. Minton[2] concedes that it is "the advance of knowledge which has rendered the idea of Satanic

[1] "Perversion of Scotland," p. 197.
[2] "Capital and Wages", pp. 15, 16.

agency through the medium of witchcraft grotesquely ridiculous". He admits that "for more than 1500 years the belief in witchcraft was universal in Christendom", and that "the public mind was saturated with the idea of Satanic agency in the economy of nature". He adds: "If we ask why the world now rejects what was once so unquestioningly believed, we can only reply that advancing knowledge has gradually undermined the belief".

In a letter recently sent to the *Pall Mall Gazette* against modern Spiritualism, Professor Huxley declares,

"that the older form of the same fundamental delusion—the belief in possession and in witchcraft—gave rise in the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries to persecutions by Christians of innocent men, women, and children, more extensive, more cruel, and more murderous than any to which the Christians of the first three centuries were subjected by the authorities of pagan Rome."

And Professor Huxley adds:

"No one deserves much blame for being deceived in these matters. We are all intellectually handicapped in youth by the incessant repetition of the stories about possession and witchcraft in both the Old and the New Testaments. The majority of us are taught nothing which will help us to observe accurately and to interpret observations with due caution."

The English Statute Book under Elizabeth and under James was disfigured by enactments against witchcraft passed under pressure from the Christian churches, which Acts have only been repealed in consequence of the disbelief in the Christian precept, "thou shalt not suffer a witch to live". The statute 1 James I, c. 12, condemned to death "all persons invoking any evil spirits, or consulting, covenanting with, entertaining, employing, feeding, or rewarding any evil spirit", or generally practising any "infernal arts". This was not repealed until the eighteenth century was far advanced. Edison's phonograph would 280 years ago have insured martyrdom for its inventor; the utilisation of electric force to transmit messages around the world would have been clearly the practice of an infernal art. At least we may plead that unbelief has healed the bleeding feet of science, and made the road free for her upward march.

Is it not also fair to urge the gain to humanity which has been apparent in the wiser treatment of the insane, consequent on the unbelief in the Christian doctrine that these unfortunates were examples either of demoniacal possession or of special visitation of deity? For centuries under Christianity mental disease was most ignorantly treated. Exorcism, shackles, and the whip were the penalties rather than the curatives for mental maladies. From the heretical departure of Pinel at the close of the last century to the position of Maudsley to-day, every step illustrates the march of unbelief. Take the gain to humanity in the unbelief not yet complete, but now largely preponderant, in the dogma that sickness, pestilence, and famine were manifestations of divine anger, the results of which could neither be avoided nor prevented. The Christian Churches have done little or nothing to dispel this superstition. The official and authorised prayers of the principal denominations, even to-day, reaffirm it. Modern study of the laws of health, experiments in sanitary improvements, more careful applications of medical knowledge, have proved more efficacious in preventing or diminishing plagues and pestilence than have the intervention of the priest or the practice of prayer. Those in England who hold the old faith that prayer will suffice to cure disease are to-day termed "peculiar people", and are occasionally indicted for manslaughter when their sick children die, because the parents have trusted to God instead of appealing to the resources of science.

It is certainly a clear gain to astronomical science that the Church which tried to compel Galileo to unsay the truth has been overborne by the growing unbelief of the age, even though our little children are yet taught that Joshua made the sun and moon stand still, and that for Hezekiah the sun-dial reversed its record. As Buckle, arguing for the morality of scepticism, says[1]:

"As long as men refer the movements of the comets to the immediate finger of God, and as long as they believe that an eclipse is one of the modes by which the deity expresses his anger, they will never be guilty of the blasphemous presumption of attempting to predict such supernatural appearances.

[1] "History of Civilisation," vol. i, p. 345.

Before they could dare to investigate the causes of these mysterious phænomena, it is necessary that they should believe, or at all events that they should suspect, that the phænomena themselves were capable of being explained by the human mind."

As in astronomy so in geology, the gain of knowledge to humanity has been almost solely in measure of the rejection of the Christian theory. A century since it was almost universally held that the world was created 6,000 years ago, or at any rate, that by the sin of the first man, Adam, death commenced about that period. Ethnology and Anthropology have only been possible in so far as, adopting the regretful words of Sir W. Jones, "intelligent and virtuous persons are inclined to doubt the authenticity of the accounts delivered by Moses concerning the primitive world".

Surely it is clear gain to humanity that unbelief has sprung up against the divine right of kings, that men no longer believe that the monarch is "God's anointed" or that "the powers that be are ordained of God". In the struggles for political freedom the weight of the Church was mostly thrown on the side of the tyrant. The homilies of the Church of England declare that "even the wicked rulers have their power and authority from God", and that "such subjects as are disobedient or rebellious against their princes disobey God and procure their own damnation". It can scarcely be necessary to argue to the citizens of the United States of America that the origin of their liberties was in the rejection of faith in the divine right of George III.

Will any one, save the most bigoted, contend that it is not certain gain to humanity to spread unbelief in the terrible doctrine that eternal torment is the probable fate of the great majority of the human family? Is it not gain to have diminished the faith that it was the duty of the wretched and the miserable to be content with the lot in life which providence had awarded them?

If it stood alone it would be almost sufficient to plead as justification for heresy the approach towards equality and liberty for the utterance of all opinions achieved because of growing unbelief. At one period in Christendom each Government acted as though only one religious faith could be true, and as though the holding, or at any rate the

making known, any other opinion was a criminal act deserving punishment. Under the one word "infidel", even as late as Lord Coke, were classed together all who were not Christians, even though they were Mahommedans, Brahmins, or Jews. All who did not accept the Christian faith were sweepingly denounced as infidels and therefore *hors de la loi*. One hundred and forty-five years since, the Attorney-General, pleading in our highest court, said[1]: "What is the definition of an infidel? Why, one who does not believe in the Christian religion. Then a Jew is an infidel." And English history for several centuries prior to the Commonwealth shows how habitually and most atrociously Christian kings, Christian courts, and Christian churches, persecuted and harassed these infidel Jews. There was a time in England when Jews were such infidels that they were not even allowed to be sworn as witnesses. In 1740 a legacy left for establishing an assembly for the reading of the Jewish scriptures was held to be void[2] because it was "for the propagation of the Jewish law in contradiction to the Christian religion". It is only in very modern times that municipal rights have been accorded in England to Jews. It is barely thirty years since they have been allowed to sit in Parliament. In 1851, the late Mr. Newdegate in debate[3] objected "that they should have sitting in that House an individual who regarded our Redeemer as an impostor". Lord Chief Justice Raymond has shown[4] how it was that Christian intolerance was gradually broken down. "A Jew may sue at this day, but heretofore he could not; for then they were looked upon as enemies, but now commerce has taught the world more humanity."

Lord Coke treated the infidel as one who in law had no right of any kind, with whom no contract need be kept, to whom no debt was payable. The plea of alien infidel as answer to a claim was actually pleaded in court as late as 1737.[5] In a solemn judgment, Lord Coke says[6]: "All infidels are in law *perpetui inimici*; for between them, as

[1] Omychund *v.* Barker, 1 Atkyns 29.
[2] D'Costa *v.* D'Pays, Amb. 228.
[3] 3 Hansard cxvi. 381.
[4] 1 Lord Raymond's reports 282, Wells *v.* Williams.
[5] Ramkissenseat *v.* Barker, 1 Atkyns 51.
[6] 7 Coke's reports, Calvin's case.

with the devils whose subjects they be, and the Christian, there is perpetual hostility". Twenty years ago the law of England required the writer of any periodical publication or pamphlet under sixpence in price to give sureties for £800 against the publication of blasphemy. I was the last person prosecuted in 1868 for non-compliance with that law, which was repealed by Mr. Gladstone in 1869. Up till the 23rd December, 1888, an infidel in Scotland was only allowed to enforce any legal claim in court on condition that, if challenged, he denied his infidelity. If he lied and said he was a Christian, he was accepted, despite his lying. If he told the truth and said he was an unbeliever, then he was practically an outlaw, incompetent to give evidence for himself or for any other. Fortunately all this was changed by the Royal assent to the Oaths Act on 24th December. Has not humanity clearly gained a little in this struggle through unbelief?

For more than a century and a-half the Roman Catholic had in practice harsher measure dealt out to him by the English Protestant Christian, than was even during that period the fate of the Jew or the unbeliever. If the Roman Catholic would not take the oath of abnegation, which to a sincere Romanist was impossible, he was in effect an outlaw, and the "jury packing" so much complained of to-day in Ireland is one of the habit survivals of the old bad time when Roman Catholics were thus by law excluded from the jury box.

The *Scotsman* of January 5th, 1889, notes that in 1860 the Rev. Dr. Robert Lee, of Greyfriars, gave a course of Sunday evening lectures on Biblical Criticism, in which he showed the absurdity and untenableness of regarding every word in the Bible as inspired; and it adds:

"We well remember the awful indignation such opinions inspired, and it is refreshing to contrast them with the calmness with which they are now received. Not only from the pulpits of the city, but from the press (misnamed religious) were his doctrines denounced. And one eminent U.P. minister went the length of publicly praying for him, and for the students under his care. It speaks volumes for the progress made since then, when we think in all probability Dr. Charteris, Dr. Lee's successor in the chair, differs in his teaching from the Confession of Faith much more widely than Dr. Lee ever did, and yet he is considered supremely orthodox, whereas the stigma of heresy was attached to the other all his life."

And this change and gain to humanity is due to the gradual progress of unbelief, alike inside and outside the Churches. Take from differing Churches' two recent illustrations: The late Principal Dr. Lindsay Alexander, a strict Calvinist, in his important work on "Biblical Theology", claims that

"all the statements of Scripture are alike to be deferred to as presenting to us the mind of God".

Yet the Rev. Dr. of Divinity also says:

"We find in their writings [*i.e.*, in the writings of the sacred authors] statements which no ingenuity can reconcile with what modern research has shown to be the scientific truth—*i.e.*, we find in them statements which modern science proves to be erroneous."

At the last Southwell Diocesan Church of England Conference at Derby, the Bishop of the Diocese presiding, the Rev. J. G. Richardson said of the Old Testament that

"it was no longer honest or even safe to deny that this noble literature, rich in all the elements of moral or spiritual grandeur, given—so the Church had always taught, and would always teach—under the inspiration of Almighty God, was sometimes mistaken in its science, was sometimes inaccurate in its history, and sometimes only relative and accommodatory in its morality. It assumed theories of the physical world which science had abandoned and could never resume; it contained passages of narrative which devout and temperate men pronounced discredited, both by external and internal evidence; it praised, or justified, or approved, or condoned, or tolerated, conduct which the teaching of Christ and the conscience of the Christian alike condemned."

Or, as I should urge, the gain to humanity by unbelief is that "the teaching of Christ" has been modified, enlarged, widened, and humanised, and that "the conscience of the Christian" is in quantity and quality made fitter for human progress by the ever increasing additions of knowledge of these later and more heretical days.

NEW LIFE OF DAVID.

BY C. BRADLAUGH

In compiling a biographical account of any ancient personage, impediments mostly arise from the uncertainty of the various traditions out of which we gather our biography, and from the party bias and colouring which often pervade and detract from their value. In the present case no such obstacle is met with, no such bias can be imagined, for, in giving the life of David, we extract it from an all-wise God's perfect and infallible revelation to man, and thus are enabled to present it to our readers free from any doubt, uncertainty, or difficulty. The father of David was Jesse, an Ephrathite of Bethlehem-judah. Jesse had either eight sons (1 Samuel c. xvi., v. 10 and 11, and c. xvii., v. 12) or only seven (1 Chronicles, c. ii., vv. 13 to 15), and David was either the eighth son or the seventh. Some may think this a difficulty to commence with, but such persons will only be those who rely on their own intellectual faculties, or who have been misled by Colenso's arithmetic. If you, my dear reader, are in any doubt, at once consult some qualified divine, and he will explain to you that there is really no difference between eight and seven when rightly understood with prayer and faith, by the help of the spirit. Arithmetic is an utterly infidel acquirement, and one which all true believers should eschew. In proof of this, I may observe that the proposition three times one are one is a fundamental article of the Christian faith. David's great grandmother was the holy harlot Rahab, and his grandmother was a lady who when unmarried went in the night and lay at the feet of Boaz, and left in the morning before it was light enough for any one to recognise her. Like her grandson she was "prudent in matters." When young, David tended his father's sheep, and apparently while so doing he obtained the reputation for being cunning in playing, a mighty valiant man, and a man of war and prudent in matters. He obtained his reputation as a soldier early and wonderfully, for he was "but a youth," and God's most holy word asserts that when going to fight with Goliath he tried to walk in armour, and could not, for he was not accustomed to it (1 Samuel c. xvii., v. 39, Douay version), Samuel shortly prior to this anointed David, and the spirit of the Lord came upon him from that day forward. If a man takes to spirits his life will probably be one of vice, misery, and misfortune, and if spirits take to him the result in the end is nearly the same. Saul being King of Israel, an evil spirit from the Lord troubled him. The devil has no ear for music, and Saul was recommended to have David to play on a harp in order that

harmony might drive this evil spirit back to the Lord who sent it. The Jews' harp was played successfully, and Saul was often relieved from the evil spirit by the aid of David's ministrations. There is nothing miraculous in this; at the people's concerts many a working man has been released from the "blue devils" by a stirring chorus, a merry song, or patriotic anthem. David was appointed armour-bearer to the king, but curiously enough this office does not appear to have interferred with his duties as a shepherd; indeed the care of his father's sheep took precedence over the care of the king's armour, and in the time of war he "went and returned to feed his father's sheep." Perhaps his "prudence in matters" induced him thus to take care of himself.

A Philistine, one Goliath of Gath (whose height was six cubits and a span, or about nine feet six inches, at a low computation) had defied the armies of Israel. This Goliath was (to use the vocabulary of the reverend sporting correspondent of a certain religious newspaper) a veritable champion of the heavy weights. He carried in all two cwt. of armour, offensive and defensive, upon his person, and his challenge had great weight. None dared accept it amongst the soldiers of Saul until the arrival of David with some food for his brethren. David volunteered to fight the giant, but Saul objecting that he was not competent to take part in a conflict so dangerous, David related how he pursued a *lion and a bear*, how he caught *him* by his beard and slew *him*. Which animal it was that David thus bearded the text does not say. The Douay says it was "a lion or a bear," but it looks, on an attentive reading, "very like a whale." David's offer was accepted, he was permitted to fight the giant, his equipment was simple, a sling and stones, and with one of these he slew the giant. Some suggest that the weapon Goliath fell under was the long bow. This is rendered probable by the book itself. In one verse it says that David slew the Philistine with a stone, in another verse it says that he slew him with the giant's own sword, while in 2 Samuel c. xxi., v. 19, we are told that Goliath the Gittite was slain by Elhanan. Our translators, who have great regard for our faiths and more for their pulpits, have kindly inserted the words "the brother of" before Goalith. This saves the true believer from the difficulty of understanding how Goliath of Gath could have been killed by different men at different times. David was previously well known to Saul, and was much loved and favoured by that monarch. He was also seen by the king before he went forth to do battle with the gigantic Philistine. Yet (as if to verify the proverb that kings have short memories for their friends) Saul had forgotten his own armour-bearer and much-loved harpist, and was obliged to ask Abner who David was. Abner, captain of the king's host, familiar with the person of the armour-bearer to the king, of course knew David well; he therefore answered, "As thy soul liveth, O king, I cannot tell." David, having made known his parentage, was appointed to command, and often stood before Saul, but one day the evil spirit from the Lord came upon Saul and he prophesied. Men who are spiritually inclined often talk great nonsense under the influence of spirits, which they sometimes regret when sober. It is, however, an interesting fact in ancient spiritualism to know that Saul prophesied with a devil in him. Under the joint influence of the devil and prophesy, he tried to kill David, and when this was repeated, even after David had married the king's daughter (for whose wedding trousseau he had procured an interesting and

delicate offering by the slaughter of two hundred men), then to save his own life David fled to Naioth, and Saul sent there messengers to arrest him, but the king's messengers having all become prophets, in the end Saul went himself, and this time the spirit of the Lord came upon him, and he stripped off his clothes and prophesied as hard as the rest. What he prophesied about we do not know. In fact, the priests have made so great deductions from the profits during the plenitude of their power, that there has been little which is profitable in connection with religion left for the people.

David lived in exile for some time, having collected round him every one that was in distress, and every one that was in debt, and every one that was discontented. Saul made several fruitless attempts to effect his capture, with no better result than that he twice placed himself in the power of David, who twice showed the mercy to a cruel king which he never conceded to an unoffending people. David having obtruded himself upon Achish, King of Gath, and doubtful of his safety, feigned madness to cover his retreat. He then lived a precarious life, sometimes levying a species of black mail upon defenceless farmers. Having applied to one farmer to make him some compensation for permitting the farm to go unrobbed, and his demand not having been complied with, David, who is a man after the heart of the God of mercy, immediately determined to murder the farmer and all his household for their wicked reluctance in submitting to his extortions. The wife of farmer Nabal compromised the matter. David "*accepted her person*," and ten days afterwards Nabal was found dead in his bed. David afterwards went with 600 men and lived under the protection of Achish, King of Gath, and while thus residing (being the anointed one of a God who says, "Thou shalt not steal,") he robbed the inhabitants of the surrounding places ; being also obedient to the statute, "Thou shalt do no murder," he slaughtered, and left neither man nor woman alive to report his robberies to King Achish ; and as he "always walked in the ways" of a God to whom "lying lips are an abomination," he made false reports to Achish in relation to his actions. Of course this was all for the glory of God, whose ways are not as our ways. Soon the Philistines were engaged in another of the constantly recurring conflicts with the Israelites. Who offered them the help of himself and band ? Who offered to make war on his own countrymen ? David, the man after God's own heart, who obeyed his statutes and who walked in his ways to do only that which was right in the sight of God. The Philistines rejected the traitor's aid, and saved David from the consummation of this baseness. While David was making this unpatriotic proffer of his services to the Philistines, his own city of Ziglag was captured by the Amalekites, who were doubtless endeavouring to avenge some of the most unjustifiable robberies and murders perpetrated by David and his followers in their country. David's own friends evidently thought that this misfortune was a retribution for David's crimes, for they spoke of stoning him. The Amalekites had captured and carried off everything, but they do not seem to have maltreated or killed any of their enemies. David was less merciful. He pursued them, recaptured the spoil, and spared not a man of them, save 400 who escaped on camels. In consequence of the death of Saul, David soon after was elevated to the throne of Judah, while Ishbosheth, a son of Saul, was made King of Israel. But Ishbosheth, having been

assassinated, David slew the assassins, when they, hoping for reward, brought him the news, and he reigned ultimately over Israel also.

As my religious readers are doubtless aware, the Lord God of Israel, after the time of Moses, usually dwelt on the top of an ark or box, between two figures of gold, and on one occasion David made a journey with his followers to Baal, to bring thence the ark of God. They placed it on a new cart drawn by oxen. On their journey the oxen stumbled and consequently shook the cart, and one of the drivers, whose name was Uzzah, fearing that God might be tumbled to the ground, took hold of the ark, apparently in order to steady it, and prevent it from overturning. God, who is a God of love, was much displeased that any one should presume to do any such act of kindness, and killed Uzzah on the spot as a punishment for his error. This shows that if a man sees the Church of God tumbling down, he should never try to prop it up; if it be not strong enough to save itself, the sooner it falls the better for human kind—that is, if they keep away from it while it is falling. David was much displeased that the Lord had killed Uzzah; in fact, David seems to have wished for a monopoly of slaughter, and always manifested displeasure when killing was done unauthorised by himself. Being displeased, David would not take the ark to Jerusalem; he left it in the house of Obed Edom, but as the Lord proved more kind to Obed Edom than he had done to Uzzah, David determined to bring it away, and he did so, and David danced before the ark in a state of semi-nudity, for which he was reproached by Michal. The story is one which, by itself, would be as entertaining to a depraved mind as any Holywell Street pamphlet, if Lord Campbell's act did not prevent the publication of indecencies. The pages of God's most holy word, we believe, do not come within the scope of the act, and lovers of obscene language may therefore have legal gratification so long as the Bible shall exist. The God of Israel, who had been leading a wandering life for many years, and who had "walked in a tent and in a tabernacle," and "from tent to tent," and "from one tabernacle to another," and who "had not dwelt in any house" since the time that he brought the Israelites out of Egypt, was offered "an house for him to dwell in," but he declined to accept it during the lifetime of David, although he promised to permit the son of David to erect him such an abode. David being now a powerful monarch, and having many wives and concubines, saw one day the beautiful wife of one of his soldiers. To see with this licentious monarch, was to crave for the gratification of his lust. The husband Uriah was fighting for the king, yet David was base enough to steal his wife's virtue during Uriah's absence in the field of battle. "Thou shalt not commit adultery" was one of the commandments, yet we are told by God of this David, "who kept my commandments, and who followed me with all his heart to do only that which was right in mine eyes" (1 Kings, c. xiv., v. 8). David, having seduced the wife, sent for her husband, wishing to make him condone his wife's dishonour, as many a man has done in other lands, when a king or prince has been the seducer. Some hold that virtue in rags is less worth than vice when coronetted. Uriah would not be thus tricked, and David, the pious David, coolly planned, and without mercy caused to be executed, the treacherous murder of Uriah. God is all just; and David having committed adultery and murder, God punished and killed an innocent child, which had no part or share in David's crime, and never chose that it

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should be born from the womb of Bathsheba. After this the king David was even more cruel and merciless than before. Previously he had systematically slaughtered the inhabitants of Moab, now he sawed people with saws, cut them with harrows and axes, and made them pass through brick-kilns. Yet of this man, God said he "did that which was right in mine eyes." So bad a king, so treacherous a man, a lover so inconstant, a husband so adulterous, of course was a bad father, having bad children. We are little surprised, therefore, to read that his son Amnon robbed his sister, David's daughter Tamar, of her virtue; and that Amnon was afterwards slain by his own brother, David's son Absalom, and are scarcely astonished that Absalom himself, on the house-top, in the sight of all Israel, should complete his father's shame by an act worthy a child of God's selected people. Yet these are God's chosen race, and this is the family of the man "who walked in God's ways all the days of his life."

God, who is all-wise and all-just, and who is not a man that he should repent, had repented that he had made Saul king because Saul spared one man. In the reign of David the same good God sent a famine for three years on the descendants of Abraham, and upon being asked his reason for thus starving his chosen ones, the reply of the Deity was that he sent the famine on the subjects of David because Saul slew the Gibeonites. Satisfactory reason!—because Oliver Cromwell slew the Royalists, God will punish the subjects of Charles the Second. One reason is to profane eyes equivalent to the other, but a bishop or even a rural dean would soon show how remarkably God's justice was manifested. David was not behind hand in justice. He had sworn to Saul that he would not cut off his seed—*i. e.*, that he would not destroy Saul's family. He therefore took two of Saul's sons, and five of Saul's grandsons, and gave them up to the Gibeonites, who hung them. Strangely wonderful are the ways of the Lord! Saul slew the Gibeonites, therefore years afterwards God starves Judah. The Gibeonites hang men who had nothing to do with the crime of Saul, except that they are his descendants, and then we are told "the Lord was intreated for the land." Perhaps David wanted to get rid of the royal family of Saul. The anger of the Lord being kindled against Israel, and he wanting some excuse for punishing the descendants of Jacob, moved David to number his people. The Chronicles say that it was Satan, and pious people may thus learn that there is little difference between God and Devil when rightly understood. Both are personifications founded in the ignorance of the masses, and their continuance will cease with their credulousness. David caused a census to be taken of the tribes of Israel and Judah. There is a trivial disagreement to the extent of about 270,000 soldiers between Samuel and Chronicles, but the readers must not allow so slight an inaccuracy as this to stand between them and heaven. What are 270,000 men when looked at prayerfully? The idea that any doubt should arise is to a devout mind at the same time profane and preposterous. Infidels suggest that 1,570,000 soldiers form a larger army than the Jews are likely to have possessed. I can only add that as God is omnipotent, there is no reason to limit his power of increasing or decreasing miraculously the armament of the Jewish nation. David, it seems, did wrong in numbering his people, although we are never told that he did wrong in robbing or murdering their neighbours, or in pillaging peaceful agriculturists. David

said, "I have sinned." The king having done wrong, an all-merciful God brought a pestilence on the people, and murdered 70,000 Israelites, for an offence which their ruler had committed. The angel who was engaged in this terrible slaughter stood somewhere between heaven and earth, and stretched forth his hand with a drawn sword in it to destroy Jerusalem itself, but even the bloodthirsty Deity of the Bible "repented him of the evil," and said to the angel, "It is enough." Many volumes might be written to answer the inquiries—Where did the angel stand, and on what? Of what metal was the sword, and where was it made? As it was a drawn one, where was the scabbard? and did the angel wear a sword-belt? Examined in a pious frame of mind, much holy instruction may be derived from the attempt at solution of these problems.

David now grows old and weak, and at last, notwithstanding that he has the advantage of a pretty maiden to cherish him, he wears out, and his death hour comes. Oh! for the dying words of the Psalmist! What pious instruction shall we derive from the death-bed scene of the man after God's own heart! Listen to the last words of Judah's expiring monarch. You who have been content with the pious frauds and forgeries perpetrated with reference to the death-beds and dying words of the great, the generous, the witty Voltaire, the manly, the self-denying, the incorruptible Thomas Paine, the humane, simple, child-like man, yet mighty poet, Shelley—you who have turned away from these with horror, unfounded if real, come with me to the death couch of the special favourite of God. Bathsheba's child stands by his side. Does any thought of the murdered Uriah rack old David's brain, or has a tardy repentance effaced the bloody stain from the pages of his memory? What does the dying David say? Does he talk of cherubs, angels, and heavenly choirs? Nay, none of these things pass his lips. Does he make a confession of his crime-stained life, and beg his son to be a better king, a truer man, a more honest citizen, a wiser father? Nay, not so—no word of sorrow, no sigh of regret, no expression of remorse or repentance escaped his lips. What does the dying David say? This foul adulterer, whom God has made king, this red-handed robber, whose life has been guarded by "our Father which art in Heaven," this perjured king, whose lying lips have found favour in the sight of God, and who when he dies is safe for Heaven—"There shall be more joy in heaven before God over one sinner that repenteth than over ninety and nine righteous men." So it is written. Does David repent? Nay—like the ravenous tiger or wolf, which once tasting blood is made more eager for the prey, he yearns for blood; he dies, and with his dying breath begs his son to bring the grey hairs of two old men down to the grave with blood. Yet this is the life of God's anointed king, the chief one of God's chosen people.

David is alleged to have written several Psalms, but of this there is little evidence beyond pious assertion. In one of these he addresses God in the phraseology of a member of the P.R., praising Deity that he had smitten all his enemies on the cheek bone and broken the teeth of the ungodly. In these days, when "muscular Christianity" is not without advocates, the metaphor which presents God as a sort of magnificent Benecia Boy, may find many admirers. In the eighteenth Psalm, David describes God as with "smoke coming out of his nostrils and fire out of his mouth," by which "coals were kindled." He repre-

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sents God as coming down from heaven, and says "he rode upon a cherub." The learned Parkhurst gives a likeness of a one-legged, four-winged, four-faced animal, part lion, part bull, part eagle, part man, and, if a cloven foot be any criterion, part devil also. This description, if correct, will give some idea to the faithful of the wondeful character of the equestrian feats of Deity.

In addition to riding on a cherub, God has other means of conveyance at his disposal, if David be not in error when he says that the chariots of the Lord are 20,000.

In the twenty-sixth Psalm, the writer, if David, exposes his own hypocrisy in addition to his other vices. He has the impudence to tell God that he has been a man of integrity and truth; that he has avoided evil-doers, although, if we are to believe the thirty-eighth Psalm, the vile hypocrite must have already been subject to a loathsome disease —a penalty consequent on his licentiousness and criminality. In another Psalm, David the liar tells God that "he that telleth lies shall not tarry in my sight." To understand his malevolent nature we cannot do better than quote his prayer to God against an enemy (Psalm cix., vv. 6—14):—

"6. Set thou a wicked man over him: and let Satan stand at his right hand.

"7. When he shall be judged, let him be condemned: and let his prayer become sin.

"8. Let his days be few: and let another take his office.

"9. Let his children be fatherless, and his wife a widow.

"10. Let his children be continually vagabonds, and beg: let them seek their bread also out of their desolate places.

"11. Let the extortioner catch all that he hath; and let the strangers spoil his labour.

"12. Let there be none to extend mercy unto him: neither let there be any to favour his fatherless children.

"13. Let his posterity be cut off; and in the generation following let their name be blotted out.

"14. Let the iniquity of his fathers be remembered with the Lord; and let not the sin of his mother be blotted out."

A full consideration of the life of David must give great help to each orthodox reader in promoting and sustaining his faith. While he is spoken of by Deity as obeying all the statutes and keeping all the commandments, we are astonished to find that murder, theft, lying, adultery, licentiousness, and treachery are amongst the crimes which may be laid to his charge. David was a liar, God is a God of truth; David was merciless, God is merciful, and of long suffering; David was a thief, God says, "Thou shalt not steal;" David was a murderer, God says, "Thou shalt do no murder;" David took the wife of Uriah, and "accepted" the wife of Nabal, God says, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's wife." Yet, notwithstanding all these things, David was the man after God's own heart.

Had this Jewish monarch any redeeming traits in his character? Was he a good citizen? If so, the Bible has carefully concealed every action which would entitle him to such an appellation, and in lieu has given us the record of his attempted extortion in the case of Nabal, and furnished us with a notice of his horde of followers—out-

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lawed, discontented, and in debt. Was he a kind and constant husband? To whom? To which of his many wives and mistresses? Was he grateful to those who aided him in his hour of need? Nay; like the wounded serpent which half frozen by the wayside, is warmed into new life in the traveller's breast, and then treacherously stabs him with his poisoned fangs, so David robbed and murdered the friends and allies of the King of Gath, who had afforded him refuge against the pursuit of Saul. Does his patriotism outshine his many vices? Does his love of country efface his many misdoings? Not even this. David was a heartless traitor who volunteered to serve against his own countrymen, and would have done so had not the Philistines rejected his treacherous help. Was he a good king? So say the priesthood now; but where is the evidence of his virtue? His crimes brought plague and pestilence on his subjects, and his reign is a continued succession of wars, revolts, and assassinations, plottings and counterplots.

The life of David is a dark blot on the page of human history, and our best hope is that if a spirit from God inspired the writer, then that it was a lying spirit, and that he has given us fiction instead of truth.

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INTRODUCTION.

THE following pages are reprinted, with some alterations and additions, from the columns of the *Freethinker*. They are neither methodical nor exhaustive. I had the privilege of knowing Mr. Bradlaugh more or less intimately for twenty years. I have worked with him in the Freethought movement and stood by his side on many political platforms. It seemed to me, therefore, that if I jotted down, even in a disjointed manner, some of my recollections of his great personality, I should be easing my own mind and conferring a pleasure on many readers. Beyond that I was not ambitious. The time for writing Mr. Bradlaugh's life is not yet, but when it arrives my jottings may furnish a point or two to his biographer.

G. W. FOOTE.

March 30, 1891.

Reminiscences of Charles Bradlaugh.

WHEN I came to London, in January, 1868, I was eighteen years of age. I had plenty of health and very little religion. While in my native town of Plymouth I had read and thought for myself, and had gradually passed through various stages of scepticism, until I was dissatisfied even with the advanced Unitarianism of a preacher like the Rev. J. K. Applebee. But I could not find any literature in advance of his position, and there was no one of whom I could inquire. Secularism and Atheism I had never heard of in any definite way, although I remember, when a little boy, having an Atheist pointed out to me in the street. Naturally I regarded him as a terrible monster. I did not know what Atheism was except in a very vague way; but I inferred from the tones, expressions, and gestures of those who pointed him out to me, that an Atheist was a devil in human form.

Soon after I came to London I found out an old school-fellow, and went to lodge with his family. They were tainted with Atheism, and my once pious playmate was as corrupt as the rest of them. They took me one Sunday evening to Cleveland Hall, where I heard Mrs. Law knock the Bible about delightfully. She was not what would be called a woman of culture, but she had what some devotees of "culchaw" do not possess—a great deal of natural ability; and she appeared to know the "blessed book" from cover to

cover. Her discourse was very different from the Unitarian sermons I had heard at Plymouth. She spoke in a plain, honest, straightforward manner, and I resolved to visit Cleveland Hall again.

Three or four weeks afterwards I heard Mr. Bradlaugh for the first time. It was a very wet Sunday evening, but as 'bus-riding was dearer then than it is now, and my resources were slender, I walked about three miles through the heavy rain, and sat on a backless bench in Cleveland Hall, for which I think I paid twopence. I was wet through, but I was young, and my health was flawless. Nor did I mind the discomfort a bit when Mr. Bradlaugh began his lecture. Fiery natural eloquence of that sort was a novelty in my experience. I kept myself warm with applauding, and at the finish I was pretty nearly as dry outside as inside. From that time I went to hear Mr. Bradlaugh whenever I had an opportunity. He became the "god" of my young idolatry. I used to think of him charging the hosts of superstition, and wish I could be near him in the fight. But it was rather a dream than any serious expectation of such an honor.

When the new Hall of Science was opened I became a pretty regular attendant. I heard Mr. Charles Watts, who was then as now a capital debater; Mr. G. J. Holyoake, Mr. C. C. Cattell, Mr. Austin Holyoake, and perhaps one or two other lecturers whom I have forgotten. Mr. Austin Holyoake frequently took the chair, especially at Mr. Bradlaugh's lectures, and a capital chairman he was, giving out the notices in a pleasant, graceful manner, and pleading for financial support like a true man. He was working hard for the success of the enterprise himself, and had a right to beg help from others.

Mr. Bradlaugh, however, was the great attraction in my case. Perhaps I was more impressionable at

that time, but I fancy he was then at his best as an orator. In later life he grew more cautious under a sense of responsibility; he had to think what he should not say as well as what he should. He cultivated the art of persuasion, and he was right in doing so. But at the earlier period I am writing of he gave a full swing to his passionate eloquence. His perorations were marvellously glowing and used to thrill me to the very marrow.

Gradually I began to make acquaintances at the Hall. I got to know Mr. Austin Holyoake and his charming wife, Mr. and Mrs. Bayston, Mr. Herbert Gilham, Mr. R. O. Smith, and other workers. By and bye I was introduced to Mr. Bradlaugh and shook hands with him. It was the proudest moment of my young life. I still remember his scrutinising look. It was keen but kindly, and the final expression seemed to say, "We may see more of each other."

In 1870 I wrote my first article in the *National Reformer*. For a year or two I wrote occasionally, and after that with tolerable frequency. I was also engaged in various efforts at the Hall; helping to carry on a Secular Sunday School, a Young Men's Secular Association, etc. Naturally I was drawn more and more into Mr. Bradlaugh's acquaintance, and when he found himself unable to continue the Logic Class he had started at the Hall he asked me to carry it on for him. Of course I was proud of the invitation. But the Class did not live long. It was not Logic, but Mr. Bradlaugh, that had brought the members together. Nor do I think they would have learnt much of the art from Mr. Bradlaugh, except in an empirical way. He had a very logical cast of mind, but as far as I could see he had little acquaintance with formal Logic as it is taught by Mill and Whately, whom I select as typical masters of Induction and Deduction,

without wishing to depreciate the host of other authorities. Mr. Bradlaugh really gave his class lessons in Metaphysics; his talk was of substance, mode, and attribute, rather than of premises and conclusions.

Mr. Bradlaugh and I were brought into closer acquaintance by the Republican agitation in England after the proclamation of the present French Republic. I attended the Republican Conference at Birmingham in 1871, when I first met my old friend Dr. Guest of Manchester, Mr. R. A. Cooper of Norwich, Mr. Daniel Baker, Mr. Ferguson the Glasgow Home Ruler, and other veterans of reform. We held our Conference on Sunday in the old meeting-place of the Secular Society, which was approached by very abrupt steps, and being situated over stables, was not devoid of flavor. On Monday the Conference was continued in one of the rooms under the Town Hall. A long political programme was concocted. I was elected Secretary, and had the honor of speaking at the public meeting in the large hall. It was my first appearance in such a perilous position. I was apprehensive, and I said so. But Mr. Bradlaugh put his hand on my shoulder and told me not to fear. His kind looks and words were an excellent tonic. When I rose to speak I thought next to nothing about the audience. I thought "Mr. Bradlaugh is listening, I must do my best." And now as I am writing, I recall his encouraging glance as I looked at him, and the applause he led when I made my first point. He was my leader, and he helped me in an elder-brotherly way. Nothing could exceed his considerate generosity. Other people did not see it, but I remember it, and it was typical of the man.

One incident at the Conference is worth noting. It occurred in the afternoon, when Mr. R. A. Cooper (I think) was in the chair. The question of Free Educa-

tion was being discussed. Mr. Bradlaugh did not quite like it, nor did I. He asked me to go with him into an ante-room and consider an amendment. What it was I can hardly remember, although I recollect that Mr. Cooper was very sarcastic about it. Since then my own opinion has changed, as I dare say Mr. Bradlaugh's had changed; and the incident would not be worth recalling if it did not throw a light upon Mr. Bradlaugh's philosophy. He was always in favor of self-help and individual responsibility, and he was naturally hostile to everything that might weaken those precious elements of English life.

During the years immediately after the opening of the Hall of Science, Mr. Bradlaugh was there a good deal. Sometimes he attended the week-night entertainments and gave a reading from Shelley or Whittier or some other poet. The audience applauded as a matter of course. They always applauded Mr. Bradlaugh. But he was no reader. He delivered his lines with that straightforward sincerity which characterised his speeches. He cultivated none of the graces or dexterities of the elocutionist. Besides, he was too original to be a successful echo of other men. I think he only did justice to Shelley's lines "To the Men of England." But this is a piece of simple and vigorous declamation; very fine, no doubt, but rather rhetoric than poetry.

Mr. Bradlaugh was anything but a cold man. I should say he was electric. But his tastes, so far as I could discover, did not lie in the direction of poetry. Certainly I heard him once, in those old days, read a great part, if not the whole of Shelley's "Sensitive Plant." He loved Shelley, however, as an Atheist and a Republican, and I suppose he took Shelley's poetry on trust. But I do not think, though I speak under correction, that he cared very much for poetry

as such. I could never discover from his conversation or writings that he had read a line of Shakespeare—the god of Colonel Ingersoll. His mind was of the practical order, like Oliver Cromwell's. He had a genius for public affairs. He was not only a born orator, but a born ruler of men. Naturally he had, as the French say, the defects of his qualities. And it may be that the terrible stress of his life tended to repress the poetical side of his nature, and less developed his subtlety than his strength. Yet his feelings were deep, and his heart was easily touched. When William O'Brien delivered that great speech in the House of Commons after his imprisonment by Mr. Balfour, with all its needless indignities, there were two men who could not restrain their tears. One was an Irish member. The other was Charles Bradlaugh. One who witnessed the scene told me it was infinitely pathetic to see that gigantic man, deemed so hard by an ignorant world, wiping away his tears at the tale of a brave man's unmerited suffering.

Mr. Bradlaugh used to attend the social parties pretty often in those old days. He did not dance and he stood about rather awkwardly. It must have been a great affliction, but he bore it with exemplary fortitude. Once or twice I saw Mrs. Bradlaugh there. She had a full-blown matronly figure. Miss Alice and Miss Hypatia came frequently. They were not then living in the enervating air of London, and they looked extremely robust. I also remember the boy Charles, of whom Mr. Bradlaugh seemed very proud. He was a remarkably bright lad, and full of promise. But he was carried off by a fever. Only a day or two after the lad's death Mr. Bradlaugh had to lecture at the Hall. I was away, and I wondered whether he would fulfil the engagement. He did fulfil it. A

friend wrote to me that Mr. Bradlaugh walked through the hall and mounted the platform with a face as white and rigid as that of a statue. He made no reference or allusion to his loss, but all could see he carried a bleeding heart. His lecturing in such circumstances was characteristic. Weaker men would have indulged their grief; he was made of sterner stuff, and would not let it interfere with what he deemed his duty.

Splendid as was his eloquence at that time, Mr. Bradlaugh did not draw the large audiences that flocked around him a few years later. The Hall of Science was at first but half its present size, the platform standing on the right as you entered, with a small gallery on the opposite side. Its holding capacity could not have been more than half what it is at present, yet I have seen the place far from full. But the audiences grew larger and larger, and eventually the hall was increased to its present proportions, although for a long time there was not cash enough to put on a proper roof, and the building was defaced by a huge unsightly beam, on each side of which there was an arch of corrugated iron.

Those were glorious times. Difficulties were great, but there was a spirit at the Hall that laughed at them. How the foremost men about the place did work! Mr. R. O. Smith and Mr. Trevilion, senior, could a tale unfold. Whenever Freethinkers are at all dejected they should have a chat with one of those gentleman. Perhaps it would make them ashamed of their dejection, and fill them with the spirit of the heroic days.

Friends have told me with what energy Mr. Bradlaugh fought the battles of the old Reform League. I *know* with what energy he threw himself into the Republican agitation that followed the downfall of

Napoleon III. He tried to get to Paris but failed. Jules Favre and his friends did not want him. Favre himself was an eloquent histrion, and no doubt he felt afraid of a man like Mr. Bradlaugh. But if Mr. Bradlaugh could not get to Paris he fought hard for France in London. Meetings at the Hall of Science did not suffice. There was money from French sources and St. James's Hall was taken for a big demonstration. The Positivists shared in the proceedings. Their chief man was Mr. Frederic Harrison. Mr. Bradlaugh and he were a tremendous contrast. In fact a London paper (I think the *Echo*) remarked that Mr. Bradlaugh spoke as well as Mr. Harrison wrote, and Mr. Harrison spoke as badly as Mr. Bradlaugh wrote. There was some truth in this, though like most epigrams it was not all true. Mr. Bradlaugh was a born orator, but not a born writer. Yet he often wrote with a forthright power, naked and unadorned, which could dispense with the aid of literary artifices.

During this English agitation on behalf of France, held firmly under German feet, Mr. Bradlaugh came into contact with a French countess, who, I believe, either supplied or was the channel of supplying the necessary funds. As the lady is mentioned in Mr Headingley's *Life of Charles Bradlaugh*, which was published with Mr. Bradlaugh's sanction, there is no reason why I should not refer to her. She came several times to the Hall of Science, and I was introduced to her. She had been a beauty, and although time was beginning to tell on her, she retained a good deal of charm and distinction, which, like a true Frenchwoman, she heightened by the art of dressing. Then as now, of course, foul tongues wagged in foolish heads, and Mr. Bradlaugh's enemies were not slow to point to the French countess with prurient grimaces. Unable to understand friendship between man and

woman, owing to their Puritan training or incurable rankness, they invited the orthodox in religion and politics to note this suspicious connection. Something of this malicious folly must have reached Mr. Bradlaugh's ears, but I imagine he was too proud and self-contained to let it disturb him.

After the Birmingham meeting, and the founding of the Republican League, of which Mr. Bradlaugh became president, and I secretary, he visited Spain on private business, taking with him a message from the Conference to Senor Castelar, the leading spirit of the short-lived Spanish Republic. I remember writing out the message in a clear, bold hand, and addressing the foolscap envelope in the same way. When Mr. Bradlaugh fell among the Carlists he cursed my caligraphy. Happily, however, the officer who scrutinised that envelope could not read at all, and Mr. Bradlaugh escaped the consequences of being known to carry about letters addressed to the devilish Castelar.

During Mr. Bradlaugh's first visit to America I was a frequent contributor to his journal, and I corresponded with him privately. I went down to Northampton and delivered a lecture at his request, under the auspices of his electoral committee. The old theatre—a dirty, ramshackle place as I recollect it—was crowded, and I had my first taste of the popularity of Mr. Bradlaugh in the borough. Every mention of his name excited the wildest enthusiasm.

While Mr. Bradlaugh was lecturing in the States a general election took place in England. It was impossible for him to return in time, but his friends looked after his interests. A committee was formed at the Hall of Science to raise the necessary funds, and Mr. Charles Watts and I went down to Northampton to conduct the election. We addressed outdoor meetings in the day, and crowded indoor meetings at night.

Again I saw what a hold Mr. Bradlaugh had on his Northampton followers. They sang "Bradlaugh for Northampton" in the Circus with all the fervor of Scotch Covenanters on their hillsides "rolling the psalm to wintry skies."

Mr. Watts and I did not win the seat for Mr. Bradlaugh, nor did he win it himself at the next election, but we managed to increase his vote, and he expressed his pleasure at the result.

Soon after the election Mr. Bradlaugh returned to England. Mr. Watts and I went down with him to Northampton. There was a crowded public meeting, I believe in the Circus; and I saw Mr. Bradlaugh, for the first time, in the presence of his future constituents. They were simply intoxicated with excitement. The shouts of "Bradlaugh" and "Charley" were deafening. Hats and handkerchiefs were waved in the air. The multitude rose to its feet and gave its hero a splendid welcome. Then we settled down to speech-making, but all that followed was somewhat tame and flat after that first glorious outburst of popular devotion.

The next election came quickly. It resulted in the return of a Tory majority for Benjamin Disraeli, and Mr. Gladstone went off to sulk in his tent. Two Tories were returned for Radical Northampton. Mr. Bradlaugh let them in. He was determined to have one of the Northampton seats. To get it he had to make himself inevitable. He had to prove that if Northampton wanted two Liberal members, one of them must be Charles Bradlaugh. It took him thirteen years to demonstrate this, but he succeeded, as he succeeded in most things. At last, in 1880, he ran as official Liberal candidate with Mr. Labouchere, and both were returned.

I assisted Mr. Bradlaugh during his second (1874)

election. It was then that I first saw Mrs. Besant. She had not yet taken to the platform, but she was writing for the *National Reformer*, and her pen was active during the contest. Mr. Watts was also there. Another figure I remember was Mr. George Odger, who labored among the Trade Unionists of Northampton in Mr. Bradlaugh's interest. George Odger was one of the ablest of all the working-class leaders I have ever met. He came from my own county, Devonshire, being born at Horrabridge, on the road between Plymouth and Tavistock. He was honest to the heart's core, as well as very able, but he was incurably indolent. You never could be sure of him at a public meeting. He had to be looked up beforehand, or he might forget the engagement and spend his time more agreeably. He was passionately fond of the theatre, and could talk by the hour on famous performances of old actors and actresses. During the daytime at Northampton I had long chats with him. He objected to fine hotels, and he objected to walking; so I had to sit with him in the garden of a semi-rural public-house, where our conversation was altogether out of proportion to our liquor. Odger liked beer; not much of it, but just enough; it suited his palate and his purse; and as I drank next to nothing, the landlord must have thought us unprofitable customers.

Mr. Bradlaugh had rooms at the George Hotel. It was the Tory house, but he preferred it, and Mrs. Besant, Mr. Watts, and the rest of us, fed and slept there during the election. This gave rise to a good deal of silly talk among Mr. Bradlaugh's enemies. One evening we were returning from a Town Hall meeting, and the Tories had been holding a small meeting at the "George." As we reached the foot of the stairs, we encountered a knot of Tories. One of them was Mr. Merewether, the Tory candidate. He

was nearly of the same height as Mr. Bradlaugh, and well built. His friends were holding him back, but he broke from them, exclaiming, "Hang it! I *will* have a look at him." He stood at the very foot of the staircase and looked hard at Mr. Bradlaugh ascending. His expression was one of good-tempered insolence. After a long look at Mr. Bradlaugh, he returned to his friends, shouting, "Well, I'm damned if he's as bad-looking as I thought."

I left Northampton before the close of the poll. Mr. Bradlaugh was leaving the same night for America, having barely time to catch the boat at Liverpool. I drove round with him before leaving, on a visit to some of the polling stations. He had paid me a modest sum for my services, but he found he had hardly enough to take him across the Atlantic, and he asked me to lend him what money I had. I fished seven or nine pounds out of my pocket—I forget which—and handed it to him. It was paid back to me by his order a few weeks subsequently; and the incident would not be worth mentioning if it did not throw a light on the libellous nonsense of Mr. Bradlaugh's enemies that he was rolling in wealth.

While at Northampton with Mr. Bradlaugh, and on other occasions, I saw something of his personal tastes and habits. He struck me as an abstemious man. He was far from a great eater, and I never noticed him drink anything at dinner but claret, which is not an intoxicating beverage. On the whole, I should say, it is less injurious to the stomach and brain than tea or coffee. He was rather fond of a cup of tea seventeen years ago, and latterly his fondness for it developed into something like a passion. More than once I found him at St. John's Wood drinking a big cup of pretty strong tea, and was seduced by his genial invitation into joining him in that reckless indulgence.

He used to smoke too in the old days, but he afterwards gave up the practice for several years. About seven years ago, however, he resumed it. I do not think he ever attained to the dignity of a pipe. He smoked cigars. Some time in April, 1889, I spent an hour with him at the House of Commons. He got the Speaker's leave to take me into the lower smoke-room, and we "discussed" a cigar and some claret while discussing some Freethought business. The claret he seemed indifferent to, but he puffed the cigar with an air of enjoyment.

During the Northampton election times I used to take a good stiff daily walk. All through my youth I had plenty of exercise in the open air, and I still grow desperately fusty without a brisk tramp at least once in the twenty-four hours. Mr. Bradlaugh generally took a drive, and I remember telling him with youthful audacity that he ought to walk for his health's sake. Of course it was difficult for him to walk in the streets. His stature and bulk made him too noticeable, and mobbing was very unpleasant. But he might have driven out of town and trudged a mile or two on the country roads. My opinion is that his neglect of physical exercise helped to shorten his life. Occasional bouts of fishing were very well in their way, but *daily* exercise is the necessary thing. I do not forget the tremendous labor, physical as well as mental, of lecturing on burning questions to large audiences. All that, however, goes on in hot, crowded rooms, full of vitiated air; and it gives no proper exercise to the legs and loins or the lower vital organs.

After one of my remonstrances Mr. Bradlaugh invited me to play a game of billiards. It was the only time I ever played with him. His style with the cue was spacious and splendid. The balls went flying about the board, and I chaffed him on his flukes. He

had not the temperament of a billiard-player. Still, I have heard that he played a fair game at St. Stephen's; but I can hardly believe it without first-hand testimony. I am willing to believe, however, that he was a good chess-player. Certainly he had a head for it. But chess is a vile game for a brain-worker, whose recreations should never involve a mental strain.

When I first knew Mr. Bradlaugh he was living at Tottenham. I never visited him there, but I often called on him at his later lodgings in Turner-street, Commercial-road. He occupied the ground floor, consisting of two rooms. The back was his bedroom, and the front his library and workshop. It was what the Americans call a one-horse affair. Shelves all round the room were filled with books. Mr. Bradlaugh sat at a desk with his back to the fireplace. On his right was the door communicating with his bedroom, facing him the door opening on the passage, and on his right the street window. The room itself could hardly have been more than twelve or thirteen feet square. I once told him he was too near the fireplace, and he said it was sometimes good to have the poker handy. At that I stared, and he told me the following story.

One day a gentleman called on him and was invited to take a chair. He sat down facing Mr. Bradlaugh, and explained that he wanted advice on a very particular matter. God Almighty had told him to kill someone, and he had a difficulty in selecting a victim. Mr. Bradlaugh put his hand behind him and quietly grasped the poker. The inspired gentleman put the problem as a knotty one, and begged the assistance of the clever Iconoclast. "Well," said Mr. Bradlaugh, keeping quite cool, "what do you say to the Archbishop of Canterbury?" "The very man!" exclaimed the inspired gentleman. He got Mr. Bradlaugh to

give him the Archbishop's address, and said, "Good-day," with a profusion of thanks. Mr. Bradlaugh went to the door to look for a policeman, but none was visible, and the inspired gentleman was soon out of sight.

"So you see," said Mr. Bradlaugh, "It's good to have the poker handy. I never saw or heard of the man again, and I knew he couldn't get near the Archbishop. There are too many flunkeys in the way."

Those were my struggling days, and Mr. Bradlaugh was very kind to me. I remember the Sunday evening when I told him I thought of taking to the Freethought platform. He pointed out the hard and thorny path I should have to tread, but when he saw I was resolved on the attempt, he put his hand on my shoulder and said, "There is no young man in the movement I would sooner welcome."

In the very same room, on another Sunday evening a little later, I first saw James Thomson. He came down to the Hall of Science with Mr. Bradlaugh, in whose employment he then was, and I gave him the article I had brought for the *National Reformer*. He shook hands very cordially, and I was delighted to meet one for whose poetry I had a profound admiration.

It was also at the Hall of Science, about the same time, that I met the eccentric Mr. Turberville, brother to Mr. Blackmore, the novelist. He was a man of parts with a bee in his bonnet. He claimed kinship with Turberville, a minor poet of the sixteenth century, and he loved to talk of poetry. His knowledge of Shakespeare was profound and minute. He admired Mr. Bradlaugh's perorations immensely, as well as his bold defence of Freethought. He made out a will in Mr. Bradlaugh's favor, but he subsequently made another will, and died in circumstances that necessitated an inquest. By agreement, however,

Mr. Bradlaugh obtained £2,500 from the estate, and the windfall came opportunely, for his struggles and litigations had involved him in considerable debt. I know he often had to borrow money on heavy interest. One day, at Turner-street, he told me that a creditor of this species had coolly invited him to dinner. "Hang it," he said, "you can't dine with a man who charges you sixty per cent."

Another recollection I have of Mr. Bradlaugh is in connexion with the funeral of Mr. Austin Holyoake. The death of this gentleman was a great loss to the Freethought cause. He was highly respected by all who knew him. The geniality of his disposition was such that he had many friends and not a single enemy. For some years he was Mr. Bradlaugh's printer and publisher, and a frequent contributor to his journal. He was foremost in every good work, but he was one of those modest men who never get the credit of their labors. He died at 17 Johnson's-court, Fleet-street, in an upstairs room above the printing office, where his devoted wife had for many weeks nursed his flickering life. The funeral was a notable event. Those of us who could afford it rode in the undertaker's coaches, and the rest walked in procession to Highgate Cemetery. I can still see Mr. Bradlaugh in my mind's eye, bustling about on the ground floor, taking everything as usual on his own shoulders. He sorted us in fours for the coaches, my *vis à vis* being James Thomson. At the grave-side, after the reading of Austin Holyoake's own funeral service by Mr. Charles Watts, Mr. Bradlaugh delivered a brief address which he had written for the occasion. On the whole it was too much a composition, but one sentence was true "Bradlaugh," and it sounds in my ears still:—"Twenty years of friendship lie buried in that grave."

How such scenes are impressed on one's memory! As I write I see the set face of Charles Bradlaugh. I behold the sob-shaken back and bowed head of Herbert Gilham just in front of me. I hear and feel the cool, rustling wind, like a plaintive requiem over the dead.

Once again, years afterwards, I saw Mr. Bradlaugh in the same cemetery, supporting the helpless figure of Mrs. Ernestine Rose as she left the open grave of the dear partner of her long life of labor for the cause of human redemption.

Owing to circumstances, into which I need not enter, I saw little of Mr. Bradlaugh between 1875 and 1880. When he was returned for Northampton I rejoiced, and when he was committed to the Clock Tower I saw my duty sun-clear. It was to participate as I could, and might, in the struggle. My contributions to Mr. Bradlaugh's journal were resumed, and I spoke at meetings in his behalf. In May, 1881, I started the *Freethinker*, my oldest living child. Mr. Bradlaugh acted with his natural generosity. He advertised my bantling gratuitously in his own journal, and gave it every possible facility. This was not known at the time, but I ought to state it now.

Throughout that long, terrible struggle with the House of Commons I was with Mr. Bradlaugh on every point. If he made a single mistake I have yet to see it indicated. My article in the first number of the *Freethinker* was entitled "Mr. Bradlaugh's Advisers." Its object was to show the absurdity of the plentiful advice offered him, and the absolute justice of the course he was pursuing.

Three weeks afterwards the bigots convened a ticket meeting at Exeter Hall. The chief promoters were Earl Percy, Sir Bartle Frere, and butcher Varley. Mr. Bradlaugh was afraid the meeting would have a pre-

judicial effect on public opinion in the provinces. The fact of the *tickets* would be kept back, and the report would go forth that a vote was unanimously passed against him at a big London demonstration. It was necessary, therefore, that the meeting should be *spoiled.* And it *was.* Mr. Bradlaugh gave me the task of moving an amendment. We had a chat in his library at St. John's Wood, and as we parted he said, "I rely on you, Foote." He looked at me steadily, holding my eyes as though to read the depths.

We got tickets somehow. But the Protestant Alliance smelt mischief, and Mr. Bradlaugh's supporters had to fight their way in. Two hundred and fifty police were not enough to keep them all out. I was naturally a marked man, and fighting had to be supplemented by diplomacy. When the noble Smithson (Earl Percy), had drivelled for a few minutes as chairman, and the resolution against Mr. Bradlaugh had been proposed and seconded by Sir John Kennaway and Canon Taylor, I rose to move an amendment. But the amendment was refused. The resolution was put, and the Christians stood up and voted, while the organ played "God Save the Queen." Then, at a signal, our people jumped on the forms, and rent the air with cheers for "Bradlaugh." At another signal they all trooped out, went off to Trafalgar-square with the big crowd outside, and passed resolutions in Mr. Bradlaugh's favor. The bigots' meeting was completely spoiled. They had to barricade the doors and keep out their own people as well as the enemy; the hall was never half full, and their resolution was passed after refusing an amendment, amidst loud execrations. Such a lesson was taught the bigots that they never made another attempt. Mr. Bradlaugh had trusty lieutenants and stern supporters, and the bigots knew he would spoil every *private* meeting that pro-

fessed to be *public*. He acted with wisdom and determination, and the result showed he knew the stake he was playing for when he said, "I rely on you," with that steady Napoleonic look.

. . . . . .

Mr. Bradlaugh's legal exploits, if properly recorded, would fill a good-sized volume. When his life is adequately written, as it will be some day, this department will have to be entrusted to a skilled lawyer. No other person could do anything like justice to a most important part of the career of one whom the Tories used to call "that litigious man," when they were trying to ruin him in the law courts and he was only defending himself against their base attacks.

Those who had only known Mr. Bradlaugh as a platform orator had some difficulty in recognising him when they first met him in one of our "halls of justice." His whole manner was changed. He was polite, insinuating, and deferential. His attitude towards the judges was admirably calculated to conciliate their favor. I do not mean that *he* calculated. He had quite a superstitious veneration for judges. It was perfectly sincere and it never wavered. He would not hear a word against them. When he pleaded before them his personal sentiments ran in a line with his best interests; for although judges are above most temptations, their vanity is often sensitive, and Mr. Bradlaugh's manner was intensely flattering.

Had he followed the legal profession, Mr. Bradlaugh would have easily mounted to the top and earned a tremendous income. I have heard some of the cleverest counsel of our time, but I never heard one to be compared with him in grasp, subtlety and agility. He could examine and cross-examine with consummate dexterity. In arguing points of law he had the tenacity of a bull-dog and the keenness of a sleuth-hound. He

always fortified himself with a plethora of "cases." The table in front of him groaned with a weight of law. Here as elsewhere he was "thorough." An eminent jurisprudist once remarked to me, "there is little gleaning to be done after Bradlaugh."

As a pleader before juries, however, I doubt whether he would have achieved a great success. He was too much of a born orator. He began well, but he soon forgot the limited audience of twelve, and spoke to a wider circle. This is not the way to humor juries. They like to feel their own importance, and he succeeds best who plays upon their weakness. "Remember," their looks say, "you are talking to *us;* the other gentlemen listen accidentally; *we* make you or damn you."

My first recollection of Mr. Bradlaugh in the law courts is twenty-two years old. How many survivors are there of the friends who filled that dingy old court at Westminster where he argued before a full bench of judges in 1869? He was prosecuted for not giving sureties in the sum of £400 against the appearance of blasphemy or sedition in his paper. The law was resuscitated in his single case to crush him; but he fought, as he said he would, to the bitter end, and the Gladstone Government was glad to repeal the obsolete enactments. The Crown retired from the suit with a *stet processus*, and Mr. Bradlaugh was left with the laurels—and his costs.

I obtained an hour or two's leave from my employment, and heard a portion of Mr. Bradlaugh's argument It gave me a new conception of his powers. That is the only impression I retain. The details have dropped out of my memory, but there remains as fresh as ever the masterful figure of Charles Bradlaugh.

The best view I ever had of Mr. Bradlaugh in litigation was in the old Court of Queen's Bench on

Tuesday and Wednesday, July 19 and 20, 1881, when he cross-examined poor Mr. Newdegate. For a good deal of the time I sat beside him, and could watch *him* closely as well as the case. By raising the point whether the writ against him for penalties had been issued before or after he gave his vote in the House, he was able to put all the parties to the prosecution into the witness-box and make them give an account of themselves. Mr. Newdegate was one of the victims, and the poor man made confessions that furnished Mr. Bradlaugh with ground for a successful action against him under the law of Maintenance.

Mr. Newdegate was a hard-mouthed witness, but he was saddled, bridled, and ridden to the winning-post. His lips opened literally, making his mouth like the slit of a pillar-box. Getting evidence from him was like extracting a rotten cork from the neck of a bottle, but it all came out bit by bit, and the poor man must have left the witness-box feeling that he had delivered himself into the hands of that uncircumcised Philistine. His cross-examination lasted three hours. It was like flaying alive. Once or twice I felt qualms of pity for the old man, he was such an abject figure in the hands of that terrible antagonist. Every card he held had to be displayed. Finally he had to produce the bond of indemnity he had given the common informer Clarke against all the expenses he might incur in the suit. When this came out Mr. Bradlaugh bent down to me and said, "I have him." And he *did* have him. Despite the common notion that the old law of Maintenance was obsolete, Mr. Bradlaugh pursued him under it triumphantly, and instead of ruining "Bradlaugh," poor Newdegate was nearly ruined himself.

What a contrast to Mr. Newdegate was Mr. Bradlaugh! He was the very picture of suppressed fire, of rampant energies held in leash: the nerves of the face playing

like the ripple on water, the whole frame quivering, and the eyes ablaze. It was wonderful how he managed to keep his intellect alert and his judgment steady. Six hours of such work as he had in court that day were enough to tax the greatest strength. Before it was over I saw bodeful blood-rims under his eyes. It did not surprise me, on meeting him at the Cobden Workmen's Club the next evening, to learn that he had been frightfully ill. "Mr. Bradlaugh," I wrote at the time, "is a wonderfully strong man, but the Tories and the bigots are doing their best to kill him, and if this sort of thing is to continue very much longer they may succeed." Alas, they *did* succeed. That terrible struggle killed him. No man ever lived who could have passed through it unbroken.

Mr. Bradlaugh was clearly right on the point raised, but the jury went against him, apparently out of sheer prejudice. When he went out into Westminster Hall he was loudly cheered by a crowd of sympathisers, who, as the *Times* sneered, "applauded as lustily as though their champion had won." Precisely so. Their applause would have greeted him in the worst defeat. He was not a champion on whom they had "put their money." He represented their principles, and the *Times* forgot, if it ever knew, that men are devoted to leaders in proportion to the depth of the interests they espouse. Conviction "bears it out even to the edge of doom."

Now let me mention something that shows Mr. Bradlaugh's tact and consideration. My work on the *Freethinker* brought me no return. I had just read the proof of an article for Mr. Bradlaugh's paper. While we were waiting for the jury's verdict he referred to the article, and guessing my need he said, "Shall I give you the guinea now?" My answer was an expressive shrug and a motion of the eye-brows.

Taking the two coins out of his pocket, he wrapt them in a piece of paper *under the table*, and presently slipped the packet into my hand. The whole proceeding touches me deeply as I recall it. He might well have thought only of himself in that time of suspense; but he thought of me too, and the precautions he took against being seen to pay me money were expressive of his inbred delicacy. Reader do not say the incident is trivial. These little things reveal the man.

Little did I dream, as I watched Mr. Bradlaugh fighting bigotry in the law courts, that the time would come when he and I would be included in a common indictment and stand in a criminal dock together. But as the French say, it is always the unexpected that happens. Early in July, 1882, I was served with a summons from the Lord Mayor of London, ordering me to appear at the Mansion House on the following Tuesday and take my trial on a charge of Blasphemy. Two other gentlemen were included in the summons, and all three of us duly appeared. We were all members of the National Secular Society, and Mr. Bradlaugh attended to render any possible assistance. The case was adjourned to the following Monday, by which time a summons had been served on Mr. Bradlaugh, who took his place beside us in the dock. After an animated day's proceedings we were committed for trial at the Old Bailey.

The object of this prosecution was, of course, to stab Mr. Bradlaugh in the back. He had fought all the bigots face to face, and held them all at bay; so they put a stiletto into Sir Hardinge Giffard's hands, and paid him his blood-money to attack the hero from behind.

Mr. Bradlaugh had to play the fox again. He wanted to gain time, and he wanted to be tried, if at all, in the Court of Queen's Bench. He always told me that

being tried at the Old Bailey was going like a lamb to the slaughter, and that a verdict of guilty there would certainly mean twelve months' imprisonment. The obvious resource, therefore, was to obtain a writ of *certiorari* removing our indictment to the superior court. Happily it was in the long vacation, and application had to be made to a judge in chambers. By another piece of good luck, it was Mr. Justice Stephen who sat behind the table on the fatal morning when the writ had to be finally granted or refused. It was obtained on July 29, 1882. Poor Mr. Maloney, who represented the prosecution, was no match for Mr. Bradlaugh, who treated him like a child, and only let him say a word now and then as a special favor.

Roaming the law courts with Mr. Bradlaugh, I was able to see his intimate knowledge of legal practice. He threaded the labyrinth with consummate ease and dexterity. We went from office to office, where everything seemed designed to baffle suitors conducting their own cases. Our case, too, was somewhat peculiar; obsolete technicalities, only half intelligible even to experts, met us at every turn; and when we got out into the open air I felt that the thing was indeed done, but that it would puzzle omniscience to do it in exactly the same way again. Seven pounds was spent on stamps, documents, and other items, and securities for costs had to be given to the extent of six hundred pounds. As I walked home I pondered the great truth that England is a free country. I had seen with my own eyes that *there is* one law for rich and poor. But I could not help reflecting that only the rich could afford it, and that the poor might as well have no law at all.

Mr. Bradlaugh next moved to quash the indictment. He argued that the public prosecutor's fiat was bad, as it did not name the persons who were to be proceeded

against, and thus resembled a general warrant, which in the famous Wilkes case the judges had held to be invalid. On this point, however, two judges, one of them being Sir James Stephen, gave judgment against him. The case was argued on Mr. Bradlaugh's part, the judges said, with "great power and learning." For my part, I think he showed a greater knowledge of "cases" than both the legal luminaries on the bench, who laid their heads close together over many a knotty point of the argument.

Beaten on the main issue, Mr. Bradlaugh was successful, however, on the subsidiary one. Two counts were struck out of the indictment. The excision made no difference to me, but a great deal of difference to him. Two numbers of the *Freethinker* were thus disposed of bearing the imprint of the Freethought Publishing Company—under which name Mr. Bradlaugh and Mrs. Beasant traded—and owing to the lapse of time it was impossible to open a fresh indictment. Of course I saw what Mr. Bradlaugh was driving at, and I could not but admire the way in which he made light of this point, arguing it baldly as a formal matter on which, as their lordships would see at a glance, he was absolutely entitled to a judgment. They would see that he was still open to all the other counts of the indictment, and therefore it might make very little difference, but right was right and law was law. Under the spell of his persuasive speech, it was amazing to see the judges smoothing their wrinkled fronts. I fancy they gave him his second point the more readily because they were against him on the first; indeed, they seemed to think it a pity, if not a shame, that all his learning and ability should be displayed for *nothing*.

Our indictment went into the list of Crown Cases Reserved, and did not come on for trial till the following April. Meanwhile I was prosecuted again, and failing

to get a writ of *certiorari*, owing to the flagrant bigotry of Baron Huddleston and Justice North, I was tried at the Old Bailey, and sentenced to twelve months' imprisonment like a common thief—as Mr. Bradlaugh had predicted.

During my trouble Mr. Bradlaugh lent me every assistance, furnishing me with legal books and advice, and visiting me in Newgate between the first and second trials, while Judge North's underlings were preparing a more pliant jury than the one which had declined to return a verdict of guilty.

In Holloway Gaol I lost sight of Mr. Bradlaugh and everyone else, except persons I had no desire to see. But one morning, early in April, 1883, the Governor informed me that Mr. Bradlaugh was going to pay me a visit, having the Home Secretary's order to see me on urgent business. The same afternoon I was marched from my cell into one of the Governor's offices, where Mr. Bradlaugh was waiting. Compared with the pale prisoners I saw day by day, he looked the very picture of health. Fresh, clean-shaven, neatly dressed, he was a most refreshing sight to eyes accustomed to rough faces and the brown convict's garb. And it was a friend too, and I could take his hand and exchange human speech with him. How vivid is my recollection of him at that moment! He seemed in the prime of life, little the worse for his terrible struggles, only the gray a trifle more decided about the temples, but the eyes full of light, and the mobile mouth full of vitality. And now he is dead! Dead! It is hard to realise. But I rang the muffled bell as he lay fighting his last battle, and I followed his corpse to the grave; and I know that the worm is busy about those leonine features, and the rain trickles through with a scent of faded flowers. Yes, it is true; he *is* dead. Dead like the king and dead like the

clown; yet living truly beyond the dust of death in the lives of others, an inextinguishable light, a vivifying fire, a passionate hope, an ardent aspiration.

> Till the Future dares
> Forget the Past, his fate and fame shall be
> An echo and a light unto eternity.

On the morning of April 10, 1883, I put on my own clothes and was driven in a four-wheeler from Holloway Gaol to the Law Courts, in company with Warder Smith, who superintended the wing of the prison in which a grateful country lodged and boarded me at its own expense. It was lovely spring weather, and I felt like a man new-born.

Inside the court where the great Blasphemy case was to be tried I found Mr. Bradlaugh with his usual load of law books. The court was crowded with friends of the defendants and legal gentlemen anxious to witness the performance.

Mr. Bradlaugh applied for a separate trial, on the ground that as there was no charge of conspiracy it was unjust to prejudice his case by evidence admitted against his co-defendants; and Lord Coleridge, who obviously meant to see fair play, granted the application.

Mr. Bradlaugh's position was, in one sense, the most perilous he had ever stood in. Just as his long litigation with respect to his seat in Parliament was drawing to a close, and as he believed to a *successful* close, he had to defend himself against a charge which, if he were proved guilty, would entail upon him the penalty of imprisonment. Of course it would not have been such imprisonment as I was suffering, for Queen's Bench prisoners are generally sent to the civil side of Holloway Gaol. But *any* imprisonment at such a moment gravely imperilled his prospects of success in the mighty struggle with wealth, bigotry, and political

prejudice. A sense of this fact weighed heavily upon him, but it did not impair his energy or intellectual alertness; indeed, he was one of those rare men whose faculties are sharpened by danger.

I need not dwell upon the evidence of the prosecution. It was most unsatisfactory, and failed to connect Mr. Bradlaugh with the *Freethinker*. Sir Hardinge Giffard, therefore, almost entirely confined himself to playing upon the prejudices of the jury.

Mr. Bradlaugh was perfection itself in examining and cross-examining, and was soon on the windward side of the judge, but his address to the jury was too boisterous. He *felt* too much. His adversary was not under this disadvantage, and Sir Hardinge Giffard's address to the jury, considered merely as a tactical display, was better than Mr. Bradlaugh's.

On the second day of the trial (it lasted for three days) there occurred a curious episode. Just before the adjournment for luncheon Mr. Bradlaugh intimated that when the Court re-assembled he would call his co-defendants as witnesses. Lord Coleridge replied in a low, suggestive tone, "Do you think it necessary?" Mr. Bradlaugh rose and for the first time I saw him tremble. "My lord," he said, "you put upon me a grave responsibility." "I put no responsibility upon you," said Lord Coleridge, "it is for you to decide." And the stately judge glided away in his robes of office.

If Mr. Bradlaugh put his co-defendants in the witness-box, one of two things might happen. They might decline to give evidence, as every answer would tend to criminate themselves; or they might exculpate Mr. Bradlaugh and procure their own damnation.

I do not blame Lord Coleridge for looking at the matter in this way. But I naturally looked at it in a different light. Mr. Bradlaugh was my general, and

I was his lieutenant, and it was clearly my duty to sacrifice myself. I could release him from danger with half a dozen words, and why should I hesitate to say them or he to exact them? I was already in prison, and another conviction could add little to my misfortune, whereas he was still free, and his continued freedom was just then absolutely indispensable to our common cause. For my part, I had not a moment's hesitation. But Lord Coleridge's words sank into Mr. Bradlaugh's mind, and after luncheon he announced that he would *not* call his co-defendants. His lordship looked pleased, but how he frowned when Sir Hardinge Giffard complained that *he* was deprived of an opportunity! Lord Coleridge did not say, but he *looked*—"Have you no sense of decency?" Sir Hardinge Giffard, however, was thick-skinned. He relied on Mr. Bradlaugh's sense of honor, and made it the basis of an artificial grievance. He even pretended that Mr. Bradlaugh was *afraid* to call his co-defendants. But he overreached himself by this hypocrisy, and obliged Mr. Bradlaugh to put his co-defendants into the witness-box. We were formally tendered as witnesses, Mr. Bradlaugh going no further, and leaving Sir Hardinge Giffard to do as he would. Of course he was obliged to interrogate us, or look foolish after his braggadocio, and in doing so he ruined his own case by giving us the opportunity of declaring that Mr. Bradlaugh was never in any way connected with the *Freethinker*.

Mr. Bradlaugh, of course, did not in any sense sacrifice me. It would have been contemptible on my part to let him bear any responsibility for my own deliberate action, in which he was not at all implicated, and if I had not been tendered as a witness I should have tried to tender myself.

After half an hour's deliberation the jury found Mr.

Bradlaugh not guilty. Standing up for the verdict, with pale set face, the grateful little "not" fell upon his ear, and his rigidity relaxed. Tears started to *my* eyes, and I saw the tears in *his* eyes as I squeezed his hand in speechless congratulation.

My own trial followed Mr. Bradlaugh's, and I was not found guilty. Three members of the jury held out against a verdict that would have disgraced a free country; and as the prosecution despaired of obtaining a verdict while Lord Coleridge presided at the trial, the Attorney-General was asked to allow the abandonment of proceedings. This he granted, the case was struck off the list, and I returned to my prison cell at Holloway.

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Let me now go back to the crowning incident of that long struggle between Charles Bradlaugh and the House of Commons. On May 10, 1881, the House passed a resolution authorising the Sergeant-at-Arms to prevent Mr. Bradlaugh from entering. On June 20, the jury gave a verdict in Mr. Newdegate's favor for the £500 penalty and costs. A motion for a new trial failed, and Mr. Bradlaugh appealed to the country. Enthusiastic meetings were held in his behalf, and he prepared a fresh *coup*. It had to be something striking, and it was. On the morning of August 3 Palace Yard and Westminster Hall were thronged with his supporters. Every one was armed with a petition, which he had a legal right to take to the House of Commons. Mr. Bradlaugh himself drove up in a hansom cab, and entered the precincts of the House by the private door. He made his way to the door of the House itself and tried to enter by a sudden effort, but he was seized by fourteen officials and stalwart policemen, picked for the work, and thrust back through the private passage into Palace Yard. Not

expecting such indignity, he contested every inch of the ground. Inspector Denning said he never thought that one man could have offered such resistance. The small muscles of both his arms were ruptured, and a subsequent attack of erysipelas put his life in jeopardy.

When he was finally thrust on to the pavement in Palace Yard his coat was torn and the rest of his garments were disarranged. His face was livid with the intense exertion when I saw him a minute afterwards. There he stood, a great mass of panting, valiant manhood, his features set like granite, and his eyes fixed upon the doorway before him. He seemed to see nothing but that doorway. I spoke to him, and he seemed not to hear. I believe a mighty struggle was going on within him, perhaps the greatest struggle of his life. He had suffered a frightful indignity, he must have been tempted to avenge it, and he had but to hold up his hand to bring around and behind him the myriads who stood outside the railings. The action would have been impolitic, but what a temptation he crushed down, and what an effort it necessitated! Never was his heroic nature more sorely tried. He justified his mastery of others by his mastery of himself. How small in comparison seemed the mob of his enemies! I never admired him more than at that moment. He was superb, sublime. They had wound their meshes about him, and the lion had burst them. One swift, daring stroke had frustrated all their plans. He who was to be quietly suppressed by resolutions of the House had cut the knot of their policy asunder, made himself the hero of the hour, and fixed the nation's eyes on his splendid audacity.

Reaction set in after that terrible struggle, and he accepted a chair that was brought him. Several members passed as he sat there. One of them was the coward, Frank Hugh O'Donnell. He had a lady on

his arm, and he passed with her between himself and Mr. Bradlaugh, so that her dress trailed over the hero's feet. It was a wretched display of insolence and cowardice. But the lady must be exonerated. She looked annoyed, her cheeks reddened, and her eyelids fell. It is so hard for a woman to resist the attraction of courage, and the coward by her side must have suffered in her estimation.

There was a crowded meeting that evening at the Hall of Science, at which I had the honor of speaking. Mr. Bradlaugh's greeting was tremendous. Two days afterwards he was seriously ill.

During that great constitutional struggle I was present at many "Bradlaugh" meetings, and I never witnessed such enthusiasm as he excited. No man of my time had such a devoted following.

The last "Bradlaugh" demonstration I attended was on February 15, 1883, in Trafalgar-square. Seventy or eighty thousand people were present. There were four speakers, and three of them are dead, Joseph Arch being the sole survivor. Mr. Adams, of Northampton, lived to see his old friend take his seat and do good work in the House of Commons, became himself Mayor of Northampton, and died universally respected by his fellow-townsmen; William Sharman, a brave, true man, is buried at Preston; and Charles Bradlaugh sleeps his long sleep at Woking.

For another twelve months I attended no public meetings except the silent ones on the exercise ground of Holloway Gaol. But I saw Mr. Bradlaugh at several demonstrations on various subjects after my imprisonment, and I could perceive no abatement of his popularity. He had his enemies and detractors, but the spontaneous outburst of feeling at his death proved his hold on the popular heart.

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I must now leap forward to that dreadful illness which left him a broken man. Years before, in 1882, when we were roaming the Law Courts together, he tapped his chest as he coughed, and seeing my anxious expression he told me that he brought up a good deal of phlegm in the morning, and that strangers who heard him clearing his chest would fancy he was very ill. But he looked so well that I soon dismissed the unpleasant fact, though it returned before his breakdown when I saw he was obliged to cancel engagements. I heard in 1884, though not from himself, that he had some heart trouble. But I was far from prepared for the shattering illness that laid him low in October, 1889.

When I called to see him after his partial recovery I was shocked by his appearance. He looked twenty years older, grey, and infirm. I sat down half-dazed. Theoretically I knew he was mortal, but I did not realise it as a fact until I saw him thin and pale from the valley of the shadow of death. His mind was clear enough, however; and although everything about him was pathetic he was quite self-collected.

One thing he said to me I shall never forget. There had been talk of his wavering in his Freethought, and as he referred to this folly he spoke in grave impressive tones. Pointing to the humble bed, he said, "When I lay there and all was black the thing that troubled me least was the convictions of my life."

Words and accents were alike solemn. The cold shadow of death seemed to linger in the room. A moment or two later he said with a broken voice, "The Freethought party is a party that I love."

The memory of that interview will always be a precious possession. I treasure it with the sacred things of my life. I had seen and touched the naked sincerity of a great soul.

When Mr. Bradlaugh returned from India I called on him, and found him greatly improved by his voyage. I waited for him a few minutes in his library, as he was at lunch, and the doctors attached great importance to regularity in his meals. He came into the room with a most genial smile. His air was fresh and buoyant, and he walked over to me quickly, holding out his hand all the way. I took it heartily, and had a good look at him, which satisfied and yet dissatisfied me. He was certainly better, but I could not help feeling that his constitution was irrecoverably broken. Never again could I hope to see the grand Bradlaugh of the old fighting days. His mind was as brave and alert as ever, but the body was too obviously disabled.

He showed me some of his Indian presents, of which he was justly proud, and then we sat down to chat. He was full of his voyage and the kindness he had experienced on every side. His reception in India had exceeded his highest anticipations, and he was looking forward to work in the House of Commons on behalf of our great Dependency.

Speaking of his financial prospects, he told me he had received offers of work from several magazine editors. But he added, "one doesn't know how long it will last; 'tis a precarious business." His face clouded for a moment, and I saw he was more troubled than he cared to say.

One thing he told me which I had no right to repeat while he lived, but I may repeat it without a breach of confidence now that he is dead.

During his brief stay in India he could have had plenty of money if he had been less scrupulous. There was nothing very dishonourable in accepting money from rich Hindoos, for he was poor and broken in health, and he was fighting for their best interests. But he was too proud to take it, and when wealthy natives

were calling on him, he always took the precaution to have an English friend in the room.

"No," he said to me, "I cannot do that. I'll live like the old Bradlaugh, or I'll go under."

He lived like the old Bradlaugh, and he went under. He took to the platform again to earn a livelihood, and it killed him, as his doctors had foreseen. I implored him at the time not to resume the lecturing. He was going to fulfil an old-standing engagement at Manchester in the vast St. James's Hall, and I begged him to cancel it. He replied that he could not afford to forfeit twenty pounds. "What is that to your life?" I asked. He only smiled grimly. His mind was made up, and he was not to be bent by advice.

On Sunday morning, February 16, 1890, Mr. Bradlaugh resigned his presidency of the National Secular Society, which he had held for so many years. The Hall of Science was packed with members, chiefly from the London district, but many of them from the provinces.

The scene was infinitely pathetic. One sentiment reigned in every heart. The Old Guard was taking leave of its General. Some of them had fought around him for thirty years, and the farewell was a mutilation of their very lives. Tears were streaming down strong faces; and they coursed down the strongest face of all, the face of Charles Bradlaugh, and plashed on the table before him. For a while he let them fall, and then he controlled his grief and rose to speak. But the words would not come. His frame shook with a great sob, and he sat down again. A second time he rose and failed. But the third time his strong will prevailed, and he began to speak in low, trembling tones.

Never was I so struck with his oratorical powers as on this occasion. Without once lifting his voice above

the note of conversation, he swayed the meeting for a full half-hour, as easily and universally as the wind billows a cornfield.

In resigning the presidency he thought it his duty to nominate a successor, and his choice was ratified by the meeting. He handed me the president's hammer after a solemn, impressive apostrophe, in which he expressed his hope that he might thank me, after many years, for good, loyal work as leader; and when I had acknowledged the lofty honor he rose to vacate the chair. Naturally I declined to let him do anything of the kind, and for a moment the two Presidents stood together in friendly altercation. But for once he gave way, and Charles Bradlaugh filled the chair to the last.

Resigning the Presidency did not mean retirement from the National Secular Society. At his own suggestion Mr. Bradlaugh was elected a life-member. He was thus a member of the Society up to the last moment of his life. Nor was he an inactive one. I frequently had occasion to consult him, and one of his last bits of work was the drawing up of a long document for the Society on Secular Burials.

Months rolled by, and the evening came for the great debate on the Eight Hours Bill between Mr. Bradlaugh and Mr. Hyndman. St. James's Hall was packed to suffocation. I sat on the platform near my old leader, and I saw how the effort was telling on him. His opponents in the meeting behaved with incredible brutality. Some of them laughed aloud when he said, "Believe me, this has tried me more than I had thought." But now the hero they laughed at is dead, and they *know* that he spoke the truth.

The last time I saw Mr. Bradlaugh in public was on Wednesday evening, December 10, 1890, when he lectured at the Hall of Science on behalf of the Forder

Testimonial Fund. I believe that was the last lecture he delivered there, if not the last lecture he delivered anywhere. He dealt with the Evidences of Christianity, in reference to Archdeacon Watkins' lectures on the Fourth Gospel, and assuredly he was as firmly sceptical as ever. At the close of the lecture he spoke of his theological position, and declared that he could not conceive of any such change of mind as glib gossipers were asserting of him.

The weather was extremely foggy, and Mr. Bradlaugh was ill. He ought not to have been there at all. After struggling painfully through the lecture, he sat down and waited for discussion. A Christian opponent rose, and Mr. Bradlaugh replied; but, being in the chair, I would not allow a second speech, and I was glad to see him well wrapt-up, and once more in the care of his devoted daughter.

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Having concluded my reminiscences of Charles Bradlaugh in relation to the *events* of his life, I shall wind up with a little personal talk of a more general character.

I have already referred to Mr. Bradlaugh's extraordinary knowledge of the law. This was strikingly illustrated after the so-called Trafalgar-square riots. The Tories made a wanton aggression on the right of public meeting in London, and found a ready instrument of tyranny in Sir Charles Warren. No doubt there is much to be said against promiscuous meetings in Trafalgar-square at all hours of the day and night, but it was a high-handed act of brutality to prohibit *all* meetings directly it was known that the London Radicals were convening a Sunday demonstration on the Irish question. While the Radicals were chafing under this insult they held several stormy meetings to discuss their best policy, and at last a Committee was

appointed to find out, if possible, the legal rights of the people and the Crown. I was a member of that committee, and I am able to state that although we waited on several eminent lawyers, it was only from Mr. Bradlaugh that we obtained any light. The others talked vaguely about the right of public meeting, and the primary and secondary uses of public thoroughfares, but Mr. Bradlaugh gave us the *facts* of the case. Trafalgar-square was Crown property, its control was vested in the Commissioner of Works, and at any moment it could be absolutely closed to the British public.

This had escaped the other lawyers, who did not find it in the Statutes at Large, from which the Trafalgar-square Act, probably as being a private one, had been excluded. Nor was it known to the Government when Sir Charles Warren issued his first proclamation. As Chief Commissioner of Police he had no authority over the Square, and until he obtained the order of its proper guardians, which he did a week later, his proclamation was only a piece of waste paper. Mr. Bradlaugh saw this, though he said nothing, when the demonstration committee called upon him a few days before Bloody Sunday. He told them that he had an engagement in the provinces on that day, but if they would postpone the demonstration until the following Sunday he would himself lead it to Trafalgar-square. His offer was not accepted, however; for the committee resented the condition he stipulated, namely, that he should have absolute control of the arrangements. They thought he was taking too much upon himself. They did not reflect that if he who takes power without responsibility is a despot, he who takes responsibility without power is a fool. It was their action, and not his, that lost the battle.

Mr. Bradlaugh made no public parade of his brave

offer. It was not his way. But it is due to his memory that it should be put on record, so that posterity may know the extent of his generous courage.

There can be no doubt, I think, that Mr. Bradlaugh was less popular with the working-classes in London after he took peaceable possession of his seat in Parliament. The London masses love a fighter, and while he was battling for his seat he was, in my opinion, the most popular figure in the metropolis. The Radical workmen never tired of his demonstrations. He could bring fifty or a hundred thousand of them together at a few days' notice. And the other speakers were, for the most part, only padding to fill up the time. It was "Bradlaugh" the multitude came for. They waited to hear him speak, they applauded him to the skies, and when he had done they dispersed. And on such occasions he was magnificent. No one can conceive the power of the man who never saw him at one of these demonstrations. He stood like a Pharos, and the light of his face kindled the crests of the living waves around him.

But he was out of sympathy with the Socialist movement, which began to spread just as he took his seat; and being assiduous in Parliament, he was drawn more and more from "the Clubs," where his libellers and detractors wagged their tongues to some purpose. His strong individualism, as well as his practical good sense, made him bitterly hostile to the mildest proposals for putting the people's industrial interests into the hands of Government departments. And being a man of most positive quality, it was natural that he should excite the hatred of the more fanatical Socialists; a sentiment which, I cannot help thinking, he exasperated by his apparent denial of the generosity of their aims. There are men in the Socialist camp (and I say it without being a Socialist) who are neither "poets"

nor "fools"—though it is no disgrace to be the former; men who have studied with severity and sincerity, who have made sacrifices for conviction, and who were sometimes hurt by his antipathy. But, on the other hand, he was bitterly goaded by Socialist adversaries, who denied his honesty, and held him up to undeserved scorn as the hireling of "the classes"—a charge which the more sensitive among them must now repent, for his death has revealed his poverty.

Mr. Bradlaugh was naturally irritable, but the irritability was only on the surface. The waves were easily raised, but there was plenty of quiet sea beneath. Though giants are often phlegmatic, his big frame embedded highly-strung nerves. When he was put out he could storm, and he was misunderstood by those who took the mood for the man. Had they seen him in the melting mood they would have learnt that Charles Bradlaugh was a more composite personality than they imagined.

During the last year or two of his life he underwent a wonderful softening. A beautiful Indian-summer light rested upon him. He was like a granite rock, which the sweet grass has overgrown, and from whose crevices peep lovely wild flowers.

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As President of the National Secular Society he did a great work. I do not think he had a pronounced faculty for organisation. But he was a firm, sagacious leader, with the personal magnetism to attract devotion. That he was never overbearing I will not affirm. But it is easy to organise sheep. One good dog will do it. Mr. Bradlaugh had to hold together a different species, with leaping legs, butting horns, and a less gregarious tendency.

He was a splendid chairman to push through a mass of business, but he shone less on ordinary occasions.

An ideal chairman, when not promoting his own schemes, should be like a midwife; he should aim at a quick delivery and a safe birth. Mr. Bradlaugh did not always observe this rule. But every man has the defects of his qualities, and even the sun must be taken with its spots.

Mr. Bradlaugh's speeches at the annual Conferences of the National Secular Society are better reading than his political speeches. Being less in the world of practice there, and more in the world of principle, he gave play to his ideal nature, his words took color, and metaphors flashed like jewels in the sword of his orations. It was a signal proof of his power, that after a whole day's exhausting work, both to himself and his audience, he never failed to rouse the wildest enthusiasm.

Now that Mr. Bradlaugh is dead I do not hesitate to repeat what I said during his lifetime, that his Freethought work was the most fecund and important. Even his great battle against the House of Commons was for religious freedom against bigotry, and his one great legislative achievement was the Act dealing with Oaths and Affirmation. His staunchest political supporters were his Freethought followers. His lectures, his personal influence, and his reputation, leavened the public mind more than his orthodox enemies suspected, and he created a vast quantity of raw material to be utilised by his successors in Secular organisation.

. . . . .

In the foregoing pages I have attempted no complete sketch of Charles Bradlaugh. I have written, not a monograph, but a number of rough jottings. Yet I hope I have conveyed an impression of the man, in some degree faithful, to those who may have been imperfectly acquainted with him; and I trust the

features I have presented, however baldly outlined, will be recognised by those who knew and loved him.

When all is said and done, I think the final impression one retains of Charles Bradlaugh is his *heroism.* His was cast in a great mould of mind and character, as well as body. Like every hero the world has ever seen, he had his defects and failings, for it is given to no man to be perfect. But positive excellence, with all its drawbacks, is far above negative merit. "Thou shalt" is loftier virtue than "thou shalt not," and the hero is superior to the saint.

Charles Bradlaugh was a colossus of manhood. He was one to design, and dare, and do. The beaten path of mediocrity had no attraction for that potent spirit. He belonged to the heroic type which seeks perilous ways and fresh conquests. Like the hero of one of Browning's poems, he was "ever a fighter." In stormy times he naturally rose to the top. He was one of the select few, not of those who enrich the world with great discoveries, or new principles, or subtle perceptions of beauty—but those who appeal to the heroism of man's nature, without which he is at best but a splendid beast, and who minister to that sense of dignity which is the supreme necessity of our race.

> The elements
> So mixed in him, that Nature might stand up
> And say to all the world, "This was a man!"

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"Truth gains more even by the errors of one who, with due study and preparation, thinks for himself, than by the true opinions of those who only hold them because they do not suffer themselves to think."—J. S. MILL.

Dedication.

To the honoured memory of those whom the world warred against and struck down, but who warred for the very world which crushed them; to the revered memory of those who, with the blood-drops from their wounded feet, softened the rugged path along which all must travel; to the memory of the martyrs for Freethought in every age and clime, I dedicate this volume. I could wish that their worthiness, redeeming its faults, might give it force for good in freeing human thought from bondage.

INTRODUCTION.

It is to be regretted that in the second half of the nineteenth century, and in a country professing to occupy an advanced position amongst enlightened peoples, there should be any necessity for the publication of a commentary on Genesis, written for the purpose of demonstrating that the book is not a perfect and infallible revelation specially given from an all-wise and infinite Deity, Creator, and Ruler of all worlds, to his creatures on this planet alone, and that it is not an unerring guide and monitor to humankind in their constant life-struggle for happiness. There is no great honour or pleasure, although there is much wearisome toil, in gathering the materials for proving that Genesis nearly always blunders in its attempts at statements of fact, that it is repeatedly chronologically incorrect, and in the chronologies of its principal versions utterly irreconcileable; that copyists, through ignorance, carelessness, or design, have in many places incorrectly transcribed the text; that the translators, according to their respective creeds, vary in their interpretations of different momentous passages; that the Hebrew language itself has been altered by the addition of vowel points, by means of which a sense is often given entirely different from the original intention; and that the majority of the ancient versions contain different and contradictory readings of various important verses. But it is absolutely necessary to do all this in a form accessible to the general reader so long as the Church persists, under statutory sanction and indorsement in its teaching to the people from their early childhood, that this Bible is God's word free from blemish. Genesis is forced upon the child's brain as God's word by nurse and pedagogue, and the mode of thinking of the scholar is in consequence utterly warped in favour of the divinity of the book before his reason has opportunity to mature for its examination. If the book only had claimed for it that which may be claimed for all books—namely, in part or whole to represent the genius, education, and manners of the people and times, from whom and which it issued, then it might fairly be objected by supporters of the Bible that the tone of criticism here adopted is not of the highest

order, and that the petty cavillings about misplaced names, misspelled words, incorrect dates and numbers, and geographical errors, &c., are hardly worthy the attention of a serious student. But as the Bible is declared to be the revelation and representative of perfect intelligence to the whole human family; as it is placed by the whole of its preachers immeasurably above all other books, with a claim to dominate, and if necessary to overturn the teachings of all other books; as it is alleged that the Bible is free from the errors of thought and fact more or less found in every other book; and as it is by act of parliament declared to be a criminal offence in this country for any person to deny this book to be God's holy word, it is not only a right, but becomes an unavoidable duty on the part of a freethinking critic to present as plainly as possible to the notice of the people every weakness of the text, however trivial, that may serve to show that the Bible, or any portion of it, is fallible, that it is imperfect, that so far from being above all other books, it is often below them as a mere literary production.

Holding this opinion, I issue the following commentary, in the hope that its perusal will induce thought in some who have hitherto been contented to drift down the stream of life, and who have been carried along the customary channel as though they were without energy enough to find or make new thought-paths for themselves or others. That my work is incomplete I am well aware, and I shall gladly see it supplemented from abler hands. I invite criticism, trusting that in the discussion of each point the debaters and onlookers may be brought to a more liberal mode of treating each other, and to a more correct appreciation of the subjects examined. To the orthodox opponent, who will probably condemn before reading, and who may probably wish to remind me that I am but the weak imitator of greater infidels, who have in former ages attacked the Bible and have failed in their attacks, I reply, that I do not pretend to originality, but that so far from the greater infidels, whose muster-roll of names includes such as Spinoza, Voltaire, and Paine, having failed in their attacks upon the Bible, they have at any rate so far succeeded that Biblical investigation is now possible without fear of serious penal consequences, when before their struggling a fiery death ended nearly every strife against the Church. They have so far succeeded that science, by their efforts set free from church fetters and restrictions, has discovered, since their success, many new

facts with which to demolish more easily the old creeds. The objections of to-day are not in whole, or even in great part, those of Voltaire and Paine. Geology and chronology have furnished weapons against the Bible which the old Freethinkers never dreamed of being able to use. But not only has Freethought new weapons, we have also had achieved for us a great success in that many of the former defences of superstition no longer avail even in the opinion of the most bigotedly orthodox. Excommunication is no longer accounted an unanswerable and logical refutation of any argument presented from heretical mouth or pen. To burn a volume in the open market-place by the hands of the common hangman cannot now be accepted as a successful answer to an infidel treatise. The king's attorney-general, and the borough or county gaol, have no longer their orthodox eloquence with which to persuade the unbeliever. From Vanini to Carlile, from faggot to dungeon, the attacks of infidelity on superstition have become more and more successful. The Church can no longer put heretics to death, although the stain of legal persecution still adheres to her robe. Penalties for opinion still exist by law, but even in her own Ecclesiastical Courts the Church finds it difficult to override the stubborn judgment of outside public opinion. Now it is only an almost obsolete statute which forbids disbelief, and in the next generation that barrier even will be swept from the path of free discussion.

The reader will find frequent references made to Bellamy's New Translation of Genesis. Bellamy was a painstaking, honest man, and good Hebraist, but his desire to free the text of the Bible from the imputation of containing objectionable passages often leads him to strain for an interpretation not warranted by the Hebrew. Kalisch's Commentary—a far superior and much less partial book, is also in constant use in these pages. His volume contains one of the most admirable collections of criticisms on Genesis ever presented to the English reader. It utters far more heresy than Colenso has yet ventured to put forward against Genesis. The author does not profess to reject the Bible as a divinely inspired book, but as he admits that it is irreconcilably contradicted by science, and confesses that in more than one place its own self-opposing statements cannot be explained away, it is evident that Kalisch's views on inspiration are not of a very orthodox order. Colenso's volumes, repeatedly quoted here, are valuable as coming from a Church of England

bishop, but the various criticisms on Genesis are scattered through the four parts, and do not, except in one part, follow in any order of chapter and verse, nor does the Bishop appear to be much acquainted with the English school of writers against the Bible. Questiones Mosaicæ, by Osmond de Beauvoir Priaulx, containing a comparison of the ideas traced in the first twenty-five chapters of Genesis with the Hindoo, Chinese, Grecian, and Egyptian myths, is specially useful as a guide to the general reader wishing to trace out coincidences of myth; it is written by a very plain-speaking man, who disclaims connection with either the orthodox or heterodox commentators, but who does not hesitate to occasionally judge very severely the morality of the narratives he examines. A very earnest and straightforward analysis of the Pentateuch, specially intended for the working classes, has recently been issued by a writer adopting the name of Presbyter Anglicanus. It is well deserving the attention of the Freethinking student. The writer has evidently been at considerable pains to place a reliable handbook in the reach of those whom he addresses. I am indebted to one of the noble band driven into exile by France's imperial degradation, for the use of Cahen's admirable French translation of the Bible, a work which ought to be in the library of every critical reader. In all references to the Hebrew I refer to it without points, believing the latter to have been added at a comparatively modern period, and to have often entirely varied the meaning of the word to which they were added. The present commentary might have occupied much greater space, its details being susceptible of considerable amplification; but my plan of criticism has necessarily been subordinate to the exigencies of business life—a few hours occasionally morning or evening being all I have been able to devote to study or writing, and this will account for many points in Genesis which, though open to similar objections to those here raised, have yet been passed without notice. So far as I have gone I believe my examination to have been thorough, and the refutation of Biblical infallibility to be complete; should any orthodox opponent think otherwise, I shall be ready to supplement the list of objections if any considerable portion of the discrepancies and flaws here noticed are got rid of by any plausible argument.

C. Bradlaugh.

Sunderland Villa. Northumberland Park,
Tottenham.

GENESIS:

ITS AUTHORSHIP AND AUTHENTICITY.

The book of Genesis, as the first book of the Pentateuch, is at the present time the subject of sharp discussion, the general public finding a special interest in the controversy in consequence of the comments of the public press on the recent publications by Dr. Colenso on the one side, and those of Dr. Cumming, Dr. Alexander McCaul, &c., on the other; and although it is probably almost impossible to present any new features to the reader on the general question of the genuineness and authenticity of Genesis, in addition to the criticisms of the last few centuries, yet I hope to include in the following comments, and in order of chapter and verse, the principal points which have been debated by the objectors to, and defenders of, this first book of the Bible, and trust in this to be useful in guiding the working class reader to information not generally accessible to him. The name "Genesis" is a Greek prefix put into English letters, and means creation, formation, production, origin, or growth. In the Hebrew the book has no title whatever beyond its first word (BeRAShITH)* בראשית, *in the beginning*, which is written in characters rather larger than those which follow. The words, "the first book of Moses," found in the authorised version, are without any authority whatever in the Hebrew text, and are unfounded in fact. Spinoza, a Jew of great learning,

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* Throughout this commentary capital letters will answer for the actual Hebrew letters, while the small letters respond to the intercalated vowels.

who wrote in Holland about the middle of the 17th century, considered it "as clear as the noon-day light" that Moses was not the author of any part of the Pentateuch; and urges that nothing is known as to when, where, or by whom the book of Genesis was penned, or by whom it was preserved.* He declares that many blemishes have crept into the Hebrew text itself, and that even the most ancient Jewish writers have animadverted on various doubtful readings and on several imperfect and truncated passages. He also urges that our Hebrew canon rests upon the decision of the Pharisees of the second Temple, who, on grounds to us unknown, selected the books we have from amongst a great number, and that their decision was far from unanimous: one book (Ezekiel) becoming the word of God, through the support given to it by Neghunja, the son of Hiskias; and another (Ecclesiastes) narrowly escaping suppression, because objected to by certain learned persons referred to in the Talmud, by Rabbi Jehuda, surnamed Rabi. (Tractatus Sabbathi, cap. 2, fol. 30, p. 2.) These persons, he says, also desired to suppress the book of Proverbs.

It is surprising, in the face of the researches of the most erudite Biblicists, that men, such as Dr. Baylee, the head of St. Aidan's College, at Birkenhead, and Dr. Miller, of Birmingham, should maintain that the original Hebrew text of God's revelation to mankind has been preserved by the Jewish Rabbis uncorrupted and without the loss or variation of a single letter or word. And why do they speak of the original Hebrew in which Moses wrote? It can hardly be pretended that the Deity selected the Hebrew for its flexibility and capacity for expressing his meaning. On the contrary, the Greek far excels the Hebrew as a written tongue. Nor is the Hebrew the most ancient written language. The construction of the various Hebrew Roots affords reason to the contrary, and it is absolutely certain that the whole of the vowel points (which in many cases entirely change the meaning of the text) are of comparatively modern date, say from the second to the fifth century of the present era—probably not earlier than A.D. 450. The

* Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, caps. 7, 8, and 9.

present square letter form of Hebrew, and the twenty-two letter alphabet, are also of limited antiquity. The Hebrew Scriptures are neither the most ancient nor the most perfect of Scriptures. That the Hebrew text of Genesis has been corrupted there can be but little doubt, and that the authorised translation is imperfect is still more certain. Luke Burke, the able Editor of the *Future*, referring to the comparative merits of the Samaritan, Hebrew, and Septuagint versions, says—"The Jew naturally prefers the reading which exists in his own version, the Samaritan contends for the superiority of his copy, and the generality of Christians prefer of course the Septuagint. Each party accuses the other of wilful corruption of the text, and some at least of these accusations must be true."* Dr. Wall, Vice-Provost of Trinity College, Dublin, speaks of the "blemishes in the existing condition of the Hebrew text," some of which he attributes to fraud, and others to gross ignorance;† and it is declared by competent critics that the Hebrew text, even after the Masoretic correction and purification, was "deficient, imperfect, interpolated, and full of errors."‡ Before the Christian era there were no divisions between words of the Hebrew text, and the five final letters were not invented; and from then till A.D. 1000 the texts of the various codices were in a most corrupt and unreliable state, and even of these we have not a single M.S. extant in the present day. The English translation (authorised version) is wretchedly imperfect. Errors abound in it, and some of them of a most laughable description. On this account great calls have been made for a new translation, and also for a new edition of the Hebrew; but neither a new translation nor a new Hebrew text will remove the bulk of the difficulties. Science has rendered the objections to the narrative insurmountable, and a pseudo-revelation must succumb to fact-supported reason.

Remembering how often I have been twitted, and probably with justice, on my want of knowledge of the Hebrew

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* Ethnological Journal, p. 19.
† Grounds for Revision of the Hebrew Bible, pp. 102 and 545.
‡ Types of Mankind, pp. 621 and 627

tongue, by those who profess to have had a better education than myself, and seeing that in the answers to Bishop Colenso, his opponents denounce him as ignorant of Hebrew (as was also the case half a century since, when the pigmy D'Oyley, set up his pretensions as an orthodox philologist against the giant erudition of the heretical Sir William Drummond), I have some pleasure in laying before my readers the following selection from a great Hebrew writer:*—"The first great 'difficulty,'" he says, "connected with our method arises from the consummate knowledge of the Hebrew tongue which its due application implies. But whence is this now to be obtained? The ancient masters of the Hebrew tongue have left nothing to posterity on the elements and principles of the language; we, at all events, have little or nothing of theirs—no dictionary, no grammar, no syntax. The Hebrew nation has lost all that it ever had of the elegancies and ornaments of life (nor is this wonderful after such long ages of depression, disaster, and persecution), and has preserved nothing but a few fragments of its language and its literature. Then the meaning of many nouns and verbs which are met with in the Bible, is either wholly unknown or is a subject of dispute. With all this when we apply ourselves to study the syntax of this language, a matter of so much moment, and seek to discover the idioms and modes of expression peculiar to the Hebrew people, we find that time, the consumer, has blotted them almost all from the memory of man. We shall, therefore, not be able, as we would wish, to determine the precise meaning of every passage which the common uses of the language would permit, and we shall come upon many sentences which, although expressed in words extremely well known, are nevertheless of meaning most obscure, and are sometimes incomprehensible. To these difficulties must be added those which arise from the constitution and nature of the language itself, which occasion so many ambiguities that it is impossible to find such a method as shall assuredly teach us how to investigate the true sense of all the ex-

* Spinoza: Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, p. 154, Latin Edition, cap. 7, sec. 44.

pressions of scripture." After pointing out that doubt and obscurity result from the use of one letter in lieu of another, from the various meanings attaching to conjunctions and adverbs, and from the imperfections of the verb, Spinoza adds—"Besides the three causes of obscurity now noted in the Hebrew language, there yet remain to be mentioned two others, each of much more moment than all the rest. The first of these is that the Hebrew has no vowels; the second that it is without spaces between the words and sentences, and has no accents to indicate the proper pronunciation; and although these two deficiencies—viz., the vowels and signs of accentuation, are wont to be supplied by points, it is impossible that we should acquiesce in the sufficiency of these, inasmuch as they are the invention and resource of men of these later times, whose authority can have no weight with us. The ancient Hebrews wrote without points (*i.e.*, without vowels and accents), as appears from the most ample testimony. The moderns supplied vowel-points and accents, as it seemed good to them that the Bible should be interpreted; wherefore they are to be regarded as mere interpretations of yesterday, and deserve no greater faith, as they have no higher authority, than the lucubrations of ordinary commentators."* Gesenius admits that the ancient translators of the Hebrew, "evidently so often translated by conjecture only."†

In the following comments I shall seek to show that in its narrative the book of Genesis is inaccurate, contradicted by other books of the Bible, and is even self-contradictory; that its chronological statements are incorrect; that its teachings on ethnology, geology, and astronomy are in opposition to the revelations of science; and that its views of morality are not such as would aid in promoting general happiness if universally entertained.

Eighty years ago Sir William Jones declared that "either the first eleven chapters of Genesis are true, or the whole fabric of our national religion is false."‡ This conclusion

* Tractatus, p. 156.
† Hebrew Lexicon, by Leo, p. 17.
‡ Asiatic Researches, vol I, p 225.

is the simple truth, and is confirmed by the critical researches of the last half century. If the authenticity and divine origin of the Pentateuch can be successfully questioned, the whole theology based upon it must fall with it. In the first eleven chapters of Genesis are contained statements upon which rest the so-called "vital truths of Christianity." The Rev. Alexander McCaul, in his reply to Colenso, feels this, and urges that "the Pentateuch possesses the testimony of the Saviour's omniscience," that it "has the testimony of the Son of God and his inspired Apostles," and that "our Lord and his Apostles taught that the Pentateuch was given by Moses, and that he was the penman."* In these statements Dr. McCaul exaggerates the real extent of New Testament corroboration, whatever that may be worth; but no one can doubt that a Christian will cling to every possible support for Genesis, as the Saviour and Redeemer will be the object of little faith if the narrative of the Fall be disbelieved (without which fall the salvation and redemption would have been unnecessary).

I shall now take each chapter and verse in its Biblical order, and though this may not appear the most agreeable course, I hope that it will prove the most useful. In doing this I am much indebted to the recent work by Dr. Kalisch,† and only regret that the reasonings of that able author appear to be very often in opposition to his facts. Chap. i. v. i. "In the beginning." According to Bellamy,‡ Grotius rendered the word בראשית Berashith, *when first;* Simeon, *before;* the Jerusalem Targum, *in wisdom;*§ Tertullian, *in power;* Philo, Rabbi Bechai, and Castalio, *in order, before all;* Maimonides, who avowedly stretched interpretations to fit any hypothesis he might choose to sustain, *with matter.* Some to whom the Hindoo mythology was familiar, have rendered this verse "By the first was created the Gods, the heavens, and the earth." In the Hindoo faith we are taught that the great Bram created the inferior Gods, the heavens, and the

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* Examination of Dr. Colenso, pp. 1, 208, and 210.

† On Genesis, published by Longman, 1858.

‡ The Holy Bible Newly Translated.

§ The Jerusalem Targum substitutes בחוכמא for the Berashith.

earth. Were the אלהים (ALEIM) inferior Gods in the mind of the compiler of the Hebrew Records? M. Priaulx,* in commenting on this first verse, says—"In the beginning of what? Not of the universe certainly, for the universe yet was not; and not of God's existence, for God's existence is infinite and eternal." The Theism of the writer of the first verse of Genesis was of no exalted order. He had determined to tell a creation story, and probably repeated in writing the tradition which had passed from sire to son, orally transmitted through many generations. That such traditions existed long prior to the Jews themselves, and certainly anterior to Moses, few can doubt who have carefully examined the Egyptian, Hindoo, and Grecian mythologies, and have endeavoured to trace their origin, especially if they happen to hold with Sir W. Jones, that a connection subsisted between the old nations of Egypt, India, Greece, and Italy long prior to Moses.† The author of the first verse of Genesis rendered the tradition into definite words without staying to notice, or perhaps lacking the mental power, to consider the logical consequences of his words. If "in the beginning" does not imply the beginning of God or of the universe, it must mean in the beginning of creation. But this would imply that God, eternal, immutable, had existed without creating and changing, then without cause had commenced to create. But if God alone existed prior to creation and at any time existed without creating, he, there being nothing but himself to affect or influence him, would still have existed without creating—that is, there would have been no creation.

The first and second verses of Genesis, which Dr. Kalisch‡ says must not be separated, are very obscure. "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth, and the earth was without form and void, and darkness was upon the face of the deep." Is this second verse a recital of the state of the earth prior to or after creation? Prior to creation seems to be the proper response; that is, that the writer of this

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* Questiones Mosaicæ.
† Asiatic Researches, vol. 1, p 271.
‡ Historical and Critical Commentary on Genesis, p. 55.

part of Genesis having no conception of "creation" other than "formation," and holding the doctrine supported as Dr. John Pye Smith thinks in the apocryphal book of Wisdom, c. ii. v. 17, tells you what was the state of things before the work of creation commenced. That this is so is clear from the fact that while it says, "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth," actually the heaven is not created (*vide* v. 8) until the second day. The old philosopher said "ex nihilo nihil fit." Sir W. Hamilton observes that "to create is not to make something out of nothing, for this is contradictory, but to originate from self;"* yet the orthodox doctrine of to-day is that Genesis teaches that God created the world out of nothing. Which shall we take, orthodoxy or philosophy? The Rev. Dr. John Pye Smith remarks that "the mere etymological argument from בראּ or any other scripture words, is fallacious and utterly unnecessary: since those words may be applied to ordering, disposing, or bringing into a new state or condition. The primary meaning of בראּ (BeRA) is "*to hew out.*"† Bellamy translates the word את (ATh) substance, making verse i. read, "In the beginning God created the substance of the heaven, and the substance of the earth," and thus to some extent avoiding a portion of the objection, which naturally arises with reference to the use of pre-existent material. Speaking of the word (ATh) he says, "Some translators have thought it to be a mark of the accusative case simply, after an active verb; but if so, there must be a repetition of the article *the;* as the following word שמים *shaamayim, heaven,* has the emphatic prefix ה *ha, the;* by which it is to be translated, *the heaven.* I say if this word *eth,* comprehends no more than simply the accusative, there must either be a repetition of the article *the,* and so את השמים *eth hashamayim,* must be translated *the, the heaven;* or the word *eeth,* must be passed over without being translated, as it is in the translations. But if this word be translated, it will add consistency to the narrative, and remove an old objection. It is said, that the historian contradicts himself, as

* Philosophy of the Unconditioned, p. 8.
† First Lines of Christian Theology, p. 321.

he says, the heaven and the earth were created and finished, and afterwards, that it *was without form and void, and that darkness was upon the face of the deep, until God said, let there be light.* First, that there was a completion of the whole, both of the heaven and the earth; and then that there was nothing but chaotic darkness, and primæval matter. Certainly the present translations carry this sense; but this has arisen from the rejection of the word *eth.* This word is composed of the first and last letter of the Alphabet, the א *aleph*, and ת *thau;* which have the same meaning as the Greek α *alpha:* and ω *omega*; the *arche kai telos, the first and the last,* in one mass, comprehending in itself all the principles necessary for the production of all things. Briefly, it signifies the very SUBSTANCE of the thing spoken of; the קרב *karab, inmost,* generative properties, as well as the visible matter; agreeably to the Syriac, the *esse cœli et esse terra.*"* Dr. Kalisch, who seems by his phraseology to refer to the above quoted argument from Bellamy, utterly denies that the word את is anything more than the sign of the accusative. When learned men thus differ on a word which changes the entire sense of the passage, how are the uneducated multitude to submit to threats of penalties here and pain hereafter because of their unbelief, when in fact they are unable to believe that both disputants are right, and are also unable to believe in one in preference to the other?

The Rev. Dr. Macdonald† discusses from a somewhat orthodox stand-point the question whether verse 1 should be taken as a title to, or read as part of, the history of creation; and that writer inclines to the latter opinion, as he thinks the former view would favour the ancient notions of eternal chaos; but the latter opinion is equally objectionable, for if verse 1 be regarded as anything more than a title, you have heaven created in verse 1, and yet not created until verses 6 to 8; you have the earth in verse 1, and yet the dry land not called earth until verse 10. Dr. John Pye Smith affirms—"That the proper and primary act of creation, is the causing of being when there was no cause,

* New Translation, p. 4.
† Creation and Fall, p. 245.

material means, or existing thing whatever except the Deity." The learned doctor's proposition is logically absurd, and on the face of it impossible, although it contains the ordinary orthodox teaching. He states that the adverse notion appeared in two forms—1. That the whole sensible universe, and every part of it, is an emanation from Deity of cœval eternity and necessity. The very ancient Oriental doctrine, the foundation of Buddhism, dominant in Thibet, many parts of Tartary, the Burman Empire, and Ceylon. 2. The belief of a necessarily existing matter altogether distinct from God.* These two opinions will easily be traced in several portions of the Hebrew text, but are also as illogical as the first.

Verse 2—"And the earth was without form and void." Bellamy renders this—"Now the earth was without form, even a waste." Kalisch—"And the earth was dreariness and emptiness." Bellamy's translation is not forcible enough, the word בהו (BEU) should be rendered *void* or *vacuum*. The writer's meaning in the verse is not very clear, because that which is empty within and has no form without, is a very unsubstantial result of creation; and it will at once overturn all orthodox notions, if creation be understood as the formation of the pre-existing chaotic mass. "And darkness was upon the face of the deep." There is yet no light, darkness prevails, and the creation of light is not recorded until verse 3; so that either the Creator had existed prior to this period† without light, a most extraordinary, or, as Kalisch calls it, "ludicrous" supposition, or the believer must imagine that the Unchangeable had more than once varied the conditions of his existence. Kalisch urges that improprieties are involved in these queries; surely the greater impropriety consists in the demand of unquestioning belief in the opposite views. "The spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters." Kalisch has it "hovered over." The word רוח (RUaCH) here translated *spirit* is

* First Lines of Christian Theology, p. 321.

† And this is the Rev. Dr. Macdonald's opinion, for he says—"This is not the darkness which was afterwards so far subdued and bounded by the light as to be called night, but the primeval darkness into which no ray of light had ever penetrated."

rendered *wind* by Aben Ezra, Onkelos, Philo, and others; *air* by Nachmanides; *mist* by Johannsen. In Genesis iii. 8, the same word, Ruach, is translated "cool." לרוח היום (LeRUaCh EIOM) being rendered in our authorised version as "the cool of the day," or, as Parkhurst renders it, "*the morning breeze.*" In Ecclesiastes iii. 19, the same word is in the authorised version translated *breath.* The primary meaning of the word Ruach, according to Parkhurst, is that of the *air in motion as in the act of breathing,* Gesenius and other Hebraists agree in this. Macdonald says—"To take רוח אלהים (RUaCh ALEIM) for a *strong wind,* as is done by Dathe Vater and Schinmann, after Onkelos, Saadias, Aben Ezra, and other Jewish expositors, is an interpretation of which Calvin well remarks, 'Adeo frigidum est ut refutatione nulla indigeat.' The Hebrew can be undoubtedly rendered *wind* as well as *spirit;* but how can it signify wind before the atmosphere was created?"* How does this reverend writer know when the atmosphere was created, unless he has some special revelation enabling him to fix the epoch? There is not the slightest record, so far as I am aware, in Genesis enabling the reader to fix the time of the creation of the atmosphere, so that this objection to the word Ruach, meaning *wind,* is, to adopt the very words of Calvin, "so silly as not to require refutation." The words translated "Spirit of God," are Ruach Aleim, the word rendered God being the word אלהים (ALEIM). The meaning of this word Aleim is not easy to arrive at. Macdonald says the etymology is involved in much obscurity. It is probably a plural noun, but the derivation is a question for dispute. Some derive it from אלה (ALE) *to curse,* which would make Aleim, *the cursers,*† an appropriate rendering, if the eternal damnation of unbelievers and disbelievers to brimstone flames so glibly preached by too many of the revivalist school had indeed any reality. Others derive it from אל (AL). This word Al is by the Septuagint translated on one occasion *Ourana, heaven,* and in the Phœnician worship the Sun was called

* Creation and Fall, p. 249.

† Newman's Lexicon, vol. 1, p. 27—Parkhurst, p. 19.

Al or Hel.* It is curious that the same word Al in the Hebrew stands for *oak*, and that in the Druidic worship entirely of Tsabaistic origin the oak was most sacred. Doubtless all the mythologies of the world have more or less a Tsabaistic source, most certainly Judaism derives some of its early pseudo history from astrologic myths. The use of this word Aleim alone in one part, and in another the word יהוה (YEUE) coupled with it or used separately, has enabled some of our Biblicists to distinguish in the Book of Genesis at least two narratives from different pens, which they entitle the Elohim document and the Jehovah document. The German writers have most exhaustively dealt with the document theory. Luke Burke argues that "the first ten chapters of the Book of Genesis are composed throughout of at least three principal documents, so elaborately interwoven as to constitute one continuous and tolerably consistent narrative. It is highly probable," he says, "that the actual number of documents in these ten chapters is five, but the existence of three will be shown to be incontestible."†

Dr. Colenso says—"It will be seen hereafter, when we proceed to examine critically the whole Book of Genesis, that throughout the book the two different hands, which we have already detected, are distinctly visible; and the recognition of this fact will explain at once a number of strange and otherwise unaccountable contradictions. One of these two writers, it will be found, is distinguished by the *constant* use of the word Elohim, the other by the intermixture with it of the name Jehovah, which two words appear as God and LORD (not 'Lord,' אדני *Adonai*), in our English translation. Sometimes the latter writer uses *only* Jehovah for considerable intervals, as the other uses only Elohim: thus, in chapter i. verse 1, to chapter ii. verse 3, we have only Elohim thirty-five times; in chapter xxiv. only Jehovah nineteen times. Can any one believe that these two passages were written by one and the same writer?"

* Parkhurst's Lexicon, p. 15.
† Ethnological Journal, p. 202.
‡ Part II., p. 175, the Pentateuch, &c.

Macdonald* remarks that the interchange of the divine names in the Pentateuch was taken notice of at an early period. Among the Christian fathers. Tertullian, Chrysostom, and Augustine, offered explanations. In the first sections of Genesis the change is not between Elohim (or Aleim) and Jehovah (or Yeue), but between Elohim, which is used constantly and exclusively in the first section, and the compound form Jehovah-Elohim, which appears in the second, with only three exceptions, where in the mouth of the serpent and of the woman it is Elohim.

Verse 3 records the creation of light, and it has been fairly objected that the creation of light on the first day, and before the sun, which was not created until the fourth day, is a point of difficulty, and some orthodox commentators have adopted the most absurd theories to meet this objection. Kalisch suggests "that on the first day the luminous matter was created, spreading through infinite space in its rarified state; but that on the fourth day it was condensed into the light-giving bodies." This is in contradiction to the Bible narrative, which clearly does not regard light as infinite, but speaks of division of light from darkness; neither does it remove the difficulty. The solar system cannot be imagined to exist short of its central sun, much less can our earth, one of a dependent series, be conceived as existing independently. Our solar system consists of various sized bodies revolving around the huge central sun, all the planets of this system moving nearly in one plane, corresponding with the centre of the sun's body, and in one direction—namely, from west to east. There is also in the solar system a progressive increase of bulk and diminution of density from the planet Mercury to Mars, while from Jupiter to Neptune the reverse is the case.† This should mark the sun as primal in order, and give to the earth at least a tertiary place, while in the Genesaic story the earth is before the sun. To imagine the earth without the sun would be to picture it under inconceivable conditions. Evening and morning, day and night, are spoken of in this verse.

* Creation and Fall, p. 28.

† Vestiges of Creation, p. 10; Kalisch, Genesis, p. 17.

The terms "evening," "morning," "day," "night," now express clear ideas, but take away the sun entirely, how do you have any rational conception of meaning for either morning, day, evening, or night? The notions of appearance to us of the sun above the horizon, and its disappearance from us below the horizon, are involved in the use of these words, which otherwise are inconceivable.* The third verse begins with "and *Aleim* said," that is "spoke," but speaking implies the possession by the speaker of the organs of speech, tongue, larynx, &c. (as the phrase "God saw" will involve "eye," optic nerve, &c., in the God seeing.) And to whom did *God* speak? Was it to "one of us" mentioned in verse 22? It is from such phrases Parkhurst demonstrates, to his own satisfaction, the orthodox doctrine of the trinity. To the less orthodox reader such expressions will rather serve to demonstrate the polytheistic views of the writer of the Elohim document, as well as the anthropotheism which pervades the Hebrew scriptures. In verse 6, God divides the waters by a firmament רקיע ReQIO (expanse.) This was to have waters above and waters beneath it, and the stars were afterwards fixed in it. Where is now this firmament? If it means the atmosphere, there is no water above it, the clouds float in it, and the stars are not in it. Kalisch says, this firmament is the expanse of heaven, that is, including the stars—*i.e.*, the central suns of many astral and solar systems. But what waters are divided above and beneath this expanse, which is, according to such an explanation, itself the universe? He says, "The earth, illumined by all-pervading light, was freed from the encumbering mass of water; an adequate portion was congregated in immeasurable distance above it, beyond a solid expanse, intended to mark this eternal division."† This explanation is entirely unjustified by science, and this "solid expanse" dividing earth from the waters, exists only in the fertile brain of the commentator. M. Priaulx points out the full absurdity of the text when he says, "the expanse not merely divides, but sustains the waters, and when rain is about to be poured down upon the earth, the windows

* Questiones Mosaicæ, pp. 13, 14.
† Genesis, &c., p. 69.

or floodgates of heaven are said to be opened."* The doctrine of a local heaven above the earth, and used as the general abiding place of Deity, from whence at various periods he descended to the earth, is supported by the general tenor of Genesis, yet I doubt whether even any thoughtful Theist would entertain an opinion so opposed to the infinity of God. The early chapters of Genesis profess to relate the creation and fall of man, but incongruities and contradictions exist, demonstrating either that the Book is not reliable, or that, instead of being an account of one creation, the chapters in fact contain two distinct accounts of separate creations. The first probably written by one who knew nothing about the garden of Eden, or the Fall, or of Cain or Abel, and whose account breaks off at verse 3 of chapter ii., and recommences with verse 1 of chapter vi.

The two distinct narratives are easily traced, and the English reader may find this done for him by Luke Burke, who prints the selected portions in order.† He makes the Elohim document begin with Genesis i. 1, and go to ii. 3 inclusive, then omitting all until verse 1 of chapter vi., recommences and continues with some omissions which deserve the attention of the reader as showing a duplicate narrative of the flood as well as a double account of the creation. These will be dealt with in their proper place in this commentary. The orthodox deny that there are two accounts of the creation in the two first chapters, and allege that "in no sense can these chapters be viewed as distinct narratives of creation. The first, they say, is a narrative of creation in all its parts, order, and proportions, but sketched only in outline; while the second is a filling up of one of the compartments of this grand picture;"‡ that is, they allege that the fourth and following verses of the second chapter are really only a continuation and amplification of the relation contained in the first chapter. The truth of this declaration will be best tested by ascertaining whether there is such an agreement between the two chapters in the treatment of similar subjects as (allowing for the

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* Questiones Mosaicæ, p. 16.
† Ethnological Journal, 1848, p. 205.
‡ Macdonald: Creation and Fall, p. 39.

second account being more ample and extended) will determine if the narrative in the second chapter is really an amplified continuation of the first. Some allege that only the first chapter gives the order of time, and that the second gives the order of importance.

Dr. Kalisch makes no such futile pretensions, but when he arrives at the end of the third verse of the second chapter says, "A languid repetition appears to follow, another cosmogony is introduced, which, to complete the perplexity, is in many important features in direct contradiction with the first. It would be dishonest to conceal these difficulties, it would be weak-mindedness and cowardice; it would be flight instead of combat; it would be ignoble retreat instead of victory: we confess there is an apparent dissonance." The dissonance is not only apparent, it is real and irremovable, as I shall seek to show in the following remarks. Assuming the second narration to commence chapter ii. verse 4, it may easily be divided into three sections—1st. from verse 4 to verse 9 inclusive, containing an account of the creation of the heavens, earth, and dormant plants, of irrigation by mist, and, in conjunction therewith, the creation of man; this section also contains the announcement that the Lord God had formed a garden eastward in Eden, and planted it with every tree pleasant to sight and good for food, and the trees of life and knowledge of good and evil; and had placed man therein; 2nd, from verse 10 to verse 17, contains a geographical description of the garden, also a repetition of the announcement that the man was placed in the garden with the additional information that he was placed there to dress and keep it; 3rd, from verse 18 to end of chapter, includes the declaration that the Lord God will make a helpmeet for man, the creation and naming of the animals, and the manufacture of woman from the rib of the man.

As the separate subjects of these sections are distinct and easily distinguishable, we shall proceed to place them in comparison with similar subjects in the first chapter. With regard to the creation of light, the division of day and night, the creation of the firmament, the sun, moon, and stars, as narrated in the first chapter, they find so meagre

a parallel in the second, as to leave no room for useful comparison, although so far as these subjects are concerned, the second chapter in no respect amplifies or extends the narrative, but on the contrary, renders it more limited.

The creation of plants affords more scope for examination and is thus described in chapter i., verses 11, 12: according to which the earth brought forth grass, herbs, and fruit trees, growing and yielding fruit and seed *before* the creation of man; while we are informed in the second chapter that God made the dormant plants, but that they were not put in the earth, and had not grown, or, as Kalisch translates it, "sprouted forth," because there had not been any rain, and there was no man to till the ground; and the creation of man precedes the narrative of the commencement of vegetation. According to chapter ii. verse 5, the earth was dry and unbroken, therefore unfit to receive the dormant germs of the plants. In order to remove this disability, God first moistened the earth by a mist, then created man to cultivate it. The stated preliminary obstacles to vegetation are removed, and the requirements are supplied —*i. e.*, water to irrigate and man to till. This being accomplished, a garden is planted, and man is placed in it to tend it; after which, the usual course of vegetation proceeds.

There is in this a grave dissonance. In the first chapter, at the command of God the earth brings forth grass, herbs, and trees, yielding seed and bearing fruit, without mention of pre-requisite conditions or obstacles; but in the second chapter vegetation cannot take place until the soil has been watered and tilled. In the first chapter the entire flora was created, grew, brought forth seed, and yielded fruit, *prior* to the creation of man; growing plants are created on the third day, man on the sixth; while in the second chapter the plants do not commence to grow until *after* the creation of man, who would thus be in existence on or before the third day. The comparison, as far as yet attempted, has elicited so striking an instance of incongruity as would of itself be sufficient to demonstrate that the account in the second chapter is not in harmony with that of the first. If the account in chapter ii. does not agree with the previous chapter, then we must admit either that the two accounts

relate to different original creations (which would be manifestly absurd), or that one of the chapters, or both of them, are false.

There seems ground for asserting that these chapters are the productions of different countries, and that the climatic conditions associated with, and influencing, the writer of chapter i., were extremely different from those affecting the writer of chapter ii. The author of the first chapter seems to have been perplexed by a quantity of superfluous water. Water covered the whole of the earth; and after having got rid of a portion of this water by placing it above the firmament, the remainder is collected into seas, leaving the dry land to appear. The author of the second chapter, on the contrary, is at first deficient of water. The earth is for him too dry for vegetation, and he waters it with a mist.

We proceed to compare the account of the creation of animals, which is set forth more fully.

In default of any professed consecutive order in the second chapter's narrative of creation, it would be a natural assumption that the gramnivorous animals would not be created before their food, and this is confirmed by the first chapter, where the vegetation is created on the third day, and the animals on the sixth. Man is also created on the sixth day after the animals, but, as according to the second chapter, man assisted in bringing forth vegetation, he must have been created before the plants and likewise before the animals. That is to say, in the second chapter man is produced at an early period of creation and *prior* to the animals, while in the first chapter man is created *after* the animals, and is, in fact, the last object created. These contradictions clearly prove that the two chapters cannot possibly be accounts by the same author of one and the same creation.

The same distinction is observable as to the material used in the production of animals.

In chapter i. verse 20, we are told that the moving creatures and the fowls of the air were produced from the waters; but in chapter ii. verse 19, it is stated that they were formed out of the ground.

The difference of time, and the relative priority in the

creation of man and the animals, can be otherwise independently proved by reference to chapter ii. verses 7 and 19, and the 20th and following verses of the first chapter.

In chapter ii. verse 18, it is said, "It is not good for the man to be alone, I will make an helpmeet for him." This evidently alludes to *the* man of verse 7, for the man of the first chapter had his female created with him, and only one act of creation is related, "male and female created he them." After the Deity had announced his intention in the second chapter of creating "an helpmeet" for the man, the narrative relates the creation of animals, and that they were brought to Adam to be named, "but for Adam there was not found an helpmeet for him." The tenor of this second chapter narrative is to place man *before* the animals (and, according to our previous argument, on the third day prior to them) in the order of creation, while in the first chapter, on the contrary, man is created *after* the animals and on the same day with them. In the second chapter man is created alone, and in solitude performed his labours in the garden. No friendly hand to aid him in his toil, he is emphatically declared to have been *alone*. "It is not good that man should be alone, I will make an helpmeet for him." It is perfectly clear that this act of making the helpmeet for man took place after the beast of the field and the fowl of the air had passed before Adam to be named, and there is, therefore, no alternative but to assign the end of the creation as the period when the Lord "made a woman and brought her to man." Thus the man of the second chapter (who was fabricated from the dust of the ground before the plants grew, which was, according to chapter one, on the third day of creation) is proven to have been in existence on the third day previous to the making of his female; while the man of the first chapter has his female created simultaneously with him. The same may be said of the females. One female has her male created simultaneously with her, while the creation of birds and beasts interposes between that of the man and woman of the second chapter. Hence neither the male nor female of one chapter can be understood to be that of the other—they are two distinct pairs.

Again, in the dedication of food to mankind, the palpable incongruity of statement thrusts itself upon our attention. In chapter i. verse 29, God said, "Behold I have given you every herb bearing seed which is upon the face of all the earth, and every tree in which there is the fruit of a tree yielding seed, to you it shall be given for meat." Here is a gift without reservation of every herb bearing seed, and every tree bearing fruit, which is upon the face of the earth. The terms are clear and distinct, "to you it shall be for meat;" there is no exception. Yet in chapter ii. verse 17, are the words, "But of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat." Nay, more, by chapter iii. verse 22, it is evident that the "tree of life" was not intended for meat for man.

The discordance in this case is not limited to the mere exception of a particular tree from the gift to man, but, in fact, extends throughout the whole of the Scriptures, as upon the truth or falsity of the exception of the tree of knowledge of good and evil hangs the whole of the Christian religion. If no exception were made, then no command was broken, no sin committed, no curse merited; there was no fall, and, therefore, no necessity for a redemption or Redeemer.

M. Priaulx* in his examination makes reference to the Heathen mythologies as suggesting possible sources for some of the traditions; he also quotes Michaelis, De Wette, and other authors, whose criticisms may guide the unlearned reader. To illustrate the points of discord, the following epitome of the two accounts is presented to the reader:—

First.	Second.
Water abundant.	Water deficient.
Vegetation proceeds at God's fiat.	Vegetation is dependent on moisture and agricultural labours.
Plants grow in the earth before man's creation.	Plants cannot grow in the earth until man has tilled the ground.

* Questiones, pp. 6 to 83.

Fowls made out of the water.	Fowls made out of the ground.
Animals created before man.	Man created before animals.
Man and woman created same day.	Man created first, then an interval for creation and naming animals, then woman made.
Man made to have dominion over the earth.	Man made only to dress the Garden of Eden.
Every fruit given to man for food.	One kind forbidden and another withheld.
Concludes with blessing.	Concludes with cursing.

Is it not justifiable to say, in the words of Kalisch, "those differences are too obvious to be overlooked or denied?"

Some time has elapsed since even the most pious amongst educated men argued that the universe was created out of nothing no longer than 6,000 years ago; but it is not yet very far distant from the day when all the orthodox preachers of theology, and ordained misrepresenters of the declarations of science, united in declaring that the Bible taught that man had only existed on the earth 6,000 years; and pious geologists then proved, at any rate to their own satisfaction, that the world's strata and the Hebrew Records bore like testimony to the modern origin of the human family. There are few men of superior attainments as philologists, ethnologists, geologists, or archæologists who still entertain this doctrine, which is conserved specially by those persons in whom the maximum of faith is accompanied by the minimum of knowledge. There are ignorant frequenters of Little Bethels, some of whom even yet limit the age of the world to the Bible period—this class diminishes as schools multiply. Many who feel the strain on their faith resulting from the discoveries of the last thirty years, declare that the Bible does not limit man's existence to 6,000 years, and are of opinion that the Genesaic record leaves him a much longer term of mundane existence. This opinion is an erroneous one, and its refu-

tation will be apparent on a careful examination of the text. Fortunately an arithmetical test may be applied, and a result arrived at in reference to the Hebrew Chronology which, if not precise, shall be sufficiently exact to determine the controversy to an unprejudiced reader.

It cannot be denied that a grave difficulty meets us at the outset of an examination of the chronology of Genesis —viz., that the figures given in the Hebrew, Samaritan, and Septuagint versions are not respectively to the same effect, the differences amounting to several centuries. This clashing of the chronologies of the various versions sorely militates against the reliability of the whole. But the Genesaic Chronology is not only unreliable from its contradictions in the various versions, but is impeachable from the physiological and archæological points of view. The enormous longevity of the patriarchs has been attacked by Luke Burke on physiological grounds.* He affirms that "All careful investigation of the facts of natural history will prove that there are determinate relations between the period of puberty and the total duration of life. In birds the multiple is sometimes very high, in fishes still more so; but in the mammalia generally, and especially in man, it will be found that the highest possible duration of life is seven times the age of finished puberty. Few human beings, especially in civilised life, ever reach this period; none, we believe, have ever exceeded it. The age of puberty greatly varies in different races of men, and the natural duration of their lives is longer or shorter accordingly. Now the chronology before us is at utter variance with this great law of nature. Mahalaleel begot Jared at the age of 65, and lived 895 years afterwards, more than thirteen times the period of complete puberty. This is the same as saying that a person whose natural life would extend to 80, 90, or 100 years, might be a man and have children at the age of 6, 7, or 8 years. In the post-diluvian period, we have even a higher multiple than this. Salah begot Eber in his thirtieth year, and yet lived 433 years: more than fourteen times the age at which his son was born. All genuine

* Ethnological Journal, p. 114.

history is entirely opposed to the admission of such extreme longevity. Neither in ancient nor modern times is there one authenticated instance of any human being having reached the age of 200 years, to say nothing of such enormous periods as 969 years." This objection is of tremendous weight, and has nowhere been effectually replied to, so far as I have been able to ascertain. Priaulx* points out that similar exaggerated notions of longevity are to be found in the Egyptian, Chinese, and Hindoo mythologies.

According to the ordinary authorised version of the Bible, not only does man's existence seem to be limited to 6,000 years, but the creation of the world itself very little antedates the scriptural origin of the human race. That is, I affirm—and in this I am supported by the orthodox chronological tables in use at each of the Universities—that the Bible declares man and the universe to have originated about 6,000 years ago. Adam, who was made at farthest on the sixth day of the creation, has, when 130 years old,† a son Seth, to whom at the age of 105 Enos is born,‡ who has when 90, a son Cainan. Mahalaleel, his son, is born when his father is 70,§ and Mahalaleel is 65 at the birth of Jared,‖ who bears Enoch at the ripe age of 162.¶ Methuselah is born when Enoch is 65,** and Lamech when Methuselah was 187.†† This brings us to Noah, who is born when Lamech's age is 182.‡‡ The Deluge took place when Noah was 600,§§ so that from the creation of Adam to the flood would be, according to the authorised version of the Genesaic chronology, 1656 years. There is from this era to the time of Terah a curious diminution in the ages of the patriarchs at the time of the birth of their respective first-borns. Two years after the flood, Arphaxad is born ;‖‖

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* Questiones, p. 257. † Genesis, v. 3. ‡ V. 6.

§ V. 12. ‖ V. 15. ¶ V 18.

** V. 21. With reference to Methuselah, the reader may be interested to know that the Septuagint fixes his birth Anno Mundi 1287, and makes him die in 2256 ; but according to the same Septuagint, the Deluge took place A. M. 2242, so that Methuselah must have survived the flood fourteen years. (See Ethnological Journal, pp. 82 91.)

†† V. 25. ‡‡ V. 28. §§ C. vii. 11. ‖‖ C. xi. 10.

he has attained 35* at the birth of Salah, who is 30† when Eber is born. Eber begets Peleg at 34,‡ to whom Reu is born at 30.§ Serug is born when Reu‖ is 32, and Nahor when Serug is 30.¶ Terah is born when Nahor is 29,** and Abram when Terah is 70.†† Isaac, the son of the promise, is born when Abraham is exactly a centenarian.‡‡ Isaac was sixty at the birth of Jacob.§§ When Jacob was 130, he went to reside in Egypt,¶¶ making to that date a total from the creation of the world of about 2238 years:* The period of the sojourn in Egypt was, according to Exodus,† 430 years, but was 400 according to Acts‡ and Genesis.§ This period is also calculated at 215 or 210 years‖ by those who have felt themselves embarrassed in the endeavour to explain this portion of the Hebrew Chronology. Reckoning the sojourn of the Jews in Egypt after Jacob's descent at about 215 years, and adding 40 years for the rule of Moses,¶ we are brought to Joshua and the Judges. No exact dates can be fixed for the rule of the Judges, but it will probably not be an unfair estimate to allow between 400 and 500 years from Moses to David, although, according to the chronological tables by Nott and Gliddon,** founded on the genealogies given in Kings, Chronicles, and Josephus, the period varies from about 200 to about 400 years. The shorter the period the stronger the case against the Bible Chronology. Munk says that it is impossible to present any historical tableau of the history of the Shopetim (Judges). The Book of Judges he does not consider historical, but declares that everything in it is recounted without regularity, and events succeed each other without regard to chronological order.†† A more extended or briefer period will be allowed for the rule of these

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* V. 12. † V. 14. ‡ V. 16. § V. 18. ‖ V. 20.
¶ V. 22. ** V. 24. †† V. 26. ‡‡ C. xxi. 5.
§§ C. xxv. 26. ‖‖ C. xlvii. 9, ¶¶ Ethno. Journal, pp. 11-19
* Exod. xii. 41. † Acts vii. 6. ‡ Gen. xv. 13.
§ Dr. Giles's Hebrew Records, p. 184; Colenso, Part I., p. 95; but see Kalisch on Genesis, 369.
‖ Exod. vii. 7, Deut. xxxi. 2. ¶ Types of Mankind, p. 710.
** Palestine, Geographique, Historique, &c.
†† What and How of the Eternal, p. 131.

Israelitish Judges, according to the views of the calculator as to the simultaneous or successive careers of any of the Judges; but no such contraction or extension can materially affect this argument. From David to the Captivity there are 22 reigns, making about 473 years, which are very clearly and distinctly stated, and thence to the supposed nativity of Jesus about 580 years, thus making in all, according to the Bible chronology, about 4000 years from Adam to Jesus. This will give the ordinary orthodox total of a little less than 6,000 years for man's existence on earth, and it is certain that the received version of the Bible teaches this doctrine, and also that the same authority declares that the whole human family find a common parentage in one pair, Adam and Eve. On the other hand there are ethnologists of no mean repute, and geologists of undoubted ability, who respectively affirm that man has existed on the earth for many chiliads prior to the Adamic era. The ethnologists declare that as far as we can trace the human race we detect apparently isolated groups diverse in type, and they deny that there is any evidence to mark one pair as the source of the whole human race; but that on the contrary many centres of origin are probably traceable for each type. I will first offer a few illustrations of the antiquity of the human race, and then discuss its unity of origin. Sir William Jones some years since advanced the strongest arguments in favour of the antiquity of the Airyan races, and later Bunsen fixes one dispersion of the Airyans from Airyana Vaêdjô at 5,000 years before the Christian era.* This calculation presumes centuries of pre-historic existence. Dr. Nott says, speaking of Egypt,† —"Not only the tattered fragments of her history handed down to us by the Hebrews, by Herodotus, Manetho, Eratosthenes, Eusebius, Diodorus, &c.; but her pyramids of 5,000 years, her massy and gorgeous temples, her obleisks, her stone tablets, her sepulchres of the dead, her numerous papyri, and even the mummied skulls of primeval races found in her catacombs, bear witness that Egypt

* Biblical and Physical History of Man, p. 78.
† Origin of Species, p. 18.

was old, populous, and civilized 1,000 years before Abraham;" that is, that Egypt was peopled and ancient amongst peoples long prior to the Bible date of the Deluge. Darwin says that "M. Horner's researches have rendered it in some degree probable that man, sufficiently civilised to have manufactured pottery, existed in the valley of the Nile thirteen or fourteen thousand years ago."* Fragments of manufactured brick have been found in the delta of the Nile, for which an antiquity of 30,000 years has been claimed, but how far the calculations supporting this hypothesis are reliable is a matter in dispute.† Dr. Bennet Dowler claims for a human skeleton discovered in the delta of the Mississippi no less than 57,600 years. His estimate is founded amongst other items on a calculation of the age of the over-lying cypress forests, and is capable, according to Sir Charles Lyell,‡ of investigation under very favourable conditions.

Thomas Henry Huxley says, "Sufficient grounds exist for the assumption that man co-existed with the animals found in the *diluvium*, and many a barbarous race may, before all historical time, have disappeared together with the animals of the ancient world."§ Sir Charles Lyell supports the statement that "North America was peopled more than a thousand centuries ago by the human race.‖ He suggests that Europe was peopled antecedent to the division of Ireland from England, or of England from France; a theory which would carry man's existence back to ages extremely remote. Those of the orthodox who cling to the Bible notion that the world was made 6,000 years ago, must feel a strange horror when reading Darwin's supposition of "a longer period than 300 million years" for the denudation of the weald by the action of the sea.¶ How will the pious acceptors of the Bible doctrine, that all the animals were created at most a few days prior to man, regard Charles Darwin's statement that "an infinite

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* Lyell's Antiquity of Man, p. 38.
† Lyell's Antiquity of Man, p. 43.
‡ Types of Mankind, p. 338.
§ Man's Place in Nature, p. 136.
‖ Antiquity of Man, pp. 204-289.
¶ Origin of Species, p. 287.

number of generations which the mind cannot grasp must have succeeded each other in the long roll of years?"

Baron Bunsen claims an antiquity for the human race of at least 20,000 years prior to the Christian era, and traces in Egypt a double empire of hereditary kings to 5413 B.C. (that is, to near 1000 years prior to the time of Adam). Before these he discovers elective kings reaching back to 7230 B.C. Prior to these, priest kings, the first of whom (Bytis the Theban) ascended the throne B.C. 9085. Farther back still does Bunsen trace the Egyptian peoples by the aid of their pyramids, their obelisks, their stone records, rescued from the sand ocean which for centuries had hidden them from human gaze.*

In Greece itself, for which no such antiquity of history can be claimed as for the land of the Nile, the Pelasgic occupation carries us back into the night of time.

Unless we are to reject as utter fable the words of Plato, historic records had been preserved by the priests of Sais relating to Greece extending over a period of about 9000 years prior to Solon.† Plato expressly affirms this to be in every respect true.

The unity of the origin of the human race is a subject which must not be confused with that of the unity of species. It is quite consistent to deny a common origin, and yet to accept sameness of species. Humboldt says—"Les recherches géographiques sur le siege primordial, ou, comme on dit, sur le berceau de l'espece humaine, ont dans le fait un caractere purement mythique. 'Nous ne connaissons,' dit Guillaume de Humboldt, dans un travail encore inedit sur la diversité des langues et des peuples, 'Nous ne connaissons ni historiquement, ni par aucune tradition certaine un moment ou l'espece humaine n'ait pas été séparée en groupes de peuples.'" "Geographical researches on the primordial seat, or, as it is called, the cradle of human kind, are in fact purely mythic in their character. 'We do not know,' says William von Humboldt, in a work as yet unpublished on the diversity of languages and peoples, 'We do not know,

* Egyptens Stelle, quoted by Gliddon: Indigenous Races, p. 579.

† The Timæus, sec. 6, Davis's translation, vol. 2, p. 327. The Critias, sec. 3, p. 415; sec. 5, p. 418.

either historically or by any certain tradition, any period when the human race was not separated into groups of peoples.'"*

Kalisch argues that "ethnographic inquiries have established the fact that if the human race does not descend from one pair, it certainly belongs to one species." He admits that the former supposition has been rejected by many intelligent and competent scholars, and that a plurality of first parents brought forth in different centres seems to be more and more extensively adopted.†

Dr. Morton says that he "can see no satisfactory explanation of the diverse phenomena that characterise physical man except in the doctrine of an original plurality of races."‡

To adopt the language of Dr. August Zeune, inasmuch as it has not yet occurred to anybody to sustain that all figs have sprung from a solitary primitive fig, even as little can any one admit the whole of mankind to be derived lineally from a single human pair. Wherever the conditions for life were, there life has been. Ethnologists to-day divide humankind into at least three great races—Mongolian, Ethiopian, and Caucasian.§ These are each subdivided, and the diversities of humanity traced out are of a most striking character.

"In the Mongolian type the skull is of a square shape, rather angular than rounded; head of a heavy form, though not large; capacity varying from 69 to 73 cubic inches: facial angle sloping backwards from 70° to 80°. The cheekbones are high and project outwards; the nose is flat, and on the same level with the cheekbones; the arch of the eyebrow is scarcely perceptible; nostril narrow; the edge of the jaw slightly rounded forward, and the chin prominent. The face is broad and flattened without any distinguishing depression, the space between the eyes is flat and very broad; lips generally well formed and not thick, cheeks round and projecting, nose broad and flat.

* Humboldt's Cosmos, par Faye.

† On Genesis, p. 33. ‡ Types of Mankind, p. 305.

§ Some contend for five distinct races, some for more. The science of ethnology is not yet matured.

The line of the outer eyelids extends towards the temples, the skin being drawn up by the unusual protruberance of the cheek bones, while the internal angle is depressed towards the nose, and the upper eyelid at this point is continued into the underlid by a rounded sweep, the eyes thus appearing as if placed obliquely; eyes small and iris dark. Skin of an olivaceous tint, varying from sallow lemon-peel to brownish yellow, but never very fair or intensely swarthy. Hair coarse, lank and black, beard scanty, not curly, partially or wholly wanting at the ears, and hair scanty on other parts of the skin. Body square, stature rather low, trunk long, extremities rather short, wrists and ankles weak."*

"The Ethiopian embraces the African central type and its varieties. An elongated narrow cranium, crisp and curly hair, jaws more or less projecting, thick lips, and black or dusky skin, are its general characteristics; but there are two marked divisions—the true *Negro* of Western Africa, and the *Kaffirs* of the South, besides various intermixtures.

"In the Negro the skull is narrow and compressed at the sides, and elongated from front to back; the dome arched and dense; the forehead convex, retreating, and narrow; the contour of the head is smooth compared to the angular form of the Mongol; the cheek bones project forward; the bridge of the nose is small and flat, the nostrils round and wide; both jaws are much elongated, edges narrow and elliptical; front teeth somewhat oblique. The whole skull is thick and heavy, facial angle from 65° to 70°; the mouth wide, with very thick lips; the face is narrow, and projects greatly in the lower part; chin retracted; eyes prominent and rather large, iris black, vessels of the eye suffused with a bilious tinge. The hair in infants rises from the skin in small mamillary tufts, disposed in irregular quincunx; in adults, it is of a crisp woolly texture, except the eyebrows and eyelashes; beard scanty on the upper lip, and chiefly confined to the point of the chin, except in late

* Space does not permit me to give the distinguishing and differing characteristics of Malay, Australian, and American subdivisions of the Mongolian type; though indeed to me they are so sufficiently striking as almost to constitute distinct types.

manhood; a few tufts of hair are on the breast, but the arms and legs are bare. Hair on the head woolly and curled in the pure races, never hanging loose or rising into a mop; body strong, muscular, and very symmetrical; bones of the fore-arm somewhat elongated; shin-bones of legs slightly bent forward, and calves placed high up; the feet broad, heavy, and soles flat; the heel-bone projecting. Skin soft and silky to the touch: in the new-born infant, dull cherry red—in adults, varying from a deep sallow to an intense black; emits a strong offensive odour, especially under exposure to the sun."

In the Caucasian type—"The head is almost round, or somewhat oblong, and the skull is smooth, rounded, and of the most symmetrical form, with a full development of the anterior portion; the cheek-bones are rather narrow, without any undue projection; the jaws are rounded, the front teeth of each being placed perpendicularly; the capacity of the skull, according to the measurement of Dr. Morton, fron 75 to 109 cubic inches, the facial angle rising 75° to nearly 90°. The face is of a round, or more generally oval shape, and the features moderately prominent; the forehead arched; the nose narrow, slightly arched, or at least with the bridge somewhat convex; the mouth small, with the lips slightly turned out, especially the lower one, and the outline gracefully waved; the chin full and round; colour of skin fair and ruddy (*Xanthous*), or of various shades of brown (*Melanous*); hair abundant on head and chin, generally soft, smooth, and wavy, and dispersed also on other parts of skin—colour various, according to complexion, from a yellow-red auburn and deep brown to glossy black: colour of iris of eyes also various, from shades of blue to hazel, dark brown and black; eyes generally full; medium stature, approaching to six feet in the Xanthous, and from five feet three to five inches in the Melanous; muscular strength, energy, and endurance generally considerable—in many superior."

These varieties of human kind may now be found on the earth's surface. Do they trace their origin to one pair? Or are they severally indigenous to their own soil and climate? Are these varying types, with all their differences,

the natural result of an origin under primarily and persistently different life conditions? Or did they find a common origin in Noah about 4,300 years ago?*

Assuming, for the purpose of the argument, a common origin in one pair for the whole human family, there are but three suppositions on which the orthodox can account for the present physical diversities amongst mankind.

1. A miracle, or immediate act of Deity changing one type into another.

2. The gradual action of physical conditions, such as climate, food, mode of life, &c.

3. Congenital or accidental varieties.†

The first point hardly needs remark. No such miracle or act of God is alleged to have taken place. The writer in Genesis who invented a Tower of Babel miracle to account for the diversity of language of which he could not help being well aware, did not find it necessary to account for the diversity of type—a fact of which he knew nothing. Ethnology is the most modern amongst sciences, though her lessons are likely to be of the highest importance to human welfare. It lies upon any one supporting the first proposition, at least to vouch its truth with his tongue or pen, ere it is needed that a formal refutation of Ethnic-thaumaturgy should be placed before the reader. The affirmative of the second and third positions has been taken by Dr. James Cowles Prichard, in his voluminous works on the "Natural and Physical History of Man."

It cannot be denied that races improve and deteriorate under varying conditions of food and climate, but it is most strongly contended that no such influences will convert one race, as the Negro, into another race, as the Caucasian. Of the permanence of type under its own climatic conditions—that is, in the country to which it is indigenous—we have overwhelming proof in the statue of an ancient Egyptian scribe, taken from a tomb of the fifth dynasty, 5,000 years

* It is not necessary to discuss the question whether Adam and Eve were the parents of the human races at 6,000 years date; or any other period, because, as the Noachian deluge is alleged to have reduced all mankind to one family, it is only necessary to start from the date of that flood.

† Dr. Nott's Physical History of Man, p. 28.

old, and precisely corresponding to the Fellah of the present day.* The sand had preserved the colour of the statuette, which, from its portrait-like beauty, marks a long era of art-progress preceding its production. It ante-dates the orthodox era of the flood, carries us back to a time when, if the Bible were true, Adam was yet alive, and still we find centuries before it kings reigning and ruling in mighty Egypt. Can the reader wonder that these facts are held to impeach the orthodox faith in the reliability of Genesis?

Dr. Nott says—"It is a commonly received error that the influence of a hot climate is gradually exerted on successive generations, until one species of mankind is completely changed into another; a dark shade is impressed on the first, and transmitted to the second; another shade is added to the third, which is handed down to the fourth; and so on, through successive generations, until the fair German is transformed by climate into the black African." *This idea is proven to be false.* A sunburnt cheek is never handed down to succeeding generations. The exposed parts of the body alone are tanned by the sun, and the children of the white skinned Europeans in New Orleans, Mobile, and the West Indies, are born as fair as their ancestors, and would remain so, if carried back to a colder climate. The same may be said of other acquired characters (except those from want or disease). They die with the individual, and are no more capable of transmission than a flattened head, mutilated limb, or tattooed skin. The monuments of Egypt present us the features of the Mongol, the Caucasian, and the Negro, 3,000 B.C. If time were wanted to produce this diversity, how many chiliads prior to the Adamic era shall we travel in order to find the first pair?"†

The only question remaining is that of congenital or accidental varieties or peculiarities alleged to spring up, and be transmitted from father to son so as to form new races. On this point, I again adopt the language of Dr. Nott—"Let us pause for a moment to illustrate this fanciful idea. The negroes of Africa, for example, are admitted not to be offsets from some other race, which have been gradually

* M. Pulzsky: Indigenous Races, p. 111.
† Physical History of Man, p. 28.

blackened and changed in moral and physical type by the action of the climate; but it is asserted that, 'once in the flight of ages past,' some genuine little negro, or rather many such, were born of Caucasian, Mongol, or other light skinned parents, and then have turned about and changed the type of the inhabitants of a whole continent. So in America, the countless aborigines found on this Continent, which, we have reason to believe, were building mounds before the time of Moses, are the offspring of a race changed by accidental or congenital varieties. Thus, too, old China, India, Australia, Oceanica, &c., all owe their types, physical and mental, to congenital or accidental varieties, and are all descended from Adam and Eve. Can human credulity go further, or human ingenuity invent any argument more absurd? Yet the whole ground-work of a common origin for some nine or ten hundred millions of human beings, embracing numerous distinct types, which are lost in antiquity far beyond all records or chronology, sacred or profane, is narrowed down to this baseless fabric.

"In support of this argument, we are told of the porcupine family of England which inherited for some generations a peculiar condition of the skin, characterised by thickened warty excrescences. We are also told of the transmission from father to child of club feet, cross eyes, six fingers, deafness, blindness, and many other examples of congenital peculiarities. But these examples merely serve to disprove the argument they are intended to sustain. Did any one ever hear of a club-footed, cross-eyed, or six fingered race, although such individuals are exceedingly common? Are they not, on the contrary, always swallowed up and lost? Is it not strange, if there be any truth in this argument, that no race has ever been formed from those congenital varieties which we know to occur frequently, and yet races originate from congenital varieties which cannot be proved and are not believed by most of our best writers ever to have existed? No one ever saw a Negro, Mongol, or Indian born from any but his own species. Has any one ever heard of an Indian child born from white or black parents in America during more than two centuries that these races have been living there? Is not this brief state-

ment sufficient to satisfy any one, that the diversity of races now seen on the earth, cannot be accounted for on the assumption of congenital or accidental origin? If a doubt remains, would it not be expelled by the recollection of the fact that the Negro, Mongol, and White Man existed, with their present types, at least 1000 years before the date when Abraham is alleged to have journeyed to Egypt as a suppliant to the mighty Pharaoh."

The science of geology affords to the inquirer still further means for testing the Genesaic narrative of the creation, and more than one surpliced defender of the faith has been compelled during the last twenty years to admit that the teachings of this science and those of the Pentateuch are in direct and irreconcilable variance. The Rev. Baden Powell says "that the whole tenor of geology is in entire contradiction to the cosmogony" of the Bible; and he adds, that "whenever the sacred writers introduce physical statements, they may fairly be understood as speaking conformably to the existing state of knowledge, and adapting themselves to the ideas, belief, and capacities of those whom they addressed."* That is, in effect, a declaration on the part of this Church of England clergyman that the Bible is not divinely inspired, but is the production of fallible and imperfectly educated men.

M. Priaulx says† that in reviewing this creation, we are struck by its division into days. These days, though several of them are undetermined by any revolution of the earth round the sun, were nevertheless meant and understood to be natural days of twenty-four hours each. Faber argues that these days are homogeneous, that the term day is often used for an indefinite time, and cannot in this chapter mean a natural day, and that therefore each day measures a space of at least 6000 years. To this argument there are two objections. 1. That the assumption that God has been since the creation, and is still, resting is contrary to Christian notions of Deity, and contrary also to scripture, and especially contrary to the theological views of infant man, whose deities are ever too busy, too personally

* Unity of Worlds; essay 2, sect. 2.
† Questiones Mosaicæ, 29.

active; and ever engaged, if not in creating, in mending and rectifying their handiwork. 2. That though "day" may be used for any indefinite time, it is surely never so when particularised and defined by adding the words "morning" and "evening." Hugh Miller in his lecture on the two records, Mosaical and Geological, enlarges on the explanatory hypotheses of Dr. Chalmers and Dr. Pye Smith, both of which represent the creation recorded in Genesis as an event which took place about 6000 years ago, as begun and completed in six natural days, but as cut off from a previously existing creation by a chaotic period of death and darkness.*

According to the first chapter of Genesis, the creation of the whole universe occupied only six days and nights, and this view of the matter is clearly confirmed by the words of the Decalogue as given in Exodus xx., 11. Geologists, on the contrary, declare that the various early strata of the earth have occupied enormous periods of time during their formation, and that even in the vegetable and animal kingdoms, the extinction and creation of species have been, and are, the result of a slow and gradual change in the organic world.†

It is worse than puerile to contend that the words "day" and "night" in Genesis are intended to express six indefinite periods of time, because as the same words are used in Exodus xx., 10 and 11, and in reference to the same event, as expressing only the seventh part of a week, it is clear that it was not the intention of the Hebrew cosmogonists to express an indefinite period, or indeed anything but a natural day. Nor would this explanation, if a correct one, relieve the orthodox students from the difficulties raised by scientific investigators. The objection is not alone that there was no such formation or creation in six days, as alleged in the text under notice, but is also, that it did not even take place in the order, or at any time, in the manner recorded in the Bible. A fashionable contention is for a very long period of chaos covered by the two first verses of Genesis,

* Testimony of the Rocks, pp. 115 to 156.

† Lyell's Principles of Geology, 8th edition, p. 179.

and then for a six day or six period work of forming the pre-existing material into the universe. But the description of the chaos of the first two verses refers to an "earth" already existing, with "waters" also. But land and waters are not the earliest aspects under which geology discover our earth. In a very pleasant book recently published in Paris,* the writer in his chapter, entitled "Epoque Primitive," argues, following Laplace's theory, that the whole of our earth, as indeed the whole of our firmament, was at one period a diffused mass of nebulous matter, and he deals with this globe as primarily a mass of gaseous incandescence gradually cooled down to its present shape and density.

This theory has been put before English readers at various times, and at great length, and especially by one most able anonymous writer (the author of the "Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation"), who in the first two chapters of his extraordinary work, explains the nebular hypothesis most lucidly.†

Kalisch supports the nebular theory, declares positively that the primary condition of the earth was a fiery one, and suggests that the time required for the cooling down of our planet to its present state, would be about 353,000,000 years.‡ M. Figuier prefixes to his work a plate showing the present strata of our earth, giving first the underlying internal and yet unextinguished fire, then the basalt, gneiss, and primitive granite, all of which rocks are now almost universally acknowledged to be the result of fire action.

An orthodox explainer of Bible difficulties says—"The first glimpse of our planet presents us with a revolving mass of igneous fluid, wheeling its annual course round the solar centre of the system, and gradually cooling down by radiation into space, whereby a granite crust is formed upon the surface."§

While it is impossible fully to discuss here the nebular theory, enough has been advanced to show that even if a pre-created chaos were conceded, "earth" and "waters"

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* La Terre avant la deluge, par Louis Figuier. Hachette, 1863.
† See also Unity of Worlds, essay 3., sec. 1.
‡ Genesis, pages 13 to 19.
§ McCausland on Stones, p. 93.

were not amongst the primitive conditions of our globe. There is, however, really no other pretence for the theory which places an arbitrary division between the first and second verses of Genesis, or between the second and those following, than this, that the clergy cannot fairly combat the difficulties raised by the text. Each verse is connected by the particle Vau ו (and) and there is not the slightest break in the narrative.

By verses eleven and twelve we are informed that the vegetable kingdom was created by one fiat on the third day. Yet the best students of geology declare that an universal primeval flora cannot be sustained, but that on the contrary the development of the vegetable world has been slow, gradual, and spread over enormous periods. According to the text, herbs and trees were created on the third day, while fishes, reptiles, and creeping things were not made until the fifth and sixth days. Yet the stone records teach us that there existed fishes, reptiles, and creeping things long ages before the period of those plants whose existence is now testified by the huge coal beds of our country.

According to Genesis, the vegetable kingdom was created only a few days earlier than man. According to geology, many millenniums intervened between the first plant and the first man.

An appeal to astronomy is equally decisive against the Bible story of the creation. According to the first chapter of Genesis, our earth was the primarily created planet of this universe. According to astronomy our earth is but one, and that neither first nor second of a series of planets, probably thrown off from, and certainly now revolving round a central sun, the whole of this vast solar being itself part of a huge astral system, and this again but a small fraction of the immeasurable universe.*

According to the Bible, the firmament is a fixed partition studded with stars, and dividing the waters, so that for heavy rain, as in the case of the Noachian deluge, the windows of heaven are opened that water may pour on the earth.

* It is estimated that the solar system to Uranus occupies at least 3,600 millions of miles.

According to astronomy all the water clouds are within a few miles of each other, while Venus, one of the nearest stars, is distant 27,000,000 of miles. No such fixed firmament exists at all. Heaven does not mean a fixed partition, it is but the word used to express the space in which an infinity of worlds, millions of miles distant from each other, perform their various revolutions.

According to the Bible God made the stars after the earth had been created, and set them in the heaven to give light upon the earth. According to astronomy, vast numbers of stars exist whose light must have been many thousands of years travelling to our earth, notwithstanding the startling rapidity with which light travels, and some nebulæ have been discovered whose light must have been travelling more than a million of years, and, therefore, so long ago, must they have existed to send out those rays we now perceive. According to the Bible, there are two great lights in the heavens; the greater—that is, the sun, to rule the day, the lesser—that is, the moon, to rule the night. According to astronomy, although the sun is by far the largest member of our solar system, being no less than 892,000 miles in diameter, it is by no means the largest amongst stars, and the moon has in reality no claim to be marked as great, being actually but little more than 1-64th the size of the earth. If Genesis be true, the earth existed some days before the sun. If astronomy be true, the earth once formed part of the sun's enormous volume, and not only never existed without the sun, as centre of the system of which the earth is a member, but could not possibly do so. According to Genesis light—that is, day light, was created before the sun. According to astronomy, day light is impossible without the sun. The terms evening and morning are used in Genesis before the sun is created; and yet these words convey to the mind but two impressions; "evening," that portion of sun light immediately preceding and succeeding the sun's apparent departure or disappearance below our horizon, and "morning," that portion of light that immediately precedes and succeeds its apparent rising above.

In the words of Kalisch, "We believe that we have indisputably demonstrated that, with regard to astronomy

and geology, the Bible records are, in many essential points, utterly and irreconcilably at variance with the established results of modern researches."

A writer in the *Westminster Review** says:—"That the 'Creation of the World' took place 4004 years before the Christian era, used to be taught in our schoolboy days as a fact not less certain than that the Norman Conquest took place 1066 years after it. And although every educated man of the present generation well knows that if there be the least truth in Geology, this statement is a baseless fiction, it is nevertheless repeated on the margin of the first verse of every 'Reference Bible' issued under Ecclesiastical authority; and thus it comes to be accepted as a dogma—which it is nothing less than a dangerous heresy to question—by that vast mass of well-meaning people who are content to take their religion upon trust, and to forego the use of their reason while professing to seek the highest of all truths. And even of those who are ready to admit that the changes of which we have evidence in the succession of stratified deposits forming the crust of the Earth, and of the Organic remains entombed in them, must have occupied hundreds of thousands or even millions of years, the great bulk are satisfied with simply antedating their commencement, and still continue to believe as devoutly as the rest, that a general chaotic disturbance, followed by a remodelling of the globe which prepared it for the introduction of Man, took place at the date assigned. Yet the progress of geological inquiry has clearly disproved the notion of any such general remodelling, by showing that all the most recent alterations which have taken place on the Earth's surface, and in the distribution of Organic life upon it, have been effected by agencies purely local and gradual, and in continuity with changes which carry us back to a period when the countries now inhabited by Man were tenanted by animals long since extinct; while it has also shown that many of the races at present existing can be traced so far back in geological time, as to have plainly lived through any such convulsionary epoch. And thus the well-meaning

* No. 46, April, 1863, pp. 517-19.

attempts which were made a quarter of a century ago to reconcile the Mosaic Cosmogony with the verities of science, have fallen into discredit; sensible and well-informed men have ceased endeavouring to harmonize the successive 'days' of creation (elongated into indefinite periods of time) with the Azoic, Palæozoic, Secondary, Tertiary, and Post-Tertiary epochs; and it has come to be tacitly admitted that Geology has as much claim as Astronomy or any other science, to build up inductions on the facts of Nature, untrammelled by the supposed *dicta* of Revelation.

"Yet it is remarkable how chary Geologists have until recently been of disturbing the popular notion that the creation of *Man* took place in the year 4004 B.C. It has seemed as if they had purchased their right to speculate freely on the anterior history of the Earth, by promising to leave untouched that which the Theologian claims as his proper province, the origin and early history of the Human Race. And if some of the more venturous among them have now and then drawn attention to the facts which seemed to claim for him a remoter antiquity, they have been called to order by those 'potent, grave, and reverend' seniors, whose credit with the educated public has mainly rested upon their obvious unwillingness to run counter on this point to the accepted belief; the facts have been quietly ignored, or the inferences voted unsound.

"Indications have not been wanting, however, in the progress of other branches of scientific inquiry, that the Human Race is much older than the ordinary chronology admits; and the convergence of such indications from several distinct paths of research, is in itself no insignificant attestation of the validity of the conclusion towards which they severally lead. The Ethnologist, who aims at tracing-out the relations of the existing families of Mankind on the hypothesis of their common origin, finds that making the largest allowance which experience justifies for the modifying influence of external conditions, he is quite unable to account for the divergence of the races clearly recognisable in the oldest Egyptian paintings, within the limited number of centuries intervening between the probable period of their execution (from 1500 to 1000 B.C.) and the date

assigned to the Creation; still less between the same period and the date of the Noachian Deluge, after which (if the Mosaic record is to be literally interpreted) the population of the world began a second time. The Philologist, who studies the filiation, growth, and metamorphoses of Languages, and who finds, the higher he mounts into antiquity, more and more reason to believe that even their most divergent forms have had a common original, still feels the necessity of a far greater lapse of time than the received chronology admits, to account for the early development of those marvellous linguistic fabrics which are at present only known to us in their ruin or decay. The Antiquarian, again, who allows due weight to the accumulating evidence that the implements and usages of 'Pre-historic Man,' in various quarters of the globe, are referable to several epochs as distinctly successive as those of the Historic period, and each of them in all probability a great deal longer, finds it impossible to conceive with any show of reason, that such a succession can have occurred within the few centuries to which we must limit it if we first make a fair allowance for the lapse of time required for the mere peopling of the earth by the descendants of a single pair. And the Physical Geographer who grapples with the difficulties presented by the existing localization of those races of Plants and Animals which are popularly supposed to have been called into being contemporaneously with Man, for his express use and service, feels himself unable to solve those difficulties without the hypothesis that very extensive changes in the relative distribution of land and waters, such as must have required an enormous lapse of time for their accomplishment, have taken place since they first diffused themselves over the areas they now occupy."*

* "Thus it was long since shown by Dr. J. D. Hooker, that the relations of the Plants of South America, New Zealand, and Tasmania cannot be accounted for except on the supposition that these countries once formed part of a great Antarctic Continent. And more recently Mr. Wallace has shown that the relations of the Animal inhabitants of the Indian Archipelago similarly point to the former existence of a great Southern Asiatic Continent, the partial submergence of which may not improbably have been synchronous with the elevation of the Himalayan range."

Chap. i., verse 24.—The words translated "and beast of the earth," are in the ordinary Hebrew version וחיתו (UChIThU) ארץ (AReTz), the correct rendering of which would be "and his beast, earth." The fact being that the writer of the Hebrew has blundered in substituting the final letter of the first word ו (Vau) for the prefix ה (He) which ought to be, and in the Samaritan version actually is, the commencing letter of the second word. The error, though a trivial one, serves to show that, notwithstanding Jesus is reported to have said—"Till heaven and earth pass, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass," yet the Hebrew text has not been preserved without blemish; and also that our translators have not hesitated to make up its deficiencies. Dr. Wall adduces this and several similar blunders as instances of extremely hasty and inaccurate vocalisation of the original Hebrew.*

Chap. ii., verse 7.—"And man became a living soul." You have in this verse a forcible illustration of the dishonesty of the translators of our authorised version. The words rendered in the orthodox version "living soul," are נפש חיה (NePheSh ChIE). In chap. i., v. 21, where exactly the same Hebrew words are used with reference to the animals produced from the waters, the translators give "living creatures" as the equivalent, as they do likewise in chap. ii., v. 19, where precisely the same two Hebrew words are again translated "living creature." The truth is that the writer of Genesis never used any phrase denoting "soul" in the modern and orthodox sense of the word. If the translators had deemed "soul" the correct rendering, why did they not use it always? The answer is that it would then have given the same "soul" to man and beast—that is, to the whole animal kingdom, and this is really the doctrine taught in the Hebrew Bible, "that which befalleth the sons of men befalleth beasts, as the one dieth so dieth the other; yea, they have all one breath; so that man hath no pre-eminence above a beast." (Ecclesiastes, chap. iii., v. 19. See also page 11, and Questiones Mosaicæ, p. 64.) The word נפש (NePheSh) means to breathe or respire.† Park-

* Grounds for Revision, p. 233.

† Hebrew Lexicon, p. 460, 7th edition.

hurst in his Lexicon says that the word has been supposed to signify soul, but that he can find no passage where it hath undoubtedly this meaning. From the instances given by Gesenius it is clear that "the soul" spoken of in the Old Testament was not immortal, as it is said to live, to die, to be killed, &c.*

Verse 8.—"The Lord planted a garden in Eden." Wilford says,† Mussulmans as well as Christians have assigned various situations to the garden of Eden, and there is hardly a country on earth or a region in heaven but has been ransacked in search of it, whilst some of the fathers have denied its existence. In consequence of the great difficulty experienced by the orthodox in finding any spot on the globe which would harmonise geographically with the Biblical description of Eden, it has been asserted by some commentators that the description is antediluvian, and that the deluge had changed the position of the rivers. But this raises two difficulties—first, if the description be antediluvian Moses was certainly not its author; and second, in describing the rivers the text uses the present tense as though the author or compiler of Genesis had in view some particular district familiar to himself, and which he expected to be able sufficiently to make known to his readers by the special features he pointed out. Kalisch gives a list of nearly forty different sites selected for Eden by prominent writers.‡ Wilford fixes it in the neighbourhood of the Indian mountains.

Stroth says—"We are obliged to assume, with Theophilus and other fathers of the Church, that Paradise fluctuated like a balloon between heaven and earth, from which each of the rivers precipitated itself downwards towards its earthly source!"§

Verses 9 and 17.—"The tree of knowledge of good and evil." It can hardly be contended that this tree had a real and tangible existence. If it is so contended, then I ask—was it the unique specimen of its species, and did it only

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* Gesenius's Lexicon, p. 559.

† Asiatic Researches, vol. vi., p. 488.

‡ Genesis, p. 100; and Asiatic Researches, vol. vi., p. 486. See Macdonald's Creation and Fall, p. 335.

§ Jewish Antiquities, by the Rev. D. G. Wait, preface, p. 25

grow in that fabled Eden for whose site men have so long and vainly sought? Did any such tree now exist producing fruit the eating of which would give a knowledge of good and evil, it would afford a short and pleasant way of acquiring knowledge; but such trees only grow in children's stories, in Arabian Nights' tales, or in the myths of ignorant nations. But supposing the tree to be a literal tree, did Adam, from eating its fruit, acquire a knowledge of good and evil? If yes, then he had previously no such knowledge. Yet he was created by God in his image; was he in his ignorance the image of God? The word "image" cannot be intended as a corporeal likeness, because God is represented as an invisible spirit without body or parts. Besides which it has been rightly observed that if Adam was ignorant of the nature of evil, he ought not to have been condemned for a transgression he did not understand.* Priaulx says—"If man was ignorant of good and evil, how could God threaten him with punishment? For, with the conception of a punishment is involved the idea of some evil: and the very threat of punishment, therefore, when rational, presupposes in the being threatened a capacity to choose between, and consequently a knowledge of good and evil."†

It is difficult to refrain from ridiculing the statement that there exist real trees bearing knowledge-giving fruit, but admitting the statement as serious, it is even more difficult to comprehend why an all-wise, all-good God should plant a tree of knowledge and then inhibit man from partaking of its fruit.

Verses 19 and 20.—Lawrence‡ says that the representation of all the animals being brought before Adam to be named, is zoologically impossible. But this is consistent, notwithstanding, with the orthodox doctrine that it is theologically possible. He objects that there are animals from the frigid zone, and some of those of the torrid zone, which could hardly exist except on the soil and under the climatic conditions to which they were indigenous. That the food for the sustenance of

* See Bellamy, new translation, p. 10.
† Questiones Mosaicæ, 75.
‡ Lectures on Man, 9th edition, p. 169.

all the animals in the world could not easily have been collected at one point at one time. The devout readers know that a miracle would remove all these difficulties, and although no such miracle is recorded, the mere omission of it ought not to weigh against the text. It is further objected that either God knew beforehand what names Adam would give, or he is not omniscient, and that if he did know then Genesis is incorrect, as it says "he brought them to Adam to see what he would call them."

Verses 21 and 22.—Was the first man made with an extra rib? If yes, did God give him the rib in order that he might afterwards take it away? Or was the first man left with a rib deficient after the making of woman? Could not the Creator have made woman of the same materials as those of which the man had been previously formed? Bellamy denies the whole story of the rib, declaring it to be a mistranslation. His version does not in this instance seem to me reliable.

Chapter iii.—This chapter is really one of primary importance to the believer in Christ, as on the truth or falsity of its narrative rests the whole Christian scheme. In the history of the fall is contained the foundation stone for the much vaunted structure of redemption. Briefly summarised, the contents of the chapter are as follows:—Man and woman are in Eden's garden where grows the tree bearing the mystic fruit, which before woman's creation man had been positively forbidden to take. A most wonderful and unique serpent, subtle and suasive in speech, is created by Deity and permitted within the limits of the primal paradise. It is idle to object that no description of serpent has ever been discovered possessed of organs for speech, or that condemned now to crawl on its belly for punishment, it must have previously progressed in some utterly incomprehensible manner on its head, its tail, or its back. The serpent talks to the woman;* we appear in Genesis to have

* Priaulx asks—"But how did the serpent speak? Did he utter a serpent's mind with a serpent's hiss, or did he talk in good set terms? If we can suppose that the serpent was so like a seraph that Eve mistook him for a good angel, we can also easily suppose that he spoke very passable Hebrew."

only a fragment of the conversation; the remark of the serpent in verse 2 is apparently too abrupt for the commencement of an important dialogue by a subtle diplomatist. In fact, in the Hebrew, the opening words are even more abrupt than they appear in the authorised version, which has "Yea hath God said." Bellamy translates it—"But how hath God said?" Kalisch—"Hath indeed God said?" Such a form of speech obliges us to suppose some previous conversation relating to the matter and not reported in the text. However this may be, we are confined to the words of the Bible wherein the astute serpent declares to the woman that the threatened punishment of death need not be feared. The woman examines the God-created tree, she sees that God has made it "good for food" although not permitted to be eaten, "pleasant to the eyes" although a tree to be shunned and avoided because of its baneful influence on all human kind, "a tree to be desired to make one wise." How the woman could see this, is one of the mysteries of our holy and act-of-parliament-protected religion. The allurements of the tree, and the persuasion of the serpent are altogether too powerful. The woman gathers the fruit and eats; she gives to her husband also, who shares the repast. In chap. ii. v. 17 it says, "in the day thou shalt eat thereof thou shalt surely die." They did not die, but on the contrary were more alive than before hearing "the voice of the Lord God walking in the garden in the cool of the day;" "in the cool of the day, when the evening breeze arises, Jehova-Elohim walks forth to take his pleasure," the man and woman hide themselves from the Omnipresent amongst the trees. God the all-wise called to Adam saying, "Where art thou?"* Adam's answer is partially incorrect. He excuses himself for hiding on the ground of his nakedness, which must have been in some degree remedied by the fig leaf aprons. In answer to the accusing question, Adam,

* Can God be conceived as speaking? If yes, he must be conceived as possessed of the organs, on the using which articulate speech is possible. Yet to think of a Deity with mouth, tongue, larynx, &c., nevertheless, having neither body nor parts!

with true Biblical manliness, shifts the responsibility to the woman, and, by implication, to God himself. His answer and defence are, "The woman whom thou gavest to be with me, she gave me of the tree and I did eat." The woman in her turn fairly says that she was beguiled and did eat. God then curses the beguiling serpent which he himself had created so fitted to beguile and so intended to beguile. God then decrees subjection to the woman and sorrow in the bringing forth of her offspring, finishing with cursing Adam by cursing the ground. In the orthodox statement of the fall there is an evident contradiction between the hypothesis and the fact, for Adam is represented as originally upright and obedient to God, and at the same time as disobedient. The alleged perfection of moral nature given by God to man ought, if true, to have been a guarantee against man's fall. His imperfection and weakness are well shown by his fall without any show of resistance on the very first temptation. The Christian doctrine is that by the one man Adam's fall, sin, suffering, and death entered into the world. (See Romans v., 12 and 17; 1 Corinthians xv., 21 and 22.)

I cannot do better in order to illustrate this doctrine than quote from a pamphlet by the well known author of the treatise on "The Necessary Existence of Deity."* He regards Hugh Miller as proving—1. That animal life existed on this earth untold ages before man appeared, and, ever since animal life began, there existed carnivora which could not live but by the death of their neighbours. 2. Those destroying animals were not only prepared to kill and devour each other, but were besides furnished with organs for the express purpose of torturing each other.† 3. That those destructive and torturing animals—existing as they

* The Theology of Geologists, by W. Gillespie.

† Hugh Miller instances the sting of the Pleuracanthus Lævissimus of the coal measures, a plate of which, half natural size, he gives on p. 72 of the "Testimony of the Rocks." "It was sharp and polished as a stiletto, but from its rounded form and dense structure, of great strength; and along two of its sides, from the taper point to within a few inches of the base, there was a thickly set row of barls, hooked downwards, like the thorns that bristle on the young shoots of the wild rose, and which must have rendered it a weapon not merely of destruction but of torture."

did before man, and, therefore, standing in no dependent relations to man's sin—came directly, of course, from the hands of the Creator, who thus made those destructive and torturing animals for his mere good pleasure. 4. That this creator is the God of the Old Testament. 5. The fact of those carnivora, existing anterior to the introduction of man upon our planet, is entirely at variance with the sentiments of those who hold (what the Bible categorically states) that there is such a connection between suffering and sin, that there could have been no suffering (physical evil) had there been no sin (moral evil) in the world. 6. The matter of fact always determining the question of right, whatever the Creator, whom this sort of geologist discovers, does, is right, simply because he does it. The creation of all manner of physical suffering among the lower animals, including, of course, exquisite torture, is right, simply because the suffering had existence [at God's fiat.]

Chap. iii., verse 7.—"They sewed fig leaves together and made themselves aprons." Bellamy says that at this period there were no implements to enable them to perform the operation of sewing; and admitting that there had been such things as needles, if the fig leaves were the same then as now, they were not of a nature and texture capable of holding together by such a process.

Man being cursed is expelled from the garden of Eden lest, as the Lord God says, "man having become as one of us," "he should take also of the tree of life and eat and live for ever;" and then the Lord placed at the east of the garden of Eden "cherubims and a flaming sword which turned every way." According to this, unless Adam got at the tree of life in some unrecorded fashion, he will not live for ever, and the doctrine of eternal torment will not apply to him, the chief sinner. Does the text mean that if Adam had taken of the tree of life before his expulsion, or had taken it by regaining admittance to Eden after he had been driven forth, then that he would have lived for ever despite the decree of the Omnipotent? If yes, then the tree has greater influence than the Almighty, and if not, then the text is a confused jumble of contradictions.

The first chapters of Genesis were classed, according to a Jewish rule, with the Song of Solomon, and the beginning and end of Ezekiel, the reading of which was forbidden to all Jews who had not attained to a certain age (according to some twenty-five, according to others thirty years.)* In Psalm xviii., v. 11, we are told that God "rode upon a cherub, and did fly." Michaelis compares the cherubs with the *equi tonantes,* thundering horses, of the Greeks. Eichorn makes them as the griffins of the Persians, guardians of the gold-producing mountains.† For a description of these cherubim, I must refer the reader to Exodus chap. xxv. 18 to 22; xxxvii. 7 to 9; 1 Kings vi. 23 to 28; 2 Chronicles iii. 10 to 13; Ezekiel i. 5 to 11; x., 9, 14, 21. 22. The Rev. Mr. Parkhurst, in defiance of the Decalogue, has obliged us with an engraving of two cherubs, who are represented standing on the top of the ark, in a vastly uncomfortable fashion, each on the only leg it possesses. Certainly these would be strange guardians for the tree of life. But why only place them on the East of Eden? Are the north, south, and west sides unguarded? Many fathers of the Church and Rabbis of the Synagogue have been of opinion that the fall never really occurred as recorded in the Bible.‡ Origen says—"What rational man will believe that God, like a husbandman, planted a garden, and in it a real tree of life to be tasted? or that the knowledge of good and evil was to be obtained by eating the fruit of another tree? And as to God's walking in the garden, and Adam's hiding himself from him amongst the trees, no man can doubt but that these things are to be understood figuratively, and not literally." St. Austin, of the three first chapters of Genesis, says, "no Christian will say they are not to be understood figuratively." Philo says, "they are figurative descriptions, leading us to allegorical and recondite senses, to which, if any one rationally attends, he will see that the serpent is used for the emblem

* Carpsovii's Veteris Testamenti, quoted by Macdonald, p. 11.

† Gesenius's Lexicon, Bagster's edition, p. 415; but see Eichorn's edition of Simonis' Lexicon, p. 826, vol. i.; and Wait's Jewish Antiquities, p. 145.

‡ Bellamy's new translation, p. 15

of sensual pleasure." Rabbi Maimonides says "that these things were not so literally understood." He taught also that "every part of Scripture admitted of various and even contrary interpretations," and that "if a passage in its literal sense were found repugnant to reason, although clearly expressed, it ought to be translated figuratively."*

Josephus† says "that at the time the serpent talked to Eve all living creatures had one language." That "when God came into the garden, Adam, who was wont before to come and converse with him, being conscious of his wicked behaviour, went out of the way; *this surprised God*, and he inquired the cause." That God "deprived the serpent of speech out of indignation at his malicious disposition towards Adam," and when he had deprived him (the serpent) of the use of his feet, he made him go rolling all along, and dragging himself upon the ground.

Chap. iv., v. 5.—Why did God accept the offering of Abel? Why reject that of Cain? Cain brought as offering the fruits of the field; Abel slaughtered the firstlings of his flock, and offered to the Creator a sacrifice stained with blood. Who was it that taught these two brothers that God needed sacrifice? Who explained to them what the sacrifice should be? The laws as to sacrifice do not appear to have been given before Moses. Why should the God who said "I delight not in the blood of bullocks, or of lambs, or of hegoats," why should he have respect unto the offering of Abel, and not unto that of Cain? How was the preference manifested? How did Cain know that God preferred Abel? On all these points the text is silent, leaving the wider range for the faith of the true believer. Should not God look with greater benevolence upon a vegetable offering produced with sweat and toil from the stubborn earth which had just been laden with the curse of sterility, than upon the mangled carcases of the firstlings of the flock? Or is this narrative to be taken as emblematical of Judaism, with its fierce and brutal propa-

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* Spinoza's Tractatus Theologico Politicus, cap. 7, sec. 75, quoting More Nebuchim, cap. 25, part ii.

† Antiquities of the Jews, Book i., cap. i., sec. 4.

ganda; with its bloody pilgrimage from Egypt to Canaan, and of Christianity, with its God-sacrificed God, nailed on a cross, spear-pierced in his side, the immortal bleeding to death, that we may no longer die? In Leviticus, chap. ii., v. 14, the very kind of sacrifice is commanded which was rejected when brought by Cain.

Verse 8.—"And Cain talked with Abel his brother." In reference to this verse, and as illustrating the spirit in which the translators dealt with what they would have us believe to be God's most holy word, it is not inappropriate to quote the words of the Rev. Dr. Wall.* He is speaking of various faults in the text, and having dealt with two classes, he proceeds—"But those of the class next to be noticed, are of a nature decidedly objectionable, as having arisen from an effort to conceal blemishes in the existing condition of the Hebrew text—an effort which led the translators, not only to a partial suppression of the truth in the cases referred to, but still further, to at times its positive misrepresentation.'

. . . An example of the kind of fault I am now complaining of, occurs in Genesis, chap. iv., v. 8., "And Cain talked with Abel his brother; and it came to pass when they were in the field, that Cain rose up against his brother Abel and slew him." Here no chasm appears; yet the context of the original passage clearly shows one, as may be perceived at once from its first clause, ויאמר (UIAMeR) קין (KaIN) אל (AL) הבל (EBeL) אחיו (AChIU) signifying literally, "and Cain said to Abel his brother"—a statement which obviously implies that some words used by Cain on this occasion originally followed in the text, which are no longer to be found in it. Accordingly a vacant space is left immediately after this clause in several Hebrew MSS., more than twenty of which have been specified by Kennicott, and the Masorets, to whose authority our translators elsewhere pay the greatest deference, have not only inserted here in their edition of the text a mark of something being omitted, but have also added the observation that there are twenty-eight such blanks in the middle of verses in the sacred record.

* Grounds for Revision of the Authorised Version, p. 102, but see contra Kalisch, 140 Genesis. Bellamy, New Translation, p. 27.

The first quarrel appears to originate in a religious difference. On questions of religion how many quarrels have since racked the world! At the first altar erected to a God, to whom the attributes of infinite love and mercy are attributed, the two sole worshippers are taught to hate each other. How many steeples have since surmounted roofs covering crowds of worshippers, whose fanatical zeal prompts them to fiendish cruelties against their fellow men! The eleventh and twelfth centuries of our era, with the glorious Christian crusades for their chief feature, present to us a historical tableau on which none but the most ignorantly pious can look without a shudder.

The question, "Where is Abel thy brother?" was one which God the All-wise did not need to put, and of the answer to which he was well aware before putting it. The declaration of Cain in v. 13, "every one that findeth me shall slay me," is a most extraordinary one, especially when it is considered that if the Bible narrative of Adam and Eve's creation be accepted, then Cain's father and mother were the only living human beings on the face of the earth. It may fairly be answered that Cain may not know how far the earth was peopled, and this, notwithstanding that his father had tasted of the fruit of the tree of knowledge, but even admitting this, it does not account for God sharing Cain's error, and setting a mark on Cain, lest any one finding him should kill him. Bellamy* declares, quoting Dodd, that the population of the world at the death of Abel, according to a fair calculation, must have amounted to many millions. This is, however, a monstrous assertion, for the text, Genesis, chap. iv., v. 25, distinctly states that Seth was not born until after the killing of Abel by Cain.

Verse 13.—In the Douay version Cain is made to say that his sin is too great for pardon. In our version he complains that the punishment is greater than he can bear. Bellamy translates it, "Great is my iniquity to be forgiven.'

Verse 16.—"Cain went out of the presence of the Lord." Despite Psalm cxxxxi., vv. 7 to 12, the writers of the early Hebrew books always speak of the God of the Jews as if he

* New Translation, p. 29.

were a localised and limited Deity. Cain goes east, Adam left Eden for the same direction. Is it in the east that the Lord is not? Cain dwelt in the land of Nod. As the situation of Eden is yet unsettled, and as the only clue we have to Nod is that it was on the east of Eden, it is useless to follow the various writers who have placed it at different parts of the world, through their lengthy dissertations, ending in nothing. Bellamy remarks that there is no land of Nod at all, but that the text means that Cain wandered about.

Verse 17.—Cain's taking a wife is here spoken of as though his marrying was the ordinary and natural event, but as according to the Bible narrative, there was yet no woman but his mother Eve, the statement is at least a startling one, as is the declaration that he built a city when there would only be himself, his wife, and son, to inhabit it.

The Roman Catholic Church teaches in a foot-note to the Douay Bible, that Cain's wife was his own sister, and a daughter of Adam, and that God permitted such marriages in the beginning of the world as otherwise mankind could not have been propagated. It is fair to inquire how Cain could have ever married his sister before she was born. Adam is not said to have had any daughter until after the birth of Seth.

Verse 26.—"Called his name Enos, then began men to call upon the name of the Lord." Bellamy translates this "called his name Enos, who began to profane in the name of Jehovah," and he says that Adam's grandson was one of the earliest idolatirs, and quotes Maomonides as supporting this opinion.* Clericus and Michaelis render it "then they began to call themselves by the name of God." Onkelos, and others, "they began to desecrate the divine name by calling the idols Gods." The Douay gives it, "this man began to call upon the name of the Lord." In an edition of the Breeches Bible printed in 1589, the translators use the language of our version, and say in a marginal note "In these days God began to move the breasts of the godly to restore religion which a long time by the wicked had been suppressed." When learned translators and commentators so differ, is it safer to believe that Enos was an idolator, or

* New Translation, p. 32. Kalisch, Genesis, 154.

that he was a pious man? Perhaps, after all, the distinction is not very great between worshipping the God of the Bible and worshipping an idol.

Chap. v., v. 2.—"Called their name Adam." Kalisch gives this, "called their name man." This verse seems to use "Adam" as the name for all the first created men and women, rather than as the proper name of one man. Bellamy says that Adam appears to be a general term for the human race. The supporters of the document theory alluded to on page 12, urge that the fifth chapter is a continuation from chap. ii., verse 3. It is at least remarkable, that neither Cain, nor Abel, nor the descendants of Cain are referred to in this chapter. The wise translators of the Breeches Bible say that by giving male and female the one name "Adam," God noteth the inseparable conjunction of man and wife!

Verse 3.—"And Adam lived 130 years," and begat Seth. According to Josephus, Adam was 230 years of age before Seth was born. The extraordinary ages assigned in this chapter, have been already alluded to in page 22. Luke Burke* presents the following table, founded on this chapter, of the patriarchal ages from Adam to Noah, according to the Samaritan, Hebrew, and Septuagint version:—

	Before Generation.		
	Hebrew	Samaritan	Josephus & Septuagint
Adam	130	130	230
Seth	155	105	205
Enos	90	90	190
Canaan	70	70	170
Mahaleel	65	65	165
Jared	162	62	162
Enoch	65	65	165
Methuselah	187	67	167 or 187
Lamech	182	53	188 or 182
Noah	500	500	500
Added century	100	100	100
Deluge	1656	1307	2242

* *Ethnological Journal*, p. 16

Josephus very *naïvely* remarks, "Let no one inquire into the deaths of these men, but let him have regard to their births only." Colenso says,* "If according to the Septuagint, Methusaleh was 167 years of age at the birth of his son, he must have been 355 years at the birth of Noah, consequently when the flood took place in the 600th year of Noah's life, he would have been only 995 years old, so that he would have overlived the flood fourteen years. See page 23."

Mr. Burke, after giving the above quoted table, adds, "The writer has here within a very brief compass an amount of disagreement probably without parallel." Whence can it arise? Not certainly from any peculiar difficulty or obscurity in the original texts. Neither in the originals, nor in the generality of copies, are the numbers anywhere expressed by letters or characters, but written out fully in words. Yet in the case before us, we have, to say nothing of minor variations, a difference of 349 years between the Hebrew and Samaritan dates of the deluge, and a difference of no less than 935 years between the Septuagint and the Samaritan. And these discrepancies not produced by a single passage, but resulting from the gradual accumulation of minor differences. As to various versions the reader is referred for information to Horne's Introduction, p. 85.

Verse 24.—"And Enoch walked with God *and he was not.*" The Breeches Bible has it, "and he was no more seen," and adds in the marginal note, that "to inquire where he became is mere curiosity." It is curious that Enoch's 365 years correspond exactly to the days of the solar year. Some seek to identify Enoch with Anakos, the Phrygian sage, who was translated to heaven.

It is worthy notice† that the names run in—

CHAP. IV., V. 18.	CHAP. V., V. 15.
Enoch,	Mahalaleel,
Irad,	Jared,
Mehujael,	Enoch,
Methusael,	Methusaleh,
Lamech.	Lamech.

* Pentateuch, Part 4, p. 166. † De Wette, Books of Moses, sec. 150.

See on this point Priaulx "Questiones Mosiacæ," p. 159, and Kalisch, Genesis, p. 162. Some urge that one list is a corrupted version of the other, three of the names being reversed. The generations of Adam as well as the two accounts of the creation summarised in page 21, are urged, as strong evidence against the Mosaic authority of Genesis, and consequently of the whole Pentateuch, of which, according to the orthodox notion, Moses was the actual writer. It may not be improper, therefore, in this place to deal with the general question of the Mosaic authorship of Genesis, and in fact with the authorship of the Pentateuch, leaving the special illustrations arising on particular texts, to be dealt with as those texts are reached in their order. The question of disputed authorship is not confined to the first book, or first five books, but extends to the whole Bible. Spinoza says,* "Of the authors, or if you please, writers, of many of the books, we either know almost nothing, or we entertain grave doubts as to the correctness with which the several books are ascribed to the parties whose names they bear. Then we neither know upon what occasion, nor at what time those books were indited, the writers of which are unknown to us. Further, we know nothing of the hands into which the books fell; nor of the codicils which have furnished such a variety of reading, nor whether perchance there were not many other variations in other copies." Peyrere followed Spinoza, and said, "God suffered the autographs to perish, and only very imperfect copies to come down to us."† In the apocryphal book of Esdras, it is distinctly stated that in consequence of the "law being burnt,"‡ Esdras took five rapid writers, and shut himself up forty days, so that they might "write all that had been done in the world since the beginning," and it is alleged that these having "understanding given them by the highest," wrote in forty days 204 books of things "which they knew not." Eusebius, after speaking of the wonderful unanimity of the translators of the Septuagint, who were alleged to have been shut up in seventy-two separate cells and without inter-

* Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, p. 158, Latin edition, chap. vii., sec. 58.

† De Wette, vol. i., div. i., sec 84.

‡ Esdras, c. xiv., v. 31

course to each other, to have made the whole translation in just the same words and letters, quoted from Irenæus—"Neither was it anything extraordinary that God should have done this, who, indeed, in the captivity under Nebuchadnezzar *when their scripture had been destroyed*, and the Jews returned to their country after seventy years, in the time of Artaxerxes, King of the Persians, *he inspired Esdras, the priest of the tribe of Levi, to compose anew all the discourses of the ancient prophets, and to restore to the people the laws given them by Moses.*"*

Bishop Colenso, after referring to a number of texts, which will be dealt with hereafter, says—"It is quite possible, and, indeed, so far as our present inquiries have gone, highly probable that Moses may be an historical character—that is to say, it is probable that legendary stories, connected with his name, of some remarkable movement in former days, may have existed among the Hebrew tribes, and these legends may have formed the foundation of the narrative. But this is merely conjectural. The result of our inquiries, as far as we have proceeded, is that such a narrative as that which is contained in the Pentateuch could not have been written in the age of Moses or for some time afterwards." Sharpe says of Genesis†—"We have no account of when this first of the Hebrew books was written, or by whom. It has been called one of the Books of Moses, and some small part of it may have been written by that great lawgiver and leader of the Israelites. But it is the work of various authors and of various ages." Michel Nicolas says,‡ quoting as his authorities Esdras, Irenæus, Jerome, and Augustine, "that there was a tradition generally received amongst the Israelites, that Esdras had been the restorer of the Mosaic writing, which had suffered great damage at the destruction of the Jewish kingdom, and which writings, according to some, had even been totally destroyed." "St. Jerome held it indifferent to regard the Pentateuch as the work of Moses, or as retouched and put

* Ecclesiastical History, book v., cap. viii., Cruse's translation, p. 171.

† Historic Notes on the Old and New Testament, Moxon, 1854, p. 6.

‡ Etudes critiques sur la Bible—Ancien Testament, p. 2.

in order by Ezra." Nicolas adds that although the Protestants have more firmly insisted on Moses as the author of the five books than have their Catholic brethren, yet it is amongst the Protestants that the first doubts were raised amongst the Christian public as to the authorship. In the earliest times of the reformers, Carlstadt declared that it was possible to sustain that Moses was not the author of the Pentateuch. In 1753 Dr. Astruc first urged the document theory referred to on page 12; he believed himself able to distinguish twelve different documents, of which he called the two principal the Elohistic and Jehovistic, from the recurrence of one of those names in the one and not in the other. Notwithstanding this, Astruc considered Moses the editor of Genesis, but argued that he had united in one volume a number of totally different and pre-existing documents. J. S. Vater elaborated Astruc's theory, and subjected the text to a much more careful and critical examination, the result of which was that he confirmed Astruc's opinion that several pre-existing and fragmentary documents were used in the composition of the Pentateuch, but he denied that Moses was the collector and editor or author of the five books, although he conceded that many portions might have been written by Moses. His opinion was, in fact, that the Pentateuch was made up of various documents imperfectly and sometimes improperly joined together. Dr. Colenso,* following the German school, has elaborated the document theory more fully than any other English writer, and concludes that the early chapters of Genesis must have had different authors. The Rev. Dr. Giles argues that the internal evidence furnished by the Pentateuch, shows that Moses is not its author, and that external evidence obtained from various sources leads to the same conclusion.†

Kurtz,‡ writing to prove that the whole Pentateuch as at present existing is from the hand of Moses, at last admits that the results of his examination have convinced him that several authors have taken part in the compostion of the Pentateuch. Ewald, who commenced by asserting one author for Genesis, now admits that more than one hand

* Pentateuch, part iv., cap. iii.
† Hebrew Records, p. 118.
‡ Colenso, part iv., p. 15.

may be traced in the book. Delitzch, while contending for Moses, admits other authors and the employment of pre-existing documents. Spinoza distinctly declares that the original writings of Moses [if they ever existed] are no longer extant, and that the present books of the Old Testament are a selection from a greater number finally put together, and approved by a Council of Pharisees, so that it depended on the votes of certain Rabbis whether or no a particular Hebrew Book was or was not God's revelation to his people. It is quite certain that if Moses wrote the Pentateuch he did not write it in the square-letter Hebrew, which is comparatively a modern language, and which did not exist in his time. It is not contended that any other language was used by Moses, and there is no pretence for carrying modern Hebrew, or any proof in favour of carrying ancient Hebrew as a language with written characters to such a period as that assigned to Moses. It is hardly possible that any work so voluminous as the Pentateuch could have been graven on stone in hieroglyph and carried about on the Levite's shoulders in the ark, yet this is the only depository assigned to the Mosaic books.

De Wette says—"Without doubt it (the ancient Hebrew) originated in the land (of Canaan), or was still further developed therein after the Hebrew and other Canaanitish people had immigrated thither from the mother country"*—and he regards Hebrew, Arabic, and Aramean as branches from a common stem. In what language, then, is Moses to be supposed to have written? Some of the Talmudists taught that the ancient Hebrew language became entirely extinct during the captivity. Genesis itself does not speak of writing amongst the patriarchs; on the contrary, remarkable events were chronicled by the help of heaps of stones, trees, altars, &c., which were named after the events. The first allegation of writing is on the tables of stone, but surely this, if written, was not in Hebrew characters. The Hebrews had been slaves to the Egyptians, and might have gathered from them some of the hieroglyph lore of that age, but surely nothing more can be claimed for the ignorant slaves than was in use amongst their educated masters. De Wette

* De Wette on the Old Testament, part 2, secs. 30 and 35.

says*—"The opinion that Moses composed these books is not only opposed by all the signs of a later date, which occur in the book itself, but also by the entire analogy of the history of Hebrew literature and language."

Chap. vi.—"The sons of God seeing the daughters of men that they were fair, took to themselves wives." Amongst all peoples, or nearly all, the mythologies delight in the love of gods and women, and men and goddesses. Voltaire says—"No nation has ever existed, unless perhaps we may except China, in which some God is not described as having had offspring upon women. These corporeal Gods frequently descended to visit their dominions upon earth; they saw the daughters of men, and attached themselves to those who were most interesting and beautiful; the issue of this connexion between Gods and mortals must, of course, have been superior to other men, thus giants were produced." The incarnation of Jesus, in consequence of the visit of the Angel Gabriel to the Virgin Mary, is but another phase of the same myth. The Greek and Hindoo mythologies furnish similar examples.

Verse 3.—"My spirit shall not always strive with man for that he also is flesh." Bellamy says that this translation makes it appear that God is flesh, and he renders it—"My spirit shall not strive with man for ever, because that he moreover is flesh." The Douay puts it—"My spirit shall not remain in man for ever, because he is flesh." Kalisch translates it—"My spirit shall not always preside in man while he is also flesh." The Breeches Bible gives—"My spirit shall not always strive with man, because he is but flesh." Which of these is the correct translation? That the spirit of God, the all-powerful, should strive with finite man for any period seems absurd.

Verse 4.—The "giants" of this verse are translated by Bellamy into "Apostates." The word is נְפִלִים (NePheLIM) from Nephel, "to fall," and might be translated "fallen ones."† Bellamy says—"The Septuagint translate the word by *gigantes*, which means earthborn, but the translators, without attending to the original word, have trans-

* Books of Moses, sec. 163.

† Gesenius' Hebrew Lexicon, 537; Parkhurst's do., 458; Simonis, 1036; Bellamy, p. 36.

lated it by "giants." The translators and revisors have followed the Greek and the Vulgate, which accounts for the errors in all the modern translations.

Verse 6.—"And it repented the Lord that he had made man on the earth, and it grieved him at his heart." The Douay Bible puts in a foot note—"God, who is unchangeable, is not capable of repentance, grief, or any other passion. But these expressions are used to declare the enormity of the sins of men, which was so provoking as to determine the Creator to destroy these his creatures whom before he had so much favoured. In Numbers, c. xxiii., v. 19, it says—"God is not a man, that he should lie; neither the son of man, that he should repent: hath he said, and shall he not do it? or hath he spoken, and shall he not make it good?" The epistle of James, c. i., v. 17, speaks of the "Father of lights, with whom is no variableness, neither shadow of turning." In Malachi, c. iii., v. 6, we find—"For I am the Lord, I change not." Bellamy translates the verse 6 above quoted—"And Jehovah was satisfied that he had made the man on the earth, notwithstanding he idolised himself at his heart," and he urges at considerable length that the words "repented" and "grieved" ought not to be in the text.* It is useless to do more in this place than regret that there should be so much room for difference as to the meaning of Hebrew words, when our salvation is said to depend on the rightly understanding their signification. Taking the text as it stands in our version, it is hard to understand how God, the immutable, could be affected to grief by an event. It is the knowledge of an event which causes grief; but if God be omniscient, he always knew of man's wickedness, and was therefore always grieved by it, and if the foreknowledge of man's wickedness caused God to repent that he had made man, then, as God's knowledge is unvarying, it must have caused God to repent that he was to create man eternities of ages before he actually created him.

It cannot be forgotten that if God made man, he also created all his surroundings, and must, if all-wise, have foreknown the effect these would produce on man's conduct.

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* New Translation, p. 37

Either God had not the power to arrange things differently, in which case he is not omnipotent; or he was careless as to man's well-being, in which case he is not all-good.

Verse 7.—That God should repent that he had made the beasts, birds, and creeping things, and should determine to destroy them, because man had acted wickedly, is a most monstrous supposition, if God is to be considered as just and good. The threat of destruction does not, in form of words, include the fish of the sea, nor do they appear to have been considered by the writer of this portion of Genesis as destroyed by the deluge. Why should there be an exception in favour of the fishes? It is remarked by many critics that the "fish also in the rivers and fresh-water lakes must almost all have died, as soon as the salt-water of the sea broke in, and rendered them brackish. And, as the flood still increased, and the waters of the sea began to lose their saltness, the fish in the sea and the shellfish on the shore must also have perished. The writer of Genesis certainly did not anticipate the destruction of the fishes; for he makes no provision for the preservation of any of their species.

Kalisch confirms this, and adds—"It has been conjectured that the spawn of fishes might have been preserved, even if the living individuals perished; but the spawn would, in an universal deluge, have lost its vitality, or have developed into fishes long before the expiration of the year; so that these individuals also would have perished." In our version verse 7 ends with the words, "For it repenteth me that I have made them." Bellamy translates it—"Yet I am satisfied that I have made them."

Verse 14.—"Make thee an ark of gopher-wood: rooms shalt thou make in the ark, and shalt pitch it within and without with pitch." Kalisch, in thus agreeing with Genesis, p. 734, makes the word קִנִּים (KeNIM) "cells," rendering it—"In cells shalt thou make the ark." The word is plural, signifying some hollow receptacles, as nests, cells, cabins, &c. (See Parkhurst, p. 645.) The Douay puts it—"Thou shalt make little rooms in the ark." If these were to divide the animals, the space would be much diminished thereby. Bellamy declares, p. 41, that the word *Kenim* only means the two rooms for sacrifice; and he renders this

verse, "Make for thee an ark of the wood of gopher; rooms shalt thou make in the ark: for thou shalt expiate in it, even a house, also with an outer room for atonement." Our translators give "pitch within" and "pitch without," for that which Bellamy renders "sacrifice" and "atonement." Bellamy writes in wrath, charging the error on imperfect translations which grew from bad to worse until the time of Jerome, who, in the fourth century, endeavoured with the help of a Jew who did not understand Latin, to amend the earlier Latin versions.

He adds*—"How far he succeeded in removing the errors of the first translators, we are all judges: for, from the copy of Jerome the Latin Vulgate made its appearance; and from this contaminated source all the European translations have been made—for sixteen centuries no translation of the sacred Scriptures has been made from the original Hebrew only. Even in the reigns of Elizabeth and James, when the old translation was revised, no appeal was made to the Hebrew." The word which is always used, and which is the proper word for pitch, is זֶפֶת (ZePeTh) used twice in Isaiah, xxxiv. 9—"And the streams thereof shall be turned into pitch, and the dust thereof into brimstone, and the land thereof shall become burning pitch," and once in Exodus, c. iii., v. 2. The word כֹּפֶר (KePeR), which the translators have rendered pitch, is not thus translated in any other part of the Bible."

What a curious language this Hebrew, if "atonement" may be converted into "pitch," or *vice versa!* The wood of the ark would be but a fragile enclosure to many of the animals, who, during a year's imprisonment therein, would gnaw a considerable number of holes in various parts of the vessel.

Verse 15.—"The length of the ark shall be three hundred cubits, the breadth of it fifty cubits, and the height of it thirty cubits." Hugh Miller† makes the ark 450 feet long, 75 feet broad, and 45 feet high. Dr. Kitto increases this to

* New Translation, p. 41. Jerome, quoted by De Wette, says—"For the most part among the Latins there are as many different Bibles as copies of the Bible, for every man has added or substracted, according to his caprice, as he saw fit."

† Testimony of the Rocks, p. 321.

547 feet in length and to 96 feet in breadth. Kalisch says, "The cubit is the length of the forearm from the elbow to the extremity of the longest finger." It is unquestionable that if the dimensions above given are arbitrary—that is, if the ark were 50 cubits broad in every part from end to end —then the ark as a floating vessel, fit to swim out such a deluge, is simply architecturally impossible. Then that Noah, even with the assistance of his family, could construct the ark, and that when constructed it would contain all the animals and their food, are statements contradicted by the probabilities of the case. The ark was to contain one pair of every unclean species, and sevens or seven pairs of every clean species.* Now there are already known upwards of 1600 species of mammalia, including at least two distinct kinds of elephant, so that there must have been at least four elephants in the ark; there are seven different species of rhinoceros, so that at least fourteen of these bulky animals must have been present. The bison, buffalo, and ox furnish twenty species of huge animals, of whom either 140 or 280 (seven, or seven pairs) representatives were to be contained in the ark; the sheep, 27 species, either 189 or 378; the goats, the same as the oxen; the deer, 51 species, give either 357 or 714; antelopes, 48 species, either 336 or 672. These are only a few of the illustrations as to large bodied animals, and might be enlarged with the various kinds of horses, lions, tigers, &c., the whole forming an enormous sum total. Then there are the birds, some of the large winged species requiring an extremely wide space to occasionally stretch themselves in. Then as to the insects, which were estimated in 1842 to consist of no fewer than 550,000 species. How could these all be brought to one centre and kept there? Many have no wings, and but feeble powers of locomotion, many live only a few hours or days after obtaining their wings, and there are myriads able to subsist only on plants found in limited botanic centres. To invent a miracle to answer the objection is but adding a difficulty rather than removing one. Some of the aquatic birds would habitually require water, yet no reservoirs or swimming tanks are provided. Many animals live only in a

* Kalisch, Genesis, p. 211. Miller, Test. of Rocks, p. 328, etc.

certain zone, and perish if suddenly transported to an entirely different climate. Were all the laws of physiology interfered with to enable the animals to live? No such miracle is recorded.

Verse 16.—"A window shalt thou make to the ark, and in a cubit shalt thou finish it above; and the door of the ark shalt thou set in the side thereof; with lower, second, and third stories shalt thou make it." Was there only one window to the ark? If yes, where was it placed, and what was its size? The Douay has, "In a cubit thou shalt finish the top of it," and this at first sight agrees with Bellamy, who says, "Moreover of a cubit thou shalt finish it at the summit;" but Bellamy declares that it was the ark and not the window which was to be narrowed to a cubit at the top of the roof. One window, wherever placed, and of whatever reasonable size, could not possibly light the whole three storied vessel, even tolerably, and yet one window, apparently a cubit wide at the top, closed, I suppose, during the rain, and one door, necessarily closed during the flood, are the only apparent means of ventilation and light. The door was most certainly closed, for we are told that God shut Noah in the ark. The window appears as certainly to have been closed for forty days until Noah opened it to send out the raven.

Verses 19 and 20.—"And of every living thing of all flesh, two of every sort shalt thou bring into the ark, to keep them alive with thee; they shall be male and female. Of fowls after their kind, and of cattle after their kind, of every creeping thing of the earth after his kind; two of every sort shall come unto thee, to keep them alive.' These should be compared with chap. vii., verses 2 and 3:—"Of every clean beast thou shalt take to thee by sevens,* the male and his female; and of beasts that are not clean by two, the male and his female. Of fowls also of the air by sevens, the male and the female; to keep seed alive upon the face of all the earth." If taken as written by one pen, these passages contradict each other as to the number of animals to be taken into the ark; and those who support the document theory refer to these verses as illustrations

* The Douay has "seven and seven" of the clean.

of the doctrine that several documents, and these of an incongruous character, have been used in the compilation of Genesis. The seven and two story is alleged to be a fragment of the Jehovah Document, and the "two of every sort" a portion of the Elohim Document.* Kalisch says, "But after even it had been mentioned that Noah had executed all that God had commanded him (vi. 22), the text not only repeats in the first ten verses of the seventh chapter several of the statements already distinctly made, but, what is more important, is in one point irreconcilable with the preceding narrative. Noah was commanded to take into the ark seven pairs of all clean, and one pair of all unclean; whereas he had before been ordered to take one pair of every species, no distinction whatever between clean and unclean animals having been made. All the attempts at arguing away this discrepancy have been utterly unsuccessful." It is puzzling, as the animals were not divided into clean and unclean until the commandments given to Moses, how Noah was to distinguish between the kinds.

Verse 21.—"And take thou unto thee of all food that is eaten, and thou shalt gather it to thee; and it shall be for food for thee, and for them." This injunction to Noah is a most extraordinary one: he is to go out through the length and breadth of the earth and gather food for himself and the pairs saved. Did he select spare animals as food for the carnivorous beasts, birds, and reptiles? If yes, how is it these are not mentioned? Did he and his three sons go out to collect fish for those birds and beasts, whose diet they are? If yes, how did he preserve them in the ark? Did these animals intended for food come to Noah voluntarily? If yes, where is this miracle alleged? Or did he and his family, in addition to their ark-building labour, have to hunt and fish in order to procure more than twelve months' food for the animals saved from drowning? Then for the birds and other animals whose food consists of the moths, grubs, worms, and other members of the insect kingdom. Did Noah go out to collect these? If yes, where were all these living things intended for food stored when collected, taking into account that some members of the

* De Wette, Books of Moses, § 150. Kalisch, Genesis, p. 183

food store would be inclined to eat their fellows? Then the vegetable food, the green and preserved fodder, the growing vegetables and flowers for those insects and birds, which cannot live without them. How are these accounted for? There is no mention of a garden or plantation in the ark, or of water provided to quench the thirst of the animals preserved. Priaulx says—"The Elohim gives Noah instructions to build an ark, and instructions which pretty clearly show that Noah knew nothing of shipbuilding; and yet follow these instructions to the letter—build the vessel to order and load it as this ark was loaded, and it would not, and could not, float; unless, indeed, you built it on a raft. But, however, let the ark be built—let it float—how then do you provide light and air for the crowds within the cells of its several stories? How do you cleanse off the impurities of this Augean stable? And how, with a crew of eight persons only, do you manage daily to supply so many animals, all so different in their habits, with their just proportions of wholesome food?"

Chap vii., v. 11.—"In the six hundredth year of Noah's life, in the second month, the seventeenth day of the month, the same day." Josephus makes the flood commence either 600 or one thousand years and ten days later than our Bible; for he says it began on the 27th day of the month and 2656 years from Adam. In his additions of the ages immediately after he only makes this 2256 years.* In dealing with the chronologies, Josephus quaintly observes —"Let every one look upon them as he sees fit."

Verse 11.—"The fountains of the great deep broken up, and the windows of heaven were opened." The Douay makes "windows" into flood-gates. It is evident that the writer thought of the waters above the firmament (heaven), which, according to him, could only be let down on to the doomed earth by opening some window or flood-gate through which they might pass (see page 14). The same language is used in chap. viii., v. 2.—"The fountains also of the deep and the windows of heaven were stopped, and the rain from heaven was restrained." The notion of supplies obtained from the deep to deluge the earth is charming in its sim-

* Antiquities, Book 1, cap 3

plicity—as if emptying an ocean or lake, however deep, could do more than result in a partial and temporary submergence of other land than the ocean-bed left bare by the receding waters. The idea of windows in heaven to let out the water is scarcely less absurd.

Kalisch, in stating the difficulties of the deluge story, says*—"The waters are represented to have covered the earth to the height of fifteen cubits above the tops of the mountains. This would require, at least, eight times the aggregate quantity of water contained in all the seas and oceans of the earth. But the rain can, even if the clouds at once discharge all their stores, cause a water-sheet of only a few inches in thickness; and the sea might spread its floods over the earth, but it does not thereby increase the actual amount of water. The sudden addition of so great a mass of water would materially change the action of gravity upon the earth; the mutation of the axis would be varied, and not only the orbit of our planet, but the whole solar system must be deranged." From whence was the water to effect an universal deluge derived? From the fountains of the deep it could not come, from the windows of heaven it did not come, and the Bible names no other source. Supposing the deluge to have happened, what then became of the water? They "returned from off the earth," "decreased continually," and "dried up," so says the Bible. But where did the waters go, and how? As to this the Bible is silent, and without a miracle, the draining away is as impossible as the deluge.

Verse 16.—"And the Lord shut him in." The Douay has —"And the Lord shut him in on the outside." Kalisch puts it—"And the Lord closed behind him." Bellamy says—"When the ineffable Deity is mentioned, such undignified and familiar language does not become the creature; it is bringing the infinite Jehovah to a level with man. It must appear obvious that there was no necessity for such a translation: as the man, under whose direction the ark was made, was capable of shutting the door of the ark." The word translated "shut," Bellamy renders as "delivered."

* Genesis, p. 211.

Verse 11.—"And the dove came in to him in the evening; and, lo, in her mouth was an olive leaf pluckt off; so Noah knew that the waters were abated from off the earth." Kalisch says—"Fresh olive leaf." Colenso says*—"The difficulty, that so long an immersion in deep water would kill the olive, had, no doubt, never occurred to the writer, who may have observed that trees survived ordinary partial floods, and inferred that they would just as well be able to sustain the deluge to which his imagination subjected them. Of the enormous pressure that would be caused by such a superincumbent mass of water, he was, we may be sure, entirely ignorant. What would be the state of an olive-tree, after having been buried for months in water, some thousands of feet deep, without its natural supplies of air and light?"

Kalisch observes that "There are trees still existing older than the date of the Noachian Deluge. If they had been submersed in water, they would scarcely, even had they outlived that catastrophe, have maintained the strength necessary to carry their existence through so many millenniums. Of the 100,000 species of known plants, very few would survive submersion for a whole year; at least, three-fourths of them would necessarily have perished in an universal deluge. It is agreed by all botanical authorities, that, though partial inundations of rivers do not long or materially change the vegetation of a region, the infusion of great quantities of salt water destroys it entirely for long periods. But the earth produced the olive and the vine immediately after the cessation of the deluge." It is hard to understand why Noah sent out the raven and the dove. The ark was stranded on a mountain, from whence Noah might have daily seen the recession of the waters. He could have learned all, and much more, by the aid of his eyes than the raven and dove could tell him.

The following extracts from Kalisch seem unanswerable:—"The surface of the earth is, in many vast tracts, covered with accumulations of soil, sand, and gravel; they have no connection with the rock formations of the former ages; and are generally known under the name of *diluvium*, since they

* Part 4, p. 18.

are believed to be the result of some vast flood. But these aggregations were indisputably produced by *many* currents of *different* force, and from *different* directions; they are the result of *different* ages, and are all of a *local* extent; they have in some cases been washed away by some new current; they are in other instances overlaid by more recent drifts; they are produced by the long action of the floods working from deep waters, by currents, eddies, and tides; they are, in fact, nothing but a part of the ordinary and uninterrupted process by which the continents have gradually formed and been elevated during unnumbered ages. There is, therefore, no probability whatever that this diluvium is the result of a transitory and general deluge. . . .

"A temporary deluge could never have produced the geological changes observable in the superficial deposit. The animals whose remains have been discovered in the 'mammalifer ous crag,' not only of Great Britain but of Northern Siberia, the elephant, the rhinoceri, the hippopotamus, the hyenas and tigers, cannot have been transported thither by the flood from the intertropical regions; this is not merely *improbable* on account of the vast distance of four to five thousand miles which separate those respective lands; or on account of the great numbers in which they are found in the same localities; or on account of the remarkable circumstance, that the *shed* antlers of the great Irish Elk, which exceeded in bulk and size the largest horses, and measured upwards of ten feet in height, occur everywhere, and mostly in an uninjured state, *together with* the bones and skeletons of that animal: but it is rendered *impossible* by the facts that they are extant in beds of various ages; and still more by the observations of comparative anatomy; for the latter has shown beyond a doubt that those northern animals were very widely different, in their internal structure and their external provisions, from the same species now living in the southern climes; the difference is greater than between an ass and a horse, or between the dog and the wolf; and it is certain beyond contradiction that those animals lived and died in the northern countries in which their remains have been found. It is known that the cavern of Kirkdale, in Yorkshire, contains the bones and remains of twenty-four species of animals, from the pigeon and the mouse, to the

hyena, the hippopotamus, and rhinoceros. But the opening of the cavern is not larger than four feet; the huge bones cannot, therefore, have been washed thither by the tropical waves; they are, besides, almost all of them *gnawed*, and show the clear marks of teeth, especially of hyenas', which in that haunt probably devoured their prey. . .

"The violent irruptions of water, and the up-heavings proceeding from the interior of the earth, have alternately, and an indefinite number of times, immersed and elevated the same tract of land; every new geological period is marked by such an event; the same part of the earth's surface was more than once sea and dry land; but the last revolution of this kind occurred before the existence of man on earth; in no stratum of the earth, nor even the very highest tertiary beds, have remains of human bodies or of human works been discovered; they occur only in the loose sand and gravel which cover the surface. It has, indeed, been alleged that human bones have been found in earlier rocks. But those instances are uncertain; and have been declared inconclusive by almost all geological authorities. Man was called into being after the earth had carried its development forward to its present state. No deluge destroyed, therefore, a wicked and disobedient race of men.

"The Biblical narrative relates that all the species of animals were preserved by Noah, and that they later propagated themselves; it implies that the deluge was no violent convulsion or catastrophe, that it did not change the aspect of nature; although it destroyed the living beings on the earth, it left no trace of its existence on the surface or in the interior; it was an event of the existing creation; the vegetable kingdom remained, essentially, uninjured; and the soil was soon afterwards fit for cultivation. . . .

"The older lateral cones of Mount Etna are, after a moderate computation, at least, twelve thousand years old; they are composed of the ordinary incoherent materials; and yet they show in no parts marks of denudation; they retain in integrity their original shape; a devastating deluge cannot, therefore, have passed over them within that period.

"In the centre of France, in the provinces of Auvergne and Languedoc, are still the remains of several hundred volcanic hills and mountains. The craters, some of which

are higher than that of the Vesuvius, ejected immense masses of lava to the heights of fifty, one hundred, and many more feet, and spreading over many miles of area. Distant periods separate different eruptions. Distinct mineral formations, and an abundance of petrified vegetable and animal life, bespeak an epoch far anterior to the present condition of our planet. And yet, since these volcanoes ceased to flow, rivers have worked their way through that vast depth of lava; they have penetrated through basalt rocks one hundred and fifty feet in height, and have even considerably entered into the granite rocks beneath. The time required for such operation is immeasurably slow. Centuries are required to mark the least perceptible progress. The whole period, which was necessary for the rivers to overcome that hard and compact mass, is large almost beyond the conception of man; all our measures of chronology are insufficient; and the mind stands amazed at the notion of eternal time. That extraordinary region contains rocks, consisting of laminated formations of siliceous deposits; one of the rocks is sixty feet in thickness; and a moderate calculation shows that, at least, eighteen thousand years were required to produce that single pile. All these formations, therefore, are far more remote than the date of the Noachian flood; they show not the slightest trace of having been affected or disturbed by any general deluge; their progress has been slow, but uninterrupted; even the pumice-stone, and other loose and light substances, with which many of those hills and the cones of the volcanic craters are covered, and which would have been washed away by the action of a flood, have remained entirely untouched."*

Kalisch thus sums up:—"Geological evidence denies the possibility of an universal deluge, both in general and especially within the last 5,000 years," yet he says—"It is impossible to read the narrative of our chapter without

* "*Comp. Cuvier*, Discours sur les Révolutions de la Surface du Globe; *Buckland*, Feliquiæ Diluvianæ, and Bridgewater Treatise; *De la Beche*, Geological Manual, p. 172, *et. seq.*; *Murchison*, Silurian System, cap. 36; *Hitchcock*, Geology of Massachusetts, p. 148, *et. seq.*; *W. J. Hamilton*, Tour in Asia Minor, vol. ii., p. 386; *Lyell*, Principles of Geology, vol. iv., p. 219; *Pye Smith*, Geol. and Script., pp. 90—149; *Hugh Miller*, Testimony of the Rocks, pp. 306—350."

being impressed that the whole earth was destined for destruction. This is so evident throughout the whole of the description, that it is unnecessary to adduce single instances. Such expressions, as 'all the mountains were covered by the floods,' are asserted to mean a great part of them. In one case, the universality does not lie in the words merely, but in the tenor of the whole narrative. *All* flesh had corrupted its way before the Lord upon the earth (v. 12); therefore, the *whole* human race was to be destroyed with the earth. The text admits of no other acceptance but a universal flood." The text speaks of the whole earth, and of everything wherein was the breath of life. The question stands thus:—"Geology teaches the impossibility of a universal deluge since the last 6,000 years, but does not exclude a partial destruction of the earth's surface within that period. The Biblical text, on the other hand, demands the supposition of a universal deluge, and absolutely excludes a partial flood."

It has been admitted by many that the deluge could not have been universal, and these have sought to urge that the Bible only teaches a partial deluge, and when you read to them, chap. vi., v. 17—"And, behold, I, even I, do bring a flood of waters upon the earth, to destroy all flesh wherein is the breath of life, from under heaven; and everything that is in the earth shall die." Chap. vii., v. 4—"Every living substance that I have made will I destroy from off the face of the earth." Verses 21, 22, and 23—"And all flesh died that moved upon the earth, both of fowl, and of cattle, and of beast, and of every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth, and every man. All in whose nostrils was the breath of life, of all that was in the dry land, died. And every living substance was destroyed which was upon the face of the ground, both man, and cattle, and the creeping things, and the fowl of the heaven"—they reply, but the whole earth may not, at the date of the deluge, have been inhabited by man and the lower animals, and, therefore, the deluge need only have extended to the parts occupied by animal life; but this answer will not suffice if you read chap. vii., verses 19 and 20—"And the waters prevailed exceedingly upon the earth; and all the high hills, that were under the whole heaven, were covered. Fifteen cubits up-

ward did the waters prevail: and the mountains were covered." A deluge, which prevailed above the top of Ararat for 150 days, must have extended to the whole earth. The words of the text are as express in favour of the universality of the deluge as they can possibly be.

Chapter viii., v. 4—Colenso argues* that, as the summit of Ararat is 17,000 feet high, 3,000 feet above the region of perpetual snow, it would have been impossible for Noah, his family, and the animals to have remained there for more than seven months—viz., from the 17th day of the 7th month, to the 27th day of the second month of the following year. A miracle alone could have prevented all from being frozen to death. This objection would be the same whether the deluge were partial or universal.

Chapter viii.—"And Noah builded an altar unto the Lord, and took of every clean beast, and of every clean fowl, and offered burnt-offerings on the altar." It is hardly possible to imagine a more revolting picture than this. According to the text, God had just finished the act of destroying, by a fearful deluge, not only the whole human race, with the exception of Noah and his family, but also the whole of the animal kingdom, save the few of each species saved in the ark. And yet more life is now destroyed in sacrifice to the Deity who has so recently consummated his vengeance by the destruction of every creature outside the ark wherein was the breath of life. The earth must yet have been strewed with decaying carcases; the whole world must have been one vast slaughterhouse, and yet the sacrifice is not enough. The fumes of the burning victims are to afford pleasure to the infinite Deity.

Verse 21.—"And the Lord smelled a sweet savour; and the Lord said in his heart, I will not again curse the ground any more for man's sake; for the imagination of man's heart is evil from his youth: neither will I again smite any more everything living, as I have done." Instead of verse 21, Bellamy translates—"Jehovah accepted the incense of rest; moreover, Jehovah said in his heart, I will neither consume nor curse again the ground for the transgressions of men, though the imagination of the heart of man be evil

* Part 4, p. 196.

from his youth. No. I will neither consume, nor smite again all living, as I have done." That the Lord should smell a sweet savour is an idea worthy the Hebrew records, and the statement deserves to accompany those in which God is represented as waxing wrath, coming down from and going up to heaven, walking and dining with Abraham, wrestling with Jacob, and carried about on the top of a box by the Levites. Sir William Drummond, in the preface to his "Œdipus Judaicus," says—"The reason which is given why the Lord would not curse the ground any more appears to me to be very strange. God smelled a sweet savour, and because his olfactory nerves were tickled, he would not curse the ground any more." According to our version the whole deluge is inefficacious, man's heart is still evil, and the punishment having been entirely useless as a reformatory measure, God determines not to destroy mankind again in such wholesale fashion.

It is impossible to dismiss this deluge story without some remarks on its utter failure as a remedial measure, if so intended by Deity, and on its terrible brutality, if regarded only as an act of divine vengeance. Genesis represents man as created good; yet in a short time, influenced by the surroundings prepared by God, man becomes so bad, that God grieved at his heart—repents that he has made him, and to relieve himself from this source of grief, determines to destroy man from the face of the earth, together with every living thing, save those protected in the ark.

But the human beings saved from the deluge were by no means without taint; they were liable to the same vices, and in the end, they and their descendants actually committed as great crimes, and this result must have been known to the Deity if all-wise. God confesses as much when he resolves that he will not again destroy the earth for man's evil imaginations. The deluge was as useless as it was cruel, and does not present any feature acceptable to a humane man. Those saved in the ark are evidently preserved not from mercy, but to prevent the necessity for another creation of the animal kingdom.

Chap. ix., verse 4.—"But flesh with the life thereof, which is the blood thereof, shall ye not eat." The Douay translates this saying, "that flesh with blood ye shall not

eat." The Breeches Bible says, "But flesh with the life thereof, I mean, with the blood thereof." Bellamy renders it, "But flesh with his soul, his blood." Kalisch gives —"Only flesh with the soul, which is its blood." The word translated *life* in our version is נֶפֶשׁ (Ne Phe Sh,) the same word which in c. ii., v. 7., is there translated *soul* (see page 42.) Either the Bible must be taken to teach that beasts have souls as well as man, or that man has no other life in kind than have the beasts. The Roman Catholics avoid the difficulty by deliberately omitting the words "which is the life thereof" altogether.

Priaulx says,* "*In the second chapter* Jehovah Elohim breathes into man's nostrils, and the plastic clay becomes a living soul. The life then of the man made by Jehovah Elohim, of the dust of the ground, seems to have been in the breath, *according to this passage*, however the life of the man made by the Elohim, and made in his image, is in the blood." Both these representations as to human life may be erroneous, but both cannot be right.

Verse 5.—"At the hand of every beast will I require it." If there is any meaning contained in these words, they teach that God will hold the beast responsible for any destruction of human life. Are beasts accountable? If yes, are birds, fishes, and insects? Or may a rattle-snake or a shark destroy human life with impunity, while God punishes the lion, tiger, and leopard?

Verses 9 and 10.—Did God make a covenant with the beasts? Do the beasts understand the covenant made with them? Voltaire, and others, have made merry over this covenant. But why, if serpents and asses can talk, as the Bible makes them, should not they be partners to a covenant?

Verse 13.—"I do set my bow." Kalisch, Bellamy, and the Breeches Bible give, "I have set my bow," the Douay "I will set my bow." The Hebrew must be a glorious language, if past tense, present tense, and future tense are so easily mistaken. Our version and the Douay both convey the impression that the rainbow had not existed before the time of Noah; that prior to the era of Noah, men had been without the brilliant coloured arch, which now always makes its appearance if the sun is shining brightly, while

* Questiones Mosaicæ, p. 216.

rain is falling in the region of the sky opposite to the sun. The theory of the refraction of the sun's rays was probably unknown to the writers of Genesis.

Horne* says it is objected that "as the same causes produce the same effects, the rainbow must have existed before the flood." Answer. So it may, but not as a sign of the covenant. The Hebrew word which in Genesis ix., 13, is rendered set, ought to be rendered *appoint*, in which case the passage would run thus:—"I do appoint my bow in the cloud to be a sign or token of the covenant between me and the earth."

Colenso says†—"The writer evidently intends to account in this way for the first appearance of the rainbow. This is the plain meaning of the language here used, which must be twisted to imply that, though the rainbow had often been seen before, as it must have been if there was rain and sunshine together before the deluge, it was first, after the deluge, made the sign of peace between God and man. The writer supposes it was then first set in the clouds after the deluge."

Verse 21.—Noah's drunkenness and Ham's offence so soon after the deluge, have been urged as some evidence that the family saved from the deluge were not quite free from spot or blemish. Bellamy denies that Noah was in his *tent*, and says that the Hebrew text represents Noah in the tabernacle. According to Parkhurst, he word אהלה (AELE) certainly does not mean *his* tent.

There seems great injustice in Noah's curse against Canaan, who, according to the text, is unconnected with his father's offence. Ham, the real culprit, escapes uncursed.

Bellamy in the notes to his translations, denies that Noah was drunken.‡ He denies that Noah was in his tent at all. He denies that Noah was uncovered, and he denies that Ham saw his father's nakedness. He renders verses xxi. to xxiv. thus:—"Then he drank of the wine and was satisfied, for he himself opened the most inward part of the tabernacle, where Ham, the father of Canaan, exposed the symbols of his father; which he declared to his two brethren without.

* Introduction to the Bible, p. 18.

† Part 4, p. 223.

‡ Genesis, p. 46

But Shem, with Japheth, had taken the vestment, which both of them set up for a portion; thus they afterwards went, and concealed the symbols of their father with their faces backward, but the symbols of their father they saw not. When Noah ended his wine, for he knew that his younger son had offered for himself."

Chap 10.—There is very strong reason to doubt whether any of the names given in this chapter are or ever were the names of individuals. Some of them are certainly by the text itself not meant for individual names at all, and others are plural nouns, more fairly applicable to the inhabitants of a district, than to one individual. Josephus suggests that the countries took their name from the first inhabitants, but even the adoption of this suggestion will not remove the difficulty, that several of the words used as proper names of individuals, are certainly plural, implying that the genealogical table of this chapter was an *ex post facto* endeavour to account for such nations as were known to the compiler of the table.

Gliddon's valuable treatise on the tenth chapter of Genesis, contained in the "Types of Mankind," and Kalisch's elaborate Essay, in his commentary on Genesis, are too long to quote here, but will well repay perusal.

Verse 3.—Riphath ריפת (R I Ph*e* Th) in 1 Chronicles, c. i. v. 6, is called Diphath, דיפת (D I Ph *e* Th) but the translators, to avoid unpleasantness, have written Riphath in both cases. Some of the editions of the Bible have in the margin of Chronicles "or Diphath, as it is in some copies," v. iv. Dodanim דדנים (D*e* D*e* N I M) in the margin of Genesis is written "or as some copies read it Rodanim." In verse vii. of 1 Chronicles, chap. i., the word is רודנים (R U D*e* N I M) so that here two letters are different in the Hebrew text; yet the translators have in Chronicles written it Dodanim, to make it agree with Genesis, though they have the less reason for this, because if they followed the sound given to the letter in the word Iavan in verse vii. of Chronicles, they ought to have written Ravadanim. This criticism of mere mistakes of letters would be without value were it not even yet contended by many of the clergy, that the Bible is God's inspired word free from error, and to confute this, it is necessary to expose the many trivial as well as

grave blunders which abound as well in the Hebrew text as in the translation. It was often pretended that the text was guarded against the possibility of error by the precautions of the Masorites—this is simply untrue. They indeed counted the verses in the Bible, but their counting neither agrees with the Talmud nor with the authorised version. Before the time of the Masora, the text had been corrupted. The cabalists and others, to support their theories, had removed and misplaced consonants, and mangled words in the most capricious manner.* Since their era new errors have increased the confusion.

Spinoza, speaking of the Hebrew text, says—"The books of the Old Testament have by no means been so very carefully preserved by those into whose hands they fell successively, but that blemishes have crept into them," "that errors, blemishes, and mistakes have crept into Scripture, no one possessed of sound judgment can, in my opinion, deny."†

Verse 5.—"By these were the isles of the Gentiles divided in their lands; every one after his tongue, after their families, in their nations." What is meant by "isles of the Gentiles?" Kalisch translates it "isles of the nations." Bellamy, "countries of the Gentiles." The word translated *Gentiles* is, in the Hebrew, almost identical with the word at the end of the same verse translated *nations*. In Genesis c. xiv., v. 1, and Joshua, c. xii., v. 23, precisely the same word is translated *nations*.

Verses 8 and 9.—"And Cush begat Nimrod; he began to be a mighty one in the earth. He was a mighty hunter before the Lord; wherefore it is said, Even as Nimrod the mighty hunter before the Lord." Bellamy translates these verses—"Now Cush begat Nimrod; he prophaned to be mighty in the earth. He was a mighty destroyer, in the presence of Jehovah; concerning which thing it shall be said: Like Nimrod the mighty destroyer in the presence of Jehovah." He adds,‡ "As to the population of the world at this period, we have no certain or probable account given; it cannot be supposed that the families and names

* De Wette, vol. i. sec. 91.
† Tractatus Theologico Politicus, chap. ix., sec 32 and 34.
‡ New Translation, p. 52.

introduced made up the population of all the countries and cities mentioned. The population at this time must have been great, or he could not have made the four great cities here spoken of, the principal cities of his kingdom, for this is the meaning; תהי (Th E I) is not noticed in the common version (verse x.), which means *revived, caused to live, made famous,* as the principals of his kingdom, Babel, Erech, Accad, and Calneh." According to Kalisch excavations amongst the ruins of Babylon, give us Urukh, as reigning about B.C. 2230, or only 119 years after the deluge.* According to the Bible, there were only two generations between Noah and Nimrod, and yet the population is already so great that kings rule over great cities.

It is quite certain that the Hebrew does not, in verse xi., mean Asshur as a person, but as a place where Nineveh and the other cities were built. Kalisch renders verse xi., "out of that land he went forth to Asshur, and built Nineveh." Bellamy, "from this land he went forth to Assyria, and there built Nineveh." Our translators having undoubtedly translated the country into a man, it is a problem worthy solution on the part of the pious, whether the blunders such as this may be safely believed in by the ignorant, and rejected by the educated, without endangering their respective salvations.

Chapter x.—Volney† has a lengthy chapter in examination of this 10th c. of Genesis, in which he alludes to the name Javan in verse 2, which in the Hebrew is written יון (I U N) or (I O N), and which Volney and others identify with the Ionians, a colony alleged to have been established in Asia about eighty years after the Trojan war—that is, about B.C. 1130, being three centuries after the Book of Genesis was written, if Moses was its author. Volney argues that the word Nimrod, which, he says, has no meaning in Hebrew, signifies "the Star of Ethiopia"—Ethiopia and Cush being the same. In effect, Volney seeks to identify Nimrod the mighty hunter with the constellation Orion.

Chap xi., vv. 1 and 2.—That all the inhabitants of the earth should speak one language would not have been ex-

* Genesis. 288.

† New Researches, cap. 18 and 19. See Colenso, Part 4, p. 244.

traordinary, if the sole inhabitants were only the descendants of Noah for about five generations; but, in that case, this chapter, in order of time, should be prior to chap x., where verses 5, 20, and 31 speak of already existing diversities of language. Besides, the whole of the inhabitants of the world would hardly have been journeying from the East, after they had built the cities mentioned in verses 10, 11, and 12 of the previous chapter. Nor would a journey from Ararat to Shinar be exactly a journey from the east. It would be rather from north to south. These two verses of chap. xi. treat the whole human race then existing, as if but one tribe travelling from the east in search of some good camping ground which they find in Shinar. The marginal chronology of the orthodox version gives about 100 years between the deluge and the building of Babel; if before the birth of Peleg's son, it must have been less than 130 years. The marginal note to the Breeches Bible fixes it—"In the yeere an hundreth and thirtie after the flood," and, taking even a most extraordinarily rapid multiplication of the human race in an age where the first child was not born until the father had attained thirty, this would leave a very scant number of builders for so vast a structure as Babel. It is extraordinary that Noah, who is spoken of as a perfect man in Genesis, and whose faith is recorded in Hebrews, should not have made some remonstrance as to this Babel building. The text does not refer to him as concerned in the matter, yet, if the Bible be true, Noah must have been present at the time. Priaulx notices this, well remarking that Noah, as head and chief of the great human family, should have ruled it, controlling or influencing its counsels and directing its actions. The preceding chapter speaks of four cities, including Babel, erected in the land of Shinar, and of three other cities, including Nineveh, built in Assyria, yet here Babel itself is left unfinished; and if the story be true, the other cities could not have been founded at that time.

Verse 9.—"The derivation," says Colenso,* "of the name בבל (BeBeL) from the Hebrew בלל (BeLeL) *confound*, which seems to be the connecting point between the story and the tower of Babel, is altogether incorrect, the word being compounded either of 'Bel,' so as to mean House of Bel,

* Part 4, p. 268.

Court of Bel, Gate of Bel, or, perhaps, as some suppose, of EL or IL, in which case BabEL means Gate of God." If the above be true, and Colenso quotes in confirmation Delitzch and Professor Rawlinson, then the accuracy of the text is very strongly impeached. If Babel originally meant, and indeed still means, a place of the God Bel, then there is a misstatement in the words of the text, "Therefore is the name of it called Babel, because the Lord did there confound all the language of the earth." Herodotus expressly calls the Tower of Babel the Temple of Bel.* Volney,† after quoting from Ktesias as to the building of the walls and gigantic works of Babylon under Semiramis, and noticing that a Babel had been erected long prior, says that the circumstance of 2,000,000 men forcibly levied throughout the whole of the vast dominions of Semiramis wearing different dresses, speaking probably more than eighty different dialects, may have given rise to a fable of confusion of tongues. Volney denies that the word Babel signifies in the Hebrew *confusion;* he renders it, Palace of Bel. The calculations of Volney would carry back the ancient Tower of Bel or Belus to a period long anterior to the Noachian deluge.

Verse 4.—Josephus says that it was Nimrod who said he would be revenged on God, if He should have a mind to drown the world again, for he would build a tower too high for the waters to be able to reach. The text asserts that the inhabitants of the world declared their intention to build a tower, whose top might reach to heaven. The writer of this part of the Bible, ignorant of astronomy, does not seem to consider this heaven-reaching tower impossible, for he says that the Lord *came down* to see the tower, and expressed his opinion that the builders would carry out their intention. The God of Genesis does not seem able to see from heaven to earth, or to know what is going on amongst human kind without a personal visit to the scene of action. He is neither omnipresent, nor omniscient. Bellamy, who does not believe that God did inspire all men with new languages in the same moment wherein he caused each indivi-

* Parkhurst's Lexicon, p. 65, and Gesenius, p. 100. See also Eichorn's Simonius, p. 204.

† New Researches, Part 3, cap. 3 to cap. 7.

dual to forget every word of his old tongue, declares the authorised translation to be incorrect. He says,* "If we were to entertain no higher sentiments concerning it, than that of building a tower whose top should reach unto heaven, to avoid the fate of a second deluge, and which, to put a stop to, required the interference of God in a way inconsistent with every idea we can form of his attributes; then there would be an end to all rational religion, and the Bible would be brought to a level with the tales of the Persian *Soph.* He who, by omniscience, knows all things, who, by his omnipotence and omnipresence is present to execute his will, had no necessity to come down from heaven to confound their language." The phrase, "Let us go down," is a puzzling one for those believing in the unity of Deity.

Verse 12.—"And Arphaxad lived five and thirty years, and begat Salah." But, according to Luke, chap iii., vv. 35 and 36, it was Cainan and not Arphaxad who was the father of Salah. Josephus† and the Book of Chronicles concur with Genesis in excluding Cainan. The Septuagint inserts his name. Which ought we to believe of our authorised version, the Old Testament or the New? Or shall we follow the Septuagint version? Is a belief in the existence of Cainan material? If yes, how is the contradiction to be reconciled?

Professor Rawlinson‡ prefers the Septuagint as deserving most respect, because he says it is the version most commonly quoted in the New Testament; and, undoubtedly, those who believe Jesus to have been the son of God, or identical with God, ought to consider Jesus and his disciples as able to decide which version best represented God's revelation. But, in case the Septuagint is preferred to the Hebrew, then the believer must alter nearly the whole of his sacred chronology. Josephus disagrees in nearly every statement of the ages of the patriarchs. He makes Arphaxad 135 at Salah's birth instead of 35 as in our version; he makes Salah 130 at Heber's birth instead of 30; Heber 134 at the birth of Peleg instead of 34; Peleg 130 at the birth of Reu or Ragau instead of 30; and Reu or Ragau

* New Translation, p. 34.
† Antiquities, Book i., cap. 6.
‡ Aids to Faith, p. 252.

130 at the birth of Serug instead of 32; Serug 132 at the birth of Nahor instead of 30.

Verse 26—"And Terah lived 70 years and begat Abram." Verse 32—"And the days of Terah were 205 years, and Terah died in Haran." Chap. xii., v. 1—"*Now* the Lord *had* said unto Abram, Get thee out," &c.* Verse 4—"And Abram was 75 years old when he departed out of Haran." According to Acts, chap. vii., v. 4, this departure was after Terah's death, so that Abraham must have been 75 years old, at least 130 years after he was born. Kalisch suggests, following Usher and others, but contrary to the Bible, that Abraham journeyed to Canaan during the lifetime of Terah, and thus avoids the difficulty† "which the Samaritan text endeavours to remove by arbitrarily changing the number 205 into 145 . . . this is not the only falsification which the numbers of one chapter have suffered." Kalisch complains of other unwarrantable alterations made in the Samaritan text. What a glorious prospect for the man to be saved by faith. His Bible is a translation from the Hebrew, the translation incorrectly executed. Of the Bible there are ancient versions, Hebrew, Samaritan, and Septuagint—all of which have been more or less tampered with, and abound in inaccuracies and misstatements—yet it is by implicit faith in this Bible he is to have eternal salvation. Luke Burke,‡ after pointing out the inaccuracy as to the ages of Abraham and Terah, and the shorter term of 145 years assigned to the latter by the Samaritan version, says—"The discrepancy we have pointed out was perceived by the Samaritan doctors, and thus coolly rectified; sixty years being lopped from off the age of Terah. An easy and expeditious way of settling historical difficulties. But those who did not hesitate to shorten the life of Lamech by 100 years, that of Jared by 115, and that of Methusaleh by 249, could not feel much scruple in abridging that of Terah by nearly one-third. Surely it is but charity to suppose that

* This is a mistranslation. The text reads, "And Jeue said." The Douay translates it, "And the Lord said." The "Now the Lord had said" is a rendering which implies a direction that might have been given long since in Terah's lifetime, instead of following after Terah's death.

† Kalisch: Genesis, p. 324.

‡ Ethnological Journal, p. 362.

when these changes were made, the Book of Genesis was not considered the word of revelation. Such changes cannot be justly regarded in any other light than as disreputable forgeries" The editors of the Breeches Bible, discovering the gross contradiction as to Abraham's age, declare that he was not Terah's first born, but that he was born when Terah was 130 years of age. Usher has put forward the same hypothesis. Luke Burke* ably answers this orthodox invention, which is indeed only an endeavour, entirely unsupported by evidence, to escape from an otherwise unanswerable difficulty. Colenso says that the text may mean that the whole of Terah's three children were born before he was seventy.† Josephus distinctly says that Abraham begat Terah in his 70th year.

Verse 29.—Sarai.‡ This is written in the Hebrew text שרי (ShRI), and means "my princess," and it is rather puzzling why God should have in chap. xvii., v. 15, altered it to שרה (ShRE) "a princess"—a distinction almost meaningless taken with the context. Dr. Wall urges that the Hebrew text has here been corrupted, and that the word Sarai was originally written סרי (SRI)—that is, ס (the letter Samek) instead of ש (the letter Shin), Sarai so written signifying emigrant or wanderer.

Verse 31—"Ur of the Chaldees." Where was Ur, and who were the Chaldees? If you are to treat them as identical with the Chaldeans of later date in the Bible, how can the existence of Chaldeans before Abram be reconciled with Isaiah, chap. xxiii., v. 13?—"Behold the land of the Chaldeans: this people was not till the Assyrian founded it for them that dwell in the wilderness." The Hebrew words rendered "Ur of the Chaldees" are, in fact, Aur of the Casdim כשדים (Ce Sh DIM) אור (A U R), the word Aur or Ur signifies "light" or "fire,"§ and Parkhurst says no doubt Ur had its name from the light or fire there worshipped. The word Ceshdim or Casdim is rendered Chaldees, and we are told that the Chaldeans were inhabitants of Babylon; but, on referring to the book of Daniel we find the astrologers or magi were called Chaldeans by the Baby-

* Ethnological Journal, p. 269. † Part 4, p. 283.
‡ Grounds for a Revision of the Hebrew, pp. 47 and 125 to 132.
§ Parkhurst's Lexicon, p. 38. Gesenius, p. 23 and p. 418.

kanians themselves; so that Ur of the Chaldees stands also for "light of the magi" or "fire of the magi." Priaulx says, "The Chaldees, according to Diodorus Siculus, were claimed by the Egyptians as their descendants; and they are spoken of by him not as a race or nation, but as a family or tribe set apart for the worship of the Gods."*

The name Abram must not be passed by without comment. It is first written אברם (ABReM), Ab meaning father and Rem high, elevated, exalted. Volney† argues that Abraham never really existed, and seeks to identify the father of elevation with the planet Saturn. This, at any rate, is not more strange than the declaration in Galatians, c. iv., v. 25, that the story of Abraham, Hagar, and Sarah is an allegory, and that Hagar, the bondwife of Abraham, was a mountain. Abba Rama is not more unlike Brama than it is like Abraham. Some have sought to show that there is more than an accidental resemblance between the two names. Maurice‡ quotes Hyde and Postellus as alleging that Brahma and Abraham were the same. Sir William Drummond§ mentions that the Hebrew characters composing the word Abraham, the second name of the patriarch, אברהם (ABREM), represent the exact number of bones in the human body.

Chap. xii., vv. 1, 2, 3, 7; chap. xiii., vv. 14 to 17; chap. xv., vv. 5, 14, 18; c. xvii., vv. 1 to 8; c. xviii., v. 18; c. xxii., vv. 17, 18; c. xxvi., v. 2; c. xxviii., v. 14. The above chapters and verses contain a solemn promise, a formal covenant, and, finally, an oath on the part of God to Abraham, repeated to Isaac, and renewed to Jacob, that the children of the former should be as numerous as the stars of heaven or as the dust of the earth, and that this prolific offspring should possess the land of Canaan for ever. They were to possess certain land from the river of Egypt (the Nile) to the Euphrates. Why Abraham and his race should have been selected for this promise in preference to all others is not very clear. No great deeds are recorded as having been performed by Abraham prior to the first pro-

* Questiones Mosaicæ, p. 258.
† New Researches, c. 14.
‡ Indian Antiquities, vol. ii., p. 322.
§ Letters to D'Oyly.

mise, nor, so far as the Bible tells us, did the descendants of Abraham justify the choice by their subsequent conduct. The original promise and the renewals are expressly stated to have been made because of Abraham's faith, and they are not stated to have been the reward of his morality. If Abraham's descendants are the Jews, the promise has hitherto been left unperformed. They have not held in perpetuity the promised land, nor have they yet become so numerous as to render a census impossible. If the promise applies to the Jews, history does not record a period when they held the whole of Canaan free from war, or hostile occupation, or aggression.

Verse 6.—"And Abram passed through the land unto the place of Sichem, unto the plain of Moreh. And the Canaanite was then in the land." Kalisch makes "*plain* of Moreh" into "oak of Moreh." Bellamy, to avoid the difficulty contained in the last sentence of the verse, follows our version to the word Moreh, and then reads "for *that Canaanite* was then over the land." The Douay renders the verse—"Abram passed through the country into the place of Sichem, as far as the noble vale; now the Canaanite was at that time in the land." It has been objected by Aben Ezra, followed by Spinoza,* that in the words—"And the Canaanite was then in the land," the "then" "at that time" plainly excludes the time when the narrative was written; whereby it is clear that the phrase must have been penned after the death of Moses, and when the Canaanites had been driven out and no longer possessed the land. This argument goes to the effect either that Moses did not write the book, or that the phrase has been interpolated since his time. Bellamy's justification of the text, by altering the phraseology, is hardly defensible. Aben Ezra, who was afraid to say all he thought, observes—"There must be a mystery concealed in the matter, and he who divines what that is, had better keep silence."† Precisely the same comment applies to verse 7 of chap. xiii.

Verse 11.—It is clear that, although the New Testament praises Abraham for his faith in God's promises, that the patriarch did not rely on God very much. He feared that

* Tractatus Theologico Politicus, c. 8.

† See also Colenso, Part ii., p. 210; De Wette: Books of Moses, §148.

he might be killed amongst the Egyptians, because of the beauty of his young wife, Sarah (she was not yet seventy years of age), and he, therefore, resorts to a falsehood to save himself. Commentators say that Abraham did not tell a lie in calling Sarai his sister, for that she was so. (See chap. xx., v. 12.) The only evidence for this is Abraham's statement in excuse of his misstatement. On the contrary, Josephus says expressly that Abraham married his niece, Sarah, as did Nahor his niece Milcah, both Sarah and Milcah being the daughters of Haran, who was the brother of Abraham and Nahor.* Bellamy and the Douay version agree in this; Bellamy identifying Iscah with Sarah.† If Iscah and Sarah be the same, then certainly Sarah was not Abraham's sister. The whole story is open to objection on account of the repetitions, with slight variations, of the same remarkable events on three different occasions. Voltaire says—"The God of the Jews commanded Abraham to go towards Palestine, promising that in his seed all the nations of the earth should be blessed. It is for theologians to explain, by allegory and *mystical sense*, how all the nations of the earth were to be blessed in a seed from which they did not descend. A short time after these promises, Abraham's family was afflicted by famine, and went into Egypt for corn. It is singular that the Hebrews never went into Egypt but when pressed by hunger; Jacob afterwards sent his children on the same errand.

"Abraham, who was then very old, went this way with his wife Sarah, aged sixty-five; she was very handsome, and Abraham feared that the Egyptians, smitten by her charms, would kill him in order to enjoy her transcendent beauties; he proposed to her that she should pass for his sister. Human nature must at that time have possessed a vigour which time and luxury have since very much weakened. That which Abraham had foreseen came to pass; the Egyptian youth found his wife charming, notwithstanding her sixty-five years; the king himself fell in love with her, and placed her in his house; but the Lord plagued the king and his house with very great plagues. The text does not tell us how the king came to know that this dangerous beauty was

* Antiquities, Book I., chap. 6.
† New Translation, p. 59.

Abraham's wife; but it seems that he did come to know it, and restored her.

"Sarah's beauty must have been unalterable; for, twenty-five years afterwards, when she was ninety years old, pregnant, and travelling with her husband through the dominions of a King of Phœnicia, named Abimelech, Abraham, who had not yet corrected himself, made her a second time pass for his sister. The Phœnician King was as sensible to her attractions as the King of Egypt had been; but God appeared to this Abimelech in a dream, and threatened him with death if he touched his new mistress. It must be confessed that Sarah's conduct was as extraordinary as the lasting nature of her charms."

The conduct of the patriarch, in receiving cattle and slaves as a compensation for the violence offered to his wife, cannot be said to redound to his credit. His putting his wife in danger to save himself, and his afterwards receiving a bribe to connive at his wife's dishonour, marks the founder of the Jewish race in a unenviable light. Abraham appears to have made no effort to rescue his beautiful wife from *one* king, although we find him strong enough and eager enough to rescue his brother Lot, when the latter was shortly after taken captive by *four* powerful monarchs.

Chap. xiii., v. 10.—"And Lot lifted up his eyes, and beheld all the plain of Jordan, that it was well watered everywhere, before the Lord destroyed Sodom and Gomorrah, even as the garden of the Lord, like the land of Egypt, as thou comest unto Zoar." Colenso says*—"This is supposed to have been written for the instruction in the first instance of the Hebrews in the wilderness. But what could they have known of the nature of the country in the land of Canaan, 'as thou comest unto Zoar?' Or what could Moses himself have known of it?" Colenso's criticism is open to the objection that, even in the time of Moses, the land of Egypt, on the road to Zoar, might have been known by repute without Moses or the Jews of his day being necessarily acquainted with Zoar itself.

Verse 18.—"Then Abram removed his tent, and came and dwelt in the plain of Mamre, which is in Hebron, and built

* Part II., p. 217.

there an altar unto the Lord."* Objections have been raised as to the possibility of the "plain of Mamre" being in the city of Hebron. Kalisch makes it—"Oak grove of Mamre." Bishop Patrick and Kidder render it—"By the oak of Mamre." Dr. Giles says—"It is evident that, though an oak may be in a city, a plain can only be in its neighbourhood." That which our version makes "a plain," the above-named learned and reverend Doctors make "an oak" or "oak grove;" and the Douay "a vale."

Chap. xiii., v. 18; chap. xxiii., vv. 2 and 19; chap. xxxv., v. 27, &c. These verses, in which Hebron is named, cannot be from the pen of Moses, for there was no such place as Hebron in his day. Kirjath Arba was not called Hebron until given to Caleb, son of Jephunneh, long after the death of Moses (vide Joshua, chap. xiv., vv. 14 and 15.) Colenso says—"It is a mere evasion to say as some have done that the city had of old both names."

Chap. xiv., v. 1.—Amraphel, King of Shinar, is identified (by Bellamy, who quotes Onkelos) as the King of Babylon, and Chedorlaomer as the King of Persia. It is a matter not free from cause of surprise that such powerful monarchs should be leagued together in war against the petty rulers of five inconsiderable towns. Josephus speaks of this simply as a war of the Assyrians against the five petty Sodomite Kings: Amraphel, Arioch, Chedorlaomer, and Tidal being commanders of the Assyrian forces and not a confederacy of independent monarchs. That Abraham, with a few hundred men, pursued and defeated the victorious confederates, recapturing the spoil they had taken, is some evidence in favour of Josephus's view. This victory of Abraham, whether it was over four independent and mighty kings, or over the Assyrian forces only, is, if true, a very wonderful one. It is quite clear that Chedorlaomer was a very powerful chieftain, having the inhabitants of the five cities of the Jordan district for his vassals. Amraphel is represented in the text as the king of the mighty empire of Babylon, Shinar being the country wherein Babylon was erected, doubtless not so grand as it afterwards became, but still one of the most powerful of the then monarchies of the

* Hebrew Records, p. 130; De Wette: Books of Moses, §148; Dr. Cooper: Geology and Pentateuch, p. 25.

world. These are assisted by two other kings; one of whom is described as the king of nations. The four allies make war upon certain kings, five in number; and, according to verse 10, they fight, and the kings of Sodom and Gomorrah fall in the vale of Siddim.

Abraham, hearing that Lot, his relative, was taken prisoner, took with him three Amorites, Mamre, Eschol, and Aner, and their followings, together with three hundred and eighteen men born in his own house, and, by night, pursued and smote the four allied kings, and recaptured his brother. As he went near to Damascus in pursuit, he must have travelled more than one hundred miles, beside crossing some very mountainous country; this, of course, enhances the character of the victory. One of the fruits of this triumph seems to have been, that the King of Sodom, who is apparently killed in verse 10, comes to meet Abraham, alive and well, in verse 17.

Josephus says that Abraham fell on his opponents in the night, "and before they could arm themselves, he slew some as they were in their beds before they could suspect any harm; and others who were not yet gone to sleep, but were so drunk they could not fight, ran away."*

Chap. xiv., 14; Deuteronomy, xxxiv. 1.—The city of Lais, Laish, or Leshem, was not called Dan until long after the death of Moses, when the Danites possessed themselves of it and called it after Dan, their father (*vide* Joshua, xix. 47, and Judges, xviii., 29). Bishop Watson replying on this point to Thomas Paine, says first that the name Dan may be the alteration of some later hand. He proceeds,† "But if this solution does not please you, I desire it may be proved that the Dan mentioned in Genesis was the same town as the Dan mentioned in Judges. I desire further to have it proved, that the Dan mentioned in Genesis was the name of a town and not of a river. It is merely stated, Abraham pursued them, the enemies of Lot, to Dan. Now a river was full as likely as a town to stop pursuit. Jordan, we know, was composed of the two united streams of Jor and Dan." Dr. Colenso remarks, "That such reasoning, which

* Antiquities, Book I, c. 9.

† Watson's Apology, Letter 3, p. 205.

might be allowed to pass in the days of Bishop Watson, would not be accepted as of any value whatever in our own days. The rivers 'Jor' and 'Dan' are not mentioned in the Bible, and their existence is not, I believe, recognised in the geography of Palestine."* Bellamy observes that it is not likely that the river Jordan derived its name from the union of two smaller rivers called Jor and Dan, because the river Jordan has only one springhead, rising near the foot of Mount Lebanon.†

Verse 18.—Melchizedek; who was he? Before answering this question, read Psalm cx., 4, Hebrews, v., 6, 10, and 11, chap. vii., and chap. viii., 1. In the verse we are examining, he is described as מלכיצדק (MeLeKITzeDeQ) —מלך (MeLeK) שלם (SheLeM). Melek generally means king, but it is also used for the sun or solar fire. Tzedek means justice. Shelem sometimes means peace, sometimes "to complete," "to finish," "to perfect."‡

What does this mean? Melekitzedek or Melchizedek; first by interpretation King of Righteousness, and after that the King of Salem, which is, the King of Peace; without father, without mother, without descent, having neither beginning of days, nor end of life—*vide* Hebrews, chap. vii. v. 3.

This description will not apply to any man who ever lived on the face of the earth; nearly everybody claims to have had a father and a grandfather: everybody has had a mother. Everybody was one hour old before he grew older; and after existing some few score years, more or less, every man has, sooner or later. died. So Melchizedek could not have been a man. In Malachi, chap. iv., v. 2, we find שמשצדק (SheMeShTzeDeQ); this is translated *Sun* of Righteousness, and it is only to the mythologic representation of the sun that the description of Melchizedek will apply. The ancients looked upon the sun as the everlasting source of all existence, and personified it in various names; Melchizedek, king of the Zodiac, appears to be one of the Bible personifi-

* Colenso, Part IV., preface, p. 12, and Part II., p. 201; but see Kalisch: Genesis, p. 358.

† New Translation, p. 65.

‡ Parkhurst's Lexicon, pp. 401, 610, 742.

cations. But supposing Melchizedek to be not a real person, what becomes of the story of Abraham giving him tithes of his spoils? If this story be not fact, how much is allegory?

Is any portion of the history of Abraham a fact? In chap. xvi., we find part of the history of Hagar and Sarai; while, in Galatians, chap. iv., vv. 24 and 25, we are told that the whole history is an allegory, and that Hagar represents Mount Sinai in Arabia, and Sarai the City of Jerusalem, which is "above."

Melchizedek is called priest of the most high God, the words translated "most high God" are אל עליון (AL OLIUN). It is not by any means certain that Melchizedek's God was the same as Abraham's. The Phœnicians called one of their Gods by this very name. Al Oliun might as reasonably be translated "the high heavens" as "the most high God." The word Al אל is actually translated heaven in the Septuagint—Isaiah, c. xiv., v. 13. The Phœnicians called the sun Hel.*

Genesis, xv. 2.—Our version says, "The steward of my house is this Eliezer of Damascus." The Douay says, "The son of the steward of my house is this Damascus Eliezer." Bellamy reads, "The steward is the son of my house, this Eliezer of Damascus." Which of these three statements did God intend to reveal to humankind? Can we prefer our translators' version to the others, and why? Our authorised text is most certainly wrong in this verse, for it omits the Hebrew word translated "son" in the other versions. Abraham, when speaking of one born in his house as his heir, seems to have quite forgotten his brother Lot, who would have been his natural heir.

Verse 8.—"And he said, Lord God whereby shall I know that I shall inherit it?" Abraham's faith, which is so highly praised in the New Testament, does not seem to have been very potent. This is at least the fourth time God has communicated with Abraham, who knowing that he is addressing God, yet requires something to corroborate God's statement, which he must have therefore doubted though coming from God direct.

Verse 11.—Instead of "Abraham drove them away," as in

* Parkhurst's Lexicon, pp. 15 and 528.

our version, the Septuagint reads, "Abraham sat down by them." Bellamy goes further. He not only says that Abraham did not drive the fowls away, but denies that he sat down by them. In fact, he repudiates the fowls altogether; for while our version reads, verse 11, "And when the fowls came down upon the carcases, Abraham drove them away," Bellamy has, "Then descended the covering upon the bodies, and with them he inspired Abraham." How satisfactory to the true believer to know that God's revelation can be so contradictorily translated. Whether or not the fowls were driven away by Abraham, all idea of infallible inspiration must, by such discrepancies, be driven from the mind of the reader.

Verse 15.—"And thou shalt go to thy fathers in peace; thou shalt be buried in a good old age." Taking the patriarchal ages as a guide and standard Abraham died young. Shem, Noah's son, Salah, Shem's grandson, and Eber, Salah's son, were actually alive when Abraham died, although Shem was born nearly 400 years before the birth of Abraham. God's promise to Abraham in this respect was certainly not kept. Compared with his long-lived ancestors, Abraham died at an early period.

Verse 13.—"And he said unto Abraham, Know of a surety that thy seed shall be a stranger in a land that is not theirs, and shall serve them; and they shall afflict them four hundred years." If this four hundred years refers to the Egyptian captivity, it is four hundred and thirty years according to Exodus, chap. xii., v. 40 and 41, "Now the sojourning of the children of Israel, who dwelt in Egypt, was four hundred and thirty years. And it came to pass, at the end of four hundred and thirty years, even the selfsame day it came to pass, that all the hosts of the Lord went out from the land of Egypt." (Also see Galatians, chap. iii., 17). But, according to the Bible chronology, it is only about two hundred years. It is impossible to give credit to one more than the other; for Genesis, Exodus, and Chronology, while they contradict one another, are not supported by any other evidence themselves. Josephus says, "They left Egypt in the month Xanthicus, on the 15th day of the lunar month, 430 years after our forefather Abraham came into Canaan, and 215 years after Jacob removed into Egypt."* This contradicts

* Antiquities, Book 2, chap. xv.

both Genesis and Exodus. Neither Abraham, Isaac, nor Jacob can be said to have been servant to or afflicted by the Egyptians.

Verse 17.—"And it came to pass, that when the sun went down, and it was dark, behold a smoking furnace, and a burning lamp that passed between those pieces." This representation of a smoking furnace and a burning lamp, serves to remind one rather of an Arabian Night's tale than of a communication from an infinite Deity. Does the text mean that an infinite and immaterial God appeared finite and material as a smoking furnace and a burning lamp? Bellamy says, "This translation gives us no information; we can have no conception of the meaning or application of a smoking furnace and a burning lamp passing between the pieces." Clouds, smoke, and fire are more than once connected in the Hebrew Records with the appearance of Deity. See Exodus, xix., 9, 16, 18; xx., 18; Deuteronomy, iv., 11 and 12, and numerous other passages. So in many of the eastern stories the angels and genii use fire and smoke to mark their coming and going.

Verses 18 to 21.—"In that same day the Lord made a covenant with Abraham, saying, Unto thy seed have I given this land, from the river of Egypt unto the great river, the river Euphrates: the Kenites, and the Kennizzites, and the Kadmonites, and the Hittites, and the Perizzites, and the Rephaims, and the Amorites, and the Canaanites, and the Girgashites, and the Jebusites." Ten nations are specified here; in Joshua, chap. iii., 10, seven only are mentioned—that is, the Kenites, Kennizzites, Kadmonites, and Rephaims are omitted; and the Hivites mentioned, in Deuteronomy, chap. xx., 17, and in Exodus, chap. iii., 17, and chap. xxiii., 23, we find only six, the Girgashites being omitted. The land from the Nile to the Euphrates has never yet been in the undisturbed possession of the Jews; portions of it have never been in their possession for a single moment, so that this promise has never been performed.

Chap. xvi.—"And the angel of the Lord found her." This is the first time an angel is mentioned in the Bible. Angel in Hebrew and Greek signifies *envoy* or messenger. The reader will hardly be the wiser for being told that the Persians had their *peris*, the Hebrews their *melakim*, and the Greeks their *demonoi*.

But it is, perhaps, better worth knowing that one of the first of imperfectly civilized man's ideas has always been to place intermediate beings between the Divinity and himself; such were those demons, those genii, fairies, and gnomes, invented in the ages of antiquity by nearly all peoples. Man always made the Gods after his own image; princes were seen to communicate their orders by messengers; therefore, the Divinity has also his couriers. The Jews, the only people under the conduct of the Divinity himself, did not, at first, give names to the angels whom God vouchsafed to send them; they borrowed the names given them by the Chaldeans when the Jewish nation was captive in Babylon. Michael and Gabriel are named for the first time by Daniel, a slave among those people. The Jewish Tobit, who lived at Nineveh, knew the angel Raphael, who travelled with his son to assist him in recovering the money due to him from the Jew Gabaël.

In Leviticus and Deuteronomy, although witches, wizards, familiar spirits, and devils are spoken of, not the least mention is made of the existence of the angels, much less of the worship of them; neither did the Sadducees believe in the angels.

But, in the histories of the Jews, they are much spoken of. The angels were corporeal; they had wings at their backs, as the Gentiles feigned that Mercury had at his heels; sometimes they concealed their wings under their clothing. How could they be without bodies, since they all ate and drank?

The ancient Jewish tradition, according to Ben Maimon, admits ten degrees, ten orders of angels.

The Christian religion is founded on the fall of the angels. Those who revolted were precipitated into hell, and became devils. A devil, in the form of a serpent, tempted Eve, and damned mankind. Jesus came to redeem mankind, and to triumph over the devil, who tempts us still. Yet this fundamental tradition is to be found nowhere but in the apocryphal book of Enoch; and there it is in a form quite different from that of the received tradition.

It is not known precisely where the angels dwell—whether in the air, in the void, or in the planets.* It has not

* Philosophical Dictionary.

been God's pleasure that we should be informed of their abode.

The Bible itself gives us very imperfect and contradictory information as to the angels whom it mentions. Hagar speaks of this angel as though he were God (see v. 13), and throughout the Bible instances will be found where the same person is spoken of as the angel of God, and as God.

Verse 12.—Our version says Hagar's son shall be "a wild man," Kalisch says "a wild ass of a man," Bellamy "a fruitful man."

Verse 13.—"And she called the name of the Lord that spake unto her, Thou God seest me: for she said, Have I also here looked after him that seeth me?" In the Douay this is translated, "And she called the name of the Lord that spoke unto her, thou the God who hast seen me; for she said, verily here have I seen the hinder parts of him that seeth me." The reader will perceive a strange difference in the two texts. If the Douay be the correct translation, where are the hinder parts of a God who is without parts? (*Vide* Thirty-Ninth Article). Kalisch translates the last clause of the verse, "For she said, Do I even still see [live] after seeing [God]."

Chap. xvii.—"And when Abram was ninety years old and nine, the Lord appeared to Abram, and said unto him, I *am* the Almighty God; walk before me, and be thou perfect." As the Lord had previously appeared to, and communicated with Abraham, it is somewhat strange that God should find it necessary to tell the patriarch, "I am the Almighty God." Abraham was certainly no more perfect after this injunction than before. It was after this that he repeated his falsehood as to his wife, and it was after this that he was privy to the ill-treatment of Hagar.

Verses 10 and 14.—"This is my covenant, which ye shall keep, between me and you and thy seed after thee; every man child among you shall be circumcised. And the uncircumcised man child, that soul shall be cut off from his people; he hath broken my covenant." If these verses apply to the whole human family, then nearly the whole of the inhabitants of Europe will be cut off, while the Abyssinians, the Kafirs, some of the South Sea and other Islanders, will be saved by the mark of the covenant. The following will be

found in the "Philosophical Dictionary," under the head "Circumcision:"—"It appears," says Herodotus in his book Euterpe, "that the inhabitants of Colchis sprang from Egypt. I judge so from my own observations, rather than from hearsay; for I found that, at Colchis, the ancient Egyptians were more frequently recalled to my mind than the ancient customs of Colchis were, when I was in Egypt.

"'These inhabitants of the shores of the Euxine sea stated themselves to be a colony founded by Sesostris. As for myself I should think this probable, not merely because they are dark and woolly-haired, but because the inhabitants of Colchis, Egypt, and Ethiopia, are the only people in the world who, from time immemorial, have practised circumcision; for the Phœnicians and the people of Palestine confess that they adopted the practice from the Egyptians. The Syrians, who at present inhabit the banks of Thermodon, acknowledge that it is, comparatively, but recently that they have conformed to it. It is principally from this usage that they are considered of Egyptian origin.

"'With respect to Ethiopia and Egypt, as this ceremony is of great antiquity in both nations I cannot by any means ascertain which has derived it from the other. It is, however, probable that the Ethiopians received it from the Egyptians; while, on the contrary, the Phœnicians have abolished the practice of circumcising new-born children since the enlargement of their commerce with the Greeks.'

"From this passage of Herodotus, it is evident that many people had adopted circumcision; but no nation ever pretended to have received it from the Jews. To whom, then, can we attribute the origin of this custom? to a nation from whom five or six others acknowledge they took it, or to another nation, much less powerful, less commercial, less warlike, hid away in a corner of Arabia Petræa, and which never communicated any one of its usages to any other people?

"The Jews admit that they were, many ages since, received in Egypt out of charity. Is it not probable that the lesser people imitated a usage of the superior one, and that the Jews adopted some customs from their masters?

"Clement Alexandria relates that Pythagoras, when

travelling among the Egyptians, was obliged to be circumcised in order to be admitted to their mysteries. It was, therefore, absolutely necessary to be circumcised to be a priest in Egypt. Those priests existed when Joseph arrived in Egypt. The government was of great antiquity, and the ancient ceremonies of the country were observed with the most scrupulous exactness. (Joseph was married into the family of the Priest of the Sun before his relations had established any religious system.)

"The Jews acknowledge that they remained in Egypt two hundred and five years (the Bible says four hundred and thirty.) They say that, during that period, they did not become circumcised. It is clear, then, that for two hundred and five years the Egyptians did not receive circumcision from the Jews. Would they have adopted it from them after the Jews had stolen the vessels which they had lent them, and, according to their own account, fled with their plunder into the wilderness? Will a master adopt the principal symbol of the religion of a robbing and runaway slave? It is not in human nature.

"It is stated in the book of Joshua that the Jews were circumcised in the wilderness. 'I have delivered you from what constituted your reproach among the Egyptians.' But what could this reproach be to a people living between Phœnicians, Arabians, and Egyptians, but something which rendered them contemptible to these three nations?"

Kalisch says, "The question arises, what was the origin of this singular custom? It must evidently have a general cause, inherent either in the human mind or in the human frame, since it was in use amongst so many different nations possessing no mutual intercourse. Now a religious motive seems to be out of the question, for some of the nations alluded to are not only strangers to all religious ceremonies but destitute of all moral feelings."* Kalisch argues for a physical reason, but in this case the whole story of the institution of the covenant of circumcision by God with Abraham is reduced to fable.

Verse 17.—"Then Abraham fell upon his face, and laughed, and said in his heart, Shall a child be born unto him that is

* Genesis, p. 386.

an hundred years old? and shall Sarah, that is ninety years old, bear?" This is not only an illustration of Abraham's want of faith in God's promise, but it also shows either that he did not know, or did not believe, that Shem had a son when 130 years old, or that Noah had children when 500 years old, or that Jared when 162 years of age begat Enoch, or that Methusaleh was 187 at Lamech's birth. If Abraham did not believe this in Shem's lifetime, why should greater faith be expected from us so many centuries after?

Genesis, chap. xviii.—The attentive reader of this chapter cannot fail to observe the extraordinary confusion in the text, as to the three men and the Lord. It is difficult to discover whether the Lord was one of the three visiting Abraham, or all of the three, or separate from the three. Kalisch tries to argue that God who, according to the Bible, is invisible, appeared to Abraham, who at the same time saw three figures in human form; and Kalisch separates the three men from God, saying that the three, who were not simply mortals, sat down to food, while the spirit of God hovered among the assembly. If not mortals, it is difficult to imagine their eating and drinking Abraham's calf, milk, butter, and cakes, and in truth Kalisch has no authority in the text for his hypothesis. The Douay version in a note says, that of the three one "represented the Lord," the other two being the angels who went on to Sodom. This hypothesis does not contradict the text, but is certainly not explicitly vouched by it. Josephus* says that the three "declared that they were angels of God; and that one of them was sent to inform them about the child, and two for the overthrow of Sodom." Josephus certainly could not have learned this from the book of Genesis, as we have it. Bellamy says, "Many writers have thought that God appeared to Abraham in three distinct forms, and that these represented the three persons of the trinity; others that they were three angels, because after it is said 'the Lord appeared unto him;' it is also said in the next verse, that 'he lift up his eyes, and looked, and lo, three men stood by him.' Were this the case, that these persons were Jehovah, or that they were three angels, was there any necessity for Abraham, when he knew the quality of his guests, to show them the way by

* Antiquities, chap. 11, 52.

going with them as a guide? for we read (verse 16), 'Abraham went with them to bring them on the way.' Can it be supposed that heavenly beings, and even God himself, required a guide?"*

Verse 2.—"And he lift up his eyes, and looked, and lo, three men stood by him: and, when he saw them, he ran to meet them." Bellamy observes that if the three men stood by Abraham, he could have hardly run to meet them. In verse 3, after having seen three persons, Abraham goes on to speak to them as if they were but one, and in verse 4, without any break, he speaks as if to more than one. In verse 9, "*they*" speak to Abraham, and verse 10, without any break in the conversation, "he" speaks to Abraham. Who is meant by "he" the text does not explain, and if it were not that the speech is addressed to the patriarch, "he" would grammatically be Abraham himself.

Verses 11 to 15.—"Now Abraham and Sarah were old, and well stricken in age; and it ceased to be with Sarah after the manner of women. Therefore Sarah laughed within herself, saying, After I am waxed old shall I have pleasure, my lord being old also? And the Lord said unto Abraham, Wherefore did Sarah laugh, saying, Shall I of a surety bear a child, which am old? Is any thing too hard for the Lord? At the time appointed I will return unto thee, according to the time of life, and Sarah shall have a son. Then Sarah denied, saying, I laughed not: for she was afraid. And he said, Nay; but thou didst laugh." Sarah in Hebrews, c. xi., vv. 11 and 12, is noticed for her faith in relation to this matter; but unless the writer of the epistle had a different copy of Genesis, Sarah's faith is surely of a doubtful character. There is more of mockery and laughter (at what she regarded as the idle promise and impossible boast on the part of the Lord), coupled with a fear of punishment for the avowal of disbelief, than there is of faith. One orthodox commentator says that "Sarah, who considered herself as past the age of child-bearing, either treated the promise with unbecoming levity, or was so delighted with the prospect of having a son, that she was thrown into an ecstasy, which discovered itself by a burst of laughter. *Let us hope, for her credit sake, that the latter*

* New Translation, p. 75.

was the case."* Abraham makes a difficulty, and Sarah laughs because at their advanced age God had promised a child; but they ought both to have known that some of their ancestors had had children at a much greater age, and the writer of the text, who speaks of them as very old people, must have been well aware that Abraham was a mere youth compared with the great majority of his ancestors. God himself, when Sarah laughed because of the absurdity of her having a child at that great age (instead of reminding her that Adam and Eve were 180 when Seth was born, that Seth was 105 when Enos was born, that Jared was 165 when Enoch was born, and Methusaleh 187 when he begat Lamech), speaks as though the promised event, though a wonderful one, would be achieved by special divine interposition, and God in nowise treats it as a natural event which, having occurred before, might not unreasonably be expected to occur again.

Verses 20 and 21.—"And the Lord said, because the cry of Sodom and Gomorrah is great, and because their sin is very grievous, I will go down now, and see whether they have done altogether according to the cry of it, which is come unto me; and if not, I will know." According to these verses God, the omnipresent, being away from Sodom and Gomorrah, had received a report of the evil doings of the people of those cities, and the Bible in effect declares that he, God, being omniscient, but not knowing whether the actual state of things had been correctly represented to him, had determined to go down to Sodom (from which city the omnipresent could never have been absent) personally to find out the truth. The chaffering and bargaining between God wavering and undetermined and Abraham persistently petitioning as to the salvation of Sodom, has in it something so contemptibly ridiculous that one is puzzled to conceive how any large number of the human family could believe the narrative inspired by the infinite God. Either God knew that there were not so many righteous persons as fifty, forty-five, forty, thirty, twenty, or ten in Sodom, in which case all his promises were deceptive, or God did not know, in which case he is not omniscient.

Verse 22.—This verse is one of those eighteen altered

* Jones: Biblical Cyclopædia, vol. 1.

according to the decrees of the Scribes. Originally it was ויהוה עודנו עמד לפני אברהם—"And Jehovah still stood before Abraham;" but Tikun Sopherim (the decrees of the Scribes) have substituted our present reading: ואברהם עדונו עמד לפני יהוח—"And Abraham still stood before Jehovah;" because it appeared offensive to say that the Deity stood before Abraham.*

Verse 33.—"And the Lord went his way, as soon as he had left communing with Abraham: and Abraham returned unto his place." Bellamy says, "This is a very undignified and awkward expression when applied to God. The Lord, who is always everywhere, went one way, and Abraham went another. This style of writing (which makes God, who is alleged to be infinite and immaterial, finite, and subject to material conditions; subject to order of time and space, having a material body, and eating material food) ought to be enough without further comment to destroy the present faith and to prevent further belief in the infallible inspiration of these Hebrew legends."

Chap. xix.—"And there came two angels to Sodom." This would leave it doubtful whether or not these were the same as the angels of the former chapter. But Kalisch translates it—"And two of the angels came to Sodom," and the Douay says—"And the two angels came to Sodom." The angels then were so much like men that they ate, drank, washed their feet, rested under a tree, walked, talked, and were clearly bodily visible to Abraham, to Lot, and to the people of Sodom. Dr. John Pye Smith says that the angel who remained with Abraham in chap. xviii., has all the predicates of Deity, and he identifies as the same the one introduced in c. xix., vv. 17 to 25; and by drawing attention to the remarkable repetition of the word Jeue (Jehovah) in verse 24, Dr. Pye Smith revives the point as to the one God Jeue on earth, calling down brimstone and fire from another God Jeue in heaven.† Priaulx‡ says—"Unless this be some Hebrew idiom, one would suppose the Lord raining, and the Lord in heaven were different persons." According to verses 8 and 30, Lot appears to have had two daughters

* Jacob Ben Chajim's Introduction, p. 28.
† Christian Theology, 249. ‡ Questiones Mosaicæ, 398.

only, and these unmarried, and yet verse 14 speaks of the "sons-in-law which married his daughters." Some translators allege that it should read "who were about to marry his daughters."

Verse 26.—"But his wife looked back from behind him, and she became a pillar of salt." Josephus says that this pillar of salt was standing in his day, and adds—"For I have seen it."* Professor Whiston, in a note to the translation, states that the existence of the pillar of salt is also attested by Clement of Rome and by Irenæus. Bellamy denies that there is any ground for believing in the conversion of Lot's wife, observing†—"Had she been turned into salt, it would have required a perpetual miracle to have preserved this monument: for salt, whether alkaline, neutral, or acid is soluble by water, and, therefore, it could not have remained long in the form of a pillar, to convince posterity, as many weak people have supposed, that she was punished for her disobedience. Commentators of this description have done more injury to the religion of the Bible than all the Atheists and Deists in the world, though they have interlarded their comments on this subject with the monkish interpolation of Josephus, who is made to say that the pillar of salt was in existence in his day. I say monkish interpolation for, at this early period, additions, alterations, and explanations were foisted into the translations to suit the craft and policy of designing men. Certainly, a moment's consideration will convince any man, that a pillar of any species of salt could not have continued visible nearly 2000 years from Abraham to the time of Josephus." And it might be added that, as neither ancient nor modern travellers, before or since that Jewish writer, have satisfactorily vouched its existence, it would require some strong evidence to identify Josephus's pillar of salt with Lot's unfortunate wife. I conclude this subject with an extract from orthodox sources‡—"Irenæus and Tertullian say it was standing about A.D., 200. Benjamin of Tudela, the Jewish traveller, avers that it was standing near one thousand years after, which would make its duration about

* Antiquities, chap. 11, sec. 4. † New Translation, p. 83.
‡ Jones: Biblical Cyclopædia, vol. 2

3000 years. Some modern travellers pretend to have seen it; but their relations savour so strongly of fable, and differ so widely, that we cannot credit them. It is certain that Maunder, Shaw, and other travellers of veracity do not pretend that there are now the least remains of this noted statue." There is in truth no evidence to identify the site of the asphalt waters of the Dead Sea with the place whereon stood the fire-destroyed city of Sodom.

It is impossible to imagine a story more fearfully horrible than that of this chapter, and it is hardly possible to conceive it to be a representation of facts. That the whole of the male inhabitants of a city should crowd round a house, as alleged in verses 4 and 5, is so monstrously unnatural that reason revolts against it. That this crowd, when smitten suddenly with utter blindness, should continue to endeavour to carry out their former design, is utterly incredible. The preservation of such a disgusting record for the edification of our children is worthy the system which supports this most moral book. Lot's lingering and reluctance to quit the city is inexplicable, and that God should pardon a little city, so that it might serve as Lot's shelter, because Lot objected to journey to the mountain, is also a most unreasonable statement. Either the inhabitants of Zoar were equally guilty with those of the other cities of the plain, in which case the same doom should, in justice, have fallen on them, or else the dwellers in Zoar were innocent, in which case it was not true, as pretended by the text, that God spared the little city on Lot's petition, in order that it might serve as his shelter. Priaulx says*—"As one of the objects of the tale is to illustrate by an example the wickedness of Sodom, I naturally conclude that the conduct it attributes to the Sodomians was not the effect of some sudden and unaccountable frenzy, but something habitual; and I cannot help asking how Lot could voluntarily fix his residence among, and afterwards contract family alliances with so lawless and so vicious a people? and how was it that, knowing their character, he did not warn away the strangers from the dangers of the loathsome city?" The concluding incidents of the nineteenth chapter are as infamously foul, and as utterly incredible as are the features

* Questiones Mosaicæ, 397.

displayed in the earlier verses. No moral lesson is even conveyed by the terrible destruction of all the cities of the plain, for it is impossible to forget that God (who deluged the earth to wash away the stains of its sin, saving only one righteous man and his family) might have prevented instead of punishing the crime: nor does the preservation of Lot and his daughters from the destroying fire in anyway result in any improvement of their moral condition. They who saw the burning cities, seem utterly unaffected thereby. It is but just to remark that Bellamy makes a most ineffectual but praiseworthy attempt to purify this chapter by attributing its foulness to an improper translation of the Hebrew text. He says, after exposing many blunders in the text—"Some may ask how could the Jews be deceived as to their language? Would they not have detected these errors? I would observe that the Jews have no advantage above the Christians in acquiring a knowledge of the language; had they, surely before this day it would have been shown that all those palpable contradictions and inconsistencies which disgrace the translations, are not to be found in the original. But, indeed, the far greater part of the Jews in all nations, though they pronounce the Hebrew or read the Hebrew Bible, yet they know not the meaning; and are obliged to gain their knowledge of the original from the national translations." This very much accords with the opinion of Spinoza quoted in pages 4 and 5 of the present volume.

Chap. xx.—On pages 87 to 89, attention has already been called to the story of Abraham's second falsehood in reference to Sarah. The first account was extremely incredible; the repetition is monstrously absurd. Sarah ninety years of age, by her own admission is now an old woman, and yet the text represents her as so charming that Abimelech sends and takes her from her husband. Newman, in his "Phases of Faith," asks, "What was I to make of God's anger with Abimelech, whose sole offence was the having believed Abraham's lie? for which a miraculous barrenness was sent on all the females of Abimelech's tribe, and was bought off only by splendid presents to the favoured deceiver." According to verse 6, Abimelech was not free and responsible. God

knew Abimelech to be a good man, and withheld him from sinning, so that the punishment was for an offence not committed, unless the sending for Sarah was an offence, when the text shows that God permitted it, and God's prophet Abraham originated it by his voluntary falsehood; and why punish others for Abimelech's offence (if offence was really committed)? If God withheld Abimelech from committing sin, why is he not as merciful to every one? It would surely be more Godlike to prevent sin than to punish the sinner.

Verse 5.—"Said he not unto me, She is my sister? and she, even she herself said, He is my brother." Dr. Kennicott,* quoting the Hebrew, says—"In these twelve (Hebrew) words, we find the pronoun of the third person five times; twice properly *he*, and three times originally *she*; but, in the printed editions, two of the feminine pronouns have been most absurdly changed into masculine. So that the preceding words, if closely, or rather if truly translated, contain the following expostulation of Abimelech on account of Sarah—'Said *he* not unto me, *he* is my sister? and *she*, even *he* said, *he* is my brother.' And is this the boasted integrity of Jewish transcribers?" It is evident by this verse that both Sarah and Abraham, with a knowledge of the consequences of Abraham's former similar falsehoods, must have both personally misrepresented their relationship to Abimelech.

Verse 16.—"And unto Sarah he said, Behold, I have given thy brother a thousand pieces of silver: behold, he is to thee a covering of the eyes, unto all that are with thee, and with all other: thus she reproved." Bellamy makes the last four words—"Thus she was justified." Kalisch renders them—"And thou wilt be recognised." The Douay gives—"And remember thou wast taken." Priaulx† quotes Boothroyd as rendering the verse—"I have given thy brother 1000 pieces of silver to purchase veils for thee, and all that are with thee." Michaelis: "I have placed with thy brother 1000 shekels of silver, with it buy thee a veil,

* Wall's Grounds for Revision, 222.
† Questiones, 412.

and wear it everywhere, so that every man may know thou art married." De Wette: "I have given thy brother 1000 shekels of silver, with it buy thee a veil, and wear it before all that are with thee, and before all other, so that thou mayest be distinguished." The Vulgate* reads—"Sarae autem dixit: Ecce! mille argenteos dedi fratri tuo, hoc eri tibi in velamen oculorum ad omnes, quî tecum sunt, et quocumque perrexeris; mementoque te deprehensam."

Verses 17 and 18.—As all the events recorded here took place after the Lord's promise to Abraham; chap. xvii., v. 21, and after the visit at Mamre, and after the destruction of Sodom, and yet before Sarah's state betokened her to be a wife, they must have occupied at most but a few weeks; how, then, did Abimelech or Abraham know that the Lord had afflicted Abimelech's wives with barrenness?

Chap. xxi., v. 9.—"And Sarah saw the son of Hagar the Egyptian, which she had born unto Abraham, mocking." The Douay says—"And when Sarah had seen the son of Hagar, the Egyptian, playing with Isaac, her son," and, in this, it follows and agrees with the Septuagint version. Which is also corroborated by the Vulgate—"Cumque vidisset Sara filium Agar Aegyptiæ ludentem cum Isaac filio suo." Which version is right? has the Hebrew been corrupted in order to afford some justification for Ishmael's expulsion? If yes, how much of the text has been similarly dealt with? It is hardly probable that the translators into the Greek or Latin have turned the "mocking" into harmless play. All orthodoxy would seek to substantiate Sarah's justification, not to lessen it.

Verse 12.—"And God said unto Abraham, let it not be grievous in thy sight because of the lad, and because of thy bondwoman; in all that Sarah hath said unto thee, hearken unto her voice." Priaulx says†—"Michaelis thinks that this counsel of the Deity sounds somewhat harshly; but he afterwards consoles himself with the reflection that it is more in accord with our views of marriage than those which obtained in the time of Abraham. To my poor judgment,

* Hahnii Biblia Heb. cum Vulgata, 21.
† Questiones, 433.

however, it seems that every man, married or not, who in our day seduces a woman, by that very act engages himself in certain duties towards her: he is bound, for instance, to save her from the perils of starvation, prostitution, &c., and, though he may, I care not for what reasons, have withdrawn from her society, his duties he is ever bound earnestly to fulfil. To us, therefore, the conduct of Abraham is, to say the least of it, cruel and unjustifiable. And when we remember that both in her own eyes and in the eyes of those among whom she lived, Hagar was innocent of all crime: that she had shared Abraham's bed at Sarah's instigation and for Sarah's sake: then Abraham's conduct appears criminal indeed. Abraham has large possessions of sheep, oxen, servants, and camels, and yet he spares not a solitary beast of burden to sustain his wife and child, no servant to guide or help them, no tent to shelter them. Out of his great wealth, twice increased by large gifts resulting from most questionable conduct, the prophet of God gives his wife "bread and a bottle of water," and then sends her into the wilderness to die. Verse 15.—"She cast the child under one of the shrubs." The child Ishmael was between 13 and 16 years of age; did the writer forget this?

Verses 30 and 31.—In chap. xxvi., vv. 25, 32, and 33, we are told that it was not Abraham, but the servants of Isaac, who digged the well; and that it was not Abraham, but Isaac who called the name of the place Beersheba. Which is correct, or were there two Beershebas? In both cases Abimelech and Phichol are parties to the oath. Did they repeat with Isaac the covenant with Abraham, or are some of the incidents in Isaac's life but copied from that of Abraham?* The thirty-third verse reads, "Therefore the name of the city is Beersheba unto this day." The Rev. Dr. Giles adds: "It is sufficient to remark that no city of Beersheba existed in the time of Moses; consequently the book in which it is found could not have been written by Moses or any of his contemporaries."

Chap. xxii.—"God did tempt Abraham." James, chap. 1, verse 13: "Let no man say when he is tempted, I am

* Kalisch: Genesis, 441; Hebrew Records, 135.

tempted of God; for God cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man." Bellamy, commenting on this chapter, says: "This is one of the most unaccountable things in sacred history as it stands in the vulgar versions." Ancient and modern objectors have said: "Is it possible to suppose that the Supreme Being, who knows what is in man, would require him to give a proof of his faith and obedience by murdering his only son, and this in direct opposition to his commands under that dispensation?" Bellamy urges that the translation is entirely wrong. "But," he observes, "the intelligent reader will naturally ask the question: If the translation be wrong, why has this error been retained for so many ages? The reason is obvious. The first Christian translation was made in Greek by Symmachus, and 200 years afterwards Jerome, who could not read Hebrew without the assistance of a Jew, with whose help he compared his translation with the original, was the first who attempted to give a translation from Hebrew into Latin; or rather who revised the old Vulgate then in use, which was a mixture from the Greek, the present Vulgate being only a mixture ex-Hieronymi, *veteris Vulgatæ et Theodotionis editionibus.* To this the Council of Trent have affixed their seal of infallibility. And though it has so many marks of human infirmity, and scarce a page that does not betray the ignorance of the compiler, yet it is with them sacred and canonical, the authentic scripture. From this translation all the European translations have been made; and thus all the errors we find in every page of the authorised version have had their origin from this contaminated fountain, the Latin Vulgate, which the Council of Trent, in order to cover their ignorance of Hebrew, have declared to be infallible."

Many competent critics are of opinion that the Hebrew text itself is as unreliable as the Latin Vulgate.

Francis William Newman* says: "A man who, in obedience to a voice in the air, kills his innocent wife or child, will be either called mad, or shut up for safety, or will be hanged as a desperate fanatic: do I dare to condemn this

* Phases of Faith, 91.

modern judgment of him? No outward impressions on the eye or ear can be so valid an assurance to me of God's will as my inward judgment. How amazing, then, that a Paul or a James could look on Abraham's intention to slay his son as exhibiting a praiseworthy faith." Paul and James agree in extolling Abraham as the pattern of faith; James and the author of the epistle to the Hebrews specify the sacrifice of Isaac as a first-rate fruit of faith; yet, if the voice of morality is allowed to be heard, Abraham was (in heart and intention) not less guilty than those who sacrificed their children to Moloch.

Voltaire remarks: "It seems astonishing that God, after causing Isaac to be born of a centenary father and a woman of ninety-five, should afterwards have ordered that father to murder the son whom he had given him, contrary to every expectation. This strange order from God serves to show that, at the time when this history was written, the sacrifice of human victims was customary amongst the Jews, as it afterwards became in other nations, as witness the vow of Jephtha."

Verse 2.—In the Douay, Abraham is told to go "into the land of vision;" in this the Vulgate "*in terram visionis*" is followed; in our version "into the land of Moriah." The Septuagint version does not agree with either, but reads *eis ten gen ten upselen*—"to the high land." Symmachus agrees with the Vulgate. The version of Aquila differs from all the others.* "And Abraham said unto his young men, abide ye here with the ass; and I and the lad will go yonder and worship, and come again to you." If Abraham believed that he was really about to offer Isaac, then he was lying to his young men. If he believed that Isaac would return, then the whole story of God's command must be untrue.

Chap. xxii., v. 12.—If this verse be taken to mean that God knew Abraham to be godfearing because he did not withhold his son, then it would appear that until this test the All-wise was uncertain as to the patriarch's piety.

Verse 14.—"And Abraham called the name of that place

* Kalisch: Genesis, 446; Colenso, part 2, 246.

Jehovah-jireh: as it is said to this day, In the mount of the Lord it shall be seen." Aben Ezra observes that the title, "Mount of the Lord," was not given to Mount Moriah until after the building of the Temple.* This would be conclusive against Moses as the writer of this phrase. The LXX. translate the last sentence *en tō orei Kyrios ōphthē*—"In the mount the Lord was seen." The Douay reads, "In the mountain the Lord will see." Abraham calls the name of the place Jehovah-jireh, yet in Exodus c. vi. v. 3, we read, "And I appeared unto Abraham, unto Isaac, and unto Jacob, by the name of God Almighty, but by my name JEHOVAH was I not known to them." If the name of Jehovah was not known to Abraham, how came he to use it?† Jacob likewise uses the name Jehovah (see Genesis, chap. xxviii., 13 and 21, and chap. xxxii. 9); although if God's speech be correct, neither Abraham nor Jacob knew it. As it is evident that if Abraham and Jacob used the name Jehovah they must have been acquainted with it, one of three theories must be adopted—either that the account in Genesis is untrue, or that the all-wise God had forgotten that Abraham and Jacob were acquainted with the name, or that his words are misstated in Exodus. Either supposition is fatal to the Bible. The word anglicised as Jehovah is יהוה JEUE. The word itself is derived from the Hebrew verb "to be," and doubtless was intended to express existence past, present, and future.‡ Godfrey Higgins§ quotes Archbishop Usher in confirmation of this rendering of the word, which he says, in chap. v., sec. 37, "is so absurdly written Jehovah." "A Mr. Davis, who was employed by the bishop to procure MSS. for him in the East, learned from the Samaritans that their nation pronounced the word Jehueh in Hebrew יהוה J e u e. This must be *j* as *i* in pine, *e* as *a* in ale, *u* as in hume or in use." In

* Spinoza: Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, cap. 8.

† Colenso: Part ii., pp. 240, 250, and 259.

‡ See, however, the lexicon of Gesenius, p. 337; Parkhurst, p. 155; Bresslau, p. 230; Newman, p. 235; Eichhorn's Simonis, p. 681; Buxtorf, p. 177, pars. 91 to 96, this last giving valuable references to Rabbinical writings.

§ Celtic Druids, p. 25, chap. i., sec 21

the historic work of Diodorus Siculus (lib. i., §94) the name of the God of the Jews is written Ιαω, showing that the four-lettered name יהוה had been read as Yahoh. In a fragment of Philo Byblius, preserved in 'Præparatio Evangelica' of Eusebius (lib. i. cap. 9) the same name is transcribsd Ιενω, which accords with the reading of the original group, as Yehuho. Clement of Alexandria gave in his Stromata (lib. v. §6) as the transcript of the four-lettered mystic name Ιαου, corresponding with the reading thereof Yahuh. His pupil Origen transcribed this name in two different ways—Ιαω, corresponding with Yehoah (or Joh), and Ιωα with Yahoh.* The name in question was transscribed by Macrobius (in his Saturnalia, lib. i. cap. 18) Ιαω, by Jerome, *Jao*, in his book 'De Interpretatione Nominem,' and *Jaho* in the commencement of his commentary on the eighth Psalm, all of which agree with Yahoh. Epiphanius, in the tenth section of his treatise against the Gnostics, states Ιαω 'as the name given by those heretics to the Ruler in the highest heaven;' and in the fifth section of his treatise against the Archontics includes Ιαβε as one of the names of the true God [the *b* and *v* being exchangeable]—this makes Yahveh. This last transcript (Ιαβε) Theodoret informs us accorded with the Samaritan pronunciation of the four-lettered name, while he transcribes the Jewish pronunciation Aia.† Αια is obviously the transcript not of יהוה but of the substantive verb היה (EJE) Hayah, of which this inflexion signifies 'he was,' or 'he has been.' Besides the above diverse pronunciations of יהוה another has been transmitted to us. In MS. copies of the Septuagint no longer extant, *pipi* is recorded to have been written instead of *Kyrios*, to represent the four-lettered name. The word Adonai is substituted in the Douay for Jehovah, which the Jews (says a foot note) never pronounce, but instead of it, whenever it occurs in the Bible, they read Adonai, and therefore they put the points which

* Joh, in the Coptic, means Moon. The name Isis is either derived from it, or it from the name Isis. (See Sharpe's Egypt, pp. 128 and 135.) See also as to Jah, the "Pentateuch Controversy," by Presbyter Anglicanus, pp 118 and 119; and Taylor's "Diegesis," c. 22.

† Grounds for Revision, pp. 200, 213, etc.; Gesenius' Lexicon, 337.

belong to the name Adonai to the four letters Iod, He, Vau, He. Hence some moderns have framed the name Jehovah unknown to all the ancients, whether Jews or Christians, for the true pronunciation of the name, which is in the Hebrew text, by long disuse is now quite lost." Origen expressly says that the four-letter name was unutterable amongst the Jews. Gesenius at one time regarded the word יהוה as perhaps of the same origin as Jov*is* Ju*piter*, and transferred from the Egyptians to the Hebrews. Parkhurst* quotes Varro as identifying Jove, Jovis pater, and Jupiter with the four-lettered name. Cahen† speaks of יהוה as a tetragrammatic name, composed of היה "it was," הוה "it is," יהיה "it will be," and he always translates IEUE as "l'Eternel."

The Rev. Mr. Etheridge says that the reverence with which the name Jehovah has been regarded for many centuries, and its consequent disuse as a spoken word, has been followed by the absolute loss of its true pronunciation. It was thought that the pronouncing the name was blasphemy.‡ "When the high priest pronounced it in the service of the day of Atonement, the people fell prostrate on the ground. After the time of the high priest Shimeon Hazaddik, it ceased to be spoken. It was last heard in the temple from his mouth. Henceforward whoever should attempt to pronounce it was to have no part in the world to come. The consequence has been an utter oblivion of the orthoepy of the name, not only in its oral sound, but in its grammatical vocalisation. The four antique consonants remain, but the peculiar nature of the Hebrew language will greatly modify the signification."

Layard in deciphering the hieroglyphical inscriptions on one of the upright tablets at Nineveh, discovered amongst the names of thirteen great gods, one identical with Yao or Jupiter.§ Abbé Cambalot, quoting Lao Tse, a Chinese writer, gives the following curious passage—"Celui que vous regardez et que vous ne voyez pas, se nomme *I;* celui que vous écoutez, et que vous n'entendez pas, se nomme

* Lexicon, p. 156.
† Genese, p. 6.
‡ Targums on the Pentateuch, p 8.
§ Second Expedition to Nineveh, p. 629.

HI; celui que votre main cherche, et qu'elle ne peut sasir, se nomme *Weï:* ce sont trois êtres que l'on ne peut comprendre, et qui confondus n'en font qu'un. Celui qui est au-dessus n'est pas plus brillant; celui qui est au-dessous n'est pas plus obscur: c'est une chaîne sans interruption, qui rentre dans le nom être, qu'on appelle *forme* sans *forme*, être indéfinissable. En allant au-devant, on ne lui voit point de principe; en le suivant, on ne voit rien au-delà." M. Abel Remusat thinks that "the *I, HI, Weï* is identical with the Jehovah of the Jews."*

The Pentateuch, says Von Bohlen, "can no better conceal, than the books which immediately succeed it, that Jehovah was at first merely the national Deity of the Israelites. Cain is afraid to dwell in a land where 'Jehovah is not;' the Deity goes down with his people into Egypt, and appears there to his chosen servants. He is constantly spoken of as 'the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob,' or 'the God of the Hebrews.'"† Von Bohlen denies that the name Jehovah is Semitic in its origin; he does not affirm from whence the Jews derived the word, but apparently favours the theory of its Egyptian origin.

Chap. xxiii. v. 2.—A writer in the *Cornhill Magazine*‡ says—"We may remark that the antipathy of the Jewish professors to women is oddly enough evinced in one of their glosses on the Book of Genesis. In this they contend that Abraham shed but few tears on the death of Sarah, inasmuch as she had grown old, and that, as a consequence, he was not altogether sorry to get rid of her. That his tears were scanty, they conclude from the fact that the letter *Caph*, which is used in describing his weeping, is a remarkably small letter, and, being a small letter, could only be used with propriety in the description of a small thing; and, accordingly, the thing described being the weeping, that weeping must have been small, as the letter certainly is." I do not know on what authority this is given. The letter *Caph* is relatively not a small letter, either in Biblical or Rabbinical Hebrew.

* Cambalot's Elemens de Philosophie, p. 20.
† Introduction to Genesis, vol. 1, p. 148: Hevwood's translation.
‡ No. 64, p. 486.

Chap. xxiii., v. 6.—"Hear us, my Lord: Thou art a mighty prince among us." Kalisch, Bellamy, the Douay, the Vulgate, and the Septuagint agree in translating the words "a mighty prince" as "a prince of God." The word rendered mighty in our version is אֱלֹהִים (ALEIM), which is generally translated God in our Bible. Why have the orthodox translators given a different rendering here?

Verse 9.—"Cave of Machpelah." The Douay, the Vulgate, and the Septuagint translate this "the double cave." That is, while our version makes Machpelah the proper name of a district, the other versions do not treat it as a proper name at all. In verse 17 this distinction quite alters the sense. Our version reads—"And the field of Ephron, which was in Machpelah;" the Douay and Vulgate, "And the field that before was Ephron's, wherein was the double cave." Was the field in Machpelah, or was Machpelah (*i.e.*, the double cave) in the field?

Verse 13.—"Saying, But if thou *wilt give it*, I pray thee, hear me." The Jewish reading of this passage affords internal evidence of some corruption, by the impossibility there is of collecting from it any intelligible and consistent meaning; and accordingly all the various attempts to fill up the chasm have proved utterly ineffectual. Thus, for instance, the supplement which is introduced into the authorised English rendering of the sentence, and marked with italics, is quite at variance with the context. The Septuagint reads, following in this the sense of the Samaritan and Syriac: "Since thou art on my side, hear me."* The Douay, following the Latin Vulgate, reads: "I beseech thee to hear me;" Bellamy: "But if thou wilt hear me;" Kalisch: "If thou only, oh, if thou would'st hear me." The words "wilt give it" are not only not in the Hebrew, but are absurdly introduced by the translators of our version, and without any warranty in the spirit of the story.

Chap xxiv., v. 3.—The conduct of Abraham as to cath-taking is disapproved in Matthew, chap. v., vv. 34 to 37, and James, chap. v., v. 12. In the Pentateuch and other books of the Old Testament swearing is common. God binds

* Grounds for Revision p. 447.

himself by an oath, and his prophets do likewise. It is not an edifying task for the true believer to estimate how often these scripture-recorded oaths have been broken.

Chap. xxiv., v. 14.—Bellamy says that "in this verse there are six words in the authorised version for which there is not any authority in the Hebrew—viz., "let the same be she that." According to the Douay and the Latin Vulgate, Abraham's servant talked to himself; how were the words made known to the writer of Genesis?

Verse 47.—"I put the earring upon her face." Kalisch renders this, "I put the nose-ring in her nose."

Verse 55.—Five words are put in for which there is no authority in the Hebrew—viz., "a few at the least."

Chap. xxv., vv. 1 and 2.—"Then again Abraham took a wife, and her name was Keturah. And she bare him Zimran, and Jokshan, and Medan, and Midian, and Ishbak, and Shuah." The account is repugnant to what went before. If Abraham, at the age of 100 years, laughed at the idea of his having a son, how does it happen that, when he was 137 years old, he marries again and begets six children?* The great age of Abraham has long before been emphatically urged (xxiv., v. 1); about forty years previous to the period to which this portion seems to refer he had felt the debility of advancing years approaching (xvii., v. 17), and the birth of Isaac was considered a miracle beyond the natural order of events (xviii., v. 11), since Abraham was at that time as good as dead (Hebrews xi., v. 12); and yet after all this he has a large family.

Verse 3.—Kalisch says, "a great perplexity arises from the circumstance that it contains names elsewhere introduced in perfectly different connections. For Sheba and Dedan, here traced to Abraham and mentioned as the sons of Jokshan, are in the great catalogue of nations (x., 7) enumerated amongst the Cushites, and described as the sons of Raamah." Asshurim seems to me more like the inhabitants of Asshur (see chap. x., v. 11, and page 80) than the name of an individual. The other two names, Letushim and Lemmim, seem plural nouns.

* Giles's Hebrew Records, p. 183.

Verses 5 and 6.—If Abraham really gave "all that he had" unto Isaac, what kind of gifts did his other children get? The text intends, probably, that Isaac got the residue of Abraham's property, not that he had the whole of it.

Verse 6.—The word פילגשים (PhILeGeShIM) "concubines," should, according to Rabbi Solomon Ben Isaac, "be פלגשם (PheLeGeSheM), without the י, to show that it was only one concubine—*i.e.*, Hagar, who was identical with Keturah, according to the opinion of Berishith Rabba."*

Verse 23 —Advocates for the rights of primogeniture ought to read this verse attentively. God seems to have a preference for younger sons: the dutiful Ishmael (who, though turned out into the desert to starve, forgot his wrongs, and attended to place his father's body in the grave) was set aside for his younger brother Isaac. The truthful, manly, and forgiving elder born Esau is supplanted by the crafty, cowardly, and untruthful Jacob.

Chap. xxvi., vv. 7 to 11.—Of this adventure happening a third time in the history of father and son, and a second time in the same country, Professor Newman says, "Allowing that such a thing was barely not impossible, the improbability was so intense as to demand the strictest and most cogent proof; yet, when we asked who testified it, no proof appeared that it was Moses; or, supposing it to be he, what his sources of knowledge were." Isaac's falsehood in passing off his wife as his sister seems to have been directly rewarded by God. (See verse 12.)

Verse 8.—The word מצחק (MeTzHQ), here translated "sporting," is the same word which in c. xxi. v. 9 (see page 108) was rendered "mocking," the translators hoping to manufacture some justification for Sarah's hard heartedness. In 2 Samuel, c. ii. v. 14, "play" seems to take a wide meaning; but the Hebrew word in that case, although somewhat similar, is clearly not the same as in the two under notice.

Verse 34.—"And Esau was forty years old when he took to wife Judith the daughter of Beeri the Hittite, and Bashemath the daughter of Elon the Hittite." In c. xxxvi. vv. 2

* Jacob Ben Chajim's Introduction, p. 20.

and 3, we read that "Esau took his wives of the daughters of Canaan; Adah the daughter of Elon the Hittite, and Aholibamah the daughter of Anah, the daughter of Zibeon the Hivite; and Bashemath, Ishmael's daughter, sister of Nebajoth." The only name agreeing is that of Bashemath, who is in one verse described as Ishmael's daughter, and in the other as the daughter of Elon the Hittite. In c. xxviii. v. 9 the third wife, the daughter of Ishmael, is called Mahalath. Is it important that Christians should have any belief as to the names of Esau's wives? If yes, how are they to believe one statement in preference to the other? If the names are declared to be unimportant, may not an objector fairly urge that many other names and a great deal of narrative are also immaterial? and if once you commence the process of rejecting any portion as unnecessary, where is the line to be drawn?

Gen., chap. xxvii., vv. 18 to 24.—"And he came unto his father, and said, My father. And he said, Here am I; who art thou, my son? And Jacob said unto his father, I am Esau thy first-born; I have done according as thou badest me: arise, I pray thee, sit and eat of my venison, that thy soul may bless me. And Isaac said unto his son, How is it that thou hast found it so quickly, my son? And he said, Because the Lord thy God brought it to me. And Isaac said unto Jacob, Come near, I pray thee, that I may feel thee, my son, whether thou be my very son Esau or not. And Jacob went near unto Isaac his father; and he felt him, and said, The voice is Jacob's voice, but the hands are the hands of Esau. And he discerned him not, because his hands were hairy, as his brother Esau's hands. So he blessed him. And he said, Art thou my very son Esau? And he said, I am." Psalm cxx., v. 2—"Deliver my soul, O Lord, from lying lips, and from a deceitful tongue." Proverbs xii., v. 22—"Lying lips are abomination to the Lord: but they that deal truly are his delight." Proverbs vi., vv. 16 to 19—"These six things doth the Lord hate: yea, seven are an abomination unto him: a proud look, a lying tongue, and hands that shed innocent blood, an heart that deviseth wicked imaginations, feet that be swift in running to mischief, a false witness that speaketh lies, and he that soweth

discord among brethren." Malachi i., v. 2—"Was not Esau Jacob's brother? saith the Lord: yet I loved Jacob, and I hated Esau." Our Roman Catholic friends try to show that this was not a lie on Jacob's part, or if one a white lie. A note to the Douay Bible tells us "St. Augustine (L. contra mendacum, c. 10) treating at large upon this place, excuseth Jacob from a lie, because this whole passage was mysterious as relating to the preference which was afterwards to be given to the Gentiles before the carnal Jews, *which Jacob by prophetic light might understand!* So far it is certain that the birthright, both by divine election and by Esau's free cession, belonged to Jacob, so that if there were any lie in the case it could be no more than an officious and venal one." Were Abraham's lies also prophetic truths? Was Isaac's falsehood of the same character? The God who hates liars and abominates lying lips specially calls himself the God of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob. It is sad to read the pitiable efforts made by various writers to free Jacob from blame. Bellamy says that Jacob did not lie, for that "when he said 'I am Esau,' he did not mean the person of Esau, but that he was in the place of Esau as to the succession of primogeniture."* What did Jacob mean when he answered that he had found the venison so quickly because the Lord God brought it to him, while he well knew that he had taken tame goats from the flock? It is idle to justify this, or the reply "I am" to the question "art thou my very son Esau?" The pious William Jones says, "We are struck with horror indeed at seeing one lie added to another, and the sacred name of God introduced as it were to sanctify the cheat."† Kalisch declares that Jacob debased himself in this scene by falsehood, craft, and shameless blasphemy. Most readers will be inclined to endorse the judgment of Kalisch. In fact a perusal of verse 12—"My father peradventure will feel me, and I shall seem to him as a deceiver; and I shall bring a curse upon me, and not a blessing"—shows that Jacob himself knew that he was trying to deceive his blind old father.

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* New Translation, p. 111.
† Biblical Cyclopædia.

Verse 36.—"Is not he rightly named Jacob? for he hath supplanted me these two times." Kalisch says Jacob, "if taken in its obvious etymological meaning, implies a deep ignominy; for the root from which it is derived signifies to deceive or defraud;" it is in this sense Esau uses the word. Our translators in this verse have followed the Vulgate, Septuagint, and Syriac, not the Hebrew, which is incoherent and evidently inaccurate. Literally translated the Hebrew is "Whether because *one* hath called his name Jacob, for he hath supplanted me this pair of turns." Cahen translates it—"L'a-t-on appelé Jacob parcequ'il m'a déja supplanté deux fois." Wall says*—"How grievously the later sets of English translators were perplexed by the structure of the Hebrew passage here examined, is placed in a prominent light by the artifice to which they were induced to resort, in order to give their respective renderings of it, in seeming conformity with the profession made by them in the title pages of their versions, some faint appearance of being taken from the Hebrew. It is obviously for this purpose that they put the first clause of their several translations of this passage in an interrogative form. But a question, coupled with a negative, substantially amounts to a positive statement; and the query 'is he not rightly named?' is virtually equivalent to the assertion, 'he is rightly named;' so that the renderings employed by them certainly could not have been derived from the Hebrew text in its present state, but must have been surreptitiously borrowed from one of the ancient versions. The very negation introduced into these renderings estranges them from the Hebrew passage, wherein no warrant whatever is to be found for such an expression, any more than for the adverb "justly" or "rightly" here inserted in their translations.

Verse 39—"Behold, thy dwelling shall be the fatness of the earth, and of the dew of heaven from above." Kalisch translates this—"Behold, without the fatness of the earth shall be thy dwelling, and without the dew of heaven from above." He adds, that were the authorised version correct, the prediction would be untrue, since Idumea is no fertile,

* Grounds for Revision, p. 455.

but, on the contrary, a most dreary and unproductive land.* Cahen, whose translation agrees with our version, remarks, "Toutefois l' Idumée, séjour d'Esau, n'etait pas une terre fertile."

Verse 40.—"And by thy sword shalt thou live, and shalt serve thy brother [there is no evidence that Esau ever did serve his brother]; and it shall come to pass when thou shalt have the dominion, that thou shalt break his yoke from off thy neck." The Douay translates this—"And the time shall come when thou shalt shake off, and loose his yoke from thy neck." Kalisch, who declares our version incorrect, renders it—"When thou truly desirest it, thou shalt break his yoke from thy neck." Cahen gives—"Toutefois quand tu auras (assez) souffert, tu secoueras son joug de dessus ton cou." The Samaritan version is just the opposite to Cahen's.† Other translators have given still different renderings of this passage.

Chapter xxviii., v. 11.—Even in a dream, the idea of a ladder reaching from earth to heaven to enable God and his angels to go up and down is rather ludicrous. The Douay says that Jacob "saw the ladder in his sleep." A dream, in the Bible, is intended to have a far stronger significance than we should attach to it; we are told that God often appeared to various persons in dreams. The writer of Genesis evidently conceived a ladder necessary to enable the angels of God to get up to heaven, in the same style in which you or I might ascend to the roof of a house.

"In India, many caves used as temples, contain a high ladder, with seven gates, in conformity with the number of planets, upon which the soul is believed gradually to ascend to the highest abode of bliss. In the mysteries of Mythra, a ladder is introduced with seven steps, on which the spirits were believed to ascend through the planets till they arrived in the eighth heaven, where the Deity is enthroned."‡

Verses 20 and 21.—"And Jacob vowed a vow, saying, If God will be with me, and will keep me in this way that I go, and give me bread to eat, and raiment to put on, so

* Genesis, p. 515.
† Cahen's Genese, 85.
‡ Kalisch: Genesis, 522.

that I come again to my father's house in peace, then shall the Lord be my God." The fair inference from this conditional statement is, that if God does not keep, clothe, and feed Jacob, then he shall not be Jacob's God. Jacob was a shrewd fellow; he did not want to be religious for nothing. He would have cared little for the preacher, whose sermon should have taught, "Take no thought what ye shall eat, or what ye shall drink, or wherewithal ye shall be clothed." Objectors to the text have rightly spoken of this chapter as recording Jacob's selfish bargain. Jacob's generous offer recorded in verse 22, to repay to God a tithe of all God might give to him, is in thorough harmony with the preceding verses.* Cahen adds—"The Scriptures do not say when Jacob performed this part of his vow."

C. xxix. v. 17 to 25.—The Douay says that Leah was bleareyed, Josephus that she had "no comely countenance," and he adds that Jacob was drunk after the wedding feast, which fact and being in the dark prevented him from discovering the change of brides.

C. xxx. v. 8.—"With great wrestlings have I wrestled with my sister." The Douay and Vulgate read—"God hath compared me with my sister." Kalisch gives—"Struggles of God have I struggled with my sister."

Verse 11.—"A troop cometh." The Douay translates this—"Happily;" Kalisch, "In felicity;" Vulgate, "Feliciter." Cahen says the phrase is difficult to translate.

Jacob's frauds upon Laban are in keeping with his previous character; but Jacob and Laban are better matched than Jacob and Esau. Laban is as willing to cheat as Jacob; the latter is only ultimately successful because he has God to aid him. Jacob expressly states to his wives that God had taken the cattle of Laban to give to him.

Chapter xxxi.—Jacob's stealing away unawares whilst Laban was away sheep shearing, forms a fitting termination to his connection with Laban. The "images" which Rachel stole are called "Teraphim" by Kalisch and Bellamy. The Douay, the Septuagint, and Vulgate call them "idols." The Hebrew is תרפים (TheRePhIM.) The Teraphim are

* Genese, p. 88.

sometimes identified with the Cherubim, see page 49. In Hosea, c. iii., v. 4, "Teraphim" are mentioned as advantages of which the sinning Israelites were to be temporarily deprived.* From the history of Micah in Judges chaps. xvii. and xviii., the Teraphim seem to have been regarded as Deities, who, although made of metal, delivered oracles in reply to priestly interrogations. They are also spoken of in the Bible as though they were heathen idols. Kalisch says†—"Almost numberless absurdities have been advanced with regard to the Teraphim; ancient Rabbis assert that their worship was connected with atrocious customs of murder, and, with ludicrous efforts to elicit divinations, that they were horoscopic or astrologic instruments; that they were automata to indicate the hours, or *that they were something like donkeys.*" Parkhurst says—"There is little room to doubt that each Teraphim was a compound image with several heads, joined to one body like the Cherubim in form, but for more private purposes."‡ Newman calls them—"Household gods which were made in the form of a human person." Mr. Etheridge says—"The obscurity which hangs over the true meaning of this word (Teraphim), may be judged of by the multiplicity of the derivations assigned to it. 1. That, by a change of the first letter, it is equivalent to Seraphim, and may denote images of bright or burnished brass. 2. That it comes from *tseraph*, 'to melt,' whence *tsoreph*, 'goldsmith,' and signifies molten images. 3. It comes from *rapha* 'to heal,' and describes talismans used as charms for curing or averting diseases. 4. From *taraph*, 'to feed, nourish.' The Teraphim from this view were some kind of objects, the presence of which, in a house, was thought to ensure support and plenty. 5. Some Rabbins make it a term of contempt from *turaph*, 'shamefulness.' 6. Others with the same idea derive it from *raphaim*, 'weak things,' like the dead. 7. Another opinion assigns it to the Syriac *teraph*, 'to ask of, inquire,' in which re-

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* Wait's Jewish Antiquities, p. 167.

† Genesis, 554.

‡ Lexicon p. 648; but see Eichhorn's Simonis, 1764; Buxtorf, 511; and Newman, 732.

spect the teraphim were domestic idols."* The devout student of the Bible can be certain either that teraphim are good, or that they are bad; the evidence goes both ways, and, as to the meaning of the word, the less probably a true believer knows about meanings the better for his faith.

Verse 24: "Speak not to Jacob either good or bad."—This would in fact be an injunction from God that Laban was to observe absolute silence. The Vulgate has "ne quidquam aspere loquaris contra Jacob," in this following the Septuagint.

Verse 51.—"And Laban said to Jacob, Behold this heap, and behold this pillar, which I have cast betwixt me and thee." In lieu of "which I have cast," the Douay has, "which I have set up;" the Vulgate, "quem erexi;" Cahen, "que j'ai erigés." This is in direct opposition, says Dr. Wall, to the rest of the narrative. "For we are expressly informed, in the 45th and 46th verses of this very chapter, that the pillar here mentioned was set up, not by Laban but by Jacob; and that the heap of stones was collected, not by Laban's but by Jacob's direction."† The Septuagint altogether omits the phrase.

Verse 53.—The words "God of their father" are not in the Septuagint. Cahen translates it, "the Gods of their fathers."

Chap. xxxii., v. 1.—"Angels of God." Bellamy does not believe these were celestial beings. (See pages 95 to 97.) The Reverend A. M'Caul has a long article,‡ in which he admits that the mere word translated angel might as fairly be rendered man; but he argues that there are beings, "angels" entrusted with various missions on earth, and that one of these is in fact God himself. The courage of Jacob does not seem raised by the meeting with the angels; their presence does not appear to have given the Jewish patriarch the slightest confidence in God's intention to protect him; Jacob's fear of Esau is greater than his faith in God.

Verse 22: "His eleven sons."—Cahen translates "ses

* Grounds for Revision, p. 458.
† Targums on Leviticus, p. 23.
‡ Rabbi Kinchi on Jeremiah, p. 9.

onze enfans;" the Hebrew is, אחד עשר ילדיו (AChaD OSheR ILeDIU), "his eleven children." Our translators have rendered sons because Jacob had then twelve children—viz., Joseph, Dinah, Zebulun, Issachar, Asher, Gad, Naphthali, Dan, Judah, Levi, Simeon, Reuben. The word "sons" is בנים—BeNIM, an entirely different word.

Verse 28.—"And he said, Thy name shall be called no more Jacob, but Israel." Yet, notwithstanding this, the name of Jacob is afterwards used repeatedly in Genesis; and when talking to Moses God calls himself "the God of Jacob," not the God of Israel.

Verse 30.—"And Jacob called the name of the place Peniel: for I have seen God face to face, and my life is preserved." 1 John, chap. xl., v. 12: "No man hath seen God at any time;" and John, chap. i., v. 18; chap. v., v. 37; and chap. vi., v. 46. 1 Timothy, chap. vi., v. 16: "Who only hath immortality, dwelling in the light which no man can approach thereto; whom no man hath seen, nor can see." Exodus, chap. xxxiii., v. 20: "And he said, Thou canst not see my face; for there shall no man see me and live." This seems as express and clear a contradiction in words as it is possible to conceive.

Verses 31 and 32.—"And as he passed over Penuel, the sun rose upon him, and he halted upon his thigh." "Therefore the children of Israel eat not of the sinew which shrank, which is upon the hollow of the thigh, unto this day; because he touched the hollow of Jacob's thigh in the sinew that shrank." This reference to a custom still existing among the Israelites seems decidedly to indicate a later date than that of Moses. No one has ventured to assert that the Mosaic law was observed by the Jews before it was instituted by Moses. Now the words of the passage before us seem to show that the Israelites had, for a very long time, abstained from eating the sinew which shrank. Moses being conscious that this custom was ordained by himself, could hardly have used such language, or have claimed such great antiquity as the words seem to indicate.*

The narrative in verses 24 to 30, coupled with Hosea,

* Hebrew Records, 142.

c. xii., vv. 3 and 4, conveys the meaning that Jacob wrestled with God, who had assumed the form of a man, that the finite and created man was as strong and able at wrestling as the omnipotent and infinite creator. That God, to conquer Jacob unfairly, put his thigh out of joint, and that even then Jacob refused to let God go until he had given him his blessing. Bellamy entirely denies the correctness of our version, and disputes the whole story.

It is impossible to read of Jacob's coward fear of Esau, and his boldness against God, without some surprise. Jacob's attempts to bribe his brother to forgive him, Esau's rejection of the proffered gifts, and his magnanimous conduct to Jacob, form an instructive scene. Jacob free in his own heart from all generous emotions, could only imagine Esau's march with 400 men as one of vengeance, and his abject entreaties to God, "Deliver me, I pray thee, from the hands of my brother," will mark his despicably cowardly nature.

It is almost impossible to find a greater contrast than that presented by Jacob whom God loved, and Esau whom he hated. Esau, rough, manly, vigorous, brave, genuine, truthful, and generous—Jacob, mean, unprincipled, cunning, cowardly, and lying.

Chap. xxxiii., v. 14.—Jacob still adheres to his old craft, it is evidently not his intention to follow Esau to Seir. Cahen says—"*Tout le monde convient que l'intention de Jacob n'etait pas d'aller à Seir mais d'eloigner son frère.*"

Verse 18.—"Jacob came to Salem." Many Rabbis translate it that "Jacob arrived in peace," or arrived safely; or cured of his accident. Coverdale, Matthews, and others, deny the existence of Salem as a city.*

Chap xxxiv.—Upon this chapter Voltaire has the following severe observations:—"The son of a king is desirous to marry, to repair a wrong done to a Hebrew girl; the marriage is approved; Jacob, the father, and Dinah, the daughter, are loaded with presents: the King of Sichem deigns to receive the patriarchs within his city; he has the incredible politeness to undergo, with his son, his court, and his people, the rite of circumcision, thus condescending to

* See Bellamy's New Translation, 132; and contra Cahen: Genese, 110; and Kalisch, 575.

the superstition of a petty horde that could not call half a league of territory their own! And, in return for this astonishing hospitality and goodness, how do our holy patriarchs act? They wait for the day when the process of circumcision generally induces fever; when Simeon and Levi run through the whole city with poignards in their hands and massacre the king, the prince his son, and all the inhabitants. We are precluded from the horror appropriate to this infernal counterpart of the tragedy St. Bartholomew, only by a sense of its absolute impossibility. It is an abominable romance; but it is evidently a ridiculous romance. It is impossible that two men could have slaughtered in quiet the whole population of a city. The people might suffer, in a slight degree, from the operation which had preceded; but, notwithstanding this, they would have risen in self-defence against two diabolical miscreants; they would have instantly assembled, would have surrounded them, and destroyed them with the summary and complete vengeance merited by their atrocity." It is difficult from the incoherency of Bible chronology to arrive with accuracy at a knowledge of Dinah's age, but the chronological evidence, such as it is, would make her very juvenile at the time of this tragedy. Some opponents of the text have contended that Dinah was only three years old. Josephus tells the story very differently from Genesis; he not only omits the whole account of the circumcision of the Shechemites, but actually states that when the sons of Jacob were asked about the proposed marriage, "the greatest part said nothing not knowing what advice to give," but that it being the time of a festival when the Shechemites were employed in ease and feasting, Simeon and Levi fell upon the watch when they were asleep, and coming into the city slew all the males.*

Spinoza says—"In the 47th chap. of Genesis, it is recorded that Jacob, when first presented by Joseph his son to Pharaoh, was 130 years old, from which if 22 be taken, which he passed in sorrow on account of the loss of Joseph, and 17 for Joseph's age when he was sold by his brethren, and lastly seven when he served for Rachel, Jacob is found

* Antiquites: Book 1, chap. 21.

at a very advanced age—viz., 84, when he took Leah to wife; on the contrary, Dinah could have scarcely been seven when she was violated by Sechem; and Simeon and Levi, again scarcely 12 and 11 when they ravaged a city and put all the inhabitants thereof to the sword."* Kalisch says,† "Some of the details of the narrative contained in this chapter are certainly of an extraordinary nature. True the caprice of Oriental princes has demanded and obtained stranger things from their subjects than that which Sechem required from the men of his town; it may further be granted that Simeon and Levi were, under the circumstances, alone able to kill the whole male population of a large city, and to carry away all the cattle and every other property (for the text does not countenance the supposition that they were supported by a large number of servants), but what did the victors do with the captive women and children?"

Chap. xxxv., v. 10.—This verse is a repetition of c. xxxii., v. 29, indeed it is a contradiction of it, for if the first change had been made by God, the second would have been unnecessary.

Verses 14 and 15.—These verses seem in the same way a repetition of chap. xxviii., vv. 18 and 19.

Verse 16.—"There was but a little way." Cahen, on the contrary, says—"Il y avait encore une grande étendue de pays."‡ The Douay and Vulgate make it, "He came in the spring time to the land." It can hardly be satisfactory for the unlearned believer to discover passages so differently translated by learned men. He is either driven to doubt, or is compelled to have faith, *not* in God's original revelation, but in the infallibility of some one out of several opposing translations.

Chap. xxxv., v. 19.—"And Rachel died, and was buried in the way to Eprath, which is Beth-lehem." 1 Samuel x., v. 2, says that Rachel's sepulchre was at Zebzah. Colenso notices "Eprath which is Beth-lehem," as one of the signs of later date, the modern name being given as well as the ancient one.§

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* Tractatus Theologico Politicus, cap. 9. † Genesis, 583.
‡ See also Kalisch 589, who makes it "still a distance."
§ Colenso, Part ii., 217.

Verse 21.—The whole of this verse is omitted in the Septuagint.

Verse 22, and chap. xlix., vv. 3 and 4., and 1 Chron. v., v. 1.—The family to whom God promised "the land," seem to have been most immoral and vicious. Abraham's conduct has been already noticed; the lives of Lot, his family, and neighbours, afford, too, much scope for animadversion; Isaac's procedure was certainly not free from blame in the matter of Rebekah, but he appears a saint by comparison with the rascality of his son Jacob, whose wife, Rachel (worthy partner of such a husband) robs her own father—the cut-throat propensities of Simeon and Levi—and the licentiousness of Reuben.

End of verse 22 to verse 26.—Dr. Giles* speaks of the inaccuracy of the last verse as follows:—"'These are the sons of Jacob, which were born to him in Padan-Aram.' But it is well known that Benjamin was born some years after Jacob returned to Canaan. The text, therefore, is incorrect, and creates a serious difficulty, if we suppose that Moses, writing in the presence of God, could have been liable to such an error." Kalisch thus sums up, *inter alia*, the difficulties of this chapter†—"The words, 'and Jacob arrived at Luz, which is in the land of Canaan' (verse 6), seem to imply that he was coming from a part beyond the territory of the Holy Land (see chap. xxxiii., v. 18), and yet he is supposed to have proceeded from Shechem [which is part of Canaan]. Jacob was commanded by God to stay or to live in Bethel (verse 1), but he left it after a very short time (verse 16). The name of Bethel was long in existence (verses 1 and 3, chap. xxviii., v. 19), and yet it seems now only to have been given to that place by Jacob (verse 15). The Patriarch's name had been changed at Peniel (chap. xxxii., verse 29), but it would seem that he received the appellation of Israel now only at Bethel (verse 10)."

Chap. xxxvi.—"Now these are the generations of Esau, who is Edom." In verse 9 the Hebrew says that Esau is the father of Edom; to avoid the contradiction our translators have written "father of the Edomites."

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* Hebrew Records, 190.

† Genesis, 591.

Verse 11.—צפו (TsePhU) is, in 1 Chron. i., v. 36, written צפי (TsePhI), probably a copyist's blunder.

Verse 12.—"Timna was concubine to Eliphaz." 1 Chron. i., v. 36, makes Timna the son of Eliphaz.

Verse 14 is a mere repetition of verse 5, and verse 18 again another repetition of the same statement.

Verse 20.—Who was Seir? In several places there is mount Seir mentioned, but we find no man so named.

Verse 22.—הימם (EIMeM) is, in 1 Chron. i., v. 39, written הומם (EUMeM), just reversing the sort of blunder referred to in verse 11.

Verse 23.—עלון (OLUN) is written, in 1 Chron. i., v. 40, עלין (OLIN), a similar error in copying, but again reversed. שפו (ShePhU) is written, in 1 Chron. i., v. 40, שפי (ShePhI).

Verse 26.—חמדן (HeMDeN) is, in 1 Chron. i., v. 41, written חמרן (HeMReN). In anglicising this word, the translators have turned the final N into M, writing it in Chronicles Amram.

Verse 27.—עקן (OQeN) is, in 1 Chron. i., v. 42, written יעקן (IOQeN). These inaccuracies, and some others occurring in this chapter, are of the same character as those pointed out in page 78, and while—being simply copyist's blunders, in substituting one letter for another, the letters being similar in form—they are of little importance to an ordinary reader, if the Bible be regarded as uninspired; they are most important to all mankind if the Bible be regarded in every particular as God's inspired word demanding our implicit faith, because these errors demonstrate not only that errors may occur in the sacred text, but that they have occurred.

Chap. xxxi., v. 31.—"And these are the kings that reigned in the land of Edom, before there reigned any king over the children of Israel."* This verse has long been a stumbling block to the critics. Colenso says—"The phrase, 'before there reigned any king over the children of Israel,' is here used to imply that one king at least had reigned, or was reigning

* Dr. Giles's Hebrew Records, 140; De Wette, vol. ii., sec. 149; Spinoza, Tractatus, c. 8.

over 'the children of Israel,' that is, apparently, not over one of the separate kingdoms of Judah or Israel, but over the *united people*, at the time when it was written. In other words, it could not have been written before the time of Samuel.*

Verse 39.—הדר (EDeR) is, in 1 Chron. i., v. 50, הדד (EDeD); and פעו (POU) is, in Chronicles, פעי (POI).

Verse 40.—עלוה (OLUE) is, in 1 Chron. i., v. 51, written עליה (OLIE).

Verse 40.—Cahen regards these latter verses as an incorrect repetition of those commencing with verse 15. He remarks that the list of dukes succeeding, instead of preceding the Kings of Edom has much embarrassed the commentators.†

Chap. xxxvii., v. 1.—In the Douay, instead of "wherein his father was a stranger," it reads, "wherein his father sojourned." Cahen reads, "*où son père avait séjourné.*" The Vulgate, "*in qua pater suus peregrinatus.*" And in verse 2, instead of "seventeen," the Douay and Vulgate read "sixteen," and they state that Joseph "accused his brethren to his father of a most wicked crime."

The words, "These are the generations of Jacob," seem without sense or connection with the verses following.

Verses 25, 27, and 28.—"Here the merchants to whom Joseph is sold, are thrice called Ishmaelites, and once Midianites. Bishop Patrick explains the inconsistency in the following extraordinary manner:—

"'*Ishmaelites.* They are called below Midianites. These people were near neighbours to each other, and were joined together in one company, or caravan, as it is now called. It is the custom, even to the present day, in the East, for merchants and others to travel through the deserts in large companies, for fear of robbers or wild beasts.'

"If the passage to which these comments are annexed, occurred in one of the famous Greek or Latin historians—Livy, Thucydides, or any other—such a note would not, for one instant, be taken as sound criticism, because none of

* Pentateuch, Part ii., p. 202.

† Genese, 124.

those able writers would be guilty of such an absurdity as applying two names, known to be distinct, to the same people, within the space of four lines. If some idle and weakly written tale contained the inconsistency, the mode of interpreting it, which Bishop Patrick applies to the passage before us, might be passed over, but even then more from its being of no importance than from its soundness or its propriety. But when we find this discrepancy in a work which professes to be inspired, it is highly desirable that such an inconsistency or discrepancy should be cleared up. Why have none of the commentators remarked on the singular circumstance of there being Ishmaelitish merchants at all, in the time when Joseph was sold into Egypt? Ishmael was Jacob's uncle, being brother to Isaac, Jacob's father. The family of Ishmael could not have increased to such an extent in the time of which the history treats. The mention of Ishmaelites, in the text before us, indicates that the writer lived many generations later, when Ishmaelitish merchants were well known. Still less likely is it that there were Midianitish merchants in those days; for Midian was also one of the sons of Abraham, and fifty-four years younger than Isaac (see chap. xxv., v. 2.) At all events, the variation in the name of this tribe of merchants renders it impossible that Moses could have written the narrative, unless we suppose that, when he had it in his power to describe the matter accurately and definitely, he rather chose to relate it in such a manner as to puzzle all future ages as to its exact meaning."*

Verse 35.—"All his daughters." What daughters had he besides Dinah? In the Douay, the word "hell" is substituted for the word "grave." The Hebrew is שְׁאֹלָה (SHALE). Jacob, it is urged, believed his son was devoured by wild beasts, and, therefore, could have hardly expected to find him in his grave; and by hell the Catholic fathers intend purgatory. I must refer my more precise readers to the various controversial works written by various shades of

* Hebrew Records, p. 145.

Catholic and Protestant divines, on the words "purgatory," "limbo," "hell," and "grave."*

Verse 36.—"Unto Potiphar, an officer of Pharaoh's, and captain of the guard." The word translated "officer" is סרים—which the Douay, Vulgate, Septuagint, and Syriac, all render "eunuch."† Cahen makes Potiphar "*chef des executeurs*," as the correct rendering. Kalisch in his note agrees in this, giving "chief of the executioners." Septuagint makes him "head cook," *archimageiro*. The word anglicised as Pharaoh is a common appellation of the ancient rulers of Egypt, and signifies "the sun."

Chap. xxxviii.—It is indeed difficult to discover why such a chapter should, during the later centuries of advanced civilisation, be permitted to disgrace a book which is placed in the hands of our daughters for their instruction. Dom Calmet says, that on first perusal it strikes our minds as not of a nature for edification, but the hidden sense which is shut up in it is as elevated as that of the mere letter appears low to carnal eyes. I deny that there is in this chapter any such elevated meaning derivable by any sensible interpretation. The record is in the first place unambiguously filthy and barbarous, without any redeeming feature. The whole of the chapter enables us to believe that the early traditions of the house of David formed a fitting preface to the life of that pious monarch, while we are obliged to wonder for what wise purpose the infinite Deity traces the genealogy of his only begotten son Jesus to so polluted a source.

Chap. xxxix., v. 1.—This verse is a mere repetition of chap. xxxvii., v. 36. The narration in this chapter serves by way of contrast to heighten the effect of the story told in the preceding chapter. Bible histories, with few exceptions, continue to place women in a degraded light.

Verse 41.—"See he hath brought in an Hebrew unto us." Verse 17, "The Hebrew servant which thou hast brought to us." Chap. xli., v. 15, "For indeed I was stolen away

* See Fulke's defence against Martin, p. 128, and pp. 278 to 231; Parker, Society Edition, pp. 81 to 84.

† See Lexicons, Bresslau, Gesenius 595, contra Parkhurst, 504, Kalisch, Genesis, 617.

out of the land of the Hebrews." Chap. xli., v. 12, "And there was there with us a young man, an Hebrew." "In the above passages the word 'Hebrew' is used in a familiar way, as if it were a well-known appellation of a *whole people*, well known even in Egypt—nay, as if the land of Canaan could already be spoken of by Joseph as the 'land of the Hebrews,' so as to be readily understood by the Egyptians with whom he was speaking."* These are evidently expressions of a later age, for in Joseph's time there was yet no Hebrew people, and even in the time of Moses there was no "land of the Hebrews."

Chap. lxi., v. 14.—In consequence of the omission in the Hebrew of certain letters, this verse is capable of at least sixteen different readings.† Our version says, "that Joseph shaved himself, changed his own raiment, and came unto the king." The Douay says that "they shaved Joseph, and changed his apparel, and brought him unto the king." The Septuagint differs from both.

Verse 45.—"And Pharaoh called Joseph's name Zaphnath-paaneah; and he gave him to wife Asenath, the daughter of Poti-pherah priest of On. And Joseph went out over all the land of Egypt." Our version says Pharaoh called Joseph Zapnath-paaneah, and the margin renders this "a revealer of secrets." The Douay and Vulgate translate it "Saviour of the world." Cahen says it is probably an Egyptian name of which the sense is unknown. The Septuagint omits the words "and Joseph went out over all the land of Egypt."

Verse 56.—This famine was over the whole earth, so that the favoured family of Abraham were worse off than the Egyptians, to whom God gave seven years' notice to enable them to prepare against the coming trouble. The seven years of previous plenty seem to have been limited to Egypt.

Chap. xliii., v. 32.—How could it be considered an abomination for the Egyptians to eat with the Hebrews? The latter were only the descendants of Abraham, few in number,

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* Colenso, Part ii, p. 206.

† See Wall's Grounds for Revision, p. 551.

and the Egyptians could not have known of their existence until they made acquaintance with Joseph; and by giving him the daughter of the high priest to wife, they had conferred great honour and favour on him—he was the first in the land, and the only Hebrew amongst them. The verse speaks as if of a custom well known. It is probable that the Egyptians did not eat with strangers. Herodotus says* that no Egyptian man or woman will kiss a Grecian on the mouth, or use the knife, spit, or caldron of a Greek.

Chap. xliv., v. 5.—The Douay commences this verse with the words, "the cup which you have stolen."

Chap. xlv., v. 10.—"Goshen." There is no such place or district known in Egypt—no profane writer mentions it.†

Verse 18.—If Pharaoh knew them to be Hebrews and shepherds, how is this reconcileable with c. xliii. v. 42, and c. xlvi. v. 34?

Chap. xlvi., vv. 8 to 15.—"All the souls of his sons and daughters were thirty and three." The names recorded in these verses only number thirty-two. The Talmudical writers, to account for the one deficient, suggest that Iochebed, the mother of Moses, was born while Jacob's family were *en route* for Egypt.‡

Verse 9.—פלוא, PheLUA, is in Numbers, c. xvi., v. 1, פלת, PheLeTh. If this second name is not intended for the other, then Genesis incorrectly states Reuben's family.

Verse 10.—ימואל, IeMUAL; and in Exodus, c. vi., v. 15, but in Numbers, c. xxvi., v. 12, and 1 Chronicles, c. vi., v. 24, he is called נמואל, NeMUAL. יכין, IKIN, is in 1 Chronicles, c. iv., v. 24, called יריב, IRIB. צחר, TseHeR, is in Numbers, c. xxvi., v. 13, and in 1 Chronicles, c. iv., v. 24, זרה, ZeReH.

Verse 10.—אהד, AED, is omitted altogether in Numbers, c. xxvi., v. 12, and from 1 Chronicles, c. iv., v. 24.

Verse 11.—גרשון, GeRShUN; in 1 Chronicles, c. vi., v. 16,§ is גרשם, GeRSheM, two letters differing.

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* Euterpe, sec. 41.

† See Kalisch, Genesis 679, and Cahen, Genese 159.

‡ Cahen's Genese, 163; and Kalisch, 689.

§ In the Hebrew this is in reality v. 1 of chap. v., the five preceding verses belonging to chap. vi.

Colenso says—"'And the sons of Judah, Er, and Onan, and Shelah, and Pharez, and Zarah; but Er and Onan died in the land of Canaan; and the sons of Pharez were Hezron and Hamul.'—G. xlvi. 12.

"It appears to me to be certain that the writer here means to say that Hezron and Hamul were *born in the land of Canaan,* and were among the seventy persons (including Jacob himself, and Joseph, and his two sons) who *came into Egypt* with Jacob.

"He repeats the words again and again:—'These are the names of the children of Israel, which came into Egypt,' v. 8. 'All the souls, that *came with Jacob into Egypt,* which came out of his loins, besides Jacob's sons' wives, were three score and six,' v 26—which they would not be without Hezron and Hamul; 'and the sons of Joseph, which were born him in Egypt, were two souls; all the souls of the house of Jacob, which *came into Egypt,* were three score and ten.'—v. 27.

"So again we read—'These are the names of the children of Israel, which *came into Egypt;* every man and his household *came with Jacob.* And all the souls that came out of the loins of Jacob, were seventy souls; for Joseph was in Egypt already.'—E. i. 1. 5. 'Thy fathers *went down into Egypt* with threescore and ten persons, and now the Lord thy God hath made thee as the stars of heaven for multitude.'—D. x. 22.

"I assume, then, that it is absolutely undeniable that the narrative of the Exodus distinctly involves the statement, that the sixty-six persons, 'out of the loins of Jacob,' mentioned in G. xlvi., and no others, went down with him into Egypt.

"Now Judah was *forty*-two years old,* according to the

* "Joseph was thirty years old, when he 'stood before Pharaoh,' as governor of the land of Egypt, G. xli. 46; and from that time nine years elapsed (seven of plenty and two of famine) before Jacob came down to Egypt. At that time, therefore, Joseph was thirty-nine years old. But Judah was about three years older than Joseph; for Judah was born in the *fourth* year of Jacob's double marriage, G. xxix 35., and Joseph in the *seventh*, G. xxx 24-26, c xxxi. 41. Hence Judah was forty-two years old when Jacob went down to Egypt."

story when he went down with Jacob into Egypt. But if we turn to G. xxxviii., we shall find that, in the course of these forty-two years of Judah's life, the following events are recorded to have happened.

"(1) Judah grows up, marries a wife—'at that time,' v. 1, that is, after Joseph's being sold into Egypt, when he was seventeen years old.'—G. xxxvii. 2, and when Judah, consequently, was, at least, *twenty* years old, and has, separately, three sons by her.

"(2) The eldest of these three sons grows up, is married, and dies.

"The second grows to maturity (suppose in another year) marries his brother's widow, and dies.

"The third grows to maturity (suppose in another year still), but declines to take his brother's widow to wife.

"She then deceives Judah himself, conceives by him, and in due time bears him twins, Pharez and Zarah.

"(3) One of these twins also grows to maturity, and has two sons, Hezron and Hamul, born to him, before Jacob goes down into Egypt.

"The above being certainly incredible, we are obliged to conclude that one of the two accounts must be untrue. Yet the statement, that Hezron and Hamul were born in the land of Canaan, is vouched so positively by the many passages above quoted, which sum up the 'seventy souls,' that, to give up this point, is to give up an essential part of the whole story. But then this point cannot be maintained, however essential to the narrative, without supposing that the other series of events had taken place beforehand, which we have seen to be incredible."*

The Rev. Dr. Giles† observes on verses 8 to 26:—

"An error is found also in the other catalogue of Jacob's children, who accompanied him into Egypt. The names occupy from verse 8 to 25 of Genesis, chap. xlvi. In verse 26 it is said:—

"'All the souls that came with Jacob into Egypt, which

* Colenso, Part I., chap ii., pp. 17-19. See also Spinoza, Tractatus Theologico Politicus, chap. ix., and Dr. McCaul; contra Colenso, pp. 3 to 15.

† Hebrew Records, p. 191.

came out of his loins, besides Jacob's sons' wives, all the souls were three score and six.

"This total is erroneous, for the names, added properly amount to sixty-seven; and a still greater difference is found between the Hebrew text and the Septuagint, in the twenty-seventh verse; the former makes 'all the souls of the house of Jacob' to be 'three score and ten,' whereas the latter states them to have been seventy-five.

"We might set aside the authority of the Septuagint as inferior to that of the Hebrew in such a matter, were it not that in St. Stephen's speech, in the Acts of the Apostles, chap. vii. v. 14, the number 27 is repeated; and an awkward dilemma is created, from which it is impossible to extricate ourselves, if these conflicting accounts, both written by inspiration, are to be considered as having come down to us in their original state. This may, with justice, be called in question; for Dean Shuckford, who supposes that the transcribers have added something in chap. xxxv., accuses them of having omitted something in chap. xlvi., of having added a verse in xlvi. 27, of the Septuagint, which is more full than the Hebrew, and, lastly, of having altered seventy into seventy-five, in chap. vii. of the Acts. It is difficult to imagine how a book, with which such liberties have been taken, can properly be regarded as an immaculate record. But the same mode of interpretation is entirely inapplicable to explain the remarkable fact, that, among those who accompanied Jacob into Egypt, are enumerated in chap. xlvi., v. 21, ten sons of Benjamin, and in v. 12, two grandsons of Judah, Hezron and Hamul. Jacob surely went into Egypt soon after the famine began; and Benjamin was then a lad, if we may trust the chroniclers, under twenty years of age. The grandsons of Judah, through his son Pharez, could not have been born until many years later; for Pharez, their father, was only two or three years old when the whole family first entered the land of their servitude."

Kalisch says*—"The text distinctly observes 'All the souls of the house of Jacob that came into Egypt were seventy,' verse 27. The same statement is as clearly re-

* Genesis, 686.

peated in other passages (Exodus i. 5., Deut. x., v. 22.) It is therefore scarcely possible to doubt that this was a historical tradition generally received amongst the Israelites. However the tenor of the present list certainly leads to the inference, that the total number of Hebrew settlers in Egypt was considerably larger than seventy. For first, Jacob had daughters (v. 7, and chap. xxxvii., v. 35). Secondly, his sons came with their wives (v. 26) none of whom is here counted. Third, his sons had likewise daughters (v. 7). but Serah only the daughter of Asher is introduced."

Verse 13.—פוה, PhUE, is in 1 Chronicles, c. vii., v. 1, פואה, PhUAE; and יוב, IUB, is ישיב, IShIB. In the first case one letter is added, and in the second two are substituted for one omitted.

Verse 16.—צפיון, TsePhIUN, is in Numbers, c. xxvi., v. 15, צפון, TsePhUN. The letter Yod is omitted. אצבן, ATsBeN, is in Numbers, c. xxvi., v. 16, אזני, AZNI, every letter being changed except the first. ארודי, ARUDI, is in Numbers, c. xxvi., v. 17, ארוד, ARUD, omitting the final Yod.

Verse 17.—ישוה, IShUE, is omitted in Numbers, c. xxvi., v. 44, but is inserted in 1 Chronicles, c. vii., v. 30. Heber and Malchiel, here put as the sons of Beriah, are by Josephus specially marked as the sons of Asher.*

Verse 20.- The Septuagint adds in this verse, for children of Ephraim and Manasseh, five names not given in our version—viz., Machir, Galaad, Soutalaám, Taám, and Edom.

Verse 21.—אחי, AHI, is in Numbers, c. xxvi., v. 38, אחירם, AHIReM. מפים, MePhIM, is in Numbers, c. xxvi., v. 39, written שפופם, ShePhUPheM. חפים, HePhIM, is in Numbers, c. xxvi., v. 39, חופם, HUPheM. These two latter names are in 1 Chronicles, c. vii., v. 12, put as children of Ir, while in Genesis and Numbers they are children of Benjamin.

Verse 21.—בכר (BeKeR), נרא (GeRA), and ראש (RASh), are all omitted in Numbers, c. xxvi., v. 38. In 1 Chronicles, c. vii., v. 6 (Beker), Becher is inserted, but the other two are omitted, and an entirely new name (Jedaiel)

* Antiquities, c. vii., sec. 4.

is added. In 1 Chronicles, c. viii., vv. 1 and 2, the reader will find another list of the children of Benjamin which contradicts the whole of the other lists, only two of the names corresponding. Becher (BeKeR), who is in this verse put as a son of Benjamin, is in Numbers, c. xxvi., v. 35, reckoned as a son of Ephraim. Naaman and Ard, in this verse called sons of Benjamin, are in Numbers, c. xxvi., v. 40, and in 1 Chronicles, c. viii., v. 3, designated sons of Bela, but Chronicles substitutes אדר (ADeR) for ארד (AReD). "All the souls were 14." The Septuagint has "18."

Verse 23.—חשים (HeShIM) is in Numbers, c. xxvi., v. 42, written שוחם (ShUHeM).

The reader will see from the above that not only do the lists severally given in this chapter, and in Numbers and Chronicles, differ from each other in spelling the various names to which attention has been drawn, but, as Kalisch observes, names introduced in Genesis are omitted in Numbers, and new names are introduced in Numbers not to be found in the Genesis list. The list in Chronicles deviates from and contradicts both. The list of names in the Septuagint contains many variations of names not above noticed.

"In verse 34 it is said, as a reason for the Israelites being placed in the land of Goshen, that 'every shepherd is an abomination to the Egyptians.' But it appears, from every other part of the history of Joseph and Pharaoh, that there was no such enmity between them. This is also the opinion of Dr. Shuckford, whose account of the matter is as follows:—

"'There is, indeed, one passage in Genesis which seems to intimate that there was that religious hatred, which the Egyptians were afterwards charged with, paid to creatures even in the days of Joseph; for we are informed that he put his brethren upon telling Pharaoh their profession, in order to have them placed in the land of Goshen, for or because, 'every shepherd is an abomination to the Egyptians,' Genesis, xlvi., v. 34. I must freely acknowledge that I cannot satisfy myself about the meaning of this passage; I cannot see that shepherds were really, at this time, an abomination to the Egyptians; for Pharaoh himself had his shepherds, and, when he ordered Joseph to place his brethren

in the land of Goshen, he was so far from disapproving of their employment, that he ordered him, if he knew any men of activity amongst them, that he should make them rulers of his cattle; nay, the Egyptians were, at this time, shepherds themselves as well as the Israelites, for we are told, when their money failed, they brought their cattle of all sorts unto Joseph, to exchange them for corn, and, among the rest, their flocks of the same kind with those which the Israelites were to tell Pharaoh that it was their profession to take care of, as will appear to any one that will consult the Hebrew text in the places referred to. Either, therefore, we must take the expression that every shepherd was an abomination to the Egyptians to mean no more than that they thought meanly of the employment, that it was a lazy, idle, and inactive profession, as Pharaoh seemed to question whether there were any men of activity amongst them, when he heard what their trade was; or, if we take the words to signify a religious aversion to them, which does, indeed, seem to be the true meaning of the expression, from the use made of it in other parts of Scripture, then I do not see how it is reconcilable with Pharaoh's inclination to employ them himself, or with the Egyptians being many of them, at this time, of the same profession themselves, which the heathen writers agree with Moses in supposing them to be' [Diod. Sic., lib. i].

"'Though learned men have observed that there are several interpolations in the books of the Scriptures, which were not the words of the Sacred Writers, some persons, affecting to show their learning, when they read over the ancient MSS., would sometimes put a short remark in the margin, which they thought might give a reason for, or clear the meaning of, some expression in the text against which they placed it, or to which they adjoined it; and from hence it happened, now and then, that the transcribers from manuscripts so remarked upon did, through mistake, take a marginal note or remark into the text, imagining it to be a part of it. Whether Moses might not end his period in this place with the words, *that ye may dwell in the land of Goshen;* and whether what follows, *for every shepherd is an abomination to the Egyptians,* may not have been added

to the text in this way, is entirely submitted to the judgment of the learned.' [Connexion, Book 5, vol. i., p. 341.]

"The learned writer of this extract is more correct in his statement of the difficulty, than in its solution. It is a principle in criticism to consider a book as free from interpolation, until it is proved that interpolations have certainly been made. The charge of interpolation is brought against the books of the Old Testament for no other reason, than to reduce them into harmony with the preconceived opinion that they were written by the authors to whom they are commonly ascribed. In the present instance, there has been no interpolation. The compiler, relating the honours paid to the family of Jacob in Egypt, and endeavouring to harmonise them with the state of things in his own times, 1,000 years later, when the Egyptians, by their religious absurdities, had been made to entertain an enmity towards shepherds, has given us a description which, in this particular, is inconsistent with itself. In short, the Egyptians held shepherds in aversion in the fifth, but not in the fifteenth century before the Christian era."*

It is scarcely necessary to add to the above; but, if it were, it would be hard to reconcile there being an abomination with the eleventh verse of chap. xlvii., in which it is stated that Pharaoh gave these very people "the best of the land, in the land of Rameses."

Herodotus† says that goatherds were held by the Egyptians in high honour.

Chap. xlvii., v. 2.—"And he took some of his brethren, even five men." The Douay says: "Five men, also the last of his brethren." Bellamy‡ says: "Some writers, in endeavouring to give the meaning of the word מִקְצֵה (MeQTsE) rendered "some," have said—1st, he took "the first that came to hand;" 2nd, "the meanest looking;" 3rd, "the best made and finest looking;" 4th, "five of the oldest;" 5th, "some of the eldest and some of the

* Hebrew Records, p. 124.
† Euterpe, 46; Cahen, Genese, 165.
‡ Genesis, 163, and see Kalisch, 696.

youngest." Rashi translates it, "the least or weakest." Jarhi interprets it, "the youngest of his brothers."*

Verses 13 to 26.—"What purpose did the penetration and shrewdness of Joseph serve? What advantage did the Egyptian people derive from his predictions? and what greater misfortunes could have befallen them than those which really happened; since without Joseph's interference they would have themselves possessed sufficient corn from the years of plenty to subsist in the years of famine? In what light, therefore, have we to view his character? Does it not, at first glance, appear despotic, cruel, and heartless, anxious only for the aggrandisement of the royal power, but unfeeling for the miserable condition of the people? Is not his person stained by the execrable meanness of sacrificing the happiness of a nation to a subservient sycophancy for a tyrannical dynasty?"†

Verse 31.—"And Israel bowed himself upon the bed's head." The Douay, following the Vulgate, reads: "Israel adored God turning to the bed's head." The Septuagint makes the bed into a staff, and the epistle to the Hebrews, chap. xi., v. 21, says: "By faith, Jacob, when he was a dying, worshipped, leaning upon the top of his staff."‡ Spinoza says the error arises solely from the use of the Masoretic vowel points; the word מִטָּה (MeTE) meaning either bed or staff, according to the points added to it.§ Cahen regards this difference as a proof that the Septuagint version is more ancient than the vowel points.‖

Chap. xlviii., v. 22.—Jacob's life contains no account of his wars with the Amorites, but rather represents him as of a very unwarlike temperament. Instead of the words, "I have given thee one portion above thy brethren," the Septuagint has, "I will give thee choice Sikima." The words in John, c. iv., v. 5, seem to refer to this, but then it

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* Cahen, Genese, 165.

† Kalisch, Genesis, p. 698; see also Presbyter Anglicanus on the Pentateuch, p. 102.

‡ See Kalisch, Genesis, p. 708, and Jenning's Jewish Antiquities, p. 360.

§ Tractatus Theologico Politicus, chap. vii.

‖ Genese, p. 170.

would seem to identify the land with that bought of Hamor (see chap. xxxiii., v. 19.*)

"The story of Joseph would seem to have been compiled in the later times of the Jews, when there was a more minute division of property, and the whole nation was composed of the triple elements of shepherds, agriculturists, and traders. It attempts to give the traditionary notion of the patriarchal times, strangely mixed up with more modern ideas.

"Now, if this famine pressed so severely on the family of Jacob, who is represented to have been left in possession of the whole country of Canaan, how utterly inadequate were the means taken to remedy the evil—a wearisome journey of some hundred miles through the desert to procure a few sacks of corn, that would have been almost consumed in the transit. Not a hint is given of danger, though the journey was long and tedious, the way through the desert, and the time a period of famine. On the contrary, the fictitious element is carried out, as if they had been travelling from Dan to Beersheba, in the tranquil days of Solomon.

"And then too, when Joseph sends for his father, the Prince of Canaan, he sends clothes and money, and provisions, and conveyances for himself and family, as if he had been in the depth of poverty. But not a word about his subjects, the people of Canaan, or his numerous dependents —they are left behind to shift for themselves; it is his own family only that appear to enter Egypt with him! Either, then, this history of Joseph formed no part of the original book of Genesis, or the statements of the great wealth and consequence of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and Esau are mere fictions. It is impossible to reconcile the two statements, they so clearly contradict each other.

"But what were the merchants of Tyre and Sidon and other seaports doing during this famine? for unless they carried corn to the most distant regions, the inhabitants must have all perished, for the famine was in all lands. What then could have induced the sons of Jacob to wander

* See Cahen: Genese, p. 173.

all the way through the desert into Egypt, when supplies could have been procured at the distance of a few miles? But it is useless to take up time with these minor inconsistencies, when the account contains so much that is glaringly contradictory. It is stated 'that the famine was *over all the face of the earth*, and that *all countries* came to Egypt to buy corn;' allowing that there is any truth in the narrative, this must be a gross exaggeration—but quite in the style of hyperbolic Orientalism!

"Now, we would ask how could Egypt feed the whole earth, when it was itself famishing, and obliged to subsist for seven years on the surplus produce of seven years of abundance? It matters not whether, in the years of famine, the land was wholly unproductive, or yielded only one-half of its usual return. Under any limitation, the narrative asserts contradictions and impossibilities; no amount of abundance in Egypt could have remedied the evil of even a partial famine."*

Chap xlix., v. 3.—"Reuben, thou art my firstborn, my might, and the beginning of my strength, the excellency of dignity, and the excellency of power." Bellamy, in lieu of "beginning of my strength," reads, "beginning of my sorrow." Instead of "excellence of dignity and the excellence of power," the Septuagint represents Reuben as self-willed and arrogant.†

Verse 5.—"Simeon and Levi are brethren; instruments of cruelty are in their habitations." Kalisch has, "An instrument of cruelty is their burning rage." Cahen, "*les instruments de violence sont leur parente.*" The Douay, "vessels of iniquity, waging war."

Verse 6.—"They digged down a wall." Kalisch has, "they hamstrung oxen." Cahen, "*ils ont coupé le jarret au taureau.*"

Bellamy thus renders verse 6.—"Into their council thou shalt not come, O my soul; to their congregation, be thou not united, mine honour; for in their anger they slew men; and for their pleasure they extirpated the bull.‡ 'O my

* The Pentateuch Controversy, pp. 105, 106.
† Kalisch, Genesis, p. 732; Cahen, Genese, p. 174.
‡ New Translation, p. 173.

soul, come not thou into their secret.' This passage, as it stands in the common version, affords us no information; it is altogether inexplicable; it cannot possibly be applied to the secret of the slaughter of the Shechemites by Simeon and Levi. Some commentators have said that this clause should be translated thus: 'Into their council, Oh my soul, thou didst not come;' but as the verb תבא (TheBA) is not the second person preter of the verb, but the second person future, it cannot be so translated; and therefore does not refer to any secret concerning the slaying of the Shechemites.

"בסדם (BeSeDeM) rendered secret, properly means council; Jer. vi. 11.—xxiii. 18, viz., 'Into their council thou shalt not come; O my soul.'

"איש (*Aish*) rendered man, is a general term; it means mankind, Job. xii. 10; the man, 1 Sam. xiii. 6; Jud. xx. 17.

"'And in their self-will they digged down a wall.' But the word שור (ShUR) never means a wall; its meaning is a bull, throughout the Scripture.

"Hence it is that the translators, not knowing how to apply the word *shor*, a bull, have concluded that this passage was applied by the sacred writer to the violence done by the sons of Jacob, and the manifest displeasure shown by him concerning the act they had committed. But this cannot be admitted, for the patriarch had shown his displeasure near fifty years before this period, when this total departure from the commands of God under that dispensation, gave birth to the slaughter of the Shechemites. I say a departure from the commands of God, from the positive precepts of that dispensation it was, which caused him to say, 'thou shalt not come into their council.' Besides, it cannot be admitted that Jacob, for near fifty years from the time of that transaction, never came into the assembly of his sons. But there evidently was no such meaning in the mind of the patriarch; he could not come into the secret assembly, or council, of that which had been transacted at so remote, or any past period; there was no necessity for his council or approbation.

"Neither would it be of any consequence to posterity to know that they slew a bull. Thus, though we have the true

translation of the word *shor*, by bull; still we are at a loss to know its true application.

"וברצנם (UBeRTzeNeM) is rendered self-will, but anger and self-will, as here applied, are the same; if they slew a man in their anger or self-will, they dug down a wall in their anger or self-will. This word means pleasure, desire, delight, to be gratified. Neh. ix. 37; 2 Chron. xv. 15; Prov. xi. 20; it reads, and for their pleasure.

"'They digged down a wall.' This clause cannot be understood; for if in their self-will they dug down a wall, it certainly was of too little consequence for the sacred writer to have committed it to posterity. It is proper here to inform those who do not understand the Hebrew, that the word שור *shor*, a bull, which the translators have rendered by wall, has the very same consonants as שור *shur*, a wall, and as the vowels [by vowels, Bellamy means only the Masoretic vowel-points], which vary the meaning and application (as in all languages) are not written between the consonants, as is the custom in the western or European languages, but under the consonants; the translators who have not attended to this most important branch of Hebrew learning, have rendered this word, which throughout the scriptures means a bull, by *shur*, which always means a wall. See 2 Sam. vi. 13; Neh. v. 18; Job vi. 5; Exod. xxi. 18; 2 Sam. xxii. 30; Job xxi. 11; Jer. xxv. 10.

"Some commentators also, not knowing what to make of the passage as it stands in the common version, have taken an unpardonable liberty with the sacred letter, by translating שור *shor*, a bull, by שר (SheR) a prince; but to render shor, a bull, by *saar*, a prince, after the manner of Kennicott and others who have followed him, is altogether inconsistent with the language; it has no such meaning in any part of scripture. The error committed in the English, and in all the European translations, is equally condemnable; for there cannot be a greater contrariety than between a wall and a bull. We shall, however, find the original to be perfectly consistent with good sense, consequently with the meaning of the sacred writer, without rendering shor, a bull, by shur, a wall, or by saar, a prince.

"עקרו (GneQRU) is translated, 'they digged down;'

but this word does not properly mean 'to dig;' neither is there any word for 'down;' it is one word, and cannot have this sense in any part of scripture. It truly means 'to cut in pieces, hough, hamstring,' Josh. ix. 9; 2 Sam. viii. 4; 1. Chron. xviii. 4."

Verse 10.—"The sceptre shall not depart from Judah, nor a lawgiver from between his feet, until Shiloh come; and unto him shall the gathering of the people be." Kalisch renders this, "The sceptre shall not depart from Judah nor the ruler's staff from between his feet, even when they shall come to Shiloh, and to him shall be submission of nations." The Douay, "The sceptre shall not be taken away from Judah, nor a ruler from his thigh, till he come that is sent, and he shall be the expectation of nations."

Kalisch says,* "As the empire of Judah ceased in the 6th century before the present era, and the tribe of Judah never afterwards obtained any permanent or brilliant political position, or exercised government over other branches of the Hebrew, and was in the time of the Maccabees, subordinate to leaders from the tribe of Levi, the prophecy would be unfulfilled were it referred to an event later than the Babylonian captivity. The Messianic interpretation must indeed rest on feeble arguments, since it forces its advocates to the assertion that intervals and interruptions of dominion are not excluded by the words 'the sceptre shall not depart from Judah until the Messiah comes.'"†

One Nikelsburger,‡ writing against the "Society for Conversion of the Jews," says—"It is universally acknowledged that Shiloh should come from the seed of *David*, who is from the seed of *Judah*, and great pains have been taken by writers of the New Testament to convince us, by long genealogical tables, that *Joseph* was from the seed of *David*, and was from the seed of *Judah*; and yet this same *Joseph* is not believed to be the *father* of *Jesus*. You believe (upon what grounds I am not aware) that *Jesus* was *also* from the seed of *Judah*. Let it be admitted for the sake of argument. Now, mark the concluding words of the verse

* Genesis, p. 750. See also Cahen, Genese, 175.
† See R. Cooper's "Bible and its Evidences," p. 200.
‡ Koul Jacob, pp. 15 to 17.

'Unto him (Shiloh, whom you believe to be *Jesus*) shall the gathering of the people be.' What can this mean, more or less, than that the people (then scattered) shall be gathered to him, as their head and ruler, and *lawgiver?* Then, if Jesus be the Messiah, or, if the Messiah be from the seed of Judah, and 'unto him shall the gathering of the people be,' of course the sceptre will remain in Judah at his coming.

"According to these words of Jacob, it must be concluded that the sceptre shall *not* depart from Judah, *from the time they are made use of by Jacob, until* (*and not before*) *Shiloh shall come* (whom you believe to be Jesus). Now, Judah had no sceptre, nor lawgiver, even in Jacob's time, nor for many years after; and many hundred years *before the birth of Jesus* the Jews had no sceptre nor lawgiver; they were a conquered nation, and in bondage in Egypt, and in Babylon, and were subject to kings and laws of other nations. Even at the time of the second temple, they were also without a sceptre, and subject to other kings. Then if the sceptre did depart *before* the coming of Jesus, and it was to depart *after* his coming, what must we make of Jacob's blessing?"

Paley, in his chapter headed "Prophecy, as an auxiliary evidence of Christianity," discreetly omits all mention of this verse. Dr. Hartwell Horne treats the prophecy as fulfilled. He says, "When the Messiah came the sceptre had departed from Judah," but the learned reconciler of Bible difficulties omits to notice that the sceptre's departure had taken place more than once, and long previous to the birth of Jesus.*

There is no trace of sceptre or lawgiver in Judah during the captivity in Egypt. In the time of Moses and Aaron, it was rather Levi than Judah whose house was honoured with regal or chief judicial authority. From Moses to David a variety of judges and rulers arose from the different tribes, Judah taking no special pre-eminence.

From the captivity to the Christian era, says Godwyn,† the state of the Jews became very confused. Sometimes

* Introduction to Bible, 8th edition, 455.

† Godwyn's Hebrew Rites and Customs, p. 3.

they were ruled by deputies and viceroys, subject to the Persian authority. In the time of Judas Maccabeus, the tribe of Levi held the chief office, and this continued until shortly prior to the reign of Herod the Askalonite.

Verse 14.—"Crouching down between two burdens." The Douay has, "lying down between the borders." Bellamy, "resting among the sheepfold." Cahen, "*se couche entre les etables.*"*

Verse 18.—This verse seems entirely unconnected with the rest of the chapter, and its obscurity has induced some critics to regard it as an interpolation†. Sir Wm. Drummond‡ regarded the prophecies of this chapter as astronomical symbols, and in his "Œdipus Judaicus," he certainly makes out a case, with which his antagonists failed to deal. The following extract illustrates the nature of his views:—"According to Aben Ezra, the figure of a man was painted on the ensign of the tribe of Reuben, and this man is supposed by Kircher to have been Aquarius. In fact, we find that Jacob calls Reuben his first-born, the beginning of his strength, etc., and these epithets apply very well to the sun in the commencement of his course, after he has passed the winter solstice. The sign of Aquarius is typified by a man with a pitcher, whence he pours forth water. Reuben is said to be as unstable as water. It is then remarked that he shall not excel because he went up to his father's bed, and we are thus reminded that he had lain with Bilhah. The oriental astronomers, and amongst others Ulug Beg, still designate a remarkable asterism in the sign of Aquarius by the name of Bula, or Bulha. This asterism rises while the sun is yet in Capricorn, which is the domicile of Saturn, the star of Israel; and it sets towards the end of July, when Aquarius sets also with his head foremost.

"Simeon and Levi are brethren.

"In the astrological calendar at the first degree of the decan of Pisces, we find the following words:—'Duo viri unum caput habentes.'

"'Instruments of cruelty are in their habitations.'

* See Kalisch, Genesis, 755

† Kalisch, Genesis 758. Bellamy, 180.

‡ Sir W. Drummond's Œdipus Judaicus, cap. 49 Genesis.

All the constellations which are considered as noxious are seen above the horizon while the sun is in Pisces. It is then that Sagitta rises, that Scorpius, according to Columella, begins to set, accompanied with tempests, and that Andromeda, not yet delivered by Perseus, regards the monster that threatens to devour her. But this is not all; the descent of Pisces is fixed by Columella, for the 14th of the Ides of October, and consequently their disappearance was the prelude to the passage of the sun into the sign of Scorpius, when the terrible reign of Typhon commenced. No sign appears to have been considered of more malignant influence than Pisces; and it appears from the astrological calendar, that the emblems accompanying this constellation were chiefly indicative of death and violence. 'Oh my soul, come not into their secret.' I am inclined to think that סד (SeD), does not signify *a secret*, but *a fetter*, or *a shackle*. It will be recollected, that the fishes are united by a bond, or shackle. 'Unto their assembly, my honour, be thou not united.' The word כבר (KeBeR), which is here translated *honour*, denotes in its primitive sense the action of light in irradiation. 'For in their anger they slew a man.' Jacob seems to attribute all the effects produced by the rising of Scorpius to the descent of Pisces. Columella fixes the passage of the sun into Scorpius on the 13th of the calends of November. We shall find that this period nearly corresponds with that in which Osiris was feigned to have been slain by Typhon, and when the death of Orion was attributed to the sting of the scorpion. The brilliant constellation of Orion sets shortly after the descent of Pisces, and immediately after the rising of Scorpius. 'And in their self-will they digged down a wall.' This interpretation rests upon the authority of Jerome; but I conceive it to be erroneous, and I appeal against it to the Septuagint, the Samaritan, and to the Hebrew copy itself. I translate, *in their self-will they castrated a bull.* Now the oriental astronomers represent Scorpius as devouring the genitals of Taurus; and, indeed, the stars called *testiculi Tauri* set precisely when Scorpius rises.

"According to all the traditions, a lion was painted on

the standard of Judah; and I can have no hesitation in agreeing with Kircher, that the sign of Leo was thereby indicated. 'Thou art he,' says the text, 'whom thy brethren shall praise.' While Taurus was the first of the signs, the summer solstice took place when the sun was in Leo; and that season of his highest elevation was held in the greatest honour. The sun in Leo was adored by the Egyptians as the king Osiris; by the Syrians as the lord Adonis; by the Tyrians as Melecharets, 'King of the Earth;' and by the Greeks as Hercules, vanquisher of the Nemean Lion. The sun being at his greatest altitude in Leo, the brothers of Judah are said to bow down before him. In the Indian sphere, in the second decan of the sign of Leo, a man is represented with a crown on his head and a lance in his hand. 'Judah is a lion's whelp, . . . he couched as a lion.' The progress of the sun through the sign of Leo was, according to Aratus, represented as a couching lion.

"'The sceptre shall not depart from Judah, nor a lawgiver from between his feet, until Shiloh come.' The constellation of Cepheus, King of Ethiopia, is still represented as a man with a crown on his head, and with a sceptre in his hand. This constellation rises, according to Columella, on the 7th of the Ides of July. Thus Cepheus, in the course of some days, comes to rise under Leo, of which it continues to be the paratanellon until the sun enters the sign of Scorpius.

"The word מחקק (MeHeQeQ), which we translate, *a lawgiver*, is shown by Bochart to be a corruption of חק (HeQ), *hyk*, which was the old Ethiopian word for a *king*. We may then suppose, with some appearance of reason, that *Hyk* was the ancient Ethiopian and Egyptian name for the constellation of Cepheus, or King of Ethiopia, which, being seen very low in the northern hemisphere when the sun is in Leo, may be figuratively said to be under the feet of the lion. 'Until *Shiloh* come.' The king with the sceptre sets about the time that Scorpius rises. In Scorpius there are two stars which the oriental astronomers call *Shulet;* and the brightest of these is named *Shuleh*. 'Binding his foal unto the vine, and his ass's colt unto the choice vine.' In the first decan of the sign of Leo in the Persian sphere I find the head of a horse and the head of an ass, and in the second

and third decan their middle and hinder parts." [The ass of Silenus, the companion of Bacchus, has been represented with its head bound round with vine leaves and grapes. Bacchus, Osiris, and the sun, are identical.]

Michel Nicolas says, "One of the most celebrated prophecies of the Old Testament is that of the dying Jacob, as to the future destinies of his numerous posterity. We are assured by many critics, amongst others by Gramberg, that this prophecy was not written until an epoch when the children of Israel already formed twelve distinct and established tribes in the land of Canaan. The 28th verse of the xlix. chapter, is sufficient to betray the later origin of the prediction, evidently written, at least in its present form, after the events of which it speaks. It proves that the editor of the passage, or at least the one who retouched it, knew of the existence of the twelve tribes." Nicolas does not, however, regard the *ex post facto* prophecy as fraudulent. He says, "The prophecies after the event are the result of the national mind celebrating the virtues of the ancient fathers of the people. The prophecy of the dying Jacob is a popular hymn, reciting the destinies of the twelve tribes, and which, by an ingenious fiction, the poet has put in the mouth of their common father. In effect, we know that poesy has often taken for its theme the recollection of some event which has actually occurred, but has become embellished by the popular imagination."*

Chap. i., v. 10.—"Threshing floor of Atad, which is beyond Jordan." Cahen says, "Does that refer to the right bank or the left? Hebron being between Egypt and the river Jordan, one cannot see why the procession came near the river." "Est-il question de la rive droite ou de la rive gauche? Hebrone etant entre l'Egypte et le Jourdain; on ne voit pas pourquoi le cortége de Jacob est venu près de ce fleuve."

In concluding a commentary on Genesis, it is not unnatural that I should be expected to make an endeavour to account for the Hebrew Record containing traditions which,

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* Etudes sur la Bible, pp. 315 and 316.
† Genese, 180. See Kalisch 776.

in whole or part, and with somewhat varied accessories, may be traced in the mythical lore of nations more ancient than the Jews. In striving to meet this expectation I am to a considerable extent indebted to an anonymous but most able writer,* who seeks to show that whatever literature the Jewish people may have at one time possessed having been lost during their troubles, the restoration occurred at a period when communication of ideas had taken place between Egypt, Greece, Italy, India, and the Jewish scribes, and that consequently an embodiment and mingling of foreign tradition might reasonably be anticipated in a volume aided in its compilation by, if not entirely resulting from, the memories of the ancient men of the Jews, whose brains had received impressions of wonders and miracles from the Ganges and the Nile, impressions mingled with and modified by the teachings of Babylonian masters. It is admitted on all hands that the chief men amongst the Jews were captives in Babylon from the time of Nebuchadnezzar until at least the sixth year of the reign of Darius. The last chapter of Chronicles fixes the term of Jewish captivity at seventy years, thus giving ample time in a new generation for inoculation of new ideas and new faiths, a result rendered the more easy because the use of the Hebrew language as a vernacular was entirely lost, and Syro-Chaldaic had become the popular dialect at the time of the return from captivity. The critical knowledge of Hebrew could have rested with but few, and these, as Spinoza tells us, have left neither grammars nor lexicons to enable us to judge of the extent of their knowledge. Christian controversialists often insist on the care taken by the Jews of their sacred records, but it is evident by the state of the Hebrew text, as illustrated by Dr. Wall and others, that the care has not been sufficient to preserve it from great corruption, and it is certain that during several centuries care was not and could not have been manifested by the Jews for the preservation of their literature. The licentiousness of the most powerful of the Jewish monarchs, the disturbed reigns of others, and the idolatry of most, leave little foundation for supposing any

* What and How of the Eternal Worker, pp. 163 to 177.

royal guardianship, and the finding of a previously unknown book by Hilkiah is strong evidence against much care on the part even of the priesthood (whose special duty should have been the preservation of their sacred writings.) Bishop Marsh says,* "Whether the temple copy of the law was rescued from destruction when Jerusalem was taken by Nebuchadnezzar it is difficult at present to determine. It appears from the second Book of Chronicles that the sacred vessels of the temple were either destroyed or carried to Babylon. But neither in this place nor in the second book of Kings, nor in the fifty-second chapter of Jeremiah, where the vessels of the temple are minutely described, do we find any account of the Book of the Law. In that apocryphal work which we call the second book of Esdras, the unknown author says, 'Thy law is burnt, therefore no man knoweth the thing concerning thee.' If this account were correct, not only the Temple copy of the Law, but all other copies of the law must have been destroyed at the taking of Jerusalem. If after the Babylonish captivity, when Ezra was restoring the Temple worship, no man knew the things of the law, no copy of it could have been left." Dr. Marsh thinks this improbable, but the view here quoted seems correct. If Jeremiah had preserved the book, surely he would not have passed by so important a matter, when recording others most trivial in comparison. Assuming the destruction of the Jewish literature, then those who re-wrote,† must have collected from all quarters, and under great difficulties. The Hebrew language having been neglected, the captives speaking their captors' tongue—Babylonian, Egyptian, Brahminic, and Hebrew legends would become commingled. From the Persians the myth of Ormuzd and Ahriman would form the basis of the evil spirit resisting God, and deteriorating his creation. From the Hindoos the fable of Krishna incarnate to redeem the earth, gives colour to all the *Messiah* legends. From the Greeks their astro-mythology, giving myths containing more poetry than the Jewish mind could grasp. These, modified by their own ignorance and barbarism, and moulded on to

* 34 Lecture, p. 56.

† See page 57.

such history as their best men remembered, enabled the Jews to frame for us the Bible which so long has been maintained as the centre and standing point of, and circle within which, all knowledge was to be found, and outside which it was damnation to venture. A Bible incoherent in its narrative, often uselessly repeating itself; defective in its chronology; inaccurate in its geography; confused in its relation to general history; and utterly worthless as a code of morality. For the rude style and more than questionable morality of the Book of Genesis, many writers have found it necessary to apologise. Some have said that the Jews being ignorant and barbarous, God condescended to suit his revelation to their capacities. The Rev. Dr. Spencer says that "the Jews were, above all the inhabitants of the earth, of a morose, ill-natured, and infamously obstinate temper—they were a cruel and barbarous people; superstitious and destitute of almost all literature. . . and therefore God in dealing with this illiterate and exceedingly superstitious people was obliged to make allowance for their infirmity, and draw them to himself by a sort of craft and not by reason. For no brute is more crossgrained, or requires greater cunning to manage than the superstitious brute, especially if he be ignorant."* According to some Biblical apologists we are therefore to expect in the Bible phrases suited to the capacity of an ignorant man, and the errors of Genesis in stating matters testable by science are intentional errors, because to the ignorant Jew the truth would have seemed falsehood.

Kalisch admirably answers, "But let it not be said that the Bible intentionally described the actual objects in so simple and unscientific a manner, in order to adapt itself to the uncultivated understandings of the contemporaries. We shall not urge that the Bible repeatedly insists that it was not written for one age and one people, but for all times and all nations; that it must, under that supposition, have assumed that in no future period any nation would advance to more profound researches and more refined culture. But every one sees the very dangerous character of that principle, that the Scriptures are not *bonâ fide* truth,

* Spencer: de Legibus Hebræorum, p. 624.

but in many important points a convenient accommodation to prevailing absurdities and childish ignorance. When can we with confidence say they are in earnest, and that their doctrines claim the authority of absolute truth? This would throw open the Bible to uncertainty and doubt in so unparalleled a degree, that it would practically cease to have any definite meaning."*

The Book of Genesis takes a wide scope, whether written for ignorant men or for all men, it seeks to determine and conclude all questions on ontology, geology, astronomy, ethnology, primitive history, and philosophy; and in Europe for centuries Genesis has impeded inquiry, but the day for its domination is rapidly passing away. Inside the church and outside its pale heresy finds speech, stone strata are not as easily forged as musty parchments, the vast vault of heaven is more easily read by patient science than are the contradictory texts which fling a world inconceivably wandering in space until sun, moon, and stars are fixed around it. Our common humanity finds higher links of brotherhood than is given by asserting the same father, Adam, for all mankind. History, exhibiting on its pages memoirs of empires whose crumbling records antedate Eden's garden story, asks, how long shall a Genesis page hide pyramids and monuments from the inquiring gaze of the archæologist? The philosopher pointing to the charred stake, memento of that infidelity which the flame alone refuted, asks, how long shall the advocates of one old book seek with it to outweigh all newer and truer thinkings?

* Genesis, p. 28.

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EXODUS:

ITS AUTHENTICITY AND CREDIBILITY.

The two words, ואלה שמות UALE SheMUTh, commencing the text, form its title in the Hebrew MSS. Often the second word is used alone to denote this book. The English title, Exodus, is from the Greek, and refers to the alleged departure of the Jews from Egypt, of which this book contains the account. The words added to the title in the authorised version "Second Book of Moses" are, like those added to Genesis, without warranty either in the Hebrew, the Greek of the Septuagint, or the Latin Vulgate.

According to orthodox commentators, Exodus gives a history extending over about 145 years from the death of Joseph. There is not only no proof that Moses ever wrote a single line of Exodus, but there is, in fact, considerable evidence to the contrary. The Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch has already been referred to in comments on Genesis;* and it is, therefore, needless to repeat the objections to it in this place. Dr. Irons, prebendary of St. Paul's, in a little volume recently published, admits that most learned men are of opinion that the ordinary Hebrew character could not have been used by Moses, and that there is ground for denying that the compilation, we call the Old Testament, is, as a whole, of earlier date than the Babylonish Captivity, even if it reaches that epoch.† Exodus is, as will be seen by the attentive reader, an anonymous work, incomplete and incoherent in many parts,

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* Genesis, p. 56.

† Dr. Irons' Bible and its Interpreters, pp. 21 to 40.

and probably based in part on pre-existing documents since lost, and in part on oral traditions. It is encumbered with repetitions, and, where capable of collation with other books of the Bible, is often contradictory.

There is but little, if any, attempt at corroboration of the narrative in Exodus by any profane writer much before the Christian era; any statement of earlier evidences depending almost entirely on the authority of Josephus, who wrote during the second half of the first century, so that the Book of Exodus must be tried on its own merits, there being no endorsement of contemporary authors to vouch its accuracy. The fruitful source of historical information, provided by the monuments of ancient Egypt, affords no result to the devout searcher for the Pharaoh who knew not Joseph, nor is there any hieroglyph recording the swallowing of Egypt's armies by the waters of the Red Sea. Between Exodus and history a wide gap intervenes. The records of God's chosen race are sadly open to adverse criticism, and their very origin is subject of controversy. Even if the fragments quoted from Manetho, of whom Josephus says that "he trifles and tells arrant lies," Chaeremon, Lysimachus, Diodorus, and others, be taken as some sort of evidence, the believer gains but little help to his faith in learning that the Osarsiph priest of Osiris was the leader out from Egypt of a crowd of leprous slaves. These can hardly be Moses' and God's chosen ones. Tacitus, who wrote about the close of the first century, during the reign of Trajan, and after the publication of Josephus's history, has the following curious statement*:—

"The Jews, we are told, escaping from the island of Crete at the time when Saturn was driven from his throne by the violence of Jupiter, settled in the extreme parts of Libya. Their name is adduced as a proof. Ida, it is alleged, is a well-known mountain in Crete; the neighbouring Idæans, by an addition to the name to adapt it to the language of barbarians, are ordinarily called Judæans. Some say that the population, overflowing throughout Egypt in the reign of Isis, was relieved by emigration into

* History, Book 5, § 2 and 3.

the neighbouring countries, under the conduct of Hierosolymus and Juda. Many state that they are the progeny of the Æthiopians, who were impelled by fear and detestation to change their abode in the reign of King Cepheus. There are those who report that they are a heterogeneous band from Assyria, a people who, being destitute of a country, made themselves masters of a portion of Egypt, and subsequently settled in cities of their own in the Hebrew territories, and the parts bordering on Syria. Others, ascribing to the Jews an illustrious origin, say that the Solymi, a nation celebrated in the poetry of Homer, called the city which they built Hierosolyma, from their own name.

"Very many authors agree in recording that a pestilential disease, which disfigured the body in a loathsome manner, spreading over Egypt, Bocchoris, at that time king, repairing to the oracle of Jupiter Hammon in quest of a remedy, was directed to purify his kingdom and exterminate that race of men as being detested by the gods; that a mass of people thus marched out and collected together were in a barren desert abandoned to their misery, when, all the rest being bathed in tears and torpid with despair, Moses, one of the exiles, admonished them not to look for any aid from gods or men, being deserted of both, but to trust themselves to him as a heaven-commissioned guide, by whose aid they had already warded off the miseries that beset them. They assented, and commenced a venturous journey, not knowing whither they went. But nothing distressed them so much as want of water; and now they lay stretched through all the plains, ready to expire, when a herd of wild asses, returning from pasture, went up a rock shaded with a grove. Moses followed them, and forming his conjecture by the herbage that grew upon the ground, opened copious springs of water. This was a relief; and pursuing their journey for six days without intermission, on the seventh, having expelled the natives, they took possession of a country, where they built their city and dedicated their temple."

Failing to discover, then, external bases for hostile criticism or for corroboration, the examination of the text itself must determine how far it is trustworthy.

Chap. i. v. 5.—"And all the souls that came out of the loins of Jacob were seventy souls: for Joseph was in Egypt already." The Septuagint states the number as seventy-five. The words, "Joseph was in Egypt," are placed in the Septuagint at the beginning of the verse, and not at the end, as in our version. Kalisch observes that, to make up the seventy persons who came out of the loins of Jacob, Aben Ezra and others have included Jacob himself, only sixty-nine being enumerated if Jacob be omitted.

Verses 6 and 7.—"Joseph died and his brethren, and all that generation. And the children of Israel were fruitful, and increased abundantly, and multiplied, and waxed exceeding mighty; and the land was filled with them." If these words mean anything, they mean that in the duration of a little more than two or three generations at the uttermost, the children of one man multiplied so as to fill the whole of the land of Egypt, and to become exceedingly mighty. An unbelieving reader may find reason to regard the whole legend as doubtful, but devout believers can only wonder that this numerous and exceedingly mighty people allowed the Egyptians so to maltreat and oppress them; or that this fruitful and abundantly-increasing people, who filled all the land, and must have numbered at least 2,500,000 persons, had only two midwives to attend them. They may also wonder why God made houses for those midwives, when, if the Israelites were so exceedingly fruitful and numerous, the midwives could have but little time to live in their own houses, but must have been always staying in other persons' houses while employed in their professional avocations. Admirers of God's unchangeable perfection may likewise wonder why he rewarded the midwives for telling Pharaoh a lie, when by his power he might have saved his chosen people from destruction without any such departure from truthfulness. The foot-note to the Douay Bible says, "The midwives were rewarded, not for their lie, which was a venial sin, but for their fear of God and their humanity; but this reward was only temporal, in building them houses—that is, in establishing and enriching their families."

Many endeavours have been made to account for the extraordinarily rapid increase in the number of the Israelites,

and one orthodox bishop has suggested that the Hebrew women might, "by extraordinary blessing of God," have brought forth "six children at a time."*

Unless it be supposed that the Egyptians were a superior race, in point of intelligence, to the Jews, it is very difficult to understand why the latter, more mighty and more numerous, should permit themselves to be oppressed by the former. The King of Egypt actually speaks of the Israelites as "more and mightier" than the Egyptians, and yet the fewer and weaker are represented as the taskmasters and oppressors. When it happens that the few oppress the many, it is usually because the few are intellectually superior, and that the many are either weak and incapable through their poverty and ignorance; or by internal dissensions are prevented from exercising such power as they really possess; but a pious reader can hardly suppose God's specially-selected and protected race to have fallen into either of these sad conditions. Josephus says that the oppression continued for 400 years,† and that the Egyptians grew delicate and lazy; that one of their sacred scribes prophesied that an Israelitish child should be born who should overthrow the Egyptian dominion, and that it was under the advice of the Egyptian prophet that the King ordered the two midwives, who were Egyptians, to kill the Israelitish males. Josephus contradicts the Bible, for he says that the midwives, by reason of their relation to the King, would not transgress his commands.‡ Professor Whiston adds in a note, "Indeed, Josephus seems to have had much completer copies of the Pentateuch, or other authentic records now lost, about the birth and actions of Moses than either our Hebrew, Samaritan, or Greek Bibles afford us." If Professor Whiston's suggestions have any foundation, what becomes of the reliability of the Hebrew Records? Doubtless, the idea that Josephus had fuller narratives to quote from is true, for we cannot assume

* See Colenso part i., 106; Cahen, Exode 1; and Kalisch, Exodus 4.

† This is clearly inaccurate, as the oppression would hardly commence till some time after the death of Joseph.

‡ Antiquities, Book ii., cap. 9, sec. 2.

that the Jewish historian invented the additional events, the more especially as in the books of the New Testament we have statements as to Moses not contained in the Pentateuch as we have it now. And in the later books of the Old Testament genealogical tables are provided with names not preserved in the columns of the Pentateuch, and which are either inventions or derived from records now lost.

Verse 11.—"And they built for Pharaoh treasure-cities, Pithom and Raamses." In place of "treasure-cities," Cahen has, "*des villes de provision;*" the Vulgate, "*urbes tabernaculorum;*" the Douay, "cities of tabernacles;" Kalisch, "store-cities." The Septuagint makes the Jews build three cities instead of two, for it adds after Raamses, "and On, which is Heliopolis." Samuel Sharpe says,* "Pithom was no doubt the same place as On, being preceded by the Coptic article." [This is in direct opposition to the Septuagint, which Sharpe quotes as an authority, and which expressly names On as a third and distinct city.] "And if we had not the authority of the Septuagint for On being Heliopolis, I should conjecture that Raamses were Heliopolis, Ra being the Coptic, as Helios the Greek, for the Sun, and that Pithom were Memphis, HM, or Hom, being the hieroglyphical name for Memphis in the Rosetta Stone."

Verse 22.—"And Pharaoh charged all his people, saying, Every son that is born ye shall cast into the river, and every daughter ye shall save alive." Von Bohlen says, "The 600,000 men contemporaries of Moses, and even his own brethren, are sufficient proof that this cruel order was never executed; or if it was, we must suppose that it only remained in force for a very limited period."† It is, however, hardly possible to believe in the countermand of the order, without some notice of such a countermand being given in Exodus, so that the difficulty is unexplained.

Chap. ii., v. 1.—The writer does not here name the father and mother of Moses. Colenso, in supporting the document

* Early History of Egypt, p. 13.
† Genesis, vol. i., cap. 10.

theory, suggests that the name of the mother was unknown to the author of this portion of the text. In chap. vi., v. 20, they are named Amram and Jochebed. Jarhi makes the mother of Moses 130 years old at the time of his birth —(this, our reader will see, is too moderate). She was at the same time his mother and his great aunt.*

Verse 10.—"And she called his name Moses; and she said, Because I drew him out of the water." The Egyptian, or Hebrew origin of the name Moses, has been much discussed. Some urge that Moses was the Egyptian name, and the Talmud gives no less than nine other names, given to him by the Jews. Others contending for Moses, as Hebrew give Osarsiph, Tisithen, or Hermes, as Egyptian appellations.

Verses 11-15.—"And it came to pass in those days, when Moses was grown, that he went out unto his brethren, and looked on their burdens: and he spied an Egyptian smiting an Hebrew, one of his brethren. And he looked this way and that way, and when he saw that *there was* no man, he slew the Egyptian, and hid him in the sand. And when he went out the second day, behold, two men of the Hebrews strove together: and he said to him that did the wrong, Wherefore smitest thou thy fellow? And he said, Who made thee a prince and a judge over us? intendest thou to kill me, as thou killedst the Egyptian? And Moses feared, and said, Surely this thing is known. Now when Pharaoh heard this thing, he sought to slay Moses. But Moses fled from the face of Pharaoh, and dwelt in the land of Midian: and he sat down by a well." It is curious that no man being present the story should get to the ears of Pharaoh. Josephus not only does not give one word of this account, but narrates very differently the motives which induced Moses to fly from Egypt. He states that Moses was made general of the Egyptian armies, and gained for them considerable victories. That he captured the royal city of Ethiopia, and married Tharbis, the daughter of the king. That on his return the sacred scribes, envious of his power, prompted the king to kill him, and that therefore

* Cahen, Exode, p. 5; and see Infra on cap. 6.

Moses, to avoid assassination, fled to Midian.* According to Abarbanel, or Abravanel, the Sepher Haishar makes Moses reign 40 years in Ethiopia before his flight to Midian.† Kalisch ‡ says, "The Book of the Chronicles of Moses differs from the relation of Josephus in some particulars, the most remarkable of which is, that Moses was proclaimed king of the Ethiopians in his 30th year, which dignity he maintained during forty years; and after this period he fled to Midian, where he was imprisoned seven years by Jethra, and then united in marriage with his daughter, Zipporah."

Verses 16-18.—"Now the priest of Midian had seven daughters." The Septuagint here adds the words, "feeding the flocks of their father Jothor." These verses give the name of the father-in-law of Moses as Reuel, but according to chap. iii., v 1, chap. iv., v. 18, chap. xviii., vv. 1, 2, 5, 6, and 12, his name was Jethro, while according to Numbers, chap. x., v. 29, his name was neither Reuel nor Jethro, but Hobab, son of Raguel. In Judges, chap. iv., v. 11, Hobab is also called the father-in-law of Moses. On reference to the Hebrew text, I find the same word רעואל is carelessly anglicised as Reuel and Raguel. Dr. Wall, who regards the Hebrew text as corrupted by the vocalizers, says, "The name of the father-in-law of Moses is exhibited, in both the Jewish and Samaritan copies of the Pentateuch יתרו ITHRU, but its transcription in the Septuagint *Jothor* proves that the *mater lectionis*, at present terminating the Hebrew group, is a spurious letter, and was not interpolated in the original text until after the first Greek version was written. Against the genuineness, indeed, of this letter the sacred text itself, even in its present state, can be made to bear evidence; as the interpolators, in their hurry, overlooked this group in one passage, Exodus, chap. iv., v. 18, where they suffered it to remain in its original state, יתר, without any vowel letter subjoined."§

Verse 21.—"And Moses was content to dwell with the

* Antiquities, Book ii., caps. 10 and 11.
† Cahen, Exode, p. 8.
‡ Exodus, p. 30.
§ Grounds for Revision, p. 147.

man." The Douay following the Latin Vulgate says, "And Moses swore that he would dwell with him." Kalisch states, that according to a rabbinical tradition, Moses promised with an oath that he would not leave Midian without the consent of Zethro.

Verse 21.—צִפֹּרָה TsePheRE, Zipporah. Cahen, remarking that the name is Hebrew, signifying *bird*, inquires what language was in use amongst the Midianites. Kalisch says the word is also Arabic, and that this was then spoken by the people of Midian. Kalisch has, however, no evidence to support his view.

Verse 22.—The Vulgate adds the following words, not found either in the Hebrew, or authorised English version, but translated in the Douay:—"*Alterum vero peperit quem vocavit Eliezer, dicens: Deus enim patris mei adjutor meus, eripuit me de manu Pharaonis.*" "And she bore another, whom he called Eliezer, saying, 'for the God of my father hath delivered me out of the hands of Pharaoh.'" Several other versions support the addition of these words to this verse.

Verses 23-25.—"And it came to pass in process of time, that the king of Egypt died: and the children of Israel sighed by reason of the bondage, and they cried, and their cry came up unto God by reason of the bondage. And God heard their groaning, and God remembered his covenant with Abraham, with Isaac, and with Jacob. And God looked upon the children of Israel, and God had respect unto *them*." Instead of had respect unto them, the Douay reads, "he knew them;" Cahen, "*Dieu les reconnut;*" the Vulgate, "*et cognovit eos;*" Kalisch, "God regarded them." Cahen says, "Look at the succession of ideas, the sufferings of the children of Israel on earth here below made them cry out. These cries mounting on high to God's dwelling, are heard by him, and the sensation recalls to his memory his ancient alliance, and in consequence he looks down upon the Hebrews, whom he then recognises."* The Bible, in fact, implies that God the omniscient had forgotten his chosen-race, to whom he had bound himself by solemn promise, covenant, and oath, that his memory refreshed, he looks down upon the Jews, who, until this, had been out of sight and out of mind.

* Exode, p. 9.

Chap. iii. v. 1.—"Mountain of God." The Septuagint does not contain this phrase.

Verse 2.—The Douay, following as usual the Latin of the Vulgate, says that "The Lord appeared," instead of the angel. As in the account of the Lord's appearance to Abraham (see commentary on Genesis, p. 100), the text is very confused—in v. 2, it is the angel; in v. 4, it is the Lord. Aben Ezra taught that throughout it was the angel, and not the Lord.* Parkhurst relying on the plural of Deuteronomy c. xxxiii., v. 16, says, "It is evident Jehovah appeared to Moses in more persons than one."† Dr. McCaul, quoting verses 2 to 6, says, "To a plain reader, abiding by the common rules of grammar and the usages of all languages, it would appear that the angel of the Lord here calls himself the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Rabbi Bechai says, "The angel mentioned here is the angel, the redeemer, of whom it is written, 'I am the God of Bethel.'" Rabbi Moses Ben Nachman supports this view. Dr. McCaul therefore affirms that the angel of the Lord is, in truth, Jehovah, the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.‡ Parkhurst says, "We often read of the angel (sometimes angels) of Jehovah, or of the aleim; that is, his agent, personator, means of visibility or action; what was employed by God to render himself visible and approachable by flesh and blood. This angel was evidently a human form surrounded by light or glory with, or in which Jehovah was present." The portraying the infinite and omnipotent Deity as appearing in a flame of fire in the midst of a thorn bush, hardly induces a reverential feeling in the mind; that the bush should burn with fire and yet not be consumed, seems a pyrotechnic juggle, unworthy serious purpose; and when we find as a grand climax to all this that Moses is desired to remove his shoes as a mark of reverence to the blazing Deity, the whole story lapses into the category of "a thousand and one Arabian Nights' tales," for although it is undoubtedly true that the bare feet of the oriental

* Cahen Exode, p. 10. See also Genesis, chap. xxii., vv. 11 and 14,
† Judges, chap. vi., vv. 11 and 14.
and Hebrew Lexicon, p. 495.
‡ Kimchi on Zechariah, p. 26.

worshippers mark their reverence for the sacred ground on which they tread, it is clearly absurd to suppose infinity more present in one spot than in any other, and therefore any one spot more holy than any other to the infinite.

Verse 6.—In Genesis, chap. xxxii., v. 28, and chap xxxv., v. 10, God said of Jacob, "Thy name shall not be any more called Jacob, Israel is thy name," [See my commentary on Genesis, p. 126.] Yet we find he calls himself "the God of Jacob," and uses the name "Jacob" several times in the book of Exodus.

Verse 8.—After "the Perizzites," the Septuagint adds, "the Gergashites," omitted here (see Genesis, p. 95). The wording, "I am come down to deliver them," shows that to the writer of Exodus the idea of Deity was that of a God, residing in some heaven above, who, when his active interference in mundane affairs became necessary, and when "the cry" "came unto" him, descended to this globe to personally redress the wrongs done to his chosen peoples; wrongs which he, God, had been unaware of until the cry of suffering, uttered by the Israelites, had reached him in his heavenly dwelling.

Verse 10.—"Come now, therefore, and I will send thee unto Pharaoh, that thou mayest bring forth my people, the children of Israel, out of Egypt." It has been asked why did God, if he meant to really benefit the Jewish people, take them out of Egypt at all, when he might, by his omnipotence, have rendered their continuance in Egypt happy by inducing the Egyptians to cease their persecution. From the fertile plains of Egypt, and from its flesh-pots, which the Jews deeply regretted, he led them into the burning sands of the desert, or else into contact with hostile tribes, who contested each stage of their journey towards the land of promise, which, when reached, was far inferior to the fruitful valley of the Nile.

Verse 14.—"I am that I am." Douay, "I am who am." אהיה אשר אהיה AEIE ASheR AEIE. Cahen says, "These three words signify, grammatically, "I shall be that I shall be," or "I am that I am"—for אהיה AEIE, indicates as well the present as the future. The passage is difficult, but

there are abundant explanations. Onkelos does not translate it, and we have imitated him as to the word AEIE, which is only found used in this place, and is, perhaps, one of the names of God. Such is the opinion of the Sepher Hamivhar and of Vater. They say that AEIE is the name of the Eternal, applied by himself to himself. The Seventy translate, "Me I am he who is;" Mendelssohn, "I am the being who exists eternally;" the Vulgate, "*Sum qui sum.*" There are many other explanations more or less abstract.* (See Genesis, p. 114.)

Verse 15.—Godwyn says that the Jews, in order to defend their abstinence from the use of the word IEUE, corrupted the phrase "This is my name for ever." Instead of לעולם LOULeM "for ever," reading לעלם LOLeM "to be concealed."

Verse 17.—"And the Perizzites;" after these, and before the Hivites, the Septuagint, as in verse 8, inserts, "the Girgashites."

Verse 22.—"But every woman shall borrow of her neighbour, and of her that sojourneth in her house, jewels of silver, and jewels of gold, and raiment: and ye shall put *them* upon your sons, and upon your daughters; and ye shall spoil the Egyptians." This mode of "borrowing" seems very much like stealing, and the translators of the Breeches Bible, in a note, say that this example is not to be followed generally. Aben Ezra, speaking for the Jews, says, "Some inveigh against us, and say our ancestors were thieves, but these do not see that it was commanded them by God, and we have, therefore, no right to inquire into the reason.† Lessing retorts, "If we consider the action in itself, we cannot but admit that the whole is falsehood, deception, and theft. But how, if hereunto simply the words are added, 'the Lord hath said or commanded,' will thereby base deceit and nefarious fraud assume the character of sacred revelation? Will thereby the most impious wickedness be converted into a pious action? Thus it would be easy to stamp falsehood as inspiration, and rancour as

* Exode, p. 12
† Kalisch, Exodus.

virtue and piety; thus we lose every test of laudable and criminal deeds; thus religion and piety differ from the most glaring villainy, but by a few empty words 'God hath said.'" Cahen and Kalisch urge that "borrow" should be translated "ask," or "demand." Cahen says,* "Those are wrong who attack the Israelites on this account. They should think that these slaves, endeavouring to break their chains, would hardly scruple to deceive their old oppressors, that such an action may be excused, and is even in accordance with what we know of the manners of ancient Asiatic nations. To judge impartially the morality of a nation, it is necessary to know its particular notions of justice and injustice, and not to judge antiquity by our present views." But Cahen may fairly be answered, that the immorality is alleged to be directed by God, whose particular notions of justice ought not to be susceptible to modification by any such influences as those here alluded to.

Bishop Colenso takes an objection of an entirely different character. He says,† "We are told that 'every woman was to borrow of her neighbour, and of her that sojourned in her house, jewels of silver, and jewels of gold, and raiment' (Exodus, ii. 22). From this it would seem to follow that the Hebrews were regarded as living in the midst of the Egyptians, mixed up freely with them in their dwellings. And this appears to be confirmed by the statement (Exodus, xii. 35 and 36) that, when suddenly summoned to depart, they hastened, at a moment's notice, to 'borrow' in all directions from the Egyptians, and collected such a vast amount of treasure, in a very short space of time, that they 'spoiled the Egyptians.' And, indeed, it would seem only natural that those among the Egyptians who did not sympathise with the mad folly of their king, and had all along a friendly feeling, and by this time also a deep respect, for Israel, should have taken refuge in the Hebrew dwellings, and sought immunity in this way from the plagues which ravaged the land.

"And so writes Hengstenberg, p. 409:—'The Israelites

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* Exode, p. 13.
† Part I., p. 56.

dwelt in houses, and intermixed with Egyptians, so that the destroying angel would pass by one door and stop at another. They lived with the Egyptians, with whom, in part, they stood on most friendly terms, in cities. According to Exodus iii., 20 and 22, it was not unfrequently the case, that Egyptian lodgers dwelt with an Israelitish householder, and those persons of good property, so that they could give from abundance, gold and silver ornaments and clothes.'

"But the supposition of their borrowing in this way, even if they lived in such a city, involves prodigious difficulties. For the city, in that case, could have been no other than Raameses itself, from which they started (Exodus xii., 37) a 'treasure-city,' which they had built for Pharaoh (Exodus i., 11)—doubtless, therefore, a well-built city, not a mere collection of mud-hovels. And so the story, in Exodus ii., 5, of the daughter of Pharaoh going down to bathe in the Nile, in the immediate proximity of the place where Moses was born, implies that his parents, at all events, lived not far from the royal residence. But, if the Israelites lived in such a city together with the Egyptians, it must have been even larger than London, and the difficulty of communication would have been thereby greatly increased. For we cannot suppose that the humble dwellings of these despised slaves were in closest contiguity with the mansions of their masters. And, in fact, several of the miracles, especially that of the 'thick darkness,' imply that the abodes of the Hebrews were wholly apart from those of the Egyptians, however difficult it may be to conceive how, under such circumstances, each woman could have borrowed from her that 'sojourned in her house.' Thus we should have now to imagine the time that would be required for the poorer half of London going hurriedly to borrow from the richer half, in addition to their other anxieties in starting upon such a sudden and momentous expedition."

Chap. iv., v. 1.—Moses was, like Abraham, a thorough unbeliever, despite the praise given to him in the New Testament for his faith; for, notwithstanding that, in chap. iii., v. 18, God personally assures Moses that the Israelites

shall hearken unto him, yet the Jewish leader now expresses his strong opinion to the contrary. He evidently did not regard God's decree as sufficient to determine the actions or opinions of the Israelites.*

Verses 8 and 9.—"And it shall come to pass, if they will not believe thee, neither hearken to the voice of the first sign, that they will believe the voice of the latter sign. And it shall come to pass, if they will not believe also these two signs, neither hearken unto thy voice, that thou shall take of the water of the river, and pour *it* upon the dry *land:* and the water which thou takest out of the river shall become blood upon the dry *land.*" The doubt as to which of several means should prove efficacious is not in character with the attribute of omnipotent omniscience. "God," says Spinoza, "is here revealed as indifferent to, and ignorant of the future actions of mankind." Two miracles are provided to be worked, so that if one fails, the second may succeed. God says if the people will not believe the first sign, they will believe the second, and yet he provides a third, in case both first and second are disbelieved. Aben Ezra, astonished by the language used here, and in other parts of the Bible, justified it on the theory that God in revelation had expressed himself incorrectly, in order to suit the inferior capacities of his chosen people. Kalisch, who alleges that God knew whether the Jews would believe or not, makes a very weak endeavour to explain the language of the text. While these wonders might have induced the Israelites to consider Moses a very extraordinary man, it is difficult to conceive how they could influence the belief of the Israelites as to the existence of God. Miracles may evidence a power out of the range of the beholder's experience, but can hardly demonstrate a theological proposition.

Verse 10.—"And Moses said unto the Lord, 'O, my Lord, I *am* not eloquent, neither heretofore, nor since thou hast spoken unto thy servant: but I *am* slow of speech, and of a slow tongue.'" The Midrash, and "The Chronicles of Moses" relate a story of a miraculous deliverance of Moses

* See Spinoza, Tractatus Theo-Pol., cap. ii.

from imminent danger of death in his infancy, when he had, by chance, in his childish play, grasped at the crown on Pharaoh's head, so that it fell down and broke into fragments. The king, considering this circumstance a fatal omen, ordered the boy to be instantly killed, when, on the advice of Jethro, in order to prove that the child was still without discernment, two basins, one filled with gold, the other with burning coals, were placed before Moses, who, by the invisible interference of an angel, did not choose the dazzling gold, for which he had already stretched out his hand, but a burning coal, with which he touched his lips; and thus he became "slow of speech, and of a slow tongue," and especially unable to pronounce the labials. "And because this defect of Moses," says Nachmanides, "was the consequence of a miracle, God did not wish to remove it."* This story is of course fabulous, but believers in the talking serpent, the talking ass, and other Bible wonders, can hardly make objection to an account because it is fable.

Verse 13.—"And he said, 'O, my Lord, send, I pray thee, by the hand *of him whom* thou wilt send.'" The Septuagint version makes Moses say, "I beseech the Lord appoint another whom thou wilt send."

Verse 14.—"And the anger of the Lord was kindled against Moses, and he said, 'Is not Aaron the Levite thy brother? I know that he can speak well. And also, behold, he cometh forth to meet thee: and when he seeth thee, he will be glad in his heart.'" The anger of the Lord kindled, and why? Because Moses had told him that he was not a good speaker, and that he (Moses) therefore desired the Lord to choose somebody else to represent his wishes to Pharaoh and the Jews. But why should the Lord be angry? He must have himself well-known Moses's disability and have foreordained that Moses should be reluctant to go. The name of Aaron is here introduced suddenly. There is no previous account of his birth, or of any difficulty in saving him from the Egyptian tyranny. There were yet no Levites, so that the title, "Aaron the Levite," is anticipatory. "Aaron thy brother, of the house of Levi," can

* Kalisch, Exodus, chap. 71.

hardly be intended, for if Aaron had been the brother of Moses, no identificatory explanation would have been necessary.

Verse 16.—"Thou shalt be to him instead of God." The Douay, following the Septuagint, has, "But thou shalt be to him in those things that pertain to God."

Verse 18.—"The Septuagint adds to this verse the words, "After many days the King of Egypt died."

Verse 20.—"His sons." Our version has, as yet, only related the birth of one—Gershom; and in v. 25 you find "her son," as if only one.

Verse 21.—What are the miracles which are previously mentioned but so many incidents in a solemn farce, if God had already determined that Pharaoh should pay no attention to them? The rod turned into a serpent, the serpent returning to its condition of a rod, the leprous hand, and the water changed to blood, not being intended by God to move Pharaoh, of what use are they? It can hardly be argued that they are like stage scenery, and used to heighten the effect of the grand *finale*. In the third chapter, God tells Moses to use subterfuge to Pharaoh, by pretending that the Jewish nation only wanted to go three days' journey to sacrifice in the wilderness, and at the same time God says, that he is "sure the King of Egypt will not let you go." If God is the ruler and ordainer of all things, he must have ruled and ordained that his chosen people should be ill-treated by Pharaoh, whom God must have created for that very purpose. Can anything be more inconsistent with the character of a just and merciful Deity? Cahen says, it is not easy to reconcile the involuntary hardening of Pharaoh's heart with the doctrine of a free will.

Verse 24.—"And it came to pass by the way in the inn, that the Lord met him, and sought to kill him." What does this mean? If the Lord sought to kill Moses, what hindered him from carrying out his desire? It is strange that he should seek to kill the very man whom he had selected to lead his chosen people out of Egypt. Where was the Inn, or *caravanserai*, situate, in which the All-Powerful sought to kill his newly appointed prophet? The foot note to the Douay says it was an angel who met

and sought to kill Moses. Onkelos says the same thing. The circumcision of the son of Moses seems connected with the story, but not very clearly. The abrupt transition from the message to Pharaoh, in v. 23, to the seeking to kill Moses, shows that something has been lost from the original text. The vv. 22-27, read as they stand, are absurd. In our version we are told that *after* the Lord let Moses go, Zipporah said, "A bloody husband thou art, because of the circumcision." In the Douay we find that Zipporah used these words—*before* the Lord let Moses go.

Verses 25 and 26.—The Septuagint has, *estē to aima tēs peritomēs tou paidiou mou*, "the blood of the circumcision of my son has ceased."

Verses 28-30.—Aaron, who wrought the signs, and spoke the words to the people, did so apparently without any direct communication from God, as to either the signs or oral declarations. He must have been more credulous or much more daring than Moses, for he seems to have readily undertaken, upon the mere representation of his brother, that which his brother had hesitated to do, although personally commanded by God.

Chap. v.—It is noteworthy that Moses not only adopts the ruse and pretence that he only desired a temporary leave of absence in order that the Jews might sacrifice, but he also speaks as though God would punish his people if such sacrifices were not offered.

Chap. v., vv. 2 and 3.—"And Pharaoh said, 'Who *is* the Lord, that I should obey his voice to let Israel go? I know not the Lord, neither will I let Israel go.' And they said, 'The God of the Hebrews hath met with us: let us go, we pray thee, three days' journey into the desert, and sacrifice unto the Lord our God, lest he fall upon us with pestilence, or with the sword." Moses and Aaron, when replying to Pharaoh, have evidently no idea of IEUE as an infinite and only God. They answer, "The God of the Hebrews met us." IEUE is to Moses a god of the Hebrews, just as Osiris is a god of the Egyptians.

Verses 22 and 23.—"And Moses returned unto the Lord, and said, 'Lord, wherefore hast thou *so* evil entreated this people? Why *is* it *that* thou hast sent me? For since

I came to Pharaoh to speak in thy name, he hath done evil to this people; neither hast thou delivered thy people at all.'" The faith of Moses in the divine wisdom and power was not yet very great, notwithstanding his special intercourse with God, nor does his reverence for the omnipotent manifest itself in his language.

Chap. vi., v. 3.—"And I appeared unto Abraham, unto Isaac, and unto Jacob, by *the name of* God Almighty; but by my name JEHOVAH was I not known to them."* In the commentary on Genesis, attention has already been drawn to the contradiction involved in this verse. Colenso, who notices the subject in his earlier parts, examines the matter very elaborately in his last volume. Following the majority of German critics in separating the Pentateuch into various Elohistic and Jehovistic documents belonging to different ages, he declares that,† "It is plain that the Elohist has intentionally abstained from using the name 'Jehovah,' till he had given the account of its revelation to Moses, in Exodus, chap. vi., vv. 2-7. He *meant*, therefore, to imply that it was literally *not known* till the time of Moses; and the words in Exodus vi., v. 3, 'I appeared unto Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, by El Shaddai; but (by) my name Jehovah was I not known to them,' were really intended by him to be understood in this sense, which is their most obvious and natural meaning.

"The Elohist, then, meant to teach his people that the name 'Jehovah' *was not the name which their great forefathers used* for the Deity. It was comparatively a modern name, at the most only three or four centuries old, and was first revealed to living man at the time of the Exodus.

"On the other hand, we find the Jehovist habitually using the name 'Jehovah' from the first, putting it into the mouth of Eve (chap. iv., v. 1), and saying that from the time of Seth men 'began to call upon the name of Jehovah.' And, in short, he represents the name as thoroughly well-known, not only to the Patriarchs, and their wives and families, but to the *Philistines* (chap. xxvi., vv. 28, 29), and *Aramœans* (chap. xxiv. 31, 50, 51) generally.

* See pages 112 to 115.

† Part 5, p. 269. See also part 2, p. 357.

This contradiction shows us at once that the Jehovist did *not* believe implicitly in the Elohistic account of the origin of the name, and for some reason thought it best to carry back that origin to the most distant ages of mankind. And from this fact alone, independently of all other considerations, we may infer at once that the account in Exodus, chap. vi., v. 2 and v. 7, is not to be taken as historically true.'"

Cahen says, "*Le Tetragramme est souvent annoncé dans la vie des patriarches. Il est même dit expressement que ce nom a pris cours du temps de Seth* (Genesis, chap. iv., v. 26); *ce qui est difficile à concilier avec ce qui est dit ici.*"* "The four-lettered name is frequently mentioned in the lives of the Patriarchs. It is even expressly stated that the use of the name commenced in the time of Seth, which is difficult to reconcile with that which is here stated."

Nicolas, in a chapter on Jehovism, examines at considerable length the arguments of Vatke, Hengstenberg, Tholuck, Bohlen, and Knobel, as to the use, origin, and meaning of the words Jehovah and Elohim. Nicolas regards the word Jehovah as expressing the eternal, and the word Elohim, as expressing the all-powerful; remarking that the latter word is also applied to kings, princes, and judges, and the former only to Deity. Nicolas regards the Hebrew theology, expressed in connection with the name Jehovah, as purely monotheistic; but Von Bohlen takes precisely the opposite view. He says, "The Pentateuch can no better conceal, than the books which immediately succeed it, that Jehovah was at first merely the national Deity of the Israelites. Cain is afraid to dwell in a land where "Jehovah is not;" the Deity "goes down" with his people into Egypt, and appears there to his chosen servants. He is constantly spoken of as "the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob," or "the God of the Hebrews;" they are forbidden to have any gods beside him, and Jehovah is represented as holding such other Gods to be similar to himself, although he eventually subdues them, and (as every nation believes of its tutelar deity) he is more powerful than they.

* Genese, chap. xiv.; Exode, chap. vi., 3.

Such it is evident cannot be termed a pure "monotheism."*

Colenso argues for the Phœnician origin of the four-lettered name which he identifies with ΙΑΩ, "a mysterious name, employed chiefly at the great feast of the Harvest," and used to designate the sun.

In an abridged translation from Moses, the Bishop gives the following extracts:—"(I.)† IAO is the sun—God at the different times of the year, with the predominant idea of Adonis as the harvest-Deity. In general, however, he represents a complexity of nature-deities, whose powers he comprehends in the meaning of his name, which is one full of mystery, and, according to Sanchoniathon, was taught in the priestly mysteries by the very oldest Phœnician hierophants.

"(II.)—As Adonis-Elyon, he is the primary being, together with the female goddess of nature, out of whom was born Uranos-Ge, as husband and wife, who parted afterwards from one another into 'heaven,' and 'earth.'

"(III.)—His name also was introduced, together with Dionysia, among the Greeks under various forms.

"(IV.)—In the Chaldee Religion, IAO was a designation of the spiritual principle of Light and Life, and seems to denote sometimes the highest Light-principle (Bel-Saturn), sometimes its efflux and image (Bel-Mithra). All these different ideas, however, are gathered up in his mysterious name IAO, which denotes him as the Principle of Life."

"The Chaldæans call the Deity IAO, which means in the tongue of the Phœnicians 'Intelligent Light;' and He is often also called 'Sabaoth,' as being over the seven (poles) heavens—that is, the Creator. Lydus, *de Mens.* iv., 38, p. 74.

"With this may be compared another passage of Lydus, *de Mens.* iv., 38, p. 74, *of Sabaoth, the Creator; for thus among the Phœnicians is the creative number named.*

"The first of these passages is found also in Cedrenus, i., p. 296, in a different connection, and with the name corrupted: "*For (ἠάὼ read Ἰαὼ) IAO among the Chaldæans is*

* Von Bohlen, Genesis, chap. xiii.

† Part v., pp. 312 and 316.

interpreted to mean, in the tongue of the Phœnicians, "Intelligent Light," and Sabbath also (to mean) "over the Seven Heavens"—that is, the Creator-Deity.

"Thus, then, we obtain the following new ideas about IAO:—

"(I.)—He was throned above the "Seven Heavens" of the Chaldæans;

"(II.)—He was a Light-Being, and, in fact, the holy Light-Principle, "Intelligent Light," out of which, according to Chaldeeism, all spiritual beings emanated;

"(III.)—He was regarded as Creator."

It is not unworthy of notice that the remarks of Colenso, and the authors from whom he quotes, are, to a considerable extent, corroborative of the views put forward by the Rev. Robert Taylor (following Dupuis and Drummond) in his Diegesis* and Devil's Pulpit, as to the Tsabaistic origin of our Hebrew mythology.

It is much to be regretted that the great learning and keen wit of Robert Taylor are sometimes rendered less effective for modern readers by the special mode of utterance adopted. He had to fight with rough adversaries, and he was drawn to fight with coarse weapons. The views he advocates on the Christian astro-mythology have received support from some most erudite investigators of Bible myths. That the sun, under various personified phases, has supplied the world with gods from the most ancient to the more modern, not excluding Jesus Christ, it would be idle to deny, after the researches of Dupuis, Drummond, and Higgins, or even after perusing such a work as Keightley's Mythology. The Bishop of Natal, by his quotations from Jablonsky and Movers, places before the multitude a ray of light on Christian history, from the use of which they may guess why the day fixed for the birth of Jesus corresponds with the New Year's birth, and why *Sun*day is our Lord's day. It will be, however, new to many, the suggestion that to Jesus himself has been applied the mystic name, IAO, and that this has been applied to him avowedly as the mystic emblematical sun.

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* Diegesis, chap. xxii.

Kalisch*, who, in his commentary on Exodus, seems much more orthodox than in his later volume on Genesis, warmly combats the notion of any Phœnician, Egyptian, Chinese, or other than Hebrew origin for the word. The "I am all that has been, that is, and that will be," of the Temple of Isis, is not admitted by Kalisch as having the antiquity claimed for it.† Speaking of the sacredness of the name, Jehovah, he observes that, according to the Talmud, "Even he who thinks the name of God in its true letters, forgets his future life." The Egyptians had also a God whose name was too sacred for utterance. Nicolas, while admitting that there are weighty arguments in favour of the hypothesis of the Phœnician origin of the word, denies that those arguments are convincing.

Verse 9.—"And Moses spake so unto the children of Israel; but they harkened not unto Moses for anguish of spirit, and for cruel bondage," although, according to chap. iv. v. 31, they had previously believed.

Verse 10.—Kalisch says, "It cannot be denied that the following part of this chapter, and the beginning of the following, to verse 7, is so obscure in its internal connection and structure, that the often-repeated assertion that we have here incoherent fragments unskilfully inserted in the context, appears at the first glance not without foundation. For neither contain—verses 11 to 13, or verse 26 to chap. vii. v. 7—any new information, nor does the genealogy, verses 14 to 25, seem in its proper place here."

Verse 15.—The family of Ohad is not mentioned in Numbers, chap. xxvi. v. 12. Jemuel is there called Nemuel;‡ Zohar is there called Zerah; and so in First Chronicles, chap. iv. v. 24, where also Jachin is called Jarib.

Verse 17.—Libni is, in First Chronicles, chap. xxiii. v. 7, called Laadan. If the writer of Chronicles only had our Pentateuch to refer to, from whence did he get the names of the children of Libni and Shimei? The writer of the names of this family in Chronicles makes a most extraordinary jumble of confusion and contradiction.

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* Exodus, chap. lii.

† See also on this, Nicolas, p. 154.

‡ See Commentary on Genesis, p. 136.

Verse 18.—No sons of Hebron are given in this chapter; but in First Chronicles, chap. xxiii. v. 19, and in chap. xxiv. v. 23, four are named.

Verse 21.—Of the sons of Izhar, three are here named, Korah, Nepheg, and Zichri; but in First Chronicles, chap. xxiii. v. 18, only one is named, Shelomith, or, according to chap. xxiv. v. 22, Shelomoth.

Verse 22.—The sons of Uzziel are here given as three, Mishael, Eezaphan, and Zithri; but in First Chronicles, chap. xxiii. v. 20, two are only named as "Micah the first, and Jesiah the second."

Verse 20.—"And Amram took him Jochebed, his father's sister, to wife." The Septuagint makes Jochebed "daughter of Amram's father's brother." Cahen suggests that this is so put because the marriage was within the prohibited degrees. The Septuagint also adds after Moses the words, "and Miriam, their sister." The name Jochebed being a compound, including the name Jah as prefix, religious critics are embarrassed by this, for, if the name Jah was not known prior to Exodus, chap. vi. v. 3, how could the ancestors of Moses use it?* Dr. John Pye Smith says that it appears to him impossible that the father of Moses should marry the daughter of Levi. Colenso says, "It is stated in the above passage that Amram took him, Jochebed, his father's sister, Kohath's sister, and, therefore, Levi's daughter, to wife; and so, also, we read in Numbers, chap. xxvi. v. 59, "And the name of Amram's wife was Jochebed, the daughter of Levi, whom her mother bare to Levi in Egypt; and she bare unto Amram Aaron and Moses, and Miriam, their sister." Now Levi was one year older than Judah, and was, therefore, forty-three years of age when he went down with Jacob into Egypt; and we are told, in Exodus, chap. vi. v. 16, that Levi was 137 years old when he died; Levi must have, therefore, lived, according to this story, 94 years in Egypt. Making the extreme supposition of his begetting Jochebed in the last year of his life, she may have been an infant 94 years after the migration of Jacob and his sons into Egypt. Hence it follows

* See Colenso, part 5, p. 273.

that if the sojourn in Egypt was 430 years, Moses, who was 80 years old at the time of the Exodus, must have been born 350 years after the migration into Egypt, when his mother must have been, at the very least, 256 years old."* "And the years of the life of Amram were an hundred and thirty and seven years." The Septuagint says, "One hundred and thirty-two."

Verses 26 and 27 could scarcely have been written by Moses, but rather appear to have been written, long after his age, by some one who wished to identify the Aaron and Moses of the genealogy with the Aaron and Moses to whom the Lord spoke, and who repeats, in oriental style, the words of identification. Cahen says, verse 26 gives the names, Aaron and Moses, in order of birth, and verse 27 reversed in order of dignity. Vater says, "Thus an author writes of men who lived long before him."

Chap. vii. v. 1.—What is meant by the words "I have made thee a God to Pharaoh?" In what sense could Moses be considered as Pharaoh's God? He was not worshipped by Pharaoh, nor did he rule Pharaoh. According to chap. iv. v. 16, Moses was to be instead of a God to Aaron. The Lord's reply is in answer to Moses's excuse that he is uncircumcised. From this it would appear that Egyptians had some repugnance to uncircumcised persons; yet, Moses, if born a Jew, ought to have been circumcised long before being put away in the ark—that is, if the Jews practised the rite, and if Moses, under care of Pharaoh's daughter, had been educated an Egyptian from his boyhood, he might fairly be supposed to have also conformed to all Egyptian customs.

Verse 7.—"And Moses was fourscore years old, and Aaron fourscore and three years old, when they spake unto Pharaoh." So that, though Aaron was the elder born, he seems to have escaped the river to which all the male infants were to have been consigned, according to Pharaoh's order. His birth is passed over without notice in the text, so much so that, according to chap. ii., verses 1 and 2, Moses would appear to be the first son born after the marriage of his parents.

* Part 1, p. 93.

Verses 10, 11, and 12.—"And Moses and Aaron went in unto Pharaoh, and they did so as the Lord had commanded; and Aaron cast down his rod before Pharaoh, and before his servants, and it became a serpent. Then Pharaoh also called the wise men and the sorcerers; now the magicians of Egypt, they also did in like manner with their enchantments. For they cast down every man his rod, and they became serpents; but Aaron's rod swallowed up their rods." The only possible conclusion from these verses is that sorcery, magic, and enchantment are actually practicable. Many clever tricks are practised in the East by serpent charmers, but the text does not regard these as tricks. It relates that the "magicians did so with their enchantments."

Kalisch, notwithstanding his orthodox efforts to clear away all the difficulties of Exodus, says, "It cannot be denied that the Pentateuch considers miracles performed, apparently not under the name of the God of Israel, but under the fancied influence of other deities, as not impossible; and that it admits even predictions which might be realised, and which are called 'false signs' only because they are given in a bad cause." Yet, to-day fortune-telling and conjuring are, except when practised as a show or stage performance, regarded as impostures deserving the House of Correction. As a specimen of the truly pious style of explanation, the following quotation is presented:* —"It may seem surprising that Jehovah should so far give countenance to a false religion as to permit these deceivers to imitate the miracles of his servants. But this was a contest between the votaries of the true God and the worshippers of demons. The necromancers were, therefore, suffered to succeed in some instances, to encourage them to persevere in their opposition, that the victory of Jehovah might be the more triumphant, and their defeat the more mortifying and complete."

To judge by the standard of to-day, the whole account of these miracles is in the highest degree unreasonable; even the most pious Theist, if he claimed for God the power

* Jones's Biblical Encyclopædia.

to turn a rod into a serpent, would hesitate to concede the same power to the sorcerers and magicians of Egypt. The throwing down the rod by Aaron, its change into a serpent, or dragon, as some versions put it, and the swallowing the other rods, form a juggler's display without purpose or utility, because God has already predestined that the signs should not produce any effect whatever upon Pharaoh. It is under colour of such a narrative, and of the texts in various parts of the Bible relating to witches and wizards, that the most monstrous beliefs have prevailed amongst Christian nations of all classes, and which follies, although nearly extirpated in most brutal fashion by the pious witch-hunters of past generations, to this day are found occasionally where piety and ignorance predominate.

Verses 19, 20, and 21.—These verses clearly threaten to change the whole of the water throughout Egypt, and consequently appear to teach that the *whole of the water* in Egypt was turned to blood; if so, the 22nd verse would be incorrect in stating that the magicians did the same, because, if *all the water* had been already turned to blood by Aaron, there would not be any left for the magicians to operate upon. Aben Ezra, seeing this difficulty, asks what waters the Egyptian magicians could change into blood, and suggests that they might have changed the subterranean waters.* We are told that this plague was throughout the whole of the land of Egypt; if so, the Jews must have suffered equally with the Egyptians. In support of the views put forward by those who regard these plagues as according with Egyptian climatic conditions, Cahen remarks that the Nile always reddens as it becomes swollen and troubled at the time of the inundations.

Chap. vii. in the Hebrew has 28 verses—that is, it includes the first 4 verses of chap. viii.

Chap. viii., v. 9.—"Glory over me when shall I entreat for thee." These words are not very clear. The Douay has, "Set me a time when I shall pray for thee."

Verse 16.—"Lice." Kalisch has "gnats;" the Douay, "sciniphs," this being merely the putting into English letters the Greek of the Septuagint *scniphes*, which Cahen renders "gnats."

* Cahen, Exode, p. 28.

Verses 17 and 18.—Had it not been for the previous transformation of non-existing water, it would scarcely be a matter for wonder that the magicians could not turn the dust into lice, when we are told that *all the dust* had been previously changed by Aaron.

Verse 21.—"Swarms of flies." Josephus says these were "various sorts of pestilential creatures;" and this is, to some extent, endorsed by the marginal reading of our Bible, "a mixture of noisome beasts." Aben Ezra makes it "crowds of wild beasts;" Cahen has "*un melange d'insects;*" Kalisch, "the beetle."

Verses 22 and 23.—It appears from these verses as if the Jews had been equal participators in all the evils attaching to the previous plagues. It is here, for the first time, that any protection to the Israelites is spoken of. Josephus says that, after the fourth plague, Pharaoh would have let the Hebrew men and women go away to sacrifice, but he would not let them take their children.*

Chap. ix., v. 10.—What kind of beasts could the boils break out upon, when all the cattle were killed by murrain? In verse 6 it is expressly stated that "all the cattle of Egypt died."

Verse 16.—"And in very deed for this cause have I raised thee up, for to show in thee my power; and that my name may be declared throughout all the earth." Cahen observes that, notwithstanding the God of the Jews did this that his name might be known through all the earth, yet that a large majority of humankind knew nothing of the Pentateuch, or of the Hebrew Deity. Even at the present day there are millions who live and die, never hearing of the plagues of Egypt.

Verses 20 and 21.—"He that feared the word of the Lord among the servants of Pharaoh made his servants and his cattle flee into the houses. And he that regarded not the word of the Lord left his servants and his cattle in the field." There is no account here of God's words being communicated to Pharaoh and the Egyptians. Perhaps a passage has been lost from the text. The Samaritan codex

* Antiquities, book 2, c. 14.

adds that Moses did tell Pharaoh. The writer of these verses ought to have remembered that all the cattle of Egypt were killed by the murrain, but he would then have had to explain how cattle already dead could flee from the field to escape being killed by the hail.

Verse 28.—Josephus says that, after the hail, Pharaoh "bid Moses take the Hebrews away with their wives and children, but to leave their cattle behind."*

Verse 30.—"But as for thee and thy servants, I know that ye will not yet fear the Lord God." The Douay has, "do not yet fear;" the Geneva has, "I know, afore I pray, ye will feare before the face of the Lord God." Kalisch argues that the Douay is the correct rendering. Cahen intimates, following the Rabbis, that the word "not" has been left out in the Hebrew text.

Chap. x. v. 9.—By this, and verse 25, it appears that Moses still pursued a policy of equivocation towards Pharaoh, notwithstanding that God had so manifested his power against the Egyptians. The request made by the Jewish prophet is not that the Israelites may be liberated, but that they may be temporarily released for the purposes of a sacrifice.

Verse 13.—"And Moses stretched forth his rod over the land of Egypt, and the Lord brought an east wind upon the land all that day, and all that night; and when it was morning, the east wind brought the locusts." The Geneva version calls the locusts "grasshoppers." Cahen translates the words "east wind" as "south wind," following the Septuagint. The Douay has "a burning wind," after the Vulgate, which has "*ventus urens.*" Kalisch defends our version, remarking that "It has frequently been asserted that an east wind could not have brought the locusts into Egypt, because these insects always wander south to north, and because they cannot well fly over water, and would, therefore, have perished in the Red Sea before reaching Egypt." Kalisch regards neither of these arguments as sufficient.

Verse 14.—"And the locusts went up over all the land

* Antiquities, book 2, chap. 14.

of Egypt, and rested in all the coasts of Egypt; very grievous were they; before them there were no such locusts as they, neither after them shall be such." Cahen remarks that Joel, describing, in a very poetic fashion, a plague of four kinds of locusts (Joel, chap. ii.), uses very similar language. Kalisch says that the two passages have been regarded as contradictory, but seeks to explain them* by alleging that in Exodus the quantity, and in Joel the number of species, is the feature unparalleled.

Verse 19.—"And Jehovah turned a mighty strong west wind, which took away the locusts, and cast them into the Red Sea." For "west wind" the original Hebrew of this passage has "wind of the sea"—that is, of course, the Mediterranean Sea, from which westerly winds blew over the land of Canaan, but not over Egypt. This expression obviously could not have been familiarly used in this way till some time after the people were settled in the land of Canaan, when they would naturally employ "wind of the sea," "seaward," to express "west wind," "westward," (1st K., vii. 25, 1st Ch., ix. 24, 2nd Ch., iv. 4), though they had also other ways of expressing the west (Jo., xxiii. 4, 1st Ch., xii. 15, Is., xlv. 6). It is evident that neither Moses nor one of his age could have invented this form of expression, either while wandering in the wilderness, or even when, in the last year, according to the story, they had reached the borders of the promised land, and the Mediterranean lay then actually to the west of their position. Still less could he have used the phrase "wind of the sea" to express a westerly wind, with reference to an event occurring in the land of Egypt, where the Mediterranean lay to the north, and the Red Sea to the east. And the same expression occurs in many other places of the Pentateuch, as G., xii. 8, xiii. 14, xxviii. 14, E., xxvi. 22, 27, xxvii. 12, xxxvi. 27, 32, N., ii. 18, iii. 23. xi. 31, xxxiv. 6, xxxv. 5, D., i. 7, iii. 27, xxxiii. 23.

It may, perhaps, be said that the Hebrews retained their own language, and their old forms of expression, after they went down to Egypt, and so used mechanically, as it were,

* Exode, p. 40; and Exodus, p. 168.

the word "sea" for "west," though so inappropriate. If this were the *only* difficulty to be met, such an explanation might be admitted. As it is, the phenomenon in question is but one of many like phenomena, as *e.g.*, that, in Genesis, xli. 6, the "east" wind is spoken of as a "parching" wind, which, as Gesenius observes, "it certainly is in Palestine, but not in Egypt, whence the LXX. in that place write 'south-west' wind instead of 'east' wind," and is very strongly suggestive of a later date of composition, for those parts, at least, of the Mosaic narrative in which it occurs.*

Verses 21, 22, and 23.—"And the Lord said unto Moses, Stretch out thine hand toward heaven, that there may be darkness over the land of Egypt, even the darkness which may be felt. And Moses stretched forth his hand toward heaven; and there was a thick darkness in all the land of Egypt three days. They saw not one another, neither rose any from his place for three days; but all the children of Israel had light in their dwellings." The difficulties as to this miracle become greater when you consider that the children of Israel were spread all over Egypt (chap. i. v. 7), and that they lodged in the same houses with Egyptians (chap. iii. v. 22), and that their dwellings were frequently in the same neighbourhoods. Darkness and light must have been near neighbours, and it is curious to consider whether, if an Egyptian and Israelite were at the time of the plague in the same room, light or darkness would prevail. Kalisch remarks that in the Septuagint, verse 23, it states, "neither rose any man from his bed." Kalisch objects to the Septuagint version as improbable. Does the learned doctor mean by so objecting that the narrative of this plague, as recorded in our version, bears an air of probability? To a plain mind, a patch-work of light and darkness over the whole of a country is about as great an improbability as can well be conceived.

Verse 29.—"And Moses said, Thou has spoken well; I will see thy face again no more." Yet, in chap. xi. v. 8, we find Moses again in the presence of Pharaoh.

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* Colenso, part ii., pp. 199 and 200.

Chap. xi. v. 3.—"And the Lord gave the people favour in the sight of the Egyptians. Moreover the man Moses was very great in the land of Egypt, in the sight of Pharaoh's servants, and in the sight of the people." And the Lord *gave* the people favour. The Douay reads, "And the Lord *will give* favour to his people." Our version is evidently incorrect, because the Egyptians afterwards suffered another plague, which would have been cruel and unnecessary had they already granted or been favourable to the wish of the Israelites. "And the man Moses was very great." Moses can scarcely be supposed to have written this of himself.

Verse 5.—Commenting on this verse, Cahen remarks that ten righteous men would have been enough to have saved Sodom, but here thousands of innocent beings are condemned for one man's crime.

Goethe quaintly says—"The petition (of Moses and Aaron) was thus refused; and, with plagues oversweeping the land, ever more pressingly renewed, ever more obstinately denied. But the excited Hebrews, in the prospect of a land of heritage promised by an ancient tradition, in the hope of independence and self-government, recognised no further duties. Under the pretence of a universal feast, they borrowed from their neighbours vessels of gold and silver, and at the moment when the Egyptians thought the Israelites occupied with a harmless festivity, an inverted Sicilian vespers was undertaken; the foreigner murdered the native, the guest the host; and, guided by a savage policy, they smote only the firstborn, that, in a land where primogeniture enjoyed so many privileges, the selfishness of the younger sons might be occupied, and the instantaneous vengeance avoided by a swift flight. The artifice succeeded; the murderers were thrust out instead of being punished. Later only the King gathered his host; but the chariots and horsemen, otherwise so terrible to foot-soldiers, fought, on marshy ground, an unequal fight with the light and light-armed rearguard, probably with the same resolute, daring band who had already exercised themselves with the perilous universal murder, and whom, in the sequel, we cannot but recognise and distinguish by their horrible deeds."*

* Westœstlicher Divan. Israel in the Wilderness.

Chap. xii. v. 17.—"And ye shall observe the feast of unleavened bread; for in this selfsame day have I brought your armies out of the land of Egypt: therefore shall ye observe this day in your generations by an ordinance for ever." This would seem to be a commandment given after the Exodus. The Douay, instead of "have I brought," has "I will bring." Kalisch and Cahen translate in accordance with our version.

Reading verses 3 and 6 attentively, portions of this chapter have the appearance of being later additions, applying to an occasion of the passover subsequent to the flight.

Verses 21, 22, 23, and 28.—"Then Moses called for all the elders of Israel, and said unto them, Draw out and take you a lamb according to your families, and kill the passover. And ye shall take a bunch of hyssop, and dip it in the blood that is in the bason, and strike the lintel and the two side posts with the blood that is in the bason; and none of you shall go out at the door of his house until the morning. For the Lord will pass through to smite the Egyptians; and when he seeth the blood upon the lintel, and on the two side posts, the Lord will pass over the door, and will not suffer the destroyer to come in unto your houses to smite you. And the children of Israel went away, and did as the Lord had commanded Moses and Aaron, so did they." Colenso comments very fully on these verses. He says*:—

"In one single day the whole immense population of Israel, as large as that of London, was instructed to keep the passover, and actually did keep it. I have said 'in one single day,' for the first notice of any such feast to be kept is given in this very chapter, where we find it written, verse 12, 'I will pass through the land of Egypt this night, and will smite all the first-born in the land of Egypt, both man and beast.'

"It cannot be said that they had notice several days beforehand, for they were to 'take' the lamb on the tenth day of the month, and 'kill' it on the fourteenth (vv. 3, 6),

* Part i. p. 54.

and so verse 12 only means to say 'on *that* night—the night of the fourteenth—I will pass through the land of Egypt.' For the expression in chap. v. v. 12 is distinctly—as in chap. xiii. v. 8, and so chap. v. v. 14—'*this* day shall be unto you for a memorial;' and, besides, in the chapter preceding, chap. xi. v. 4, we read, 'And Moses said [to Pharaoh], Thus saith Jehovah, *about midnight* will I go out into the midst of Egypt, and all the first-born in the land of Egypt shall die,' where there can be no doubt that the 'midnight' then next at hand is intended. It is true that in the story as it now stands, the directions about 'taking' the lamb on the tenth day, and 'keeping' it till the fourteenth, are perplexing and contradictory.

"'Moses called all the elders of Israel.' We must suppose, then, that the 'elders' lived somewhere near at hand. But where did the two millions live? And how could the order to keep the passover have been conveyed, with its minutest particulars, to *each individual household* in this vast community in one day—rather in *twelve hours*, since Moses received the command on the very same day on which they were to kill the passover *at even* (Exodus, chap. xii. v. 6)?

"It was absolutely necessary that the notice should be distinctly given to each separate family. For it was a matter of life and death. Upon the due performance of the divine command it depended whether Jehovah should 'stride across' the threshold (see Is., chap. xxxi. v. 5), and protect the house from the angel of death, or not. And yet the whole matter was perfectly new to them. The specific directions—about choosing the lamb, killing it at even, sprinkling its blood, and eating it with unleavened bread, 'not raw, nor sodden at all with water, but roast with fire,' 'with their loins girded, their shoes on their feet, and their staff in their hand'—were now for the first time communicated to Moses, by him to the elders, and by them to the people. These directions, therefore, could not have been conveyed by any mere *sign*, intimating that they were now to carry into execution something about which they had been informed before. They must be plainly and fully delivered to each individual head of a family, or to a number

of them gathered together, though these, of course, might be ordered to assist in spreading the intelligence to others, but so that no single household should be left uninformed upon the matter.

"This would be done *most* easily if we could suppose that the whole Hebrew community lived as closely together as possible, in one great city. In that case, we should have to imagine a message of this nature, upon which life and death depended, conveyed without fail to every single family in a population as large as that of London, between sunrise and sunset, and that, too, without their having had any previous notice whatever on the subject, and without any preparations having been made beforehand to facilitate such a communication.

"The story, however, will not allow us to suppose that they were living in any such city at all. Having so large flocks and herds, 'even very much cattle' (Ex., chap. xii. v. 38), many of them must have lived scattered over the large extent of grazing ground required under their circumstances; and, accordingly, they are represented as still living in 'the land of Goshen' (Ex., chap. x. v. 26). But how large must have been the extent of this land? We can form some judgment on this point by considering the number of lambs which (according to the story) must have been killed for the passover. The command was, 'They shall take to them every man a lamb, according to the house of their fathers, a lamb for an house; and if the household be too little for the lamb, let him and his neighbour, next unto his house, take it according to the number of the souls; every man, according to his eating, shall make your count for the lamb' (Ex., chap. xii. vv. 3 and 4). Josephus (*de Bell. Jud.*, vi. g. 3), reckons ten persons on an average for each lamb; but, he says, 'many of us are twenty in a company.' Kurtz allows fifteen or twenty. Taking ten as the average number, two millions of people would require about 200,000 lambs; taking twenty, they would require 100,000. Let us take the mean of these, and suppose that they required 150,000. And these were to be all '*male* lambs of the first year' (Ex., chap. xii. v. 5). We may assume that there were as many *female* lambs of

the first year, making 300,000 lambs of the first year altogether.

"But these were not all. For if the 150,000 lambs that were killed for the passover comprised *all* the males of that year, there would have been no rams or wethers left of that year for the increase of the flock. And, as the same thing would take place in each successive year, there would never be any rams or wethers, but ewe-sheep innumerable; or, indeed, when the first set of rams died out, there would be no more propagation, and both ewes and rams would cease. Instead, then, of 150,000, we may suppose 200,000 male lambs of the first year, and 200,000 female lambs, making 400,000 lambs of the first year altogether. The total number of sheep in an average flock of all ages will be about *five times* that of the increase in one season of lambing. So that 400,000 lambs of the first year implies a flock of 2,000,000 sheep and lambs of all ages. Taking, then, into account the fact that they had also large herds, 'even very much cattle,' we may fairly reckon that the Hebrews, though so much oppressed, must have possessed at this time, according to the story, more than two millions of sheep and oxen.*

"What extent of land, then, would all these have required for pasturage? Let us allow five sheep to an acre. Then the sheep alone of the Israelites would have required 400,000 acres of grazing land—an extent of country considerably larger than the whole county of Hertfordshire or Bedfordshire, and more than twice the size of Middlesex, besides that which would have been required for the oxen.

"We must, then, abandon altogether the idea of the people living together in one city, and must suppose a great body of them to have been scattered about in towns and villages, throughout the whole land of Goshen, in a district of 400,000 acres—that is, twenty-five miles square [625

* This is hardly the full extent of the difficulty, for, as the lambs were to be free from blemish, they would be only a selection from a still larger number. Maimonides declares that, according to Jewish tradition, the four days between the taking and sacrifice of the lamb were to afford time to see that the intended victim was faultless (Kalisch, Exodus, p. 190).

square miles], larger than Hertfordshire (391,141 acres). But, then, the difficulty of informing such a population would be enormously increased, as well as that of their borrowing, when summoned in the dead of night (Ex., chap. xii. vv. 29-36), to the extent implied in the story. For, even if we supposed the *first* message to prepare, kill, and eat the Paschal lamb, communicated to the whole people within twelve hours, and acted on, when they were abroad in full daylight—or that they actually had had a previous notice to 'take' the lambs on the tenth, and 'keep' them to the fourteenth—yet how could the *second* notice, to start, have been so suddenly and completely circulated? Not one was 'to go out at the door of his house until the morning' (Ex., chap. xii. v. 22). Consequently, they could not have known anything of what had happened in Pharaoh's house and city, as also among his people throughout the whole 'land of Egypt' (Ex., chap. xii. v. 29), until the summons from Moses, or, at least, the news of the event reached each individual house. The whole population of Hertfordshire, by the census of 1851, was considerably under 200,000 (167,298). We are to imagine, then, its towns and villages increased more than *tenfold* in size or in number. And, then, we are to believe that every single household throughout the entire country was warned in twelve hours to keep the Feast of the Passover, was taught *how* to keep it, and actually *did* keep it; and that, further, they were warned against midnight to start at once in hurried flight for the wilderness when each family was shut up closely in its own house, and strictly forbidden to come out of it till summoned, and they could not, therefore, communicate the tidings freely as by day from one person to a number of others."

Chap. xii. v. 29.—In this verse is related the horrible consummation of a series of plagues which God had caused to fall on the Egyptians. And why all this punishment? Was it because the Egyptians, as a nation, had oppressed the Israelites? If so, the cattle, the trees, and the green herbs were included in the punishment, although they could not have participated in the offence; besides which, the Egyptians could never have oppressed the Israelites if

the oppression had not been permitted by the Omnipotent Deity who had sworn to Abraham to protect and cherish them. Was the punishment because Pharaoh would not let the children of Israel go? If so, what had the first-born of the "maid-servant in the mill, and of the captive in the dungeon," to do with Pharaoh's offence? How could these poor wretches prevent the decree of Egypt's mighty chieftain? But even Pharaoh was specially controlled by God; in chap. iv. v. 21, chap. vii. v. 3, chap. ix. vv. 12 and 16, chap. x. vv. 1, 20, and 27, chap. xi. v. 10, and chap. xiv. v. 4, we have distinct repetitions of the statement that God himself hardened Pharaoh's heart and prevented him from allowing the children of Israel to go. Then, why all this punishment? In chap. ix. v. 16, chap. x. v. 2, and chap. xiv. v. 4, we are told that God raised Pharaoh up for the very purpose of smiting him and his people, so that God might perform the miracles, that the name of God might be declared throughout all the earth, that the Israelites might worship the Lord, and that the name of God might be honoured amongst the Egyptians; and in seeking to attain this result, which, to this day, has not been arrived at, God plagues and torments the Egyptian nation with most painful and destructive plagues, killing the first-born in every family, from the monarch who sat on the throne to the captive in the dungeon, and ending by drowning Pharaoh and his army in the Red Sea. The religious thinker, attempting to examine this horrible picture, might, perhaps, be tempted to blaspheme by questioning God's justice and goodness, were he not saved from this dilemma by a consciousness of the falsity and absurdity of the whole tale. According to chap. ix. vv. 3 and 6, all the cattle of the Egyptians, their horses, asses, camels, oxen, and sheep, were killed by the murrain; by verse 10 of the same chapter, a boil breaking forth with blains is sent upon the same cattle; by verse 19 the Egyptians are cautioned to gather in *their cattle*, which, if the preceding verses be true, were already dead, lest they should again die from the effects of the hail, and he who feared the Lord amongst the servants of Pharaoh made his *dead* cattle flee into the house

lest they should be killed again, and those who did not fear the Lord had their cattle killed a second time by the hail; in chap. x. v. 25, Moses asks Pharaoh to give him some of his *twice killed* cattle that he may kill them a third time as sacrifices to the Lord; in chap. xii. v. 29, God, in the night, kills the first-born of all the cattle, some of which must have been thus *thrice* killed; yet, despite all this, we find Pharaoh with an army of chariots, horses, and horsemen, who are finally and irrecoverably got rid of by being drowned in the Red Sea.

Verses 37 and 38.—"And the children of Israel journeyed from Rameses to Succoth, about six hundred thousand on foot that were men, beside children. And a mixed multitude went up also with them; and flocks, and herds, even very much cattle." Cahen says, "This supposes a nation of at least 3,000,000 individuals; when camped with their beasts and camels, they would have occupied at least a square league of surface, and in marching must have extended into a column many miles long. It is difficult for such a multitude to travel in any country, and very difficult indeed to obtain nourishment in a desert." After reading Colenso's comments, which are subjoined, the reader should take De Quincey's masterly essay on the Revolt of the Tartars, from which he may judge the difficulties attending the exodus of any cattle-holding people. The Bishop of Natal says:—

"It appears from N., i. 3, ii. 32, that these six hundred thousand were the men in the prime of life, 'from twenty years old and upward, all that were able to go forth to war in Israel.' And this large number of able-bodied warriors implies a total population of at least two millions. Here, then, we have this vast body of people of all ages, summoned to start, according to the story, at a moment's notice, and actually started, not one being left behind, together with all their multitudinous flocks and herds. I do not hesitate to declare this statement to be utterly incredible and impossible. Were an English village of (say) two thousand people to be called suddenly to set out in this way, with old people, young children, and infants, what indescribable distress there would be! But what shall be said of a

thousand times as many? And what of the sick and infirm, or the women in recent or imminent childbirth, in a population like that of London, where the births are 264 a-day, or *about one every five minutes?*

"But this is but a very small part of the difficulty. We are required to believe that, in one single day, the order to start was communicated suddenly, at midnight, to every single family of every town and village throughout a tract of country as large as Hertfordshire, but ten times as thickly peopled; that, in obedience to such order, having first 'borrowed' very largely from their Egyptian neighbours in all directions (though, if we are to suppose Egyptians occupying the *same* territory with the Hebrews, the extent of it must be very much increased), they then came in from all parts of the land of Goshen to Rameses, bringing with them the sick and infirm, the young and the aged; further, that, since receiving the summons, they had sent out to gather in all their flocks and herds, spread over so wide a district, and had driven them also to Rameses; and, lastly, that, having done all this since they were roused at midnight, they were started again from Rameses that very same day, and marched on to Succoth, not leaving a single sick or infirm person, a single woman in childbirth, or even a 'single hoof' (E., x. 26), behind them!"

Verses 40 and 41.—"Now the sojourning of the children of Israel, who dwelt in Egypt, was four hundred and thirty years. And it came to pass, at the end of the four hundred and thirty years, even the selfsame day it came to pass, that all the hosts of the Lord went out from the land of Egypt." Stephen, in Acts, chap. vii. v. 6, says it was four hundred years. Dr. John Pye Smith, with all his orthodoxy, felt that there was a great difficulty to encounter, and writes as follows*:—

"Many comprehend in this reckoning the time from the communication to Abraham (Genesis, chap. xv. v. 13), or his entrance into Canaan, ten years earlier. This will leave only two hundred and fifteen years for the sojourn in

* First lines of Christian Theology, p. 459, as to Hebron. Dr. John Pye Smith could hardly have seen First Chronicles, chap. xxiii. v. 19. (See Genesis, p. 94).

Egypt. Yet, during that period, the population increased to what would give 603,550 *warriors*, men above twenty years old, not including the tribe of Levi (Numbers, chap. i. v. 46). Hence, it is scarcely imaginable that the whole number of the nation could be less than two millions; an increase from seventy-two, which is quite impossible. Supposing that they doubled themselves every fourteen years, the number would have been less than half a million. But if four hundred and thirty years be taken, the increase is probable. We see, also, that the males of the whole family of Kohath were 8,600 (Numbers, chap. iii. v. 28); yet Kohath had only four sons (Exodus, chap. vi. v. 18), from whom the grandsons mentioned are eight in number, none being mentioned from Hebron, who, perhaps, died childless. Also, that the father of Moses should have married the daughter of Levi, appears impossible. Surely, then, one or more generations have fallen out from the table (Exodus, chap. vi. vv. 17 and 18)."

The Samaritan has, "the sojourning of the children of Israel and of their fathers, while they sojourned in the land of Canaan and in the land of Egypt, was 430 years."* This reading would avoid, to some extent, the difficulty as to the 430 years. Cahen says, "Kohath, one of the first priests, and son of Levi, died 133 years old. His son, Amram, 137 years. Moses, Amram's son, 120 years. These added together only make 390 years, leaving 40 deficient. But there were also 40 years between the leaving Egypt and the death of Moses, making the difference 80 years. Moreover, these three generations can have hardly followed one at the end of the other, but must have been, to some extent, concurrent, still further increasing the deficiency. In order to make up the 430 years, some go back to the time of Abraham. But these are met by the difficulty that Genesis, chap. xv. v. 13, says that the Egyptians shall torment the Israelites for 400 years." Josephus says expressly "430 years after Abraham came into Canaan, but 215 only after Jacob removed into Egypt."

Verse 46.—In this verse we have one of many illustra-

* Colenso, part 1, pp. 91 to 95. Cahen, Exode, p. 50.

tions of the value of the Massoretic points. The words בבית BeBITh, אחד AChaD, יאכל IAKeL, "In one house it shall be eaten." According to the pointing of the Keri, the last word is *active;* the pointing, according to the Kethiv, makes it *passive,* and two inferences are deduced from this in the Talmud.* Rabbi Jehudah maintains that the man who partakes of the passover HE must eat it in one place, but that the passover itself may be divided, and a part of it eaten by another company in another place; basing his argument upon the Keri, *he must eat it at one place.* Whereas Rabbi Simeon maintains that the passover itself IT, must be eaten in one place, and cannot be divided between two different companies in different places, though the man himself, after having eaten his passover at home, may go to another place and partake of another company's passover; basing his argument upon the Kethiv, *it must be eaten in one place.*†

Chap. xiii. v. 2.—"Sanctify unto me all the first-born, whatsoever openeth the womb among the children of Israel, both of man and of beast; it is mine." By this and several other texts, it is stated that the first-born, both of man and beast, were devoted to the Lord. It is quite clear that the beasts so devoted were to be slaughtered as sacrifices, but it is not so clear as to the fate of the human beings. There are special regulations for some sorts of redemption, by payment, but what were the penalties falling on the unredeemed? By Leviticus, chap. xxvii. vv. 28, 29, and the history of burnt offering by Jephtha of his own daughter, Judges, chap. xi., it appears that human sacrifices were parcel of the Jewish religious rites; a portion of their

* The Keri is the text as written in the margin, the Kethiv the literal text. The Keri velo Kethiv gives the marginal insertion of words not found in the text, supplemented to elucidate it. The Kethiv velo Keri shows the omission in the margin of entire words written in the text, but suppressed to remove difficulties. Bellamy says, "The Keri translators endeavour to give the sense of the text, and frequently omit some important word, or attempt to alter the original. But by Chetib (or Kethiv) is meant the true text, which should be so translated as not to reject a single word in the original. The Keri and Chetib translators stand opposed to each other.

† Jacob Ben Chajim's Introduction, p. 31.

prisoners seems also to have been sacrificed to the Lord after each victory, as in other idolatrous nations; and in Jephtha's case we find these remarkable words after the account of the sacrifice, "And it was a custom in Israel." Kalisch indignantly denies the allegations made by some writers, which imply frequency of human sacrifice amongst the Jews.* Bunsen suggests that the sanctification of the first-born male was to prevent the practice (amongst the Hebrews) of sacrificing to Moloch, which was common with the Syrian tribes. The Douay says, in a foot-note to the above verse, that the first-born of the beasts were to be sacrificed, but that the first-born Hebrew males were to be deputed to the ministry in divine worship. The text bears the view precisely opposite to Kalisch, Bunsen, and the Douay, especially when compared with Leviticus, chap. xxvii. v. 29, "None devoted, which shall be devoted of men, shall be redeemed; but shall surely be put to death." This is surely explicit enough without even such an illustration as that of the case of Jephtha's daughter.

Verse 5.—After "Jebusites" the Septuagint adds "the Gergashites and the Perizzites." According to Cahen, the Samaritan version is the same as the Septuagint.†

Verse 6.—"Seven days thou shalt eat." The Septuagint has "six days." In Deut., chap. xvi. v. 8, the text of our version says, "Six days shalt thou eat."

Verse 8.—The Douay differs from our translation, which represents God as directing the Israelite to tell his son *that the feast is held because of that* which the Lord did; while the Douay directs the Israelite to tell his son "what the Lord did," but not that the feast is held because of it.

Verse 9.—"A sign to thee upon thy hand, and for a memorial between thy eyes."‡ Cahen says that "Before writing was known or taught, they were obliged to institute mnemonique means for recalling the historical events fit to consolidate the national unity. Even to-day anniversary fetes serve similarly as historic schools for the people." Kalisch says, "For a people little practised in abstract

* Exodus, pp. 186 and 187.

† See Commentary on Genesis, p. 95.

‡ See v. 16, in which similar language is used.

ideas, and sunk in slavish mental torpor, the prudent legislator thought it advisable to facilitate the understanding of the laws by visible, external symbols and signs ; and, for this purpose, he chose—1. Memorials to be borne on the arm and the forehead (phylacteries תפלין TePheLIN) ; 2. Memorials to be written on the doorposts of the houses (מזוזות MeZZUTh, Deut., vi. 9, xi. 20) ; and 3. Fringes and threads to be worn on the borders of the garments (ציצת TsITseTh, Num. xv. 37-41) ; with respect to which it is expressly said (vv. 39 and 40), 'And you shall see them, and shall remember all the commandments of the Lord and do them.' These three precepts, and the practical support they afford, are comprised in the following Talmudical passage :—'He who has *Tefillin* on his head and his arm—and *Zizith* on his garment—and a *Mesusah* on his door—has every possible guarantee that he will not sin' (Menach, 33 b.)."

Verse 13.—"And if thou wilt not redeem it, then thou shalt break his neck." Kalisch says "that it was not cruel to order the killing of an unredeemed male unclean animal, because it was in the power of the owner to redeem it." But the Douay and Cahen, instead of "if thou wilt not," translate "if thou do not." So that, if the owner was unable to redeem, he was obliged to kill.

Verses 17 and 18.—"And it came to pass, when Pharaoh had let the people go, that God led them not through the way of the land of the Philistines, although that was near ; for God said, 'Lest peradventure the people repent when they see war, and they return to Egypt.' But God led the people about, through the way of the wilderness of the Red Sea." Even a devout believer might be sadly puzzled by these verses. Was God afraid lest the people should repent? and did he express that fear to his confidant. Moses, or in what manner, and to whom did God speak? Did God lead his chosen people into Egypt to avoid all wars ? if so, how comes it that we almost immediately hear of the battle with the Amalekites ? *(vide* chap. xvii). God's fears seem ill-founded, for the Jews (although they had a very hard fight with the Amalekites, and one in which they were nearly beaten, even with God's aid in their favour)

never talked of returning to Egypt, in consequence of that fight. The road taken by the Israelites was rather away from than towards the land to which they were journeying. The right road was north-east; the road the Jews went was south-east. It is properly less than fourteen days' journey from Egypt to Palestine; the Jews took forty years! Kalisch says, "that from Raameses to Gaza, the most southern town of the Philistine Pentapolis, is a straight and much-frequented road of about eight or ten days' journey."

Verse 18.—"And the children of Israel went up harnessed out of the land of Egypt."* The word, חמשים ChaMeShIM, which is here rendered "harnessed," appears to mean "armed," or "in battle array," in all the other passages where it occurs. Thus, Joshua, i. 14, "But ye shall pass before your brethren *armed*, all the mighty men of valour, and help them." So, Joshua, iv. 12, "And the children of Reuben, and the children of Gad, and half the tribe of Manasseh, passed over *armed* before the children of Israel, as Moses spake unto them." And, Judges, vii. 11, "Then went he down, with Phurah his servant, unto the outside of the armed men that were in the host."

It is, however, inconceivable that these down-trodden, oppressed people should have been allowed by Pharaoh to possess arms, so as to turn out at a moment's notice 600,000 armed men. If such a mighty host—nearly nine times as great as the whole of Wellington's army at Waterloo (69,686 men, Alison's "History of Europe," xix. p. 401)—had had their arms in their hands, would they not have risen long ago for their liberty, or, at all events, would there have been no danger of their rising? Besides, the warriors formed a distinct caste in Egypt, as Herodotus tells us, ii. 165, "being in number, when they are most numerous, 160,000, none of whom learn any mechanical art, but apply themselves wholly to military affairs." Are we to suppose, then, that the Israelites acquired their arms by "borrowing" on the night of the exodus? Nothing whatever is said of this, and the idea itself is an extravagant one. But, if even in this or any other way they had come

* Colenso, part i. p. 48.

to be possessed of arms, is it conceivable that 600,000 armed men, in the prime of life, would have cried out in frantic terror, "sore afraid," Ex., xiv. 10, when they saw that they were being pursued?

The difficulty of believing this has led many commentators to endeavour to explain otherwise, if possible, the meaning of the word. Accordingly, in the margin of the English Bible we find suggested, instead of "harnessed," or "armed," in all the above passages except Joshua, iv. 12, "by five in a rank," because the Hebrew word, חמשים ChaMaShIM, has a resemblance to חמש ChaMaSh, "five." And others again explain it to mean "by fifties," as the five thousand were arranged in the wilderness of Bethsaida, Mark, vi. 40.

It will be seen at once, however, that these meanings of the word will not at all suit the other passages above quoted. And, indeed, by adopting the first of them, we should only get rid of one difficulty to introduce another quite as formidable. For, if 600,000 marched out of Egypt "five in a rank," allowing a yard for marching room between each rank, they must have formed a column 68 miles long, and it would have taken several days to have *started* them all off, instead of their going out all together "that self-same day," Ex., xii. 42 and 51.

But if they did not take it with them out of Egypt, where did they get the armour with which, about a month afterwards, they fought the Amalekites, Ex., xvii. 8-13, and "discomfited them with the edge of the sword?" It may, perhaps, be said that they had stripped the Egyptians, whom they "saw lying dead upon the seashore," Ex. xiv. 30. And so writes Josephus, Ant., ii. 16, 6:—"On the next day Moses gathered together the weapons of the Egyptians, which were brought to the camp of the Hebrews by the current of the sea and the force of the winds assisting it. And he conjectured that this also happened by Divine Providence, that so they might not be destitute of weapons." It is plain that Josephus had perceived the difficulty. The Bible story, however, says nothing about this stripping of the dead, as surely it must have done if it really took place. And though body-armour might have been obtained in this way, would swords, and spears, and shields, in any number,

have been washed upon the shore by the waves, or have been retained, still grasped in the hands of drowning men?

If, then, the historical veracity of this part of the Pentateuch is to be maintained, we must believe that 600,000 armed men (though it is inconceivable how they obtained their arms) had, by reason of their long servitude, become so debased and inhuman in their cowardice (and yet they fought bravely enough with Amalek a month afterwards), that they could not strike a single blow for their wives and children, or for their own lives and liberties, but could only weakly wail and murmur against Moses, saying, "It had been better for us to serve the Egyptians, than that we should die in the wilderness," Ex., xiv. 12.

Chap. xiv.—Aben Ezra says that we ought not to reflect upon the order contained in this chapter to return, so that Pharaoh, pursuing the Israelites, might be engulfed in the sea, the ways of the eternal are profound, and human wisdom nothing before him.*

Chap. xiv., vv. 19 and 20.—"And the pillar of the cloud went from before their face, and stood behind them. And it came between the camp of the Egyptians and the camp of Israel; and it was a cloud and darkness to them, but it gave light by night to these; so that the one came not near the other all the night." The cloud that gave a light to the Israelites must have been of a curious nature. The Douay, following the Vulgate, has it in the 20th verse, "it was a dark cloud, and enlightening the night." Kalisch says this rendering is without meaning; he admits that many of the translators have been sadly puzzled by the verse, and remarks, "but certainly the text narrates a miraculous fact, and it is futile to explain it naturally." Cahen, translating the passage, "it was a cloud and an obscurity, and it enlightened the night," asks what enlightened the night? The Septuagint reads as if the darkness of the cloud, deepening into night, prevented any communication between the two camps. Dr. John Pye Smith says†:—"Throughout the entire narrative the miraculous revelations of God to Moses are often spoken

* Cahen, Exode, p. 55.

† First Lines Christian Theology, p. 249.

of as being made in this luminous and awful cloud. It is called 'the glory of the Lord.'" It appears to have been the general, and probably the invariable, token and known proof of the Divine presence. Examples—Exodus, chap. xvi. vv. 9 and 10, chap. xxiv. vv. 16 and 17; Numbers, chap. xii. v. 5, chap. xiv. vv. 10 and 14, chap. xvi. vv. 19 and 42, chap. xx. v. 6; Deut., chap. i. vv. 30 and 33."

Verse 7.—Josephus says that Pharaoh took 600 chariots, 50,000 horsemen, and 200,000 footmen. The Jewish historian describes the whole affair with very different accessories to those presented in our version. A long speech by Moses to the Jews, and long prayer by Moses to God, are given by Josephus, but are entirely wanting here.

Verse 15.—The Talmud* says that Moses betook himself, in this critical position, to prayer; and that God said it was not the time to make long prayers while the people were in trouble. It is suggested that a portion of the Hebrew text preceding this verse has been lost.

Verses 24 and 25.—Our authorised translation reads, "The Lord looked unto the host of the Egyptians through the pillar of fire and of the cloud, and troubled the host of the Egyptians, and took off their chariot wheels that they drave them heavily." In the Douay it is, "The Lord, looking upon the Egyptian army through the pillar of fire and of the cloud, slew their host and overthrew the wheels of their chariots, and they were carried into the deep." Kalisch says, "confounded the host of the Egyptians, and made glide out their chariot wheels, and led them on with difficulty." The Septuagint, "and he tied up the axles of their chariots, and led them on with force." Aben Ezra asked how the Israelites could all cross the Red Sea in one night, and makes them pass in several columns, more than two millions of human beings, including women and children and baggage, started from their halting ground after nightfall, and reached the other side so rapidly that the Egyptians, following, were drowned towards morning. The story is monstrously incredible.

Verse 31.—"And Israel saw that great work which the

* Cahen, Exode, p. 58.

Lord did upon the Egyptians; and the people feared the Lord, and believed the Lord, and his servant Moses." The Israelites' belief in the Lord and in his servant Moses was of a very unstable nature; and, notwithstanding all the mighty miracles alleged to have been wrought in their presence, we find them repeatedly murmuring (chap. xv. v. 24, chap. xvi. v. 3), and in a very short time utterly repudiating Moses and God (chap. xxxii. v. 1). If the Israelites frequently doubted Moses and disbelieved in God, with the terrible series of plagues fresh in their recollection, can it be wondered that we, to whom they are related in a style so incoherent, at this distance of time, should also have misgivings as to their truth? Josephus, who is evidently rather staggered by the prodigies he has recorded in reference to the Exodus, assures his readers that, notwithstanding "the strangeness of the narrative," he delivered every part as he found it in the sacred book, and he quaintly adds, "as to these events, let every one determine as he pleases."

Chap. xv. v. 2.—"I will prepare him an habitation." Kalisch translates this, "I will glorify him," agreeing with the Douay.

Verse 3.—The expression, "The Lord is a man of war," although not unnatural as an oriental fashion of speaking of the deity supposed to have conquered the Egyptians, is hardly calculated to inspire us with that love of God alleged to be so necessary to our salvation. "The Lord is his name." The Douay has, "The Almighty is his name." Cahen, "The Eternal is his name." The Vulgate, "*Dominus quasi vir pugnator.*"

Verse 8.—"The blast of thy nostrils." The Septuagint has, "The breath of thy anger." The Vulgate, "*In spirito furoris.*" The Douay, "With the blast of thy anger." Kalisch says that it was an old and wide-spread belief that "anger sits in the nose," or that anger manifests itself most visibly in that part of the face.

Verse 11.—"Who is like unto thee, O Lord, among the Gods?" Who are the Gods? In the Douay the phrase is translated, "Who is like unto thee amongst the strong, O Lord?" The Roman Catholics wished to avoid the sus-

picion of polytheism. Cahen, "Who is like unto thee amongst the mighty?" The Vulgate, "*Quis similis tui in fortibus.*"

Verses 22, 23, 24, and 25.—"And they went three days in the wilderness, and found no water. And when they came to Marah, they could not drink of the waters of Marah, for they were bitter; therefore the name of it was called Marah. And the people murmured against Moses, saying, 'What shall we drink?' And he cried unto the Lord; and the Lord showed him a tree, which, when he had cast into the waters, the waters were made sweet." Josephus tells* this story differently. He says that "the water being bitter, Moses betook himself to prayer to God, that he would change the water from its present badness, and make it fit for drinking. And when God had granted him that favour, he took the top of a stick that lay down at his feet, and divided it in the middle, and made the section lengthways. He then let it down into the well, and persuaded the Hebrews that God had hearkened to his prayers, and had promised to render the water such as they desired it to be, in case they would be subservient to him in what he should enjoin them to do, and this not after a remiss or negligent manner. And when they asked what they were to do in order to have the water changed for the better, he bid the strongest men among them that stood there to draw the water, and told them that, when the greatest part was drawn up, the remainder would be fit to drink. So they laboured at it till the water was so agitated and purged as to be fit to drink."

Verse 27.—"And they came to Elim, where were twelve wells of water, and threescore and ten palm trees; and they encamped there by the waters." Josephus says that "the palm trees† were no more than seventy; and they were ill-grown and creeping trees by the want of water, for the country about was all parched, and no moisture sufficient to water them and make them hopeful and useful was derived to them from the fountains, which were in number twelve;

* Antiquities, Book III., chap. i. § 2.
† Antiquities, Book III., chap. i. § 3.

they were rather a few moist places than springs, which, not breaking out of the ground nor running over, could not sufficiently water the trees. And when they dug into the sand, they met with no water; and if they took a few drops of it into their hands, they found it to be useless, on account of its mud. The trees also were too weak to bear fruit, for want of being sufficiently cherished and enlivened by the water."

Chap. xvi. vv. 3 and 4.—"And the children of Israel said unto them, Would to God we had died by the hand of the Lord in the land of Egypt, when we sat by the flesh-pots, *and* when we did eat bread to the full; for ye have brought us forth into this wilderness, to kill this whole assembly with hunger. Then said the Lord unto Moses, Behold, I will rain bread from heaven for you; and the people shall go out and gather a certain rate every day, that I may prove them, whether they will walk in my law, or no." If we may judge by the Israelites' own account, starvation could not have been one of the phases of oppression suffered by them in Egypt. They appear, if hard worked, at least to have been well-fed by their Egyptian rulers.

Verse 4.—The Lord who spake to Moses was not an Omniscient Deity, for he says, "I will rain bread from heaven for you, etc., that I may prove them whether they will walk in my law or no;" so that God here pourtrayed did not know until he had proved the Israelites whether they would obey or disobey. *Kalisch has a most elaborate note, giving descriptions of the several sorts of manna known in Asia, but none of these correspond with the manna of the Bible. 1st. The Bible manna is constant for forty years, the natural manna is only found at certain seasons. 2nd. The Bible manna is abundant enough to feed more than 2,000,000 people; while, in plentiful years, 700 pounds of manna is a large yield for the whole peninsular of Sinai. 3rd. The Bible manna is the usual nutritious, satisfying substitute for bread, whilst the natural manna is a medical relaxing substance. 4th. The tendency on the part of the manna to fall in double quantities the

* See also Genesis, p. 102.

day before the Sabbath, so as not to fall on seventh day, is peculiar to the Bible species.

Verse 8.—Many critics urge that this verse must be misplaced, as Moses had not yet been informed that God intended to give the Israelites flesh. Some put vv. 11 and 12 immediately after v. 3

Verses 12 and 13.—This story of the gift of quails is told in Numbers, chap. xi., in an entirely different manner; nor does it seem possible to reconcile the two accounts. The date of the gift is different; in Exodus, chap. xv. v. 1, it is the fifteenth day of the second month of the wanderings; in Numbers, it is after the twentieth day of the second month in the second year of the wanderings. The place of the gift of quails is different. In Exodus, it is in the wilderness of Sin, between Elim and Sinai; in Numbers, it is at Taberah. The manner of the gift is very different; in Exodus the quails and manna come on the same day, one in the evening and the other in the morning, both being given together; in Numbers the manna is given some time before, and it is after the people have grown tired of eating manna, and murmur at it, that God in anger sends them quails. In Numbers Moses is represented as expostulating with Deity as to whence the supply of food is to be obtained; in Exodus there is no mention of this. In Numbers, God plagues and destroys the Jews because they ask for flesh-food; but in Exodus, all record of this vengeance is omitted. In Josephus, the gift of quails is placed in order of time before the gift of manna.

Verse 11.—Josephus, omitting the Lord's speech to Moses, says, after the gift of quails,* "as Moses was lifting up his hands in prayer a dew fell down; and Moses, when he found it stick to his hands, supposed this was also come for food from God to them: he tasted it; and perceiving that the people knew not what it was, and thought it snowed, and that it was what usually fell at that time of the year, he informed them that this dew did not fall from heaven after the manner they imagined, but came for their preservation and sustenance. So he tasted it, and gave

* Antiquities, Book III., chap i., § 6.

them some of it, that they might be satisfied about what he told them. They also imitated their conductor, and were pleased with the food."

Verse 15.—"And when the children of Israel saw *it*, they said one to another, It *is* manna; for they wist not what it *was*." The children of Israel did not call the bread from heaven manna, but they said when they saw it, מן הוא (MeN EUA), *i.e.*, What is this? The Vulgate so puts it, "*Manhu quod significat, quid est hoc?*" Kalisch translates it, "What is that?" So the Septuagint.* The English version, "It is manna," is singularly contradictory, for the children of Israel could hardly call it by a distinct name if "they wist not what it was." Cahen denies that the words MeN EUA are an interrogation, and translates them, "*C'est une nourriture.*"

Verses 16, 17, and 18.—These verses convey the notion that the quantity for each person was limited to one omer, and that though each person gathered as he could, some much and some little, yet when the gatherer measured for his family, he who gathered little, had not less than an omer for each; and he who gathered much, no more.

Verses 20 to 24.—While the manna invariably putrified if kept till the second day on six days of the week, yet, if the second day happened to be the seventh day of the week, then no putrefaction took place. In verse 23 Moses announces for the morrow a day of rest, but it is not until verse 26 that the seventh day is spoken of as a periodic holiday. Our version, which reads, "To-morrow is the rest of the holy Sabbath," is incorrect. Kalisch and Cahen agree in translating, "To-morrow is a day of rest, a holy rest." The word "Sabbath" is only the using English equivalent for the Hebrew letters, שבת SheBeTh, without translating.

Verse 25.—"To day is a Sabbath." "Many men of little faith," says Aben Ezra,† "have been misled by this verse. They have deduced from it that the Sabbath ought to include the day but not the night preceding. They rely on the word "to-morrow" of verse 23.

* See also Josephus, Antiquities, Book III., chap. i., § 6.

† Cahen, Exode, p. 70.

Verses 33 and 34.—"And Moses said unto Aaron, take a pot, and put an omer full of manna therein, and lay it up before the Lord, to be kept for your generations. As the Lord commanded Moses, so Aaron laid it up before the Testimony, to be kept." Cahen and Kalisch both argue that this could not have been done as related in the text; they urge that the verse is anticipatory. Kalisch says it is self-evident that the command, or, at least, its execution, could not have taken place until after the construction and elevation of the Jewish Tabernacle. Cahen agrees in this.

Verse 35.—"And the children of Israel did eat manna forty years, until they came to a land inhabited; they did eat manna, *until they came unto the borders of the land of Canaan.**" On this passage Scott remarks as follows:—"As Moses lived till a great part of the fortieth year was passed, when Israel was encamped on the plains of Moab, there is no reason to say that this verse was added *after his decease.*" But, surely, this verse could not have been written till after they had ceased eating manna, "on the morrow after they had eaten of the old corn of the land," Joshua, chap. v., v. 12. Nor could it have been written until the Israelites were *within* the Canaanite boundary; since קצה, "border," which is here used, as in Gen., chap. xxiii. v. 9, and about ninety other passages, never means *extra terminum*, but always *intra terminum.* Kalisch says, "According to Joshua, chap. v., vv. 10 to 12, the manna ceased after the transit of the Israelites over Jordan—after the death of Moses, who (according to Abarbanel) could only have made the statement by divine inspiration." Cahen says,† "Leclerc contends that this verse could not be by Moses, because he was dead before the cessation of manna." "The manna commenced the fifteenth yiar and finished the fifteenth nissau, thus it wanted thirty days to make up forty years."

Chap. xvii.—"And all the congregation of the children of Israel journeyed from the wilderness of Sin, after their journeys, according to the commandment of the Lord, and pitched in Rephidim: and *there was* no water for the people

* Colenso, part 2, p. 212. † Exode, p. 72. ‡ Exodus, p. 310.

to drink." In Numbers, chap. xx., vv. 1 and 2, the want of water is stated to be in the desert, at a place called Kadesh. In Numbers the miraculous supply of water is after the death of Miriam, here it is before her death.

Verse 7.—"And he called the name of the place Massah and Meribah, because of the chiding of the children of Israel, and because they tempted the Lord, saying, Is the Lord among us, or not?" There is no previous mention of any such question. Theologians may not unfairly be asked, how it was possible for the Jews to tempt the omnipotent and immutable Deity?

Verse 11.—"And it came to pass, when Moses held up his hand, that Israel prevailed; and when he let down his hand, Amalek prevailed." Kalisch says,§ "The sense of this verse is obscure, and has already much engaged the ancient interpreters, who attributed to it a symbolical meaning." Thus we read in the Talmud, "Can really the hands of Moses cause victory, if they are raised, or defeat, if they are let down?" But holy writ teaches us here, that, when the Israelites looked up to heaven, and humbled themselves before their heavenly father, they were victorious; if not, they were defeated. This is similar to the precept in Numbers, chap. xxi., v. 8: "Make thee a fiery serpent, and set it upon a pole: and it shall come to pass, that every one that is bitten, when he looketh upon it, shall live." Can a serpent cause or prevent healing? But if the Israelites regarded the heaven and were obedient to the precepts of their God, they were healed; if not, they perished. This interpretation, although it approaches the spirit of our narrative, is yet too general to apply to this event. For during the combat, piety or impiety were out of the question; and further, the text does not state that the Israelites looked sometimes up to the hand of Moses and sometimes not; but that Moses now raised and now lowered it. Can any reasonable man believe that if Napoleon had stood on an eminence near the scene at Waterloo, and had held up his hands, such conduct would have influenced the success of either party, other than as the conduct of a leader who might thus cheer or dishearten his troops? Why should a man believe of Moses that to

which he would refuse credence in the present day, if related of some modern general? The believer may fairly wonder why, if God was really on the side of the Israelites, he allowed his aid to depend upon whether Moses could hold up his hand?

Verse 14.—"And the Lord said unto Moses, Write this *for* a memorial in a book." Aben Ezra regards this verse as written in the fortieth year of the wanderings, and urges that the book it refers to is now lost. The writings, not now discoverable, but referred to in the Bible, are numerous, including—1, The book of the wars of the Lord; 2, The book of Jasher; 3, The book of the chronicles of the kings of Israel; 4, The books of Solomon; 5, The book, or story, or vision of Iddo; 6, The book of Nathan; 7, The book of Gad. There are various other writings mentioned in the Old Testament, but of which we know nothing but the names.*

Verse 16.—"Because the Lord hath sworn *that* the Lord *will have* war with Amalek from generation to generation." "Why was Amalek to be so punished? God the Creator must have created both Amalekites and Israelites (it must have been according to his special decrees that the former fought with the Hebrew race), yet the Bible Deity favours the latter and declares war against the former from generation to generation. What a strange idea—strife between an Omnipotent and Infinite God and his weak and puny creatures. By the expression 'the Lord hath sworn that the Lord will have war with Amalek from generation to generation,' true believers may learn that God predetermined to make war upon unborn generations of Amalekites, whom he was yet to create for the purpose of exterminating." Kalisch and Cahen translate the verse, "Because the hand was against the throne of God; therefore the Lord will have war with Amalek from generation to generation."

Verse 15.—"And Moses built an altar, and called the name of it Jehovah-nissi:" The words here written, "Jehovah-nissi," are, in the Douay, "The Lord is my exalt-

* See Cahen, Exode, p. 74. Kalisch, Exodus, p. 312. Giles's Hebrew Records, p. 40.

ation." The Septuagint, "God my refuge." Mendelssohn and Kalisch, "God is my banner." Cahen, "The Eternal, my standard."

Verse 16.—"For he said, Because the Lord hath sworn *that* the Lord *will have* war with Amalek from generation to generation." Kalisch and Cahen (who says that the passage is difficult) agree to substitute for the words, "Because the Lord hath sworn," the phrase "Because the hand was (or is) against the throne of God." The Douay has, "Because the hand of the throne of the Lord." The Septuagint reads, "Because the Lord hath fought Amalek with a hidden hand."

Chap. xviii.—Cahen says,* "The journey of the father-in-law of Moses gives rise to many difficulties. The Sepher Hamiv'har says that this journey did not take place until the second year of the going out of Egypt. These difficulties are also increased from Moses having only one father-in-law, who made one journey only, while we find seven names for the father-in-law—viz., 1, יתר, JeTheR; 2, יתרו, IThRU; 3, חובב, HUBeB; 4, חבר, HeBeR; 5, קני, QeNI; 6, רעואל, ROUAL; 7, פוטיאל, PhUTIAL. [Whence Cahen gets this seventh name is not clear, unless he goes outside the Bible and gets it from the Talmud.] It is not impossible that these seven names apply to the same man, but it is very improbable. To our knowledge, Moses has taken two wives, one Midianite and one Ethiopian (Exodus, chap. ii., v. 21). He might have married others, and had many fathers-in-law." Some ancient interpreters, as Eben Ezra (in v. 13) and Rashbam, whom several modern critics, as Ranke (Untersuchungen, i., p. 83), have followed, are of opinion, that the narration concerning Jethro, which is here inserted, does not stand in its proper place, and that the arrival of Jethro took place only in the second year after the legislation, or after the erection of the Tabernacle. As reasons, Eben Ezra mentions: 1, that according to v. 12, "a burnt-offering and eucharistic sacrifices†" were killed, whilst nothing has been related about the building of a new altar; 2, the words in v. 20, "And thou shalt illustrate to them the ordinances

* Exode, p. 75.

† Kalisch, Exodus, p. 314.

and laws," point to the time after the legislation; 3, that Moses encamps, according to v. 5, by "the mountain of God;" 4, that according to Numbers, chap. x., v. 30, Jethro returned to his home (v. 27), only when the Israelites departed from Horeb; and 5, that the new arrangement of Jethro, explained in our chapter, took place not earlier than in the time of that departure. Kalisch endeavours to explain away these points, but with very slight success.

Verses 1 to 6.—Some part of the previous history is clearly deficient. We have no account of Moses sending his wife back; on the contrary, in chap. iv., v. 20, we are told that he took both her and his two sons into Egypt. Cahen quotes from the Mechilta, an ancient and mystical commentary upon the Pentateuch, that when Aaron met Moses (c. iv., vv. 27 and 28) Aaron asked, "To whom do those belong?" Moses answered: "This is my wife, whom I have taken in Midian; those are my sons." "Where are you taking them?" "To Egypt." "We suffer already for those who dwell there, and yet you augment the number." Moses then said to his wife, "Go to the house of thy father." "She took her infants and went."*

Verse 9.—"And Jethro rejoiced." The Septuagint, "And Jethro was seized with astonishment."

Verse 11.—"For in the thing wherein they dealt proudly *he was* above them." Kalisch translates this, "yea, by the very thing, that they acted wickedly against them." The Douay, "because they dealt proudly against him." The Breeches Bible, "for as they dealt proudly with them, so are they recompensed." Cahen, literally, "for by the thing that they have acted with pride upon them." The passage is obscure, and seems as if part of the verse were missing.

Verse 21.—"Moreover thou shalt provide out of all the people able men, such as fear God, men of truth, hating covetousness; and place *such* over them, *to be* rulers of thousands, and rulers of hundreds, rulers of fifties, and rulers of tens." † "Not quite unfounded is the astonishment of Aben Ezra, that Moses should have been able to find among the degenerated Israelites, who showed them-

* Exode, p. 76. † Kalisch, Exodus, p. 321.

selves now, and almost always during the wanderings in the desert, pusillanimous and refractory, 78,600 men of so distinguished and exalted qualities." The way in which Moses speaks of the Jews would hardly lead us to expect a result so favourable. Josephus says there were to be judges over 10,000, then over 1,000, then 500, then 100, then 50, then 30, then 20, then 10.* This would make the number of judges much larger than 78,600, for reckoning only by the 600,000 fighting men, it would be—

for the	10,000	—	60
for the	1,000	—	600
for the	500	—	1,200
for the	100	—	6,000
for the	50	—	12,000
for the	30	—	20,000
for the	20	—	30,000
for the	10	—	60,000
making a total of			129,860

Cahen observes,† "It is evident that Jethro only indicated the hierarchical division of judicial power, necessary to facilitate the business of government. It is undoubtedly singular, that a man elevated midst the sciences of Egypt, that one of the greatest legislators of antiquity should have need of counsel for a matter which appears to us so simple."

Verse 25 is entirely wanting in the Samaritan, which, however, here adds ten verses not given in the Hebrew.

Chap. xix. v. 1.—"In the third month, when the children of Israel were gone forth out of the land of Egypt, the same day came they into the wilderness of Sinai." It would be difficult from this verse to determine upon which day of the third month it was that the Israelites came into the wilderness. Some of the ancient rabbis fix it the first, some the third, and others the fifteenth; none have any evidence to guide them. The modern believer who knows that his salvation depends on his faith, and who cannot, therefore, rest unconcerned as to the particular day, will fix on the

* Antiquities, Book III., chap. iv. † Exode, p. 79.

one he thinks most likely. There is no more evidence in favour of one than of another.

Verse 9.—"Believe in thee for ever." If God intended that the effect produced on the Israelites by hearing his voice from out of the thick cloud be that of ever-continuing faith, then the intentions of Deity were woefully disappointed; the faith of the Jews in the God who rescued them from Egypt did not endure even during the temporary absence of their leader, Moses, on the mountain.

Verses 12 and 13.—"And thou shalt set bounds unto the people round about, saying, Take heed to yourselves, that ye go not up into the mount, or touch the border of it; whosoever toucheth the mount shall be surely put to death. There shall not an hand touch it, but he shall surely be stoned, or shot through; whether it be beast or man, it shall not live; *when the trumpet soundeth long, they shall come up to the mount.*" The words italicised seem in direct contradiction to the whole of the remainder of the injunction (see also verses 21, 23, and 24). The Septuagint says that the people might go up into the mountain when the voice and the trumpets were no longer heard and the cloud no longer seen.

Verse 18.—"And the whole mount quaked greatly." The Septuagint reads, "all the people were stupified." The Douay reads, "and all the mount was terrible."

Verse 22.—"And let the priests also, which come near to the Lord, sanctify themselves, lest the Lord break forth upon them." Kalisch says, "It is difficult to comprehend the introduction of the priests in this verse, as it is not until chap. xxviii. v. 1, that the sons of Aaron are appointed to priestly functions." Instead of "break forth upon them," Cahen has, "*faire une destruction parmi eux.*"

If this account of the meeting between Moses and God had been given in the book of Mormon, in the Koran, or in the sacred books of any pagan people, some Christian critic would have exclaimed, "Why, this is clearly an imposture! Most certainly the man who led the people, and who wished to pretend that he was to have an interview with God, took precautions to keep the people at a sufficient distance to prevent detection of his schemes; the

trumpet sounding, the darkness, the thunder and lightning, are so many scenic and pyrotechnic appliances to impress his ignorant and credulous followers, and to give effect to the delusion. Perhaps the mount was a volcanic one, in which case the addition of the trumpet soundings completed the scene; and, in any case, the secrecy observed as to all the transactions on the mount protected Moses from exposure. How careful are the directions given to prevent any inquisitive straggler from getting sufficiently near to make a fatal discovery! Can any reasonable man believe that an infinite God blew a trumpet, or caused a trumpet to be blown, to announce his coming, or that he descended upon Sinai surrounded by fire and smoke? In many fabulous relations we find similar recitals, but it is absurd to suppose that this refers to an Almighty and Infinite Deity. We are told in verse 20, 'The Lord came down upon Mount Sinai on the top of the mount, and the Lord called Moses up to the top of the mount, and Moses went up.' Can you require stronger evidence of the character of your book? Omnipresent and Infinite Deity pictured as standing on the top of a mountain, and calling to Moses, who was down below, to come up to him!!" Cahen observes that to impress an ignorant people like the Israelites with a notion of omnipotence, the fear of the thunder, the lightning, and the tempest, was necessary. They surely ought to have been already enough impressed by the Egyptian plagues and the Red Sea miracle.

The records and traditions of most peoples show that in early times many of their national leaders increased their influence over the populace by pretended communications with the Gods.* Jewish fable differs only from Hindoo, Greek, or Egyptian myth by the coarseness of its surroundings. The general outlines are nearly everywhere the same, although the minor details may and do differ. Nicolas† says:—"It is a remark often made, but which cannot be too much repeated, that the anthropomorphisms which are so frequent in the Book of Genesis are not found in the other Books of the Pentateuch. Whilst Elohim

* Kalisch, Exodus, p. 331. Keightley's Mythology, p. 404, &c.
† *Etudes sur la Bible*, p. 130.

came in person, and under a human form, to treat with Abraham, and, again, later, to announce the birth of Isaac, Jehovah, invisible to the eyes of Moses, speaks to him from the midst of a burning bush, or out of the thick cloud. He never manifests himself under a tangible form; no man can see the face of the Eternal even in the tabernacle where he dwells on the mercy seat between the two cherubims; he remains invisible. When Moses enters the holy place to consult Jehovah, a voice answers him, but no figure appears to his eyes." [Exodus, chap. xxiv. vv. 10 and 11, is rather in opposition to this view of Nicolas.]

After relating the story of the tempest and thunder and lightning, when God appeared at Sinai, Flavius Josephus adds—"Now, as to these matters, every one of my readers may think as he pleases, but I am under the necessity of relating this history as it is described in the sacred books."* He then adds a very long speech of Moses, who begins by telling the Jews that God has received him graciously; is now in the camp, and has made some suggestions for their domestic and political government. This speech does not exist in our "sacred books."

Chap. xx.—The second verse of this chapter begins in the first person, "I am the Lord," and continues in the first person to verse 6, where it merges into the third person. The Talmudists, therefore, say that the Israelites did not themselves hear God's voice after the sixth verse.† The Decalogue given in the first thirteen verses of this chapter is repeated in the fifth chapter of Deuteronomy, but with considerable variations. Aben Ezra counted thirteen differences either in the words or ideas, some trivial and some important, and sought to explain them away.

Verse 3.—"Thou shalt have no other Gods (אלהים ALEIM) before me." Kalisch has "beside me." Cahen, following literally the Hebrew, "before my face." The Douay, "Thou shalt not have strange Gods before me." This prohibition of other Gods (Elohim) is in terms which, coupled with the preceding verse and two following verses, make this a command from the Jewish national Deity, who

* Antiquities, Book III, chap. v., § 2.
† Cahen, Exode, p. 87.

is jealous of the influence which might possibly be exercised by the Elohim of neighbouring peoples; it is not a clear declaration that only one God exists, but an injunction to worship only the Jehovah Elohim. The other Elohim were by no means few. The Hebrew Scriptures abound with names of various heathen deities, of which a list is given in the Glossary to Etheridge's work on the Targums, and which will be dealt with in this commentary in the order in which the names occur.

Verse 4.—"Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of any thing that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth." The Septuagint has, *eidolon*, "idol." Kalisch* admits, and Cahen declares, that the prohibition in this verse has exercised a retarding influence upon the progress and development of the plastic arts amongst the Hebrews, but he denies that the plastic arts in general are forbidden by the text, and considers that if it were so, the prohibition would be barbarous and irrational. This commandment is contradicted by the injunction in Exodus, chap. xxv. vv. 18 to 20, for the manufacture of the "cherubims;" and if it be replied that cherubims are not things that are in heaven above, earth beneath, or water under the earth, then vv. 33 and 34, for the images of almonds and almond flowers, remains to be explained away. In the serpent of brass, Numbers, chap. xxi. v. 8, the sculptured oxen of Solomon's temple, and in other texts, this command is further contradicted.

Verse 5.—"I the Lord thy God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate me." Kalisch has, "a zealous God,"† but his translation is not justified by the context, which (as Cahen observes) explains that God is jealous of any bowing down of service rendered to idols or other Gods. Many commentators have been shocked by the vindictive character attributed to God in this verse, forgetting that it precisely accords with his disposition as manifested in Exodus, chap. xvii. vv. 14 to 16,

* Exodus, p. 345.

† See Parkhust on the root קנא, Lexicon, p. 635.

and in many other parts of the Bible. Kalisch says*—"It appears to be in opposition to the divine love and justice, that the children should innocently suffer for the crimes of their fathers; and this principle, if really contained in our words, would be a great defect in the system of the Mosaic ethics. But already the directly opposite declarations in other passages of the Old Testament ought to warn us to be circumspect in the exposition of our text. In Deut., chap. xxiv. v. 16, we read literally:—"The fathers shall not be put to death for the children, neither shall the children be put to death for the fathers: every man shall be put to death for his own sin;" and with a verbal reminiscence from this passage we read in 2 Kings, chap. xiv. vv. 5 and 6:—"And it came to pass as soon as the kingdom was confirmed in his hand [of Amaziah], that he slew his servants, who had slain the king, his father. But the children of the murderers he slew not: according to that which is written in the book of the law of Moses, wherein the Lord commanded, saying, The fathers shall not be put to death for the children." Still more solemnly rises Ezekiel against that preposterous maxim, and devotes to this subject an elaborate polemical discussion in the eighteenth chapter of his prophecies; and the result is, in vv. 20 to 24, thus condensed:—"The soul that sinneth, it shall die. The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, nor shall the father bear the iniquity of the son; the righteousness of the righteous shall be upon him, and the wickedness of the wicked shall be upon him."

Chap. xx. v. 7.—"Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain; for the Lord will not hold him guiltless that taketh his name in vain." Instead of "in vain," Kalisch has "for falsehood," and Cahen says that the words "in vain" here apply to everything which is not true in each instance. Josephus gives this, "that we must not swear by God in a false manner." So far† back as the time of Hesiod (between 700 and 800 B.C.), Eris, or Contention, was called the god of oaths, and Polybius states that among the ancients the use of judicial oaths was rare, but as perfidy grew, oaths increased. The Egyptians con-

* Exodus, p. 348. † Kalisch, Exodus, p. 354.

sidered perjury as the blackest crime, which was invariably punished with death, since it implied both a contempt for the gods and a violation of that faith which is the only tie and guarantee for the welfare of society. The Persians refused to swear, but gave their hand as a plight of troth. The Scythians told Alexander the Great—"We swear only by keeping our word." "Hercules," says Plutarch, "was so devout that he never took an oath." Clinias held adjuration in perfect abhorrence, and the very Greek word "Epiorkos," signifying perjury, means literally the frequent habit of oath taking. This reluctance to swear at all, even just and judicial oaths, prevailed among the Jews also; the Talmud recommends a simple "Yes, yes," or "No, no," instead of every oath (Sheb., 36, *a*); and the New Testament expresses this idea with peculiar emphasis: "Swear not at all—neither by the heaven, for it is God's throne, nor by the earth, for it is His footstool, but let your communication be, Yea, yea, and Nay, nay: for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil" (Matt., v. 34—37; James, v. 12; with which injunctions Matt., xxvi. 63, 64, does not stand in contradiction); and in accordance herewith oaths were denounced by Justin, Irenæus, Basil, Chrysostom, and Augustine.

How deeply this antipathy to swearing was rooted in the minds of the Orientals is shown by the exactly similar proverb of the Arabs: "Never swear, but let thy words be, Yes or No." And, indeed, oath-taking seems to imply, in its principle and origin, that other simple assertions are less sacred or binding, and thus indirectly to exercise an injurious influence upon the moral and religious notions of the people."

In his "Rationale of Evidence," and afterwards in a special essay entitled, "Swear not at all," to which papers* we are indebted for the following observations, Jeremy Bentham most elaborately and exhaustively examines the oath question, so far as it relates to England:—

"An oath is a 'ceremony composed of words and gestures,' in which the Deity is invoked as the sanction of

* Also Dumont's Traité des Preuves Judiciares, chapitre xii. Du Serment considéré comme sureté.

truth, or is engaged by the swearer to punish him should he not perform what he has thus promised. Though oaths have been distinguished into promissory and assertory, or into vows and testimonial oaths, there is no essential difference between them. In both cases the same religious sanction is called in to guarantee the truth; and in the testimonial oath, as in the vow, there is an undertaking or a promise, a promise to say that which is true under an engagement or obligation to the Deity to undergo punishment for the breach of that promise.

"If there is a natural inducement to tell the truth, independent of that popular sanction which is maintained by the opposed pain or punishment, consisting in disapprobation or shame; independent, also, of such inconveniences or pains expected as form the religious sanction; and independent, further, of those pains which form the political one, it must be sought in some pain or inconvenience which naturally and necessarily attends the use of falsehood, and which, were it sufficiently powerful to act against all the opposed inducements, would be the sufficient guarantee of truth.

"Where there is no opposing motive of superior power, truth is natural to man, simply because falsehood requires an effort of thought and contrivance, and is, therefore, painful. Truth is ready, because it is known; falsehood is not *known*, and therefore it must be invented. Invention is a labour; and our natural love of ease, therefore, determines us to speak the truth. And the strength of this inducement, or that of the motive of indolence, is increased by the proverbial and never-forgotten consciousness that the first invention may require many more, and thus carry with it a long train of future labour.

"If evidence is commonly and in common cases true, it is only because it is the easiest proceeding; the truth here, it is plain, being estimated by the perception and belief of the narrator; and when it is not true, or when it is false, in the same sense, it is because of the presence of some opposing motive of greater power.

"If any one shall object to the assumed force of this sanction here considered as the love of ease, or as a desire

to avoid the pains of labour or trouble, he has not considered the wide influence of this principle over the whole of our conduct, an influence to which we mainly owe the force of all our habits, since those are modes of conduct determined by their facility, as, reversely, to change them demands a powerful effort.

"The power or force of the natural sanction is, however, a very different question from that of its existence in any particular case. The very same cause which renders truth easier than falsehood tends also to impede the discovery of the whole truth. Here exertion becomes necessary, because of the imperfection of memory; and thus, although the narrator may relate what he remembers without much effort, he will not trouble himself to seek in his recollection that which would perhaps give him more pain than invention or falsehood. It is then that interrogation or cross-examination becomes a remedy auxiliary to the natural sanction.

"But if this inconvenience is thus corrigible, there is one of greater weight, for which a more powerful corrective is wanted. Whatever may be the force of the love of ease as a motive to truth, it is too feeble to contend against almost any interest in favour of what is not truth, or any interest to which falsehood would be favourable. Let us now, therefore, inquire into the nature and power of the popular sanction, or of that which consists in the public opinion in favour of truth and in disfavour of falsehood.

"Our welfare or happiness, it is plain, depends materially on our own actions or conduct, and our actions must be regulated by our knowledge. But that knowledge cannot all consist in personal experience; it must be founded on the experience of others in great part, and thus far it is dependent on testimony, or is regulated by the veracity or otherwise of those around us. It is, therefore, true or false, knowledge or ignorance, in proportion as society, or those persons on whom we depend, are veracious or falsifiers. Thus does it follow, that our happiness depends on our knowledge far more, indeed, than is generally imagined by mankind; but thus also must it be evident, that if ignorance is injurious, the false must be still more pernicious to us, since, if the one may prevent us from acting right, the

other will be the direct cause of our acting wrong. Thus does truth become a necessity of society, and hence public opinion has been invariably led to stigmatise the want of it as a disgrace or crime.

"The religious sanction is the one of those safeguards for truth which are independent of the form or ceremony of an oath, the purpose of which, however, is an attempt to render that sanction more operative or efficient. The religious sanction ought to be complete; it ought to be possessed of entire efficacy as it stands—a naked law. It is a positive law, declared from the mount amid thunderings and lightnings; it is a law declared again by Jesus, repeated by his Apostles. Whatever power religion possesses over man and his conduct as to its other laws, that power must it possess over him as to this one; and if it possesses none as to truth, how shall we believe that it possesses any over any portion of our conduct? And by whatever else religion enforces its laws, by that does it enforce the practice of truth; by the promise of future rewards and the denunciation of future punishment. Yet it is of no avail; or rather the law known to all, the sanction known to all, are acknowledged to be of no avail, nevertheless we seek to make them available by the addition of a ceremony.

"We shall inquire how that succeeds by-and-bye. But it is worth our while to see, in the meantime, what has been the practice, not merely of Christians, but of the establishments for the inculcation and support of Christianity—of the Church itself.

"That Church, the Catholic and the parent Church, which undertook to teach the people to speak truth—to speak nothing but the truth, at all events—and never to speak falsehood, systematically supported what is called the interests of religion, religion itself, the law of truth, by means of falsehood. In no one instance has the religious sanction placed the slightest obstacle in the way of falsehood when those interests of the Church called the interests of religion were to receive advantages, real or fictitious or apparent, from falsehood. Thus it is still in that Church; this is not the history of Leo, but the history of yesterday, to-day, to-morrow, as long as those interests shall thus be

misnamed. Thus was the door of exceptions opened, and thus for centuries is the history of the Church the history of falsehood—lies—for no other term but that vulgar one is available. Miracles, relics, saints, apparitions, decretals, fictitious gospels, acts of councils, revelations, all false; all, and more; a regular, arranged, determined system of falsehood, supported by the false testimonies and unblushing assertions of the highest characters in the series of that Church.

"And yet that Church sought to bind to truth by the religious sanction, adding to it a ceremony, those to whom it gave a daily example of falsehood in its own practice, under the very colour of religion and its interests. Truth was the law of Moses and of the Gospel, and yet Popes could relieve subjects from their oaths to kings, and the Church could decree that faith was not to be kept with heretics; could command falsehood to others as law, when it was the expounder and protector of that law which commanded truth from the mouth of Christ himself, whose vicegerent it pretended to be on earth. And this was the Church which established the doctrine of mental reservation and equivocation, which taught its most favoured friends and supporters to lie to God as to man; taught them not only to break his positive law, but to ridicule and insult him in the very act and mode. Here at least is a system under which we may surely ask, if anywhere, of what avail is an oath? Of what avail it is anywhere, as adding strength to the religious sanction, we shall proceed to inquire.

"We began with examining by definition what an oath is, but we chose to limit ourselves at first to its obvious, ceremonial, and political character. We must now ask what particular relation the Deity bears to the party swearing? as a larger part of the question rests on this than the thoughtless public are aware of.

"By the act of an oath man engages himself to submit to the punishment which the Deity has assigned to the breakers of his law—viz., no less than eternal torments; and by the same act he therefore engages, or endeavours to engage, the Deity to inflict that punishment should he fail in performing his portion of the contract.

"There are, therefore, two contracting parties, the Deity and the swearer; or, at least, there is an attempt to make such a contract. What, then, is the oath? No less than to make 'man the legislator and judge, God the sheriff and executioner; man the despot, God his slave.'

"If, therefore, in any case the Deity refuses to obey the order attempted to be imposed on him, or to agree to the contract, the effect of the oath is nothing, because the contract is void. The oath is a complete lien on the 'Almighty executioner' if in all cases he enforces the punishment, and it is thus perfectly efficacious; but if we adopt the term 'probable' only, then we do no less than assert that he is a 'negligent servant,' obeying the orders received from us sometimes, but at others disobeying them. And what can we know on this subject? That he engages to punish breaches of truth simply? We shall see presently to what besides this we attempt to bind the Almighty.

"The absurdity of all this, to give it no harsher name, ought to be apparent; and if it be admitted, then is the ceremony divested of its force, and of the influence which is attached to it. It does nothing unless it can enforce the Most High as a contracting party; and to this end, then, at least, of future penalties, and consequently of present force, it is nugatory.

"We need scarcely stop here to say that by human laws the infraction of an oath is perjury, a crime punishable by those laws; and therefore it follows that one or the other punishment must be superfluous or undue; while, if human penalties be adequate, no other can be necessary, whereas if inadequate, the justice of the Deity," as Mr. Bentham remarks, "cannot find adequate exercise till man gives him leave, and is thus kept in a state of dependence on human folly or improbity.

"But there is a far higher species of absurdity attached to an oath in the case where two swearers engage themselves to the production of incompatible or opposite effects. In this case the Deity is presumed to be compelled, or at least engaged, to punish two opposed modes of conduct—if the oaths mean anything—and is thus consequently engaged to produce incompatibilities. For example, 'James' swears

by his coronation oath to support the Catholic religion, while 'George' swears to maintain the Protestant. What, then, is the work cut out for the Almighty? To combat each religion, and at the same time and place to defend it, to combat it with one hand and defend it with the other.

"It is admitted that the preceding objections might be overlooked if the practical consequences of an oath presented a balance of utility; but it will shortly be proved that as far as relates to good consequences, it is an inefficient invention, and that, on the other hand, it often is, or may be, a direct and positive source of evil.

"It would be evil, for example, in the case of a despot or a tyrant, who should make use of the force of an oath of allegiance for purposes of oppression; while we have here also an example of that absurdity which would thus engage the Deity to abet vice and protect crime. The oath of allegiance, it is plain, if it be anything, places the Supreme Being in alliance with the tyrant or under his orders, because, engaging Him to punish those who do not keep their promise to obey the despot, they require him to sanction whatever crime towards the people thus engaged may seem fitting or convenient to this governing power.

"Here is another cause of evil, and a common one involving the same kind of absurdity. It is common for banditti to exact oaths from their prisoners to submit to various evils in their, the exactors' favour; such as secrecy, ransom, and so on, as is practised in Italy and Greece every day. Mark here the absurdity again. It is assumed that the Almighty becomes leagued with thieves and robbers; the most atrocious criminals are empowered to command the Supreme Being, and to make Him the abettor and protector of crime, and to direct His vengeance against those who refuse to submit to their orders in breach of His own laws. Common sense is sufficient to show the more than folly of obedience to an oath in such a case; and yet is it certain that nothing has been more disputed than the force of this kind of obligation, while timorous or conscientious persons daily submit themselves to it, in manifest breach of social order as well as of reason; in

manifest breach even of the Divine laws, as abettors of crime. But we will suppose, with the opposite party, that this obligation is not binding. The oath, then, is void. That is, it does not, in this particular case, bind the Almighty whom it undertook to bind. But this is the determination of the casuist; it is an oath or not an oath, as any one pleases to consider it, and it is evident that it will be judged by each according to his own views, and in numerous cases according to his own views, and in numerous cases according to his convenience, profit, or what not. The oath of Jephtha, the oath of Herod, these were both wicked oaths; they engaged the Supreme Being in murder; they were void oaths, therefore; yet were they kept and for evil. The oath of George ought to have been similarly a void oath; in the mind of one set of casuists, it must have been such; for what was the result to the adherents of James? It is an evil consequence, however, in which all persons, all governments, all religious institutions are concerned, that the usage of oaths is hostile to simple veracity or to truth. Two species of falsehood are thus established—simple mendacity and perjurious mendacity; while as censure or punishment is reserved for the latter exclusively, the former ceases to be a crime, and even loses a portion of its disgrace. There are thus instituted two degrees in one crime, and the smaller crime is practised without remorse as with impunity. Let us only suppose oaths abolished in juridical cases, and we should immediately see that not only would the general immorality of simple mendacity be immediately felt, but that the popular sanction would also immediately reappear in its full force. Thus also, and in the very same manner, do oaths tend to destroy the power of the more purely religious sanction of that very sanction which they have been invented to enforce. The law of truth, laid down in the Old and New Testament, becomes less availing because the very ceremony amounts to a declaration that its force is not much worthy of being regarded, or virtually, that it is undeserving of regard, or is powerless. It is a law which the ceremony declares to be a law not binding, a law that must be rendered binding by a human contrivance, before it can

deserve regard or be of avail. Religion is made to be at war with religion: man declares solemnly that the positive precept of the law is not a law, that the positive and explicit command of Christ does not command obedience. He attempts to abrogate the force of the law which he professes to support, the law of religion by religion.

"But, in this contrivance, man is not the mere inventor of a supererogation, the fabrication of a chain to bind, still faster, that chain by which religion is meant to hold man fast in the bonds of virtue and morality, the contriver of a chain, mischievously weakening or destroying the strength of that one by which the Deity had originally designed to bind him down to his duties, while he substitutes a worse one in its place. He declares, indeed, that he comes to aid the laws of the Supreme Being. But even thus, what is the amount of this declaration? That the Supreme did not know best how to effect his own purposes. That he requires man to teach him his duty, his road to his own ends. That Christ, his Christ, was so ignorant of the best means of securing the law of truth, as to require the counsel and aid of man; the Creator of the creature. Is this indeed so? and is this all? No. Man is not here a mere supererogator, an unbidden counsellor, a Pope dictating laws to the Supreme. He is an infractor of a positive law; he comes to amend the law, and he commences by breaking the law. He is not simply attempting to enforce the law by his unbidden counsel, but he is abolishing by his own act a positive law, plainly pronounced as tongue could speak. 'Swear not at all.' Not at all. Can any intention be more clearly expressed? Could it have been more clearly expressed than by the preface to this injunction, this absolute, uncompromising law? Can it be doubted that this command refers to formal swearing to oaths, not to profane and expletive swearing? 'Ye have heard that it hath been said by them of old time. Thou shalt not forswear thyself, but shalt perform unto the Lord thine oaths; but I, 'I' say unto you, swear not at all.'

"If we were to judge by the great and peculiar use made of oaths, we should conclude that they were effectual securities for truth; but when we examine the practice

and the results, we are compelled to adopt a conclusion directly the reverse. Historically viewed, the inquiry would be a curious one; but it is too spacious by far for our limits. The endless oaths of our Saxon or early ancestors' engagements before God, through saints and relics, made at every minute, to be broken at every hour, would alone tempt us to be content with our common and apparently much feebler securities. The force of an oath is compounded of three sanctions; of that of religion under the adjuration, of that punishment which the municipal law allots to the infraction, and of public opinion, or of the infamy attached to falsehood or perjury. Take away the two latter, and the former is nothing. Look at the jury-man's oath. It is as solemn as 'kiss the book, give me a shilling' can make it; though the shilling, which is the most valuable part of the oath in some cases, is excused in this one. Perjurious unanimity is even secured by torture, the oath is broken every day because it cannot be kept; it wants the two sanctions of punishment and infamy, and God, as usual, goes for nothing. This is an excellent expedient also, it cannot be denied, for impressing the value of an oath on the people, on witnesses in particular, swearing for the very same purposes before the same authorities, in the very presence of those persons to whom perjury is admitted and sanctioned. Let us, again, see what is esteemed respecting the validity of an oath in the Universities, in that of Oxford, at least; in that establishment founded by religion, maintained for religion, conducted by members, dignitaries of the Church, for the purpose of educating servants of the Church, for the sake of religious education. The statutes, drawn up some centuries ago, are no longer adapted to the habits and opinions of the times; they cannot be obeyed, and have accordingly fallen into disuse. The officers, dignitaries of the Church, who enforce them by oath, know that they cannot or will not be obeyed; those who take the oaths never intend to obey them; they are violated daily with impunity, impunity from man at least; and yet are these oaths perpetually administered, perpetually taken, to be perpetually broken, as they have been daily since the time of Laud.

This is not perjury punished or punishable by statute, but, if an oath means anything, it is perjury to God. And if, as the very theory of an oath supposes, the taker calls down on himself God's eternal wrath for the infraction or non-performance of that which is here a promissory oath, a vow, then, is there not a clergyman educated at Oxford existing who is not perjured; who is not, by his own deliberate and solemn act, now lying under the invoked penalty of future and eternal punishment; and this, by the ministers of religion, in the very seat of religion, and for the service of religion. 'Swear not at all;' here, at least, it would be policy, if no more, to obey the law. And here, also, it is unquestionable that the law is broken, because this is the precise kind of oath, the very vow itself, which is clearly forbidden, and which no gloss can evade.

"There can be no evasion of any kind here. If an oath is anything, in any case, it is binding here; and if it does not bind here, by itself, by its own intrinsic power, as a direct and unqualified imprecation of God's vengeance, where does it bind by those chains of man's forging? Nowhere, we should answer; because we cannot adopt the grievously absurd supposition, that a large portion of the Church of England, even omitting such laity as have been and are under the same engagements, are, as far as they have gone to eternity, gone to eternal punishment, and must continue to go thither, now and hereafter, until this absurd and mischievous custom shall be repealed.

"This usage is not now our affair. It lies between God and themselves; and what he may judge of this class of perjury, we do not pretend to conjecture. But it is our affair to say, or rather to think, that if an oath, quoad oath, is not binding in the Universities, it is not by consequence *per se*, binding in any case. Why is it not binding in human eyes at the Universities? Clearly for the same reasons that it does not bind the unanimous disagreeing jury. It wants the two sanctions of human punishment and popular infamy.

"The oath is necessary in cases of evidence, say the lawyers, because thus only can you punish pernicious mendacity in judicial cases. Certainly, at present. But why

not punish pernicious mendacity without the oath? The injury to man is the crime to be punished, not the defiance or insult to God. To this one must presume God will himself see. But no; it would not be convenient now to punish all judicial mendacity; it would cut off a vast mass of gain, and—what is as little to be desired by lawyers—prevent an endless mass of injustice. The effect of an oath, in cases of evidence properly so called, is perhaps to inspire the judge with undue confidence in the testimony given. Admitting the theory of this ceremony, presuming that it is to act on those who believe in future punishment for its infraction, what is the foundation of the judge's confidence in its power in individual cases? It rests on something which he cannot know, or even conjecture; on the power of the religious feeling in the swearer's mind, on its efficacy against opposing interests. And these interests are not merely pecuniary, they may consist in affection, political feelings or fancies, hatred, anything in the nature of passion of sufficient power to triumph over the principle of conscience.

"The apology for this species of oath is that it is applied to a case where we have no other means in our power of coming at the truth; it is that of a positive and negative assertion, on the opposed parts of the plaintiff and the defendant. But the answer is, that such an oath resembles the ancient cases of ordeal, and that as we have no means of conjecturing what its power is over either party, it gives no security whatever for truth: and that consequently it would be far better to take a solemn declaration, attaching to it the human penalties of false evidence in case of ascertained mendacity. Here is another inconvenience arising from an oath in the case of judicial testimony. To an inexperienced or indolent judge, it is an excuse for negligence or laziness. He has performed his legal duty in receiving testimony thus protected for him by the law, and may, therefore, if he pleases, leave the responsibility upon the law, and neglect all that belongs to the chances of veracity or otherwise, in the witness, as matter extra legal. But what, in reality, is the acknowledged value of the oath in this case, in practice? Is it anything at all, or is it ever trusted to? Scarcely

ever; perhaps never. The judge, every one, despises the oath which he is bound to administer, and proceeds as if it had never been given or thought of. All that he gains by it is the power of punishing the mendacious witness, if he chooses; a power rarely exerted, and which might equally be granted in any case of judicial mendacity. How is evidence examined? Just as it would be if there were no oath existent; just as if the ceremony had never been heard of; just, we may indeed almost safely add, as if there were no such thing as religion. A man cannot be received in evidence if he does not believe in God, and yet his evidence is received and examined as if there were no God. The whole religious sanction, without the oath or with it, bears no value in practice, even here; just as we have shown that it is perfectly worthless in the case of university oaths. Whether the university oath-takers believe, it is not our business to inquire; but they act as if they did not, and just so does the judge act in the examination of evidence. And properly; for how can he know what is the force of the religious sanction in the mind of the evidence? He forms his judgment by the nature and mode of the answers, by their simplicity, and that of the examinee, or otherwise, by his air and look, his tones, his confidence, his consistency, by the results of cross-examination. Here he has his rules of judgment; but he has no rule by which to judge of the power of the examinee's sense of religion. And the longer he lives, the greater his practice, so much the more does he learn to undervalue or despise the oath; while his experience teaches him, also, that the religious sanction is of the least avail in civil cases. Surely, we may fairly ask, what is the value of an expedient which is least esteemed by those who are best acquainted with its nature?

"It is an evil arising from oaths, that they tend naturally to make a witness persist in the falsehood which he has already uttered. In all cases, indeed, retractation is difficult, on account of the shame which attends it: but the difficulty is much increased when to this shame is to be added the disrepute of perjury. There also arises a singular evil of another character and of a very different kind—an evil from which society at large suffers in its feelings. The

judge, or the court, if it decides justly, is compelled to decide on the evidence from that conviction which is founded on all the collateral circumstances, independent of the oath to which we have already alluded; being in all this regulated by its knowledge and experience. See the consequences. There may be numerous sworn witnesses in any such case, to whom the court has attached no credit, as happens, in fact, in our own courts every day. And in this case the falsehood is notorious even to the public; to the audience present and to the whole abroad, by the publication of the proceedings. What is the result of this, but to prove the painful extent of immorality, and the contempt in which religion is held? It is not only that the public becomes convinced that an oath is of no value, a conviction sufficiently noxious in itself, but that there is no sense of religion among the people, should it happen that such events are common. Need we say that they are of every-day occurrence? There is another danger and another evil arising from the system of oaths, proceeding from a species of modified falsehood, short of their bold and plenary infraction. There are hundreds who, flattering themselves that the whole bond consists in the ceremony, conceiving that a sense of God and religion alone is no chain binding them down to the truth, think to escape under cover of some oversight, error, or incorrectness, in the ceremonial itself. The English swearer kisses his thumb instead of the book, and thus establishes in his own mind a clear privilege for mendacity. And this evil practically is increased, in our own judicial proceedings, by the slovenly way in which oaths are administered; an evil which the formula of Scotland has comparatively contrived to escape. Where superstitious usages are more minute and numerous, the difficulty of procuring a real oath in evidence becomes still greater among those who do not consider the intention as anything, but who regard the whole as a mere formula, partaking of a sort of incantation. Thus in Hindostan, the slightest error, out of numerous minute peculiarities, serves to vacate the oath; and hence a frequent difficulty experienced in the Hindoo courts. Thus will a Jew question whether the hat on his head is the real hat desig-

nated in his law, whether the book is the proper book. Here, it is plain, the very invention is an invention to produce and cause mendacity, instead of ensuring truth. It transfers the chain which, proceeding from religion, should bind the swearer to a formula; abolishes the ordinary religious sanction, should that have any force, to substitute in its place a complicated incantatory ceremonial, which the fraudulent examinee finds the means of avoiding. And even without all this, it is the oath which opens the door to all kinds of judicial and deceptive falsehood in the shape of mental reservations, words pronounced mentally or inaudibly, or words used by the speaker in one sense to be understood in another. That cannot, surely, be esteemed a very dexterous invention, which is, by its very nature, an engine for falsehood and fraud."

Sir William Hamilton, corroborating Bentham as to the university oaths, makes the following very potent remarks in illustration of the value of oath-taking in religious establishments. Speaking of Oxford, he says, "All members * of the University make oath to the faithful observance of the academical statutes; and the heads, specially sworn to see that these are by all faithfully observed, are by statute branded as pre-eminently guilty of 'broken trust and perjury.' If even 'by their negligence, any [unrepealed] statute whatever is allowed to fall into disuse,' the heads have for themselves voluntarily incurred the crime of 'broken trust and perjury,' in a degree infinitely higher than was ever anticipated as possible by the legislature, and, for others, have, for their interested purposes, necessitated the violation of their oaths by all members of the University. By law, Oxford is not merely an establishment for the benefit of the English nation, it is an establishment for the benefit of those only in community with the English Church. But the heads well knew that the man will *subscribe* thirty-nine articles which he cannot believe, who *swears* to do and to have done a hundred articles which he cannot, or does not, perform. The natural tendency of the academical ordeal was to sear the conscience of the patient to every pious scruple; and the example of 'the

* Discourses on Philosophy, p. 468.

accursed thing' thus committed and enforced by 'the priests in the high places,' extended its pernicious influence from the universities, throughout the land. England became the country in Europe proverbial for a disregard of oaths; and the English Church in particular was abandoned as a peculiar prey to the cupidity of men allured by its endowments, and educated to a contempt of all religious tests. As Butler has it:—

> 'They swore so many lies before,
> That now, without remorse,
> They take all oaths that can be made,
> As only things of course.' "

Oath-taking found its origin in bygone ages, in the infancy of civilisation, in the necessity for gaining some hold over the minds of ignorant and barbarous men. Chiefly in the hands of the priesthood the power of administering such oaths; chiefly in their hands the influence resulting from its administration. For a long time it was taught that the Church could absolve from all consequences of perjury; that the Pope could release subjects from their oaths of allegiance and liberate rulers from their most solemn pledges. It is said that Clement VI. granted to the reigning Prince and Queen of France and to their successors the faculty to break any oaths which they might find it inconvenient to observe. Civilisation has swept away much of the ignorance and barbarism. It has weakened the power of the priesthood. There are comparatively few who now regard Church absolution as removing the stain of perjury. How long shall it be ere the good sense of the nation shall destroy a most useless and pernicious ceremony; one which degrades alike the witness and the judge. In Great Britain, notwithstanding the Gospel prohibition of oath-taking—this Gospel being part and parcel of our common law—it is only by obedience to a detestable formula, and in opposition to the Gospel injunction, that an Atheist, or Deist, can obtain justice. Christians of all sects, Quakers, Moravians, and indeed persons of any religion, may now, if they choose, affirm instead of being sworn. But persons who do not believe in God, or in a future state of rewards and punishments, are to-day in precisely the same position

as that of the Quakers a few years ago. They have no choice but to accept a practical outlawry, or to kiss the cover of the Bible after the repetition, by the oath-administering official, of the peculiar formula, "So help me God"—a form which to the Atheist is a mockery. Nay, Atheists and all so-called Infidels who do not believe in a future state of rewards and punishments are, by the common law of England, declared utterly incompetent as witnesses. They may be sued, but may be prevented from entering the witness-box in their own defence. If they are plaintiffs, the process must be decided without the Atheist's evidence as to his complaint. The mere abolition of the oath ceremony would not be enough to meet the case of the non-believer, for although a witness might be permitted to affirm, it would still be a fatal objection to his competency that he was an Atheist, and would, if substantiated, cause the entire rejection of his evidence. What is necessary is, that an Act should be passed, giving liberty to affirm in all cases, and abolishing incompetency on the ground of want of religious faith. The liberty to affirm by itself would be useless so long as the utter incompetency of the proffered witness is declared by our common law. At present, and according to English law, any person might murder a bishop in the presence of half-a-dozen Atheists, and escape justice, because none of those Atheists would be legally competent to bear testimony as to the murder.

Chap. xx., vv. 8, 9, 10, 11.—"Remember the Sabbath-day to keep it holy. Six days shalt thou labour, and do all thy work. But the seventh day is the Sabbath of the Lord thy God; in it thou shalt not do any work, thou, nor thy son, nor thy daughter, thy man-servant, nor thy maid-servant, nor thy cattle, nor the stranger that is within thy gates. For in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that in them is, and rested the seventh day; wherefore the Lord blessed the seventh day, and hallowed it."* Deut., chap. v., vv. 12, 13, 14, 15.—"Keep the Sabbath-day to sanctify it, as the Lord thy God hath commanded thee. Six days thou shalt labour, and do all thy work. But the seventh day is the Sabbath of the Lord thy God;

* See also Exodus, chap. xxiii., v. 12.

in it thou shalt not do any work, thou, nor thy son, nor thy daughter, nor thy man-servant, nor thy maid-servant, nor thine ox, nor thine ass, nor any of thy cattle, nor the stranger that is within thy gates; that thy man-servant and thy maid-servant may rest as well as thou. And remember that thou wast a servant in the land of Egypt, and that the Lord thy God brought thee out thence through a mighty hand and by a stretched out arm; therefore the Lord thy God commanded thee to keep the Sabbath-day."

Which of the above texts gives the correct reason for the observance of the Sabbath-day? Is it because, as stated in Exodus, that on the seventh day God rested after his creation labours? or is it because, as alleged in Deuteronomy, that on that day he rescued the Jews from Pharoah's power? The contradiction is here clear and precise; but passing it on one side, it is not unreasonable to ask, bearing in mind the statutory and common law restrictions as to Sunday observance, whether the Christian Sunday is in truth identical with the Jewish Sabbath? If not, how does this part of the decalogue as to Saturday apply to the conduct of the Christian community on Sunday? What is the real origin of the Sabbath? Does the doctrine of Sabbath observance relate to God or man? Is it to be judged as a religious dogma or a political need that on Sunday man should devote himself to worship or to rest? If the question is a religious one, the Government ought not to interfere. The State has no right to decide by statute a debatable point in theology, or to inflict restraints and penalties on the people (with reference to their social conduct on the Sunday), drawn from so-called divine decrees applying not to Sunday, but to Saturday, and which decrees were issued to a people whose social condition was widely different from our own. There is in truth not the slightest ground or pretence for the attempt to identify the Jewish Sabbath with the Christian Sunday. The Jews themselves, by their observance of the seventh day of the week, distinctly repudiate the attempt to transfer the law of the Pentateuch to the manufacture of the first day as a holy day.

The Christian believer can find in the Gospels no pre-

tence of sanction for the supposition that Jesus substituted first day for seventh day. The days of our week bear, throughout all Europe, names which mark their connection with Isabaism. In England the Saxon mythology has modified a little the nomenclature. Woden and Thor have taken their special days, but our Lord, the sun, still gets the first day of the week as honour to the chief place he occupies in our planetary system. Sunday for the sun, Monday for the moon. Tuesday, instead of Mardi, or Martedi, the day of the planet Mars, takes its name from Tuisco, or Tuisto, the god of war to the Saxons, as Mars to the Greeks. Wednesday, instead of Mercredi, or Mercoledi, the day of the planet Mercury, is Woden's day. Thursday, instead of Jeudi, or Jovedi, the day of the planet Jupiter, is Thor's day—Thor, the Thunderer, who, in the Scandinavian myths, filled Jove's throne. Friday, instead of Venerdi, or Vendredi, the day of Venus, is the day of the Saxon goddess, Freya, or Friga. Saturday, or Saturn's day, keeps its name. Yet out of these days—none of their names of Jewish origin—the followers of the Christian Church in this country pick one day, a day which the Jews do not recognise; and, by help of Jewish law, seek to frighten us away from the pure air and green fields, away from painting and sculpture, away from river and rail, away from everywhere but some Great Bethesda or Little Bethel, where supreme cant allied to grimmest godliness gives Sunday sanction to week day sin.

The Sabbath-day observance societies have no right to appeal to Exodus or Deuteronomy. There is no link between the Sabbath of the Pentateuch and the Pagan Sunday. Nor can those who desire to devote a day to the worship of God stop far short of blasphemy with their threats of hell-fire as the punishment awarded by infinite omnipotence to Sabbath breaking. They say, in effect, that little John, a child of respectable parents, having opportunities of week-day rambling, is good and righteous, and earns hope of heaven by resting contented in only walking from his parents' residence to church or chapel on Sunday; but that little James, the weaver's son, who works in a lucifer match manufactory, and inbreathes poison from

six on Monday morn till six on Saturday eve, will incur the penalty of deep damnation, because, up with the lark on Sunday morn, he runs away from the wretched shelter of home to the side of the clear sparkling river to look for fish who do not go to church, or ramble through the fields and woods to enjoy the odour-laden breeze, or to chase those ephemeral existences for whom even a Spurgeon has not yet reserved an eternity of brimstone for stretching their wings on Sunday. 'Tis rank sin for carpenter James to buy on Sunday morning from costermongers' barrows the poor provender for Sunday's meal; and if Exeter Hall and Newington Tabernacle speak truly, the creator and ruler of an infinity of worlds eagerly watches with angry jealousy to punish such awful crime. Three boys at toss-halfpenny on Sunday morning grieve the immutable, and render him severe and unforgiving, while he shows, nevertheless, great mercy towards a crowned murderer who tramples on the liberties of a nation.

Does the workman need a rest-day? Yes, indeed, and many more than he gets, or is likely to get. A weekly rest-day is good to keep; in that it breaks a little the too much machine-like existence which so many of the masses endure. But *rest* to the weaver, with treddle-wearied legs and shuttle-tired fingers, means a stroll across the verdant carpet spread by nature, a walk in the green lanes, sun-shaded by the foliage-covered trees. Rest to the unnameable, because innumerable, multitude of handicraftsmen who rise from their couches to toil and rejoin their beds to gather new strength for next day's labour—rest to them; change is rest. Let their eyes feast on the beautiful, let their ears drink in harmony. Let our picture-galleries, our collections of sculpture, our museums, and public gardens and parks be wide opened, and let the best music, fruit of highest genius, soften, for at least one hour per week, the harshness of the clang of the six days' struggle to live. Let road, river, lane, and field teem on Sunday with the out-loosed life which is pent up too often in unwholesome areas from Monday to Saturday. Out of the way with your threats of eternal brimstone after death; let me free into the open space where I may inhale the rich perfume of the

life elixir the pure atmosphere affords. Get you gone with your grim, straight-combed, miserable heads—clasp your hands, down on your knees, if you will; we, with easy elastic step, are off for a Sunday wandering; and as we return, odour-laden with Nature's freshness, we ask you, if there be a life-giver, is it not good worship to try to guard the gift?

What is the real origin of the Sabbath-day? Kalisch says:—"Although* every calm Biblical critic will sedulously keep aloof from mystic speculations on the hidden properties of the numbers, it cannot be denied that in the sacred volume some numbers predominate, which bear a holy and religious character. Among these the number *seven* ranks first. Its frequent, almost regular repetition cannot be accidental. The seventh day is the Sabbath; the seventh year, the שמטה, SheMeTE, or the Sabbath of the fields; after seven times seven years, the Jubilee, or the perfect restoration of the original conditions of property ensues; the seventh new moon is the 'day of the sound of the trumpet,' or 'the day of remembrance;' the seventh month is almost entirely occupied with the holiest festivals; Passover lasted seven days, and on every day a sacrifice of seven lambs was offered; seven days was the Feast of Tabernacles, and seven weeks lie between Passover and Pentecost; seven days the young animals remained with their mothers before they were fit for firstling-offerings (Exodus, xxii., 29); the circumcision was performed after full seven days from the birth; seven days was the legal duration for many Levitical lustrations; during seven days the priests were initiated; seven times the blood was sprinkled at important expiatory sacrifices; seven days lasted the mourning for the dead (Gen., i., 10); seven days also the marriages (Judges, xiv., 12); seven animals were, in primeval times, presented on solemn occasions as alliances and promises (Gen., xxi., 28-30); and the sacred word *oath* (שבועה) is etymologically connected with the number *seven* (שבע); symbolical actions are repeated seven times (1 Kings, xviii., 43; 2 Kings, v., 10, 14; compare Gen., iv., 15; Eze., xxxix., 9; xl., 12; xli., 3; Num.,

* Kalisch, Exodus, p. 448.

xxiii., 1, 14, 29; 1 Chron., x., 12, ect.); the mark of the highest reverence was a sevenfold prostration (Gen., xxxiii., 3); and a progeny of seven children was considered a peculiar blessing (1 Sam., ii., 5; Jer., xv., 9; Job, i., 2); seven was, in fact, frequently used as a number signifying *many*, in general, or as the number *kat exochen* (Deut., xxviii., 7; Judges, xv., 7, 17; 2 Kings, iv., 35; Isaiah, iv., 1; xi., 15; Job, v., 19; Mich., v., 4; Ruth, iv., 15). Seven chief utensils were in the holy tabernacle—1, the altar of burnt offerings; 2, the laver; 3, the show-bread table; 4, the altar of incense; 5, the candelabrum; 6, the ark; and 7, the mercy seat and the cherubim, which formed one vessel, xxv. *et seq.* But even in historical events the number seven is very markedly obvious. Noah took into the ark seven pairs of every clean animal (Gen., vii., 2); seven days before the beginning of the Deluge he was once more informed of it (verse 4); he waited seven days after having first sent out the dove; and when she returned, seven days more (verses 10, 12); Jacob served seven years for Leah and seven years for Rachel (Gen., xxix., 20, 27, 30); Pharaoh dreamt of seven fat and seven lean cows, of seven full and of seven empty ears of corn; and accordingly seven years of abundance and seven years of famine ensued (Gen., xl., 1; compare 2 Sam., xxiv., 13; 2 Kings, viii., 1); the father-in-law of Moses had seven daughters (Exod., ii., 16), of whom Moses selected the worthiest for his wife; Jericho was encircled during seven days; on the seventh day seven priests, with seven trumpets, passed seven times round the city, which was then only attacked and taken (Josh., vi.); Solomon finished the temple in seven years (1 Kings, vi., 38); and at its consecration celebrated a festival of twice seven days (viii., 65). It would be easy by obvious combinations to increase this list considerably, and we mention only that the three patriarchs and their four wives make the number seven; but we may distinctly call attention to the fact that the three 'signs of the covenant' of Mosaism, circumcision, the Passover, and the Sabbath, are all connected with the number seven. The same mystic number prevails especially in the Indian mythology: a God shines through the world on a chariot drawn by seven

horses; there are seven worlds (Locas), seven great continents (Dripas), seven oceans; the human body consists of seven chief members; there are seven periods in the life of man, &c.

"The simple and obvious explanation of the holiness of the number seven is that the ancient Israelites, as most of the Eastern nations, counted originally their months after the course of the moon, which renews itself in four quarters of seven and three-eighths days each, and after this time assumes a new phase. These periodical and extraordinary changes of the moon produced a powerful impression upon the susceptible minds of the ancient nations. They excited them to reflections on this wonderful phenomenon, and everything connected with it assumed, in their eyes, a peculiar significance. Hence the day of the new moon was generally celebrated with some distinguishing solemnity, which, like all festivals, is regulated and fixed in the Mosaic law (Num., x., 10, xxviii., 11, &c.); and the new moon is in the Old Testament frequently mentioned together with the Sabbath (2 Kings, iv., 23; Isaiah, i., 13, &c.) Hereto we add that the number of the seven planets known to them (Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, the Sun, Venus, Mercury, the Moon), which successively presides over the hours of the day, and each of which commenced, therefore, a different day, contributed in later times not a little to secure to it that mysterious significance, especially as the result of the astrological pursuits soon brought all human affairs and occupations into some relation with those planets. But that division of the week into seven days was known and adopted by the most different nations, as the Assyrians, Arabs, Indians, Chinese, Peruvians (but not the Persians), and many African and American tribes, which never came into intercourse with the Israelites, and later by the Greeks and Romans, who followed the Egyptians. We must, therefore, recognise therein, not an exclusively theocratical, but a general astronomical arrangement, which offered itself to the simplest planetary observation of every people."

So far Kalisch. M. Priaulx, in his comments on Genesis, deals with the same question. He says:—

*"The Book of Genesis tells us that a septenary cycle was possibly known to Noah, and certainly in use with Laban and his family. But that cycle is represented as subordinate to, and merely the consequence of, the Sabbath-day; as, in fact, owing its existence to the observance of that day; and yet throughout Genesis, with the exception of this creation, there is not the slightest allusion to any seventh as a peculiarly holy day. Not, indeed, till after the Exodus is the *Sabbath* mentioned, and then its sanctity is pressed upon us in almost every verse, and its observance is ensured by the heaviest penalties; the very severity with which it is commanded bespeaks it an innovation, and no ancestral and well-established custom. In a word, we have no evidence whatever that the hebdomadal, as a constantly recurring cycle, as dividing and measuring the whole year, was known to the Hebrews before their settlement in Egypt. And we must conclude, therefore, that the weeks of Noah and Laban were merely any seven days set apart for a festal or a religious purpose, perhaps because the heptad, or number seven, was held in peculiar reverence, or for some other reason which at this distance of time it would be vain to speculate on, but which may easily be drawn from many natural phenomena, as from the first chapter of Genesis. The Egyptian week is a cycle of seven days, each one of which has its appropriate name, taken from the planet to which it is dedicated. Did not, then, the Egyptians, a people devoted to astrology, thence fix the number of their days? Or were they led to a division of their months into weeks by the observation that the moon required *seven* days from new moon to its first quarter, and *other seven days* to reach its full, and so on to its decline? And did they, then, finding that the planets were the same in number as the days, apply the names of the one to denote the other? I cannot determine which of these is the more probable reason for the Egyptian week; but I perceive that, as that week was associated with no events, hallowed by no traditions, it had no arbitrary origin, but was founded on an observation, never mind how crude, of the phenomena of Nature; and that, therefore, like other

* Priaulx Questiones Mosaicæ, p. 36.

natural divisions of time, it might be alike original in China, in Haran, and in Egypt. If, however, it is necessary to decide between the pretentions of the Jews and those of the Egyptians, we must avow that it seems to us just as probable that the Jews, who show none but accidental or traditional reasons for the use of their cycle, should have borrowed it from the Egyptians, as it is improbable that the Egyptians, with whom it appears as a natural measure of time, should have acquired it from the Jews."

After drawing attention to Persia, China, India, and Mexico, as using no Sabbath, M. Priaulx proceeds :—

"The savage on his return from a successful chase makes holiday and prepares a plentiful banquet, and gorges himself with food, and then lays himself down to sleep, and wakes but to eat again, and then again to sleep, until his stock of provisions is exhausted, and hunger at length rouses him to fresh exertions. His life is divided between the severest toil and the most listless indolence. So soon, however, as men begin to live in societies, and have learned to tame and to keep cattle, and to cultivate the earth, so soon as they have some assured means of subsistence, so we find their legislators regulating the alternations of labour and repose, *consecrating particular days of rest, and hallowing these days* by dedicating them to the Gods, and making them happy days for the people, by adorning them with feasts and games, and solemn sacrifice. Thus among the Egyptians, according to Herodotus, there were many public festivals. In *Greece* the days were of three kinds—working days, black days, and festal days.

"On most of these last days, the shops and courts of judicature were shut up. The labourers rested from their works, the tradesmen from their employments, the mourners intermitted their sorrows, and nothing but ease and pleasure, mirth and jollity, were to be found among them.

"*In Rome* the days were similarly divided; every ninth day was a holiday, and on holidays the citizens were expected to abstain from litigation and quarrels, and the slave from labour. *The Persians*, besides many other holidays, celebrated the five intercalary days (dies appendices), which completed their year, in joy and feasting. These same days,

the Mexicans believed, 'had been purposely left by their ancestors as days of vocation, and during this time they gave themselves up wholly to idleness, and only studied how to lose that overplus of time. Tradesmen left off work, the business of the tribunals ceased, and the very sacrifices in the temples.' *In China*, the holidays were new and full moon. *In India*, there are certain prescribed days, on which the superstitious Hindoo dares not even clean his teeth. Among the Boodhists, of Ceylon, four days of the month are dedicated to public worship—the four first days of the changes of the moon; when those who are able attend at the temples. There are no other public days of festival or thanksgiving; all, however, are at liberty to select such days for themselves, and these they particularise by acts of devotion, consisting in fasting, prayer, and forming resolutions for their future good conduct; all which devout acts are addressed to their saviour Boodha."

The Mishna, in the treatises entitled, "Sabbath Erubin and Yom Tob," gives some curious and some very ridiculous examples of the rabbinical regulations for Sabbath observance. These go so far as to declare that a tailor may not carry his needle with him late on Sabbath eve for fear he might be tempted to sew on the Sabbath. One rabbi José declares that a one-legged cripple must not carry with him his wooden leg on the Sabbath. A man with toothache on the Sabbath must not rinse his teeth with vinegar. A flower may not be plucked from a perforated flower-pot, but it may be plucked from a flower-pot not perforated.

According to Exodus, chap. xxxi., v. 14, chap. xxxv., v. 2, Sabbath breaking was to be punished with death; and in Numbers, chap. xv., v. 32, an instance is given of the actual infliction of this penalty. If Sabbatarians were thoroughly logical, they ought to claim that all Sabbath breakers should be stoned to death.

According to English law, travelling in a stage or mail-coach on a Sunday is lawful, and the driver is lawfully employed. (See *ex parte* Middleton, 3 Barnewall and Cresswell, p. 164, and Sandiman *v.* Breach, 7 Barnewall and Cresswell, p. 96.) Contracts to carry passengers in a stage-coach on Sunday are therefore binding, but the

driver of a van travelling to and from distant towns, such as London and York, is unlawfully employed, and may be prosecuted and fined twenty shillings for each offence (see cases quoted *supra*) ; and, presuming that the laws of God and England are in unison, the driver of the van will be damned for Sabbath breaking, and the driver of the stage-coach will go to heaven for the same offence. By the 10 and 11 William, cap. 24, mackerel may be sold on Sunday either before or after Divine service. There is no offence against the common law of England in trading or working on a Sunday; therefore the statutes must be strictly construed. If a butcher should shave on a Sunday, he would commit no offence, because it would not be following his ordinary calling. Persons exercising their calling on a Sunday are only subject to one penalty, for the whole is but one offence, or one act of exercising, although continued the whole day. A baker, pastry-cook, or confectioner is liable to be prosecuted if selling bread and pastry before nine or after half-past one o'clock on the Sunday (sec. 34, Geo. III., cap. 61; 1 and 2, Geo. IV., cap. 50, sec. 11; and 3, Geo. VI., cap. 106). If the Archbishop of Canterbury's cook, groom, footman, butler, and all other his men-servants and maid-servants do not each of them attend church every Sunday, they may be prosecuted and fined under the 1, Elizabeth, cap. 2 ; and 3, James I., cap. 4. If the Archbishop of Canterbury's coachman drive his master to church on Sunday, and if his footman stand behind the carriage, these being their ordinary callings, and not works of charity or necessity, they may be prosecuted and fined 5s. each under the 29, Car. II., cap. 7. Tobacconists may be prosecuted for selling tobacco and cigars on a Sunday. Railway officials may be punished for working on a Sunday; certainly on excursion trains. The stokers and men employed on the steamboats plying to Gravesend, &c., are also liable to prosecution, although a few watermen enjoy the privilege of Sabbath breaking by Act of Parliament. Civil contracts made on a Sunday are void, with some few exceptions—viz., a soldier may be enlisted on a Sunday (Walton *v.* Gavin, 16; Queen's Bench, 48); a labourer may be hired on a Sunday (Rex *v.*

Whitmarsh, 7; Barnewell and Carrington, 596); a guarantee may be given for the faithful services of a person about to be employed (Norton *v.* Powell, 4; Manning and Grant, 42); a bill of exchange may be drawn on a Sunday (Begbie *v.* Levi, 1; Carrington and Payne, 180). Civil process must not be served on Sunday, but an ecclesiastical citation may; therefore, the Church reserves to itself the right of Sabbath breaking on all occasions. No civil arrest can be made on Sunday. A cookshop may be open on a Sunday for the sale of victuals. Every person who should go to Hyde Park, or any of the other parks, to hear the band play, if out of his own parish, is liable to be fined 3s. 4d. If two or three go from out of their smoky city residences to the Lea to fish, or to the green fields to play cricket, they may each be fined 3s. 4d., if out of the parish in which they reside.

Verse 13.—"Thou shalt not kill." This verse must be qualified by chap. xxi., vv. 20 and 21, and by Deut., chap. vii., v. 2; Deut., chap. xx., v. 13 to 16, and similar texts.

Verse 17.—The Samaritan Codex here differs very considerably from our version, inserting in substance the 23 to 27 verses of the fifth chapter of Deuteronomy. Josephus follows the Samaritan, with slight variation.

Chap. xxi., vv. 2 to 6.—"If thou buy an Hebrew servant,* six years he shall serve: and in the seventh he shall go out free for nothing. If he came in by himself, he shall go out by himself: if he were married, then his wife shall go out with him. If his master have given him a wife, and she have born him sons or daughters; the wife and her children

* The word "servant" עבד OBeD, is in Cahen translated "slave." Gesenius Lexicon, p. 599, translates "a servant who amongst the Hebrews was commonly 'a slave.'" Parkhurst, p. 508, "a servant or slave." Newman in his Lexicon, p. 450, says, "a slave either for life or a limited period." (A hired servant is שכיר SheKIR)—see Eichorn's Simonis, vol. ii., p. 1,137; and Bresslan, p. 416. The same word, OBeD, is used in Leviticus, chap. xxv., vv. 44 and 45. In v. 6, the word translated Judges, is אלהים ALEIM, which is, *1* Genesis, translated Gods (see commentary on Genesis, p. 11). The Septuagint has instead of "before the Judges," "before the tribunal of God." The Douay, following the Latin Vulgate, has, instead of "Judges," "Gods."

shall be her master's, and he shall go out by himself. And if the servant shall plainly say, I love my master, my wife and my children; I will not go out free. Then his master shall bring him unto the judges; he shall also bring him to the door, or unto the door post; and his master shall bore his ear through with an awl; and he shall serve him for ever."

These verses recognise, and in most terrible language, the existence of slavery as an institution connected with the then Jewish future. They declare that a man may buy a Hebrew servant, provide him with a bond-wife, and breed bond-children, who shall become the property of the master.

The offer of liberty to the Hebrew servant at the end of six years' servitude, on condition that he abandoned his wife and children, is a piece of indefensible cruelty. Did the writer of Exodus not know that a slave might love liberty and yet not desire to leave his family slaves while he enjoyed solitary freedom? Was God aware that sometimes the most wretched slave may have true and warm affection for his wife and children? Is a slave ever a man with a man's passions and feelings; or, is he always a chattel, or inferior animal?

It is a puzzling theory this, and, at first glance, scarcely worthy of a place in a revelation from an all-wise and all-good God—*i.e.*, that a man may be a religious man and yet keep his brother and sister as male and female slaves, breeding and begetting other slaves.

"If the servant shall plainly say, I love my master, my wife, and my children," why he would be less than a man if he did not love his wife and his children even more than a freedom which would be embittered by the consciousness of his family's slavery. He would be a strange husband if he did not wish to stay with them rather than be separated from them. The phrase, "I love my master," is a most diabolical addition. Could a man love the master in whose hands he would be forced to leave his wife and children as slaves, and would not the expression of love towards him be a venial falsehood in order to secure the opportunity of protecting the wife whom he had sworn to love, and the children whom he was bound to protect, because he had caused

their birth? What is the slave's reward for his love? If he prefers staying with his wife and children, does God give him his freedom as his recompense?—give the whole family their freedom, their reward? No. He says that the man who should be honest enough, humane enough, the man who should be true enough, to stay behind to protect his wife and his children—that man should be taken before the judge, should have his ear bored through, and be a slave for ever—a slave without hope of freedom—a slave without prospect of redemption; and this apparently because he has committed the crime of loving his wife and children. If he hated them—did not care for them—if he had no fatherly, no husbandly love, he might go free; but because he loved his wife and children, for that crime he must pay the penalty of being a slave for ever.

Verse 6, which provides that the Hebrew servant is always to continue in serfdom, is confirmed in Deut., chap. xv., v. 17, but is contradicted by Leviticus, chap. xxv., vv. 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, where the release of the Hebrew brother is to appear in the year of the Jubilee.

Verses 7, 8, 9, 10, 11.—These verses contain a provision for the sale by a man of his own daughter. And for what purpose? Our translators have carefully endeavoured to hide the real meaning of the text. Verse 7 reads, "And if a man sell his daughter to be a maid-servant, she shall not go out as the *men-servants* do." In the Douay it is, "If a man sell his daughter to be a servant, she shall not go out as *bondwomen* are wont to go out." Kalisch says, אמה LAME, is here rather concubine than maid-servant. Cahen says, "The father had power to sell his daughter at any age, אמה LAME, *slave.* The difference between this word and שפחה ShePheChE, appears to me to be this, שפחה ShePheChE generally designates a female slave, and אמה AME is the honorary title taken by the slave, become mother from אם *mother, a matron.* In admitting this, the whole of the paragraph, difficult enough otherwise, becomes very clear. It speaks of a father who sells his daughter to a master who makes her his concubine."

The 8th verse in our translation reads—If she please not her master, who hath betrothed her to himself, then shall

he let her be redeemed to sell her to a strange nation; he shall have no power seeing *he hath dealt deceitfully with her.*" In the Douay, "If she displease the eyes of her master to whom she was delivered, he shall let her go, but he shall have no power to sell her to a foreign nation *if he despise her.*" In the margin of Breeches Bible the last words of the 8th verse are translated, "seeing he hath deflowered her." Cahen renders *ayant été infidele envers elle,*"* "having been unfaithful towards her." Kalisch in his note to this verse adds, "he had brought her from her father only under the condition and with the promise to live with her in conjugal intercourse."

Verse 10.—In our version it is, "If he take him another *wife,* her food, her raiment, and her *duty of marriage,* he shall not diminish." In the Douay, "If he take another wife for him, he shall provide her a marriage, and raiment, neither shall he refuse the *price of her chastity.*" (Vulgate *pretium pudicitæ.*) In the Breeches Bible, "If he take him another wife, he shall not diminish her food, her raiment, and *recompense of her virginity.*" The word עונה ONeThE in our version, "duty of marriage," is in Kalisch translated, "conjugal cohabitation." Cahen writes, "*le devoir conjugal.*"

Can any man doubt as to the real meaning of the above four verses? Is it not clear and beyond contradiction that here is a law professedly from a God of truth and purity, rendering it lawful for a man to sell his own daughter, in order that she may fill a place in the seraglio of her purchaser. Our translators have somewhat glossed the text, partially hiding its disgusting meaning, but still enough was left to excite suspicion. Is this the Book from which you let your little girls read, and from which you expect them to acquire that knowledge which shall render them happy and virtuous?

Verse 16.—"And he that stealeth a man, and selleth him, or if he be found in his hand, he shall surely be put to death." Cahen translates this verse, omitting the word "or," ו, for which there is no Hebrew equivalent. The

* See Lexicon's under בגד Eichorn's Simonis, p. 205—Gesenius, p. 102—Parkhurst, p. 55—Kalisch, Exodus, p. 389.

Douay has, "being convicted of the guilt." The Rabbis discussed how the man being sold could still be found in the hands of his vendor, and they taught that the stolen person must have been seen in the house of the kidnapper, and then have been sold to another—without which the offence was not complete. The Rabbis applied this only to stealing an Israelite (see Deut., chap. xxiv., v. 7).

Verse 20.—"And if a man smite his servant, or his maid with a rod, and he die under his hand, he shall surely be punished." The Douay has, "He that striketh his bondman, or bondwoman, with a rod, and they die under his hand, they shall be guilty of the crime."

Verse 21.—"Notwithstanding, if he continue for a day or two, he shall not be punished, for he is his money." The Douay says, "But if the party remain alive a day or two, he shall not be punished, because it is his money." Cahen, "If he survives for a day or two." Colenso says, "I shall never forget the revulsion of feeling, with which a very intelligent Christian native, with whose help I was translating these words in the Zulu tongue, first heard them as words said to be uttered by the same great and gracious Being, whom I was teaching him to trust in and adore. His whole soul revolted against the notion, that the great and blessed God, the merciful Father of all mankind, would speak of a servant, or maid, as mere 'money,' and allow a terrible crime to go unpunished, because the victim of the brutal usage had survived a few hours."* We are here told that if one of God's children, whom God caused to be born free, or who had, during life, risen to freedom, kills another of God's children, whom God has caused to be born a slave, or who, during life, has been reduced to thraldom, the murderer of the owner of the victim shall escape punishment, if (as the Douay quaintly expresses it) the victim remain alive a day or two after the infliction of the punishment, which was the primary cause of death; and this notwithstanding v. 12, which says, "He that smiteth a man, so that he die, shall be surely put to death." Why is this mercy? Is it because there is some extenuating circumstance which reduces the heinousness

* Part 1, p. 9.

of the crime? None who read the Pentateuch can suppose the God of the Jews to be tender hearted as to taking human life. Why is the murderer spared? Has mercy any voice? No: but because the slave killed is the murderer's money; because the murderer bought and paid for that slave with current coin, justice is reverent to wealth and the power of gold is recognised even in the kingdom of God. To day the Society for Suppression of Cruelty to Animals would prosecute and obtain the committal to prison of any man, who, on such prosecution, should be found guilty of beating his horse or his dog, so that it died on the second or third day. It would be no defence to urge on the part of the prisoner that he had paid for the ill-used animal. It would be a rash advocate who ventured to raise such a defence. But in a trial at the last day before the Supreme Judge, when a "Legree" is accused of the murder of an "Uncle Tom," the accused, relying on the Pentateuch, may raise a valid defence with the words, "He was my money." The power of gold will open the gates of heaven to the murderer, who can look complacently down into hell upon the murderers who had no money.

Verses 23, 24, 25.—"And if *any* mischief follow, then thou shalt give life for life. Eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot. Burning for burning, wound for wound, stripe for stripe." Aben Ezra quotes a Jewish writer who denied that these verses could be taken literally; for instance, how could you apply the law "eye for eye" to a blind man, who had put out the eye of one possessing both organs of sight in good condition. How make a retaliative wounding neither more nor less dangerous than that for which it is retribution.*

Verse 32.—"If the ox shall push a man-servant or maid-servant; he shall give unto their master thirty shekels of silver, and the ox shall be stoned." The slave is quite treated as a mere chattel for loss or injury to which the master is to receive compensation. According to the calculation of Kalisch, thirty shekels of silver would be about seventy-two shillings and sixpence. In the Hebrew this

* Cahen, Exode, p. 96.

chapter numbers thirty-seven verses—the first verse of chapter twenty-two being included in chapter twenty-one.

Chap. xxii., v. 9.—"For all manner of trespass, whether it be for ox, for ass, for sheep, for raiment, or for any manner of lost thing, which another challengeth to be his, the cause of both parties shall come before the judges; and whom the judges shall condemn, he shall pay double unto his neighbour." The Douay join this to the last verse and read, "To do any fraud, either in ox, or ass, or sheep, or raiment, or anything that may bring damage: the cause of both parties shall come to the Gods, and, if they give judgment, he shall restore double to his neighbour." Cahen translates, "In all kinds of wrong relating to an ox, an ass, a lamb, or any lost object, of which they shall say that is it, the cause of the two shall come before the judges; and he whom the judges shall condemn shall tender double to his neighbour." He adds that it is difficult to seize the precise meaning of the verse. The word "judges" or "gods," as the Douay gives it, is אלהים, ALEIM (see "Bible: What it Is," Genesis, pages 7 and 11). Kalisch, who translates the verse somewhat differently, draws attention to further variation in the Septuagint and Luther's version, and says that there is no authority for the English rendering, "which *another* challengeth to be his."

Verse 11.—"Here an oath is commanded; in Matthew, chap. v., vv. 34 to 37; and James, chap. v., v. 12, oaths are forbidden."

Verse 18.—"Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live." The Septuagint has "poisoner" instead of "witch." In the Douay, "Wizards thou shalt not suffer to live." Can we wonder that our criminal courts occasionally reveal a scene of life in which we see some poorly taught servant girl parting with her hard-earned pence to propitiate some man or woman, whom she believes to possess supernatural power? It is customary, on such occasions, for the presiding magistrate to deplore the ignorance of the labouring classes, and to exclaim against the folly of believing in witches and wizards, yet he swears the witnesses on the Bible, containing this verse, and would refuse to receive the

evidence, if, after hearing the magistrate's opinion on the folly of believing in witchcraft, the deponent should happen to remark, "Then I cannot believe in the Bible." Kalisch declares that the doctrine of sorcery or witchcraft is opposed to Mosaism,* and that the idea of Satan as an evil principle was only borrowed after the Babylonian Captivity. We are placed, however, in this difficulty—*i.e.*, that either the Pentateuch is the reliable record of Mosaic doctrines, or there is no reliable record in existence; and, according to the Pentateuch, it is clear that the possibility of sorcery, enchantment, witchcraft, &c., was recognised. Witches are not spoken of as impostors but as criminals. The doctrine of the existence of angels and demons, of familiar spirits, who might be subject to human control, of guardian angels and evil genii, is as old as the childhood of nations. Those who have recognised, on the one hand, the theory of the existence of God and of good angels have, on the other hand, been quick to admit the doctrine of Satan and his devils. Hoping and believing that God and his angels were propitiated by prayer and offerings; they have also believed and feared that Beelzebub and his legions might be similarly influenced.†

Almost every mythology which has existed among mankind has sanctioned the belief, that beings exist in the universe greatly superior to the human race in wisdom and power, and regarding mankind with the most deadly hostility. The terrors of this faith have, in many instances, been very much aggravated by the absurd idea, that it is possible for mortals to become the allies of these superhuman beings, to partake their power and to assist their evil designs. In some countries, the persons to whom such a compact is attributed are venerated as the favoured priests and servants of a formidable Deity. In others, the accusation of witchcraft is the ready pretext for robbing or murdering an obnoxious neighbour. But, in almost all nations, savage or civilised, the delusion exists or has

* Exodus, p. 426 and contra 115. See also Deuteronomy, c. xviii., v. 10, and Leviticus, c. xx., vv. 26 to 31.

† Monboddo Antient Metaphysics, vol. iv., Book 2, c. 7. Farmer on the Demoniacs, p. 13.

existed. A very slight knowledge of the absurd and degrading notions, anciently entertained respecting the spiritual world, will enable our readers to form a sufficiently accurate idea of the accusations which were common in the old trials for witchcraft in Europe, and especially in our own land. Neither Tasso nor Dante was superior to the superstition which clothed a supposed fallen archangel in the vulgar terrors of horns, tusks, and cloven feet. In their age, and since the witch was generally a spiteful old woman, who had sold her salvation for the pleasure of blighting her neighbours' corn, destroying their cattle, and feasting by night in their cellars and larders, her familiar spirit or attendant devil was present as a cat, a toad, or, in some peculiarly atrocious cases, a blue-bottle fly; the Demon, to whose service the witch devoted herself according to popular repute, combined the lowest passions of humanity with the stupidity, ferocity, and almost the outward shape of a wild beast.

The old maxim of English law that an accused person is regarded as innocent until proved guilty, did not apply to cases of witchcraft. In these it was reversed, and, in default of testimony against the accused, tests were applied. The most common test was the ancient ordeal by immersion in water, or, as it was called, *swimming;* in which the failure of the accused party to sink completely was held an infallible proof of guilt. This test was most comforting; if innocent the patient got drowned, if he escaped drowning he was burned. Another approved method was by *pricking;* which consisted in puncturing the body of the unfortunate victim, in the hope of detecting the *marks* or insensible spots, which were supposed to exist in every witch. In a third, the culprit was kept bound hand and foot, without food, drink, or sleep, for a day and night; it being thought that no witch could exist for a longer time without some visible communication with her familiar spirits. In these trials, the malignant vigilance of the persecuting watchers was seldom disappointed in detecting some symptom which they chose to consider a sign of guilt; and even when this did not occur, the life of the accused was generally endangered by the inhuman violence with which the tests were applied.

But the ordeal, absurd, cruel, and partial as it was, was only used in cases of the barest suspicion, and where no pretence of testimony could be alleged. The slightest shadow of evidence, or of what the prejudiced demonologist chose to consider evidence, was enough to send the culprit to the stake without hope or respite. The Continental Jurists openly laid down the rule, that persons of notoriously bad character, although not to be believed upon their oaths on the ordinary occasions of dispute that might arise between man and man, were to be believed if they swore that any person had bewitched them. James I. of England confirmed their opinion and improved upon it, by adding that the evidence of children, not old enough to understand the nature of an oath, ought also to be received. And, indeed, it was well for the victims when these proofs were of a kind which, in the opinion of their judge, justified their condemnation to a speedy death; for any contradiction or uncertainty in the evidence was considered a ground not for acquittal, but for extorting a confession from the accused party, by the unrelenting use of the severest torture.

The evidence for the defence was weighed in a very different balance. The monstrous supposition that an ugly woman could be a good Christian, or that a convicted perjurer would bring a false accusation of witchcraft, required to be supported by such proofs as scarcely any human testimony could furnish. Bodinus, a learned demonologist of the seventeenth century, has declared that an acquittal for sorcery could never be justified, unless the innocence of the accused was clearer than the proof of the sin's existence. How a negative—and such a negative—could be established in the triumphant manner—how a friendless vagrant was to prove that, during a life of thirty, forty, or fifty years, he had *never* attended a witch Sabbath, *never* soured milk, or raised tempests, or *never* danced at midnight on a broomstick at the Brocken—the sage magistrate has omitted to specify. But it is certain that his rule, sweeping as it is, is far too limited to justify all the condemnations which took place; for proofs of *alibi*, supported by the clearest testimony of the senses, were frequently

set aside, on the gratuitous supposition that the witnesses had been deceived by a diabolical illusion; and women were burnt alive for having been present at the nightly revels of *Domdaniel* or *Blockula*, though their husbands swore that they had never quitted their beds during the nights in question. There is, in short, little or no exaggeration in affirming that every imputation of sorcery raised a presumption of guilt against the culprit, and that very nearly approaching to what the law of England terms a presumption *absolute*. It was a presumption which a mere conjecture was sufficient to establish, and which, though nominally liable to be disproved, was in practice altogether insuperable. The pretended crime of witchcraft has been recognised and punished, from the earliest ages among the nations of Western Europe; though it was not until a comparatively modern period, that the superstition assumed its most absurd and malignant shape. Its most ancient victims were in general persons who had provoked suspicion by pretending to possess, or attempting to exercise forbidden knowledge. Such was the well-known case of Eleanor Cobham, Duchess of Gloucester, who was condemned to perpetual imprisonment in the Isle of Man, for attempting the life of Henry VI., by means of a sympathetic waxen image. Such was that of the Marèchal de Retz, a French nobleman of high rank and distinguished military reputation, who was publicly executed for sorcery in the fifteenth century, although, if the stories told of his crimes have any truth, he might well have dispensed with diabolical assistance in tormenting mankind. And such, in some measure, was the death of the heroic Maid of Orleans, whose delusions, innocent and patriotic as they were, were of a kind which no doubt excited sincere distrust and abhorrence among her superstitious enemies. Early in the fifteenth century, a general belief began to spread through Europe, that the crime of sorcery was fearfully on the increase. This delusion originated in the gross superstition and ignorance, resulting from many centuries of monkish domination over the popular mind, probably powerfully assisted by the strange pretensions of the Alchymists, which had long attracted the unfavourable

notice of the Church, and which were just at this time attaining their highest pitch of extravagance. The contagion of fear spread rapidly and fatally. In 1459 took place the celebrated trials and executions for witchcraft at Arras; the earliest instance, upon a large scale, in which innocent persons were put to death for that crime without any apparent object or provocation. The horrible example was eagerly followed throughout France, Germany, and Switzerland; and a few years later, a superstition, peculiarly proper to Biblical Christianity, was solemnly sanctioned by the Supreme Pontiff of the Christian Church. In 1488, Innocent VIII. gave the signal for one of the most fatal and wicked persecutions that ever disgraced mankind; by issuing a bull, in which he summoned all good Christians to the rescue of the Church from the open assaults of Satan and his mortal allies. His exhortations were repeated and renewed by several of his successors; and particularly by the pious and infamous Alexander VI. Then arose throughout Europe that strange and fearful monomania, which has so often seemed to impart a mysterious fascination to crimes of a new and shocking character. It was fortunate for mankind that the crime of sorcery, being morally and physically impossible, could not become common; or the world would really have become, what a terrified Demonologist called it, "a large madhouse for witches and devils to play their antics in." But religious teaching did its best; everything that could be done under such discouraging circumstances was done most zealously and perseveringly, both by witches and witch destroyers. The more enthusiastic sorcerers scrupulously performed all the approved ceremonies for raising the Devil, and generally finished by becoming convinced that their object had been fully attained. The more artful and incredulous satisfied themselves with terrifying and robbing their neighbours, by the help of false pretensions to witchcraft. On the other hand, hypochondriac squires, terrified clowns, hysterical girls, and mischievous children, united in ascribing their sufferings and mishaps to enchantment; and usually fixed at random upon the nearest old woman as their tormentor. These accusations were so

readily heard, and so unsparingly acted upon by the legal authorities, that the number of executions shocked and startled even the thoughtless and excited mob. The poorer classes began to look forward with natural alarm to the time when age and deformity might qualify themselves for the fate which they daily saw overtaking their neighbours, and, in many places, the inquisitors of the law were compelled by popular violence to abandon their researches. But Churchmen and kings felt no such apprehension, and the fury of the persecution became daily more unsparing.

For nearly two hundred years after the bull of Innocent, the mania continued with scarcely any symptoms of abatement. Throughout the sixteenth century it was chiefly confined to France and Germany, in which countries the number of its victims must be reckoned by hundreds of thousands. Their total amount, indeed, can only be calculated from those which remain on record; but some idea of its magnitude may be formed from the fact that many districts and large towns burnt two, three, and four hundred witches every year; and that in some the annual executions destroyed nearly one per cent. of the whole population! The accusations were of the usual kind, except in the south of France, where the crime of *lycanthropy*, which consisted in self-transformation into a wolf, or, as such enchanted animals were called, a *loup-garou*, was believed to be very prevalent. The Reformation, which swept away so many superstitions, left this, the most odious of all, in full activity. The Churchmen of England, the Lutherans of Germany, the Calvinists of Geneva, Scotland, and New England, rivalled the most bigoted Roman Catholics in their severities. Indeed, the Calvinists, though the most opposite of all to the Church of Rome, were in this respect perhaps the most implicit imitators of her delusions.

The contagion was late in making its appearance in Great Britain, though its presence, when once it became general, was not less destructive than in other countries. It was not until 1562 that the English Legislature disgraced themselves by formally recognising the practice of magic as felony. After this time, however, the panic gradually increased; and towards the end of Elizabeth's

reign the spread of witchcraft had become a favourite subject of lamentation and warning with the Court preachers. At length, in 1593, occurred the well-known and disgraceful tragedy of the witches of Warbois, which ended in the public murder of a whole family, upon no better evidence than the ravings of a delirious girl. Still this was for some time almost a solitary instance. But the pestilence broke out afresh upon the accession of James I. That vain and worthless pedant had always looked upon witchcraft with peculiar horror, and had, moreover, been greatly delighted by the fatal flattery which asserted that he was the most dreaded enemy of their fraternity. A Scottish Act of Parliament for the suppression of sorcery had been passed in 1563, but during the reign of Queen Mary the executions under it, though more frequent than in England, were comparatively few. James, however, speedily increased them to four hundred annually, a number more than quadruple their previous amount, though not greater than was furnished by many single towns on the Continent. He presided at the famous trial of Euphemia Macalzean and her accomplices in 1591, a trial which terminated in the execution of thirty persons at once, many of them with circumstances of unusual and shocking barbarity. He also signalised himself by publishing a treatise on demonology, in which he maintained the most puerile superstitions of the witch-finders, and openly accused Reginald Scott of sadducism for denying the possibility of the crime.

Accordingly, in 1604, the very year after the accession of James to the English throne, a new act was passed for the detection and punishment of sorcerers; and from this time the persecution may be said to have fully commenced. During the seventeenth century, 40,000 persons are said to have been put to death for witchcraft in England alone! In Scotland the number was probably, in proportion to the population, much greater; for it is certain that even in the last forty years of the sixteenth century the executions were not fewer than 17,000. In 1634 the madness may be said to have reached its highest pitch. In that year occurred the celebrated case of the Lancashire witches, in which eight innocent persons were deprived of their lives

by the incoherent falsehoods of a mischievous urchin. The civil war, far from suspending the persecution, seems, if possible, to have redoubled it; for the English Puritans and Scottish Covenanters were, like all of their religious persuasion, full of love and charity, and most rigorous and unscrupulous in exterminating sorcery. In 1644 and 1645 the infamous Matthew Hopkins was able to earn a comfortable subsistence by the profession of witch-finder, which he exercised, not, indeed, without occasional suspicion, but still with general success. And even twenty years later, the delusion was still sanctioned by the most venerable name of the English law; for it was in 1664 that the excellent Sir Matthew Hale, after a trial conducted with his usual patience and impartiality, though not perhaps with his usual good sense, condemned two women to death as witches, both of whom were executed accordingly.

At length, however, soon after the middle of the seventeenth century, the superstition began to show signs of decline. In some countries its fall was hastened by the belief that the powers of darkness had used the general panic as a means of destroying the innocent, and that the witch-finders were either witches themselves, or subject to diabolical delusion. The conjecture excited general attention; for the most zealous demonologist could not deny that Satan would have found, in such a deception, a far easier and more effectual means of tormenting mankind, than in the petty mischief usually ascribed to him. This fortunate counter-delusion produced a great effect in many parts of Germany, and also in New England—in which colony the mania broke out with sudden violence about the year 1670, and, after costing nineteen lives, as suddenly disappeared.

In 1669 seventy persons were put to death at a small village of Dalecarlia, in Sweden, upon the evidence of some insane or malicious children: but, fortunately, the contagion did not spread any further in that country. And so late as 1697 five persons were executed together at Glasgow, upon the evidence of a sick girl, aged eleven! But these were the expiring effects of the delusion. In 1680, France set the example to Europe of its final and absolute suppression. In

that year, Louis XIV. issued a proclamation prohibiting all future prosecutions for witchcraft; and directing that even those who might profess the art should only be punished as impostors. A solemn remonstrance by the Parliament of Rouen was wisely disregarded; and the benefits of the step were speedy and conspicuous. The good example was followed, though less readily than it ought to have been, by other nations. In Germany the punishment of death had been already disused, and even that of imprisonment was daily becoming more rare. In England and Scotland the exertions of enlightened and humane judges, among whom Chief Justices Holt and Dundas of Arniston are honourably conspicuous, generally succeeded in drawing a verdict of not guilty from the jury, or a pardon from the Crown. At length the long list of murders was brought to its close in both countries. In the former, the last execution was at Huntingdon, in 1716; in the latter, at Dornoch, in Sutherlandshire, six years later. Two or three instances of popular violence against suspected witchery met with just and exemplary punishment; and in 1736, the statute of James I. was solemnly repealed throughout Great Britain. One solitary crime more was committed at Wurzburg, in Bavaria—a town which had early and long been infamous for the cruelty of its witch-finding magistrates. In 1749—when the subject was almost forgotten everywhere else—a young woman, named Maria Sanger, was, to the horror of all Europe, burnt alive in that town, on a charge of having bewitched the nuns of a neighbouring convent. This was the last execution for witchcraft which ever took place in a civilised country. Yet even to day, and even in England, remnants of the vulgar superstition may be traced out amongst the uneducated; and although civilisation has robbed religion of the power to burn the body, it has not yet entirely rescued the child from the liability to those early Bible teachings which leave their disastrous impress to taint maturer thinkings.

Chap. xxii., v. 20, "He that sacrificeth unto *any* god, save unto the Lord only, he shall be utterly destroyed." It should really be read, "He that sacrificeth to the ALEIM, except only to JEUE, shall be destroyed." And v. 28, "Thou

shalt not revile the Gods (Aleim)." And chap. xxiii., v. 13. Who and what are these gods, or Aleim, and why these commands? According to its best advocates, the sole end of this Mosaic dispensation is the worship of one God, yet here are other gods referred to. If I sacrifice to them, I hazard destruction, and if I revile them, I shall probably fare no better. Josephus says, "Let no one blaspheme those Gods which other cities esteem such."*

The words in v. 20 forbid any sacrifice to the ALEIM, except to JEUE (Jehovah), who is, therefore, here regarded as one of the Aleim. Who were the others? The prohibition in Exodus, chap. xx., v. 3, read with the verses above quoted, would apparently make the whole of the Aleim, except Jeue, heathen deities; but there are instances in which another name than that of Jehovah is given to a God of the Jews. For example, the names compounded with אל AL, such as אל שדי AL SheDI, Almighty God, אל עליון AL OLIUN, the most High God, &c., and we find one אלה מעוים ALE MOZIM, the God of fortresses, who may either be a Jewish or a heathen God. We give here a few of the names of heathen deities found in the Bible; and shall deal with others as we reach them in order.

בעל BOL † Baal, "the ruler." Under this name, which occurs very often in the Bible, several nations worshipped the Solar fire as the active ruling producing principle of nature. Sanchoniathon says, "This god the Phœnicians thought to be the only Lord of Heaven, calling him Beelsamen, which in their language is Lord of Heaven." God was called Bal in the Punic tongue. The name Hannibal, famous amongst the Carthaginians, signifies "God be gracious to me." Baal, says Etheridge, is sometimes used not only for the sun, but also for the planet Jupiter, and is then joined with Gad the designation of that star in the oriental astronomy. So, too, in the Zabian Mythology, Jupiter takes the name of Bel. ‡

Colenso in his translation and abridgment from "Movers

* Antiquities, book 4, chap. viii., § 10. See also, p. 220.
† Parkhurst's Lexicon, p. 74.
‡ Targums on the Pentateuch, p. 21.

Phonizie" shows how this word Bel in various forms, as Bel Mithra, Bel Saturn, and Zeus Belus, is identified with the sun, the light-giver, the life-giver.*

Gesenius says that Baal was the domestic and principal deity of the Tyrians, and was worshipped together with Astarte or Ashtaroth by the Hebrews (see Judges, chap. ii., v. 13, and chap. x., v. 6); Bel being the sun, and Astaroth the moon.† Baal is said to have been represented by a bull, and Astaroth as a female with a bull's head.

בעל פעור BOL POUR, Baal Peor (Numbers, chap. xxv., v. 3). The word Pour, according to Parkhurst, means "open," as in the sense of an open-mouthed beast of prey, and it is alleged that this name was used because of the gaping mouth of the idol, into which the victims were thrust.‡ Professor Bresslau in his Lexicon gives, however, a very different meaning, treating the word as signifying "uncovering of the nakedness," and he identifies the worship of Baal Peor with that class of idolatry, by women, of the productive organs common to many of the old religions.§ The Reverend Thomas Maurice, who evidently takes this view, quotes Bishop Cumberland in favour of the opinion that the worship of Baal Peor and of Priapus is of one and the same character.‖ Selig Newman corroborates by his translation of the word POUR the opinion here given. Simonis also corroborates this view,¶ the Lexicons of Newman and Simonis give to the word POUR as here used a speciality of signification which can only apply to the Priapian rites. In the index to the Breeches Bible of 1589, the same explanation is given. Cahen couples Baal Peor with Belphegor.

Etheridge says, "the Rabbins give an obscene meaning to the name Peor, but others, as Gesenius, derive it from an

* Colenso on Pentateuch, part v., p. 315.

† Gesenius Lexicon, p. 131; Parkhurst Lexicon, p. 568; Newman's Lexicon, p. 513.

‡ Parkhurst, p. 586—Gesenius, p. 635.

§ Bresslau's Lexicon, p. 482.

‖ Indian Antiquities, vol. ii., p. 266, and Keightley's Mythology, p. 208—Newman's Lexicon, p. 535.

¶ Eichorn's Simonis, p. 1308.

old verb, still retained in the Ethiopic, signifying 'to serve,' or 'worship.'"

בעל זבוב BOL *Ze*BUB, Beelzebub, Lord of the Flies.* This name does not occur often in the Bible (see 1 Kings, chap. i., vv. 2 and 3; Matthew, chap. x., v. 25; and Luke, chap. xi., v. 15, &c.); and Bresslau translates it, "The Baal who kills flies—*i.e.*, the Deity protecting from vermin." Parkhurst, referring to Baal Zebub as one of the Aleim of the Philistines, says, that he appears to have been one of their medical idols. The Septuagint render Baal Zebub as "Baal the fly."

מלך *Me*LeK, Molok, King—(Leviticus, chap. xviii., v. 21.) According to the Rabbins, the statue of Molok was of brass, with a human form, but the head of an ox; it was hollow within, and heated from below, and the children to be sacrificed were cast into its arms. Etheridge says, "From the similarity of meaning with that of Baal, 'a sovereign' or 'lord,' Molok is regarded as another epithet for the same deity—the ruler of existence; but as manifesting his dominion in the destruction of life, a phase of character opposite to that of Baal, the sovereign producer. Hence the worship of Molok was solemnised with fatal rites. The parent surrendered the life of his offspring and burned his own child as a holocaust." Parkhurst regards this as only another phase of sun-worship. The name Melek forms part of Melchizedek, the king who was without father or mother, without beginning or end. If the quotations from Diodorus are reliable, there seems to have been a striking likeness between the sacrifices offered to Saturn and to Molok. Adrammelech (the glorious Melech) and Annamelech (the cloud Melech)—2 Kings, chap. xvii., v. 31—are apparently only slightly varying names for the same deity.

כמוש, *Ke*MUSh. Chemosh. Parkhurst's guesses as to the meaning of this word do not much aid us. Etheridge says the symbol of Chemosh was a black star. Gesenius says it was a black stone. Cahen says that you have nothing but conjectures as to this deity or the meaning of his name.

* Leo's Gesenius, p. 188—Tregelle's Gesenius, p. 131—Bresslau, p. 170—Parkhurst, p. 169.

Chap. xxiii., v. 5.—"If thou see the ass of him that hateth thee lying under his burden, and wouldest forbear to help him; thou shalt surely help with him." The Douay has after burden, "thou shalt not pass by, but shall lift up with him." Kalisch reads, "forbear to leave it to it; thou shalt leave it only with him." Cahen has, "*garde toi de l'abandonner à luimême, abandonne-toi avec lui.*" Luther says, "take care; leave it not, but leave willingly thine own for his sake." Michaelis, "so shalt thou not go by and him for his master leave helpless, but thou shalt take hold and not leave him more than thine own." There appears to be considerable difficulty as to a Hebrew word, עזב, OZeB, which occurs three times in the passage referred to, and the meaning of which is disputed. How satisfactory to the true believer to know that God has revealed his will in a language which the rabbis of his own chosen race cannot agree in translating, even in apparently some of the most simple phrases.

Verse 15.—"And none shall appear before me empty." The verses 14 and 15 are repeated almost literally in Deut. c. xvi., v. 16. The injunction that none of the worshippers are to come empty handed is worth attention to those who still regard the Books as of divine origin. Every worshipper is required to bring with him some gift with which to propitiate the infinite and immutable Deity.

Verse 23.—"For mine Angel shall go before thee, and bring thee in unto the Amorites, and the Hittites, and the Perizzites, and the Canaanites, the Hivites, and the Jebusites: and I will cut them off." After the Canaanites, the Septuagint adds the "Gergashites."

Verse 28.—"And I will send hornets before thee, which shall drive out the Hivite, the Canaanite, and the Hittite, from before thee." The Septuagint puts "the Amorites" in before the others—"Hornets." The Hebrew word is צרעה, TzROE, but Gesenius regards the phrase as figurative.

Verse 29.—"I will not drive them out from before thee in one year; lest the land become desolate, and the beast of the field multiply against thee." Bishop Colenso, who shows that, if the Israelites had been as numerous as re-

presented in the Pentateuch, they would have peopled Canaan as thickly as were the English counties of Norfolk, Essex, and Suffolk in 1851, asks, are these three Eastern Counties in any danger of lying desolate with the beasts multiplying against the inhabitants.*

Verse 31.—The Septuagint, instead of leaving the river as in our version, names it the great river Euphrates—"Thou shalt drive them out." The Douay, Vulgate, Septuagint, and Cahen agree in saying, "I will drive them out." This promise of the angel going before the Jews to strike fear into the Philistines and Canaanites, and to drive them out, does not appear to have been entirely verified; nor is it true that the Lord kept all sickness away from the Jews, or that the other promises in this chapter were all fulfilled. CHAP. xxiv., vv. 9 to 14.—The narrative here given is in effect contradicted in chap. xxxiii., v. 20, John, chap. i., v. 18, 1st Epistle of John, chap. iv., v. 12, 1st Epistle to Timothy, chap. i., v. 17, Colossians, chap. i., v. 15. It cannot be urged that this is figurative, because the evident intention is to give a literal account of seventy-four persons going up to see God. To what place they went up is not clear; it was not upon the mount, or, at any rate, but a short distance on it, for Moses and Joshua left them, and went up from them into the mount.

Verse 1.—"And he said." The Rabbis have made great conjectures as to who it was said what follows. It is urged that it cannot mean "and God said," because the words used refer to God as a third person. The Samaritan version adds here, and in v. 9, after Nadab and Abihu, the names Eleazar and Ithamar,

Verse 4.—"Pillars." The Douay has "titles." Cahen has "steles."

Verse 5.—"Young men." נערי NORI. It is stated in the Talmud that the editors of the Pentateuch found in the temple three manuscripts; two of which had this word, and one of which had זעטוטי ZOTUTI, and that the Rabinical editors adopted the reading of the two, destroying the third.†

* Pentateuch, Part I., p. 83.

† Cahen, Exode, p. 101—Chajim's Introduction, p. 16.

Verse 7.—"Book of the Covenant." ספר הברית SePheR EBeRITh. What was this book so read? What has become of it? The Rabbis have disputed on these points but have left us no information. It clearly must have been a book separate from the Pentateuch and anterior to it. Was it God's revelation? And if yes, how does its loss affect the Bible believer?

Verse 9.—Joshua is not named here, and unless he is included amongst the seventy elders, which, from v. 14, does not seem probable, it is difficult to understand why he is omitted, as it is clear, from the remainder of the chapter, that he must have been with Moses.

In the Hindoo mythology we find several instances of gods, under whose feet paved work may be seen; but these gods are—according to Christians—neither omnipotent, infinite, nor omniscient. All Christians assert that the extraordinary histories of Indian deities are fabulous, and when they gaze on the curious pictures of various gods, given in the "Asiatic Researches," Maurice's "Indian Antiquities," and other kindred works, they feel convinced of the superiority of their own system, which is free from such ridiculous absurdities. But how do these enlightened Christians deal in their own minds with this chapter, which tells them that their "invisible" God was seen by seventy-four men in a fiery mount, with, as it were, a paved work under his feet? These seventy-four, though no man can see God and live, being so little affected by the immediate presence of the infinite that "they saw God and did eat and drink."

Dr. John Pye Smith, never at a loss, easily reconciles these apparent discrepancies by asserting that they refer to the different persons of the Father and the Messiah, but this is only "confusion worse confounded," for it is quite clear that it was not the Messiah who is referred to, either here or in the many other texts speaking of the appearance of the Lord to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob; it is also clear from the New Testament that Jesus was not invisible; so we are left without aid from the Reverend Doctor's comment, and must still wonder how an "invisible" God ever appeared to anybody.

In a debate held between the writer and the Rev. Dr. Baylee, president of St. Aidan's College, Birkenhead, the following reference was made to this chapter :—

"I." Do you believe, according to 1st Timothy, chap. i., v. 17, that God is invisible; and according to chap. vi., v. 16, that no man hath seen or can see God; and according to 1st John, chap. iv., v. 12, that no man hath seen God at any time?

Dr. B. I do.

"I." Do you also believe, according to Exodus, chap. xxiv., v. 10, &c., that seventy-four persons all saw God at one time?

Dr. B. I do.

"I." Am I to understand that you believe that God has not been, and cannot be, seen, and that he has been seen. Do you thus believe?

Dr. B. I do.

"I." Is not that a contradiction?

Dr. B. It is not.

Comment on this would be worse than useless.

Chap. xxv., v. 1, &c.—The directions which follow are of a most extraordinary character when put into the mouth of an infinite Deity. To suppose the creator of the universe directing the manufactory of a dwelling for himself (v. 8); or to picture the Mighty Ruler of all existence ordering the fashion of a golden chair in which he shall sit (vv. 19 and 22), requires, at least, the exercise of great faith, and the utter disuse of all reason. It is somewhat embarrassing—even for a devout believer—to recollect the words of the injunction against graven images, &c., contained in v. 4 of chap. xx., and to apply it in connection with the directions for sculptural adornments of the tabernacle. The Douay version has in this chapter a number of trifling differences of translation. In v. 1, it has "first fruits" in lieu of "offerings;" in v. 4, "violet" instead of "blue," and it says the scarlet is to be "twice dyed;" in v. 5, it has "violet skins" in lieu of "badgers' skins." Cahen call this, skins of the Tehaschime, and says that the meaning of the expression is unknown. The Talmud teaches that this was the skin of a rare beast, something like a leopard, but which

existed only during the construction of the temple. In v. 8 the Douay has, "the rational" in lieu of "the breastplate." In v. 18, in lieu of "mercy seat," it has "oracle;" and the same in v. 20. In v. 25, instead of "a border of an hand breadth," it has "to the ledge itself a polished crown, four inches high."

Verse 10.—Sacred arks have been used amongst many ancient people—the Greeks, Romans, Etruscans, Egyptians, &c.; and some of them very similar in form to that here provided.* Did God adopt the Pagan pattern, or was he unaware of it?

In the reference to the cherubims in v. 18, no size is specified. They are spoken of as if they were objects familiar to Moses. Josephus, speaking of these cherubims, says, "They are flying creatures, but their form is not like to any of the creatures which men have seen, though Moses said that he had seen such beings near the throne of God."

Verse 40.—"And look that thou make *them* after their pattern, which was shewed thee in the mount." When was this pattern shown? Was it a pattern made by God and preserved in heaven? Some of the Talmudical commentators declare that Moses did see the model of the tabernacle during his stay on the mountain; and that, in fact, the Jewish Sanctuary is really an imitation of a similar, though infinitely more grand, structure in heaven.†

The twenty-sixth chapter one would regard as a most trivial description, utterly unimportant to us, but as we find the whole of it repeated only ten chapters further in the same book, we are bound to examine it in order to discover if it be possible the great moral lesson hidden by the curtains, rings, boards, bars, and vails, which are so amply delineated. Kalisch translates the word משכן MeShKeN (in our version called tabernacle) as "habitation." The tabernacle was to be the habitation of the God of the Jews.

Verse 1.—"Moreover thou shalt make the tabernacle *with* ten curtains *of* fine twined linen, and blue, and purple,

* Kalisch, Exodus, p. 491.

† Kalisch, Exodus, p. 496.

and scarlet: *with* cherubims of cunning work shalt thou make them." What does the last clause of this verse mean? The Douay, following the Latin Vulgate, has, "And thou shalt make the tabernacle in this manner: thou shalt make ten curtains of fine twisted linen, and violet and purple and scarlet twice dyed, diversified with embroidery." The Douay omits the cherubims, but the fair explanation seems to be that these lost birds, beasts, or monsters, were in addition to being placed as images on the ark, to be also embroidered, by way of ornamentation, to the curtains of the tabernacle.

Verse 29.—Cahen says, "Suppose that the interior was covered with gold of only a *millimétre* of thickness, it would have required more than 3,600 kilogrammes of gold; or in money, value about 14,000,000 of francs; a large sum this for a tribe of wanderers.

Verse 31.—There is here the same strange difference between our version and the Vulgate and the Douay—the latter reading, "wrought with embroidered work and goodly variety," in lieu of "with cherubims shall it be made."

Verse 35.—The Samaritan version inserts here the first ten verses of chap. xxx. There are numerous variations between the various translations of this chapter, but none of an important character. Josephus gives the following quaint explanation as to the tabernacle and its accessories:—"Now,* here one may wonder at the ill-will which men bear to us, and which they profess to bear on account of our despising that deity which they pretend to honour; for if any one do but consider the fabric of the tabernacle, and take a view of the garments of the high priest, and of those vessels which we make use of in our sacred ministration, he will find that our legislator was a divine man, and that we are unjustly reproached by others: for if any one do without prejudice, and with judgment, look upon these things, he will find they were every one made in way of imitation and representation of the universe. When Moses distinguished the tabernacle into three parts, and allowed two of them to the priests, as a place accessible and common, he denoted

* Antiquities, Book 3, chap. vii., § 7.

the land and the sea, these being of general access to all; but he set apart the third division for God, because heaven is inaccessible to men. And when he ordered twelve loaves to be set on the table, he denoted the year, as distinguished into so many months. By branching out the candlestick into seventy parts, he secretly intimated the *Decani*, or seventy divisions of the planets; and as to the seven lamps upon the candlesticks, they referred to the course of the planets, of which that is the number. The vails, too, which were composed of four things, they declared the four elements; for the fine linen was proper to signify the earth, because the flax grows out of the earth; the purple signified the sea, because that colour is dyed by the blood of a sea shell-fish; the blue is to signify the air; and the scarlet will naturally be an indication of fire. Now, the vestment of the high-priest being made of linen, signified the earth; the blue denoted the sky, being like lightning in its pomegranates, and in the noise of the bells resembling thunder. And for the ephod, it showed that God had made the universe of four (elements); and as for the gold interwoven, I suppose it related to the splendour by which all things are enlightened. He also appointed the breast-plate to be placed in the middle of the ephod, to resemble the earth, for that has the very middle place of the world. And the girdle which encompassed the high-priest round, signified the ocean, for that goes round about and includes the universe. Each of the sardonyxes declares to us the sun and the moon; those, I mean, that were in the nature of buttons on the high-priest's shoulders. And for the twelve stones, whether we understand by them the months, or whether we understand the like number of the signs of that circle which the Greeks call the *Zodiac*, we shall not be mistaken in their meaning. And for the mitre, which was of a blue colour, it seems to me to mean heaven; for how otherwise could the name of God be inscribed upon it?"

Chap. xxviii.—Can anything be more puerile than the representation of Deity given here? The supporter of the doctrine that this book is literally true requires us to imagine the God of the Universe giving directions for the particular description and decorations of cloak, girdle,

bonnet, and breeches to be worn by a few members of the human family dwelling in a narrow district of this our earth, which itself sinks into insignificant littleness when compared with the solar and astral systems of mighty vastness in which it figures but as the one grain of sand in Sahara's desert, or the solitary drop of water cast upon the bosom of the Atlantic.

Verse 30.—"And thou shalt put in the breastplate of judgment the Urim and the Thummim." The Douay has followed precisely the Latin of the Vulgate, "Thou shalt put in the rational of judgment doctrine and truth." Kalisch says that almost innumerable conjectures have been made as to the Urim and Thummim, and that the subject is one of the most obscure kind. The Jews believed that, through the Urim and Thummim, oracular replies were made. See Numbers c. xxvii., v. 21; 1 Samuel c. xxviii., v. 6. Cahen enters very fully into the examination of this verse. He says*—"It is necessary to remark that nowhere in the Hebrew text is there any mention of the construction of these objects, nor of their remarkable qualities. No part of the Bible gives the least information concerning them. The Pentateuch, which enters almost minutely into the details of the vestments of the priests, observes an absolute silence concerning the Urim and Thummim, as though these were commonly known to the Israelites, and not requiring description. Indeed, nothing is more common among the ancients than consultations by oracles in private, as in public affairs: also the Rabbi Azaria, the author of 'Maur Oinim' (the light of the eyes) says, 'In the name of the Rabbi Abadia Sephorno I have heard these words; in the breastplate of the High Priest there were two names, etc., and the Urim were similar in intention and form to those predictions which rendered by the idolatrous priests called oracles among the ancients.' These oracles had already ceased during many ages when the Chaldean and Greek translations were composed, and when Josephus and Philo wrote their works. And since their time, profound obscurity has reigned concerning the form and manner of consultation. We are,

* Exode: Notes Supplementaires.

therefore, reduced to analogies and conjectures concerning it, even upon the origin of the words Urim and Thummim. Onkelos does not translate them, nor Mendelsohn. Abarbanel relates, according to a commentator, that Urim and Thummim did not give the gift of prophecy, but that they gave the means of answering well to questions having for object the public needs."

Ben Ouziel paraphrases *Aurim* by that which enlightens from Aur אור, *gold, light;* and as to Themim תמים, he says, *that which makes perfect, from* תום Thum, *perfection;* which would be, for Urim and Thummin, *light* and *perfection*, as some translate. The Septuagint has translated in the same sense. These translations have given rise to the opinion put forth by Spencer, that Urim and Thummim were small speaking statues, as the תרפים Teraphim or סרפים Seraphim, *Serapis* of the Egyptians. There are quoted in support of this conjecture two passages from ancient authors—the one of Diodorus Siculus, and the other of Elian. The first, speaking of the president of the Egyptian tribunals, expresses himself thus—"He wore round the neck, suspended by a gold chain, a small figure of precious stones, which they called *the truth.* The debates opened when the president placed in front of himself the image of truth." (Lib. i., c. xxxi.) The second, after saying that the judges in Egypt were priests, adds—"The most aged among them was their chief and supreme judge. It was required that he should be the justest and most sincere of man; he wore round the neck an image of Sapphire; this image was called *the truth.*" (Varian. Hist., lib. xiv., c. 34.) The Prophet Hosea expressly joins the ephod to the teraphim:—"There is neither ephod nor teraphim." Ch. iii., v. 4. We know that Micah, wishing to improve the profession of Cohen, priest, provided himself with ephod and teraphim. (Judges, c. xvii., vv. 3, 5, and c. xviii., v. 17.) Some pretend that the twelve precious stones of the breastplate formed the Urim and Thummim. Such is firstly the opinion of Josephus—"By means of the twelve precious stones, he says, which the Pontiff wore on the breast in the breastplate, God predicted victory to those who went to battle. Then the light from these stones be-

came so brilliant before the army began its march, that the people remained convinced that they had God for an auxiliary. Thence also the name *Logion* (supreme reason) given by the Greeks to this oracle, for nothing could contradict it." (Ant., lib. iii., c. 8.) A divination by lot founded upon the greater or less brilliancy of certain gems, is still in use in several countries of India. The Babylon and Jerusalem Talmuds are of the same opinion. One reads in the first (Jom. c. vii. fol. 73)—"How was it made (the answer to the Urim and Thummim)? Rabbi Io'hanan (John) says, they (the letters) came forth; Resch Lakisch says, they reunited themselves. How? since there was not the letter *tsadi* צ among them? Rabbi Schemouel, the son of Isaac, says—the names of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob were written. Then the letter Teth ט was still wanting? Master Rabbi A'ha, the son of Jacob, answers —the words of 'tribes of Jeschouroun' were written there." The Talmud of Jerusalem says that a very gentle voice made itself heard; and instead of Jeshuron, it puts Israel. According to the Talmud, this oracle was not consulted except for public affairs. (Jom. c. vii., fol. 72.)—"The priest is not questioned except for the king, the court of justice, and the wants of society." It is very probable, above all, by the history of Achan (Joshua c. vii.) that the answers were drawn by lot. It was in this manner, even according to the Talmud, that the distribution of the land was made among the tribes. The ephod had perhaps the form of a bag, in which were placed the several possible chances; that which was drawn was the decision of God. The possession of the divinatory apparel gave to the sacerdotal caste immense power, which it had soon to share legally with the seers (the *Nabis*, inspired orators); and illegally with simple individuals, such as Micah and the Levites, direct descendants of Moses. (Judges c. xviii., v. 31.) Josephus says that this oracle ceased about two centuries before the destruction of the second temple. (Ant. lib. iii., c. 18.)

The use of the equivalent to the Urim and Thummim amongst the Egyptians is rather a ground for the supposition that the Jews borrowed these mystical ornaments from the former nation; for, as the religious Parkhurst admits,

"It is by no means credible that they should take it from the Israelites after the giving of the law."* Gesenius also admits, that "The Hebrews seem in this manner to have imitated the Egyptians."† Etheridge says, "Connected, though to us in some uncertain way, with the breastplate, were the Urim and Thummim, the means or instruments of decision or judgment, in doubtful matters of importance to the public interests of the nation. Urim is the plural form of the noun אור, AUR—'fire or light'—and Thummim the plural of תם, TheM—'fulness or completion, integrity, uprightness, truth.' The ordinary rendering of Urim and Thummim is, 'Lights and Perfections.' Onkelos merely Aramaizes the terms. The LXX. give them by *ten delosin kai ten aletheian*, 'manifestation and truth;' the other Greek versions by Aquila, Symmachus, and Theodotion, by *tous photismous kai tas teleiotetas*, 'illuminations and perfections:' the Syriac by 'resplendence and completion;' the Samaritan version by 'elucidations and certainties;' and the Vulgate by *doctrinam et veritatem;* the Arabic, by 'holiness and truth.' As to the manner in which responses were obtained by the Urim and Thummim, *silente Scripturâ nihil pro certo statuatur.* There are several conjectures, more or less plausible, but conjectures only. *Ex. gr.*: 1. Two tablets representing an affirmative or a negative, inserted within the folds or pouch of the breastplate, and used in the manner of drawing lots. 2. That the priest dressed in the ephod stood before the veil, and heard the answer pronounced by a voice from within. 3. The verbal answer would be spelled out by the priest, as one letter after another became illuminated. 4. The wearing of the breastplate had a moral influence on the mind of the priest, which predisposed him to receive the answer by an inward dictate of the Holy Spirit. 5. The Urim and Thummim were identical with the twelve jewels. We see in Exodus, chap. xxviii., v. 30, that the Urim and Thummim were to be put upon the breastplate; what was put upon it but the jewels? These were, therefore, the Urim and Thummim, and were ordained to make instru-

* Parkhurst, Lexicon, p. 40.

† Tregelles Gesenius, p. 24.

mentally the perfect revelation, *Thummim*, by their lights, *Urim*. Now, as the Divine response, unlike the more diffuse oracles given in after-days by the Holy Spirit to the prophets, was vouchsafed to the high priest in a simple affirmative or negative—yes or no—it is conjectured that the affirmative answer might have been given by the increased refulgence of the jewels; and the negative, by the withholdment of it. On the general subject, compare Exodus, chap. xxviii., v. 30; Lev., chap. viii., v. 8; Exodus, xxxv., v. 27; Ezek., chap. xxviii., v. 14; 1 Samuel, chap. xxiii., v. 2. And the instances in Num. xxvii., vv. 18—31; Joshua, chap. vii., vv. 13 and 21; Judges, chap. i., v. 1; Judges, chap. xx., vv. 18 and 28; 1 Samuel, chap. xiv., vv. 40—43; 1 Samuel, chap. xxiii., vv. 9-12; 1 Samuel, chap. xxviii., v. 6."*

Chap. xxix.—At the very time that God was thus directing that Aaron and his sons should be anointed, and while God was intimating that he would sanctify Aaron, the latter must have been engaged in the manufacture of the golden calf. Did God know this? If he did, it is hard to understand how he chose an idolator for his priest. If otherwise, God is not omniscient. The family of Levi, who, with Simeon, was so severely spoken against by Jacob, seem the most favoured by Jacob's God.

Verse 33.—" And they shall eat those things wherewith the atonement was made, to consecrate *and* to sanctify them." The Douay reads, " That it may be an atoning sacrifice, and the hands of the offerers may be sanctified." Kalisch remarks that the construction of this verse is most embarrassing.

Verse 36.—The Septuagint's translation differs here in some respects from our version, and from the Hebrew saying, that the sacrifice is to be made the day of the purification. As the Jews were in the desert, and as these offerings were to be every day (v. 36) day by day (v. 38), and continually (v. 42), one is tempted to inquire, with Aben Ezra, where the Jewish wanderers were to find the necessary bullocks, lambs, flour, wine, and oil† for the fulfilment of all these sacrifices?

* Targums on the Pentateuch, p. 45.

† Cahen, Exode, p. 140.

Chap. xxx., vv. 1 to 10.—In the Samaritan these verses are wanting here, having been inserted, chap. xxvi., v. 35.

Verses 12 and 13.—"When thou takest the sum of the children of Israel, after their number, then shall they give every man a ransom for his soul unto the Lord, when thou numberest them; that there be no plague among them, when thou numberest them. This they shall give, every one that passeth among them that are numbered, half a shekel, after the shekel of the sanctuary: (a shekel is twenty gerahs;) an half shekel *shall* be the offering of the Lord." Cahen asks, whether the shekel was a piece of money or a weight? and remarks that the use of the words shekel of the sanctuary seems to imply that there was also another current or profane shekel. Colenso says,* "We may first notice in passing, that the expression, 'shekel of the sanctuary,' in the above passage, could hardly have been used in this way until there *was* a sanctuary in existence, or, rather, until the sanctuary had been some time in existence, and such a phrase had become familiar in the mouths of the people. Whereas, here it is put into the mouth of Jehovah, speaking to Moses on Mount Sinai, six or seven months before the Tabernacle was made. And in Exodus, chap. xxxviii., vv. 24, 25, and 26, we have the same phrase used again, of the actual contributions of the people towards the building of the Sanctuary. The Seventy indeed render the Hebrew phrase by *to didrachmon to agion*, 'The sacred shekel.' But this can hardly be the true meaning of the original, הקדש בשקל, EQeDeSh BeShQeL, and if it were, the difficulty would still remain, to explain what the 'sacred shekel' could mean, before any sacred system was established. But these words direct that, whenever a numbering of the people shall take place, each one that is numbered shall pay a 'ransom for his soul' of half a shekel. Now, in Exodus, chap. xxxviii., v. 26, we read of such a tribute being paid, 'a bekah for every man —that is, half a shekel, after the shekel of the sanctuary— for every one that went to be numbered from twenty years old and upward,' that is, the atonement money is collected;

* Part 1, chap. vii., in reply to Dr. McCaul's "Examination of Colenso," p. 39.

but nothing is there said of any census being taken. On the other hand, in Numbers, chap. i., vv. 1—46, more than six months after the date of the former occasion, we have an account of a very formal numbering of the people, the result being given for each particular tribe, and the total number summed up at the end; here the census is made, but there is no indication of any atonement money being paid. The omission in each case might be considered, of course, as accidental—it being supposed that, in the first instance, the numbering really took place: and, in the second, the tribute was paid, though neither circumstance is mentioned. But, then, it is surprising that the number of adult males should have been *identically the same* —(603,550)—*on the first occasion as it was half a-year afterwards.*"

Verse 15.—The words "when they gave an offering unto the Lord to make atonement for your souls," are totally omitted in the Douay version.

Verses 22 to 38.—The God of the Jews, who, according to Christians, is a God of love and full of mercy and loving kindness, here ordains that every man who shall manufacture, give to a stranger, or smell a particular kind of scented ointment, shall be put to death. Christian Theist, you tell me that yours is the "eternal, immortal, and only wise God" (*vide* 1st Timothy, chap. i., v. 17)—do you in truth believe that he would order me to be utterly cut off because I might perhaps unconsciously make an ointment of a particular odour? Do you believe if I take a certain description of perfumed pomade, and "smell thereto," or even if I proceed to the rubbing some on the hair of my head, that I shall be put to death? Many defenders of the Bible urge that these enactments were only meant for the Jews, who seem to have required some strange laws; if so, it is a pity God has allowed the Book to come to us in its present state, as we find it hard to believe that one verse or passage is intended only for the Jews, and the following one intended for the whole world.

Chap. xxxi., vv. 14 and 15.—Moses would hardly have been eligible for the "Society for Abolition of Capital Punishment," if it had been established in his day. These

verses must have since become a dead letter, an obsolete statute which, even if the Bible be the expression of God's law, God does not and man dare not attempt to enforce in the present age. But if this verse is a dead letter, how much more of the Bible is affected in the same manner? Who is to tell which enactments may be safely disobeyed, and which carry with them the terrible penalty specified in the text?

Verse 17.—"He rested and was refreshed." Although even the most faithful and pious believer must have great difficulty in attempting to satisfy his brain as to that stupendous miracle, the creation of the universe out of nothing, yet this great difficulty sinks into utter insignificance beside the greater one of endeavouring to imagine the omnipotent andimmutable Deity resting after his labour, and being *refreshed by his rest.*

Verse 18.—The expression "finger of God" is evidently intended to be understood literally here, but the question then arises as to the nature of an infinite spirit without body, parts, or passions (*vide* thirty-nine articles), yet having fingers, hands, face, and back parts. Dr. Pye Smith says,* on the anthropopatheia of the Scriptures (treatment of God as if possessing a human shape and nature)—"This is very remarkable and very extensive, but it is manifested by comparison with many other parts of the Scriptures, that the terms employed are terms of *condescending comparison* with the acts and effects of the thus mentioned organs of the human body, to convey, especially to unpolished men, a conception of those properties and actions of God, which to our feeble ideas have a resemblance, and that they were so understood. Language had not then terms for the expression of abstract conceptions." Dr. Smith, in instructing the Christian theologian, tells me that God created man and all the circumstances surrounding him, yet speaks of "human incapacity and infirmity," and of "the language of the Scriptures being formed in condescension thereto," and, in effect, says that the Bible is in God's own language, but the language of the Bible is imperfect, and not sufficient for the expression of the mes-

* First Lines of Christian Theology, p. 129.

sage which God intended the Bible to convey. Dr. Pye Smith admits that modern language is more expressive than that of the Bible; but is it not remarkable that the prescient Creator should have not foreseen the time when the language of his revelation would sink below the level of the human capacity? It is worse than folly to put forward hypotheses as to God's condescension in using weak language; in reality, not to express, but, in fact, to conceal some grand sentiment. The Book itself nowhere suggests such an idea, and I ask to what mind (however "unpolished" it may be) can the following words convey any other conception of the properties and actions of God than that of the literal reading?—

"And I will take away my hand, and thou shalt see my back parts, but my face shall not be seen." Dr. Smith says that "metaphysical or philosophical preciseness is not in the character of Scriptural composition," yet upon our misconception of the true meaning of that composition hangs the penalty of eternal torment.

Chap. xxxii.—During the absence of Moses on the mount the Jewish people applied to Aaron to make them Gods to go before them. Forgetting that Moses had so recently given proofs of his divine legation, they used very disrespectful language, saying, "As for this Moses, the man that brought us up out of the land of Egypt, we wot not what is become of him." Aaron, who had been specially chosen by God to be his priest and prophet, and as to whom God was then making special regulations, instead of reminding the people of the miracles God had just performed on their behalf, instead of reproving them for the slighting manner in which they had spoken of his brother Moses, instead even of appealing to Nadab and Abihu, and the seventy elders who had personally seen God so shortly before, and who must all have been impressed with the awful majesty of the Deity, forgetting or disregarding the first and second commandments contained in chapter xx., vv. 3, 4, and 5, and that their God is a jealous God, forgetting also the repetition contained in v. 23 of the same chapter, Aaron (who alone had been nominated to enter the holy of holies), without the slightest attempt at remon-

strance, asked the people to bring him their golden earrings, out of which he voluntarily made a molten calf;* and the people having said, "These be thy Gods, O Israel, which brought thee out of the land of Egypt," Aaron built an altar and proclaimed a feast. This calf (says Kalisch) was probably in imitation of the Egyptian Apis (Osiris in Memphis), or Mnevis (the sun in Heliopolis).

Verse 6.—"And rose up to play." Cahen observes that at the fêtes of Apis, after eating the remains of the sacrifices, the people always commenced to dance and play. The God was very unfortunate. Adam and Eve ate the fruit he forbad them to eat, and now his chosen people forget and forsake him, and repeatedly doubt and deny his power. The miracles performed by Moses and Aaron in Egypt—events any one of which should have been sufficient to have struck terror into the Israelites for the remainder of their lives—the interview between God and the seventy-four, only a few days before, were all passed as nothing; and the Israelites, after a few days' absence on the part of one of their leaders, seek new Gods, and find the other leader, in whose charge they are left, willing to gratify their desires. God having permitted all this to happen, informed Moses thereof, and then uses this remarkable phrase—"Let me alone that my wrath may wax hot against them, and that I may consume them, and I will make of thee a great nation." Is this the language of an infinite and immutable Deity?

Verse 10.—The Samaritan version inserts here the words, "Jeue was very angry with Aaron to have destroyed him." Can God the immutable be imagined in a state of furious anger, resolving to destroy his people, and yet, upon the persuasion of one of his own creatures, induced to change his resolve? The expostulatory reasoning of Moses addressed to God is worthy repetition.

Verses 11, 12, and 13.—"Lord, why doth thy wrath wax hot against thy people, which thou hast brought forth out

* Josephus not only omits all this story of the golden calf, but so states the absence and return of Moses after forty days and nights on the mount, that if the Jewish historian be correct, all this chapter must be untrue.

of the land of Egypt with great power, and with a mighty hand? Wherefore should the Egyptians speak, and say, For mischief did he bring them out, to slay them in the mountains, and to consume them from the face of the earth? Turn from thy fierce wrath, and repent of this evil against thy people. Remember Abraham, Isaac, and Israel, thy servants, to whom thou swarest by thine own self, and saidst unto them, I will multiply your seed as the stars of heaven; and all this land that I have spoken of will I give unto your seed, and they shall inherit it for ever." And this reasoning, which points out to the all-wise Deity that if he persisted in his new resolve he would be unable to keep his sworn promise to Abraham, and which reminds him that it will give an opportunity to the talkative Egyptians, is effective.

Verse 14.—"And the Lord repented of the evil which he thought to do unto his people." Cahen quotes the following from the Berechith Raba:—"Moses, wishing to appease God, said, 'Master of the universe, they have given thee a helper, and yet you are angry against them. This calf which they have made shall be thy auxiliary. Thou shalt make the sun shine, it the moon; thou the planets, it the stars; thou shalt make the rain fall, it shall make the plants grow.' God answered, 'Thou art also a dupe. This calf is nothing at all.' Then said Moses, 'Well, then, why get angry with these children?'"*

Verse 19.—"And it came to pass, as soon as he came nigh unto the camp, that he saw the calf, and the dancing; and Moses' anger waxed hot, and he cast the tables out of his hands, and brake them beneath the mount." According to verse 16 these tables were "the work of God," and the writing thereon was "the writing of God." After the breaking of the two tables of stone, and before the destruction of the calf, there was, according to Deut., chap, xx., v. 18, an interval of a second period of forty days and nights not mentioned here.

Verse 20.—"And he took the calf which they had made, and burnt it in the fire, and ground it to powder, and strawed it upon the water, and made the children of Israel

* Exode, p. 150.

drink of it." The word "burnt" Cahen translates "calcined."* Gold is a metal distinguished by its extreme permanence in air and fire, by its density, malleability, and ductility; it might have been melted by the action of fire, but could not be burnt—*i.e.*, consumed by fire. The Douay says that Moses "beat it to powder;" this would be very difficult, as it is so malleable that it may be beaten into leaves not more than the 280,000th part of an inch in thickness. Our version says, "ground it to powder;" this would be also a difficult task, unless Moses had chemical aids of which we know nothing. The golden calf being reduced to powder, Moses strewed it upon the water, and made the Israelites drink of it. Unless a chloride of gold had been formed by the use of chlorine and nitro-muriatic acid, and of which we have no account, or unless some analogous chemical process had been pursued, the gold would not be soluble in water, but would sink to the bottom, leaving the water entirely unaffected. According to the repetition of this story in Deut., chap. xx., v. 21, it appears that the golden calf was burnt, ground, and stamped until it was "as small as dust," and was then thrown into the brook. Nothing is there said about the Israelites drinking it.

Aaron was a most cowardly traitor when in charge of the people. He encouraged them to idolatry, and when questioned by Moses he laid all the blame on the Jews. His excuse for the manufacture of the calf is really charming. "I said unto them, Whosoever hath any gold, let them break it off. So they gave it me; then I cast it into the fire, and there came out this calf." After this, Moses, whose anger had waxed hot, collected the men of the tribe of Levi, who had been equally guilty with their brethren in the worship of the calf, and set them to slaughter every man his brother, his companion, and his neighbour. In this slaughter there fell, according to our version, 3,000 men; but according to the Douay, 23,000 men were slain. It is doubtful whether the author of 1 Corinthians, chap. x., v. 8, refers to this or to Numbers,

* See Exode, p. 151.

chap. xxv., for the reference agrees with neither. Whichever version is right, it is evident that Aaron, who deserved the most punishment, escaped scot-free. The Lord's vengeance was not satisfied with even this terrible sacrifice of human life; and we are told, in the phraseology of our orthodox version of the Bible, that "the Lord plagued the people because *they made* the calf which *Aaron made*."

Verses 32 and 33.—"Yet now, if thou wilt forgive their sin—; and if not, blot me, I pray thee, out of thy book which thou hast written. And the Lord said unto Moses, Whosoever hath sinned against me, him will I blot out of my book." Cahen says that it is an Israelitish tradition that God kept in heaven a register of all the living, and that if a name was effaced, the person died (see Psalms, chap. lxix., v. 28; chap. cxxxix., v. 16; Isaiah, chap. iv., v. 3).

Chap. xxxiii., vv. 1 to 3, and chap. xxxiv., v. 11.—Judea was not a land flowing with milk and honey, nor did the Lord perform his oath. He did not secure Canaan to the seed of Abraham, nor drive out the Canaanite and the other nations mentioned (*vide* Joshua, chap. xvii., vv. 12 and 13; Judges, chap. i., vv. 19, and 27 to 35; chap. ii., vv. 20 to 23, and chap. iii., vv. 1 to 6).

In verse 2, after Perizzite, the Septuagint and Samaritan, add "the Gergashites." "I will not go up in the midst of thee: for thou art a stiff-necked people: lest I consume thee in the way." This phrase from the mouth of an immutable Deity would be impossible. The person who wrote it regarded it as possible that, if God actually went with the Jews in presence in their journeying to the promised land, he might lose his temper at the sight of their shortcomings and destroy them; to obviate the possibility of an event so lamentable, God, the omnipotent, who is always everywhere, determines to keep away from the Jews, and sends an angel as his deputy.

Verses 4, 5, and 6.—Why did the Lord want the children of Israel to put off their ornaments? If this were narrated in any other book than the Bible some shrewd Christians would shake their heads and say, We are afraid Moses and Aaron were not quite honest—first, Aaron induces the people to bring him their gold earrings under

the pretext that he would make them a God, and now Moses deprives the people of their remaining trinkets, under the pretence that the Lord commands them to put them off. It must not be forgotten that many of these jewels, earrings, and other trinkets must have been actually obtained by the Israelites from the Egyptians, in accordance with the command of Moses given previous to the Exodus.

Verses 9 and 10.—This "pillar of cloud" is a favourite shape, and if the whole were an imposture, it would have been an easy matter for Moses by artificial means to have raised a "pillar of cloud" when he pleased, especially as such precautions were taken to prevent too close an examination by the Israelites.

Verse 11.—Apart from the question of contradiction (which has been noticed on page 271), is not this verse condemned by itself? The purpose and meaning of the language used is to raise Moses in the estimation of the Israelites, and to effect this object it degrades the Deity by the very terms used; the conversation contained in verses 12 to 20 has all the same tendency, making it appear that Moses was God's favourite, and that God *knew his name.* The "young man" Joshua was, according to Cahen, about 56 years old.

In verse 13, instead of "show me thy way," the Douay has "show me thy face;" this accounts for the expression in v. 20, "Thou canst not see my face," but it distinctly contradicts the "face to face" of verse 11.

Verse 14.—"My presence shall go with thee, and I will give thee rest." Cahen reads, "*mon indignation se calmera et je te serai favorable.*"

Verse 15.—"If thy presence go not with me, carry us not up hence." Cahen, "*Si ton indignation ne se calme pas, ne nous fais pas monter d'ici.*" The Douay, "If thou thyself dost not go before, bring us not out of this place."

Verse 23.—"And I will take away mine hand, and thou shalt see my back parts; but my face shall not be seen." Who can read this verse thoughtfully, and yet be filled with awe and admiration for a Deity, who only allows his favoured Prophet to see his "back parts." The absurdity is heightened by the remembrance of the many distinct

appearances of God to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, the view accorded shortly before to Moses himself, and seventy-three other persons who all saw God in the mount, and last, not least, the coming face to face with God noticed in verse 11.

Cahen says, "In speaking of the infinite, absolute, and immaterial Being, man is compelled to use terms which recall finite, contingent, and material objects. These kinds of figures, which are continually made use of in metaphysics, often throw upon this science a certain obscurity which is met with even in the works, written by our contemporaries in our mother tongue; how much more profound must this obscurity be when the writer makes use of a language which, seven centuries before the vulgar era, had been then for a long time dead, and the grammar of which does not date higher than the age of Charlemagne? We leave them to each the liberty of seeking in this phrase a metaphysical sense."

The Douay, in a foot note, says, "The Lord by his Angel, usually spoke to Moses in the pillar of the cloud; so that he could not see the glory of him that spoke familiarly with him. In the vision here mentioned, he was allowed to see something of him, in an assumed corporeal form: *not in the face, the rays of which were too bright for mortal eye to bear*, but to view him as it were behind, when his face was turned from him." The eleventh verse, unhappily for the recipients of the Douay, is directly in opposition to this. The Palestine Targum, on verse 22, makes Moses overshadowed by the Memra, until the glory of the Shekinah had passed by. This Memra is a sort of God in a second personality, and, Etheridge says, is probably identical with the "word" in the Gospel of St. John.*

Chapter xxxiv.—The reader finds again in this verse the temporary localisation of God on the top of the mountain where Moses goes to him for, at least, the third time, and fasts there for a third period of forty days, neither eating bread nor drinking water. While verse 1 says that

* Targums on the Pentateuch, p. 15.

the Lord will re-write the Decalogue on the two tables of stone, verse 20 says that it was Moses who actually did write the second edition of the Ten Commandments.

Verse 6.—The Lord "proclaimed." The Douay puts the words in the mouth of Moses, "The Lord God merciful and gracious." When, where, and how was this mercy, graciousness, and long suffering on the part of the God of the Bible manifested? Was it when condemning the first man and woman falling into the divinely baited trap, and cursing the very ground on which they stood (Genesis, chap. iii.); or when he determined to destroy not only man whom he was tired of striving to make better, but also the beast, and the creeping thing, and the fowls of the air (Genesis, chap. vi., v. 7); or was it when he rained brimstone and fire upon Sodom and Gomorrah (Genesis, chap. xix., v. 24); or when, having himself hardened Pharaoh's heart, so that he should not let the children of Israel go, he slew the firstborn in every family throughout Egypt in order to procure Israel's deliverance (Exodus, chap. xii., v. 29); or when he drowned all Pharaoh's army in the Red Sea (Exodus, chap. xiv., v. 27); or was it when he, the great creator, swore to have war with Amalek from generation to generation (Exodus, chap. xvii., v. 16)—that is, where was the mercy and graciousness of the destroyer who pre-doomed to misery the unfortunate race whom he must create in order that they should suffer; or when he killed Nadab and Abihu with fire (Leviticus, chap. x., v. 2); or when he repeatedly attached the penalty of death to the infringement of almost any article of the ceremonial law; or when his fire consumed the people because they complained (Numbers, chap. xi. v. 1); or when he smote them with a great plague (verse 33); or when he ordered the man to be stoned to death who was found gathering sticks on the Sabbath (Numbers, chap. xv. v. 36); or when he enjoined his people to be pitiless against all heretics (Deut. c. xiii., v. 6); or was it when he caused the earth to swallow Korah, Dathan, and Abiram, and all that appertained to them, and afterwards slew 250 more by fire, and 14,700 more by plague (Numbers, chap. xvi., vv. 31 to 35, and 49); or when he sent fiery serpents to

bite his people, so that they died (Numbers, chap. xxi., v. 6); or when he sent the plague, and killed 24,000 of his people (Numbers, chap. xxv., v. 9); or when he directed the terrible slaughter of the Midianites (Numbers, chap. xxxi.); or when he gave general injunctions for the pillage and slaughter to extermination of all peoples who did not consent to serfdom (Deut. c. xx., x. 40).

Verse 11.—After "Hivites," the Samaritan and Septuagint add "the Gergushites."

Verse 14.—"The Lord, whose name is jealous, is a jealous God." Kalisch renders "jealous," "zealous," but there does not seem sufficient ground for his change. According to an ordinary dictionary, to be jealous is to be "suspiciously viligant," "suspiciously fearful." The omniscient, omnipotent, immutable, and infinite Deity, of what can he be jealous? Perhaps this phrase might be considered figurative, were it not that we do find in the Bible narrative considerable evidences of this jealousy operating in God's transactions with his people.

Verses 29, 30, 35.—The Douay says that after Moses had talked to the Lord, his face was horned, and that the children of Israel, seeing the horns, were afraid to come near him. The Douay strictly follows the Vulgate, "*quod cornuta esset facies sua.*" Cahen says the word קרן, KeReN, signifies "ray" or "horn," from which, he says, is derived the singular idea of representing Moses with a horned face. This "horned" face is one of the many points of resemblance found in the stories of Moses and Bacchus.* In our own authorised version, this very word KeReN is translated "horn" in Exodus, c. xxvii., v. 2.

Chap. xxxv., vv. 1 and 2 give a third repetition of the prohibition of Saturday, with a second repetition of the threat of death as a penalty for disobedience. The command to "kindle no fire" on the Sunday has been much discussed by the Jewish writers.

We extract the following from Cahen on this subject:—"Rosenmüller, according to Michaëlis, declares that this

* See article "Bacchus," Voltaire's "Philosophical Dictionary," and Parkhurst's "Hebrew Lexicon," p. 659.

law (as also several others established by Moses) was suitable to Palestine and not to all countries. In hot countries, the supper is the principal meal. The Jews, who reckoned the day from one evening to the next, prepared and took this meal on the sixth day, a little before the commencement of the Sabbath, and they lit a fire when the Sabbath was ended, to prepare the supper of that day. It does not appear that this law forbade them to light a fire in order to keep away the cold." Rosenmüller adds, "It is shown sufficiently by this prohibition that the Mosaic Code was not established for every nation, nor for every country." The Talmudist and the Caraïtes have not always understood it thus; these extend the rigour of the prohibition to a much higher degree. One of their chiefs, Eli Bechizi, in the fifteenth century, attempted to bring back his people to more reasonable ideas: but a Caraïte doctor, named Abrahame Babi, in a work entitled, "*Aisur ger Shebeth*" (prohibition to light a fire on the Sabbath), supported the most rigorous sabbatical observance. Aben Ezra says that the Rabbi Saaiah has composed an excellent treatise upon the same subject. Though the prohibition to light a fire on the Sabbath would appear to relate to some custom which the author had in view, and which is unknown to us, the supposition of Michaëlis is presented without proof, and appears to us difficult of admission. The prohibition to light a fire is absolute. The Caraïtes appear to have followed the law more closely than the Talmudists; the first do not allow the fire to be lighted by a non-Israelite; and certainly nothing will justify us in causing to be done by another what we are forbidden to do ourselves.* The Septuagint finishes this verse with these words, "I, the Eternal"—(*ego, Kyrios*).

Verse 28.—Aben Ezra, says Cahen, expresses his astonishment that the Rulers had still preserved oil to burn after several months absence from Egypt. There are many differences in this chapter between the text of the Septuagint and our version; in the Vatican copy of the Septuagint, verse 8 is entirely omitted. There are also many verbal differences of translation between the

* Exode, p. 162.

authorised version and the Douay; we select one verse as an illustration. Our version has in verse 26, "And all the women, whose heart stirred them up in wisdom, spun goats' hair." The Douay has, "And goats' hair giving all of their own accord."

Chap. xxxvi., v. 3.—"And they received of Moses all the offering which the children of Israel had brought for the work of the service of the sanctuary, to make it withal. And they brought yet unto him free-offerings every morning." The Douay reads, "He delivered all the offerings of the children of Israel unto them. And while they were earnest about the work, the people daily in the morning offered their vows."

Verse 4.—"Gramberg," says Cahen, "is astonished that so many skilled workmen were found in the desert amongst a people, who, in their greatest posterity under Solomon, were unable to find one good carpenter."

Verse 7.—From this verse to the end of the chapter xxxix., the difference between the Hebrew text and that of the Septuagint is so great, and the transposition of phrases so frequent, that the latter version is contained without being divided into verses—it being impossible to make them correspond.

Verses 20 to 30.—Colenso, who identifies the shittim wood with the acacia, quotes from Canon Stanley the statement that not a single tree of this description can now be seen in the region where the building of the tabernacle is supposed to have taken place. There are very many differences between the Douay version and our own; in this chapter, and in c. xxxvii. and c. xxxviii., in the description of the curtain hangings and fittings of the Tabernacle, words and phrases appearing in the one which are not found in the other. To repeat the whole of these variations here would be tiresome to the reader.

Chap. xxxviii., v. 8.—"The looking glasses of the women assembling." Kalisch says, "The looking glasses of the women who served." The Douay has, "The mirrors of the women that watched." Cahen regards this as probably borrowed from the Egyptians, whose women, he says, were accustomed to enter the tabernacle with a mirror in the left-hand.

Verse 25.—The words "after the shekel of the sanctuary," are not in the Samaritan version.

Verse 26.—In his note to this verse, Cahen raises the question since amplified by Colenso in his comment on chap. xxx., v. 11—viz., that the numbers given are the numbers of the census, although the census did not take place until a later period.*

Verse 29.—Cahen calculates the value of the metals used in the Tabernacle at about 3,000,000 francs.

Chap. xxxix., vv. 10 and 11.—Our version puts a carbuncle in the first row and an emerald in the second. The Douay says, the emerald was in the first and the carbuncle in the second row. Kalisch puts both the carbuncle and emerald in the second row, inserting a cornelian and a smaragd in the first. In the second row, the Douay has "a jasper" instead of a diamond. This "jasper" is put by our version in the fourth row, where the Douay and Kalisch have "a chrysolite."

Verses 15 to 21 are so different in the Douay from what they are in our version, that it is really difficult to imagine the two versions as translations from the same Hebrew original.

Verse 21.—In the Samaritan version, it is added that "they made the Urim and Thummim, as God had commanded Moses."

Chap. xl., v. 7 and 8 are altogether wanting in the Septuagint version.

Verse 17.—After the word "month," the Septuagint and Samaritan add "from their departure from Egypt."

Verse 38.—Cahen remarks that "the writer of Exodus has made use of five words to denote the tabernacle—1 residence; 2nd, tent; 3rd, the holy; 4th, tent of meeting or assembly; 5th, residence tent of assembly. We notice in the tabernacle—1st, the ark or chest with the cover and the cherubim; 2nd, the table with the show bread; 3rd, the golden candlestick; 4th, the court of the tabernacle, with an altar of incense, and an altar of sacrifice, and a basin of brass. Of all these objects, we find little mentioned in times posterior to Moses of any save

* Exode, p. 175.

the ark. We do not know what became of the tabernacle under the government of the Schophtime (Judges). The greatest likeness exists between the construction of the tabernacle and that of the temple of Solomon. According to the systematic ideas which Gramberg has formed upon the composition of the books of the Old Testament, he thinks that the conception of the tabernacle is posterior to the building of the temple. ('Critical History of the Religious Ideas of the Old Testament,' tome 1, p. 15, Berlin, 1829). This bold conjecture, which we do not pretend to adopt, we submit to the consideration and examination of archæologists and men of an independent mind."

De Wette, in a note on chap. xxxv. to c. xl., says,* "Chap. xxxv., vv. 1 to 3 seems misplaced, and so does xli. 36-38, which does not seem to be contemporary with the erection of the tabernacle. These accounts of the tabernacle present some important peculiarities. In Exodus xxv., Moses is commanded to make the tabernacle and its furniture after a certain pattern. A minute description is given of the furniture to be made for it, of the dresses of the priests and the form of consecration, and two men are said to be inspired to perform the work. Next (xxxiii. 7 and 9) it seems, the tabernacle is finished. It is named the 'tabernacle of assembly.' The people flock to it to seek Jehovah. Moses entered, and a cloud stood at the door of it. But *after this* (chap. xxxv., *sq.*), Moses requests contributions for building the tabernacle. They were brought; the tabernacle is made; it is called the 'tabernacle of the assembly;' and the cloud descends upon it. But Moses was not able to enter it." In concluding the commentary on Exodus, we cannot avoid asking what is the fair result of our labours, and it certainly seems undeniable that the volume fails in commanding respect either as a history of the Exodus of the Jews from Egypt or as a legislative code. Examined as historical narrative, the volume is found incoherent and contradicted by other portions of the Pentateuch. Tested as a code of laws, many of the enactments are cruel and brutal, some of them are puerile, and others are contradicted in other books of the Bible. Read

* On the Old Testament, Vol, II., p. 114.

as a revelation from a Deity, the picture given of God as vacillating, uncertain, and vindictive is, by no means, a portraiture to command our love. Exodus cannot be a revelation from God, taking the ordinary theistic definition of Deity; it pictures an all-wise God choosing a man, with an impediment in his speech, to be a preacher, and declares that when the man hesitated on account of his natural infirmity, God became angry at a difficulty, the existence of which he not only well knew that Moses could not help, but which must have been of his own creation. It represents a just God as seeking to kill (apparently without the slightest efficient cause) the very man whom he had just entrusted with the important mission of releasing his chosen people from bondage; it speaks of an invisible God as becoming visible; of an immutable God as changing his purposes; of a loving and merciful Creator and father declaring war against unborn generations of his own creatures and children; of a just God as punishing the people for following the advice of the priest whom he had sanctified and appointed, and yet allowing the criminal priest not only to escape unpunished, but actually rewarded for the very misconduct for which God plagued his people. It pictures a merciful and good God as tormenting and murdering the Egyptians, solely for the purpose of convincing the Jews that he is really the Lord God of Israel, and afterwards plagueing and slaughtering those very Israelites, because all the former cruelties practised on their neighbours had not produced sufficient convincing effect on them. It teaches monotheism in one verse, and yet leaves polytheism the only fair inference from another.

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ITS AUTHORSHIP AND AUTHENTICITY.

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LEVITICUS:

ITS AUTHENTICITY AND CREDIBILITY.

The word, ויקרא, UIQRA, "and he called," which is the first word in the Hebrew of this third book of the Bible, forms its title amongst the Jews. The words "third book of Moses" do not exist either in the Hebrew, Greek, or Vulgate. Cahen says—"The Greeks and Latins have called it Leviticus, because it treats of all that relates to the service of the Levites or those holding priestly offices, of the sacrifices, of the perpetual fire, of the separation, of the leprous, of purification, of expiation, of the feasts, of the worship, &c. It is for this reason that the Rabbis call this book, TURe*T*h KENIM, תורת כהנים, doctrine of the priests, and תורת הקרבנות, doctrine of oblations. The partiality with which the matters relating to sacrifices are treated, shows evidently that the author of Leviticus belonged to the sacerdotal caste. We find in this third part of the Pentateuch more development, more method in its explanations than in the four other parts. It is almost totally consecrated to the services exercised by the tribe of Levi. Gramberg places the composition of this book in the fourth period, commencing at the Babylonian captivity." The sacrifices and priestly rites ordered in Leviticus, and the other books of the Pentateuch, are not peculiar to the Jews; most of them are derived from Egypt, and nearly all nations have made usage of sacrifice to their Gods as a means of propitiation. The sacrifices here ordered are divided by Etheridge* into two classes,

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* Targums on Leviticus.

expiatory and eucharistic—that is, sin offerings and praise offerings. Dr. John Pye Smith* defines sacrifice as "a solemn act of religion in which the life of a living creature is taken away as an acknowledgment of sin on the part of the offerer, with the expectation of obtaining a remission of the penal suffering thus confessed to be merited from God to whom the sacrifice is presented." Admitting only for the sake of argument the sin committed by man against God and the punishment deserved, the doctrine of sacrifice is, that God must have somebody or something on whom or which he can inflict the punishment, which ought but for the sacrifice to fall on the sinner—mercy is left out, the appetite for vengeance must be appeased in some manner.

Etheridge, in speaking of the two classes into which he divides the sacrifices, says—"The first class (expiatory) includes the sacrifices proper. In them the life of the victim was offered for the life of the sinner, and its blood was shed as an atonement for guilt. These peculiar sacrifices were of three kinds:—1. The Olah, Kalil, or 'whole burnt offering,' because wholly consumed, and sent up, by the action of fire, in the flame and smoke of the altar. Olah comes from Alah, 'to ascend;' lxx. *olokautoma*, 'holocaust,' a term which refers to the entire consumption of the victim. 2. The Chataah, or 'sin offering,' the same word signifying 'sin' (Sept. *amartia—i.e., peri amartias*). 3. The Asham, or 'trespass offering' from Ashmah, 'to be guilty;' Sept. *Thusia soteriou*, 'the sacrifice of salvation;' Vulg., *hostia pro delicto;* Sept., *peri plemmeleias.* While the difference between sin and trespass offerings is textually marked in the Levitical law, the distinction between the offences for which they were offered is not so clearly given. Some think that 'sins,' in the technical phraseology of the ceremonial law, are violations of prohibitory statutes—*i.e.*, doing something which the law forbids to do. 'Trespasses,' on the other hand, are violations of imperative statutes—*i.e.*, neglecting to do those things which are commanded. These piacular sacrifices are sometimes called kippurim—lxx. *Katharismoi*, 'expiations or atonements.' On the

* First lines of Christian Theology, p. 528.

question about the manner in which they were expiatory, or on the real relation between their presentation and the forgiveness of sin, there are two opposite doctrines.

"1. There was that in the nature of the sacrifice itself which could efficaciously atone for sin. But the divines who take this view are not agreed as to the principle upon which the offerings became expiative. *a.* Some have thought that the virtue of the sacrifice consisted in this—that a certain material possession was given up by the offerer for the sake of gaining a spiritual blessing. *b.* Others consider the sacrifice in the light of a fine, by the payment of which the offender is set right with his judge; while (*c.*) others holding that evil rests in that which is material or sensual, and regarding blood as the representation of the sensual or evil principle, see in the shedding and presentation of blood at the altar a physical atonement for moral evil or sin. *d.* Yet in direct opposition to this theory, another opinion considers the vital blood to have been propitiatory because it was pure, and represented the acknowledgment of the offerer's obligation to have been himself pure, and his desire to become so.

"2. The second doctrine is, that the Mosaic sacrifices had not, nor could have, any intrinsic or atoning power in themselves; but derived their value from their having been divinely appointed as means to lead the mind of the offerer to a real expiation of which they were the symbols. They were types of the atoning sacrifice of the lamb of God who taketh away the sin of the world."

As to *a*, it may be replied (1) that the Jews did not look for spiritual blessings. Their pleasures and pains, punishments and rewards, were all for this life; the loss of life is the most severe punishment threatened. 2. That to imagine that a man, who has a cow or a sheep to roast, may procure a spiritual blessing which is withheld from the poorer sinner, who lacks the means of this propitiating Deity, is hardly consonant with the modern theistic doctrine of an all-good, all-just, and all-merciful God. The same argument applies to *b*. The doctrine of physical atonement by the offering of the life of any man or brute for man's sin, seems so monstrously cruel and cowardly,

that it would hardly require further notice were it not that it is this doctrine which forms the base of New Testament Christianity. We object to the whole theory of expiatory sacrifice, either as contained in the Pentateuch or as afterwards taught in the New Testament, as unreasonable, degrading, and debasing. It is scarcely curious that the Levites, who shared with God the sacrifice, should promulgate the law which directs that only first-class cattle, goats and birds, and the best fruits and flour, shall be offered. The writer of Cozri* says that, judging each sacrifice in itself, it would be difficult to imagine it agreeable to God: for the priest is quite as much an executioner as a minister of the altar. For example, in slaughtering a lamb, the priest is stained with blood, he skins the lamb, washes its entrails, washes it, he cuts the lamb in pieces, sprinkles the blood, arranges the wood, lights the fire, carries away the refuse, offal, &c. If it were not, says the Cozri, for the order of God, the priest would refuse entirely such disgusting and menial duties.

Colenso says†—"The Book of Leviticus is chiefly occupied in giving directions to the priests for the proper discharge of the different duties of their office, and further directions are given in the Book of Numbers.

"1. In the case of every burnt offering which any man shall offer, whether bullock, or sheep, or goat, or turtle dove, the priests, Aaron's sons, shall sprinkle the blood upon the altar, and put fire upon the altar, and lay the wood in order on the fire, and lay the parts, the head and the fat in order upon the wood; 'and the priest shall burn all on the altar to be a burnt sacrifice.'

"2. So in the case of a meat offering, peace offering, sin offering, or trespass offering, the priest has special duties assigned to him as before.

"3. Every woman, after child-birth, is to bring a lamb for a burnt offering, and a pigeon or turtle-dove for a sin offering, or two young pigeons for the two offerings, and the priest is to officiate as before (*L.* xii).

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* Cahen, Levitique, p. 33.

† Pentateuch, Part I., p. 122.

"4. Every case of leprosy is to be brought again and again to the priest, and carefully inspected by him till it is cured (L. xiii).

"5. Any one cured of leprosy is to bring a burnt offering and a sin offering, and the priest is to officiate as before (L. xiv).

"6. For certain ceremonial pollutions which are specified, the priest is to offer sacrifice (L. xv. 15, 30).

"7. For a male or female Nazarite, when the days of separation are fulfilled, the priest is to offer a burnt offering, a sin offering, and a peace offering (N. vi).

"8. Every day, morning and evening, the priest is to offer a lamb for a continual burnt offering, besides additional sacrifices on the Sabbath, the New Moon, at the feast of unleavened bread, and at the feast of the first fruits (N. xxviii).

"9. In the seventh month for several days together, besides the daily sacrifice, there were to be extraordinary additional sacrifices, so that, on the fifteenth day of the month, the priest was to offer 13 bullocks, 2 rams, and 14 lambs; and in the seven days, from the fifteenth to the twenty-first, 70 bullocks, 14 rams, and 98 lambs (N. xxix).

"10. Lastly, if it should be thought that the above sacrificial system was not meant to be in full operation in the wilderness, we may call attention to the frequent references made in the enunciation of these laws to the camp (L. iv. 12, 21, vi. 11, xiii. 46, xiv. 3, 8), as well as to the words of the prophet Amos, v. 25—'Have ye offered unto me sacrifices and offerings in the wilderness forty years, O House of Israel?' which show that, in the Prophet's view, at all events, such sacrifices were required and expected of them.

"And now let us ask for all these multifarious duties during the forty years' sojourn in the wilderness, for all the burnt offerings, meat offerings, peace offerings, sin offerings, trespass offerings, thank offerings, &c., of a population like that of the City of London, besides the daily and extraordinary sacrifices, how many priests were there? The answer is very simple. There were only three—Aaron (till his death) and his two sons, Eleazar and Ithamar.

"And it is laid down very solemnly in N. iii. 10—'Thou shalt appoint Aaron and his sons, and they shall wait in the priest's office; and *the stranger that cometh nigh shall be put to death.*'

"Yet how was it possible that these two or three men should have discharged all these duties for such a vast multitude? The single work of offering the double sacrifice for women after child-birth must have utterly overpowered three priests, though engaged without cessation from morning to night. The births among two millions of people may be reckoned as, at least, 250 a-day, for which, consequently, 500 sacrifices (250 burnt offerings and 250 sin offerings) would have had to be offered daily. Looking at the directions in L. i., iv., we can scarcely allow less than *five minutes* for each sacrifice; so that these sacrifices alone, if offered separately, would have taken 2,500 minutes, or nearly 42 hours, and could not have been offered in a single day of twelve hours, though each of the three priests had been employed in the one sole incessant labour of offering them without a moment's rest or intermission.

"It may, perhaps, be said that *many* such sacrifices might have been offered at the same time. This is surely somewhat contrary to the notion of a sacrifice as derived from the Book of Leviticus; nor is there the slightest intimation, in the whole Pentateuch, of any such heaping together of sacrifices; and it must be borne in mind that there was but *one* altar, five cubits (about 9ft.) square (E. xxvii. 1), at which we have already supposed all the three priests to be officiating at the same moment, actually offering, therefore, upon the altar *three* sacrifices *at once*, of which the burnt offerings would, except in the case of poor women (L. xii. 8), be *lambs* and not pigeons. But then we must ask further where could they have obtained these 250 'turtle doves or young pigeons' daily, that is, 90,000 annually in *the wilderness?* There *might* be *two* offered for each birth; there *must*, according to the law, be *one* (L. xii. 6, 8). Did the people, then, carry with them *turtle doves* and *young pigeons* out of Egypt, when they fled in such haste and so heavily laden, and as yet knew nothing of any such law? Or how could they have had them at all under Sinai? It

cannot be said that the laws, which require the sacrifice of such birds, were intended only to suit the circumstances of a later time, when the people should be finally settled in the land of Canaan.

"In fact, we have one of these commands, manifestly referring to their life in the wilderness (L. xiv), where after it has been ordered that the priest shall go out of the camp to look at the leper (v. 3), and that the leper duly cleansed shall 'after that come into the camp and shall tarry abroad out of his *tent* seven days' (v. 8), and on the eighth day, shall offer 'two he lambs and one ewe lamb,' &c. (v. 10), it is added, v. 21, 'and if he be *poor* and cannot get so much, then he shall take one lamb, &c., and *two turtle-doves* or *two young pigeons*, such as he is able to get.'

"Here the 'turtle doves or young pigeons' are prescribed as a lighter and easier offering for the poor to bring; they are spoken of, therefore, as being *in abundance*, as being within the reach of every one in the wilderness under Sinai! It would seem to follow that such laws as these could not have been written by Moses, but must have been composed at a later age, when the people were already settled in Canaan, and the poor, who could not afford a lamb, could easily provide themselves with pigeons. In the desert, it would have been equally impossible for rich or poor to procure them."

Chap. i., v. 1.—"And the Lord called unto Moses, and spake unto him out of the tabernacle of the congregation, saying." The Douay, following the Vulgate, says, "Out of the tabernacle of the testimony." Cahen calls it, "*De la tente d'assignation.*" It is evident that the writer of Leviticus has in his mind located the God of the Jews in the tabernacle. Following Exodus, c. xxv., v. 22, it is the national Deity, the God of the Jews who gives these commands.

Verse 3.—The Douay reads—"If his offering be a holocaust" (the Septuagint, *olokautoma*, that which is burned entirely) "and of the herd, he shall offer a male without blemish at the door of the testimony *to make the Lord favourable to him.*" It will be perceived that the words italicised are not contained in our version at all. Cahen

has "to obtain grace before the Lord." The holocaust, or whole burnt offering, is so called because the whole victim was consumed with fire, and ascended, as we are told in verse 9, "with a sweet savour to the Lord." What elevated conceptions of the Deity are here conveyed; an infinite God, whose favour is granted to the man who offers the most sheep or oxen; a just and immutable God, to whom the sweet savour of roast mutton is an acceptable expiatory equivalent on behalf of a murderer, a robber, or other criminal.

Verse 7.—The Douay says the wood is to be put in *before* the fire; our version that the fire is to go *first*, and the wood to be laid upon it.

Verses 9, 13, and 17.—"A sweet savour unto the Lord" (see Genesis, pages 74 and 75). The author of these verses evidently regards the sweet savour of the sacrifice as a feature pleasant to the immutable Deity.

Verse 15.—"Wring off his head and burn it on the altar." The Douay has "twisting back the neck and breaking the place of the wound."

Chap. ii. v. 3.—"And the remnant of the meat-offering shall be Aaron's and his sons';* it is a thing most holy of the offerings of the Lord made by fire." And see also verse 10 in the same words. The priests are not neglected in this revelation. Care is taken that the flour shall be fine and the meat without blemish.

Verse 11.—"No meat-offering which ye shall bring unto the Lord shall be made with leaven; for ye shall burn no leaven, nor any honey, in any offering of the Lord made by fire." Leaven is that which will cause fermentation in the mass to which it is applied. Cahen says this prohibition of leaven in the sacrifice is common to all ancient nations. Aben Ezra regards honey as a leaven. In the foot-note to the Douay we are told that "No leaven nor honey was to be used to signify that we excluded all *double dealing and affection to carnal pleasures!*

Verse 12.—"As for the oblation of the first-fruits, ye

* After the word "sons" in each of the above verses the Douay has instead of the concluding words, "holy of holies of the offerings of the Lord."

shall offer them unto the Lord." And verse 14 (see Genesis, page 50). Cain's offering of first-fruits was rejected.

Verse 13.—"And every oblation of thy meat-offering shalt thou season with salt; neither shalt thou suffer the salt of the covenant of thy God to be lacking from thy meat-offering; with all thine offerings thou shalt offer salt." Without salt the sacrifice would be incomplete. Was not the salt rather required by the priests than by God? It is easy to understand why a man wishes for salt to season his meat if the meat be intended for food, but it is not so easy to comprehend the same requisition on the part of a God. The Douay says that salt is an emblem of wisdom, without which none of our performances are agreeable to God.

The words "meat offering" used throughout this chapter in our version are misleading. The Hebrew is מנחה MeNChE, and denotes "a bloodless offering."

Chap. iv. vv. 11 and 12.—"And the skin of the bullock, and all his flesh, with his head, and with his legs, and his inwards, and his dung, even the whole bullock shall he (the priest) carry forth without the camp unto a clean place, where the ashes are poured out, and burn him on the wood with fire: where the ashes are poured out there shall he be burnt." (See also chaps. vi., x., xi.) Colenso says,* "The whole population of Israel at the exodus may be reckoned at two millions." Now, we cannot well allow for a *living* man, with room for his cooking, sleeping, and other necessaries and conveniences of life, less than three or four times the space required for a *dead* one in his grave. And even then the different ages and sexes would be very disagreeably crowded together. Let us allow, however, for each person on the average three times six feet by two feet, the size of a coffin for a full-grown man—that is, let us allow for each person thirty-six square feet, or four square yards. Then it follows that for two millions of people, without making any allowance for the tabernacle itself and its court, and the 44,000 Levites, male and female (Numbers, iii. 39), who pitched round about it (Numbers,

* Pentateuch, part i. p. 38.

i. 53), the camp must have covered—the people being crowded as thickly as possible—an area of 8,000,000 square yards, or more than 1,652 acres of ground.

"Upon this very moderate estimate, then (which, in truth, is far within the mark), we must imagine a vast encampment of this extent, swarming with people, more than *a mile and a-half* across in each direction, with the tabernacle in the centre; and so says Josephus, Ant., iii. 12, 5: —It was like a well-appointed market; and everything was there ready for sale in due order; and all sorts of artificers were in the shops; and it resembled nothing so much as a city that sometimes was moveable and sometimes was fixed.

"Thus the refuse of these sacrifices would have had to be carried by the priest himself (Aaron, Eleazar, or Ishamar —there were no others) to a distance of three quarters of a mile. From the outside of this great camp wood and water would have had to be fetched for all purposes, if, indeed, such supplies of wood or water for the wants of such a multitude as this could have been found at all in the wilderness—under Sinai, for instance, where they are said to have encamped for nearly twelve months together. How much wood would remain in such a neighbourhood after a month's consumption of the city of London even at midsummer? And the "ashes" of the whole camp, with the rubbish and filth of every kind, for a population like that of London, would have had to be carried out in like manner through the midst of the crowded mass of people. They could not surely all have gone outside the camp for the necessities of nature as commanded in Deut. xxiii. 12-14. There were the aged and infirm women in childbirth, sick persons, and young children who could not have done this. And, indeed, the command itself supposes the person to have a "paddle" upon his "weapon," and, therefore, must be understood to apply only to the *males*, or rather only to the 600,000 *warriors*. But the very fact that this direction for ensuring cleanliness—"For Jehovah thy God walketh in the midst of thy camp; therefore shall thy camp be holy: that he see no unclean thing in thee, and turn away from thee"—would have been so limited in its application, is

itself a very convincing proof of the unhistorical character of the whole narrative.

"But how huge does this difficulty become, if, instead of taking the excessively cramped area of 1,652 acres, less than *three square miles*, for such a camp as this, we take the more reasonable allowance of Scott, who says, "This encampment is computed to have formed a moveable city of *twelve miles square*—that is, about the size of London itself, as it might well be, considering that the population was as large as that of London, and that in the Hebrew tents there were no first, second, third, and fourth stories, no crowded garrets and underground cellars. In that case the offal of these sacrifices would have had to be carried by Aaron himself or one of his sons a distance of six miles; and the same difficulty would have attended each of the other transactions above mentioned. In fact we have to imagine the priest having himself to carry on his back on foot from St. Paul's to the outskirts of the metropolis the 'skin and flesh, and head and legs, and inwards, and dung, even the whole bullock,' and the people having to carry out their rubbish in like manner, and bring in their daily supplies of water and fuel, after first cutting down the latter where they could find it! Further, we have to imagine half-a-million of men going out daily, the 22,000 Levites, for a distance of *six miles* to the suburbs, for the common necessities of nature! The supposition involves, of course, an absurdity. But it is our duty to look plain facts in the face."

Dr. M'Caul's reply to this is very feeble. He suggests that the priests were not personally to do the work, but the whole tenor of Leviticus is to the contrary,* and, as Colenso very fairly says, whoever had to do it, the difficulty would still remain.

Chap. v., v. 1.—"And if a soul sin, and hear the voice of swearing, and is a witness, whether he hath seen or known of it; if he do not utter it, then he shall bear his iniquity." Bellamy makes it—"Moreover, a soul shall surely sin if he hear the voice," &c. This verse is by no means clear; with Bellamy's improvement, it reads as if a person called

* Examination of Colenso, p. 33.

as a witness was culpable, if he refrained from stating the facts; but would this mean that the sin would be less if he stated the matter, or if he had not been called as witness? Cahen says that, amongst the Hebrews, the witness did not swear, but listened to the oath as in most cases of sworn testimony.

Verse 2.—"He also shall be unclean, and guilty." Bellamy says—"This translation strikes the reader with an impropriety. No guilt certainly can attach to a person who has not consented to the crime, the nature of which was hidden from him at the time."

Chap. v., vv. 4, 5, and 6 read somewhat differently, and are much shorter in the Douay; "make an atonement for" is rendered in the Douay, "pray for."

Verse 12.—"According to the offerings made by fire unto the Lord." Bellamy says—"In this short clause, containing only ten words, there are no less than six put into the text which have no authority in the original."

Verse 13.—"And the remnant shall be the priests," see chap. ii., v. 3. Bellamy urges that this translation is incorrect, and that the whole offering was to be for the priest. In the Hebrew, chap. v. has seven verses more, and chap. vi. seven verses less.

Chap. vi., v. 13.—This fire must have been out several times, especially since the last conquest of Jerusalem. Where is it burning at the present time? By reference to chap. ix., v. 24, and chap. x., vv. 1 and 2, it would seem either that this fire came from God himself, or that there was a special sort of fire alone approved.

"The fire shall constantly burn on the altar, and shall not be extinguished, even during the march; how? The Rabbi Jehouda says, they covered the fire with a kind of fire cover; the Rabbi Schimone says, they covered the fire with cinders." The precepts, adds the Sepher Hamivhar, commanded in the desert were for the most part only obligatory for Palestine. It was the same, it continues, with the show bread during the stay of the Israelites in the desert, where they were sustained with manna, and yet it is said: *it shall be for Aaron and his sons who shall eat it in a holy place.* The Sepher Hamivhar says also, if fire came

from heaven, what signifies "it shall not be extinguished?" Several of the ancient commentators, Jews and Christian, attributed to a miracle the continual presence of the fire upon the altar. But, says Rosenmuller, such a miracle is imaginary. The perpetual fire existed also in the temples of other peoples. The Persians not only adored fire as the image of the divinity, but they maintained it constantly on the altar. Says Quintius Curtius, liv. iii. c. 3—"They carried in front upon the altars of silver, the fire which they themselves called the sacred perpetual fire." The worship of fire, derived from that of the sun, is probably the most ancient of worships. Perhaps the fire was constantly maintained by the Hebrews upon the altar where were made the daily sacrifices, in order that the necessary fire should never fail from the negligence of the priests."*

Verse 23.—"For every meat-offering for the priest shall be wholly burnt: it shall not be eaten." Bellamy observes—"Surely there is not anything like infinite wisdom in thus wantonly destroying every day in all the tabernacles, a great portion of the best provisions in the land;" and he translates this—"Thus every bread offering of the priest shall be whole, none shall be consumed." We do not agree with Mr. Bellamy in his effort to escape from the dilemma, but it shows how reliable must be the Hebrew, if it be capable of conveying two directly opposite meanings.

Chap. vii., vv. 7 to 10.—"As the sin-offering is, so is the trespass-offering; there is one law for them; the priest that maketh atonement therewith shall have it. And the priest which offereth any man's burnt-offering, even the priest shall have to himself the skin of the burnt-offering which he hath offered. And all the meat-offering that is baked in the oven, and all that is dressed in the frying-pan and in the pan, shall be the priest's that offereth it. And every meat-offering, mingled with oil and dry, shall all the sons of Aaron have one as much as another."

Verse 34.—"For the wave breast and the heave shoulder have I taken of the children of Israel from off the sacrifices of their peace-offerings, and have given them unto

* Cahen, Levitique, p. 19.

Aaron the priest and unto his sons, by a statute for ever from among the children of Israel." Colenso says*—"These last directions are given in the story before Aaron and his sons were consecrated. Hence they must be considered as intended to apply to them, while the camp was in the Wilderness, as well as to the 'sons of Aaron' in future generations. But what an enormous provision was this for Aaron and his four, afterwards two, sons and their families! They were to have the skins of the burnt-offerings—and the shoulder and breast (that is, double breast) of the peace-offerings, of a congregation of two millions of people, for the general use of their three families! But besides these, they were to have the whole of the sin-offerings and trespass-offerings except the suet, which was to be burnt upon the altar (Leviticus iv., 31, 35; v., 6) and the whole of the meat-offerings, except a handful, to be burnt as a memorial (Leviticus ii., 2), and all this was to be eaten *only by the three males in the most holy place*" (Numbers xviii., 10)!

And it would seem that they were not at liberty to *burn* the sin-offerings, or consume them in some other way than by eating; they must be "eaten in the holy place." At all events, we find it recorded that Moses, on one occasion, "diligently sought the goat of the sin-offering, and behold, it was burnt! and he was angry with Eleazar and Ithamar, the sons of Aaron, saying, Wherefore have ye not eaten the sin-offering in the holy place, seeing it is most holy, and God hath given it you to bear the iniquity of the congregation to make atonement for them before Jehovah?" *Ye should indeed have eaten it in the holy place,* as I commanded (Leviticus x., 16—20). The very pigeons to be brought as sin-offerings for the birth of children, would have averaged, according to the story, 264 a day; and each priest would have had to eat daily 88 for his own portion "in the most holy place!" Cahen points out in a note to Numbers the utter impossibility of Aaron and his two sons alone fulfilling all the priestly duties.

Chap. vii., v. 13.—"He shall offer for his offering leavened bread." Rosenmuller says—"It may appear singular to

* Pentateuch, p. 127.

find leavened bread prescribed in this verse, while in chap. ii., v. 11, it is expressly stated that nothing shall be offered as sacrifice which has fermented.

Verses 23 to 27.—These are cruel and useless laws. The punishment of death is strangely disproportioned to the offence; and unless the law has become obsolete, we must wonder that God allows the manufacturers and consumers of articles of food, made from the blood and fat of animals, to escape unpunished in the present day. In point of fact, while Christians teach that the whole of the Bible is God's divine word, there is little of the legislation of the Pentateuch, saving the Decalogue, of which they know anything.

Chap. viii., vv. 1 to 4.—Bishop Colenso objects* that the whole of the congregation could not have been gathered to the door of the Tabernacle, but we are inclined rather to agree on this point with Dr. M'Caul's reply than with the Bishop's objection.† We think that the text does not mean that all the people were to be *within the court.* It is right to add that some of the Talmudic commentators, who ought to know the meaning of the Hebrew, take the same view as Dr. Colenso, and declare that a little space contained a great multitude. Cahen says that the passage is metaphoric, and Aben Ezra argues that it only applies to the chiefs and elders of the tribes, and Cahen refers to Numbers, chap. i., v. 16; chap. xvi., v. 2; and Joshua, chap. xxiv., v. 1. These texts, however, do not meet Colenso's argument.

Chap. viii.—The anointing of Aaron and his sons appears to have been recorded already (Exodus, chap. xl.), but this narrative is more full. To a civilised unbeliever the sprinkling blood on the tip of the right ear, the thumb of the right hand, and the great toe of the right foot, seems a farce.

Verse 35.—"Ye shall abide at the door." Bellamy observes that "it is said in the common version that during the seven days of the consecration they were to abide at the door of the tabernacle day and night. They were not to go forth (verse 33). But it must appear that this would

* Pentateuch, part i., p. 31. † M'Caul on Colenso, p. 17.

have been a very awkward place for them had they remained there for such a period, which they were not to leave day nor night. This was a thing altogether impossible, as on various occasions they must have necessarily quitted such a station."

Verse 32.—"And that which remaineth of the flesh and of the bread shall ye burn with fire." Bellamy says—"This would have been highly criminal so long as there were starving poor in every town to receive it."

Chap. ix., v. 2.—"Young calf." Bellamy remarks—"All calves are young. This is incorrect. The words בן בקר, BeN BeQeR, are omitted. They were to take a male calf, but no information of this kind is given in the common version."

Chap x., v. 1.—"Which he commanded them not." The Douay says—"Which was not commanded them." The latter translation is the most correct. There is no absolute prohibition. The story of the death of Nadab and Abihu, who had been previously admitted to God's actual presence, is a strange one. It looks as if there had been some revolt or jealousy amongst the Levites at the special selection of Aaron, Ithamar, and Eleazar. The case of Koran, Dathan, and Abiram is somewhat similar. The "fire from the Lord," which devoured the two sons of Aaron, seems to have spared their clothing (see verse 5), "in their coats," which reads in the Douay, "vested with linen tunicks." Josephus, after mentioning this death of Nadab and Abihu, says that to avoid abuse of the divine authority Moses "left it to God to be present at his sacrifices when he pleased and when he pleased to be absent."*

Verse 9.—"Do not drink wine nor strong drink, thou, nor thy sons with thee, when ye go into the tabernacle of the congregation, lest ye die; it shall be a statute for ever throughout your generations." Deut., chap. xiv., v. 26.—"And thou shalt bestow that money for whatsoever thy soul lusteth after; for oxen, or for sheep, or for wine, or for strong drink, or for whatsoever thy soul desireth; and thou shalt eat there before the Lord thy God, and thou shalt rejoice, thou, and thine household." Bellamy says—

* Antiquities, Book iii., chap. 8.

"The words 'strong drink' are altogether indefinite. Strong drink is applicable to many liquors which do not cause drunkenness. The word שכר, ShKeR, which is translated strong drink, is not a compound word; it means neither strong nor drink, but literally to satisfy, to satiate. It is applied to wine in its first state, or the juice of the grape. It means wine that is satiated—that is, the juice of the grape satiated—with fermentation, by which process the vinous spirit is produced.

Chap. xi.—It is difficult to conceive the reason why, in the list of articles fit for food, eels should be forbidden as having no scales, and classed as unclean with hares and swans, while locusts, grasshoppers, and beetles are permitted. The Douay gives entirely different names to some of the prohibited animals, from those contained in our version.

Cahen confesses that it is impossible in many cases to say what birds or animals were intended by the names given in the Hebrew. This chapter is with slight variations repeated in Deuteromy, xiv.

Verse 5.—"The coney." The Douay, following the Vulgate and the Septuagint, calls it the cherogrillus.

Verse 6.—The hare does not chew the cud; it has not the stomach of a ruminant animal.*

Verse 13.—"The eagle, the ossifrage, and the ospray;" the Breeches Bible has "goshawke" instead of "ossifrage;" the Douay has the "griffon," but adds in a foot-note, "not the monster which painters represent, which hath no being upon earth;" the Vulgate, "gryphem;" Cahen has "the eagle, the peresse, and the ozniah."

Verse 16.—"And the owl, and the night-hawk, and the cuckoo." The Douay has "the ostrich, and the owl, and the larus." The Breeches Bible, "the ostrich, the night-crow, and sea-mew." Sharpe has "the ostrich, the night-hawk, and the falcon."

Verse 18.—"And the swan, and the pelican, and the gier-eagle." The Douay has "the swan, the bittern, and the porphyrion." The Breeches Bible, "The redshanke, the pellicane, and the swanne."

* *Vide* Professor Owen in Letter of Bishop of Natal.

Verses 20 and 21.—"All fowls that creep, going upon all four, shall be an abomination unto you. Yet these may ye eat, of every flying creeping thing that goeth upon all four, which have legs above their feet, to leap withal upon the earth." Four-legged fowls and animals which have legs anywhere else than above their feet are rare. The Targum of Onkelos says "joints" instead of legs. Bellamy repudiates this translation altogether.

Verse 22.—"Even these of them ye may eat; the locust after his kind, and the bald locust after his kind, and the beetle after his kind, and the grasshopper after his kind." The Douay says, "That you shall eat as the bruchus in its kind, the attacus, and the ophiomachus, and the locust." The Breeches Bible, "The grasshopper after his kind, the solean after his kind, the hargol after his kind, and the hagab after his kind." The last three names are simply awkward attempts to anglicise the Hebrew without translating.

Chap. xii.—In translating this chapter, Cahen says that he is obliged sometimes to use Latin and to adopt periphrase, in order to avoid offending the delicacy of his readers.

Vater says that the difference of time of purification for male and female infants arose from the Jewish national prejudice, which regarded the woman as less perfect than the man.

Verse 5.—According to Dr. Jennings, the Talmudists dispute whether שבעים SheBOIM, in our version rendered two weeks, should not be 70 days.

Chap. xiii., vv. 47 and 48.—"The garment also that the plague of leprosy is in, whether it be a woollen garment or a linen garment. Whether it be in the warp or woof, of linen, or of woollen, whether in a skin, or any thing made of skin." "This," says Cahen, quoting also certain Rabbinical writers, "is not according to the order of nature any more than the plagues of the houses; it is a miracle from a special providence, for the Israelites, to turn them from evil doing, of which these evils are the chastisement. This kind of supernatural explanation amounts to declaring that one knows nothing about it. Rosenmuller says—'It is

difficult to form an idea of this kind of leprosy, even in attributing it to the wool taken from animals dead of some disease. In the skins the scurf and irruption are less extraordinary, above all when they have been badly prepared, if the hair has been left on, as is common in the East. It is extremely difficult to determine what this leprosy was, several consider it as similar to that of the body.' Moses would have thus prohibited the clothing containing the leprous poison proceeding from the living body. Nevertheless this opinion is contested. What is the necessity, asks Kebenstreit, for a special law when the leper himself was banished from all human society, and everything upon him was declared impure? Besides, more than this, the lawgiver declares equally impure the leprosy of the cloth and linen, as it may have attacked the weft and the cord, or both; he recognises also that it might happen that one part of the stuff might be attacked by the contagion, while the other remained intact. It would be difficult to say how a leprous cloth could become contagious. We cannot conceive how the same stuff could be made of different materials and more or less tainted, since it was forbidden to the Jews to have clothing of mixed linen and wool. (Leviticus xix., 19; Deuteronomy xxii., 11). The virulence of the leprosy might certainly have invaded all the clothing made of one simple texture, be it wool alone, or linen. We know at the present time in different diseases the clothing of the sick is so much corrupted that it presents a certain danger to the healthy persons who may clothe themselves with it. In these diseases, nevertheless, the virus does not affect the cloth entirely, and does not stop in the warp only or in the woof: there is no virus which extends itself after the clothing is taken from the sick person. Even the black matter of the mortified and dried-up parts in cancer, never goes farther than into that part of the stuff which has first touched it. If it is thus, I do not know that the word contagion can be applied to that blemish in the clothing which Moses calls leprosy. I believe rather that this word has passed metaphorically from a living body to an inanimate one; it is a license which we permit ourselves sometimes, as we say that the

trees and stones are eaten by the cancer, when some humidity or some putrid influence caused by the atmosphere has corrupted them. As to the leprosy of the cloth, Michaelis thinks that the wool might be infected with leprosy, when it proceeds from sheep wasted by diseases or only sick. Generally this species of wool is harsh and useless, and cloths made of such a material are easily worn out, and those who clothe themselves with it run great danger. It is the same with the leprosy of skins, of which Moses speaks. I think, adds the author whom we cite, that it was that which takes place, for the skins of other animals dead of disease or old age, above all the skins of oxen, where that is common in the contagions of herds. These skins are brittle, appearing often half-eaten up, and are not a little hurtful to health. Yet it appears to us more simple to regard the whole as preventive measures of hygiene, very exaggerated, and of which we find nowhere else any application in the Holy Scriptures."*

Chap. xiv., v. 34.—"When ye be come into the land of Canaan, which I give to you for a possession, and I put the plague of leprosy in a house of the land of your possession." The species of leprosy which we are about to describe is, according to Aben Ezra, the effect of a miracle. It is singular that laws should have been made for a supernatural thing, and which could not be foreseen. Gueddes remarks that it may well be a question here of an eruption of saltpetre, which in our countries is not hurtful to health. Some think that it concerns a leprosy which has passed from living bodies to the walls, which is improbable, since the leprous were submitted to the inspection of the priest on the appearance of the first spots which announced the leprosy. Others say that it refers to a nitrous efflorescence, but the description which the text presents seems rather to relate to the lichens with which the stones were covered, with which some simulate completely a leprosy. Jar'hi makes upon this verse a singular remark—it is an announcement, says he, that a malady will come which will make known to the Israelites the treasures which the Amorites have hidden in the walls during the forty years

* Cahen, Levitique, p. 53.

wandering of the Israelites in the desert. We see according to that that the leprosy of houses is unexplained and unexplainable; the leprosy of men relates to the nomad state—it is a question but of camps and tents; the leprosy of walls is traced to the sedentary state, for it is known that it is principally during this state that the sacerdotal ordinations were enacted, but feebly executed."*

Chap. xiv., v. 49.—"Two birds." The Douay says "two sparrows;" and, according to verse 4, it appears that it was "lawful to eat" sparrows, although, as sparrows fed upon the unclean creeping things forbidden in chap. xi., they ought, under that chapter, to have been unclean also.

Chap. xv.—Cahen says—"In this chapter we are again obliged to occasionally use the Latin," in order to avoid giving unnecessary offence whilst conserving the literal rendering. Cahen, after mentioning that many of the commandments that are given in Leviticus are such as could not have been carried out, refers to Ezekiel, chap. xx., v. 25—"Wherefore I gave them also statutes that were not good, and judgments whereby they should not live."

Chap. xvi., v. 8.—"And Aaron shall cast lots upon the two goats; one lot for the Lord, and the other lot for the scapegoat." In lieu of "scapegoat" the Douay has "emissary goat." The word in the Hebrew is עזאזל, OZAZeL, Azazel. Gesenius says—"By this name I suppose to be understood originally some idol, to be appeased by sacrifices, as Saturn and Mars; afterwards I suppose from the names of idols being often applied to demons, this name was used for that of an evil demon inhabiting the wilderness, who had to be appeased by sacrifices by this very ancient and Gentile rite."† According to‡ Aben Ezra, Azazel is the name of a demon, to appease whom an offering was sent; this view being supported by certain Rabbinical writers and by the Book of Enoch. It appears probable to us that Azazel is the name of one of these demons inhabiting devastated places, and named for that reason Shedim, from shud, to devastate; as there was another species of demon living in the woods, a species of

* Cahen, Levitique, p. 59. † Lexicon, p. 617.
‡ Bresslau's Lexicon, p. 429; but see Simonis, p. 1173.

Pan, satyrs. This name is not unknown to the cabalists. Azazel is, according to the Zohar, one of the fallen angels, and precipitated into hell. There are Aza and Azael. It is this that we read also in the Ethiopian book attributed to Henoch. The opinion of Hiskouni is that it concerns here the angel of death, Samael. (They pretend to derive this word from סר מאל, SeR MAL, "he turned himself from God.") Perhaps in admitting an easy translation made designedly, one might read עז אל, OZeZ AL, the god Azaz, a name which has a singular conformity to the Isis of the Egyptians. However that may be, it appears that we discover here the remains of two origins of worship so ancient, Maimonides avoids explaining himself. "Be it on account of the weakness of our understanding," says he, "be it because of the imperfection of our wisdom, it is impossible for us to know the reason of this sacrifice" (Moré Neb, part iii., chap. 26). Aben Ezra, in his usual manner when he experiences embarrassment, enounces in oracular style: "If thou art capable of understanding the mystery of Azazel, thou will learn also the mystery of his name; for he has similar associates in the Scriptures. I will tell thee by allusion a part of the mystery. When thou art thirty-three years old thou will understand us." He finishes abruptly, without speaking allegorically or otherwise.*

Chap. xvi., vv. 21 and 22.—"And Aaron shall lay both his hands upon the head of the live goat, and confess over him all the iniquities of the children of Israel, and all their transgressions in all their sins, putting them upon the head of the goat, and shall send him away, by the hand of a fit man, into the wilderness: and the goat shall bear upon him all their iniquities into a land not inherited, and he shall let go the goat into the wilderness." The absurdity of this injunction is heightened by the inutility, for I do not find that the Israelites were ever let off from any punishment by reason of the scapegoat.

The Egyptians had a similar custom, as we learn from Herodotus, Euterpe 2, chap. 39, who relates it in these words:—"After they have killed the victim, they cut off its head, but they flay the animal's body, after which, having

* Cahen, Levitique, p. 68.

pronounced many imprecations on the head, those who have a market and Grecian merchants dwelling among them, carry it thither and sell it to them; but those who have no Grecian residents to sell it to, throw the head into the fire, pronouncing over it the following imprecations:—'If any evil is about to befall either those that now sacrifice, or Egypt in general, may it be averted on this head!'" "The two customs, though not perfectly the same, are so far similar that the one appears to have been derived from the other. The import of both is certainly the same: for in both the animal sacrificed is made use of as a substitute to draw away calamity from the party sacrificing; in the one case being sent into the wilderness, and in the other consumed by fire."

Verse 21.—"Putting them upon the head," the Douay has, "Praying that they may light upon his head." Cahen, whose translation slightly differs, says—"There is here a very remarkable distinction, the sins of the sacerdotal class and those of the people towards their statutes and temples are redeemed explicitly and wholly, God accepts the sacrifice; but the other sins of the people are not expressly redeemed, God does not accept the sacrifice, they send the living goat to Azazel."

Chap. xvii., vv. 3, 4, 5, and 6.—"What man soever there be of the house of Israel that killeth an ox, or lamb, or goat, in the camp, or that killeth it out of the camp, and bringeth it not unto the door of the tabernacle of the congregation, to offer an offering unto the Lord before the tabernacle of the Lord, blood shall be imputed unto that man; he hath shed blood; and that man shall be cut off from among his people. To the end that the children of Israel may bring their sacrifices which they offer in the open field, even that they may bring them unto the Lord, unto the door of the tabernacle of the congregation, unto the priest, and offer them for peace-offerings unto the Lord. And the priest shall sprinkle the blood upon the altar of the Lord at the door of the tabernacle of the congregation, and burn the fat for a sweet savour unto the Lord." The absurdity of this command will be apparent upon the slightest examination. If the Jews were as

numerous as is represented when in Egypt, and continued to increase and multiply in the same ratio, they would have filled a very large portion of the earth's surface; but even allowing for Biblical exaggeration, it would have been impossible for a people, amounting to several hundreds of thousands, to have all slaughtered their cattle at one spot (the door of the Tabernacle); and if they had done so, judging from the appearance and odour of modern slaughter-houses, the "holiest of holies" would have hardly been at the same time "the sweetest of sweets." It would have been still more impossible for each individual to have brought (perhaps from a distance of several miles) each an ox, lamb, or goat killed. It is not at all probable, in a nation so ignorant as the Jews, that the people possessed carts and waggons for the purpose of transporting the dead cattle to and fro, and if they had, the waste of labour would have been enormous. The severe penalty of death is all that is required to make this essentially one of "God's laws." What would be said if all the slaughtered cattle in England were, by Act of Parliament, compelled, under penalty of death, to be brought to the door of St. Paul's Cathedral to have the fat and blood taken from them? Colenso, who has submitted these verses to an elaborate comment, applying them to the texts affecting the Passover lambs, asks how these commands could have been complied with, when 150,000 lambs would have had to be killed by 150,000 people in the short space of two hours.*

Verse 7.—"And they shall no more offer their sacrifices unto devils, after whom they have gone a whoring." Chap. xix., vv. 26 and 31; chap. xx., vv. 6 and 27; Deut. c. xxxii., v. 17.† What are devils? If God is the Creator of all things, did he create devils? If so, it is scarcely just to punish us for falling victims to devils, whom God must have made sufficiently powerful to tempt us to the commission of crime. If otherwise, are devils independent existences; because in that case the Deity is neither omnipotent nor infinite. Many Theists are now in-

* See Pentateuch, part i., p. 42; 2 Chronicles, c. xxix. and c. xxxv.

† See Exodus, p 256; J. P. Smith's "Christian Theology;" Farmer on the "Demoniacs."

clined to admit that they are neither; and that devils, angels, gods, familiar spirits and demons, all stand in the same mythological position. They belong to the past, not to the present. They belong to the age of ignorance, not of inquiry. We find in such verses as these the clue to the superstitious fear with which the inhabitants of some little villages still regard certain old men and women; and the clue to the persecutions for witchcraft. Strong objections have been urged against the doctrine of devils, demons, and familiar spirits. It is said by Theists that it is contrary to all natural conceptions of the benevolence and mercy of the Deity that he should have created, and should sustain in existence, beings of the highest intellectual order to be the subjects of eternal misery themselves, and causes of it to all humanity. It is further urged that the doctrine detracts from the power of God by holding forth an almost omnipotent chief of a legion of powerful and mischievous devils, all bent on the destruction of mankind. It is further, and very reasonably, urged that the Jews, especially after their connection with the Chaldean and Persian nations, had imbibed very extended, and, at the same time, very puerile ideas with regard to the operations of both good and bad spirits. The properties of plants, of mineral waters, of minerals, of certain climatic conditions, the existence of any remarkable phenomena, the insanity of men, or animals, were all, in ancient times, attributed to the presence and influence of good and bad spirits. Science has exploded these errors; and, in exploding them, has also impeached most severely the pretended divine revelation in which they were sustained. Bellamy translates the "to devils" as "before goats," and says that the word translated devils has no such meaning in any part of Scripture. He points out that the same word is rendered "satyrs," in Isaiah xiii., v. 21; and c. xxxiv., v. 14. The word translated "devils," Cahen does not translate at all; but writes Seirime, which is simply trying to give corresponding letters for the Hebrew word שעירם (ShOIReM.)*

Aquila says, "The shaggy ones;" others say, "the satyrs." It refers here doubtless to some foreign Deity; the phrase

* Levitique, p. 78.

which follows makes this supposition probable, and one is led to think of Pan, of fauns, especially if we reflect that goats were generally adored among the Egyptians, principally at Thebes—see Herod, Euterpe, p. 42. The different explanations which we have given agree as to the goat, and it appears that the Israelites had followed these irregularities with which Amos reproaches them in his day (c. v., v. 25). At any rate, it would be difficult to say any thing determinate, whether upon the nature of the sacrifice, or upon the manner of making it. The Targums give the word as "demons," and Mendelsohn says Waldteufeln, or wood demons. It seems always certain that the object of the institution of sacrifices was to deter the Israelites from sacrificing to the sylvan gods (see More Nebouch, part 3, chap. 46). It concerned also the maintenance of the power of the Levites.

Chap. xviii., v. 21.—"And thou shalt not let any of thy seed pass through the fire to Molech, neither shalt thou profane the name of thy God: I am the Lord." The texts in which references to Molech occur are chap. xx., v. 2; 1 Kings c. xi., v. 7; 2 Kings c. xxiii., v. 10; Jeremiah c. xxxii., v. 35.*

The Rabbins assure us† that this idol was of brass sitting upon a throne of the same metal, adorned with a royal crown, having the head of a calf and his arms extended as if to embrace any one. When they would offer any children to him, they heated the statue within by a great fire, and, when it was burning hot, they put within his arms the miserable victim, which was soon consumed by the violence of the heat; and that the cries of the children might not be heard, they made a great noise with drums and other instruments about the idol. Others relate that the idol was hollow, and within it were contrived seven partitions, one of which was appointed for meal, or flour, in the second there were turtles, in the third an ewe, in the fourth a ram, in the fifth a calf, in the sixth an ox, and in the seventh a *child.* All these were burned together by heating the statue in the inside. It appears from the sub-

* See Commentary on Exodus, p. 268.
Parkhurst Lexicon, p. 401.

stance of this idol, which was brass, or copper, from its having the head of a calf, the animal emblem of fire, from its being divided into seven partitions, answering to the seven planetary spheres or orbits (or according to others having seven chapels before it), and from the horrid rites performed to it, that it was intended as a representative of the solar fire. This is further confirmed by its name מלך (MeLeK), king; for as a king in his political capacity acteth where he is or not by means of others, so the solar fire in this system doth, in some sense, act where it is not, by means of the light which it is continually sending forth, and putting in motion. Add to this, that the apparent spring of material action is in the fire.

It has been doubted whether in that shocking rite of making their children pass through the fire, making them enter in or by the fire, to Molech, they were always burnt to death or not. Whoever will attentively consider the following passages in the Hebrew Bible, will be strongly inclined to the affirmative. (See Ezek. xvi., 20, 21; xx., 25, 26, 31; xxiii., 37; compare Jer. xxxii., 35, with chap. vii., 31.) Eusebius quotes from Diodorus Siculus, a passage so apposite to our present purpose, that the judicious reader cannot be displeased at seeing a translation of it in this place. It relates to the Carthagenians when besieged by Agathocles, Tyrant of Sicily. "They imputed this calamity," says Diodorus, "to Saturn's fighting against them; for whereas they used, in former times, to sacrifice the best of their own children to this God, they had lately offered such children as they had privately purchased and brought up; and on inquiry, some of those who have been sacrificed were found to be suppositious. Reflecting, therefore, on these things, and seeing the enemy encamped at their very walls, they were seized with a religious dread, as having profaned those honours, which their ancestors paid to the Gods. In haste, then, to rectify their errors, they chose out two hundred of the noblest children, and sacrificed them publicly. Other persons, who were accused of irreligion, gave up themselves willingly to the number of no less than three hundred. For they had a brazen statue of Saturn stretching out his hands towards the

ground in such a manner that the child placed within them tumbled down into a pit full of fire."

Thus Diodorus, whose description of the idol, and of the manner of these infernal sacrifices, it must be confessed, differs somewhat from the Rabbinical account above cited. And, indeed, what can be more probable than that, at different times and places, there should be some variations in both these respects?"

"I take* Molech and Baal to be," says Godwyn, "one and the same idol, they were both names of supremacy and rule. Baal signifieth a Lord or Master—and Molech, a King or Prince. They had both the same manner of sacrifice, they burnt their sons for burnt-offerings unto Baal likewise (Jer. xix., 5). Yea, they built the high places of Baal, which are in the valley of Benhinnom, to cause their sons and their daughters to pass through the fire unto Molech. Jerem. xxxii. 35. In which text the place of sacrifice is noted to be one and the same, common to both idols, and Molech put in the end of the verse, to explain Baal in the beginning thereof. Some think them to be different, because the Planet Jupiter was worshipped under the name of Baal; but the planet Saturn is probably thought to have been worshipped under the name of Molech. If we diligently observe histories, we shall find such a confusion of the planets, that the sun, as it was sometimes called Baal, sometimes Molech: so it was sometimes called Jupiter, sometimes Saturn; and concerning Baal, this is evident: hence Jupiter was called by the Phœnicians, Baal-samen, which name is derived from the Hebrew, and soundeth as much as Jupiter Olympicus, the Lord of Heaven; for Baal signifieth Lord, and Shamain, heaven. And what is this Lord of Heaven in the theology of the Heathens, other than the Sun? who may as well be styled the King of Heaven, as the Moon the Queen. Yea, Sanchoniatho, as Eusebius in the forequoted place relates him, taketh all these three for one—namely, the Sun, Jupiter, and Baal-samen."

Verse 4.—"Turn ye not unto idols, nor make to yourselves molten gods: I am the Lord your God." The

* Godwyn's Hebrew Rites, p. 143.

manufacture of "molten" gods must be comparatively modern. The Deity must have allowed idolatry a long existence if the Mosaic prohibition was the first. A writer in the *Westminster Review** says:—"The Egyptians, as we gather from Herodotus, were the first idolators, and their early temples, according to another authority, had no statue in them. Previous to this time, and long after, they appear to have worshipped the one God—a being without name, without figure, incorporeal, immutable, infinite, the origin and source of all things, and who was to be adored in silence. The ancient Persians worshipped fire as the symbol of the Deity (Hyde, de Veterum Persarum), and their sacrifices were made, not in temples or to images, but on the top of lofty mountains. In the temples of the Chaldeans, at Babylon, there was no statue even so late as the days of Herodotus; and for a hundred and seventy years after the foundation of Rome there was not a statue in any temple at Rome. In the early books of the Bible we find that the religion of Abraham was no new or astounding doctrine in that remote age. Melchizedek, King of Salem, in Canaan, was a 'priest of the most High God;' and Abimelech, King of Gerar, in Palestine, recognised the Almighty in a dream, and, with reference to his own subjects, exclaimed, 'Lord, wilt thou also slay a righteous nation?' The Arab Job, Jethro the Midianite, and Balaam the Syrian, were all acquainted with the true God.

"But with limits like ours, it is impossible to indulge in any speculations on that dark period which precedes the first faint dawning of history. The Jewish doctors, indeed, are kind enough to point out the very individual by whose means idolatry was introduced into the world, and a firm faith in their dictum would save much trouble. According to the Rabbi Moses Ben Maimon, Enos, discoursing on the splendour of the heavenly bodies, insisted that, since God had thus exalted them above the other parts of creation, it was but reasonable that we should praise, extol, and honour them. The consequence of this exhortation, says the Rabbi, was the building of temples to the stars, and the

* Vol. xii., p. 43.

establishment of idolatry throughout the world. By the Arabian divines, however, the imputation is laid upon the patriarch Abraham, who, they say, on coming out from the dark cave in which he had been brought up, was so astonished at the sight of the stars that he worshipped Hesperus, the moon, and the sun successively as they rose. These two stories are very good illustrations of the origin of myths by means of which even the most natural sentiment is traced to its cause in the circumstances of fabulous history. But the Arab Job, without thinking it necessary to inquire into the sources of his feelings, explains the philosophy of early idolatry in a few simple and beautiful words. 'If,' says he, 'I gazed upon Orus (the sun) when he was shining, or upon Tärêcha (the moon) when rising in her glory, and my heart went secretly after them, and my hand kissed my mouth, I should have denied the God that is above.'

"The pious Arab here points to what the Easterns tell us is the most ancient religion in the world. This, the Arab historian Haragi says, consisted in the belief of the eternity of the world, governed by a co-eternal mind whose symbol was fire. The apparent, or material source of fire, was the sun, to which, as well as to the moon and the stars, as partakers of the same celestial nature, a proportioned reverence was due. The chief seat of this religion was in Haram, on the Chaldean border, where the grand temple of the Sabeans was on the top of a hill. The words, Haranite and Sabean, came thus to be used as equivalent terms. We have now almost lost sight of the original tradition; and the revelations of the Deity are made to mankind through the stars "walking in brightness," and the various phenomena and influences of nature. The worship of the mysterious element of fire soon gives place to that of its material fountain, the sun; the whole host of heaven gradually became immortal powers; the entire world is a reflex of God, and God is adored in that world which thus reveals him to man. Thus primitive religion becomes a Pantheism. At first, the style of religious instruction would be plain, concise, even abrupt, to suit the simplicity of the dogmas; but afterwards, as Pausanias

relates of early Greece, the priests would begin to envelop their ideas in enigmatical forms. The same diversity of intellect, which at the present day causes the component parts of even civilised society to resemble different races of men, must have existed from the beginning; some magnificent minds, towering above the common boundaries of knowledge, would lift up the veil of nature; while the vulgar, grasping as it were only the outside of their thoughts, would materialise their most refined ideas, and multiply the number of gods till the Pantheism arrived at the axiom of the Greeks, "Everything is the image of the Deity." Hence the esoteric and exoteric doctrines; the priests would speak a different language to the wise and to the ignorant; his meaning would be addressed to the initiated, and its enigmatical form of communication to the multitude. The time was passed when God talked face to face with man, but the same need of such inter-communication remained; and in the flight of birds, the entrails of beasts, and the thousand other omens so dear to ignorant credulity, the will of heaven would be manifested to mankind. Symbols, or the images of ideas, must thus have been of very early invention; and the obscurity of the symbolical mode of teaching is the consequence of the difficulty of reducing idea to form. The myth speedily followed, and was at first, perhaps, intended to explain or illustrate the symbols; subsequently it was used in the biography of personages who were supposed to partake of the sanctity of the symbol; and finally was understood to mean ancient tradition as contradistinguished from history.

"The heroes of the myths were probably at first imaginary beings—personifications of the powers of nature; and as man can only reason from what he knows, their constitution and attributes must have been borrowed from his own. The earth, that fertile womb from which he saw new or renewed creation springing every day, became a female, the Mighty Mother, the Eternal Spouse; and the heavens, whose powers were concentrated in the sun, were the original male—the principal of life and fecundity. The grand distinction of sex was preserved throughout the

whole system. When Nature came to be personified, not as a whole, but in her attributes, every god had either a wife or a mistress; and in the heat, the thunder, the storm, and the volcano, the mythologist found materials for the discords, rapes, and adulteries of the immortals, but too closely analogous with the crimes and sufferings of mankind. In fine these distinctions were concentrated, as it were, in two emblems, called the Lingam and the Yoni by the Hindoos, and the Phallus and Cteis by the Greeks, and observable in a greater or less degree in every system of mythology.

"But the mere fact of conferring a name upon an abstract idea, and attaching an almost human history to it, was not sufficient. The vulgar, with something like the scepticism of St. Thomas, required to see and feel; and visible and tangible images were, therefore, presented to their brute senses. These, at first, were rude stones or columns, for religion had precedence in point of time of the arts; but as mythological story took hold of the imaginations of men, they were seized with the desire of fashioning their blocks in imitation of their gods: and hence, we presume, the beginning of sculpture. Unchiseled stones, according to Pausanias, were the first images of the gods of the Greeks; and the Phœnicians, the Megareans, the ancient Arabs, and the Jews, were once plunged in the same rude idolatry.

Verse 31.—"Regard not them that have familiar spirits, neither seek after wizards." See also chap. xx., v. 6. The Douay is, "Go not aside after wizards, neither ask after soothsayers." Bellamy, "Ye shall not turn to the serpents, moreover after the wizards ye shall not seek." Cahen, "Turn not towards the oboth and seek not the yidonime," —that is, he does not translate either of the words. The Septuagint has in lieu of "oboth," "ventriloquists;" and Gesenius observes that this is a correct rendering, because ventriloquists amongst the ancients commonly abused this art of inward speaking for magical purposes. Cahen says that the word אובות AUBUTh, signifies leathern bottles for holding water; and Parkhurst adds that they were so called from being remarkably capable of distension or swelling.*

* But see Bellamy, New Translation, p. 333.

In Chap. xx., v. 27, the word אוֹב, AUB, of which Aubeth is the plural, is in our version again rendered, "familiar spirit." Gesenius asks, "how could it be that the same Hebrew word should express a bottle and a ventriloquist? Apparently from the magician when possessed with the demon, being as it were a bottle or vessel, and sheath of this python."

Chap. xxi., vv. 17, 18.—"Speak unto Aaron, saying, Whosoever *he be* of thy seed in their generations that hath *any* blemish let him not approach to offer the bread of his God: For whatsoever man *he be* that hath a blemish, he shall not approach; a blind man, or a lame, or he that hath a flat nose, or any thing superfluous." The Douay says, "if he have a little, a great, or a crooked nose." Bellamy says the word translated "flat nose" has no such meaning in any part of Scripture, and that it is surprising how such a notion could enter into the minds of the translators; he makes the verse read, "blind, or lame, or defective, or unnatural."

Verses 19—21.—"Or a man that is broken-footed, or broken-handed. Or crook-backt, or a dwarf, or that hath a blemish in his eye, or be scurvy, or scabbed, or hath his stones broken: no man that hath a blemish of the seed of Aaron the priest shall come nigh to offer the offerings of the Lord made by fire; he hath a blemish, he shall not come nigh to offer the bread of his God." Here the disability is confined to the Levite, but in Deuteronomy, chap. xxiii., v. 1, it is more general.

Chap. xxii., vv. 12 and 13.—"If the priest's daughter also be *married* unto a stranger, she may not eat of the offering of the holy things. But if the priest's daughter be a widow, or divorced, and have no child, and is returned unto her father's house, as in her youth, she shall eat of her father's meat; but there shall be no stranger eat thereof."

So that if the priest's daughter were left a destitute widow, with a child or children, her father was not to permit her to eat of his meat.

Chap. xxiii., v. 43.—"That your generations may know that I made the children of Israel to dwell in booths, when I brought them out of the land of Egypt: I am the Lord your God."

The Douay renders "booths" as "tabernacles," but it ren-

ders the same Hebrew word in v. 42 as "bowers." Cahen gives "cabanes," huts, and says of "what huts do they speak here? When were they made?" One rabbinical writer suggests, that God caused the huts suddenly to come out of the earth for the Israelites. Mendelsohn rises against this idea, and quite puts it aside. He cannot conceive how any one can take upon himself to fabricate so strange a miracle of which no one else has ever thought. But what more would it be if one had thought of it? (See Gramberg, v. i. p. 290.)

Chap. xxiv., v. 7.—After the words "pure frankincense," the Septuagint adds, "and salt."

Verses 15 and 16.—This reads as if, first, a prohibition against cursing the God of any individual; and 2nd, a prohibition against blaspheming Jehovah.

Chap. xxv., v. 30.—"The house that is in the walled city." Spinoza draws attention to the marginal reading, which runs "the house that is not in the walled city."* Bellamy says, "In this clause the translators have omitted translating the negative לא L.A.; *i.e.* not; and have followed the bold example of those called the Keri Translators, or those who, when they could not otherwise make sense of the passage as written by the sacred writers, have rejected certain words."

Chap. xxv., vv. 30 to 43, are in contradiction to Exodus chap. xxi., verse 2. There the Hebrew slave was to be free the seventh year, but according to this he is held till the year of jubilee.

Verses 44 to 46—"Both thy bondmen and thy bondmaids, which thou shalt have, shall be of the heathen that are round about you; of them shall ye buy bondmen and bondmaids. Moreover, of the children of the strangers that do sojourn among you, of them shall ye buy, and of their families that are with you, which they begat in your land; and they shall be your possession. And ye shall take them as an inheritance for your children after you, to inherit them for a possession; they shall be your bondmen for ever; but over your brethren the children of Israel ye shall not rule one over another with rigour." The slave dealing† here legalised, appears to have become a regular trade. Ezekiel, chap,

* Tractatus Theologico Politicus, cap 9, § 38.

† See also Exodus, p. 251, and Jeremiah, c. xxxiv., v. 9.

xxvii., v. 13, speaks of the trade in "the persons of men." Bellamy, ashamed of this disgraceful passage, seeks most ineffectually to explain away the meaning of the text.

Chap. xxvi., verse 12.—"And I will walk among you, and will be your God, and ye shall be my people." Cahen says, "The ancients believed that each nation had its Deity. Jehovah is here announced as the national God of the Hebrews, the special God of Palestine."

Verse 42—"Then will I remember my covenant with Jacob, and also my covenant with Isaac, and also my covenant with Abraham will I remember; and I will remember the land." The covenant with Abraham in Genesis, chap. xvii., verse 8; with Isaac chap. xxvi., v. 3; and with Jacob, chap. xxviii., v. 13, is explicit and unconditional. The descendants of these three are to be as numerous as the dust of the earth, and are to inherit Canaan for ever.

"Jacob." God appears to have forgotten that by Genesis, chap. xxxvi., v. 10, he changed the name to Israel.

All the promises and denunciations of this chapter bear relation to this life, and Cahen says, that the belief in a future state was introduced long after the *confection* of the Pentateuch, wherein no trace is found of such a belief.*

Chap. xxvii.—De Wette says that "it is evident that the addition of this chapter is an after thought; for the book is brought to a regular epic conclusion, by the promises and denunciations in chap. xxvi., and still more by the formula, 'These are the statutes and judgments and laws which Jehovah made between him and the children of Israel in Mount Sinai, by the hand of Moses.' Or, what is, perhaps, as probable, the book originally ended with this formula appended to chap. xxv.; for chap. xxvi., 3—46, bears marks of a very recent origin—even later than the captivity. The threat, verse 34, 'Then shall the land enjoy her Sabbaths as long as it lieth desolate, and ye be in your enemies' land because it did not rest in your Sabbaths when ye dwelt in it;' and verse 43 must have been written after Jer. xxv. 11,—where the captivity of seventy years is threatened; and 2 Ch. xxxvi. 21, which says the captivity lasted 'until the land had enjoyed her Sabbaths; for as long as

* Preface to Numbers.

she lay desolate, she kept Sabbath, to fulfil three score and ten years." Perhaps the book ended originally with chap. xxv., to which the formula xxvi. 46, was appended."*

Chap. xxvii., v. 29.—"None devoted, which shall be devoted of men, shall be redeemed; but shall surely be put to death." The commentators give themselves much trouble to soften this terrible sentence. According to Jar'hi, it concerns a man condemned to death, when he may not be delivered from it for money; according to others, it is necessary that the person should be consigned to it by public authority and not by a private individual, and the Talmud treats Jepthah as mad to have thought that a human being could serve as a victim for a burnt offering; but there are too many facts which prove the existence and execution of this barbarous law; see besides the paraphrase of Ben Ouziel:—"All anathema which shall be anathematised of the human race cannot be redeemed neither by money, by vows, nor by sacrifices, neither by prayers for mercy before God, since he is condemned to death."†

Nicholas‡ has the following comments, which appear to us most pertinent. He says: "It will be vain to seek to deny that the legislator has appropriated a great number of the practices and civil and religious institutions of Egypt."

The holy ark is incontestably an imitation of the small chapels in painted or gilded wood which are seen so frequently represented in the Egyptian paintings. The breastplate of the High Priest recalls the image which the priests of Egypt wore upon their breasts. Among the Hebrews, as among the Egyptians, women did not hold any office in the priesthood; the priests were all clothed in a robe of linen of dazzling whiteness; they only had the privilege of entering into the Temple properly so-called, access to which was forbidden to the laity, who would have been smitten with sudden death did they transgress this prohibition. "It was from the examination of the precious stones which adorned the statue of Ammon," says Mr. Maury, "that the oracle was drawn." This manner of divination recalls the Urim

* De Wette's Introduction, § 152 b.
† Cahen Levitique, 141. See also commentary on Exodus, p. 200.
‡ Etudes sur la Bible, 95.

and Thummim among the Jews, which might indeed have been easily borrowed from the Egyptians. "Among the Hebrews as among the Egyptians, the sacrifices and the oblations furnished subsistence to the priests in like manner; the victims were to be without blemish, the priests were charged to assure themselves of this; finally, the animals offered in sacrifice were treated in nearly the same manner; certain parts were to be consumed with fire, while other parts were given back to the person who offered the sacrifice, and served for the family repast.

Analogous legal prescriptions, often identical, were imposed on the Hebrews as on the Egyptians. For both, a certain number of animals could not be used for food. It is true the prohibiting did not relate to the same animals in the two countries, and was not founded on the same reasons. It was a sin for the Egyptians, says Plutarch, to drink or eat what was forbidden, and we know that it was the same among the Hebrews. The two peoples agree in regarding swine as unclean. With the one, as the other, the leprous, considered as impure beings, were subject to similar regulations. Lustrations were commanded in certain identical circumstances; there were special commands for the sacerdotal order. Mourning had similar customs with the two nations; the women smote their breasts while uttering loud cries, and covered their heads with dust or ashes, and the men allowed the hair of the head and the beard to grow, while everywhere else, Herodotus remarks, the custom was to cut the hair in sign of mourning. The distribution of days into weeks is found in the two nations, and both designated them by analogous names. It is supposed from this that the period of weeks, invented by the Egyptians, was borrowed from them by the Hebrews. The antipathy to foreigners was as strong with the one nation as the other, an antipathy which did not fail to strike the first Greek writers who have spoken of the Israelites. In short, there is little even to the fringes which hung on the bottom of the garments of the children of Israel, and which have given rise to so many whimsical hypotheses, which is not found on the bottom of the linen tunics of the Egyptians.

Finally, to terminate this enumeration of customs and ceremonies common to the Hebrews and Egyptians, an enu-

meration which it would be easy to prolong, I will say some words on the sacrifices of substitution, unknown to the Hebrews before Moses, but forming an essential part of his legislation. These sacrifices were usual in Egypt. Herodotus has preserved to us the formula of imprecation employed by the Egyptians in this ceremony. "If any misfortune," said the priest in laying his hand upon the head of the victim, "menaces those who offer this sacrifice, or Egypt entire, may it fall upon this head." The formula employed by the Egyptians in the sacrifices of substitution is not mentioned in any passage of the Old Testament; but one may suppose that it could not differ essentially from that of the Egyptians; we know at least that whoever offered a sacrifice of this kind, placed the hand upon the head of the victim, in order to indicate that it was to bear the punishment of the transgression which he had himself committed. From these analogies, a great number of learned men have concluded that the Mosaic legislation was a copy more or less faithful of the Egyptian institutions. I do not dissimulate myself, that this hypothesis seems to find its confirmation in Jewish tradition, which represents Moses as reared at the Court of Pharaoh, and initiated in all the mysteries and knowledge of the Egyptians.

THE BIBLE: WHAT IT IS.

BOOK IV.

NUMBERS:

ITS AUTHENTICITY AND CREDIBILITY.

BY

ICONOCLAST.

Charles Bradlaugh

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NUMBERS:

ITS AUTHENTICITY AND CREDIBILITY.

THE word במדבר, BeMeDeBeR, "in the desert," is the usual title of this book in the Hebrew, although it sometimes bears the title וידבר, UIDeBeR, its commencing words, "and he spake." The title in the Septuagint is "*Arithmoi*," from which the Vulgate "Numeri" and the English "Numbers" are derived. The words "fourth book of Moses" have no foundation or authority in either Greek or Hebrew. The book is evidently made up of several documents,* sometimes carelessly put together. Vater, and those who have followed him, contend for several and distinct authors for the different documents. The Massorites are supposed to have counted the verses and letters of the Book of Numbers, and to have stated that it contains, or contained in their day, 10 parscioth, or grand divisions, 33 sedarim or minor divisions, 1288 verses, 16,707 words, and 62,529 letters, and that the middle of the book is in chap. xvii. 4.†

Chap. i. 2.—"Take ye the sum." Bellamy, "Take ye the chief." Cahen, "Faites le denombrement" (make the numbering), and adds, "this is the second numbering." (See Exodus xxx. 11, and xxxviii. 25.) There is also a third (Numbers xxvi.) These three numberings, made at different dates, and giving the same result, are difficult to explain.‡ The words "tabernacle of the congregation" are in Sharpe's translation rendered "appointed tent" wherever they occur.

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* Simon: Histoire Crit. du Vieux Test., p. 24. † Ibid, p. 140.
‡ See Bible: What it is, Exodus, p. 281.

Verse 14.—"Eliasaph the son of Deuel." Chap. ii. 14, "Eliasaph the son of Reuel." In chap. vi. 42 and 47, and in chap. x. 20, it is also Eliasaph the son of Deuel. Which is right? The word written Reuel is the same as the word written Raguel, Numbers x. 29. In lieu of Deuel in chap. i. 14, the Septuagint has *Ragouel*, which it repeats without variation in each of the above texts.

Verse 21.—"Those that were." Bellamy declares that these words in this verse, and in verses 23, 25, 27, 29, 31, 33, 35, 37, 39, 41, and 43, have no authority in the Hebrew text. He is right; but the words do not change the sense, although it is not unfair to inquire why translators should supplement God's revelation.

Verse 24.—"Children of Gad." Cahen says that the Septuagint puts here "Judah," and varies in stating the other names; but the copy to which reference has been made in this commentary, has "Gad," and agrees in the rest with the authorised version.

Verse 46.—By this verse we learn that the number of Jews above twenty years of age, warriors (not including the Levites) capable of bearing arms, was 603,550—Josephus* says 603,650; and taking old and young into consideration, as also men incapable of military service for various reasons, you can hardly compute these at more than four out of each ten, which would leave a total of about 1,500,000 males; the proportion of females would be 1,500,000 more. These, together with male and female slaves, and the tribe of Levi, must have made at least 3,000,000 people, an immense number to pass through a desert, where food and water were deficient. Cahen says that the numbers given are not historic, and that it is, therefore, idle to inquire why they are the same as those given seven months before.

Verse 49.—"Only thou shalt not number the tribe of Levi, neither take the sum of them among the children of Israel." Chap. iii. 15 says, "Number the children of Levi." The Lord must have changed his original intention.

Chap. iii. 7.—While this verse speaks of Moses and Aaron, the chapter only mentions the descendants of Aaron and of Levi.

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* Antiquities, book 3, c. 12, sec. 4.

Verse 16.—"Moses numbered." The Septuagint says, "Moses and Aaron numbered."

Verse 39.—22,000 is incorrect; it should be 22,300*—viz., Gershonites, 7,500; Kohathites, 8,600; Meranites, 6,200. This may seem a trifling error, but in a revelation from God we are not prepared to expect errors at all; and in this case it is a grave error, and not a mere slip of the copyist or transcriber, for in verse 46, corroborated by verse 50, we are told that the first-born were 273 more in number than the male Levites, when, in fact, they were 27 less. It is very extraordinary that the Levites should be comparatively so few in number, especially when we consider them as the most favoured by God. The whole of the Levites, male and female, could not be much over 50,000, while the other tribes averaged, on the most limited calculation, at least four times that number. Cahen, who judges the numbers of the Levites to be unreliable, says that the proportion of first-born is evidently too weak.

"All the first-born males, from a month old and upwards, of those that were numbered were twenty and two thousand two hundred and threescore and thirteen." (Numbers iii. 43.) Let us see what this statement implies when treated as a matter of fact. For this purpose, I quote the words of Kurtz, iii., p. 209:—"If there were 600,000 males of twenty years and upwards, the whole number of males may be reckoned at 900,000 (he elsewhere reckons 1,000,000), in which case, there would be only *one* first-born to *forty-two* (forty-four) males. In other words, the number of boys in every family must have been, on the average, forty-two." This will be seen at once if we consider that the rest of the 900,000 males were *not* first-borns—and, therefore, each of these must have had one or other of the 22,273 as the first-born of his own family—except, of course, any cases where the first-born of any family was a *daughter*, or was *dead*, of which we shall speak presently. And these were not the first-born on the *father's* side, as Michaelis supposes, so that a man might have many wives and many children, but only one first-born, as was the case with Jacob himself. They are expressly stated to have been

* Simon: Hist. Crit. du Vieux Test, p. 40.

the first-born on the *mother's* side—"all the first-born that openeth the matrix." (Numbers iii. 12.) So that, according to the story in the Pentateuch, *every mother of Israel must have had, on the average, forty-two sons.**

Chap. iv. 3.—"From thirty." The Septuagint says, "from twenty-five," and the same in verses 23, 30, 35, and 47. In Chap. viii. 24, our own text makes the age of Levitical service from 25 to 30.

Verse 25.—"Badgers' skins." Bellamy urges that badgers as unclean animals were not allowed in the tabernacle. The Septuagint gives the word translated "badger" as a colour *azure*. The Vulgate and Douay, *violet*; but Gesenius and Bresslau are against this. Cahen says, *couverture de ta'hasch*. Newman and Parkhurst seem doubtful.

Chap. v. 8, 9, 10.—"But if the man have no kinsman to recompense the trespass unto, let the trespass be recompensed unto the Lord, even to the priest; beside the ram of the atonement, whereby an atonement shall be made for him. And every offering of all the holy things of the children of Israel, which they bring unto the priest, shall be his. And every man's hallowed things shall be his: whatsoever any man giveth the priest it shall be his." The rights of the priesthood are well looked after. God has in the Pentateuch well provided for the Levites whatever else may have been neglected. Here is a complete identification of the rights of the Lord with those of the priest, "Let the trespass be recompensed unto the Lord, even unto the priest." Whether or not this Book was at any time a revelation from God, it is quite clear that it has always been the interest of the priesthood to support it.

Verses 17 to 27.—We read of various ordeals amongst savage peoples, and it is customary to deplore the ignorance and barbarity of the nations amongst whom these customs are allowed to prevail. If we abide by this style of criticism, what must we say of the legislator who established or adopted the ordeal of the waters of jealousy?—"And the priest shall take holy water in an earthern vessel; and of the dust that is in the floor of the tabernacle the priest shall take, and put it into the water." "Holy water." What

* Colenso, Part I., p. 84.

was the nature of this water? Josephus says the priest took the dust "if any happened to be there." Cahen says that according to the Talmud, something was put into the water to render it bitter. Josephus adds, if the woman was unjustly accused she became with child, and was delivered in the tenth month Verse 28 gives some sort of colour to the same notion. Cahen observes that though full provision is made for punishment of the guilty woman, not the least word is said of any punishment for the calumniating husband in case of the woman's innocence; on the contrary, it appears by verse 31, that the man was to be held guiltless.

"Among the ancient nations means were sought for compelling—so to speak—God to declare clearly his will, to distinguish the just from the unjust, the innocent from the culpable; hence the judgments termed judgments of God, the ordeals of the Middle Ages, of which duelling remains a sad relic. Ideas more just as to the action of Providence have suppressed among civilised nations those blasphemous modes of interrogating the divine will; but they still exist in the Indies and among the tribes of Africa. Vater makes the following reflections on this subject :—Grotius has gathered together all the passages of the ancient Greek and Latin authors, wherein mention is made of certain waters to which was attributed the virtue of punishing perjury; but it is still more remarkable that a similar custom exists, and for a similar case, in the neighbourhood of Sierra Leone, among the Mandingus and the Berlamets. It is regarded as an act of religion, and as such is executed by a priest. They steep in water the bark of a tree named *Macon* (?); the effect is less dangerous for the rich than for the poor; death often follows before the end of the year. The law treated of in the text appears to be rather a means of terror, and cannot be considered as coming from God, nor even from a man judicious and humane, for all the infamy falls upon the woman. We must consider it at the best as a political law, invented to put bounds to the ill-founded suspicions of orientals, ever so jealous of the honour of their wives. (Geddes). See Vater, *Nomb.* pp. 28-9."*

* Cahen: Nombres, p. 29.

Bellamy says—"This statement of the trial for jealousy is—as it stands in the common versions—irreconcilable with the divine proceeding in every part of Scripture; it is undignified as it has respect to God who is the speaker; and we do not find that water being set apart for any particular purpose, when consecrated, was made more holy, or possessed any virtues more than the common river water of Jordan. It was not possible for a distinction to be made between the innocent and the guilty, by simple water and dust, which the woman was made to swallow, unless a perpetual miracle had been performed; which then might have been exhibited at the whim of any man, even of the worst of men, who might have chosen to suppose that his wife was incontinent. And thus the divine communication might have been made subservient to the licentious. It is undignified as it has respect to God, who is made to say, Such shall be the effect of this water; because this discriminating power rested with God only, which might have been determined by the suspected party being brought before God, and who could have pronounced the guilt or the innocence of the woman, without having recourse to a proceeding of this nature; as he did in other cases. It was a proceeding which would have been so easily and so deceptionally practised by the idolators; who would not have been at a loss how to have caused gripings and swellings among their followers, when it had suited their interests or convenience."*

Chap. vi.—Lessius argues that these Nazarites were a kind of monks existing amongst the Egyptians long prior to the Mosaic era. The burning of the hair, referred to in verse 18, appears to be the adoption of a custom prevalent amongst many Pagan nations who left the human hair to grow to a considerable length, and then offered it to some deity by way of sacrifice.

Chap. vii. 1.—Cahen observes that this chapter ought more properly to follow after Exodus, chap. xl., v. 16, as the completion of the tabernacle belongs to that date, the second month of the first year, and does not follow the date with which Numbers commences—viz., the first day of the second month of the second year of the Exodus.

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* Bellamy: New Translation, p. 370.

Verse 2.—"Heads of the house." The Septuagint has "twelve chiefs of the house."

Verse 14.—"One spoon." In the Douay it is "a little mortar." Cahen "a cup." The Breeches Bible, "an incense cup;" and so in vv. 20, 26, 32, 38, 44 50, 56, 62, 68, 74, 80, 86, except Cahen, who has afterwards "spoon."

In verse 72, the Hebrew word "day,' יום IUM, is twice repeated, and the same surplusage exists in verse 78.

Verse 89.—"And when Moses was gone into the tabernacle of the congregation to speak with him, then he heard the voice of one speaking unto him from off the mercy-seat that was upon the ark of testimony, from between the two cherubims; and he spake unto him." This voice is uttered in the hearing of no one but Moses. The Douay reads, "And when Moses entered into the tabernacle of the covenant to consult the oracle, he heard the voice of one speaking to him from the propitiary that was over the ark between the two cherubims, and from this place he spake to him." Is not this similar to the oracle-consulting of other nations? It is admitted now, by all intelligent men, that the oracles of Delphos, of Ammon, and of Dodona, were only instances of jugglery and cunning, practised by the priests on the people. In what respects are the oracles of the Jews superior? In one of the temples uncovered at Pompei there is a god with a partially hollow body, in which there is enough room for the priest to have concealed himself when delivering the oracle. "The general characteristics of oracles," says a writer in Brande, "were ambiguity, obscurity, and convertibility; so that one answer would agree with several various, and sometimes directly opposite, events. Thus when Crœsus was on the point of invading the Medes he consulted the oracle of Delphi as to the success of the enterprise, and received for answer, "That by passing the River Halys, he would ruin a mighty empire." But whether it was his own empire, or that of his enemies, that was destined to be ruined was not intimated, and in either case the oracle could not fail to be right. The answer of the oracle to Pyrrhus is another well-known instance of this sort of ambiguity. '*Aio, te Æacida, Romanos, vincere posse*'—as it might either be interpreted in favour of or against Pyrrhus. This ambiguity and

equivocation were not, however, the worst feature that characterised the oracles of antiquity. They were at once ambiguous and venal. A rich or a powerful individual seldom found much difficulty in obtaining a response favourable to his projects, how unjust or objectionable soever. But such and so powerful is the influence of superstition, that this system of fraud and imposture maintained a lengthened ascendancy, and interested responses of the oracles frequently sufficed to excite bloody wars, and to spread desolation through extensive States." It is worthy of notice that while throughout this chapter we find bullocks, sheep. and goats, plenty for sacrifice, yet three chapters on we find the Israelites complaining of utter absence of flesh food.

Chap. viii. 4.—"According unto the pattern which the Lord had showed Moses." We have already referred to this in Exodus, p. 273. Can any sane person imagine that the infinite Creator presented on Sinai to the gaze of Moses heaven-made samples of golden candlesticks?

Verse 8.—"With his meat offering, even fine flour." The Douay, "And for the offering thereof fine flour." The meat of our version does not exist in the Hebrew.

Verse 11.—"Shall offer the Levites before the Lord for an offering." The margin puts "wave" in lieu of offer, and "wave offering" in lieu of offering. Cahen, "*Tournoiera les Levites un tournoiement devant l'Eternal.*" The verb "*tournoyer*" is "to whirl," to turn round, which would make Cahen's translation, "Shall turn round the Levites a turn roundabout before the Lord." The Breeches Bible says, "Shall offer the Levites before the Lord as a shake offering." In v. 13, where nearly the same words occur, Cahen uses the same terms as in v. 11. So also the Breeches Bible; but the Douay has, "Shall consecrate them being offered to the Lord."

Chap. ix. 1.—Having commenced the book, chap. i., v. 1, with the second month of the second year, we now go back to the first month, showing that the order of date is little cared for. To account for similar irregularities, Richard Simon * suggests that the Pentateuch was written on leaves rolled together, and that the order of some of these leaves has been changed.

* Vieux Testament, Histoire Critique du, p. 35

Verse 6.—"Defiled by the dead body of a man." The Douay has, "Unclean by occasion of the soul of a man."

Verse 16.—The words "by day," are not in the Hebrew, but they are in the Septuagint and Vulgate.

Verse 22.—"Or a year." Cahen says that these words are wanting in six Hebrew MSS., as they are also wanting in the Septuagint. The Douay has "a longer time."

Verse 23.—"At the commandment of the Lord they rested in the tents, and at the commandment of the Lord they journeyed; they kept the charge of the Lord, at the commandment of the Lord by the hand of Moses." And yet despite all this obedience to the commandments of the Lord so often given personally to the Jews, the whole history of their wanderings in the desert is made up of disobediences and offences.

Chap. x. 6.—In the Septuagint this verse is much longer, containing the directions for the third and fourth soundings for the western and northern divisions.

Verse 9.—"And if ye go to war in your land against the enemy that oppresseth you, then ye shall blow an alarm with the trumpets; and ye shall be remembered before the Lord your God, and ye shall be saved from your enemies." This conveys the notion that the trumpet sounding might recall the Israelites to God's memory.

Verse 12.—"And the cloud rested in the wilderness of Paran." "The general notion, I say, is, that this cloud was an atmospheric cloud; that it went before them to direct them in the way, and that when they saw it stationary they rested; that during the long period of forty years they were in a solitary wilderness, where there were no inhabitants but themselves. This is liable to objections. It has been said by objectors, "If a cloud had gone before them, and it had been a common atmospheric cloud, as has been, and is understood by the generality of people at this day, it must, when it rested, have been in the sight of the Hebrews always stationary on the top of the tabernacle, and consequently must never have removed till the time of their journeying. Why was this cloud called *the cloud of the Lord*, and not a cloud of the sky? say objectors, as in other parts of Scripture, when a cloud of the sky is meant. Where was the necessity to watch day and night for the resting of the

cloud, in order to know where they were to remain, when this information could with far greater propriety have been given before they departed? Concerning this cloud, see Exodus, chap. xl. Such are the objections which have been, and continue to be made by intelligent men, from the groundless notion that this cloud was a cloud of the sky, which went before them in all their journeys. That the place to which they were to go was made known to them before they departed cannot be doubted; and, therefore, there was no necessity for a cloud to go before them; a perpetual miracle to be done in this way."*

Verse 21.—"And the Kohathites set forward, bearing the sanctuary; and the other did set up the tabernacle against they came." There is no authority for the words "the other" in the Hebrew. It is difficult to comprehend what this verse means Some regard the second half of the verse as an interpolation.

Verse 33.—Cahen asks how the ark could go in front and before the Israelites, when its place was fixed between the first and second standards?

Verse 34.—"Of the Lord." These words are not in the Septuagint, and Cahen says they are wanting in at least one MS. Jarhi says that vv. 35 and 36 are not in their proper place here.†

CHAP. xi. 1.—"And when the people complained, it displeased the Lord; and the Lord heard it; and his anger was kindled; and the fire of the Lord burnt among them, and consumed them that were in the uttermost parts of the camp." "The Lord heard it." The Hebrew is "to the ears of the Lord." The Septuagint "to the eyes of the Lord;" and instead of "the uttermost parts," the Septuagint has "a part." The text does not say why the people complained.

Verse 4.—See commentary on Exodus, p. 210. Some of the early Jewish writers ask how it was that the Israelites could already be in want of flesh, while they had on leaving Egypt "flocks and herds, even very much cattle?"

Verse 8.—"And baked it in pans, and made cakes of it; and the taste of it was as the taste of fresh oil." The Douay

* Bellamy, New Translation, p. 379.

† Nombres, p. 54.

says, "and boiled it in a pot, and make cakes thereof of the taste of bread tempered with oil." According to Exodus xvi. 32, the taste was like that of honey. Cahen says that the oleaginous substance known as manna does not seem easy to grind in mills or in a mortar. Le Clerc and others have thought that the verses 7, 8, and 9 which here break awkwardly into the narrative are an interpolation.

Verses 11 to 15.—Moses talks to God in a very strange fashion; he is querulous and reproachful. The "nursing father," of verse 12 is incorrect. The Douay, Bellamy, and Cahen render it "nurse." God's replies to Moses are on a par with the style of the Jewish leader's address. God says, "I will come down and talk with thee;" "Is the Lord's hand waxed short?" Bellamy, in a note to verse 12, remarks that it does not appear that the translators or compilers of the Vulgate understood the grammar of the language; and the revisers of the translation in the time of James appear either not to have understood it, or to have given no attention to the Hebrew.

Verse 29.—In this verse the word רוח RU*a*Ch, is twice translated "spirit." In verse 31 the same word is translated "wind" (see commentary on Genesis, p. 11).

Verse 33.—"Ere it was chewed." The Douay, "and that kind of meat had not yet failed." If our version be true that the people were smitten with the plague before they had time to digest their gathering, then verse 20 is contradicted, where the Lord says that the people shall eat for one month.

Chap. xii. 1.—"The Ethiopian." In a foot-note to the Douay Bible, and by many commentators. it has been sought to identify this Ethiopian with Zipporah, the daughter of the priest of Midian. Cahen, however, points out that the Cushites (the word כשית KeShITh being the Hebrew which is rendered Ethiopian) were a distinct race from the Midianites. Dr. Giles says* that, admitting the identity of the Cushite woman with Jethro's daughter, the manner in which her name is mentioned is perfectly incompatible with her having been already described, and that so fully in Exodus ii., as the daughter to the priest of Midian, and married to Moses, possibly several years before the

* Hebrew Records, p. 222.

strife which Miriam and Aaron now stirred up on her account. This leads to the following conclusion, either that the two accounts of the wife of Moses were written by two distinct authors, or that the Ethiopian woman whom Moses married was not the same as the daughter of Jethro, priest of Midian. In the former case the whole Pentateuch, as it now is, cannot be considered as the work of Moses; in the latter case, the mixture of the Israelites with other tribes would appear to have begun very early after the Exodus, and to have been carried to a very great extreme. If the Cushite or Ethiopian woman be the same Zipporah of Exodus, you have the further difficulty, says Cahen,* that Moses had been married to Zipporah 42 years at the time of this incident.

Verse 3.—"Now the man Moses was very meek, above all the men which were upon the face of the earth." This is one of the many verses which have puzzled commentators,† and afforded grounds for the declaration that Moses cannot have thus written of himself. Many somewhat orthodox critics incline to the doctrine that this verse is an interpolation.

Father Simon reminds‡ us that we ought not to be too curious as to the particular authors of each book, it being sufficient, according to Pope Gregory, of saintly memory, to admit that all these books have been written under inspiration. The Douay says that "Moses being the meekest of men, would not contend for himself; therefore, God inspired him to write here his own defence; and the Holy Spirit, whose dictates he wrote, obliged him to declare the truth, though it was so much to his own praise."

Verse 8.—"With him will I speak mouth to mouth, even apparently, and not in dark speeches; and the similitude of the Lord shall he behold; wherefore then were ye not afraid to speak against my servant Moses?" In the Douay the whole of the portion of this verse here given in the future tense is rendered in the present tense. Cahen agrees with the Douay. He remarks that the anthropomorphic phraseology of this verse has given great trouble to the commen-

* Cahen, p. 62.
† Spinoza: Tractacus Theologico-Politicus, cap. 8, sec. 15.
‡ Histoire Critique Vieux Test, p. 2.

tators. The anger of God directed against Miriam and not against Aaron, though both appear to have offended, and the curious conversation between the Jewish Deity and Moses and Aaron, are deserving of close attention. The true believer may discover the hidden greatness; to an infidel the notion of the Lord "coming down," the picture of God as he "stood in the door of the tabernacle," Moses seeing *the form* or "similitude of the Lord," are so many evidences of the puerility of Judaistic theology.

Chap. xiii. 8.—"The son of Nun." The Septuagint has "the son of Naue."

Verse 16.—"And Moses called Oshea the son of Nun Jehoshua." Why our version alters the end of the name as well as the beginning is hard to say. In the Hebrew the only change is the letter י Yod, at the commencement. In Acts vii. 45, Joshua is called Jesus, and Dr. Wall argues that the Hebrew text has been corrupted in this word, which he says should be Yeshua, the Hebrew equivalent for Jesus.*

Verse 22.—"Hebron" (*vide* commentary on Genesis, p. 90).

Verses 23 and 24.—"Brook of Eshcol." It is suggested that this naming cannot fairly be supposed to have taken place until after the Israelites entered the land, and that consequently the book itself could not have been written by Moses.†

Chap. xiv.—It is not unworthy of notice that although the descendants of Abraham are supposed to have been surely maltreated by the Egyptians, even to the extent of slaughtering the male born Jews, yet the Israelites are ever anxious to return to the land of Egypt. God's displeasure at the murmuring of the Jews is in this instance scarcely reasonable. Under divine commands Moses had selected twelve prominent men to make a survey of the Promised Land and to report to the people. Ten of these make an evil report of the land, and draw a highly coloured picture of the dangers attending any attempt to conquer it. Two, Caleb and Joshua, gave a contrary version,

* Grounds for Revision of Hebrew Text, p. 136.
† Giles's Hebrew Records, p. 133.

but the Hebrews put their faith in the majority, and at least talked of stoning the two dissentient reporters. God was displeased that the Israelites believed the majority, and he, in somewhat the same language as may be found in Exodus xxxii., said that he would smite the Israelites with pestilence, and make Moses a greater and mightier nation. As on the former occasion, Moses sought to influence God by telling him that if he kills all this people as one man, the nations will say that he did it because he was not able to bring the people to the Promised Land. On this God, the immutable, ultimately changed his determination, and yet the orthodox of to-day refer to the Bible for elevated conceptions of Deity.

Verse 2.—The word "God," twice repeated in this verse, has no equivalent in the Hebrew, nor in the Septuagint or the Latin Vulgate.

Verse 10.—After the words "the glory of God appeared," the Septuagint adds, "in a cloud." Our version says the glory appeared "in" the tabernacle; the Douay says that it appeared "over" the tabernacle.

Verses 13 and 14.—The Douay renders these verses as though both the Egyptians and the inhabitants of this land would talk depreciatingly of the Lord, while our version makes it that the Egyptian would speak of the Lord's doings to the inhabitants of this land. Cahen says that the construction of these two verses is very complicated.

Verse 18 is nearly a repetition of Exodus xxxiv. 7. The Jews, Cahen says, have a tradition that when Moses ascended to the Lord he found him writing "The Lord is long suffering." "For the just only?" asked Moses. "For the sinners also," was the Lord's reply, and that it was for this reason that Moses on each of these occasions repeated this formula.

Verse 22.—"Ten times." These ten times are supposed to be—1st, Exodus, xiv., 12; 2nd, xv., 23 and 24; 3rd, xvi., 3, 4th, xvi., 20; 5th, xvi., 27; 6th, xvii., 2 and 3; 7th, xxxii.; 8th, Numbers, xi., 1; 9th, xi., 4; 10th, the murmuring here recorded.

Verse 23.—Cahen says, "If this were the judgment of an ordinary tribunal, the punishment would appear to be out of proportion to the fault. God had himself commanded

the exploration of the country, and twelve notable men worthy of confidence had been chosen; ten making an unfavourable report, it was natural the people should believe them, yet for this God punishes the Israelites more severely than when they joined in the worship of the golden calf.

Verse 25.—("Now the Amalekites and the Canaanites dwelt in the valley.") The words seem abruptly interpolated. There is a sudden break off in the narrative, and the words as they stand in our version, have no connection with the text preceding or following them.

Verse 34.—"And ye shall know my breach of promise." Bellamy says, "This passage has caused much controversy. . . . It has been asserted by many eminent and learned men, that God, because of his absolute sovereignty not being accountable, had a right to break his promise. . . . . Thus it represents the source of all good as capable of doing those things which would be disgraceful to man; he who is unchangeable as subject to change; subject to all the fallen passions of man; and what is worse (objectors say) it represents the being of all perfection as capable of violating his sacred promise." Bellamy avoids this hostile criticism by translating the words "know my breach of promise" as "experience my threatenings." Cahen says that the word on which so much depends, and which he translates "absence," making it "know my absence," is only found in one other place in the Bible, Job xxxiii. 10.* The Douay renders it "know my revenge." Sharpe writes it "know my estrangement."

Verse 35.—"I will surely do it unto all," Bellamy renders thus, "Surely I will not do this to any." He says our translators have omitted the negative, לֹא LA.

Verses 43 to 45.—In Exodus xvii. 14 and 16, God swore to utterly put out the remembrance of Amalek from under heaven, and to have war with them from generation to generation. From this chapter it is evident that God had not kept the first portion of his oath, and that he had suspended the second. Here he aids and assists the Amalekites to destroy the Israelites.

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* In our version it is there translated "occasions." See also Etheridge on Targums, p. 282.

Verse 45.—"Hormah."* This verse could not have been so written in the life time of Moses, as the city of Zephath was not called Hormah until after the death of Joshua (*vide* Judges i. 17): in chap. xxi., 1 to 3, we find an account of the destruction of certain cities, and the naming the place Hormah, which is apparently inconsistent with the account in Judges. After the word Hormah, which the Septuagint writes Erman, that version adds, "and they returned to the camp." "This" (says Dr. Shuckford, as quoted in the Family Bible) "was effected in the days of Joshua (Joshua xii. 14) or a little after his death" (Judges i. 17) Yet Dr. Shuckford did not perceive that the relation of an event, which happened in or after the days of Joshua, could not have come from the pen of Moses.

Chap. xv.—This chapter seems out of place, having no connection with the one which precedes or the one which follows.

Chap. xv. 7, and chap. xxviii. 7.—We draw the attention of Dr. Lees and the United Kingdom Alliance to the special utility of the Bible as a book for total abstainers from wine and strong drink.

Verses 32 to 35.—You have here an application of the law of Exodus xxxi. 14 and 15. To-day these Bible enactments are obsolete, and if twenty Jews were now indicted for killing a man whom they had found gathering sticks on Sunday, the judges, notwithstanding that Christianity is parcel of the law of England, would rule that the Pentateuchal law was of no avail as a plea against the common law, and the Jews would be convicted, if not of murder, at any rate of manslaughter.

Chap xvi. contains the history of a rebellion on the part of Korah, Dathan, Abiram, and On, against the authority of Moses, connected with which there are several curious features; the rebels are swallowed up and consumed by a sort of earthquake, explosion, and fire, which of course is sent by the Lord; but as Moses took a whole day to make the necessary preparations, it is quite possible to account for the destruction of Korah and his party in a less miraculous manner. It is apparent that Moses had a direct interest in

* Giles's Hebrew Records, p. 135.

the destruction of these men, who wished to share the priestly power which Moses was limiting to the family of his brother Aaron.

By verses 29 and 30 it is clear that the manner of their destruction was pre-arranged by Moses; and it is also clear that the Israelites themselves took this view of the matter, for in verse 41 we find them charging Moses and Aaron with having killed the people of the Lord. There are one or two puzzling features in the story. It is difficult to understand how Korah's children escaped if verses 27, 32, and 33 be true; yet we are told in chap. xxvi. 11, "the children of Korah died not." It is clear from the murmurings of the people that they did not regard the death of Korah and his associates as an act of God's wrath. The only impression made seems to have been that it increased their discontent against Moses. In the Hebrew the last fifteen verses of this chapter become the first fifteen of chap. xvii.

Chap. xvii. 1 to 8.—This miracle of Aaron's rod budding amongst the other rods was easy of accomplishment, when we remember how carefully the tabernacle was guarded by Moses and his selected priests, who had every facility for changing one rod for a branch from a fruit-bearing tree. The rod, according to this account, budded, blossomed, and bore almonds all within twenty-four hours.

Verse 6 says there were "twelve rods, and the rod of Aaron was among their rods." The Douay says, "there were twelve rods beside the rod of Aaron."

Verses 12 and 13.—These verses are a sufficient evidence of the care taken by Moses to prevent the people inspecting too closely his thaumaturgic tabernacle. Cahen adds as comment to this and the foregoing chapter, "Behold an earthquake, a miraculous burning, a plague, a miraculous vegetation—four prodigious events thrown together to legitimise the exclusive sacerdotal supremacy of one family."

Chap. xviii. 10.—"In the most holy place shalt thou eat." Most holy place should be "holy of holies." Sharpe and Bellamy so translate it. Cahen renders it "*saint des saints*," and observes that the verse is embarrassing because there was a prohibition against any person entering except the high priest on the day of expiation.

Verse 15.—See chap. iii., 12 and 14. There is some con-

fusion in these texts, as by the earlier text it was only the surplus number of first born Israelites beyond the number of the Levites, who were to be redeemed with money—here all are to pay the five shekels.

Verse 18.—But see Deuteronomy xii., 17 and 18, and xv. 19 and 20. There is an inconsistency in these texts. One gives the whole flesh to the Levites, the other does not.

Verses 20 to 24.—It is much to be regretted that our priests never imagined that this part of the revelation had any personal relation to them; great attention has been paid to the tithe part of the Book, but our reverend pastors have most wonderfully overlooked the part which says, "Thou shalt have no inheritance in their land." This, they say, only applies to the Jews. On what principle, then, does the tithe injunction or any other part of the Book apply to the Gentiles? The extraordinary quantity of food provided in this and other chapters for the family is out of all reason.

Chap xix. contains a direction to the priest to burn a red heifer, the ashes of which heifer apparently become water, by a process not described, but consequent on the burning; or rather, if the translators of our version had condescended to be explicit, I suppose they only meant, as stated in verse 17, that the ashes are to be mixed with water. This water is a kind of holy water, with which every unclean person is to be sprinkled, under pain of death. Among a people so numerous as the Jews, some must have had great difficulty in getting access to this water, especially those residing at a great distance from the place where the ashes were kept. Cahen says that this commandment as to the red cow must be placed amongst the irrational enactments, and points out that it is almost an imitation of one of the Egyptian sacrifices in the worship of Osiris and Isis.

Verse 2.—The Douay and Bellamy make Eleazer himself kill the red heifer, while our version makes one slay her before Eleazer's face. In truth the whole of the Hebrew of this chapter is very obscure as to the persons who are to perform the particular acts.

Verse 13.—"The dead body of any man that is dead." Those who defend the style of the orthodox version will perhaps say if it is possible to have the dead body of any man that is alive.

Verse 20.—"The first month." But of what year? Cahen says that the end of the narrative would make you think it the 40th year, and he adds that it is curious that you only find records in the Pentateuch of the events of the first and second and the 40th years, the history of the intermediate 37 years being left entirely unknown.

In the Douay translation of verse 6, following the Latin Vulgate, we are told that Moses and Aaron cried to the Lord and said, "O Lord God, hear the cry of this people, and open to them thy treasure, a fountain of living water, that being satisfied, they may cease to murmur." These words are entirely omitted in our version, and it would seem that some other portion of the original account must be lost, as we find the Lord reproaching Moses and Aaron for their exhibition of unbelief, of which we have no account here. There is a strong similarity in the account here, and that in Exodus xi. In both cases the name Meribah follows the event.

Verses 23 to 29.—Aaron's death is rather curiously related; it was not only a sudden death, but one pre-arranged, and the account almost conveys the idea that Moses and Eleazer killed Aaron in the mount. Cahen says the account is a most singular one. Goethe says that "Aaron disappeared (*verschwunden*) shortly after he had proved refractory against Moses," and he afterwards quaintly adds—"Moses himself vanished as Aaron had vanished; and we err very much if Joshua and Caleb had not found it expedient to put an end to the rule, already born for years, of a narrow-minded man, and to despatch him after the so many unfortunates he had despatched before."

Chap. xxi., vv. 1 to 3.—This narration is perplexing; the Israelites certainly did not destroy all the Canaanites, and could scarcely have destroyed the cities of the Canaanites, until they had entered the land of Canaan, into which it is alleged they did not go in the lifetime of Moses.

The King of Arad is in Joshua, c. 12 v 14 one of the kings, destroyed after the death of Moses. Here the text calls him King Arad, and in Joshua King of Arad; the Hebrew is the same in both cases מלך ערד MeLeK OReD. Bellamy argues that there must be an error in the translation, for, he says, these cities were in being and were divided amongst the tribes on the division of the land.

V. 2.—"And Israel vowed a vow unto the Lord, and said, if thou wilt indeed deliver this people unto my hand, then I will utterly destroy their cities." This vow is in the nature of a bargain; God, according to v. 3, accepts the terms. Jacob made a similar sort of bargain, "if the Lord will do certain things, then the Lord shall be my God."

Verse 6.—Cahen says it is singular enough that when the people complained of the fatigues of the journey and bad food that they should be bitten by serpents to reduce them to silence.

V. 8.—In our version, verse 8, Moses is told to make a "fiery serpent;" in the Douay, he is told to make a "brazen serpent." In the Hebrew the word נחש NaChaSh rendered serpent in verses 6, 7 and 9, does not occur in v. 8 at all. The direction is, "make thee a שרף She RaPh." Cahen says, "It is known that amongst the Greeks and Egyptians the serpent was a symbol of medicine. The serpent is the emblem of Esculapius. Perhaps the words serap and serapis have some analogy. Parkhurst says * "It may perhaps be worth remarking that Esculapius, the Roman God of Health, was feigned to have been brought to Rome from Epidaurus, a city of Peloponesus, in the form of a large serpent, and that his image is usually represented holding in one hand a knotted stick with a serpent twisted round it."

The names of the encampments given here do not agree with those given in chap. 33. There are places omitted here which are mentioned in the other chapter, and places named here of which there is no record in cap. 33.

Verse 14.—"The Book of the wars of the Lord." What book is this? Who was the author of it? What has become of it? Was it inspired? If not, why is it cited as an authority in this book for which inspiration is claimed? In answer to all these questions, it is only possible to say that the book referred to is, although the first and only book specially quoted in the Pentateuch, one of several books quoted from in our Bible, and now lost; the authorship is unknown; it must have been a well-known book at the time Numbers was written, and, consequently, more ancient than Numbers.

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* Lexicon 773.

It is evident the writers of Paul's Epistles, the Epistle of Jude, and the Acts of the Apostles, must have had writings to refer not now extant, as there are references made in those portions of the New Testament to facts not recorded in the Hebrew Scripture handed down to us.

Dr. Giles has collected* a list of the various books referred to in different parts of our version, and not now existing, and has also noted several references in the Old and New Testament to facts of which no records now survive.

In St. Paul's Epistle to the Hebrews, ix., 19, we read thus:—

"For when Moses had spoken every precept to all the people, according to the law, he took the blood of calves and of goats, with water and scarlet wool, and hyssop, and sprinkled both the book and all the people."

The writer of this epistle must also have had more sources of information than we now possess, for the account which he gives in the verse before us does not exactly tally with any of the various verses in the Levitical Law, where the subject is related. Nothing is said of the "book" being sprinkled with the blood, even if the other parts of the description are allowed to bear a sufficient resemblance.

Another remarkable instance bearing upon my present argument, is the account which St. Jude gives of a contest between Michael and the devil:—

"Yet Michael, the archangel, when contending with the devil he disputed about the body of Moses, durst not bring against him a railing accusation, but said, 'Lord rebuke thee?'"

It is not known to what St. Jude alludes in this verse; nothing is said in the Old Testament of any contest between the devil and the archangel Michael.

In St. Paul's Second Epistle to Timothy, chap. iii, v. 8, are found the names of two of the magicians who competed with Moses in magical arts in the presence of Pharaoh, King of Egypt

"Now, as Jannes and Jambres withstood Moses, so do these also resist the truth; men of corrupt minds, reprobate concerning the faith."

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* Hebrew Records, pp. 39 to 42, and pp. 199 to 204.

It is presumed that the names, "Jannes" and "Jambres," not found in the Books of Moses, became known to St. Paul through the medium of other writings, in which many particulars of Jewish history were recorded, but now no longer in existence.

Several circumstances of the life and acts of Moses are known to us, only because they are noticed in the New Testament, no mention being made of them in the old Jewish Scriptures. For instance, in Acts vii., v. 22, etc., we are told that—

"Moses was learned in all the wisdom of the Egyptians, and was mighty in words and deeds. And when he was full forty years old, it came into his heart to visit his brethren of Israel," etc.

But in the Book of Exodus the account of these things is much shorter, and nothing is said of the age of Moses at the time referred to.

Neither is there any authority in the Pentateuch for the remark which occurs in Hebrews xi, 24:—

"By faith Moses, when he came to years, refused to be called the son of Pharaoh's daughter."

These circumstances make it probable that there were other original records in the time of St. Paul, which have since perished.

This conclusion is supported by the admitted fact that many books which have perished are quoted in the Old Testament itself. Such are the books of Jasher, Enoch, the Wars of the Lord, and many others.

A perplexing train of argument opens to us from a consideration of these facts. If the books which have perished were of value, why have they perished? If they were of no value, why have valuable writers, like St. Paul, quoted them? It is supposed that they were of inferior authority, but this point has not been proved. If the existing books are genuine relics of a high antiquity, yet some of the lost books were more ancient still. The same Providence which has preserved the one has suffered the others to sink, even though those which have floated down the stream of time are imperfect on many points, which the others would have supplied.

Cahen following Mendelssohn, regards the quotation from

the lost book of the wars of the Lord, as commencing verse 14 and ending verse 21.

Verse 27.—Wherefore they that speak in proverbs say—The Douay has "Therefore it is said in the proverbs." Cahen "*C'est pour quoidisent les poetes.*" "Wherefore the poets say." He remarks, "The author wished to prove that Heshbon was a city of Sihon, and cites the stanza of a poem." Is this another unknown writing more ancient than the Pentateuch. Bellamy to avoid the difficulty translates the verse in the future "Therefore they shall say in proverbs." A convenient language the Hebrew for theological disputation.

In chap. xxiv. 3 and 15, our version reads, "The man whose eyes are open;" the Douay has it in each verse following the Vulgate, "The man whose eye is stopped up;" the Breeches Bible renders it, "The man whose eyes were shut up." Cahen translates the concluding sentence of each "discours de l'homme à l'æil percant," and observes that according to tradition Balaam was blind. The Septuagint gives it—"The man seeing truly," or "seeing truth;" Bellamy, "The man whose eye was shut."

Verse 7.—Agag is a difficulty. The Bible Agag is many generations later than Balaam. Some seek to bring this writing to the period of Saul or David.

Verse 16.—"Which saw the vision of the Almighty, falling into a trance, but having his eyes open."

Verses 4 and 16.—The words "into a trance" have no authority in the Hebrew. Bellamy* objects very strongly to this translation, as in some measure justifying the tendency to believe in witchcraft and necromancy, but his own version is hardly an improvement.

Verse 24.—"And ships shall come from the coast of Chittim." Bellamy has, "For beasts from the power of Shittim;" the Douay, "They shall come in galleys from Italy."

Chap. xxv. 1.—If the "Shittim" here mentioned is the same as in chap. xxxiii. 49, it is the last station of the Israelites in the desert.

Verse 4.—According to our text all the heads of the

* New Translation, p. 420.

people were to be themselves hung. According to the Samaritan version and the Targums of Palestine, Onkelos, and Jerusalem, the heads of the people were to judge the Israelites and order the guilty to be hung. This "fierce anger of the Lord" to be abated by a glut of vengeance is inconsistent with Deuteronomy iv. 31, "The Lord thy God is a merciful God."

Verse 6.—"Brought unto his brethren a Midianitish woman." The Septuagint says he "conducted his brother to the Midianite." Josephus says that the Israelite married the Midianite.

Verses 7 and 8.—"And when Phinehas, the son of Eleazar, the son of Aaron the priest, saw it, he rose up from among the congregation, and took a javelin in his hand. And he went after the man of Israel into the tent, and thrust both of them through, the man of Israel and the woman through her belly. So the plague was stayed from the children of Israel." The Palestine Targum contains a record of twelve miracles wrought on this occasion *inter alia*. Phinehas carried the two bodies on the lance six miles throughout the whole camp without fatigue. It also states that the man who was killed by Phineas because he brought the Midianitish woman into the camp had reminded Moses that he himself had married the daughter of Jethro, a Midianite.

Verse 9.—"24,000." In 1. Corinthians, x. 8, the number is given as "23,000." Josephus says "14,000."

Chap. xxxvi. 4.—"Take the sum of the people" are added in our version without authority in the Hebrew. Cahen says that verses 3 and 4 have evidently been altered or are very defective. Our translators have striven here to make the text readable.

Verses 10 and 11.—The Douay says, "And there was a great miracle wrought; that when Core (Korah) perished, his sons did not perish." Our version* omits the miracle, but says that those destroyed "became a sign," and that "the children of Korah died not:" yet in chap. xvi. 32 and 33, we are told that "the earth opened her mouth, and swallowed them up, and their houses, and all the men that

* Cahen here agrees with our version.

appertained unto Korah, and all their goods, they and all that appertained unto them, went down alive into the pit, and the earth closed upon them, and they perished from among the congregation."

Verse 12.—Nemuel is called "Jemuel" in Genesis, xlvi. 10, and in Exodus vi. 15, but is Nemuel in 1 Chronicles iv. 24. The commencing N נ here and in Chronicles is I in Genesis. Jachin is in 1 Chronicles iv. 24 called Jarib the יכין IKIN, being changed to יריב IRIB, the second and fourth letters being altered.

Verse 13.—"Zerah" is called "Zohar" in Genesis, xlvi. 10, but the spelling is very different. Here the word is זרח ZeReCh, in Genesis צדר TzeCheR. The family of Ohad mentioned in Genesis is missing here, and also in 1 Chronicles iv. 1. The very numerous differences between this chapter and Genesis xlvi., and between the two books and the first book of Chronicles, should be sufficient to demolish the doctrine of plenary inspiration without a single word to give additional force to the facts.

Verse 15.—Zephon צפון TsePhUN is in Genesis xlvi.16., written Ziphion צפיון TsePhIUN.

Verse 16.—"Ozni" is called "Ezbon" in Genesis xliv. 16. Eri is in the Septuagint written *Addi*.

Verse 20.—Shelah is in the Septuagint written *Selom*.

Verse 21.—"Hamul." The Septuagint has "*Jamoun*." The Samaritan, according to Cahen, has a word sounding similarly to the Hebrew, but with different letters.

Verse 23.—"Pua" is called "Phuvah" in our version, Genesis, xlvi. 13, but in the Hebrew they are spelt alike פוה P.U.E.

Verse 24.—"Jashub" ישוב IShUB is called "Job" יוב IUB in Genesis, xlvi, 13.

Verse 30.—Jeezer איעזר AIOZeR. In the Septuagint this is *Achiezer* in this verse. In Joshua xvii. 2, our version gives us Abiezer, the letter ב being introduced after the first letter. Judges vi. 11 follows Joshua. The error here and in verse 24 apparently occurs by the omission in Numbers of the 2nd letter in each case. The Septuagint has probably had a version in this verse where the ב had been changed to כ or they have blundered and mistaken one for the other.

Verse 32.—Shemida is in the Septuagint *Sumaer.*

Verse 35.—"Becher of the family of the Bacharites" is omitted in the Septuagint. In 1 Chronicles vii, 20, in lieu of "Becher" you have "Bered," and in lieu of "Tahan" you have "Tahath;" the Septuagint has this "*Tanach.*'

Verse 38.—There is a difference in the number and names of the sons of Benjamin when compared with Genesis xlvi. and 1 Chronicles viii. In Genesis 10 sons are named, here 5 sons and 2 grandsons, sons of Bela. In Chronicles 5 sons differently named and 9 grandsons, sons of Bela. Ahiram אחירם AChIReM is in 1 Genesis xlvi. 21 Ehi אחי AChI, and in 1 Chronicles viii. 1, Aharah אחרח AChReCh. In the Septuagint all the names differ: Bela is *Bale,* Ashbel is *Asuber,* and Ahiram is *Jachiran.*

Verse 39.—Shupham in the Hebrew is שפופם ShePUPeM in Genesis xlvi. 21, it is Muppim. In 1 Chronicles viii. 1-2 Shupham does not occur at all amongst the five sons of Benjamin, but a similar name, Shephuphan, is put in verse 5 as a son of Bela; the only difference in the Hebrew being that the final ם is transformed into a final ן. Instead of Shupham the Septuagint has *Sophan,* and omits "of Hupham the family of the Huphamites" altogether.

Verse 40.—"Ard" ארד ARD, in the Septuagint *Adar* Addar אדר. This is only a transposition of the two last letters, but it is curious that the Septuagint of Numbers, and Hebraic of Chronicles should make the same blunder. Here Ard and Maaman are sons of Bela; so in Chronicles, in Genesis they are sons of Ephraim. Which is the correct account?

Verse 42.—Shuam is in the Septuagint. *Same* in Genesis xlvi. 23, it is Hushim חשים CheShIM, in lieu of שוחם ShUCheM Shuam.

Verse 45.—The words "of the sons of Beriah," which mean nothing here, are wanting in the Septuagint, and Cahen says are also wanting in the Samaritan.

Verses 54 to 56.—"To many thou shalt give the more inheritance, and to few thou shalt give the less inheritance: to every one shall his inheritance be given according to those that were numbered of him. Notwithstanding the land shall be divided by lot: according to the names of the tribes of their fathers they shall inherit. According

anger was kindled because he went." Cahen remarks that God, after having given permission to Balaam to go, is irritated because he has availed himself of the permission. The Jewish commentators have taken great trouble to explain away the text. Bellamy says: "In the 20th verse it is said, that God told Balaam he should go, but here we find it said—*and God's anger were kindled because he went.* Much has been written respecting this matter, by many commentators, and they have concluded their researches by saying that 'Moses, as became an historian, hath only stated the case, and left the reader to infer Balaam's crime. *If the men come and call thee, go.* But he rose up early, got himself ready, and went, without waiting to be called.' If the reader were 'to infer' the crime of Balaam, we might attribute a variety of crimes to the son of Beor; for every reader would form his own conclusion as to the crime; but to suppose that his crime consisted in his readiness to go with the princes of Balak, without their first calling on him, is too trifling for remark. They came for the express purpose, and Balaam had told them to wait till the morning, till he had received further information, and God permitted him to accompany them. Therefore, to the present day, we remain in profound ignorance respecting the crime of Balaam; and the holy character of God, by whose permission he went, is charged with inconsistency and injustice, in being angry at his going, and in opposing him on the way."

Verse 22.—"Angel of the Lord" מלאך יהוה MeLAK JEUE* The angel of the Lord stands in the way as שטן SheTeN, which is here called "adversary." The same word is in Job i., 6, 7, &c., written Satan. This angel of the Lord is represented with a "drawn sword," as though there were in reality an angelic armoury and harness of war for the angels.

Verse 28.—"And the Lord opened the mouth of the ass and she said." The pious Bellamy here repudiates our version. He says objectors say, "This statement, as it stands in the common version, exceeds everything in impos-

* See Pye Smith's "Christian Theology," p. 248, McCaul's, Kimchi on Zechariah, p. 9. Parkhurst's Lexicon, p. 368, "Bible what it is," p. 125, Genesis, and 168 Exodus.

see the land which I have given unto the children of Israel." The Septuagint reads, "Here ascend the mountain which is near the passage of the Jordan, the mount Nebo, and see the land of Canaan."

Chap. xxx.—Cahen gives the following *resumé* of the solemn sacrifices, "Daily, 2 lambs; Sabbath, 2 lambs; first of each month, 2 bulls, a ram, 7 lambs and a goat, total 11; Passover, 2 bulls, a ram, 7 lambs and a goat, total 11; Pentecost, the same, total 11; Trumpet Day, the same, total 11; Day of Atonement, the same, total 11; and of the tabernacles, 69 bulls, 105 lambs, 15 rams, 8 goats, total 197." Thus in 52 weeks they sacrifice 400 victims in addition to the individual sacrifices. This continual effusion of blood would necessarily give the Levites a hard and cruel character.*

Chap. xxx. 1.—In the Septuagint this verse is verse 40 of chap. xxxix.

Chap. xxii. 1.—"On this side Jordan, by Jericho:" the Douay has it over against where Jericho is situate "beyond the Jordan:" Bellamy, who says that the translation in our version is not accurate, gives it "on the passage by Jordan of Jericho," which reads very obscurely; the Hebrew is עבר (beyond, across, over, or on the other side). In Numbers, xxi. 13, our own translators make the same word "other side," which they here make "this side."† It is evident in this case either that the translators must have falsified the text to support their theory that Moses was the writer of the book, or that there is a very extraordinary coincidence of error.

Verse 9—"And God came unto Balaam, and said, what men are these with thee?" Many object that such a question from the All-wise is an absurdity; it is as reasonable as "Adam, where art thou?" More than one pious writer has been tempted to regard the story of Balaam as a legend. In verse 8, the word translated "Lord" is יהוה JEUE, in verse 9, "God" is אלהים ALEIM; verse 22, "And God's

* Nombres, p 143.

† This subject has been rather fully examined in Dr. Giles's "Hebrew Records," pp. 284 to 289. But see Horne's Introduction, *contra.*

to the lot shall the possession thereof be divided between many and few." Bellamy* remarks that it has been objected that if the determination were to be by lot it was most improbable, nay, nearly impossible, that the chance of the lottery should always be the larger portion to the largest number. Cahen adds† that according to the maps Simeon, the least numerous tribe, had an allotment as large in superficial extent as Dan, nearly the strongest.

Verse 58.—The Septuagint omits the Mahlites, and reverses the order of the Korathites and Mushites.

Cahen, after giving the result of the two numberings—

	1st numbering Numbers, chap. 1.	2nd numbering Chap 26.	Variation.
Reuben	46,500	43,730	2770
Simeon	59,300	22,200	37,100
Gad	45,650	40,500	5150
Judah	74,600	76,500	1900
Issachar	54,400	64,300	9900
Zebulun	57,400	60,500	3100
Ephraim	40,500	32,500	8000
Manasseh	32,200	52,700	20,500
Benjamin	35,400	45,600	10,200
Dan	62,700	64,400	1700
Asher	41,500	53,400	11,900
Napthali	53,400	45,400	8000
	603,550	601,730	1820
Levites	22,000	23,000	1000

adds—"Thus, despite the forty years, and notwithstanding the miserable life that the Israelites had led in the desert, in the face of plagues, diseases, pestilence, and wars, there was only a reduction of 1,820 Israelites, and an augmentation of 1,000 priests. Such results are not in the domain of natural things, and as a consequence are not in any way historic."‡ It is specially noteworthy that all the Israelites now numbered were men not included in the former census.

Chap. xxvii. 12.—"Get thee up into this mount Abarim, and

* New Translation, p. 427.
† Nombres, p. 133.
‡ Nombres, p. 132.

sibility that we meet with in the tales of the Talmud, the legends of the Koran, or the Veda of Brahma. It is true that a miracle is held forth by the translators, for which there is not any authority in the original; a miracle for which there was no necessity. Had such a miracle been done, some wise end must have been intended, but Balaam was not convicted by the speaking of the ass. He remained in the same state of mind, and would have killed the creature had he not been convicted by the unexpected visit and reproof of the messenger. Thus was the necessity of any miracle superseded by the presence of the messenger, or principal man in the ministry, under whose government Balaam officiated, who on seeing him beat the ass, accosted him by saying—*Wherefore hast thou smitten thine ass?* and thus *reproved the madness of Balaam.* Beside, a circumstance of so very extraordinary a nature would, no doubt, have alarmed Balaam; but we find, as it is stated in the common version, that he was neither alarmed nor surprised, as if he had been accustomed to converse with the animal and with angelic beings. This, as observed, has been the opinion from the earliest ages among Christians; an opinion founded on an erroneous translation of the passage, propagated from the time of Jerome, continued in the Vulgate, and finally copied into all the European translations; where it has been kept by bigotry and superstition to the present day, without appealing to the Hebrew verity."*

It is scarcely wonderful that the Midianites and Moabites should have looked upon Balaam as a prophet, whose curse or blessing would affect the success of the Jews. In the early ages we have many instances of persons revered by the people of their countries, and believed to possess supernatural powers of benefiting by blessing, or injuring by cursing. Amongst savage people such a superstition is common even to-day, and indeed has only died out amongst ourselves with the decay of the belief in witchcraft. The blessing or curse of the Pope still has its power for Roman Catholics; but is an inexplicable matter when we find the superstitions of the ignorant people shared by God himself. God communicated with Balaam, saying, "Thou shalt not curse this people." God at first forbade Balaam to go to Balak, afterwards gave him permission, and then God's anger

is kindled because Balaam, using the permission, went with Balak's messengers, and the angel of the Lord is sent to stand in Balaam's way. This angel is at first invisible to the wise man, Balaam, but is at once perceived by his ass. This angel has "his sword drawn in his hand"—this sword (being also at first only visible to the ass), must have been different material from the swords commonly in use. The ass obstinately refusing to go forward, is thrice beaten by Balaam. The ass indignantly remonstrates, inquiring why he is beaten, and Balaam manifests no surprise that his ass should speak. In any other book than the Bible none would regard this as other than fable.

Chap. xxiii.—"God is not a man that he should lie; neither the son of man, that he should repent: hath he said, and shall he not do it? or hath he spoken, and shall he not make it good?" Genesis, vi. 6.—"And it repented the Lord that he had made man on the earth, and it grieved him at his heart." 1 Samuel xv. 11.—"It repenteth me that I have set up Saul to be king." Verse 35.—"And the Lord repented that he had made Saul king over Israel." 2 Samuel xxiv. 11.—"And the Lord repented him of the evil." Exodus xxxii. 14.—"And the Lord repented of the evil which he thought to do unto his people." Verse 21.—"He hath not beheld iniquity in Jacob, neither hath he seen perverseness in Israel." What does the text mean then in Numbers xiv. 11 and 22, and Exodus xxxii. 9? &c.

Chap. xxxi. gives an account of the slaughter of the Midianites, and the destruction of their "cities" and "goodly castles" by 12,000 Jews, and the capture of 32,000 virgins, 675,000 sheep, 72,000 oxen, and 61,000 asses.* The number of slain is not given, but it is easy to ascertain a minimum, if we reckon to each virgin for father, mother, brother, married sisters and their husbands, and other married females and their husbands, an average of four persons—which I conceive will be an estimate much under the true amount—we shall find 128,000 to have been slaughtered by 12,000 Jews, who on their side did not lose a single soldier. The Hebrew list of killed and wounded is a blank page. This is a statement which would be rather difficult for an old soldier

* Pentateuch, part 1, p. 144.

to believe. This difficulty is increased when we remember that the Midianites dwelt in "cities" and "goodly castles," under shelter of which they could have contended against the attacks of the Jews. After all this fighting, the tired warriors must have had considerable trouble (especially if the captives merely opposed passive resistance) in bringing back the spoil, which averaged to each man (supposing that all the Jewish soldiers had escaped unhurt) nearly three virgins, fifty-six sheep, six oxen, and five asses, besides gold, silver, lead, iron, tin, brass, jewels, and other spoil. The Jews, however, were mighty warriors; and it has been previously noticed how two men slaughtered the whole of the inhabitants of a city. Verse 7, which says that the Jews slew "all the males," must be positively untrue, because if all were killed except the 32,000 virgins taken captive, there would be an end to the Midianitish nation; while in Judges, chap. vi., we actually find the Midianites more powerful than the Israelites. Bishop Colenso, who deals with this subject in almost the exact words of my former commentary, published some years prior to the Bishop's book, says, "How is it possible to quote the Bible as in any way condemning slavery, when we read here of Jehovah's tribute of slaves 'thirty-two persons?'" Dr. Colenso raises the further objection that taking the various other events crowded together after the death of Joshua, there was not time for the war on Midian. Cahen adds that the Midianitish slaughter is unmentioned in Deuteronomy, and declares that the numbers given in this chapter cannot be regarded as historical.

Verse 2.—The words אחר תאסף AChaR TASaPh, translated, "afterwards shalt thou be gathered" in our version, are given by Jacob Ben Chajim* as one of the five instances in which the Itur Sopherim is shown.

Verse 8.—"Reba." The Septuagint reads this *Robok.*

Verse 15.—"And Moses said unto them, have ye saved all the women alive?"

Verse 16.—"Behold, these caused the children of Israel, through the counsel of Balaam, to commit trespass against the Lord in the matter of Peor, and there was a plague

* Introduction to Rabinical Bible, p. 12.

among the congregation of the Lord." This counsel of Balaam is mentioned at length by Josephus.* but not in the Pentateuch. Have we lost the account from out of our sacred Scriptures? The Talmudic writings contain some similar statement.

Verse 17.—"Now therefore kill every male among the little ones, and kill every woman that hath known man by lying with him." Cahen observes: "We have here presented to us a terrible bath of blood. Even amongst the most cruel and most savage nations they had always spared the women and infants of both sexes. The legislator of the Hebrews was in no respect warlike, but, as the Bible presents him, was harsh and inflexible, and, like Samuel, without pity in his vengeance. In his adolescence he killed the Egyptian, in the case of the golden calf, where his brother was so much compromised, he ordered one portion of the people to slaughter the other, and now he ordains a massacre of women and children whom the warriors in their humanity had spared.† Le Clerc suggests that God would recompense the infants in the next world, but such an apology trenches on the ironical."

Verse 18.—This command appears likely to produce a repetition of the conduct condemned as an offence in c. xxv., and for which the Israelites were then so heavily punished.

Verse 22.—From the manner in which את and ואת are written in this verse, the Massorah say that "the gold belongs to the king," and the meaning is that this passage ought to be so. They demonstrate this from some fancied similarity in the construction of Joshua ix. 1. We lament our inability to comprehend the Massoretic explanation, and refer the more erudite to Jacob ben Chajim.‡

Verse 40.—"And the persons were sixteen thousand, of which the Lord's tribute was thirty and two persons." What became of the persons who fell to the Lord's share—were they offered as human sacrifice?§ The beasts were so offered; what became of the human beings? Human sacri-

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* Antiquities, Book 4, c. 6, § 6.

† Cahen, Nombres, 148.

‡ Introduction, p. 31.

§ See commentary on Exodus, p. 200, and Leviticus, p. 334.

fices prevailed amongst the ancient and barbarous peoples of the world, the Hebrew race were certainly no exceptions of mildness and kindliness.

Hartwell Horne takes notice of the objection raised to the cruelty involved in this chapter; his explanation is, however, very weak. He says that God, having determined the extirpation of the Midianitish nation, it was necessary to destroy all the males; but he forgets conveniently that although all the Midianitish men were destroyed, the Midianites were nevertheless not extirpated.* This forgetfulness is the more remarkable as in another part† of his work he does recollect that the Midianites so far recovered their *total extermination* as to conquer the Israelities and make them tributaries.

In another place Horne tries to meet the contradiction between this chapter and Judges by saying‡ "it is not said that all the males were extirpated." Surely verse 7 is conclusive; it absolutely says, "and they slew all the males." Kalisch reminds us that the Levites, though exempt from military service, had a share in the booty of the war. Bishop Watson§ says that he sees nothing in this account "but good policy combined with mercy."

Chap. xxxii. 40.—Machir must mean the tribe of Manasseh, or descendants of Machir—Machir himself must have been long since dead (see Genesis l. 23.)

Verse. 41.—Jair is here reckoned without explanation, as of the tribe of Manasseh, although, according to 1 Chron. ii. 21, he was by the paternal side of the tribe of Judah.

Chap. xxxiii.—Goëthe, in his 'Westostlicher Divan,' criticising the wilderness wanderings, urges that about thirty-eight out of the forty years are left unaccounted for, and that the stations given in this chapter are greatly in excess of those named in the narrative as given by Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy. Goëthe has tabulated most of the following details.‖

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* Hartwell Horne, vol. i., app. 3, sec. 5, par. 7.
† Vol. 3, part 1, cap. 1, § 3.
‡ Vol. 1, appendix 3, sec. 6, par. 33.
§ Letter 3 to Thomas Paine.
‖ But see Hartwell Horne, vol. 1, p. 544.

Verse 8.—"Wilderness of Etham" is in Exodus xv. 22, "Wilderness of Shur."

Verse 10.—"And they removed from Elim, and encamped by the Red Sea."

Verse 11.—"And they removed from the Red Sea, and encamped in the wilderness of sin." The encampment by the Red Sea is not mentioned in Exodus, which in xvi. 1 takes the Israelites from Elim to the wilderness of sin without intervening station.

Verse 12.—"Dopkah." The Septuagint has "Raphakah." In this and the following verse neither Dophkah nor Alush are mentioned in Exodus, which c. xvii. 1 takes the Jews from the wilderness of sin to Rephidim.

Verse 16.—"Taberah." Numbers xix. 3 is not mentioned here, but it is not clear that it was a separate station.

Verse 18.—According to Goëthe, neither Rithmah nor any of the seventeen following places are in any way alluded to in the narrative of the Israelitish wanderings; but although Goëthe was accurate in stating that none of the stations from Rithmah to Hashmonah appear to be mentioned, yet a reference in Deut. x. 6 must have escaped the German poet.

Verse 22.—"Kehelathah." Here and in the next verse the Septuagint substitutes *Makellath*.

Verse 26.—"Tahath." In this and the following verse the Septuagint reads "*Kataath*."

Verse 27.—"Tarah." Here and in verse 28, the Septuagint has "*Tarath*," the ת being mistaken for ת, or *vice versa*.

Verse 29.—"Hashmonah." Here and in verse 30 the Septuagint has *Selmona*.

Verse 31.—"And they departed from Moseroth, and pitched in Bene-jaakan." In the Septuagint, Bene-jaakan is written *Banaia*. In Deuteronomy x. 6, Bene-jaakan comes before Moseroth (there written Mosera), and from Mosera, according to Deuteronomy, the Israelites go to Gudgodah, which I suppose is identical with Horadgidgad, which in verse 32 of this chapter they reach from Bene-jaakan.

Verse 35.—"Ezion-gaber" occurs in quite a different order before Bene-jaakan and Moseroth. (See Deuteronomy ii. 8.)

Verse 38.—There is a clear contradiction between this verse and chap. xx. 23—29, on the one hand, and Deuteronomy x. 6. Horne explains this transaction in two modes. First, he says that the same place might have different names, and next, he says that both our version and the Hebrew text omit "several things" which are preserved in the Samaritan version, and which would remove the difficulty.

Verse 42.—"Zalmonah and Punon." Neither of these are mentioned between Hor and Oboth in chap. xxi., after Izeabarim; several stations are mentioned in Numbers xxi. 12, 19, 20, 25, and 33, which are left here without notice.

Verse 46.—Neither of the stations here named are otherwise mentioned in the Pentateuch as encampments; but we are told, chap. xxxii. 34, that the children of Gad built Dibon, so that Dibon-Gad, or Dibon of the children of Gad, would almost be a post-Mosaic name.

Chap. xxxiv.—Cahen regards this chapter as evidently written after the conquest.

Verse 4.—"Addar" in the Septuagint is *Arad.*

Verse 7.—Horne says* that "Mount Hor" of our version is incorrect, as confusing the north and southern boundaries. The Douay has, "most high mountain." Cahen says that it is evidently not the mountain upon which Aaron died.

Verse 8.—"Zedad" in the Septuagint is *Saradak.*

Verse 9.—"Zephron" in the Septuagint is *Dephrona.* "Hazarenan" in the same is *Arsenain.*

Verse 10.—"Shepham" is *Sephamar* in the Septuagint.

Verse 11.—"Riblah" is *Belah* in the Septuagint.

Chap. xxxv. 4.—"A thousand cubits." The Septuagint says "two thousand," and Cahen remarks that it is evident that there is here a fault in the Hebrew text, as two thousand appears from the following verse to be the correct number. The Rabbis, discovering the contradiction between verses 4 and 5 as to the one thousand and two thousand cubits, resort to a variety of hypotheses for the purpose of explaining it away.†

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* Introduction, vol. iii., part 1, cap. 1.

† Cahen sur la Zone des Villes Levitiques.

Verse 14.—"On this side Jordan." The Douay reads, "beyond the Jordan." The remarks on page 364 apply equally to this text.

At the end of the book of Numbers, Cahen has given a translation from the 5th book of the laws of Menu. A great antiquity has been claimed for these laws which exhibit many points of similarity with Hebrew enactments. The Jewish legislation has trodden in the same path as the Indian and Egyptian, probably the Egyptian.

In the most recent volume of Dr. Kalisch we see that this painstaking and learned commentator does not hesitate to declare his opinion that parts of Leviticus and Numbers have been written since the Babylonish Captivity.

The following extract from his volume* will not be out of place here—"Though the question whether the Levitical income, as fixed in the middle Books of the Pentateuch, was excessive or not, is of little practical moment; it is yet of considerable historical interest, as it is calculated to illustrate the character of an important part of the legislation. It is utterly inappropriate to found the claims of the Levites upon the plea that they had a legal right to the twelfth or thirteenth part of the territory of Canaan, which they ceded to the other tribes, and for which they could demand ample sustenance. It is true that the Book of Numbers represents the matter in this light; for it ordains that the towns should be given to the Levites, "from the inheritance of their possession." But it requires, after the preceding observations, no further arguments to prove that this is nothing but a Levitical view or rather pretence. The tribe of Levi had, by its own daring and recklessness, forfeited the territorial possessions which it might have owned; and, scattered through the land, it was compelled to seek subsistence by whatever means it could devise. In reality the priests and Levites could fairly demand compensation for their ministerial and other services; and so their income is indeed regarded in some passages. But if tithes, first fruits, and first-born animals, their shares in holocausts and thank-offerings, in expiatory and bloodless oblations, the devoted property, the booty of war, the forty-eight towns with their

* Leviticus, p. 624.

surrounding districts, and the manifold minor privileges, are surveyed and computed, it will be found that the Levites received infinitely more than their due proportion.

According to the double census, recorded in the Book of Numbers, the Israelites over twenty years of age amounted, in round figures, to 600,000, the Levites over one month to 22,000, which, at a very moderate calculation, would be about 17,000 over twenty years; the proportion of Levites to Israelites was, therefore, as 17,000 to 600,000; that is, the Levites formed about the *thirty-fifth* part of the Israelites. But by the tithes alone they received the *tenth* part of the whole agricultural produce of the soil, and of the annual increase of cattle. One Levite had, therefore, from this source only, an income equivalent to that of three or four Israelites. If the other revenues are added, they must indeed be regarded as exorbitant; and it has been observed that if all the enactments of the Pentateuch had been carried out, the priests would soon, without working, have acquired all the property of the land. Though the Levites increased their income grew proportionately; for industry and agriculture, and therefore the Levitical revenues, kept pace with the growth of the population, and in some periods, the territory or arable land of the Hebrews was considerably enlarged. It is irrelevant to enquire whether all the prescribed imposts were burdensome to the Israelites or not in a land of remarkable fertility; the question is, whether they were fairly required for the sustenance of the Levites. If wealth was obtained through the fruitfulness of the soil, it belonged more justly to those who produced it by their exertions.*

The same author, a few pages earlier, gives us several instances in which there is a disagreement between Numbers and the other Pentateuchal books, and in which that disagreement is in favour of the Levites; as, for example, between Numbers xviii. 17, 18, where the whole of a firstling is devoted to the priest and the Lord, while by Deuteronomy xii. 17, 18, xiv. 23, xv. 19, 20, it appears that the Israelites had nearly the whole of the animal for their own eating.

As with the firstlings, so the gift of the first fruits to the

* Leviticus, p. 624.

priests is in Numbers wide and sweeping, while in Deuteronomy it is very limited.

Numbers is presented to us as a history of the wanderings of the Israelites during nearly forty years, about thirty-eight of which are a perfect blank; it also contains an account of some of the wars in which they were engaged. According to its English title, it professes to be the work of the same writer as the Book of Genesis; but in this respect its pretensions at once fail, for it is not at all probable that one man would make such strange variations in writing the names of the persons and places referred to in the course of this commentary. It cannot be revelation from God, because it contains a variety of errors, some evidently copyist's blunders, others arising from the imperfect blending of several documents; because it pictures a God of great mercy and long suffering, ordering indiscriminate and merciless slaughter, as in the case of the Midianites; because it assumes that the curse or blessing of Balaam would affect the welfare of the Israelites, and represents an omniscient and immutable Deity as forgiving or punishing sinners according as they sprinkled or neglected to sprinkle themselves with water in which had been mixed the ashes of a burnt red cow; because it is evidently wholly, or in some part, compiled from other and earlier writings, and therefore never was an original. As a narration of events, it must be regarded with extreme suspicion. The numberings of the Jews in chapter i. must be considered as suppositious; and the account of the wholesale slaughter of the Midianites is evidently untrue. As an educational book, it is entirely without merit, and affords neither instruction nor amusement to its reader, unless, indeed, he be of a sufficiently depraved character to enable him to find amusement in adding together the thousands of Israelites slaughtered by God, or in calculating the probable number of the Midianites slain by the children of Israel.

THE BIBLE: WHAT IT IS.

BOOK V.

DEUTERONOMY:

ITS AUTHENTICITY AND CREDIBILITY.

BY

CHARLES BRADLAUGH.

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DEUTERONOMY:

ITS AUTHENTICITY AND CREDIBILITY.

אלה הדברים ALE EDeBeRIM "These the words" is the Hebrew title of this book, but that title is generally shortened to the word DeBeRIM. The Septuagint gives this volume the name *Deuteronomion*, which, although signifying a second law, is, as Cahen says, used here rather to denote a repetition of the laws already given in the preceding books. The word Mishna also applied to this book has the same sense of "repetition." The words "the fifth book of Moses" given in our version are neither in the Greek nor in the Hebrew. The Massora count in Deuteronomy 10 parscioth, 21 sedarim, 9055 verses, 16394 words, 54892 letters.* Colenso contends that the great difference in style between this and the other four books of the Pentateuch at once mark for it another author and probably a later age.† Several examples of differences of expression are given by the Bishop of Natal;‡ of ideas and words found in Deuteronomy alone, or found in the other four books and not in this. He concludes that it is impossible that any writer could in a brief period have so changed his whole tone of thought and expresssion as he must have done to account for the differences between Deuteronomy and the four preceding books if they are all supposed to be the work of one pen, and urges it as a fact proved, "that whoever may have composed the book of Deuteronomy, he was undoubtedly a different person from those who were concerned in writing the main portions of the rest of the Pentateuch." Kalisch notices that the book of Deuteronomy is not quite so favourable to the priests as are some other portions of the Pentateuch, and considering

* Simon, Histoire Critique du vieux text, p. 141.
† Colenso, part 3, pp. 391—393.
‡ Ibid, p. 396 to 404.

Deuteronomy as composed when the priests had not yet gained full power over the Israelitish mind, he assigns to Leviticus a later date than to the fifth book. Dr. Colenso regards the book of Deuteronomy as mainly the work of one writer, and puts the date of its composition some 800 years after the Mosaic era.* De Wette† says, "In addition to the Jehovistic style, this book has some peculiarities of its own, not only in forms of speech and words. There is a diffuse fulness of words which can scarcely be explained from the rehetorical design of the author." M. Nicolas says,‡ "It is beyond doubt to-day that Deuteronomy bears the marks of a writing of the later period of the Jewish Monarchy, and that out of the five books of the Pentateuch, it contains the least of truly ancient documents."

Chap. i. 1 and 5, and chap. iv. 41 and 46.—"On this side Jordan;" the Douay has "beyond the Jordan" in each instance.§ This is one of the twelve difficult passages to which Aben Ezra¶ refers as not written by Moses, but the translators in our orthodox version have avoided the difficulty. The Septuagint, the Latin, and many other versions agree with the Douay. Bellamy writes it "at the passage of the Jordan," "the Red Sea." This must be a mistake; any place between those mentioned would, according to the orthodox maps, be quite away from the Red Sea** The word is סוּף SUPh; the Red Sea is usually written with יַם IM; IM SUPh. Tophel and Dizahab are unknown places, and are not mentioned in the list of stations in Numbers. Instead of writing Dizahab as a separate place, the Douay says after Haseroth, "where there is very much gold," giving this as a literal translation of the word, as though it were a description of Haseroth and not a distinct place. The Septuagint, in lieu of Hazeroth, has *Aulon*, and translates afterwards Dizahab in the same manner as the Douay. Dr. Colenso†† says, "The account of the appointment of officers

* Ibid, pp. 430. † Introduction, vol. 2, sec. 156.
‡ Etudes sur la Bible, p. 9.
§ See Numbers, Bible: what it is, Book 4.
¶ Spinoza Tractatus, Thelogico-Politicus, cap. 8; but see Horne's Introduction, vol. 1, c. 2, p. 64.
** Hartwell Horne, vol. 4, p. 21. Jones, Biblical Cyclopædia.
†† Part 3, p. 433.

as here given involves more than one inconsistency. First, the Deuteronomist loses sight of the fact that, according to the story (N. xxvi. 64), the whole generation was *dead* which received the law at Horeb; and so he makes Moses say, v. 6, 'Jehovah our God spoke unto *us* in Horeb,' and still more distinctly, v. 9, 'I spake unto *you* at that time, saying, I am not able to bear you myself alone;' and v. 14, '*Ye* answered me and said.' But a more remarkable discrepancy exists in v. 15, where the statement is wholly at variance with that in E. xviii. 25, 26. In this latter passage the appointment of the officers take place *before* the giving of the law at Sinai; here it takes place nearly twelve months afterwards, when they are *just about to leave* Horeb, v. 6. If it be said that we must extend the meaning of the phrase 'at that time' (in v. 9—18) to include the whole twelve months, and must suppose that the fact stated in v. 6—8 occurred in point of time subsequently to that in v. 9—18; yet both these accounts are contradictory to that in N. xi. 14—17, where, *after they have left Horeb*, Moses complains of the burden of the people (though according to either of the other two statements, he had a multitude of officers to help him), and he is commanded then to appoint seventy elders, 'and they shall bear the burden of the people with thee, that thou bear it not thyself alone.'" One portion of Dr. Colenso's criticism requires the qualification that a large number of the Jewish children not numbered in the census might have been alive. The words of Numbers and *Deuteronomy* are very misleading. Another difficulty is that here the judges and rulers are appointed on the suggestion of Moses with the assent of the people, while in Exodus xviii. Moses does all this at the instance of Jethro, his father-in-law, here unmentioned.*

Verse 10.—"Ye are this day as the stars of heaven for multitude." We are told in chap. vii. 7, that when God chose the Jews, they were the "fewest of all people." This verse 10 is purely an oriental figure of speech, but we allude to it here for the purpose of showing how miserable are some of the attempts at explanation. Horne, in defiance of the precise words of the text, argues that "if the

* But see Hartwell Horne, vol. 1, App. 3, sec. 6.

aggregate number of the Israelites* who have ever lived could be ascertained, it would be found far to exceed the number of all the fixed stars." Thus Bible contradictions are reconciled by devout commentators.

Verse 15.—"Captains over thousands." The Douay has, "rulers, tribunes," and instead of "officers amongst your tribes," has, "who might teach you all things."

Verse 22.—"And ye came near unto me every one of you, and said." This is simply impossible. The bulk of those who came to him must have been dead, according† to Numbers xiii. 1 and 2, the sending the searchers was by the direction of God; here it is made as if at the instance of the Israelites.

Verses 37 to 39.—"Also Jehovah was angry with me for your sakes, saying Thou also shalt not go in thither. But Joshua, the son of Nun, which standeth before thee, he shall go in thither; encourage him, for he shall cause Israel to inherit it. Moreover, your little ones, which ye said should be a prey, and your children which in that day had no knowledge between good and evil, they shall go in thither, and unto them will I give it, and they shall possess it. But as for you, turn you, and take your journey into the wilderness by the way of the Red Sea." "Here again," says Colenso, "the Deuteronomist, though thoroughly imbued with a *general* notion of the story, seems to have lost sight of the particular fact that Moses was sentenced to die, and Joshua appointed to succeed him, not at the time which is here referred to—in the days of the former generation, but after an interval of thirty-seven years, at the *end* of the wanderings, N. xxvii. 15—23, only a few months before this address is supposed to be delivered. The fact may be that, knowing that Caleb and Joshua were excepted in the story from the general doom, he names Caleb as so excepted in v. 36, and then goes on to mention Joshua as also excepted, but inadvertently anticipating his appointment to succeed Moses, and so falling also into the anachronism of ante-dating the doom of Moses."‡

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* Introduction, vol. 1, App. 3, sec. 8.

† Cahen, Deuteronome, p. 5; Colenso, part 3, p. 434.

‡ Colenso, part 3, p. 435; see also De Wette on the Books of Moses, sec. 156.

Chap. ii. 11.—"Accounted giants." Bellamy* makes giants into apostates throughout this chapter, urging that it was utterly impossible for a whole nation to be giants.

Verse 12.—"The Horims also dwelt in Seir beforetime; but the children of Esau succeeded them, when they had destroyed them from before them, and dwelt in their stead, as Israel did unto the land of his possession, which the Lord gave unto them." This verse is evidently from the pen of a writer living after the Israelites had possession of the land. Colenso† says, "These words are a mere parenthetical interruption of the narrative. But in the time of Moses, Israel had not done this unto the land of Canaan, which, surely and not the country on the other side of the Jordan is meant by the 'land of his possession.'" Some critics regard the whole of the 10th, 11th, and 12th verses as an interpolation, partly because they interrupt the words of the Lord which recommence in verse 13, and because of the post-Mosaic language of verse 12.

Verse 20.—"Zamzummims." The Septuagint has *Sochommim*.

Verse 23.—"Hazerim." The Septuagint has *Asedod* and *Gazes* instead of Azzah. In lieu of "Caphtorim" the Douay has "Cappadocians," following the Septuagint, which agrees with the Targum of Onkelos. Bellamy says that verses 20 to 23 should be read as in a parenthesis, other critics speak of them as an interpolation interrupting again the Lord's speech, and evidently from some later hand.

Verse 29.—The statement of the text that the Edomites sold meat and water to the Israelites is utterly at variance with Numbers xx., 18 to 21, and Deuteronomy xxiii., 3 and 4.

Verse 30.—"The Lord thy God hardened his spirit, and made his heart obstinate." The "hardening of heart" has been already remarked upon‡ in the case of Pharaoh. Such texts as this clearly demonstrate, to even the most obtuse mind, that the Book cannot be a revelation from an immutable Deity. That a merciful and loving God should harden any man's heart is unreasonable in the extreme; and that he should do it to a monarch for the purpose of affording

* New Translation, p. 453. † Part 2, p. 214.
‡ Exodus, p. 196.

an excuse for slaughter of that monarch's subjects is a blasphemous proposition, which every Theist ought to deny. Can men wonder that Atheists grow in number, when the character of the Deity is delineated by the Pentateuchal writers in such a contradictory and absurd manner? A just God grossly unjust, a merciful God cruel in the extreme, an immutable God constantly changing; in fact, a God consistent only in the attribute of incomprehensibility! Bellamy, denying the accuracy of our version, says:—"In such case the King of Heshbon was not to blame, he was only doing that which God impelled him to do, and if the translation were accurate, Sihon must have been doing the will of God."

Verse 31.—After "Sihon" the Septuagint adds, King of Esebon the Amorite;" and in verse 32 "King of Esebon."

Chap. iii. 9.—"Sirion" is by the Septuagint written *Sanior*, and in chap. iv. 48, the same mountain is called Sion, "which," says Horne,* "seems to be a contraction or a faulty reading."

Chap. iii. 11.—"For only Og, King of Bashan, remained of the remnant of giants; behold, his bedstead was a bedstead of iron: is it not in Rabbath of the children of Ammon? nine cubits was the length thereof, and five cubits the breadth of it, after the cubit of a man." Dr. Pyle (in the Family Bible) remarks† on this passage:—"It is probable that either Og conveyed his iron bedstead, with other furniture of his palace, into the country of the Ammonites, to prevent their falling into the hands of the Israelites; or else the Ammonites had taken it from him in some former conquest, and kept it as a monument of their victory. Either of these cases would be probable, if it could be first proved that Moses wrote this verse, and that he knew of Og's bed being kept in Rabbath. But as Rabbath was not taken by the Israelities until the time of David, as we read in 2 Samuel, xii. 26, "And Joab fought against Rabbah, of the children of Amman, and took the royal city," it is very unlikely that the Israelites knew anything about the bedstead of King Og until then. In the reign of David, five hundred years

* Introduction, vol. 3, part 1, chap 2.

† See Dr. Giles's Hebrew Records, p. 147.

had passed since Og lived, and his bedstead had consequently become an object of curiosity; like the great bed of Ware, which is still shown in that town, though only three hundred years old. It is hardly possible that Moses knew anything about this bedstead of King Og, afterwards so famous.

This verse 11 is another of the famous twelve passages referred to by Aben Ezra as against the Mosaic authorship.* Vater says† that it is scarcely probable that Moses could have written verse 11. Dead soon after the combat, where could he have learned these particulars only known after the capture of Rabbath? Bellamy,‡ to escape the difficulty, conjectures that Og flying from the Israelites took his iron bedstead with him to Rabbath, and that Moses learned this from the people of Bashan. Colenso examines several of the arguments *pro* and *con.*,§ and leaves the passage as one of those fatal to the Mosaic authorship.

Verse 14.—"Jair, the son of Manasseh, took all the country of Argob unto the coasts of Geshuri and Maachathi, and called them after his own name, Bashan-havoth-jair, unto this day." Hartwell Horne admits that the last clause in this verse could not have been written by Moses, for it implies a writer who lived at least some ages after the settlement of the Jews in Palestine. But he says that if the clause was inserted by some transcriber in a later age, it does not affect the authenticity of the work.‖

Verse 14.—"Geshuri." The Septuagint has *Gargasi.*

Verse 18.—"All that are meet for the war," Bellamy says, "four words out of the seven in this clause are not sanctioned by the original, and the word meet has here no meaning." Cohen makes it "all valiant men."

Verse 24.—"What God is there in heaven, or in earth, that can do according to thy work?" This is a strange phrase from the lips of a man who only believed in one God; and it appears that it has been repeatedly used as an argument against monotheism. Bellamy says that "the translation

* Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, chap. 8, Père Simon Critique, p. 45.

† Cahen: Deuteronome, p 17. ‡ New Translation, p. 457.

§ Part 2, p. 215.

‖ Introduction, vol. 1, chap. 2, sec. 1.

of this verse cannot be admitted, for it leads the mind to suppose that there are numbers of gods in heaven and gods on earth."*

Chap. iv. 12.—"And the Lord spake unto you out of the midst of the fire; ye heard the voice of the words, but saw no similitude; only ye heard a voice;" and v. 15. According to Exodus, chaps. xx. and xxi., this would hardly be the case—chap. xix. 18, affords no corroboration for this statement that the Lord spake "out of the midst of the fire," nor does it appear that the people heard "the voice of the words," for the Lord says to Moses (Exodus, chap. xix. 21), "Go down, charge the people," and in chap. xx., 22, "Thus shalt thou say unto the Children of Israel." —Exodus, chap. xxiv. 3, and Deut., chap. v. 5, make it clear that the words were announced by Moses. Bellamy adds—"The erroneous opinion of God speaking from the midst of the fire is also unintelligible. It was not possible for the people to know that the voice came from the midst of a fire, such a notion stamps neither sanctity, dignity, nor rationality upon the original text."† In using the words "ye heard" and "ye saw," Moses must have forgotten, or rather the writer who puts these words in the mouth of Moses must have forgotten that "all the generation" who were at Sinai had been "consumed" in the wilderness. Those who heard and saw could have been in any case but a minority of the audience now addressed.

Verse 40.—"That thou mayest prolong thy days upon earth, which the Lord thy God giveth thee, for ever." The Douay omits the "for ever." Bellamy translates it "prolong time upon the land . . all the days." The earth, I suppose, means Judea only, and this has not been held by the Jews to the present day, much less for ever.

Verses 41 to 43.—These three verses are held by many critics to be an interpolation, they have not the slightest connection with the preceding or following verses.

Chap. v. 2.—"Jehovah our God made a covenant with *us* at Horeb. Jehovah made not thiscovenant with our fathers, but *with us, even us, who are all of us here alive this day.*

* New Translation, p. 457. † New Translation, p. 459.

Jehovah talked with *you* face to face in the mount out of the midst of the fire. I stood between Jehovah and you at that time, to show *you* the word of Jehovah; for *ye* were afraid by reason of the fire, and went not up unto the mount."

Here we have the strongest instances of the oversight before referred to. It may, of course be said, in all these cases that Moses is addressing the people collectively, and that the fathers with whom the covenant was made at Horeb, included the children to whom he was now speaking at the end of the wanderings. But, if every one of those fathers were dead, as the narrative tells us, and only a small proportion of those now listening to Moses were present on the former occasion as children under age, the above words could scarcely have been used by one taking note of this circumstance. So do we read in xi. 2—7: "I speak not with *your children*, which have not known His miracles and His acts, which he did in the midst of Egypt, unto Pharaoh the King of Egypt, and unto all his land, &c., but *your eyes have seen* all the great acts of Jehovah which he did."*

Chap. v. 6 to 21, have been already commented on at some length, save some variations, which, as Cahen says, are most remarkable in a fundamental document (see Commentary on Exodus, page 239).

Verse 7.—"Before me." Bellamy, Cahen, and Hebrew, "before my face." Cahen says that the Chaldean interpreters, to avoid the anthropomorphism, never translate the word "face" in speaking of God.†

Verse 12.—"As the Lord thy God hath commanded thee" are wanting in Exodus.

Rabbi Ben David says, that the law upon the Sabbath is frequently repeated in Exodus and Leviticus, and that whenever a reason is given for the law, which is not always the case, the Lord's rest after creation is mentioned (see Exodus xxxi. 17), and not the departure from Egypt.

Verse 22.—"These words the Lord spake . . . with a great voice, and *he added no more.*" Yet in Exodus xx. 22 to 26, and in the following chapters, he adds a great deal more.

Chap. vi. 2.—"And that thy days may be prolonged."

* Colenso, part 3, page 448. † Deuteronome, p. 29.

Those who are in favour of the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, would do well to notice how all the penalties and all the bliss are confined to this life in the various Hebrew enactments. (See also verse 24 of this chapter.)

Verses 4 to 9 inclusive are regarded as most important by the Israelite, being the prayer which the Talmud obliges him to repeat morning and evening. The first and last letters of the 4th verse are written larger than the rest, and the Cabalistic Rabbis trace strange meanings in the numerical value of these letters.* This chapter elevates the God Jehovah above the gods of the neighbouring nations, but writes as if Jehovah might be envious of adoration offered to the other deities.

Verse 5.—"Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy might." Is it possible that the Jews could love a Deity, whom they had only seen as smoke and fire, as a pillar of cloud by day, and as a pillar of fire by night; who had led them from the flesh-pots of Egypt into the sterile sandy desert of sin? If love instead of fear were a necessary consequence of punishment, the Israelites would, of course, love very strongly; but it is surely utterly impossible they could love a God who told them that he was a jealous God, whose anger might be kindled against them, and who might destroy them from off the face of the earth; who had tormented them with various plagues, for uttering complaints which they could scarce avoid. Hunger and thirst would tempt the most contented men to murmur; and yet for these murmurings they had been terribly dealt with. All the full grown men who had left Egypt had died by the way, either by foreign or civil strife and war, by pestilence, fiery serpent, earthquake, or fire from heaven, yet "Thou shalt love the Lord." A Lord of bloody sacrifice, a God who smelled a sweet savour when his altar was as an *abattoir*, and when the fumes of burning flesh, hide, fat, and wool, ascended to heaven, This injunction, "Thou shalt love," is more than governed by the "Thou shalt fear" of verse 13.

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* Cahen, Deuteronome, p. 33.

Verse 16.—"Ye shall not tempt the Lord your God, as ye tempted him in Massah." The Septuagint, instead of "in Massah," reads "in temptation," the Douay "in the place of temptation." From the language put into the mouth of Jesus in Matt. iv. 7, it would appear as if he understood the word tempt to mean here "corrupt enticement."

Chap. vii. 2.—"And when the Lord thy God shall deliver them before thee, thou shall smite them, and utterly destroy them; thou shalt make no covenant with them, nor show mercy unto them." See Exodus xxxiv. 6, Deuteronomy iv. 31, Psalms xxxiii. 5, li. 1, cxvi. 5, cxlv. 8 and 9; 2 Chron. xxx. 9, Nehemiah ix. 31, Micah vii. 18, 1 Corinthians xiv. 33. Is it possible a God of mercy, long-suffering, gracious kindness, and goodness, could have given such a command as this to his people: "Thou shalt smite them and utterly destroy them; thou shalt make no covenant with them, nor show mercy unto them?" Cahen has the following note upon this verse*—"It is very clear, says Gueddes, 'that the total destruction of these peoples is intended in the order of Moses. It is equally clear that this order is here represented as a divine order. But, he adds, I can scarcely believe that God, supremely good and just, could have given to Moses and the Israelites an order so sanguinary as that which is here in question. In order to justify such a destruction, one refers to earthquakes and other natural catastrophes which cause the loss of millions of innocent lives; that similar calamities rest also upon the divine will; and, finally, that the nations whose destruction is here commanded had merited such a chastisement. But these reasons are very weak. In the first place, we do not know the first causes of these natural events, and we cannot certainly draw any conclusion from them against the principle of moral equity. We cannot represent to ourselves the divine will except in connection with his wisdom, his justice, and his benevolence towards his creatures. Nay more, the Israelites were, according to the Pentateuch itself, a sinful people, and were not of much greater worth than the other peoples. But suppose that they were more worthy, what was the crime of these massacred innocents, of the

* Deuteronome, p. 38.

children of the Canaanites? Certainly the Israelites had no more right to attack these people and to expel them from their country than these again would have had a right to expel the Israelites. He only can make us consider such an order as emanating from God, who, being under the necessity of covering these atrocities under the mantle of religion, desires to give them a sacred sanction. The Inquisitors have acted in this manner, executioners of the Moors, the Jews, the Vaudois. For the rest there is no other testimony in favour of the divine origin of such an order than the assertion of a Hebrew historian. The Canaanites must have regarded as very unjust a God who was the author of this order, or else supposed it a pure pretext. It is more likely then that God never gave it; it is opposed to all moral equity, and we know nothing of it except from the party interested in its execution.' To this energetic outburst of Gueddes, founded upon a holy and legitimate indignation, we will add that the extermination of populations is an Asiatic policy, and that we need not take for fact the view of a priestly writer. A fanatic, religious or political, may fail of pity, but an entire people will never fail of it; the Canaanites were not exterminated."* Bellamy, who agrees that a command such as is contained in this verse is utterly inconsistent with the book being a revelation from God, puts the blame on the incorrectness of the translation, and says:† "Sorry am I to say that the present erroneous translations have, to the disgrace even of Christian nations, countenanced such black crimes against humanity." Bellamy quotes Dr. Sykes, Dean of Winchester, as endorsing his opinion.

Verse 3.—"Neither shalt thou make marriages with them." According to the natural sense, marriage with the people of these nations is permitted as soon as they have abandoned idolatry. It is the opinion of the Rabbi Moses Mekoutsi, and it follows that marriage with other nations is permitted, without the necessity of the individuals abjuring their mode of worship. And in fact these kinds of marriages do not appear to have been rare. David and Solomon took wives from the neighbouring races, and these women

* Cahen, Nombres, p. 38. † New Translation, pp. 465—470.

remained attached to the worship of idols. And yet Solomon is only blamed for having married women belonging to races with whom it was forbidden to make an alliance before their abjuration of idolatry, but not at all because these women were not of the Israelitish faith. Besides, Deuteronomy permits the Israelites to marry the women taken in war; it prescribes certain formalities, but it is not a question of a change of religion. The Talmudist, St. Paul, even finds that these sorts of unions are useful to religion (1 Corinth. vii. 14). It is in this manner, says M. Creuzenach (Thariag, p. 45), that the Grand Sanhedrim convoked at Paris by Napoleon in 1807, gives its opinion upon the marriage of Jews with Christians. Without doubt, continues M. Creuzenach, the celebration of marriage, as it is celebrated in our time among the Israelites, has need of modification if it is to be practised in mixed marriages. Nevertheless, he adds, that it is not according to some rigorists, the principal difficulty that the Talmud opposes; now the Talmud does not only invalidate the celebration of these kinds of marriages, but it regards them as criminal, and it invokes on this subject a synodal decision from the time of the Hasmonians. The Sanhedrim has always supposed, with reason, that in that decision it was only a question of marriages between Jews and Pagans, since it was taken before the establishment of Christianity. We will add to the excellent observations of M. Creuzenach that the marriages between Israelites and Pagans were not unknown things. The Bible relates, without adding any reprobation of it, as a very simple thing, that the sons of Elimelech married Moabites (Ruth i. 4). We know that from one of them is descended the dynasty of David. It is also well to call to mind that the intervention of a rabbi in marriage is a measure simply of police and not a religious obligation.*

Verse 9.—There is a curious jumbling here between our version, the Douay, and the Hebrew. The Douay omits "he is God." The Douay and Cahen add "strong" before faithful.

Verse 20.—"The hornet." Bellamy says "the leprosy."

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* Cahen, Nombres, p. 39.

Chap. viii. 2.—"To prove thee, to know what was in thine heart, whether thou wouldest keep his commandments, or no." Cahen says that theologians have great trouble to reconcile this verse with the divine attribute of foreknowledge.

Verse 4.—"Thy raiment waxed not old upon thee, neither did thy foot swell, these forty years." The Septuagint introduces "thy shoes are not broken under thee," see also xxix. 5. If this were true, a curiously continuing miracle must have been worked. Bellamy* says that it is "preposterously absurd" to accept such a miracle—he objects to the translation. "No mention is made of this miraculous provision of clothing in the older narrative. Kurtz observes, iii. 312—313: The history of the exposition of these verses furnishes one of the most striking examples of the extent to which a merely literal exegesis of the Scriptures may go astray. A whole series of both Jewish and Christian commentators interpret these passages without the least hesitation, as meaning that the clothes and shoes of the Israelitish children grew with their growth, and remained for the whole of the forty years not in the least the worse for wear.† Thus Justin says (Dial. c. Tryph c. 131) 'The strings of whose sandals never broke; nor did the sandals themselves get old, nor their clothes wear out, but those of the children grew with their growth.' So Pfeiffer, 'By a remarkable miracle, not only did the clothes of the Israelites in the desert never get old, but they grew with the growth of the Israelites themselves, so as to fit both men and boys in succession.' Pfeiffer also quotes a Rabbinical saying with approbation: 'Go, and learn from the snail whose shell grows with its body.' Other Rabbins suppose the angels of God to have acted as tailors to the Israelites while they were in the desert, and interpret Ez. xvi. 10—13, as containing a literal allusion to the fact. Without going to such an absurd length as this, Augustine, Chrysostom, Theodoret, Grotius, and even Leeyling, abide by the literal explanation, that, through the blessing of God the clothes and shoes never wore out; so that those who grew to manhood were able to hand them

* New Translation, p. 472.
† See Note in Cahen, Deuteronome, p. 43.

over as good as new to the rising generation. But thus assuming a succession of wearers, these commentators at all events, escaped the fatal notion that the clothes and shoes grew with the bodies of the wearers. When first Peyrerius denied that the clothes and shoes of the Israelites were miraculously preserved for forty years, and maintained that 'the meaning of the Mosaic account was nothing more than this, that the Jews were never in want of anything, during the whole of the forty years that they were in the desert, but had so abundant a supply of everything, especially of wool from their flocks of cloth, of skins and of cloth, of skins and of leather, that they were never without materials from which to make their clothes.' Leeyling, who is usually so very temperate, protested most vehemently against such '*petulantia et impietas.*' Nevertheless the opinion expressed by Peyrerius became gradually the prevailing one. We find it advocated, for example, by Clericus, Buddeus, and Lilienthal. The last of the three, however, thinks it necessary to point, not only to the flocks possessed by the Israelites from which they could obtain both wool and leather in great abundance, but also to the fact that every Israelite must certainly have brought some clothes and shoes with him out of Egypt —that they asked the Egyptians for clothes and obtained them (E. iii. 22. xii. 35)—that they would, no doubt, take off the clothes of the Egyptians who were drowned in the Red Sea, and afterwards washed on shore (E. xiv. 30), and lastly, that they took the booty of the conquered Amalekites, including, according to Josephus, a quantity of clothes. But surely the literal interpretation of the texts in question is the true one, and plainly implies a miracle of some kind, which prevented their clothes and shoes from wearing out, whatever may be the difficulty of conceiving what kind of miracle it could possibly have been."*

Verse 9.—It is not true that Judea was "a land wherein thou shalt eat bread without scarceness," as various famines are mentioned. See Ruth, i. 1, 2 Samuel, xxi. 1, 1 Kings, xviii. 2, 2 Kings, vi. 25, 2 Kings, viii. 1, and 2 Kings, xxv. 3.

Verse 15.—"Fiery serpents, and scorpions, and drought." The Douay has "the serpent burning with his breath, and

* Colenso, part iii., p. 450.

the scorpion and the dipsas," and explains that by dipsas it means a serpent whose bite caused violent thirst.

Verse 19.—"If thou do at all forget the Lord thy God, and walk after other Gods . . ye shall surely perish." The Jews were often as a nation and by their Kings guilty of idolatrous practices, and yet have not perished.

Chap. ix. 9.—The statement that Moses fasted on the first visit to the Mount, is not contained in Exodus xxiv. 18; the number forty is like the number seven, a favourite and mystical number. The rain descended forty days and forty nights (Genesis vii. 4); Isaac and Esau married at forty (Gen. xxv. 20: xxvi. 34); forty days were fulfilled for the dead Joseph (Gen. l. 3); the spies searched the land forty days (Numbers xiii. 25); and the Israelites were therefore condemned to wander forty years (xiv. 33); Goliath challenged the Israelites forty days; David reigned forty years (2 Samuel, v. 4, &c.) Very numerous instances might be given of the recurrence of the word "forty." It can scarcely be taken as historic. This chapter is very broken and incoherent. Cahen thinks that several documents have been used in its composition. De Wette speaks of its obscurity.

Chap. x., 1 to 5.—"At that time the Lord said unto me, hew thee two tables of stone like unto the first, and come up unto me into the mount, and make thee an ark of wood. And I will write on the tables the words that were in the first tables which thou brakest, and thou shalt put them in the ark. And I made an ark of shittim wood, and hewed two tables of stone like unto the first, and went up into the mount, having the two tables in mine hand. And he wrote on the tables, according to the first writing, the ten commandments, which the Lord spake unto you in the mount out of the midst of the fire in the day of the assembly: and the Lord gave them unto me. And I turned myself and came down from the mount, and put the tables in the ark which I had made: and there they be, as the Lord commanded me." Great contradiction exists between the narrative here and that in the Book of Exodus. In the words of Knobel, "the writer here treats the older records with great freedom." It will be observed that in E. xxxiv., 29, the two stone tables with the ten commandments are in the hands of Moses, before any receptacle has been made in

which to place them. *Here*, however, the ark is commanded to be made, v. 1, and is actually made, v. 3, *at the same time* with the second set of tables, *before* Moses goes up into the mount to receive them. But the account in Exodus makes this impossible. Not only is there nothing said about the ark in E. xxxiv., 1, where he is commanded to make the tables; but it is only after coming down with the second set of tables that Moses, E. xxxv., 10—12, summons the 'wise hearted' to come and make all that Jehovah hath commanded, the Tabernacle, and his tent, and his covering, &c., the *Ark* and the staves thereof, with the mercy seat, &c., and afterwards in E. xxxvii., 1—9, we have the full account of Bezaleel making it. And yet the ark of the Deuteronomist was not, as might be suggested, a mere temporary Ark; for he makes Moses say, x. 5, 'I turned myself, and came down from the mount, and *put the tables into the ark which I had made, and there they be*, as Jehovah commanded me."* Cahen says that to escape the difficulty, some of the Rabbis have suggested that there were two arks.

Verse 6.—"And the children of Israel took their journey from Beeroth, of the children of Jaakan to Mosera." But according to Numbers, xxxiii., 31, it was just the reverse.

Verse 6.—"Mosera. There Aaron died, and there he was buried." According to Numbers, xx., 28, Aaron died and was buried on Mount Hor. Colenso says—"This passage is evidently quite out of its place, and as here introduced, it involves a complete contradiction. For the death of Aaron is here described as happening *before* the separation of the Levites." (See Numbers iii., 5, 6, and 9.)

Verses 6 to 9.—These verses seemed to have been inserted without regard to the context; they have no connection with the rest of the chapter, which would read more coherently if read from v. 5 to v. 10, omitting the four intermediate verses. Dr. Kennicot says that these verses belong to another chapter.† In v. 8, the words, "unto this day," would denote a considerable lapse of time from the death of Aaron. Cahen, after a very long note showing how the Samaritan version avoids part of the difficulty,

* Colenso, part 3, p. 454.
† Horne's Introduction, vol. 1, p. 584.

says that the original documents, of which the book is composed, have not been here put together with sufficient care.

Verse 22.—"Three score and ten." In Genesis xlvi. 26, this is "Three score and six." In Acts vii. 14, "Three score and fifteen."*

Chap. xii. 6.—Cahen points out that the direction here and in other verses to sacrifice in one fixed place, is opposed in Exodus xx. 24.

Verse 15.—"Notwithstanding thou mayest kill and eat flesh in all thy gates, whatsoever thy soul lusteth after, according to the blessing of the Lord thy God which he hath given thee: the unclean and the clean may eat thereof, as of the roebuck, and as of the hart." This is a direct contradiction of Leviticus xvii. 3 and 4: "What man soever there be of the house of Israel, that killeth an ox, or lamb, or goat, in the camp, or that killeth it out of the camp, and bringeth it not unto the door of the tabernacle of the congregation, to offer an offering unto the Lord before the tabernacle of the Lord; blood shall be imputed unto that man; he hath shed blood; and that man shall be cut off from among his people." Horne admitting the contradiction, tries to explain it that the law in Deuteronomy is in repeal of that in Leviticus.

Verses 17 to 19.—"Thou mayest not eat within thy gates the tithe of thy corn, or of thy wine, or of thy oil, or the firstlings of thy herds or of thy flocks, nor any of thy vows which thou vowest, nor thy freewill offerings, or heave offering of thy hand. But thou must eat them before Jehovah thy God, in the place which Jehovah thy God shall choose, thou, and thy son, and thy daughter, and thy manservant, and thy maidservant, and the Levite that is within thy gates; and thou shalt rejoice before Jehovah thy God in all that thou puttest thine hands unto. Take heed to thyself that thou forsake not the Levite as long as thou livest upon the earth." But the *tithes* above mentioned belonged *wholly* to the Levites according to the law in N. xviii., 21, 24, 26, supposed to have been laid down only just before, in the

* See Commentary on Genesis, p. 137, and Horne's Introduction, vol. 1, p. 584.

very same year in which this "last address" of Moses was delivered; and the *firstlings* belonged wholly to the Priests, N. xviii. 15—18. And here the *people* are to feast upon them, and not to "forsake" the Levite within their gates, but admit him to a share in their enjoyment! The most complete contradiction obviously exists between the two sets of laws, supposed to be uttered, the first directly by Jehovah Himself, the second by Moses, within a few months of each other.*

Verse 23.—"The blood is the life, and thou mayest not eat the life." The Douay has, "the blood is for the soul, and therefore thou must not eat the soul." Bellamy has, "the blood is the soul, therefore thou shalt not eat the soul." Cahen agrees with Bellamy and the Douay, and adds, "this passage is very explicit for those who wish to understand it." We have previously treated the question of נפש NePeSh as "soul" in the previous part of this Commentary on Genesis, Book 1, p. 42 and p. 76. The word which our orthodox translators render "life" here, they actually render soul in the next chapter, v. 6. In the Hebrew, v. 32 of cap. xii., is v. 1 of cap. xiii.

Chap. xiii. 1 to 5.—Here Moses says, "if a prophet" of a different faith arise, and his sign or wonder come to pass, "that prophet shall be put to death." Can we, therefore, wonder that the Jews put Jesus to death, the more especially as according to the Bible he endeavoured to introduce a new form of worship, and new doctrines amongst them? The word נביא NeBIA, prophet, is used here as if the meaning were well known; it occurs once previously (Genesis, xx. 7), but does not seem to have been in general use until much later in the Jewish history.

Verses 6 to 10.—"If thy brother, the son of thy mother, or thy son, or thy daughter, or the wife of thy bosom, or thy friend, which is as thine own soul, entice thee secretly, saying, let us go and serve other gods, which thou hast not known, thou, nor thy fathers; namely, of the gods of the people which are round about you, nigh unto thee, or far off from thee, from the one end of the earth even unto the other end of the earth; thou shalt not consent unto him, nor

* Colenso, part 3, p. 475.

hearken unto him; neither shall thine eye pity him, neither shalt thou spare, neither shalt thou conceal him: but thou shalt surely kill him; thine hand shall be first upon him to put him to death, and afterwards the hand of all the people. And thou shalt stone him with stones, that he die; because he hath sought to thrust thee away from the Lord thy God, which brought thee out of the land of Egypt, from the house of bondage." Cahen points out how this would leave an opportunity for personal vengeance; any person might make a false accusation of this kind. The command is evidence of how poor a conception of a loving God existed in the mind of the writer. In the Old Testament the persecuting spirit kills the heterodox, in the New it preserves him for eternal torment.

Verses 12 to 16.—"If thou shalt hear say in one of thy cities, which the Lord thy God hath given thee to dwell there, saying, certain men, the children of Belial, are gone out from among you, and have withdrawn the inhabitants of their city, saying, let us go and serve other gods, which ye have not known: then shalt thou enquire, and make search, and ask diligently; and, behold, if it be truth, and the thing certain, that such abomination is wrought among you; thou shalt surely smite the inhabitants of that city with the edge of the sword, destroying it utterly, and all that is therein, and the cattle thereof, with the edge of the sword. And thou shalt gather all the spoil of it into the midst of the street thereof, and shalt burn with fire the city, and all the spoil thereof every whit, for the Lord thy God: and it shall be an heap for ever; it shall not be built again." Colenso says* that this law it is plain could never have been carried out in legal form. How were they to put a city on its trial for the offence in question, so as to give it an opportunity of clearing itself of the charge? And was every city to be destroyed and utterly exterminated in this way, where perhaps an unruly mob, the majority, might have become for a time too strong for the better souls among them—and were these, too, to be involved in the general ruin? The text gives no countenance to any abatement of the severe rigour of the law.

* Colenso, part 3, p. 478.

Chap. xiv. 5.—"The fallow deer." The Douay has "the buffle." Cahen, who says that the signification of most of the names is doubtful, does not translate this word at all, but simply puts in our alphabet the Hebrew word יחמור IChMOR, as to which translators differ.* Some of the names here, and in the Douay, are transposed, and the translations in Bellamy and Cahen vary. The "Pygarg" is simply the anglicising the Greek letters of the Septuagint. Our margin gives the word "bison" as a translation, but as some of the Greek lexicons translate "pygargos" as "weak, impotent, timid," the marginal guess seems very far from the Septuagint view.

Verse 7.—There is here a repetition of the same error as that contained in Leviticus, xi. 5 and 6, as to the hare chewing the cud.†

Verse 12.—"The ossifrage," in the Douay is "the grype."

Verse 13.—"The glede," Douay, "ringtail."

Verse 15.—"And the owl, and the night hawk, and the cuckow." The Douay has "the ostrich, the owl, and the larus."

Verse 16.—"The little owl, and the great owl, and the swan." The Douay, "the heron, the swan, and the stork." In fact, in nearly every verse the birds are differently named in the two versions.

Verse 19.—"And every creeping thing that flieth is unclean unto you; they shall not be eaten." This is contradicted in Leviticus, xi. 21 to 23, where certain creeping things are permitted.

Verse 21.—"Ye shall not eat of anything that dieth of itself: thou shalt give it unto the stranger that is in thy gates, that he may eat it; or thou mayest sell it unto an alien." Bellamy says that this appears to be inconsistent with every principle of goodness and just dealing, as it is stated in the common version. The animal dies, and it is to be given or sold to one unaware of the fact. "Such a

* See Parkhurst, p. 221, Breslau 235, Newman 186, Gesenius 346, Buxtorf 141, Eichorn's Simonis 579.

† See Commentary on Leviticus, p. 315, and Colenso, part 3, p. 481.

proceeding," says Bellamy,* "would be reprobated in every civilised nation." Bellamy contends that the true translation is exactly the reverse of that given in our version. What a glorious revelation, where such questions can arise as to the true meaning of the Hebrew text.

Chap. xiv. 22 to 27.—"Thou shalt truly tithe all the increase of thy seed, that the field bringeth forth year by year. And thou shalt eat before the Lord thy God, in the place which he shall choose to place his name there, the tithe of thy corn, *of thy wine*, and of thine oil, and the firstlings of thy herds and of thy flocks; that thou mayest learn to fear the Lord thy God always. And if the way be too long for thee, so that thou art not able to carry it; or if the place be too far from thee, which the Lord thy God shall choose to set his name there, when the Lord thy God hath blessed thee: then shalt thou turn it into money, and bind up the money in thine hand, and shalt go unto the place which the Lord thy God shall choose; and thou shalt bestow that money for whatsoever thy soul lusteth after, for oxen, or for sheep, *or for wine, or for strong*† *drink*, or for whatsoever thy soul desireth; and thou shalt eat there before the Lord thy God, and thou shalt rejoice, thou, and thine household, and the Levite that is within thy gates; thou shalt not forsake him; for he hath no part nor inheritance with thee." Bellamy objects to the translation, urging that, if accurate, its effect would be to give an enormously large share in Etheridge's translation, to the Levite. In verses 23 and 24, the Targum of Onkelos reads Shekinah in lieu of "name," and so wherever the word thus occurs in this book. Colenso says: "In this passage, the permission is given that, if the way was too long, the whole of the *tithes* and *firstlings* might be turned into money; and the person must go up with this money in his hand, 'to the place which Jehovah shall choose,' and there buy with the money 'what his soul lusteth after, oxen, sheep, wine, strong drink, whatsoever his soul desireth;' and the good things thus provided were to be 'eaten

* Bellamy, p. 484.

† We commend the words we have italicised to the notice of our teetotal friends. See also Psalm civ. 15; Judges ix. 13; Proverbs xxxi. 6, 7; Isaiah xxv. 6.

before Jehovah' by the man and his household, and 'the Levite that is within thy gates—thou shalt not forsake him.' But no such provision is made for the conversion of the *firstlings* into money, in Numbers xviii. 17, a law supposed to be given by Jehovah himself only a few months previously, which says:—'The firstling of a cow, or the firstling of a sheep, or the firstling of a goat, thou shalt not redeem; they are holy; thou shalt *sprinkle their blood upon the altar*, and shalt *burn their fat for an offering made by fire*, for a sweet savour unto Jehovah.' And, as before observed, all the meat of the firstlings was expressly given to the *priests* by the law, in Numbers xviii. 18, where we read, 'And the flesh of them shall be thine, as the wave-breast, and as the right shoulder are thine.' So, too, the *tithes* were expressly to be consumed by the Levites, except a tenth of them, which they were to give to the *priests* by the law in Numbers xviii. 25—32, where it is said, verse 31, 'Ye (the *Levites*) shall eat it *in every place*, ye and your households; for it is your reward for your service in the tabernacle of the congregation.' Here, however, in Deuteronomy xiv. 22—27, it is ordered, in direct contradiction to the above laws, issued, according to the story, *from the mouth of Jehovah himself*, Numbers xviii. 8, 20, 25, a few months previously, that the man who offers, and his family, and 'the Levite that is within his gates,' shall make a feast upon the produce of both the priests' firstlings and the Levites' tithes, at *Jerusalem*, xii. 6, 17—19, xiv. 22—27, xv. 19—23, whereas the Levites were to have eaten them at their homes 'in every place.'"*

Chap. xv. 4 contradicts verse 11.—The former, although softened down by our translators, stating that there shall be a time when "there shall be no poor amongst you;" while the latter declares that "the poor shall never cease out of the land."

Verses 12 to 17.—See Exodus xxi.; there are several differences between the two laws. Here the servant is not to be sent away empty; in Exodus the contrary is implied. Here the same law applies to man-servant and maid-servant; not so, however, in Exodus. There the servant, whose ears

* Colenso, part iii. p. 482; but see Horne, vol. iii. p. 288.

are to be bored, is to be brought before the judges; here nothing is said as to any judicial formula, and the reason—*i.e.*, the leaving in captivity the wife and children—is omitted.*

It is clear from Jeremiah xxxiv. 8—17, that the Jews themselves paid no attention to this law until about the time of Jeremiah, when it was temporarily observed, and soon again neglected. A grave question arises whether, until the supposed finding the book of the law in the days of Josiah, the Jews knew anything whatever of these commands.†

Chap. xvi. 1.—The month Abib appears to have been the only month named in the early books, the others go by numerals. אביב ABIB, or, as the Douay calls it, the month of new corn, corresponds in great part to April, as the month, says Cahen, in which the corn commenced to ripen in Palestine, and is afterwards called ניסן NISeN. The names‡ of months held by the Jews are, like those of the angels, all of Chaldean origin.

The following is the table of the Jewish months, as observed after the Babylonian captivity:—

1.—ניסן NISeN or Abib, corresponding to March and April, and commenced the religious year it had thirty days.

2.—זיו ZIU or אייר AIIR, corresponding to April and May, had twenty-nine days.

3.—סיון SIUN, corresponding to May and June, had thirty days.

4.—תמוז TheMUZ, corresponds to June and July, had twenty-nine days.

5.—אב AB, corresponds to July and August, had thirty days.

6.—אלול ALUL, corresponds to August and September, had twenty-nine days.

7.—תשרי TheShRI, corresponds to September and October and commenced the civil year, had thirty days.

8.—בול BUL, also called מרחשון MeRCheShUN, corresponds to October and November, had twenty-nine days.

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* See "The Bible: What it is." Commentary on Exodus, pp. 250-62, and Colenso, part iii. p. 497.

† See Colenso, part iii. p. 499.

‡ See Cahen, Deuteronome, p. 72, and Horne, vol. 3. p. 166.

9.—כסלו KeSLU, corresponds to November and December, had thirty days.

10.—טבת TeBeTh, corresponds to December and January, had twenty-nine days.

11.—שבט SheBeT, corresponds to January and February, had thirty days.

12.—אדר ADeR corresponds to February and March, had twenty-nine days.

These months being nearly lunar months, in order that they might always fall about the same season, the Jews added every second or third year, an intercalary month called UADeR or second ADeR.

"It appears," says Dr. Inman, "the ancient Greek year, like the Jewish, commenced at the autumnal equinox. The division of the year into months, does not appear to have been general among the Hebrews for some considerable time after the Grecian captivity, and having adopted the ancient Greek calendar, they never materially improved upon it, until their second expulsion from Jerusalem. This drove them once again amongst people more intelligent and less obstinate than themselves, and who, as it were, compelled them to adopt new ideas."*

Verses 16 & 17.—As the Israelites are forbidden to present themselves empty-handed, whatever else the Pentateuch may fail in, it is clear that it makes admirable provision for the priest. The sacrificial regulations are not peculiar to Hebrew worship. "Some regarded the offerings," says Kalisch,† "simply as *presents* given to the gods in order to secure their good graces: just as in many primitive politics, subjects are not allowed to approach their king without a gift, that they may constantly be reminded that all their possessions properly belong to him. It was an old aphorism, 'Presents win gods as well as kings.' The ancient Hebrews were not strangers to a similar notion; they were commanded 'not to appear before God empty;' the Hebrew names for sacrifice in general mean properly *gift* or *present*; and writers in the latest periods warned the people not to offer faulty or valueless animals, such as, if presented to a prince or a governor,

* Ancient Faiths, vol. 2, p. 860.

† Leviticus 4.

would fail to secure his gracious reception; though of course enlightened men proclaimed that God, the Lord of the Universe, does not *require* man's poor offerings. Hence arose the idea that the richer the gift, the greater the favour which it secured.

"The Athenians could never understand why the gods so often allowed them to be defeated by the Lacedæmonians, since they always offered the fairest and most numerous, their enemies scanty and paltry sacrifices. In every invocation to the gods, an allusion to generous offerings previously presented, was deemed most efficacious, and to determine the final issue. Roman authors attributed the security and growth of the empire to the scrupulous observance of sacrificial and other rites; while, on the other hand, it is reported that the Thoes, a tribe at the confines of Thrace, who entirely neglected sacrifices, vanished utterly from the earth, with their towns and property. It was made a matter of calculation or barter, how much was required to attain a certain end, for the gods do nothing gratuitously, they sell their goods to men; health might be purchased by a calf, wealth by four oxen; a royal crown cost a hecatomb; while more trifling bounties might be acquired by a cock, a wreath of flowers, or even a handful of frankincense. On ordinary occasions, and when no great boon was demanded, no efforts were made to offer valuable gifts. The Greeks often appropriated to the gods insignificant, if not absolutely worthless parts of the victims; they were therefore taunted and ridiculed by the comic poets for the folly and selfishness which expected benefits for nothing. But when important objects were to be gained, or great events to be signalised, the *number* of sacrifices was deemed most essential. It became a matter of ambition and self-interest to slaughter hecatombs. Marius vowed one in the Cimbric war, Æmilius Paulus in the Macedonian. After the discomfiture at Lake Thrasymene, three hundred bulls were sacrificed to Jupiter; white cattle to many other gods of the first rank; and to the rest, victims of less value. On one occasion the Syracusans offered 450 oxen to Jupiter. The Athenians killed annually, in commemoration of the battle of Marathon, 500 goats in honour of Artemis Agrotera. Olympias, the mother of Alexander the Great, offered a thousand animals

of every domestic kind. At the death of Tiberius and the accession of Caligula, it is computed that about 160,000 victims, principally oxen and calves, were slaughtered in Rome. In fact, the opulent, however wicked, believed that they possessed the power of obtaining from the gods whatever they desired, and of thus triumphing over the poor or the thrifty. From this conception there is but one step to the idea that the gods can be *forced* into compliance with the petitions of the worshippers, and this idea frequently occurs in the Hindoo mythology of later periods. The Hebrews also occasionally carried the number of sacrifices to an excess. It is reported that David, when conveying the ark of the covenant from the house of Obed-Edom to Jerusalem, killed an ox and a fatling after every sixth step; that Solomon, when his succession was secured, offered 1,000 animals; when he was anointed, 1,000 bullocks, 1,000 rams, and 1,000 lambs; and when he consecrated the temple, 22,000 oxen and 120,000 sheep. It is indeed more than probable that most of these numbers are largely exaggerated, as, in fact, Solomon is finally related to have killed animals 'that could not be told nor numbered for multitude.' But they prove at least that the Hebrew historians not only regarded them as possible, but wished them to be considered as historical, for the greater gratification of their heroes and of the events which they recorded. In other cases, the sacrifices were conceived as real *food* presented to the gods, who were supposed actually to consume the offering, either by eating it bodily or by inhaling the smoke when burnt. 'The gods,' says Lucian, 'feed on ambrosia and nectar; but they delight most in the steam of the fat that rises with the smoke of the sacrifices, and in the blood of the victims poured by the offerer round the altar.' This notion has by many antiquarians been considered the first origin of sacrifices. The *lectisternia* of various ancient nations require but a passing allusion. They generally consisted of tables covered with the most delicious viands, and of sumptuous couches on which the images of the gods were placed reposing, as if actually partaking of the dainties. They were customary among the Persians. They occur in the apocryphal narrative of Bel and the Dragon in Babylon. They have been noticed among some Tartar tribes. They were familiar to

the Greeks and Romans. In Homer, Neptune is described as 'sitting down to sacrificial meal and enjoying it.' The gods were even considered to eat the flesh of human sacrifices; and Dionysos bore distinctive names descriptive of that attribute. The early Romans offered to Jupiter Dapalis a piece of *roast* pork with wine. We have a detailed description of the first grand *lectisternia* prepared at Rome, in honour of Apollo, Mercury, Neptune, Latona, Diana, and Hercules. On the capitol, the Romans gave annually to Jupiter a banquet or *epulum*, to which Juno and Minerva were invited, and at which the gods reclined on a couch, while the goddesses, in accordance with Roman views of propriety, sat in chairs. Some ordinances and expressions of the Old Testament compel us to suppose that similar notions were, in early times, entertained by the Hebrews also. The shew-bread table, with the constant and regularly renewed loaves, the type of the ordinary and daily sustenance in the East, points unmistakeably to the cereal food primitively placed before the Deity, though, of course, in the Pentateuch, that origin is effaced as much as was at all possible. Animal sacrifices were to be accompanied by vegetable and drink-offerings, and all oblations whatever were to be presented with salt; evidently because human repasts consist not of meat alone, but of bread and wine, and salt is indispensable in the preparation of food. The term, 'an offering made by fire to the Lord,' used in reference to every class of sacrifice, is in some passages explained by the phrase, 'food of the offering made by the fire to the Lord,' or 'food of the offering made by fire for a sweet odour;' and the offering itself is repeatedly called *food of God*. These phrases undeniably betray the rude conceptions held by the people in its earliest stages, and, even while in exile at Babylon, the Jews, imitating the custom of the land, 'prepared tables to God, and filled the goblet to Meni.' But it is equally indisputable that the terms in question were gradually understood in a more spiritual or refined sense, and that they were so taken in the Pentateuch. For it is evident that the expression, an offering 'for sweet odour,' must have originated when the chief sacrifices consisted of incense and other fragrant substances; yet in the Pentateuch it is retained for the most offensive smell of burnt meat and

fat, hides, feathers, and flour; while, on the other hand, it is never employed with reference to the burning of frankincense. It took, indeed, such deep root in the language that even Josephus spoke of sacrifices as the 'daily food' of God; and the apostle Paul described the voluntary gifts sent to him by the congregations as 'an odour of sweet smell, a sacrifice acceptable, well pleasing to God.'"

Verse 18.—"Judges and officers shalt thou make thee in all thy gates."

"So far from there having been a code of written law," says Dr. Inman,* "we notice that David himself administered judgment in person, for we find Absolom saying, when any man that had a controversy came to the king for judgment, 'See thy matters are good and right, but there is no man deputed of the king to hear thee: oh, that I were made a judge in the land, that every man which hath any suit or cause, might come unto me, and I would do him justice.' (2 Sam. xv. 2—4, see also 2 Sam. viii. 15). It is perfectly clear that David could never have known the law as laid down in Deut. xvi. 18, 'Judges and officers shalt thou make thee in all thy gates;' nor the command in Deut. xvii. 18, which enjoins upon the king the necessity of making a copy of the law, and to read therein all the days of his life. Nor could he have known that of Deut. xix. 17, where it is laid down that the proper tribunal for controversy is one composed of the priests and judges; nor that of Deut. xxi. 5, where it is enjoined that it is to be by 'the priests, the sons of Levi,' that every controversy shall be tried; nor that of Deut xxv. 2, where a judge, and not a king, is spoken of. It is doubtful indeed if Levites existed in the days of David. Throughout the whole of the career of the first king of Jerusalem, whose piety has almost passed into a bye-word, we find no reference to Abraham, nor to any of his immediate successors; there was no attention paid to Sabbath or Passover, nor to the assembling of all the males three times in a year before the Lord (Exod. xxiii. 17). We hear nothing of the feast of Pentecost, of the feast of Trumpets, of the great day of Atonement, nor the feast of Tabernacles. There is, however, a reference made to them in 2 Chron. viii. 13,

* Ancient Faiths, vol. 2, p. 40.

which is manifestly a modern fiction, written at a very late date. Again, we find that this monarch, whose anxiety to keep the law of the Lord, is conspicuous through those psalms which are traced to his pen, seems to have been utterly ignorant of the law enunciated in Deut. vii. 3, and Josh. xxiii. 12, 13, in which marriage with strangers, the remnant of the ancient inhabitants, is strictly forbidden, for he made no scruple in marrying a daughter of Salmai, King of Geshur, from whom, indeed, sprang his rebellious son Absolom. Of the country of Haggith, Eglah, and Abital, we are not informed. Equally ignorant with the father was the son, since Solomon did not fear to marry women from Egypt, Moab, Ammon, Edom, Zidon, and elsewhere. (1 Kings xi. 1)."

Verse 21.—"Thou shalt not plant thee a grove of any trees near unto the altar of the Lord." The word translated "Grove" is אשרה ASh*e*RE, and this Kalisch says,* "Is the image of the Astarte or Venus, worshipped by the Phœnicians and Aramæans, not 'groves,' which signification is perfectly unsupported." So far as we are aware, the word occurs before in Exodus xxxiv. 13, Deut. vii. 5, and xii. 3. Cahen says, "Selden explains the Hebrew word Asherun, by the images representing Astarte."† Gesenius, who regards the proper and primary signification of the word ASh*e*RE as afterwards neglected and obliterated, speaks of it as used to denote the companion and consort of Baal and *her image*, and perhaps, generally, images of idols, at least those of a particular kind.‡

The kind of images referred to, is made very clear by Dr. Inman, and will need but little explanation to those familiar with the works of Dulaure.§

Dr. Inman,‖ says Asherah is "Translated *grove* in the English Bible. There is some difficulty about the meaning of this word, inasmuch as it is associated with 'image pillars.' These being emblems of the male organ, would lead to the belief that the Deity was masculine; but the ה at the end of the word indicates a feminine idea, and sug-

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* Exodus, p. 588. † Deuteronome, p. 39.
‡ Lexicon, p. 90, and p. 661; see also Parkhurst, p. 47.
§ Des Divinitès Generatrices, p. 194, and p. 88.
‖ Ancient Faiths, vol. 1, p. 307.

gests that Asherah—*i.e.*, the female organ, was the counterpart of Asher; if so, the emblems would be offerings to the goddess. That they were so, we may judge by the inscription which Lucian records as existent on the two enormous phalli in the vestibule of the temple of the Syrian goddess—*i.e.*, that they were erected by Bacchus to his mother Juno. Amongst the Phœnicians, Asherah was a goddess. We may fairly conclude, then, that the word in question typified the female creator under her mundane form. Asherah and Ashtoreth are equivalent to each other. The idea embodied in our word *grove* has nothing to do with a clump of trees, for we find (1 Kings xiv. 23) that groves were erected 'under every green tree,' and that they were objects of worship (Judges iii. 7). When worshipped, they were associated with Baalim, as husband and wife. It has been abundantly proved, that the image of Baal, or Asshur, was characteristic of his sex; we presume, then, that the emblem of Asherah would be equally so. That it was so in many instances, the learned author of 'The Remains of the Worship of Priapus in the Middle Ages' has demonstrated, for he has figured four stone images of women (which existed till within very recently over the porches of certain churches in Ireland, and may still be seen in museums), in which the 'Asherah' is exposed in so flagrant a manner, that we cannot exhibit it pictorially. The same author depicts other images which have existed, or which may still be seen in ecclesiastical buildings elsewhere, wherein attention is drawn by a female to that part which characterises her sex. The same writer remarks that, amongst the Irish, the figures in question were considered as charms to bring good fortune; and we have already mentioned that the feminine emblem for a very long period, and over a vast extent of country, has been considered as a talisman to bring good luck. Now, amongst the Phœnicians, *Asherah*, or 'the grove,' was the goddess of good fortune, and we thus obtain evidence confirmatory of our views. But it is probable that the naked truth was generally veiled under certain emblems, and it behoves us to ascertain what these were. The most simple form which was adopted was the closed, or slightly opened mouth, placed uprightly."

Dr. Inman refers to an Egyptian seal given by Layard in

his "Nineveh and Babylon," p. 156, where Harpocrates, seated on the mystic lotus, is depicted adoring the Yoni.

Kalisch says:* "Asherah, or Ashtaroth, the Phœnician Goddess Ashtarte, was in almost every respect the counterpart of Baal, with whom she was generally worshipped in conjunction, and hence bore also the appellation *Beeltis*, the supreme female divinity in the Assyrian Pantheon, 'the mother of the gods,' or 'the great goddess,' or 'queen of the lands,' sometimes called the wife of Asshur, but more safely to be taken as the wife of Bel-Nimrud, the second member of the governing triad of Assyrian gods; for she was the goddess of the moon, and appears in inscriptions under the name *Tanais*, or the Persian Artemis, and as the goddess of war and the chase. She was therefore called 'the queen of heaven,' or Urania, and represented either with a woman's head, or the head of a bull, the emblem of royalty, and with horns, generally three, in the form of the crescent, and later a star between them; for she was Venus as planet, or in the Babylonian mythology *Ishtar*, 'queen of the land,' the 'queen of all the gods,' 'the beginning or mistress of heaven and earth,' and especially 'goddess of war, battle, and of the chase,' the 'queen of victory,' the 'fortunate or happy;' she was the passive or female principle of conception and birth, or the element of water, and therefore the goddess of fruitfulness termed *Mylitta*, and worshipped, especially by women, with cakes, libations, and incense. So universal was her service that her name was employed to express foreign deities in general; it flourished in Judah, especially under Manasseh, in Israel, under Ahab, and it was coupled with rites involving the grossest and most sensual forms of natural religion, and probably representing the remains of even ruder notions and more revolting practices. Hence in the Assyrian period, the Hebrews adopted easily the trans-Euphratic service of the 'tents of the maidens,' kindred to that of Ashtarte, because also requiring the chastity of virgins as an offering to the Deity."

Verse 22.—"Neither shalt thou set thee up any image; which the Lord they God hateth." The word translated "image" is in the margin, and by Bellamy, called "pillar"

* Leviticus, p. 358.

or "statue." Cahen makes it "stèle." In Genesis xxviii. 18 and 22, the same word is written "pillar." Some Jewish commentators point out that Jacob's action was apparently agreeable to God, although directly against this commandment. The "hate" here spoken of, manifested itself in "love" for Jacob.

Chap. xvii. 2 to 7.—These manifest the existence of Tsabaistic forms of worship, and read with chap. xiii. 6 to 10, show the stringent courses resorted to, to sustain the Hebrew theocracy.

Verse 5.—There are several words of this verse wanting in the Septuagint version. The Douay apparently follows the Septuagint here.

Verse 9.—"Thou shalt come unto the priests the Levites." Kalisch points out that while by the Book of Numbers the Levites were kept clear and distinct from the priests who were the descendants of Aaron only, yet throughout the Book of Deuteronomy the writer speaks as if the priests and Levites were identical, that is, as if the priests were the whole tribe of Levi, and observes further that in Deuteronomy the Levites are represented as performing offices "from which they were in the other books rigidly debarred, and which were reserved for the priests exclusively."*

Verse 14.—"A king." Septuagint has "a chief." Cahen says, "Doubts have been raised as to the authenticity of this command."† The opinion of many critics is that it is an interpolation after the era of Solomon, and it is certainly contrary to the general tenor of the Pentateuchal constitution.

Verse 14 to end of chapter.—Cahen‡ remarks that doubts have been thrown upon these verses as being out of harmony with the general theocratic spirit of the Pentateuch, and inconsistent with the conduct and language of Samuel when the people demanded a king. The law§ against the increase of wives is regarded as posterior to the excesses of Solomon and Rehoboam.

Chap. xviii. 1.—"The priests the Levites, and all the tribe

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* Kalisch, Leviticus, pp. 584 to 599.

† Cahen, Deuteronome, p. 79. See Colenso, part 3, p. 509.

‡ Deuteronome, p. 78.

§ But see Hornbeck contra Judæos, lib. 7, cap. 6, p. 518.

of Levi, shall have no part nor inheritance with Israel: they shall eat the offerings of the Lord made by fire, and his inheritance." Kalisch* makes this "The priests the Levites, the whole tribe of Levi," and urges that this part of the text is in direct contradiction to the book of Leviticus, where the portions of the sacrifices were strictly limited to the children of Aaron. Colenso points out how the translators, by adding the word "and" before "all the tribe," have modified greatly the meaning of the original.

On verses 6 to 8, Colenso comes to the conclusion that at the time this was written, the Levites as a body were not very desirous of being employed at the sanctuary, and thinks this corresponds to the state existing at the close of Manasseh's, or beginning of Josiah's reign.

Verse 8.—"They shall have like portions to eat, *besides that which cometh of the sale of his patrimony.*" What patrimony† did this mean? In Numbers xviii. 20, it is apparently distinctly put that Aaron and the Levites are to have no part or inheritance in the land. Cahen says that the passage italicised is difficult, and has the appearance of a marginal gloss which has slipped into the text.

Verses 10 and 11.—"There shall not be found among you anyone that maketh his son or his daughter to pass through the fire, or that useth divination, or an observer of times, or an enchanter, or a witch, or a charmer, or a consulter with familiar spirits, or a wizard, or a necromancer." Verse 10, "or an enchanter," Cahen renders as one consulting serpents. The Douay, as one that "observeth dreams or omens." Bellamy says that "an observer of times," "is neither a translation nor even a true comment on the original," and puts it "revealing discovers by a cloud." Verse 11, "a consulter with familiar spirits or a wizard," Cahen translates "one interrogating Ob or Idoni."‡ Bellamy renders it "consulteth a basilisk," and says "This word אוב AUB was the Egyptian name for the basilisk. It was a saying amongst the ancients, 'In the most virulent poison is con-

* Leviticus, pp. 209, 599; and see Colenso, part 3, cap. 11.

† See note to Etheridge's Translation of the Targums, p. 515.

‡ See on this Bryant, Ancient Mythology, vol. i. p. 473, and Rev. J. B Deane on Serpent Worship.

tained the greatest medicine,' and as the basilisk was supposed to be the most poisonous of all the serpent genus, which creature was reverenced by all the Eastern nations at that period, they concluded also that by it they might obtain the greatest knowledge concerning hidden things."

Verse 14.—"Hearkened unto observers of times." Bellamy has "will report by clouds," and in a note says: "I am here led to take some notice of the ancient mysteries of the Greeks, called the *Eleusinian Mysteries*, or the mysteries of *Eli-Sini, my God of Sini.* The *Eleusinian Mysteries* were mysteries, or sacred rites, appertaining to the worship of God, were divided into two parts—viz., the greater and the lesser mysteries. The lesser mysteries were open to all, but the great mysteries were only known to those, a small number of the initiated, who had the privilege of communicating a knowledge of future things. This is the same as is said by Eusebius. The unlearned were confined to the literal observation of the laws of Moses; but the learned were admitted to the contemplation of a more refined philosophy, who explained the figurative sense." We also learn from Herodotus, Diodorus Siculus, and the Christian fathers, that the Asiatic Colonists who peopled Greece, brought with them their religious doctrines and professions. Greece appears to have been peopled from Egypt and Babylon; for Herodotus says, that most of the Gods came from the Egyptian colonies of Cecrops, Inachus, and Danaus, and some also from the Pelasgians. The same historian also says that the Grecian Bacchus was from Egypt, was called Dionysos, by Melampus—Herod. lib. ii. c. 47, which is *Dionisius;* who was Moses. See Exod. xvii. 15, *Jehovah Nissi*, which without the Latin termination is Dio-nissi. Hence it does appear that when the Hebrews on their conquest of the land of Canaan, had established the worship of God, and when the certainty of divine communication at Mount Sinai had reached Greece, the Greeks adopted the theology of the Hebrews, and called their mysteries the mysteries of *Eli-Sini* or of *my God of Sini.* Which afterwards were called *Eleu-Sini—his God of Sini, or the mysteries of the God of Sini.* And hence the term *Eleusinian Mysteries,* or the mysteries celebrated in the rites and ceremonies by the ancient true worshippers of God from Adam

to Moses. This appears to have given the name to the city Eleusis, where these mysteries were celebrated; like the words Ελλελευ Ιη Ελιουν which are only the Hebrew הללו יה *Hallelujah, praise ye Jehovah,* and עליון *most high,* in Greek letters. In my 'History of all Religions,' I have shown that the ancient Bacchus was born in Egypt, and that he was Moses. Diodorus Siculus records three Bacchuses —and Nonnus in his Dionysiacs, or mysteries of *Dio-nissi, i.e.,* Jehovah-Nissi, mentions the three Bacchuses. Bacchus, which signifies *great,* was successively applied to the three, who stood at the head of the dispensations—viz., Adam, Noah, and Moses. The remembrance of the first Bacchus was celebrated on the sixth day of the mysteries at Eleusis, in perfect conformity with the creation of man on the sixth day. A passage in Nonnus, who had studied the Mythology of Bacchus, will show that the third Bacchus was Moses. 'And the goddess delivered the child to the priestess of Eleusis. The nymphs of Marathon, crowned with ivy, danced around the young Bacchus to celebrate his birth; they shook the Attic torch at night. They instituted sacrifices in honour of the old, and of the new Bacchus,'—viz., the morning and evening sacrifices which had been handed down from Adam and Noah. It must also appear to the reader, that the goddess who delivered the child to the priestess, was the daughter of Pharaoh, for at that period the sons and daughters of kings were priests and priestesses; and that the *nymphs* were the maidens of the daughter of Pharaoh, Exod. ii. 5. Thus the Greeks, who originally made up a mythology or system of fables, by perverting the rites of Bacchus, or Moses, gave this name to various supposed divinities in the theogony of Greece, to find the origin of theogonies of other nations, and established this heathen worship at one place, Eleusis, after the manner of the Hebrews at Shiloh."*

Chap. xix. 1 to 13, in fact, is a repetition, with slight variation, of the legislation as to cities of refuge in Numbers xxxv. 11, &c.; but, says Cahen, while there is here an order for three cities of refuge, and a provision for adding three others, if the Lord shall enlarge thy coast, in Numbers, which passes for a book written prior to Deuteronomy, six

* Bellamy, p. 494.

cities are mentioned without any such conditional clause, "which has made some commentators think, and not without reason, that the command in Numbers is later than the one here given, and that the compilers have by error inserted one before the other."*

Chap. xx. 10 to 18.—"When thou comest nigh unto a city to fight against it, then proclaim peace unto it. And it shall be, if it make thee answer of peace, and open unto thee, then it shall be, that all the people that is found therein shall be tributaries unto thee, and they shall serve thee. And if it will make no peace with thee, but will make war against thee, then thou shalt besiege it; and when the Lord thy God hath delivered it into thine hands, thou shalt smite every male thereof with the edge of the sword; but the women, and the little ones, and the cattle, and all that is in the city, even all the spoil thereof, shalt thou take unto thyself: and thou shalt eat the spoil of thine enemies, which the Lord thy God hath given thee. Thus shalt thou do unto all the cities which are very far off from thee, which are not of the cities of these nations. But of the cities of these people which the Lord thy God doth give thee for an inheritance, thou shalt save alive nothing that breatheth. But thou shalt utterly destroy them; namely, the Hittites, and the Amorites, the Canaanites, and the Perizzites, the Hivites, and the Jebusites, as the Lord thy God hath commanded thee: that they teach you not to do after all their abominations, which they have done unto their gods; so should ye sin against the Lord your God."

This is most certainly a noteworthy specimen of a revelation from God. The city approached must have been one against which the Jews made voluntary war; a city out of the land of Canaan. The Jews are to offer it peace, and if the city accept the peace, the people are to be slaves, for the word at the end of verse 11 is עבדך† OBeDUK, and is the same servitude as that of the bought bondsman. If the city prefers its freedom, then there is to be no mercy: "thou shalt smite every male thereof with the edge of the sword." These comparatively merciful commands were in relation to

* Deuteronome, p. 84.

† See "Bible: What it is," Exodus, p. 250.

the inhabitants of the cities afar off, for the six peoples mentioned in verse 17, there was not to be even the faintest glimpse of mercy. Bellamy regards verse 16 as inhuman and contradictory to other texts. He says:* "It is said 'every one shall be put to death for his own sin.' But infants and sucklings could not offend, therefore these words cannot be applied to the merciless precept of saving alive nothing that breatheth." Bishop Colenso says: "It is well that we are no longer obliged to believe that the above frightful command emanated from the mouth of the most Holy and Blessed One. This does not apply to the cities of Canaan only. But *any* city which the Israelites might decide for any cause 'to fight against' if it did not surrender on the very first summons, 'make an answer of peace,' and open to the foe, on the condition of becoming tributaries and servants, was, according to this injunction, to be besieged and captured, and to this end the express aid of the Almighty is promised, and then all the males, except young children, are to be put ruthlessly to death."

Verse 19.—"For the tree of the field is man's life." The Douay translates these words "For it is a tree and not a man." The marginal note to our authorised version makes the text say that the tree is to be employed in the siege; the text itself saying that the tree is not to be cut down to be employed in the siege. Bellamy says that there are three errors in the common version of this verse, and translates the words "the tree of the field is for man." Cahen gives the same translation, but says the passage is difficult to translate.

Chap. xxi. 10 to 14.—"When thou goest forth to war against thine enemies, and the Lord thy God hath delivered them into thine hands, and thou hast taken them captive, and seest among the captives a beautiful woman, and hast a desire unto her, that thou wouldest have her to thy wife; then thou shalt bring her home to thine house; and she shall shave her head, and pare her nails: and she shall put the raiment of her captivity from off her, and shall remain in thine house, and bewail her father and her mother a full month; and after that thou shalt go in unto her, and be her

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* Page 498.

husband, and she shall be thy wife. And it shall be, if thou have no delight in her, then thou shalt let her go whither she will, but thou shalt not sell her at all for money, thou shalt not make merchandise of her, because thou hast humbled her."

In verse 14, instead of "then thou shalt let her go whither she will," the Targum of Onkelos reads, "then thou mayest send her away by herself." It is not quite clear to what captives this applied, for in verse 16 of the previous chapter total extermination was decreed against the Canaanites: "thou shalt save alive nothing that breatheth." Supposing it to apply to the tributaries of c. xx. 11, or the "women" of verse 13, then it amounts to the provision that if a Jewish soldier saw a beautiful woman amongst the captives, he could take her home, use her as a wife until he grew weary of his prize, and then he might desert her. He was only prohibited from selling her, but there is nothing in the text to prohibit him from turning her out penniless and destitute. The text does not imply that he ought to provide the ruined woman the means of existence. Clearly the writer of the Targum of Onkelos assumed the right of the sated captor to get rid of the burden of the woman of whom he had become tired. Colenso adds, "Here also we have the manners and customs of the writer's age exhibited." "The Persian Cyrus, or the Roman Scipio, though heathens, taught by their lives a higher morality than this, which, besides the inhumanity involved in it, practically sanctions concubinage and polygamy." Bellamy, who puts the blame on bad translation, admits that, according to the authorised version, the text involves "a total departure from the principles of justice and of humanity," and that by it "a man was authorised to take a woman, and after having made her his wife, he was at liberty to send this helpless stranger from his house, without making any provision for her future support."

Verse 15.—"If a man have two wives." Cahen says "this is the only place [in the law] where polygamy is treated of. The Patriarchs had concubines but only one legitimate wife." "Nor can the verse be taken as limiting polygamy to two wives." (See Genesis, iv. 19, as to the two wives of Lamech, and xxix. 23 and 30, as to Jacob.) Later we find polygamy commonly practised amongst the Hebrews.

Verses 18 to 21.—"This law," says Horne, "has been stigmatised as being both inhuman and brutal." Horne first defends the law, and then says, "We do not read in the whole Jewish history of this law having been carried into execution."* Cahen observes, "Jarhi said that they killed the son to prevent the continuance of his bad conduct, but this is not very likely; nations do not kill a man for that which he will do later." Rosenmuller admits the harsh character of the law, but pleads for it as necessary amongst the people and in the climate where it was given.

Chap. xxiii. 1.—"He that is wounded in the stones, or hath his privy member cut off, shall not enter into the congregation of the Lord." Cahen translates this, "Qu'un homme mutilé ayant les testicles ecrasés ou coupés ne vienne pas dans l'assemblée de l'Eternel," and says, "c'est une espece de castration encore en usage dans l'Orient, et qui consist a amollir aux enfans tres jeunes les testicules dans l'eau chaude et a les comprimer ensuite." The Vulgate, which is followed by the Douay, writes it "eunuchus attritis testiculus." Matthew xix. 12, seems to shadow out a different doctrine. According to Demetrius,† Bishop of Alexandria, if the Pentateuch remained in force in the third century, the famous Origen would have been excluded from heaven in consequence of a too literal observance of the text in Matthew.

"The exclusion,"‡ says Colenso, "of a bastard to the tenth generation from the privileges of the sanctuary, while the father, the guilty cause of his child's illegitimate birth, was not excluded, seems, to our modern sense of right and equity, most unjust." It is also directly opposed to the spirit of chap. xxiv. 16, and Ezekel xviii. 20.

Dr. Inman says,§ "The opening of this particular chapter of Deuteronomy, is one which is very disgusting to the thoughtful mind. It thrusts upon us the belief that the Almighty thought more of the representative triad, the emblem under which He was worshipped on earth, than He did of the feelings of the heart. To our ideas, it is repugnant

* Horne's Introduction, &c., vol. i. p. 569.
† See Mosheim, 3rd cent. part 2, chap. 3, sec. 14.
‡ Part 3, p. 531. § Ancient Faiths, vol. 2, p. 245.

that one, who from the greed of parents, or from the misfortunes of war and slavery, has become an eunuch, should by that very fact be deprived of all spiritual comfort. The notion is itself contradicted by other portions of the Bible, and we shall not greatly err if we attribute the law thus enunciated to human, rather than to divine, agency. We are fortified in the view thus taken by the consideration of the second and third verses, wherein it is enacted, that a Mamzer, an Ammonite, and a Moabite, shall be excluded for ten whole generations from the congregation of the Lord. Modern Christians believe that the Almighty rejoices to receive into His fold all or any who were outside; not so, however, the Jews. They had been told so constantly by their teachers that they were a chosen people, specially beloved of God, as to believe thoroughly that they stood in the position of His earthly spouse. They were, therefore, as jealous of admitting any one into their number, as a wife would be if she saw another woman trying to steal her husband's love. We shall see still farther reason to believe in the human origin of the law, when we have ascertained the real signification of Mamzer. In our Bible, the word is translated 'a bastard,' but this, as Spencer very justly remarks,* is evidently incorrect; for bastards, such as were Pharez, the son of Judah by Tamar, Jephthah, the son of a strange woman, and Amasa, the son of a strange father (2 Sam. xvii. 25), who seems not to have been married to Abigail, were not excluded from the congregation. Still farther, we are distinctly told that there was a portion of the Mosaic law which prevented children from suffering from the sins of the fathers, and to exclude nine generations from participation in religious worship, because a parent had been adulterous, was contrary to the spirit of the Jewish institutions. To obviate the difficulties involved by the ordinary interpretation, Spencer inquires closely into the real significations of the word, and concludes that it really signifies 'a stranger,' 'a gentile,' 'an alien,' or 'a foreigner.' With this meaning, every difficulty vanishes. We see, as it were, the ancient Jews reproduced in the modern Arabic Mahometans, who consider their temples defiled if entered by a Christian."

* "De Legibus Hebræorum," pp. 105, *et seq.*

Verses 4 and 5.—There is a direct contradiction between these verses and chap. ii. 29, where, as Cahen points out, the Moabites are said to have provided food and water for the Jews; nor is it anywhere pretended that the Ammonites had anything to do with hiring Balaam. David was within the ten generations from Ruth the Moabitess, and to avoid this difficulty, the Jewish writers have pretended that the text does not include Ammonite or Moabite women.*

Verses 12 to 14.—Colenso points out† that these verses are evidently unhistoric, as it would have been impossible for the aged and infirm, sick persons, and young children to have complied, and he draws special attention to the extraordinary wording of verse 14. What we cannot understand is, how the Bishop of Natal could afterwards write that "in the Book of Deuteronomy itself," read in a proper spirit, "we shall find the living bread which our souls may feed on—we shall find in it the word of God."‡

Verses 17 and 18.—On these verses see Colenso, part 3, p. 534. Cahen, Notes Supplementaires Deuteronome, p. 170. Dr. Inman's Ancient Faiths, p. 168, vol. 2. Dulaure's Differens Cultes, vol. 2. Voltaire's Defense de Mon Oncle. It is noteworthy that the same word קדש QeDeSh, which is in other parts of the Bible translated righteousness, is here rendered as the equivalent of a most abominable offence.

Chap. xxiv. 1.—Any one reading this verse must be struck with the strange facility with which one of God's chosen people might get rid of his wife, if "she found no favour in his eyes." Cahen says that the Talmudists have much discussed what it was intended to mean by "some uncleanness." The same word occurs, xxiii. 14. Ouziel translates the word "uncleanness," as if it were "transgression." The pious Bellamy is so struck with the text that he objects to the translation, admitting that as it stands, "we are led to suppose that if a man took a woman, and made her his wife, it was in his power by pointing out some imperfection in her, to divorce her and turn her out of his house."

Verse 2.—It would appear here as if a divorced woman might in any case re-marry, but by Leviticus xxi. 7 the priests

* Deuteronome, p. 99. † Part 1, p. 39. ‡ Part 3, p. 629.

are forbidden to marry a divorced woman, who is placed in that verse on a level with a woman who is a prostitute.

Verse 7.—"If a man be found stealing any of his brethren of the children of Israel, and make merchandise of him, or selleth him; then that thief shall die; and thou shalt put evil away from among you." This limits the punishment for man stealing to the case where the one stolen happens to be an Israelite. We have already referred to this in dealing with Exodus xxi. 16.*

Verse 16.—This verse has already been dealt with in treating Exodus xx. 5,† to which it is in direct contradiction, as it is also to Exodus xvii. 14 and 16, and other texts; but see also Jeremiah xxxi. 30, and Galatians vi. 5 and 7.

Chap. xxv. 5 to 10.—Colenso, who declares that a similar practice obtains amongst the Zulus, says: "This law that a brother must take to wife his dead brother's widow, must in all cases, where the surviving brother was already married, not only have permitted and encouraged, but even enjoined, polygamy under the penalty of a lasting disgrace."‡ In fact, according to Cahen§, the practice ceased amongst the Jews in the 11th century in consequence of the interdiction pronounced by Rabbi Guerschone against polygamy.

Verses 17 to 19.—On this|| see Exodus xvii., where, however, there is nothing recorded inconsistent with fair battle on the part of the Amalekites.

Chap. xxvii., 2 to 8.—"And it shall be, on the day when ye shall pass over Jordan unto the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee, that thou shalt set thee up great stones, and plaster them with plaster. And thou shalt write upon them all the words of this law, when thou art passed over; that thou mayest go in unto the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee, a land that floweth with milk and honey; as the Lord God of thy fathers hath promised thee. Therefore it shall be, when ye be gone over Jordan, that ye shall set up these stones, which I command you this day, in mount Ebal, and thou shalt plaster them with plaster. And there shalt thou build an altar unto the Lord thy God, an altar of

* "Bible: What it is," Exodus, p. 253.
† See Book 2, Exodus, p. 221.
‡ Part 3, p. 536. § Deuteronome, page 106.
|| Bible: What it is, p. 214.

stones: thou shalt not lift up any iron tool upon them. Thou shalt build the altar of the Lord thy God of whole stones: and thou shalt offer burnt-offerings thereon unto the Lord thy God. And thou shalt offer peace-offerings, and shalt eat there, and rejoice before the Lord thy God. And thou shalt write upon the stones all the words of this law very plainly."

Colenso* points out that in the Samaritan Pentateuch, the above passage is, with trifling variation, also inserted after v. 17 of Exodus xx. In v. 4, instead of mount Ebal, the Samaritan reads mount Gerizim.

Upon this point, Kennicott writes as follows, Diss. i. p. 96: "It must have appeared strange, surprisingly strange, that it is not more clearly expressed what this law, thus to be engraved, was—that a point of so much importance should not have been, somewhere or other, very accurately noted, and very particularly circumscribed by Moses, partly for the more secure direction of Joshua, and partly to render this awful transaction more intelligible through future ages. But all this surprise ceases, all this puzzle is unravelled, all this uncertainty is at once removed, if we allow the authority of the Samaritan Pentateuch, if we will but grant that there may have been in the Hebrew text a certain passage, which is found in all the copies of the Samaritan text and version, and which is also found, exactly as in the Samaritan Pentateuch, in that Arabic version of it in the Arabic character, which has been before mentioned, and which is a very valuable, because a very literal, version. According to this truly venerable copy of the Book of Moses, all is clear. The whole is perfectly regular, and in harmonious proportion, several circumstances concurring to render it highly probable that the Ten Commandments constituted the Law which was to be engraved. And as it can scarcely be conceived that such a point could have been omitted by Moses, it makes greatly for the honour of the Samaritan Pentateuch, to have preserved so considerable a passage. Why the ancient Jews should omit this passage can be a matter of no doubt at all with those who mark the honour it does to mount Gerizim. And, therefore, the same

* Part 3, p. 540.

men who corrupted Deut. xxvii. 4, have but acted with uniformity, if they have also corrupted E. xx., *omitting* Gerizim in the latter instance just as honestly as they *altered* it in the former. But that some verses *did* formerly follow after the Tenth Commandment in E. xx. 17, and before v. 18, we have not only the authority of the Samaritan Pentateuch (which, together with the several foregoing confirmations, may be thought satisfactory) but we have also the authority of an ancient Syrian MS., which contains a version of the Old Testament, and is catalogued in the Bodleian Library, 3,130. Between v. 17 and v. 18, at the very place where the passage is now found in the Samaritan Pentateuch, in this Syriac MS., though translated from a *Hebrew* copy, there is left, in the middle of the page, a vacant space, just equal to five verses expressed in the Samaritan. And no such vacant space is left anywhere else through the whole MS., excepting a space somewhat larger in Ecclus. xxvii. and one somewhat lesser, 2 Macc. viii. The inference from this very remarkable circumstance I leave to the learned reader."

"That the Samaritan text should be condemned as corrupted *merely* for having more in it than the Hebrew, no man of learning will maintain. Certainly the Jews *might omit*, as easily as the Samaritans *might insert*. And I presume that it has been, and will be hereafter more fully proved, that several whole passages, now in the Samaritan, but not in the Hebrew Pentateuch, are not interpolations in the former, but omissions in the latter."

Richard Simon.* who fully examines this text, and who regards the law here ordered to be written, as consisting of the twelve curses set out in the end of the chapter, says, "Those amongst the Jews who have preferred the literal sense of the Scriptures to the dreams of the Talmud, and to the play upon words of the Cabalistic Doctors, agree with us that they ought not to apply to the whole of the law that which is written in this xxvii. chapter. In effect, can any one imagine that Moses ordered the Israelites to engrave all the contents of the Pentateuch upon twelve stones?"

The fulfilment of the command is supposed to be narrated in Joshua viii. 30 to 35, but it is evident to any careful

* Histoire Critique du Vieux Testament, Liv. i. cap. 6, p. 42.

reader, that what Joshua is recorded to have said, was most certainly not the writing upon the stones of the whole of the Pentateuch, but of some brief laws which are represented as being written in the presence of the Israelites, who stood while the writing was being done, and had the whole read over to them when it was finished.*

So much turns upon the variations between our Bible and the Samaritan Pentateuch, that it may not be out of place here to say a few words upon the three divisions of the Hebrew race—the Samaritans,† and the Caraites, as distinguished from the Jews ordinarily so-called, all of whom profess to trace their descent from Abraham, The Caraites may be passed in a few words; they adhered to the strict letter of the text, they accepted all the books of the Bible, and in this were opposed to the Samaritans, but they rejected the Talmud, and considered the Jews as heretics for their user of the Talmudical writings.

The Samaritans call themselves שומרים ShUMRIM —viz., guardians or observers of the law. They accept the Pentateuch only as inspired, and their ancient version of it differs in many important respects from the ordinary Hebrew versions. There is a sort of translation of this old Samaritan Pentateuch in use amongst the Samaritans, this last-named version being in a kind of *patois* compounded of Syriac, Hebrew, and Arabic. The letters of the old Samaritan and modern Hebrew alphabets differ. The Samaritan text is considered, by Dr. Wall, as much nearer pure Hebrew, and as much more ancient than the ordinary Hebrew text. Le Clerc describes the Samaritan as more correct than the Hebrew in several places. The Samaritan version is regarded by Dr. Wall as less ancient than the Septuagint, the Samaritan text as probably of much greater antiquity. An essay penned, I presume, by Munk,‡ states the interminable contest between the Rabbis as to the original character in which the Decalogue was written, and finishes by saying, "the complication of the Samaritan writing, and

* See Dr. Giles's Hebrew Records.

† But see Horne's Introduction, vol. ii. p. 10, p. 327, and Nicolas: Etudes sur la Bible, p. 93; Wall's Grounds for Revision of Hebrew Text, p. 607.

‡ Sur les Samaritains. § 8 Cahen, Deuteronome.

the relative simplicity of the Assyrian appears to us an indication that the first is more ancient than the second, which dates probably from the sojourn in Babylon, from whence came the names of the angels and of the months."

Chap. xxvii. 15.—Nicolas observes: "It is usual to confound, without the least reason, Polytheism with idolatry. There is nevertheless nothing in common between these two religious forms. Polytheism, the adoration of many gods, might exist without being idolatrous. Although, in fact, it has always been found connected with idolatry, and idolatry is certainly not inseparable from Polytheism; it is in reality a worship rendered to the symbolic representation (*εἰδωλον*, image figure) of one god or of many gods. There is monotheistic idolatry as well as Polytheistic idolatry. There were a great number of idolators amongst the Hebrews, some may be found to-day amongst the Christians. It is no less true that the Hebrews were generally as monotheistic as the Christians are now."*

Chap. xxvii., 15—26.—Horne says, "Of all those tremendous imprecations which appear in our common English version, there is not one authorised by the original."† The Douay, Bellamy, Cahen, and, to our mind, the context directly contradict Horne's view.

Verse 21.—Dr. Inman points out that in Exodus xxii. 19, Leviticus xviii. 23, and xx. 15 and 16, we have three distinct repetitions of the law on this point, "a sufficient proof of the necessity for making it, inasmuch as no legislator denounces a crime which is to him unknown."‡

Chap. xxviii.—In reference to this chapter, Dr. Inman compares the worship of the Jewish Deity with that of Baal Berith. "Both through their priests, equally promise sensual gratification; and both through the same medium, would doubtless be able to attribute any misfortune which happened to a votary, to a breach of covenant, or breaking of the bargain."§ The bargain here being obedience and worship on the one side, paid for by special temporal advantages, or *vice versa*.

Verse 10.—"And all people of the earth shall see that

* Etudes sur la Bible, p. 125.

† Introduction, vol. i., page 575.

‡ Ancient Faiths, vol. i., p. 568. § Ibid, p. 323.

thou art called by the name of the Lord; and they shall be afraid of thee." While we are not quite sure as to the accuracy of the translation, it is really very curious that the word Jew is much nearer the sound of IEUE יהוה in this verse translated Lord, than it is to any other Hebrew word from which the sound Jew can be supposed to be derived. If the Jews had been called Jeue or Jewe, their name would have been very much what it is. Bellamy says, "The passage does not mean that they should be called by the name of the Lord, a thing most preposterously absurd," and he translates it "the name of Jehovah will be declared by thee." This is hardly maintainable as fact, even if better as translation, for the Jews never did declare the name Jehovah, but —regarding it as too awful (or too difficult) to pronounce— substituted for it the word Adonai. Instead of "called by the name of the Lord," the Douay has "the name of the Lord is invocated upon thee." Cahen corroborates this translation, despite its unwieldy reading.

Verse 15.—"To do all." These words are not in the Samaritan version. There are several verbal differences between the Hebrew and Samaritan in this chapter.

Verse 18.—The curse threatened on the "fruit of the body" for disobedience by the parent, is worthy notice as emanating from the Deity, who was at the same time the lawgiver, the Creator of the offender, the compeller of the offence, and the creator of the "fruit of the body," in order that it might be punished for an offence it had no share in.

Verse 36.—Cahen thinks that the reference to Gods of wood and stone, shows that this portion of the text was written at, or after, the Babylonian captivity.

Verse 49.—"As the eagle flieth," in lieu of יִדְאֶה IDAE from DAE, to fly; the Samaritan has יִרְאֶה IRAE from RAE, to see.

Verse 53.—"And thou shalt eat the fruit of thine own body, the flesh of thy sons and of thy daughters, which the Lord thy God hath given thee." Bellamy* says: "This is a thing so wicked, . . . that it is surprising how a supposition so truly disgusting could ever enter into the mind;" but even this is exceeded in the same chapter.

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* New Translation, p. 514.

Verse 57.—The horrible imagination in this verse, though slightly modified in our translation, may be seen more clearly by reference to the Douay. Our translators somewhat cloaked the terrible filthiness of the Hebrew text, which the Vulgate renders with disgusting accuracy.

One writer, with a strong reverence for the character of Jesus,* speaks of the curses contained in this chapter as "forming altogether a curse so dreadfully horrible, so cold-bloodedly minute and malignant, that one would think some demon must have conceived it, and not a man; and yet it is Moses who promulgates it in the name of God!"

This chapter is considered by Colenso to have been written "by one who had already the ruin of the ten tribes before him," and is probably one of the many passages which induced Jerome writing against Helvidius to say that it was to him a matter of indifference whether or not the Pentateuch was to be regarded as re-edited by Esdras, or as the authorship of Moses.†

The learned Jesuit Bonfrerius, dealing with similar phrases, said, "I prefer saying that another writer has added something to the books of Moses, than to be continually representing him as a prophet."

Chap. xxix. 4.—Cahen, quoting Gueddes, says that this verse cannot be taken literally, as the Israelites had bread and wine for their sacrifices.

Verse 19.—"And it come to pass, when he heareth the words of this curse, that he bless himself in his heart, saying, I shall have peace, though I walk in the imagination of mine heart, to add drunkenness to thirst." The Douay translates the last clause, "I shall have peace, and will walk on in the naughtiness of my heart, and the drunken may consume the thirsty." Cahen renders it, "There shall be peace for me if I walk according to the good pleasure of my heart, so that fulness (plenitude) may put an end to thirst," and in his note he says that the exact sense of the phrase is even yet at the mercy of the conjectures of commentators.

Verse 23.—"Admah and Zeboim, which the Lord overthrew in his anger and in his wrath." In Genesis xix. 24,

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* Three lectures by E. N. Dennys, p. 7.

† Simon: Histoire Critique du V. T., book 1, caps. iv. and v.

there is no mention of the destruction of any cities, save those of Sodom and Gomorrah.

Verse 29.—Cahen says that this verse is neither connected with those which precede it, nor with those which follow, and appears to have been inserted to give hope to the exiles. The manner of the verse is suddenly changed from the third person to the first.

Chap. xxx. 4.—"Unto the outmost parts of heaven." Cahen, in his note, says, "Même dispersés aux extremités de la terre. Ben Ouziel paraphrase sur Elie et le Messie." Dr. Henry More* says that "קצה השמים or *αχρον ου ουρανου* implies that the earth is bounded at certain places, as if there were truly a Hercules Pillar or *non plus ultra*. As it is manifest to them that understand the natural signification of קצה and *αχρον*—for these words plainly import the earth bounded by the blue heavens, and heavens bounded by the horizon of the earth, they touching one another mutually, which is true only in appearance, as any man that is not a mere idiot will admit."

Chap. xxxi. 15.—"The tabernacle." Dr. Inman argues† at great length against the possibility of the existence of the tabernacle in the wilderness, on the ground that if the other statements in the Pentateuch be true, the Jews could neither have had the raw material nor the tools to make such a tabernacle as is represented to have existed.

Dr. Inman asks, "Can any one read the thirty-second chapter of Deuteronomy without feeling that it has been written towards the close of the Jewish monarchy? And with that thought, will he not associate the language of the Pentateuch with that so constantly used by Jeremiah?"‡

De Wette thinks that the contents of this chapter are enough to cause it to be taken as the production of an age when the nation were already dispersed, and the ten tribes found themselves in exile.§

Verses 4, 15, 18, 30, and 31.—For the word "rock" in these verses, the Septuagint, the Vulgate, Douay, and Breeches Bible each have the word "God." The Hebrew

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* On the Cabbala, p. 57.

† Ancient Faiths, vol. ii., p. 794. ‡ Ibid, p. 115.

§ Israelite History, part i., p. 393, and Introduction to Old Testament. vol. ii., sec. 160

word is צור TsUR, or צורם TsURéM, which latter Parkhurst puts as a plural noun, and "a name of certain idols, representative of the heavens, under the attributes of compressors, givers of strength or firmness," conveying an impression that the Jewish religion was strongly permeated with Tsabaism. Dr. Inman identifies Tsur, the Rock, with "Phallus," and in verse 18 Cahen translates the Hebrew, "Ton roc générateur."

Chap. xxxii. 8.—"When the Most High divided to the nations their inheritance, when he separated the sons of Adam, he set the bounds of the people according to the number of the children of Israel." This verse is not very explicit; but if it means that God had apportioned the promised land to the Israelites, it then becomes a curious question as to how the Canaanites ever became possessed thereof. A marginal note to the Breeches Bible says that:—"When God, by his providence, divided the world, he lent for a time that portion to the Canaanites which should after be an inheritance for all his people Israel." If this be true, then, when God reclaimed his loan, he surpassed Shylock, and took a great quantity of blood as interest for his "pound of flesh." It does not appear anywhere that the Canaanites ever were informed of this strange tenure. Instead of holding the land as a loan, they looked upon it as their country, but suddenly found, if the Bible be correct, that God had "sent them a strong delusion, that they might believe a lie." (*Vide* 2 Thess. ii. 11.) Lord Monboddo,* who appears to have only had the Septuagint version to refer to, says, in a very curious argument in favour of the existence of genii and demons, that "this is one of the most blundering translations of the Bible;" and he makes the last clause of the verse read: "He set bounds to the nations according to the number of the angels of God." The Septuagint has "αγγελων Θεου," but the Hebrew agrees with our version.

Verse 12.—"There was no strange god with him." Bellamy translates this: "A strange God was with him," but this translation seems strained against the text. It is a consolation for persons ignorant of Hebrew when great scholars can give two precisely opposite versions.

* Ancient Metaphysics, vol. iv. book 2, chap. 7.

Verses 15 and 17.—These verses are remarkable as containing the singular of the plural word אלהים ALEIM, and have given rise to much controversy amongst the learned divines, because it is apparent to even the most prejudiced, that if the singular word אלוה or אלה (ALUE or ALE) signifies "God," the plural must mean more Gods than one. In verse 17 you have both the singular, ALE, translated "God," and the plural, ALEIM, translated "Gods." Cahen translates, "à des demons, à des non dieux, à des dieux qu'ils ne connaissent point." "Unto devils, not to God; to gods whom they knew not, to new gods that came newly up, whom your fathers feared not." The word translated "devils," or "demons," is שדים ShᵉDIM, which also occurs in Psalm cvi. 37. Bellamy, who in this follows Parkhurst,* says of Shedim: "As a noun masculine plural, it was the name given by the Hebrews to the idols worshipped by the inhabitants of Canaan. . . . The idol was the ancient *multimamia*, or *many-breasted idol* (as Isis), worshipped . . . by the heathens." This is deriving the word from שד ShᵉD, the breast or teat; but Dr. Inman, who examines this view at considerable length,† does not think it tenable. Instead of "to gods that came newly up," Bellamy reads, "at the approach of the new moons they came."

Verses 20 to 43.—It is useless to comment at length on the language attributed in these verses to the "infinite, immutable, and merciful Father of us all;" it is quite sufficient to repeat the terrible threat from a God of love, "to devour flesh with his sword, and to make his arrows drunk with blood;" and that "the sword without and the terror within shall destroy the young man, and the virgin, the suckling, and the old man with grey hairs."

Verse 22.—"For a fire is kindled in my anger." Cahen renders this, "Car la colere s'est enflammée dans mes narines." (For the rage burns in my nostrils.)

Verse 27.—"Were it not that I feared the wrath of the enemy," is strange language to be used by an omnipotent Deity.

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* Lexicon, p. 721.

† Ancient Faiths, vol. ii. pp. 716–19.

Verses 48 to 52.—It is impossible to ascertain what offence was committed by Moses. In Numbers xx., we find that the Lord threatened to punish Moses and Aaron on account of their unbelief; but it is evident some portion of the Book must be lost, as the particular instance of unbelief is not mentioned.

Chap. xxxiv. 1.—"Unto Dan." This is one of the many passages showing compilation after Moses (see Joshua xix. 47, and Judges xviii.), and that Dan was so called after the destruction of Laish or Leshem.* "As to Deuteronomy,' Michel Nicolas says, "there is no doubt that it is posterior to the four preceding Books of the Pentateuch. By the manner in which the tribe of Levi is honourably distinguished from the others (as in Deut. xxxiii. 8 to 11), by the importance given to the laws concerning royalty (Deut. xvii. 14 to 20), the prophets (Deut. xiii. 1 to 5) and the sacerdotal classes (Deut. xvii. 8 to 13; xix. 17; xxv. 5; xxxi. 9); as also to everything which is said of the religion of which the unity is incontestably established (Deut. xii. 2 to 7; xvi. 1 to 7), an author may be recognised who lived after the reign of Solomon. No date seems to accord better with the composition of this book than the period in which the religious reform of King Josiah was accomplished."† Some passages, however, relate to a more recent period (Deut. iv. 27; xxviii. 25, 36, 49, 64; xxix. 27; xxxii. 5 to 22.)

"Deuteronomy," says Ewald, as translated by Nicolas,‡ "is in the Old Testament that which the Gospel of John is in the New. In the one book as in the other, the history is only the frame in which the teaching is placed; and Deuteronomy is a new form, a prophetic renewal of the law, as the Gospel of St. John is a spiritual view of Christianity. The author of the work knew the Books of Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, and Joshua. This is proved by the parts he has borrowed from them. None can doubt that he had also before him documents, either historic or legislative, of which preceding writers had not made use when they find him appealing to ancient prescriptions which are

* See on this, Genesis book i., p. 91; Giles's Hebrew Records, p. 131; and Colenso, part i., p. 201.

† Nicolas: Etudes sur la Bible, p. 29. ‡ Etudes, p. 41.

not found in the other books of the Pentateuch." Ewald thinks the book of Deuteronomy to have been written by a Jewish refugee in Egypt during the latter part of the reign of Manasseh, and to have excited the religious reform of the time of Joshua. Nicolas, while not regarding the question as settled, inclines to the view maintained by Ewald. "One other fact,"* remarks Nicolas, "still induces us to place the formation of the actual Pentateuch after the return from the Babylonish captivity. It is that Deuteronomy, the composition of which cannot go beyond the reign of Josiah, or at most belongs to the reign of Hezekiah, would not, in the later times of the monarchy, have been associated without difficulty to Books comparatively much more ancient, and then universally accepted as a sacred Mosaic document. It required, so to say, that time should give its sanction to this book before it could be judged worthy to take its place with the writings of Moses and the prophets. But after the return from the Babylonish captivity, everything which belonged to the period anterior to this national misfortune became uniformly tinged with antiquity and sanctity. It is not necessary to endeavour to prove this, it is in the nature of things. It was then, but only then, that Deuteronomy could form the fifth Book of the Mosaic code. In fact, the hypothesis which I propose upon the date of the actual formation of the Pentateuch is confirmed by Jewish tradition. There was during these ages a general opinion amongst the descendants of Jacob that Esdras had been the restorer of the Pentateuch (Instaurator Pentateuchi, according to Jerome, who represents the general sentiment of the Rabbis.) This tradition certainly had more in view than the mere restoration of Mosaism by the celebrated Doctor of the Law. It related clearly to the books of Moses. This cannot be doubted when one considers the clearly marked form which the tradition takes in 4 Esdras xiv. 41 to 48, and which it had still kept up to the period of the Hegira amongst the Jews of Medina. If it reposed on any historic basis, and this it is difficult to doubt, it ought to show, not as is sometimes maintained, that Esdras himself composed the Pentateuch, but only that he put it in order, or, in other words,

* Etudes, p. 87.

that he gave to the anterior writings which were, or which passed for, the works of Moses, the form in which they have come down to us." Father Simon in "Histoire Critique du Vieux Testament," goes a little farther than Nicolas, and would attribute to Esdras the entire composition of the Pentateuch. Dr. Kalish* regards the book of Deuteronomy as penned about B.C. 620 : parts of Leviticus and Numbers he considers as clearly written after the Babylonian captivity.

Professor Wheatstone† says: "Similar are the words of Leontius (de Sectis, Act. 2) : 'Ezra, coming to Jerusalem, and finding that all the books had been burnt when the people were taken captive, is said to have written down from memory those two-and-twenty books of which we have given a list in the foregoing place.' Isidorus (de officiis) and Rabanus Maurus (de Inst. Cleric. c. 54) write to the same effect. They affirm, therefore, two things: one, that the whole sacred and canonical Scripture perished in the Babylonian captivity; the other, that it was restored to its integrity by Ezra, instructed and inspired in a wonderful manner by the direct agency of God. It is very possible that the books, which may have been previously in some disorder, were corrected by Ezra, restored to their proper places, and disposed according to some fixed plan, as Hilary in his prologue affirms particularly of the Psalms. Perhaps, too, Ezra either changed or reformed the shapes and figures of the letters. Jerome, indeed, in his epistle to Paulinus, maintains that 'Ezra invented new forms for the letters after the return from the captivity; for that previously the Jews had used the same characters as the Samaritans.' Hence, if we credit Jerome, Ezra introduced new forms of the letters, more elegant and easy than those which were before in use, copied out the law in these new characters, and left the old ones to the Samaritans. In conformity with this statement, Jerome further tells us, upon Ezekiel ix., that the last letter of the alphabet was formerly similar to the Greek *Tau*, and that it still, in his time, retained that figure in the Samaritan character ; while the last letter of the Hebrew alphabet has now quite another and different shape."

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* Leviticus, pp. 645 and 649.

† "Disputation on Scripture," p. 115. See "Bible: what it is," Genesis, p. 56.

The examination as to the alleged Elohistic and Jehovistic documents is more readably complete for an English reader in Part iii. of Bishop Colenso, than in any other work of which we are aware. The student who has greater time may turn to Nicolas's comments on Vainhinger, Bleek, Knobel, Ewald, Astruc, Eichorn, and Vater, on the document theory. De Wette, commenting on Deuteronomy,* says, "Moses cannot have been the author of chapters xxxi. to xxxiv., as it appears in special from xxxi., 24—26, xxxiii. 1, and xxxiv. The anachronisms in ii. 12, iii. 14, xix. 14, and xxxiv. 1, and the general manner in which the Mosaic history is treated, as in chapters i. to iii., carry us to a period after Moses. The references to Jerusalem and its temple, transfer us to the time when the Jehovistic documents of the other books were written. The references to the earlier books bring us to a time considerably later than that in which those books originated. The laws respecting the Kings, Prophets, and Levites, and that respecting the unity of worship, bring us to the period after Solomon, and to the times of Josiah, when the unity of worship was first carried out. In chapter xxxi. 26, is a command to place the law books in the ark; but as it was not there when the temple was consecrated (1 Kings, viii. 9), this must have been written long after that event."

It is impossible to conclude this Commentary on the Pentateuch without a parting word to the reader as to the English, Latin, Greek, and Hebrew versions of the Old Testament. To-day it is practically admitted by Convocation that the authorised English Protestant version, so long accepted as God's message to the world, is unreliable. It is hardly worth staying to consider the good done by the British and Foreign Bible Society, in widely circulating translations of this admittedly inaccurate version. The Rev. Dr. Whittaker, an erudite Church of England divine, in his arguments against the Papists, makes it doubtful how far the errors of the authorised English text are susceptible of correction. He says:† "Unless the Hebrew and Greek originals be most foully corrupt, it follows that the Latin

* "Introduction to Canonical Scriptures," vol. ii., sec. 160.
† Whittaker Against Bellarmine and Others, p. 163.

edition is most foully corrupt, inasmuch as it differs widely in all the books from those originals. Who does not see from this that either the originals are corrupted, or the Latin Vulgate edition is full of innumerable errors? For where the difference and opposition of the readings is so great as is actually found between the originals and the Latin edition, it cannot be said, or conceived, that everything is sound and uncorrupted. For, whoever will compare the Latin with the originals, shall find almost everywhere a remarkable discordance." If the Latin Vulgate be rejected, then naturally the English Douay version, translated from it, must fall with it. That is, both the Catholic and Protestant versions stand condemned. Where then shall our reader turn? If he goes to the Septuagint, which St. Augustin says was done by seventy-two translators in separate cells, whose translation was found to agree in every letter; supposing even he escapes the shock of hearing that "this doth St. Jerome utterly deny" and "derideth as a fable and a lie:"* yet again on the authority of the Master of St. Jonh's, Cambridge, he may be told that "The sounder opinion seems to be that of those who determine that the true Septuagint is wholly lost, and that the Greek text, as we have it, is a mixed and miserably corrupted document."† "Nay, the faults of the Greek translation are so manifest that it is impossible to find any way of excusing them." Josephus distinctly says, if his evidence may be taken as of any value, that the version made for the second Ptolemy was not a complete translation of the whole of the Hebrew writings, but "only the books of the law,"‡ whatever this may mean; while the Septuagint as we have it goes from Genesis to Malachi. If we feel disposed to reject the Septuagint, we are placed in the dilemma raised by the Rev. Dr. Irons, that Jesus used§ the Septuagint very frequently, and at times employed a version differing both from the Hebrew and the Septuagint. Are we to suppose that Jesus did not know Hebrew, or that he knew the Greek version to be the most reliable? Dr. Irons says further, that we are

* Dr. Fulke's Defence of the English Scriptures, p. 53.
† Whittaker's Disputation, p. 121.
‡ Antiquities, preface, sec. 3.
§ The Bible and its Interpreters, p. 20.

confronted by the striking fact that the Septuagint, or some Greek version, was more in use amongst the Jews 1800 years ago than the Hebrew, and that not only had this possibly been the case for some generations, but that it was thought by many that this Greek version fixed the meaning of some parts of the Hebrew text. And he asks, "What is this Greek version or Septuagint, as it is called? Who made it; from what originals was it made? And when? And why? And what is its present state?" And this dignitary of the Church of England answers so potently that we repeat his own words: "Strictly speaking, no one knows who made the Septuagint. No one knows from what copy of the originals any parts of that version were made. It appears to be a growth of at least two generations: and as it might be expected, the style is not the same throughout." But if on the authority of Church of England teachers we reject alike the King James version and the Douay, the Vulgate and the Septuagint, what remains? Will the orthodox refer our reader to the Hebrew? Then indeed confusion becomes worse confounded. There are but few scholars capable of testing Biblical Hebrew by their criticism. The Hebrew of the Bible is not now, nor has it been for centuries, a spoken language. It has literally no classic literature to guide us to its meanings in cases of doubt; and if we may put any faith in the Rev. Dr. Wall, another clergyman of the Established Church, the Hebrew text itself is corrupt throughout. Dr. Irons, admitting that the Masoretic points at present found in nearly all Hebrew B bles cannot be traced back "to a higher antiquity than the seventh century of our era," affirms that "previous to the sixth century then the Hebrew Bible (we must face the fact) was read traditionally. The Jews believed that, together with the written word divinely imparted to Moses, there were unwritten instructions, directing both the continuance and the interpretation of the sacred writings." Where shall the reader turn with the most important versions of "God's message to man" thus in turn condemned as untrustworthy?

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